Historic Shelter Projects 2008 D Section D Historical Case Studies From the Cuny Archive
D.4 D.2 Bangladesh D.3 India Conflict 1975 Nicaragua Conflict 1971 Earthquake 1973 D.7 D.9 D.5 D.6 Thailand Guatemala Sudan Conflcit 1979 Conflict 1985 India, Earthquake 1976 Andrah Pradesh Cyclone 1977 D.8 Tonga Cyclone 1982
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D.1 Historical case studies - overview Case studies from the Cuny Center Summary The main focus of this book has been on shelter responses after the year 2000. However, the loss of housing from natural disasters and conflict and the subsequent need for shelter is not a new phenomenon. This chapter includes case studies from the 1970s and 1980s taken from the Cuny Center in Washington DC, USA. These case studies document responses during which the first guidelines used by humanitarian actors today were developed. Although some of these case studies are from responses that took place over forty years ago, many of the issues and projects are similar and relevant to those being implemented today.
Need for guidance efforts must be community-focused quakes in Nicaragua (1972), Guatemala There are occasional records of and take into account the community’s (1976) and multiple disasters in Bangla- shelter responses going back to the own potential for self-help. Secondly, desh (1973-1975) to argue for shelter 18th century, but concerted efforts to that above all else, shelter and settle- responses that helped affected com- research and develop a best practise in ment programmes must provide the munities build back better from day the field only started in the early 1970s. beneficiaries with sufficient levels of one, using local labour and materials, Indeed, the earliest modern guidelines hygiene and remove public health risks and supported by locally adapted haz- for shelter response for any humani- to the greatest degree possible, as ard-mitigation construction training. tarian organisation, dating from 1959, this was the largest danger to human If beneficiaries were to be relocated merely suggested finding a military spe- life after the occurrence of a disaster in camps, then the camps would have cialist and following his advice when or forced displacement. The develop- to be community focused, with the it came to the spacing and grouping ment of minimum standards for shelter shelters clustered into small neigh- of tents in planned emergency settle- over the subsequent thirty years, bourhood groups, and with space for ments. often expressed in numeric indicators, livelihoods and public activities. Post-colonial civil wars, notably derived from this need to equitably Meanwhile, the development of in Nigeria and Bangladesh (then East protect the health and hygiene of those new materials, such as plastic sheeting, Pakistan), and a number of large-scale living in emergency and transitional and the increasing professionalisa- earthquakes in the late 1960s and early shelter and settlements, with limited tion of logistics and communications 1970s, led to exponentially greater resources to support them. systems in humanitarian response numbers of forcibly displaced popula- allowed agencies the potential for a tions and a correspondingly increased First camp guidance more rapid, wider and larger response. role for humanitarian organisations in The first sets of guidelines, drawn the field. Without adequate guidance, up by Fred Cuny in 1971, were for Lead agencies it became quickly apparent that badly shelters within the context of planned By the end of the 1970s and the designed shelter and settlement pro- camps, but were based on the under- various crises in south-east Asia, the grammes could cause more harm than standing that the development of a rapidly increasing number of agencies good. camp was a process taking place over entering the field for the first time or an indeterminate length of time. The with little previous experience forced By 1973, NGOs like Oxfam and guidelines divided the type of shelter advocates of best practice to change CARE, researchers like Ian Davis, response into phases, depending upon their emphasis, in order to ensure and consultants like Fred Cuny were whether the camp was subject to an that the ensuing chaos was not as big engaged in developing comprehensive initial emergency influx of population, a disaster as the original emergency. guidelines for humanitarian response whether the camp was being maintained From that point on there would be and continued practical research into and services consolidated, or whether the inception of ‘lead agencies’ from issues related to shelter. Many of the the camp was being upgraded and the UN that were clearly mandated concepts that are now accepted as expanded for longer-term occupancy. with overall coordination and technical standard practice today derive from guidance. This would be facilitated by a the research conducted in the 1970s In the face of well-meaning but decisive change of guidelines emphasis, by Cuny, Davis and their collaborators. misguided attempts to create a perfect universal prefabricated shelter and towards universal, often numeric, Overarching principles shelter design competitions conducted minimum standards against which all The two sets of overarching prin- thousands of miles from any disaster, agencies’ performance could be held ciples in the development of these it was important for Fred Cuny and accountable, but which at the same guidelines were, firstly, that commu- Ian Davis, with the support of various time ran the risk of failing to take into nities must be supported in regaining NGOs and then the UN, to use their account needs for local adaptation. sustainable livelihoods, and that all own experiences in responses to earth-
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1980s Throughout the 1980s, the numbers adequate response. Knowledge of best ments and extreme weather conditions of refugees caught in protracted situa- practice among all actors was a prereq- attributable to global warming. tions increased, while the willingness of uisite before the start of a programme, Experiences such as those in Aceh, host governments to provide options rather than something that could be Indonesia following the 2005 tsunami for permanent resettlement dimin- just learned in the field. This would have raised important questions about ished. The UN first expounded a policy become the Sphere Project (www. the unintended effects of shelter response of voluntary repatriation as sphereproject.org). responses in accelerating urban the single preferred durable solution, Transitional shelter and migration and extending the sprawl of and decried camps as the option of settlement the cities further into hazardous or en- last resort. Under such circumstances, At the same time as the Sphere vironmentally fragile locations. the focus of those working on best drafting process, other initiatives gave practice in the shelter sector started the shelter sector its first set of inde- to pay more attention to the political pendent, sector-specific vocabulary aims to which settlements could be since the 1970s. The shelter process twisted. This was often based on their for the affected communities and for own experiences of witnessing un- humanitarian organisations is now sustainable camps being used as ‘pull seen as having transitional phases, with factors’ or to house hostage popula- an insistence that the first emergency tions, in places like Sudan or the Horn response must somehow demon- of Africa. strate support for the eventual durable 1990s and Sphere solution. The crisis in Rwanda in 1994 Urban challenges gave the impetus to many organisa- The last four years have seen tions to capitalise on the movement moves to widen the accountability and started in the early 1990s with the Red predictability in all sectors of humani- Cross Code of Conduct. This aimed tarian response through the develop- to not only systemise the qualitative ment of the Cluster System. But those and quantitative aspects of minimum years have also seen greater challenges standards across all sectors including brought closer to the spotlight. shelter, but to also ensure the widest possible awareness of those standards, In the last two years, the number of and the maximum possible adherence people living in urban populations has and buy-in among humanitarian or- reached 50% of the world’s population ganisations. This was done in the re- for the first time, and many of those are alisation that in complex emergencies living in hazard-prone areas on marginal the UN lead agency system could lands. This is especially relevant with not always be relied upon to ensure the potential threat to coastal settle-
Fred Cuny Fred Cuny trained as an urban planner in Cuny conceived humanitarian response as centred the mid-1960s, and worked professionally with upon the affected communities, and serving to disadvantaged communities in southern Texas, support them in a return to sustainable livelihoods. before his experience as a pilot of small planes He advocated for camp designs that clustered gained him a position working with relief agencies shelters into small communities, shelters made during the Biafran War in 1970. Between 1971 of traditional materials that were built by the and 1995, Cuny and Intertect, the consultancy refugees, and the training needed to ensure that that he set up, worked with NGOs, the UN, and those shelters and houses would be built back safer major donors in a number of high-profile disasters. and hazard resistant. Cuny also advocated a holistic Through all of these, Cuny sought to develop approach to humanitarian response and worked to guidelines for best practice and to advance the combine shelter responses with those for water/ state of the art in humanitarian response. Cuny and sanitation, food security, livelihoods and public Intertect were responsible for the writing the first- health. By the early 1990s, he was increasingly ever set of camp planning guidelines, contributed involved in advocating for policy and intervention to Shelter After Disaster, and wrote much of the first strategies in conflict and disaster. He was killed in draft of the Handbook for Emergencies. They were also Chechnya in 1995. early advocates for the promotion of minimum standards in humanitarian response, through guidelines and manuals.
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D.2 India - 1971 - Conflict - Refugees Case study: First camp planning guidelines Project type: Distribution of building materials with training support Disaster: Civil war in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) No. of people displaced: 10 million people
Project target population: china Seven camps, each with 15,000 to 20,000 people,
with one camp designed to be extended India Bangladesh for up to 300,000 people Occupancy rate on handover: 100% West Bengal Shelter size Various
Summary Refugee camps were designed in decentralised ‘village’ groupings. Construction and upgrading was undertaken in three phases: meeting basic needs, sustainable upgrading and maintenance of the camps. Emphasis was given first to sanitation and public health issues, and then to the emotional and social well-being of the inhabitants. From the lessons learned in this response, the first-ever humani- tarian camp planning guidelines were developed.
