A Study of Religion, Its Sources and Contents
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> A STUDY OF RELIGION MARTINEAU VOL. I. HENRY FROWDE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE AMEN CORNER, E.G. STUDY OF RELIGION SOURCES AND CONTENTS BY JAMES MARTINEAU, D.D., LL.D. LATE PRINCIPAL OF MANCHESTER NEW COLLEGE, LONDON s Tldrtpov ovv S^i if vx*) ytvos ^yKpares ovpavov Kal -yfjs Kal irdffrjs TTJS irepto'Sou ytyovtvcu <pu/j.fv, rb <f>p6in/nov Kai apery? ir\rjpfs, ^ rb fj.r)$frepa. KfKrrjfj.fvov ; PLAT. Legg. x. 897 B VOL. I AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1888 \_All rights reserved"] T' ct - T'-v r r -. T rr SANTA BAJRBAUA IN MEMORY OF AN UNBROKEN FRIENDSHIP THROUGH THIRTY YEARS* COMPANIONSHIP IN DUTY AND IN STUDY WITH JOHN JAMES TAYLER AND OF THE QUICKENING INFLUENCE OF HIS RIPE SCHOLARSHIP AND TENDER PIETY THESE VOLUMES PREPARED AT HIS DESIRE AND ANIMATED BY HIS FELLOWSHIP OF SPIRIT ARE AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED TO THE PUPILS WHOM WE SOUGHT TO HELP ON THEIR WAY TO WISE AND FAITHFUL LIFE VOL. I. PREFACE. I CANNOT better introduce my readers to the main purport of these volumes, than by relating a conversa- tional criticism, by an eminent English Positivist, on a no less eminent American representative of the Spen- cerian system of thought. Friendly relations had grown up between them, when Professor Fiske, of Harvard, was in this less cordial from the country ; relations, none the ' tacit assumption, supposed to be warranted by his Cosmic Philosophy,' of their common rejection of religious beliefs. On the appearance, in 1884, of his interesting Address to the Concord School of Philosophy, entitled ' The Destiny of Man in the light of his Origin,' a report of its argu- ment, contained in a private letter, was read to his English friend who listened till it came out ; attentively enough that the Professor found, in the psychical evolution of an intimation of individual but then Man, immortality ; broke in with the exclamation, 'What? John Fiske say that ? Well it what I have main- ; only proves, always tained, that you cannot make the slightest concession to ' metaphysics, without ending in a theology ! a position, in which the speaker has no doubt been confirmed by the ' author's second Concord Address, in 1885, on the Idea of God.' A more fortunate criticism there could hardly be : for, if it answers the speaker's end, it certainly secures the au- thor's too but the ' If once ; being naive confession, you viii PREFACE. allow yourself to think about the origin and the end of things, you will have to believe in a God and immortality.' The conditions of the Agnostic case could not be more compen- diously stated : to make it good, you must be careful not to look beyond phenomena, as empirical facts : you must abjure the enquiry into causes, and the attempt to trace invisible issues : never lift the veil that bounds experience, and you will need nothing and know nothing of a trans- cendental world. ' On the very threshold, therefore, of the Study of Reli- ' gion we are met by the question, whether this Comtean delimitation of knowledge is correct. This was my reason for entering on the survey of human relations at the prac- tical end, and seeking the bases of conduct before pene- to the roots of ' Ethical ' trating thought ; allowing Theory to rest, as long as possible, on experienced psychological facts and back their ; holding apparent religious signifi- cance for more effectual testing, when their interior con- tents had been laid bare. And this led me to say, in dismissing the former volumes from my hand, that the Moral Postulates on which their exposition proceeded ' could be tried only in the court of Metaphysics,' and must stand over for a separate hearing. The cause thus reserved is called on for trial in the F'rst ' Book of the present Study.' But for the promise which I have quoted, I would gladly have spared my readers its intricate and technical for I am aware of the pleadings ; tediousness of these tribunals when metaphysical ; especially the whole process wins at last, through all its dizzying cir- cuits, only the very position which common sense had assumed at first. For this is all, I take it, that metaphy- sics can pretend to accomplish by their scrutiny of the PREFACE. ix ultimate factors of human knowledge. They discover for us that, for all phenomena of experience, we are obliged to supply in thought a transcendental object, as their l . Think we must but as the base of that ground it, ; only relation : believe we must if evict the it, ; for, we it, phe- nomena to it and too : but cannot cling go prove it, we ; since it is impossible for thought, however nimble, to leap beyond its own laws, and see, from