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Key-Server Adaptation to Iot Systems

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Key-Server Adaptation to Iot Systems Key-Server Adaptation to IoT Systems Jacek Wytrębowicz Institute of Computer Science, Warsaw University of Technology, ul. Nowowiejska 15/19, Warszawa, Poland Keywords: Digital Certificate, Key-Server, IoT System. Abstract: This paper presents an opinion on future evolution of secure communication in IoT systems. Due to advances in cryptography, in processing power of integrated circuits, and in energy harvesting, the constraints of today’s IoT devices will weaken and asymmetric encryption could be widely applied. The number of IoT related certificates would grow; so appropriate certificate servers should appear to support them. The paper points a direction for further works on such infrastructure, indicating suitable technology to be applied. 1 INTRODUCTION Machines, and by increasing threats in computer networks. Today we have co-processors designed to The need of securing IoT systems is incontestable. perform computationally intensive cryptographic However, it is not easy to satisfy that necessity, operations – called cryptography accelerators. They especially when an IoT system is based on Wireless are parts of processors (e.g. Intel's AES-NI or Sensor Networks (WSN). The difficulties in Analog Devices’ ADuCM302x) or separate protecting the IoT systems arise due to limited integrated circuits (e.g. Microchip’s ATSHA204A, computational resources, which result from expected ATAES132A and ATECC508A). ADuCM302x is low price of the IoT devices and energy supply assigned for IoT devices; it supports AES 128/256 constraints. There are a lot of research and industrial and SHA256 cryptographic operations. solutions that try to tackle this problem. A holistic ATECC508A is also assigned for IoT devices, and it view on security requirements, and attacks with their supports ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman) key corresponding countermeasures in WSNs is agreement computations. Moreover, there are IP presented in the article (Wang et al. 2006). The cores for semiconductors for the security and applicability and limitations of existing Internet cryptography, e.g. from IP Cores, Inc. The progress security protocols in the context of IoT are discussed in integrated circuit design allowed construction of by (Nguyen et al. 2015). A survey of the main secure cryptoprocessors (named also embedded research challenges and the existing solutions in the secure elements) that are built in smartcards, ATMs, field of IoT security is given by (Sicari et al. 2015). SIM cards, TV set-top boxes, and military Those three above-mentioned surveys are just applications. A secure cryptoprocessor does not examples, however they give reach reference lists to output sensitive data and minimizes the need to related publications. Moreover, a comprehensive protect the rest of the device. description of today’s solutions and research Most of research work in IoT security is based directions for identity management for IoT can be on past experiences and existing standards, trying to found in the book (Mahalle and Railkar 2015). There overcome both past and today’s problems. However, is also an active document presenting State-of-the- regarding the advances in integrated circuit Art and Challenges for the IoT Security (Garcia- technologies and in energy harvesting for IoT, we Morchon and Sethi 2017), which is regularly could ask the following questions. Would the updated by IETF from 2011 (last seen update in constraints to processing power, memory size and September 2017). communication volume, be valid in the future? In recent 25 years the development of secure Would the future technical challenges be different? industrial solutions was incentivised by growing Would they rather arise from IoT application needs? market of smartcards and Automatic Teller One of such needs, we can anticipate, is certificate 155 Wytr˛ebowicz, J. Key-Server Adaptation to IoT Systems. DOI: 10.5220/0006670201550160 In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Sensor Networks (SENSORNETS 2018), pages 155-160 ISBN: 978-989-758-284-4 Copyright © 2018 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved SENSORNETS 2018 - 7th International Conference on Sensor Networks management problem, which would swell with the between components of an IoT system and in sure increase of IoT deployments. The need of identification of the components. The standardization of mechanisms for device communication enables transmission of collected bootstrapping and key management was already data and control commands, as well as configuration advocated by (Keoh et al. 2014), who give a good parameters, test sequences and software updates. review of IETF efforts to standardize security A human user can wish to check the identity of solutions for the IoT ecosystem. the network services he is connected to. The owner Digital certificates are efficient for authentication of the IoT system is the trusted party for him. In of communicating parties, for integrity checking of many cases the owner is the company employing the received data, and for exchange of temporal user. Hence identity certificates of the services ciphering keys if confidentiality is needed. The should be signed by the company or at least by the rising number of IoT devices together with their company maintaining the IoT system. The short life-cycle make any central or even maintenance company is a trusted party for the hierarchical certificate management inefficient. owner; they are bound together with some contracts Today’s solutions either do not provide any with defined responsibilities. If the maintenance certificate management functionality or provide a company is not the integrator of the system, then it local or private solution that is not certain for every has to trust the integrator and have an appropriate Internet user. Hence a certificate management legal agreement with it. Then the identity certificates infrastructure available in the global Internet is to of the services should be also signed by the provide. Let us imagine the requirements for such integrator. It is worth pointing out that the infrastructure; further we call it Certificate maintaining company of a given IoT system as well Management Infrastructure for IoT (CM4IT). as the integrator company can change over time. In that case new signatures should be added to identity certificates according to the new responsibilities. 2 WHO USES DIGITAL The integrator should verify identity of the components (hardware and software) used to build CERTIFICATES IN IoT? the system. By hardware components we mean IoT devices and gateways. The verification can be done There is no single architecture for an IoT system to apart from the system before assembling it or within be deployed. However, there are always IoT devices, the system during its operation, or both. Checking and very often gateways separating them from the the components’ identity in run time strengthens outside network. Depending on application of the security of the system – it facilitates software system, different parties can be engaged in its component upgrades, and it protects against development, maintenance and usage, and of course unsolicited substitutions of hardware components. different security requirements. Anyway we can Hence all critical components should have identity distinguish the parties, and the trust dependencies certificates. The identity of a software component between them. Let’s assume that the general IoT can be just its cryptographic hash signed by the system consists of: numerous devices issuer’s private key. The best identity of a hardware (microcontrollers embedded in “things”), gateways component is its public key signed by the separating devices from the Internet or Intranet, manufacturer, and the corresponding private key servers laying in direct proximity to a gateway or should be protected in a cryptoprocessor built-in the somewhere in the network cloud. There are end- hardware. users accessing (locally or remotely) services of the According to the above-mentioned scenario, an servers and an administrator of the given IoT identity certificate of hardware or software system. We can distinguish the following engaged component should be signed by its producer, by the parties: owner of the system, a maintenance system integrator and if needed by a maintenance company (usually integrator of the system), software company. The identity of critical IoT services development companies, and hardware available in the network should be signed at least by manufacturers. the integrator and if possible by owner of the The access management for human users is system. behind our consideration – there are many well- We can also notice that there is digital equipment known solutions for it. For sure, digital certificates that has to be approved by a certification body, e.g. of public keys belonging to humans can be applied. some medical devices. An IoT system can fall into Here we are interested in securing communication such category. Therefore, the certification body is a 156 Key-Server Adaptation to IoT Systems party involved in the system exploitation and could Its main disadvantages are: growing size of the digitally sign its elements to endorse their legality. register and energy consumption of related servers if The certificates should be stored in a distributed a proof-of-work schema is used to guarantee manner for resiliency reason, and should be correctness of registered records. accessible for the IoT system in order to enable run- All these approaches have their
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