Project timeline
Conflict 3 months 7 months 9 months I I I
26 March Independence 1971Bangladesh starts War of projectCamp starts .planning Project closed 16 DecemberWar ends 1971
Strengths and weaknesses 99 Camp construction is a process. Life-and-death issues of ‘phases’ allowed the camps to be planned for an should be addressed first, but other issues should not be indeterminate and potentially long-term existence. ignored in later phases of construction or upgrading. -- The majority of sanitation and public health issues were 99 Standardisation of shelter types in later phases of camp caused by the poor choice of land for the camp in the development facilitated the development of the land grids beginning. and road systems. 88 Poorly supervised construction contractors created an 99 The decentralised ‘villages’ design allowed for the exploitative (and illegal) black market for refugee labour. provision of services with less effort by staff, as well as 88 In open camps near large cities, it was sometimes adaptation to land contours, organisation of refugee impossible to stop local non-refugees from posing as adminstrative groups, protection of minorities and use of refugees in order to receive shelter and food that was more areas between villages for agricultural activities. than they could have expected to receive as members of 99 Describing the construction of camps over a timeline the homeless population back in Calcutta.
Case study credits: Cuny Center 86 86
D2 India West Bengal.indd 86 11/03/09 17:15 Historic Shelter Projects 2008 D.2 Before the war Smaller refugee flows into West guidelines of basic camp planning prin- upgrading of shelters and the need for Bengal from what was then called ciples was written later that year. more space and sanitation facilities. East Pakistan had been continuous • Phase II: These were camps with Because of the continuous influx since the initial partition period of more stable populations. They had of refugees over a number of months 1948-49. Many of the refugees were more rational designs. Shelter materials and the sheer size of the displacement, of the Hindu minority in East Pakistan. were distributed, basic drainage and many of the camps quickly became However, from 1949 to 1970, resent- sanitation were constructed, and overcrowded. Matters were made ments over discrimination by the West roadways and public facilities were worse by cholera outbreaks and the Pakistan government continued to rise. improved. Attention was also given major flooding of many of the camps They came to a head in the aftermath to providing opportunities for both during the rainy season in September. of the Bhola Cyclone of 12 November livelihoods and social activities. Repatriation of the majority of the 1970, where the West Pakistan gov- • Phase III: With well laid-out roads refugees started after the end of the ernment was accused of mismanag- and better drainage, focus moved to war. ing the relief effort and neglecting higher-standard public facilities and the affected populations, despite the Selection of beneficiaries the considerations of creating more fact that an estimated 500,000 people (and assessment) permanent settlements, if required. were killed. This resulted in an East In the larger camps, the ‘villages’ With a more stable camp population, Pakistan political party (the Awami layout was used to advocate the sepa- different village areas could be used for League) gaining a landslide majority in ration of Hindu and Muslim groups cooperative experiments on different December 1970. within the same camp. There were types of shelter or shelter groupings, concerns about ensuring equal support Demonstrations for independence to best adapt to the residents’ needs. for both groups. were met with a severe crackdown by In all phases, the design aimed to West Pakistan military forces, leading The inhabitants of some of the have the shelters grouped into small to the declaration of independence on smaller and more basic Phase I and decentralised villages in order to 26 March 1971 and the resulting war. Phase II camps were selected to be support the refugees’ self-adminis- The war only ended once India, fearing moved to the larger Phase III camps tration, as well as to aid drainage and further destabilisation from mass when the first camps were closed construction over uneven land. The influxes of refugees, intervened on the down. decentralisation of services also meant that the refugees had greater access to side of East Pakistan between 3 and 16 Land rights / ownership December 1971. those services, resulting in less unrest Later reports stated that the Indian and greater health benefits. After war breaks out government had been at pains to insist An estimated 10 million families, at upon the non-permanent nature of the This was also the first time that the a peak rate of tens of thousands per camps, and had restricted the use of clustering of shelter layouts in this way day, fled into West Bengal in India. ‘permanent’ construction materials in had been advocated. Many arrived in self-settled camps in the camps. After the end of the war, Implementation the vicinity of Calcutta. The Govern- and the establishment of independence The camp construction and admin- ment of India and the Corporation of by Bangladesh, the great majority of istration was undertaken by the Indian the City of Calcutta assigned land for the refugees were repatriated volun- authorities and much of the work was camps, and the Indian Army provided tarily. However, more than 1 million done by Indian Army engineers. basic supplies and administration. refugees (mainly Hindus) chose to remain in India. A few of the old camps A process was eventually initiated A number of the camps were spon- have since been incorporated into the to close down smaller Phase I and taneously self-settled. Both catego- expanding local cities, although the in- Phase II camps in flooded areas. ries of camps were often on marginal habitants’ housing rights are unclear. lands and in low-lying areas prone to In the Phase III camps, workshops flooding. Technical solutions were set up to make bamboo matting for use in shelter construction – The construction, upgrading and The NGO had been involved in enough for 8,000 shelters in less than maintenance of the camps were divided public health and water and sanitation one month in one camp. Some of the into three phases, with the following projects in the camps, and had asked works were done by paid contractors, emphases: a consultant team to develop a more but much of the local construction and comprehensive strategy for camp • Phase I: These were described as upgrading was done by labour teams planning and camp development. The being the first emergency camps built organised around the villages. consultancy worked directly on the at the start of the influx, with little implementation of various projects in prior thought given to siting or facilities. Materials the camps, ranging from the setting up Sanitation was often poor, shelters The first shelters were made of materials workshops to drainage ex- were very basic and facilities were from thatch, bamboo and recovered cavation. They also implemented camp inadequate. The most pressing issues materials. Later phases of shelters layout strategies from which a set of were the construction of drainage, the included polythene sheeting and some corrugated tin roofing sheets, as well as
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the bamboo matting. These were used Phase III camp benefited from its army engineers. Imported materials for roofing, partitions and flooring in proximity to Calcutta in terms of were later augmented by the bamboo the shelters and latrines, and for the the procurement of its construction matting made in the camp workshops. lining of drainage canals. materials. The ability of that camp to develop rapidly was attributed to the Logistics authorities’ willingness to commit The construction of the larger full-time professional technicians and 88 88
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D.3 Nicaragua - 1973 - Earthquake Case study: Small camp Project type: Shelters in community-grouped camp Disaster: Earthquake in the capital city of Managua No. houses damaged: 50,000 destroyed; 24,000 damaged Project target population: 180 families initially, then 360 families in tents Later, 310 families in polyurethane igloos Occupancy rate on handover: 60% of tents; 45% of replacement igloos Managua Shelter size Tent: 12m2 (approximate size) Nicaragua Igloo: 20m2 (approximate size)
Summary Working with displaced families, the NGO created a camp layout in Masaya, which, for the first time, grouped families into group clusters and supported community networks. This resulted in a camp with a much higher occupancy rate than any other camp built in response to the disaster, and at much lower costs.
Project timeline
Disaster 1 month 3 months 4 months I I I
23 DecemberEarthquake 1972 Project. start igloostents byReplacement polyurethane of Project conclusion
Strengths and weaknesses
99 Group clustering of tents allowed displaced families to 88 Full occupancy was never achieved, because of family give mutual social support. preference for host-family situations where possible. 99 Adequate space was provided in the camp for public 88 Prefabricated polyurethane shelters were delivered too amenities, which were easily accessible by all. late and were inappropriate in design in terms of beneficiary -- Lighting, water and sanitation were provided, through acceptance, cost per unit, potential for expansion or cooperation with the national government. maintenance and fire hazard. -- The camp was easily accessible for logistics, but not for 88 There was no potential for the support of early occupant livelihood opportunities. reconstruction on families’ customary land.