a foreign station, whether they tell lies. The business of the metaphysician is to assemble, to discriminate, to interpret, these trans- cendental constants of thought, and shew how they deal with its phenomenal material, and organize the relations which form the contents of human knowledge. When for every variable he has named its permanent, his task would be complete, were it not for perverse attempts, on the part of speculative simplifyers, to escape the persistent relativity of nature, by cutting asunder the sides of every duality, in order to make over the monopoly of the universe, either to the phenomenal alone, or to the real alone : telling us, in the former case, how cleverly the phenomena can simulate the of the real in the the real can aspect ; and, latter, how dissemble, by masquerading before the human fancy. ' ' ' According to the first, the All is resolved into the to the fused into ' the One.' Many' ; according second, And so it comes to pass that, while Comte sets up the goal of knowledge at the Lawr s of Change, Schelling plants it at ' the Absolute.' This artificial breach between the inseparable terms of 1 Wir iiberhaupt einen transcendentalen Gegenstand den Erschei- nungen zum Grunde legen miissen, ob wir zwar von ihm was er an sich selbst sey, nichts wissen. Kant, Krit. der reinen Vernunft. Rosenkranz, ii. 422. x PREFACE. is fruitful in illusions the contents and a relation ; leaving sciences of experience without their uniting tissue of living at the the Reason thought ; and, opposite extreme, inflating to the stretch of a monotonous infinitude, virtually emptied already by preaching the nothingness of all it holds. The distinction between the two factors of knowledge was, for the metaphysician who pointed it out, also their harmony. By an abuse of his method, it has been harassed into an alienation : and he is needed again, to undo the miscon- struction and effect a reconciliation. This he will attempt by a simple regress to the point of first divergency. He will not affect to go a step with either party on his separate way. He will not flatter the one, by offering new of his ' Absolute ' or the outbid- proofs ; appease other, by him in his valuation of the law of Evolution and ding ; then, having planted their imaginations at opposite foci, try to talk them into a common centre. His task calls for neither invention nor diplomacy. He has only to explain, that antithesis in thought does not involve separation, still in as all is of less, antagonism being ; that, knowledge relations, and all relations are dualities, a theory which unifies by sinking a co-ordinate term can land us in nothing but ignorance. By this kind of critical metaphysics alone, interpreting the text of the law of Reason, have I endeavoured to save such constants of human thought as are essential to religious belief, and have suffered of late from sceptical disparagement. Two of these have sufficed for the end in view, the intuition of Causality, as the ground of Natural phenomena, and that of Right, as the of Moral the one the and the ground ; planting Intellect, other the Conscience, face to face with the Eternal Source of wisdom and righteousness. If it be true that such PREFACE. xi ' Metaphysics are sure to end in a Theology,' it is not that they piece together new artifices of masonry for its sup- port, but only that they watch the lines of hostile approach to its foundation, and countermine them, ere any harm is done. At least, to such defensive work alone, of simply clearing and guarding the rock-base of natural faith, are these volumes devoted. For much of the Agnosticism of the age, the Gnosticism of theologians is undeniably responsible. They have in- considerately overstrained the language of religion till its meaning breaks : and the coherent thinker easily picks up its ruins to show that they can contain nothing. Whoever calls God by names of highest abstraction, such as 'the ' Absolute,' the Great / Ami f r tne very purpose of placing Him beyond comparison, as pure Thesis, without Antithesis or Synthesis, exposes himself at once to the proof that such a Being can never come into human ap- at all and will be for his prehension ; reproached ignorance ' of the relativity of knowledge,' which denies all access to ' things in themselves.' The critic's rebuke is well-de- served and if he intends it no more than that ; by God, so far forth as unrelated, is unknown, he should have thanks for his correction. But if he means to suggest, that what is only relatively known is, on that account, unknown, he simply repeats the error of the theologian and raises it to a higher power, by insisting, not only that an absolute object may be cognizable, but that, in order to be cognizable, it must be absolute.