Case study credits: Cuny Center 89
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Before the earthquake Selection of beneficiaries washing facilities. The latrines were Large-scale urban migration during (and assessment) placed outside of all of the shelter the 1960s had increased the popu- The beneficiary group appear to clusters along the side of the camp. have been self-selected, having moved lation of Managua from 170,000 to The design also took into account to Masaya in the first few days after the 430,000 in the decade before the the possibility that the camp would earthquake. earthquake. This left a deficit of 80,000 exist into the longer term or would be houses, with many additional people in Land rights / ownership upgraded into a permanent settlement. substandard housing. More than 25% The site was designated as a camp Space was provided for the installation of the national population were living by the government, who also provided of standard drainage and semi-perma- in the capital city area. support with sanitation and other nent water and sewage facilities. During the last months of 1972 services. The government decided to Implementation rebuild Managua on its original site and Nicaragua had been experiencing a The tents were erected by the plan, in theory permitting families to drought. As a result, some aid organi- occupants of the camp, the US Army, return to their customary locations sations were already present in the and the Nicaraguan Boy Scouts, who within the city. By the summer of country at the time of the disaster. also worked together to install basic 1974, the Nicaraguan Boy Scouts, drainage. Before the earthquake, the site for who owned the site, were planning to the camp had been the grounds for the bulldoze the remaining shelters and The extra space needed for the Nicaraguan Boy Scouts, who retained evict the last few families. construction and deployment of the formal ownership of the site during igloos also caused some displacement its use for displaced families. The land Technical solutions of shelters from the original cluster Tents were provided by the was already cleared for use and there design. were some facilities in place, such as a US Army within four weeks of the number of permanent latrines, before disaster. However, these were seen One NGO provided camp manage- the first arrivals of earthquake-affected as inadequate to last through the rainy ment support in the form of a reception families. season. committee to assess the medical and social needs of or new arrivals. In- After four months, polyurethane After the earthquake formation was distributed via notice igloos (previously used in Peru in 1970) With more than 250,000 people boards and a camp newspaper. homeless, the national government were constructed for the beneficiaries made the decision to move many of by international staff using specialised There was no initial plan for the the homeless to tent camps near the machines. delivery or upgrading of some facili- ties, so the NGOs had to negotiate city or in the outskirts. However, Although the internal shelter space with the government (not always with 130,000 affected people chose instead of the igloos was larger than that of success)to extend water lines into to stay with extended family members. the tents, the igloos had much lower each cluster, build shower units and occupancy rates. This was in part due All other camps were laid out along construct a septic tank. However, the to the lateness of the delivery, but also strict military lines. However, one question of waste incinerators was left because the design was not one that camp, the one at Coyotepe, Masaya, unresolved. was designed by the NGO consult- related to standard housing shapes ant Fred Cuny to be laid out in square for the beneficiaries. The igloos were Logistics and materials ‘clusters’ of 16 shelters each, with not easily extendable or maintain- Delivery of both the tents and the the explicit intention of providing the able, although there were reports of igloos came at a relatively late stage. physical structures for community self- parts of the igloos being broken off to Permanent toilets previously con- support. This was the first time that make materials for other shelters. The structed on the site were used, but such a layout concept had ever been igloos were also criticised for being other permanent buildings were not. In implemented and it has provided the flammable. terms of the support and maintenance of the camp, the site was located along basic template for all other cluster- Camp layout based designs since. The design also a main road 3km away from the town took into account firebreaks, security The camp was laid out using square of Masaya and 20km from the nearest lighting and adequate public spaces for clusters of 16 shelters, with a central airfield. The camp remained reliant recreation and community activities. space for administrative buildings and on the delivery of food and water and Meanwhile, many of the other camps social/recreation areas. The clusters removal of waste solids by truck. experienced much lower occupancy were placed so that the camp could Materials Quantity rates and early abandonment of be expanded after the initial construc- shelters. tion phase. This would allow the camp Phase I – Sears Co. 360 to have the capacity for up to 3,500 high-wall chalet tents By the end of 1973, the vast people (700 shelters). The layout Phase II – Bayer Co. 310 majority of camp residents had left the was designed to accommodate either polyurethane igloos camp, mostly to return to Managua. community or individual cooking and Latrines, water facilities, No data lighting, also supplied
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D.4 Bangladesh- 1975 - Conflict - People displaced Case study: Shelter upgrades Project type: Cyclone-resistant shelters in camps for the displaced Disaster: Bangladesh War of Independence, 1971 No. of people displaced: Hundreds of thousands Project target population: China Three camps Occupancy rate on handover: India 100% Shelter size Bangladesh Various
Summary Long-term camps for displaced stateless populations were upgraded using cyclone-resistant shelter designs made from local materials in order to reorganise and upgrade small camps along community cluster designs.
Project timeline
1948 Disaster Dec 1971 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years I I I I I I
BangladeshBiharis displaced to War ofEnd Independence of Bangladesh BiharisDisplacement into campsconstruction of Design processof shelter and shelterField prototypes testing camp of stakeholdersConsultationsConstruction with evaluationProgramme
Strengths and weaknesses
99 Shelters made from local materials were successfully 99 Implementation was quick, due to use of locally available designed to withstand strong winds. materials. 99 Small clusters of shelters allowed for privacy and for 88 The A-frame design was structurally sound but reduced community support. indoor space and made extension of shelter difficult. 99 Reorganisation of the camp layout gave more personal 88 Lack of involvement of the target population in the outdoor space to each family and allowed for better design process resulted in lower levels of beneficiary drainage. satisfaction post-occupancy.
Case study credits: Cuny Center 91
D4 Bangladesh.indd 91 11/03/09 17:12 D.4 Bangladesh- 1975 - Conflict - People displaced - Shelter upgrades Historic Before the upgrading of the camps Hundreds of thousands of Urdu- speaking Biharis migrated from eastern India to what was then East Pakistan during the partition period of 1948. During the Bangladesh War of Inde- pendence in 1971, the Biharis sided with the Government of Pakistan. After the surrender and evacuation of Pakistani armed forces, the Biharis
were left behind, declared to be enemy Cuny Center citizens by the new Bangladesh govern- ment, denied the right to resettle in Pakistan by the Pakistan government, and were rendered stateless. During the 1972-1974 period, the Biharis were displaced into camps, often under force from the Bangladeshi authorities. A number of those camps were scattered on marginal lands on the periphery of Dacca. In 1972, some NGOs had given shelters or shelter materials to the camps, but the camp layouts were often poorly organised, and the shelters themselves had not been upgraded since that point. In 1974-75, local police forced some of the Biharis into new camp sites. This
had the initial effect of making NGOs Cuny Center reluctant to support the camps, in case they were seen as supporting the gov- ernment policies. This attitude only changed after April 1975, after storms Site plans before and after upgrade had caused major damage to some camps. After the upgrading of the Selection of beneficiaries (and assessment) The Intertect consultancy had been camps There continued to be very minor People were largely self-selected working with US university research- technical issues with the structures by arriving at the camp. All families in ers on the development of emergency themselves. These issues, such as the the camp were eligible for the new shelter designs and implementation angle and placement of the windows, shelters. Assessments of beneficiary processes since late 1973. In 1975, were easily fixable by the occupants. satisfaction (and the reasons for any they were given donor assistance to However, it was noted that the families dissatisfaction) were included in the deploy shelter prototypes in the field. did little if anything to improve or project’s final report of October 1975. After that, Intertect persuaded NGOs adapt their shelters. Members of the consultancy team working in three different camps to made further assessments in 1977. use their designs for shelters, camp Later assessments showed that layout and construction processes. although the beneficiaries were Land rights / ownership generally satisfied with their new The Bihari camp residents continue The aims of the research project shelters, the A-frame design made to be stateless (recent rulings give the had been to design shelters that: it difficult to make extensions or option of Bangladeshi citizenship only • would be sustainable and resistant additions. There were also complaints to later-born generations) and do not to hazard; that although the A-frame was highly own the land. • could be constructed by the resistant to high winds, it also reduced Technical solutions beneficiaries; the head height. • would instruct the beneficiaries Multi-family shelters were designed In general, the lack of beneficiary in hazard-resistant design through the using bamboo poles, palm thatch, participation in the design process was construction process; and matting and jute rope. The design was seen in the reduced sense of ownership • could be made in large numbers, that of an A-frame with cross-bracing, or responsibility after occupancy. and could be made out of low-cost, which had performed best in strong- local materials. wind tests back in the US. 92 92
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The shelters built in the camps also had raised floors to protect the families from flooding. A small number of alter- native models were made with varying lengths and for varying numbers of families. The consultant recognised that most post-natural disaster situa- tions generally required single-family shelters that could be built on each family’s plot. But it was felt that in the planned camps for the Biharis, with very limited amounts of space, the
multiple-family shelters were appropri- Cuny Center ate. The same basic design principles could be used for single-family shelters if required. The layout of the camps was based upon small U-shaped clusters of shelters. These were later simplified to square clusters in some camps. Space within the U was intended for the use of women, particularly those observing purdah. The areas outside the U shape, along the access routes through the camp, were intended for use by the men. In this way, the public men’s area was also intended to be made available for workshops or other livelihoods ac- tivities, and also gave each community more control over the public space nearest their shelter cluster. Washing and cooking areas were contained Cuny Center within each cluster.
Shelter design details Implementation Two prototypes of the shelter were previously designed in the US were built in the field under the supervision too cumbersome and too detailed. of the university/consultant team and The work teams preferred to were occupied by refugee families. be trained verbally, but this slowed Based on observations of environmen- down the rate of construction. This tal issues, minor changes in structure meant that large-scale production of were made. After further consulta- the shelters would be impossible or tions with camp stakeholders (local would have to rely on large numbers of government officials, NGOs, camp trainers and supervisors. Eventually, flip residents), the upgrading was started in charts with simplified graphics were phases, with sections of the camp being also developed for use in the project. upgraded in rotation. Logistics and materials It was estimated that it would take The basic materials were provided a multi-person team two days to build to the refugees by the humanitar- one shelter, with different small teams ian organisations. All materials were assembled to take charge of different si- available locally. multaneous tasks. However, problems were encountered in instructing the U-shaped community block plans work teams in both the design and the construction techniques. The manuals
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D4 Bangladesh.indd 93 11/03/09 17:13 D.5 Guatemala- 1976 - Earthquake - Materials distribution and training Historic
D.5 Guatemala- 1976 - Earthquake Case study: Materials distribution and training Project type: Distribution of building materials Training support Disaster: Earthquake in Guatemala No. of houses damaged: 222,261 Project target population: 15,000 families, in four rural districts Occupancy rate on handover: Very low for initial tents Guatemala Very high for shelters constructed from distributed materials Shelter size Various
Summary Housing materials were distributed, and training and advice were provided through locally hired teams. The aim of this was to accelerate reconstruction and provide community-wide training on seismic-resistant construction techniques. I
Project timeline
February1976 13 months I
Project start conclusionProject Earthquake
Strengths and weaknesses
99 Permanent reconstruction was able to start on an 88 Although the distribution of educational booklets was immediate basis. Even when the roofing sheets were widespread and popular with other organisations, they initially used to build a small shelter, they were then reused did not always support this by interactive training. This to build the permanent house. reduced the booklets' impact on those using them at a 99 Self-build methodologies allowed for support to a distance. greater number of beneficiaries and gave them training on 88 Lack of coordination between agencies and differing how to 'build back safer'. methodologies (free distribution of materials vs. subsidised -- Small group cooperative reconstruction projects resale) reduced programme impact in terms of training and worked better in rural areas than in urban areas. self-reliance for beneficiaries. -- Once organisational budgets were reduced towards 88 Lack of clarity on the principles behind the seismic the end of the programme, it became obvious that it was resistance guidelines led to some questioning of the need cheaper to build using skilled, higher-paid workers, than or usefulness of improvements. apprentices on low wages.
Case study credits: Cuny Center 94 94
D5 Guatamala.indd 94 11/03/09 17:15 Historic Shelter Projects 2008 D.5 Before the earthquake During the preceding decade, Guatemala City and other urban areas had seen rapid increases in population, with many of the new arrivals living in hazardous areas on steep slopes at the edges of the city. Even in the rural areas, many had built their houses out of adobe, often with heavier tile roofs, without the inclusion of seismic-resist- ant features. Prior to the earthquake, a number of smaller INGOs, as well as local community-based organisations, had been active in development pro- grammes (but not necessarily shelter- related) in the affected areas. While the official language of the country is Spanish, many of those in the rural affected areas had limited command of this language and preferred to commu- nicate in local Mayan dialects. After the earthquake The earthquake struck the Central Highlands of Guatemala, killing 23,000 people and leaving more than a million homeless. Some 58,000 houses were destroyed in Guatemala City and 163,000 in the rural areas. Initial official relief efforts were further hampered by the number of roads and rivers blocked by landslides. The emergency response from the US and other governments was swift, with 5,000 tents transported to Guatemala Cuny Center City within seven hours of the earth- Sketch showing earthquake-resistant techniques bracing quake. As equally rapid as the external The international NGO in question Land rights / ownership response was the rate at which affected partnered with a regionally-based Many of the affected population families started building impromptu NGO that already had ongoing pro- were squatters in peri-urban areas shelters themselves. Around 50,000 grammes in Guatemala (it was im- who often built back on traditional shelters were built within the first 24 plementing the earthquake shelter sites with no guarantee of tenure. hours of the disaster. Although this programme), in order to accelerate At least one researcher involved in meant that much of the affected popu- programming and ensure incorpora- the programme counselled against lation were quickly under shelter, it led tion of local knowledge. wholesale rationalisation of the street to a rapid increase in the price of cor- Selection of beneficiaries systems in those areas, because it rugated galvanised iron roofing sheets. would mean depriving many families of Four affected rural areas were There were additional concerns that their customary plots. Land holdings in assigned to the NGOs by the national this would cause scarcity for the re- rural areas may also have been tradi- government. A partial registration of construction effort and cause the tional for the most part, but this issue beneficiaries was helped by an imple- materials to be too expensive for many was not as acute in those areas. of the affected people. menting partner and the fact that local cooperatives were already present in Technical solutions Because of the high-profile nature the area. In some areas there were In light of the scale of the self-build- of the disaster many organisations issues of competition for beneficiaries ing of shelters, the NGOs in question without prior field experience sent or of beneficiaries switching NGOs made a decision to support these personnel to the disaster. The govern- when others appeared with free dis- efforts by distributing construction ment was generally unable to enforce tributions or other attractive options. materials, supported with technical coordination between organisations. training.
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D5 Guatamala.indd 95 11/03/09 17:15 D.5 Guatemala- 1976 - Earthquake - Materials distribution and training Historic
At the beginning of the programme, the programme. The choice of the a total of 67 separate recommenda- materials that were distributed and tions for seismic-resistant features resold through the cooperatives was were drawn up by a consultant for also geared towards seismic-resistant the NGO as the basis for the training construction. programme. The intention was that Logistics and materials even if not all of the recommendations The corrugated galvanised iron were followed, the house would still sheets were imported from El Salvador. be substantially safer. There was some Some 95,000 sheets were bought and disagreement, as some NGO staff resold by the NGO during the first thought that the list of recommenda- six months of the programme. Funds tions was too comprehensive and was recovered from the resales were even- being used too strictly in the field.
Cuny Center tually used to expand the operation. Some thought that a smaller number Construction materials were sold of recommendations might support a Sketch showing structural roofing through local, pre-existing cooperative larger number of beneficiaries. details societies. This was intended to raise The programme had six key pillars: The NGO created four different the profile and develop the capacity model houses, although the families of those cooperatives, but concerns • Salvage materials from destroyed eventually built a wider range of were voiced a few years later that this or damaged homes; adapted designs. A booklet was also had ended up overstretching their ca- • Use indigenous materials (apart developed and over 100,000 copies pacities and flow of funds. from the roofing); were eventually distributed as an • Mount an extensive educational element of training programmes. programme; • Build a model house in each Implementation community using techniques (such as The beneficiaries were provided the introduction of timber and barbed- with information and training on seis- wire bracing) that would ensure safety mic-resistant construction, using local the next time; materials and technologies (demon- • Use the model house as a focus of strated by the model houses). But the further educational activity; responsibility for the design and for • Distribute the corrugated galva- reconstruction remained entirely with nised iron roofing sheets at subsidised the beneficiaries themselves. prices through the cooperatives. The local cooperatives distrib- Construction materials were sold uted the corrugated galvanised iron at subsidised prices to ensure that the and other materials and also become people had a true need of the materials, the focal points for the training pro- to reduce the sense of dependency and grammes. to spread meagre budget resources to a wider population. There were limits In many affected communities, to the amount of each article that model houses were built using local each family could buy, in order to limit labour, as directed by the NGO and hoarding or speculation. in coordination with village master craftsmen. Once these craftsmen, A full set of housing materials, masons and carpenters had been in sufficient quantity and variety to trained they were then employed
build a whole house, was sold through Cuny Center to train a series of apprentices while the local cooperatives. But the main working on the reconstruction of the material, which was imported and dis- houses in the community. tributed by the NGO, was the roofing Options for roofing materials - tiles, sheets. The thicker 26- or 28-gauge Unfortunately, many of the trained palm leaves, thatch, corrugated iron sheets were preferred over the 30- or masons found better-paid jobs in the 35-gauge sheets. (Note: With standard cities and left the rural work pro- wire gauge and corrugated iron sheet, grammes. Eventually, a local company the higher the gauge, the thinner the had to be engaged and supported sheet.) to take on the work for that part of
96 96
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D.6 India - Andhra Pradesh - 1977 - Cyclone Case study: Materials distribution and training Project type: Distribution of building materials Training support Disaster: Cyclone in Andhra Pradesh, India No. of people displaced: 3.4 million people in total; 20,000 in the
administrative area where the NGO was China working. Virtually 98% in areas affected by
India the tidal wave. India Project target population: 2,000 households Andhra Pradesh Occupancy rate on handover: India Not known Shelter size 25m2 (constructed from distributed materials)
Summary The distribution of basic kits of local materials, supplemented by materials for strengthening cyclone resistance, was supported by the inter-organisational creation of a special centre to provide technical training and information. The project was timed, and in some cases postponed, to ensure that labour was not diverted from agricultural tasks and to ensure the availability of appropriate materials.
Project timeline
November1977 1 month 2 months 3 months 10 months I I I I I
Cyclone programmeStart of multi-sectorstructionStart programme of shelter/recon-and InformationReconstructionSet-up Centre of AppropriateTraining Project review
Strengths and weaknesses 99 Where recoverable materials were available, affected 88 Resources were wasted, and beneficiary dependency communities were able to reconstruct sufficient shelter encouraged, by the distribution of materials where affected for themselves. populations had already rebuilt their own shelters in the 99 Livelihoods, and the recovery of the rice crop and paddy first phases. fields, were recognised as being of primary importance to 88 Gaps in coordination prevented a systematic and long-term sustainable recovery. The shelter construction equitable response to all affected areas, and in some cases schedule was adapted accordingly. resulted in the provision of inappropriate housing types 99 Traditional materials choices and traditional building and response methodologies that were damaging to the methods were supported and strengthened. recovery process. 99 Using inter-agency coordination to set up a specialised 88 The promise by some organisations that ‘pukka’ houses technical training centre created a neutral forum where all for the beneficiaries would eventually be constructed actors could get information and could receive evaluations actually held back the process of recovery in wider ranges of their progress without bias. of affected communities. Case study credits: Cuny Center 97
D6 India Adrah Pradesh.indd 97 11/03/09 17:14 D.6 India - Andhra Pradesh - 1977 - Cyclone - Materials distribution and training Historic Before the cyclone The affected population was pre- dominantly rural, farming rice and keeping livestock to supplement their income. The affected areas were all low lying and were intensively culti- vated. The vast majority of the popula- tion lived in houses made of tradi- tional materials. Common materials were bamboo and palmyra leaf thatch (made from a certain type of palm tree). Before the cyclone there had been official encouragement to make houses ‘pukka’ - made using reinforced concrete. Pukka housing was also preferred by much of the population Cuny Center and displayed a higher social status. Safer shelter techniques - strapping columns to beams Shelter design elevation showing cross-bracing Some of the faith-based and local to do so. There was also pressure from day to tend their farms. organisations that were involved in the the government and from international Tensions rose over the course emergency response had been working donors (and from within some organi- of the response, due to the different in the area since at least 1969. Many of sations) to start construction imme- levels of support given to communities the larger international organisations diately, using outside contractors or affected by the tidal wave and those were new to the area. non-local volunteer forces if necessary. affected by the high winds. Additional After the cyclone It was recognised that the tidal tensions arose between communi- The cyclone created two different wave had left dangerous levels of ties who had made agreements with areas of damage: an area damaged by salinity in many of the communities’ different aid organisations, which had a six-metre tidal wave that travelled paddy fields, and that the greater different types of programme method- as far as 24km inland at its furthest need was to recover what was left ologies. point; and an area damaged by high of the previous rice crop, and then The NGO initially targeted the most winds reaching over 270km/h, all along to unblock irrigation canals and flush vulnerable members of each village for a 50km stretch of coastline. out the paddy fields. Some feared that the materials distribution, asking the the large labour force needed for the local Rotary Club to work with the In the areas affected by the wind immediate construction of concrete villages to select 20 of the most vul- alone, many of the materials from housing would divert efforts from the nerable households from each village, the destroyed houses were still lying agricultural efforts and, in doing so, according to agreed-upon criteria. nearby. About 90% of the surviving block long-term recovery. Therefore, population very quickly built their a two-pronged strategy was advocated Land rights / ownership own shelters using this material and and involved: Affected communities were aided removed the need for ‘emergency’ on their customary locations, although • supporting the beneficiariesin their shelter support. some agencies constructed shelters in own reconstruction, and on a schedule the early stages of the emergency in In the areas affected by the tidal of their own choosing, through the grid patterns near the affected villages, wave almost all of the original housing distribution of materials and technical without full consideration for land materials had been washed away, so support; and ownership questions. By December the survivors were in need of shelter • encouraging the adaptation of 1977, the local government was materials. the reconstruction schedule to the insistent that those who had fled to agricultural calendar. The local government distributed the towns or cities at the beginning of poles and palmyra thatch during the Selection of beneficiaries the emergency should be strongly en- first few days, with aid agencies joining couraged to return to their villages and Lack of capacity by the local govern- in later. The NGOs had started pro- not remain permanently in the towns. gramming in the health and medical ment, combined with the large number sectors, but quickly changed their focus of newly created organisations looking Technical solutions to shelter. to help and ‘adopting’ random villages, Basic kits of traditional materials made beneficiary selection problem- were distributed to the communities. The local government requested atic. Selection was also made more It was recognised that in some cases that the humanitarian organisations complex by the fact that some commu- distribution would have to be timed to construct pukka housing for all ben- nities were displaced into local towns take into account both the agricultural Connection detail eficiaries and offered 50% matching or large villages, but were still travelling work cycle and the time needed to funding to all organisations who chose back to their original locations every cure the bamboo for construction. 98 98
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The architect hired by the NGO felt that because parts of the roof had actually blown off, this had reduced the internal wind pressure and had saved the larger structure of many of these types of houses during the cyclone. Implementation Direct implementation was done by the families themselves, with technical assistance from local carpenters. The beneficiaries were also responsible for Cuny Center shelter quality and for any adaptations of their shelter. The NGO, and later ARTIC, provided technical information through direct field visits, training of local carpenters, the development of Shelter design elevation showing cross-bracing booklets and posters, and in one case The initial construction efforts consultation with the various organisa- the production of a short play to impart were evaluated three weeks into the tions, but also produced booklets on important construction messages. programme. Based on the evaluations, safer housing construction for local Logistics and materials improvements and additions were distribution. Similar sets of materials were initially made (cross-bracing and the protec- The design of the model house that provided by the local government in tion of the housing posts below ground the NGO provided to the beneficiaries the first stages of the emergency. This level) in the guidelines and prototypes. was square, with a pyramid-shaped roof delivery was taken over by the NGOs, Based on the interest of a wide of a 45-degree slope to be both wind- and was augmented with the materials range of shelter actors and the local resistant and to allow water runoff (bamboo, metal straps) necessary to government, an Appropriate Recon- from the palmyra thatch. A ring beam make the shelters cyclone resistant. struction Training and Information and aluminium strips to bind the joints One of the arguments for delaying the Centre (ARTIC) was established were added to the cross-bracing. The reconstruction was that the materials to give advice and conduct evalua- wooden posts were treated for infes- used in traditional construction were tions for the various ongoing shelter tation and rot and were sunk 1m into strongest or best for use as construc- programmes. ARTIC was funded and the ground. The palmyra thatch was tion materials. In the case of bamboo, supported by a loose consortium attached to the roof using traditional this would have needed to be bought of major INGOs and local partners. sewing methods, despite the sewing some weeks in advance and then cured ARTIC not only worked directly in materials’ lack of great strength. before use. Materials list The following list shows the main materials provided and the ones that were of most value in the construc- tion of adequate and cyclone-resistant structures.
Materials Wood posts Bamboo bracing Wood roof frame Palmyra leaf roofing material Metal binding straps Plastic sheeting (used to protect wood posts below ground level) Cuny Center Cuny Center Connection detail
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D6 India Adrah Pradesh.indd 99 11/03/09 17:15 D.7 Thailand - 1979 -1980 - Political conflict - Refugee camp Historic
D.7 Thailand - 1979 -1980 - Political conflict Case study: Refugee camp Project type: Construction of two refugee camps Development of a manual of standards Disaster: Invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam, December 1978 No. of people displaced: About 1 million people crossed the border into Thailand at the height of the displacement. Project target population: Thailand Khao-I-Dang refugee camp went from
29,000 people shortly after its opening in December 1979, Cambodia to 130,000 -160,000 in March 1980, to 42,000 by 1982. Thailand Sakeo camp had 28,000 people shortly after opening, dropping to 17,000 when it closed in July 1980 (the remaining 17,000 were transferred to other camps). Occupancy rate on handover: 100% Shelter size 16m2 (in multi-family units)
Summary For the first time, clear numeric standards were introduced via the distribution of an operations policy and standards manual to each camp to ensure equitable minimum services, based primarily on public health and water/sanitation concerns. Two camps were planned according to these standards, using a decentralisation of services, and in later cases a ‘checkerboard’ design that provided internal space for some expansion.
Project timeline
1975 1978 Dec 1978 Oct 1979 1 month 3 months 1980 1993 I I II I I I
under collapseKhmerment, Rougeof agriculture Large-scalegenocide and displaceby VietnamInvasion of CambodiaFaminecamp in CambodiaOpening of SakeoDang campOpeningI camps of Khao-I-of SakeoResettlement I to other of part Sakeo camp campclosed officialKhao-I-Dang closure regime
-
Strengths and weaknesses
99 Creating a written manual provided a clear checklist for (‘aquaprivies’) permitted more flexibility in shelter layout the many organisations with limited prior experience. design. 99 Spaces for expansion within the camp permitted some 88 Although multi-unit longhouses freed up more external release of pressure from increasing population levels. space in extremely cramped sites, their use postponed 99 Advocacy of an incremental approach to shelter rather than solved the problem of overcrowding, and at provision allowed for a response to continued influxes and the expense of privacy and security. increasing camp populations. 88 An overall lack of space and poor drainage contributed 99 Innovations in water/sanitary latrine technology to health problems.
Case study credits: Cuny Center 100 100
D7 Thailand conflict.indd 100 11/03/09 17:14 Historic Shelter Projects 2008 D.7
Before the opening of the camp Despite the later population previous relief operations were not The invasion of Cambodia by Vi- reduction of the Khao-I-Dang camp, repeated. etnamese forces in December 1978, the initial increases in population had Through regional workshops with the escalation of fighting between Viet- posed severe challenges for control the consultant and others in 1980, this namese and Khmer Rouge forces after of the camps. Overcrowding and manual formed the starting point for June 1979 and famine in October 1979, the high-turnover nature of camp the first draft of the UNHCRHandbook caused a mass influx of refugees across residents caused the camp to descend for Emergencies. the border into Thailand, peaking at into violence and to become extremely Because of the lack of space, the approximately 1 million people in late difficult to govern at times. shelters were constructed as multi- 1979 and early 1980. Selection of beneficiaries family longhouses, using mainly tradi- The Thai government was initially The mass numbers of the influx and tional materials (bamboo and thatch). reluctant to host the refugees. After the political pressures exerted by the Fire-retardant wallboard was used for early incidents where 40,000 refugees Thai authorities and the Khmer Rouge the sides of the longhouses and for the were returned to Cambodia, the Thai did not permit beneficiary selection internal divisions between individual authorities agreed to permit camps upon arrival. Resettlement pro- families. However, this did not remove in nine locations in the border area. grammes and transfers influenced the problems caused by lack of privacy or However, they insisted on close selection of who later left the camp. communicable disease. control of access and the delivery of Land rights / ownership For the most part, the larger long- services to the camps, and on the basic Thai authorities designated the houses in Khao-I-Dang were laid out and supposedly temporary nature of camp site and the camp administration in parallel. Some reduction of space those camps. assigned individual plots to refugees. was achieved through a ‘checkerboard’ The refugee population had been All rights of occupancy were under- layout, with blocks of open space severely traumatised by four years of stood to be non-permanent. When all throughout the camp. This also allowed forced displacement, genocide, famine the camps closed 1993, repatriation for additional shelters, if required. In and armed invasion. was supported through UN-backed the Sakeo extensions, the longhouses were grouped into four to eight houses Of the nine camps, eight were in- programmes aiming for land grants and around small internal squares. These ternally controlled directly by the providing legal advice. were intended as private outdoor Khmer Rouge army or its affiliates. Standards manual space or vegetable gardens for each The camp at Khao-I-Dang, however, A policy and standards implemen- grouping of refugees. Later shelters was the only one under clear Thai tation manual was drafted for the UN were also improved by building them government authority, administered by consultants during the last months on stilts, to avoid flooding during the by the UN. Leaders of the refugee of 1979 and published in draft binder rainy season. groups presented themselves to the form by January 1980. The camp sites camp administration at the opening of and services part of the manual had Implementation the camp. eight initial parts focused on water The organisation assigned a number of NGOs to undertake the different Due to the size, speed and high- and sanitation issues, and one part on phases of camp construction, upgrading profile nature of the emergency, the housing and construction. It empha- and maintenance, using the manual as a UN had to cope with a rapid expansion sised minimum numeric standards, general guide. The refugees themselves of its own staff and the arrival of large along with clearly defined job roles and were responsible for the construction numbers of NGOs, many without prior responsibilities within the camp. of their own shelters. experience in the field. Because of the Implementing agencies in the camp variability of the experience of the UN were to be held accountable to these Logistics and materials and NGO staff, a consultancy firm was standards through routine assessments The basic materials were provided hired to develop a manual of standards. undertaken by the UN. The stated to the refugees by the humanitarian Many of those policies and standards goals for the manual were: organisations. were implemented at the Khao-I-Dang • To ensure that all services meet a Materials list and Sakeo camps. basic minimal level of quality; The following is a partial list of After the opening of the camp • To ensure that all services are the materials used for the multi-unit Both camps opened in October- provided in a uniform manner; shelters. November 1979 and quickly filled • To provide the basic information to capacity. Khao-I-Dang camp was necessary to successfully implement Materials initially intended to be temporary, UNHCR standards; Bamboo poles housing people who would be then • To standardise routines and to Plastic sheeting transferred to other camps, repatri- facilitate reporting and monitoring; Rope or wire ated, or resettled in other countries. • To provide a guide for those who The camp also became a collection have had no prior experience in the Thatch (palm) point for those who had been injured field; and Fire-resistant wallboards during the conflict. • To ensure that the mistakes of Timber flooring
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D7 Thailand conflict.indd 101 11/03/09 17:14 D.8 Tonga - 1982 - Cyclone Isaac - Disaster mitigation Historic
D.8 Tonga - 1982 - Cyclone Isaac Case study: Disaster mitigation Project type: Quick Impact Projects Shelter disaster mitigation Disaster: Cyclone Isaac, 3 March 1982 No. of people displaced: 45,000 made homeless Project target population: 6,600 people in 34 villages for Small Projects programme; 95,000 people (entire population) for disaster mitigation/preparedness programme Occupancy rate on handover: Unknown Tonga Shelter size: Various
Summary The settlement-focused ‘Quick Impact Projects’ gave responsibility and control to beneficiary villages. A parallel programme on disaster mitigation strategy offered the technical tools to ensure that the awareness of how to ‘build back safer’ would be incorporated into projects.
Project timeline
Mar 1982 1 month 12 months 14 months 27 months I II I
Cyclone IsaacProgrammeDisasterStart Assistance Smallcomponent Projectsin disasterIdentification mitigation of gapment) for TonganApril 1982govern-Publication (first ofdraft Assistance manuals: Projects ProgrammeCompletion Disaster of Small South ofPacific finalPublication countriesdraft for other
Strengths and weaknesses
99 Communal projects supported recovery on a 99 Using simple techniques and local materials increased settlement-wide basis. the likelihood of acceptance by the affected populations. 99 Beneficiary-led proposals allowed a wide range of 88 Lack of technical support left questions about the different projects to take place, all tailored to each village’s hazard-resistant quality of the Small Projects. needs. 88 There is a lack of clarity as to what extent the 99 Disaster mitigation measures were designed to be recommendations of the strategy were followed through. incorporated into the quick-repeat cycle of disasters, as both preparation and response at the same time.
Case study credits: Cuny Center 102 102
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Before the cyclone Small Projects Land rights / ownership Tonga consists of 170 islands, 36 The implementing organisation, For the most part, beneficiaries of which are inhabited. Approximately in cooperation with the Government built back on their customary land. two-thirds of its population of 95,000 of Tonga and a major internation- al donor, started their programme Technical solutions people live on one main island group. The villages were left to decide three weeks after the cyclone. The whether there were any proposals Tonga is exposed to a number of project was intended as a form of for which they would like to apply hazards (earthquakes, volcanic eruption ‘Quick Impact Project’. It was called for funding. Staff worked with the and tsunamis) of which cyclones are the Small Projects Disaster Assistance villages to prepare the actual technical the most common, striking once every Programme and had a shelter and set- proposals. 1.6 years on average. Cyclone Isaac tlements focus. was declared by the Tongan authori- Responsibility for all construction The uneven speed of progress in ties to have been the worst disaster and for the construction quality of the the completion of some projects meant in Tongan history, in part because of Small Projects was left explicitly to the that the programme did not finish until the magnitude of the destruction of beneficiaries. housing, public buildings and livestock the end of June the following year. The (95% of livestock were killed in some Small Projects programme was already Because most villagers were places), but also because of the pro- on the ground before the emergency. able to quickly build basic shelters, portion of damage caused to the more The consultants employed to create a and because they were applying as a heavily populated island of the capital shelter strategy were also involved in a village, the proposals were often for city, Tongatapu. broader project of disaster mitigation communal facilities in the village, or for housing in the South Pacific. groups of structures that benefited The emergency response was con- the shelter and settlement recovery as Disaster mitigation strategy strained by the large number of islands, a whole. These included restorations For some time prior to Cyclone the dispersed nature of the popula- of village fences, showers, kitchens Isaac, the same international donor tion and limited communications. It and toilets, as well as community food had also been funding the first stages emerged after the cyclone that there gardens. Other projects, not directly of a shelter-focused disaster prepar- had been no comprehensive govern- related to shelter, included the resto- edness study for all of the anglophone ment disaster mitigation or disaster ration of poultry units, water tanks and South Pacific islands. Parts of the study response programme in place. a wind tower. specific to Tonga were then written in Repeated cycles of disaster and direct reference to the cyclone and a Disaster mitigation strategy short-term emergency response had draft was released in April 1982. This The consultant realised that most contributed to a lack of disaster- then informed studies for the other traditional houses were built and main- preparedness and disaster-mitigation islands. The consultant continued to tained incrementally by the families. planning. The repeated disasters had work with the same donor and with Outside support, whether it was both forced resources to be used for research organisations until 1984 to materials or information, often arrived emergency response and had damaged produce guidelines for other South while the recovery and reconstruction the local population’s capacity for self- Pacific countries. process was already underway. The fact reliance. Selection of beneficiaries that this process was often ongoing Public buildings were designed when Tonga was faced with the next Small Projects The size of many using seismic and cyclone codes from disaster led the consultant to develop small islands and the prior stationing of Australia and New Zealand, but these a series of illustrated information the implementing organisation’s staff were not applied to private housing. booklets that advocated: allowed information about the Small The modernisation of some of the Projects programme to be delivered • self-reliance and self-build housing stock in the prior decade had to each community by word of mouth. techniques for the affected families; also seen many houses built with badly Villages made proposals as a whole and • use of traditional techniques and secured metal roofing sheets. each village’s proposal was assessed by locally available materials; After the cyclone the implementing organisation. The • last-minute strengthening measures Relief agencies and the armed national government was informed of applicable to both transitional and forces of Australia, New Zealand all decisions. A number of field visits permanent housing; and and other countries worked quickly to each village were made during the • the incorporation of hazard- to bring food supplies, medicine and projects to monitor for quality and resistant measures into the repair other support to the affected popula- speed of progress. of disaster-damaged housing, as few houses were torn down and built anew tion. The largest immediate concern While it was designed primarily for from scratch. was the widespread destruction of the Government of Tonga, the strategy The guidelines had to take into livestock and crops. While 1,000 for disaster mitigation and prepared- account the wide range of hazards tents and tarpaulins were delivered in ness was also intended to be accessible that were possible in Tonga. The main the first few days, many families had to the country’s entire population. already started the rebuilding process. guidelines concerned strengthening
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The site was visited and the proposal was checked to ensure that it answered a cyclone-related problem, was within a maximum of US$ 5000 and met other criteria. A clear agreement on the division of responsibilities was drawn up between the organisation and the village. The
Cuny Center organisation was to procure the materials, while the village would pick Tieing techniques Bracing techniques up the materials from the local depot and would take responsibility for con- struction. One challenge involved ensuring that the villages understood what the materials would be used for. This issue became more central in villages where the leadership structures were not clear. Disaster mitigation strategy Cuny Center The studies and the illustrated guide- Preventing uplift due to strong winds Preventing uplift due to strong winds lines were made available to the Tongan government. Other consult- ants developed similar illustrated guidelines that were published as sup- plements in a local newspaper. Logistics and materials Small Projects In some of the small projects, the NGO was able to ask a village to show how much con-
Cuny Center struction material they already had and were willing to use in the project. The Lateral bracing Wind resistance techniques resulting project budget was then used to meet the shortfall. In some projects the implementing organisation was not able to survey the available construction resources beforehand and they therefore made a more comprehensive budget. Some materials (e.g. timber, thatch) could be sourced locally, but many other materials had to be brought to the Cuny Center different islands, making projects Safe wall cladding fixture Safe roof fixture longer to implement. The implement- ing organisation was able to buy scarce against both cyclones and earthquakes, reducing damage, repair and upgrading. materials duty free at the government focusing on the binding of roofs to wall The graphics guidelines were also store, which saved an estimated 27% posts and the binding of ring beams accompanied by other documents that in costs. and reinforcement of joints. focused on the setting up of permanent The guidelines included the disaster preparedness capabilities planting of bushes in front of houses within government structures. to protect them from objects blown Implementation - Small by high winds. The most important Projects element was the realisation that post- Proposals for each project were disaster mitigation measures would be received on a rolling basis; approval Cuny Center implemented both before and after took about three weeks in each case. repeating disasters, as part of a cycle of Use of diagonal bracing 104 104
D8 Tonga.indd 104 11/03/09 17:14 Historic Shelter Projects 2008 D.9
D.9 Sudan - 1985 - Conflict Case study: Planned camps Project type: Planned camps Disaster: Civil war and famine in Ethiopia (Eritrea and Tigray) 1983-1984 No. of people displaced: Hundreds of thousands Project target population: 232,000 across 15 camp complexes (June 1985) Eritrea Camp capacity designed for up to 640,000 Tigray
Occupancy rate on handover: Ethiopia Unknown Sudan Shelter size: Various
Summary Relocating refugees from smaller camps gave time to create better sites and facilities in the larger camps built as part of the second stage. Building camps using a hierarchy of shelter groupings (cluster-block-sector) helped the humanitarian actors ensure support for the cycle of repatriation.
Project timeline
1983 1984 September1984 November1984 December1984 January 1985 April 1985 June 1985 I I I I I I I I
from TigrayFirst large influx of refugeesLarge-scale migration starts Measles reported in camps per 1000Death people rates per in daycamps rise to 15than 5Death per 1000 rates people reduced per to day less55,000 Voluntary people repatriation of Failure of harvests in Ethiopia
Strengths and weaknesses
99 Working with local relief agencies allowed camp but were insufficiently known among many implementing planners to understand village and community structures, organisations. and to adapt camp layouts to those structures accordingly. 88 Unplanned camps not only had problems with water 99 Having clearly demarcated sections and blocks in a supply, but some then had health-threatening problems camp facilitated both repatriation and phased reuse of the with drainage once the rains arrived. camp for newcomers. 88 Relocation to new camps, while unavoidable, had large 99 Decentralisation of services in the camp allowed for programme costs. easier training of village health workers in preparation for 88 Not even advanced camp layouts can solve the grave repatriation. issues of malnutrition or communicable disease. 88 Multi-sectoral guidelines on camp planning and camp management had been available for a number of years,
Case study credits: Cuny Center 105
D9 Sudan.indd 105 11/03/09 17:13 D.9 Sudan - 1985 - Conflict - Planned camps Historic Before the influx There had been ongoing conflict between the Ethiopian government and rebel groups fighting for inde- pendence for the provinces of Eritrea and Tigray since the 1970s. Many refugees from the conflict moved to Sudan. During 1983-1984, the conflict combined with drought across many countries in Africa to create a major famine. There were no early warning programmes or adequate stockpiles until after September 1984. Before 1984, sufficient food had been supplied into Tigray from Sudan. By mid-1984 the Relief Society of Tigray, a national civil relief organisa- tion, stated that the famine had reached crisis levels and that they would lead Tigrayans out of Tigray and into Sudan, where they could receive aid. Cuny Center/UNHCR Initial camps in Sudan were sometimes located adjacent to the Block plan sites of older permanent refugee set- arrivals from each village. tlements. In early December 1984, Selection of beneficiaries it was realised that there were not There was no selection per se. As This cluster, block and sector enough water resources for these the refugees arrived in the camps in hierarchy was derived from the camps. A decision was taken to look more or less intact village groups, it Handbook for Emergencies, which had for sites that would support larger was possible to work with the village been made available two years before numbers of refugees. Even then, not leaders and social structures to identify the crisis. A Sudan-specific version of all camps had adequate clean water for vulnerable members. the handbook specific was created. many months. Waterborne disease, Land rights / ownership As the main emphasis was placed alongside measles and malnutrition in There were no permanent land on water supply, sanitation and the new arrivals, became the chief cause of rights given to refugees. In fact, the logistics of food and medicine, the death in the camps. government of Sudan insisted that basic shelter was often a traditional Although the Sudanese had new refugees would not be granted tukul tent made out of branches, welcomed hundreds of thousands of permanent residency. although there were some distribu- refugees for resettlement from Ethiopia Technical solutions tions of other shelter materials. The over the previous two decades, the Once decisions had been made to government’s insistence that the scale of the new influxes, and the transfer some of the refugees from in- camps were to be short term often fact that Sudan itself was suffering a adequate camps, the new camps were prevented the use of any more durable drought, caused a reversal of policy in set up following a hierarchy of blocks shelter materials, even if the resources the Sudanese government. Even when of buildings. This started with a cluster had been available. this decision was overturned, the gov- of shelters based on the size of each Implementation ernment indicated that they did not extended family. These clusters could The Relief Society of Tigray would expect the refugees to remain in the be grouped together to form a block often lead the Tigrayans into Sudan in long term. that would follow the size of a single entire village groups. In some cases, After the first influx village. A number of blocks would form the society would also participate in NGOs began searching for suitable a sector of a camp. the transfer of groups from one of sites for new camps. Between April Importantly, the number of clusters the first camps to a second camp with and June 1985, 55,000 refugees were in a block was not predetermined, but better facilities. able to return to Ethiopia. But this still was dependent upon the number of Materials left 258,000 new Ethiopian refugees in extended families coming from each Pressure from the Govern- eastern Sudan, in addition to 120,000 village in Tigray. To the extent possible, ment of Sudan meant that use of any Chadian refugees in the west of the services such as health units and sup- ‘permanent’ materials was avoided. country, 700,000 ‘old’ Ethiopian plementary feeding centres were de- Although there were distributions of refugees and increasing numbers of in- centralised throughout the camps. plastic sheeting, many of the refugees ternally displaced Sudanese. Space was left in each block for late
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D9 Sudan.indd 106 11/03/09 17:13 Historic Shelter Projects 2008 D.9
lived in self-built tukul tents, made from tree branches, grass thatch and cloth. Logistics Access to the camp helped with logistics. The most important paved highway in Sudan, connecting Port Sudan with Khartoum, ran through the camps areas. A major train line also ran adjacent to the highway for part of the time, and airports capable of handling large jets or C-130s were available at towns used as logistics hubs. Most materials had to be imported using UN mechanisms, apart from in- dividual shelter materials scavenged by the refugees. During the emergency, there were some severe delays in the provision of materials, but these were caused by poor pre-planning, lack of stockpiling and internal organisational issues, as much as by lack of physical infrastructure. Cuny Center\UNHCR
Sector plan
‘[The design] had several major advantages. First, it enabled the relief agencies to train a cadre of health workers from each village. In the event that people decided to return to Tigray (which many of them did several months after arriving in the camp), the skills and training the workers had acquired would be taken back to the village with them. Second, it provided camp administra- tors with a simple way to reunite families. When anyone entered Sudan, they simply had to tell the relief authorities what Ti- grayan village they were from; they could be transferred to the camp where the people from that village were located. Family reunification could then be han- dled on a self-help basis. Finally, camp administrators were pre- sented with an intact community organization with which to work, facilitating activities which re- quired notification or organiza- tion of the refugees.’- Fred Cuny Cuny Center/UNHCR Camp plan
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D9 Sudan.indd 107 11/03/09 17:13 - Annex
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Further reading 310808.indd 108 11/03/09 17:55 Shelter Projects 2008 Annex
Further reading Key shelter-related documents Websites www.humanitarianreform.org The home page of the project to establish clusters as a coordination mechanism. Includes the Emergency Shelter Cluster and Early Recovery Cluster home pages, which contain further reading on the cluster approach as well as on technical issues.
www.reliefweb.int Up-to-date information on complex emergencies and natural disasters, as well as an archive of information, fi eld reports and situation reports from emergencies since 1996.
http://ochaonline.un.org 1. UNDRO Shelter after disasters 2. Transitional settlements 3. Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced.
Corsellis, T. and Vitale, A. (2005). Transitional Settlement: Displaced Populations, Oxfam Publishing, United Kingdom. Guidelines aimed at strategic planners and implementers of settlement responses. Considers settlement options for displaced populations. Available online: www.shelterlibrary.org
IFRC/Oxfam (2007). Plastic sheeting: A guide to the specifi cation and use of plastic sheeting in humanitarian relief. A guide to the use and specifi cation of plastic sheeting in humanitarian operations. Available online: www.plastic-sheeting.org
Norwegian Refugee Council/The Camp Management Project (2008). The Camp Management Toolkit. A comprehensive fi eld manual for camp management agencies and stakeholders involved in camp operations. Available online: www.nrc.no/camp
The Sphere Project (2004). The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. Sets out what people affected by disasters have a right to expect from humanitarian assistance. Includes shelter and settlement planning, with standards, indicators and checklists. Available online: www.sphereproject.org
UNDRO (now UN/OCHA) (1982). Shelter after Disaster: Guidelines for Assistance. Guidelines and description of shelter provision in all aspects of natural disasters, from preparedness to reconstruction. Available online: www.sheltercentre.org (www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/undro-shelter-jul82.htm)
UN/OCHA (2008). Transitional Settlement and Reconstruction after Natural Disasters, fi eld edition. Guidelines aimed at strategic planners and implementers of settlement responses. Considers settlement issues for people affected by disasters as well as assitance methods to support them in their reconstruction. Available online: www.shelterlibrary.org
UN/OCHA (1998). Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Identifi es the rights and guarantees for the protection of internally displaced people. Relevant to forced displacement and protection and assistance during displacement, as well as during return or resettlement and reintegration. Available online: www.shelterlibrary.org
UNHCR (2007). Handbook for Emergencies, UNHCR, 3rd ed. A managers' guide to setting up emergency operations for large-scale infl uxes. Provides advice on how to tackle various aspects of the emergency response. Available online: www.unhcr.ch
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Further reading 310808.indd 109 30/03/09 12:44 Senza titolo-3 1 11/03/09 17:54 Despite the hundreds of shelter projects completed around the world every year after conflicts and natural disasters, 2008 there are few compilations of case studies and best practices. As a result, an opportunity to consolidate learning from what has gone before has been lost. IASC Emergency Shelter Cluster This book shares with the humanitarian community over thirty case studies of completed emergency and transitional SHELTER PROJECTS shelter projects. The project summaries
included aim to illustrate some of the SHELTER PROJECTS shelter project options available to organisations working in both post- 2008 disaster and post-conflict situations. The focus of this book is on projects which maximize the use of emergency response funds by paving the way for sustainable recovery.
This document is targeted at:
Programme managers and field shelter programme staff from local, national and international organisations at all experience levels.
HS number ISBN and/or ISSN Number UN-HABITAT Postal Address Telephone Fax [email protected] www.unhabitat.org
Printed in Italy
UNHCR IFRC
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies