Quarter 2018 nd Issue 89, 2 89, Issue
and Urbanization Security, Climate Change, Climate Security, By-With-Through Approach By-With-Through The USCENTCOM The USCENTCOM a Joint Function Information as
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY-NINE, 2ND QUARTER 2018 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher VADM Frederick J. Roegge, USN, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell
Book Review Editor Frank G. Hoffman, Ph.D.
Associate Editor Patricia Strait, Ph.D.
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office
Intern Victoria Sanker
Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; Col James D. Dryjanski, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Col David J. Eskelund, USMC/Marine Corps War College; RADM Janice M. Hamby, USN (Ret.)/College of Information and Cyberspace; RADM Jeffrey A. Harley, USN/U.S. Naval War College; BGen John M. Jansen, USMC/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; MG John S. Kem, USA/U.S. Army War College; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Brig Gen Chad T. Manske, USAF/National War College; Col William McCollough, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; LtGen Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC/The Joint Staff; RDML Jeffrey Ruth, USN/Joint Forces Staff College; VADM Kevin D. Scott, USN/The Joint Staff; Brig Gen Jeremy T. Sloane, USAF/Air War College
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Jim Q. Chen/College of Information and Cyberspace; Stephen D. Chiabotti/School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National Defense University; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/ Joint Forces Staff College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney- Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/ Georgetown University; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.); Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): In January 2017, General Colin Powell, USA (Ret.), addressed students at National Defense University in Washington, DC; met with staff of Joint Force Quarterly, from left, John J. Church, Andrea L. Connell, Joanna E. Seich, Jeffrey D. Smotherman, and William T. Eliason; and signed copies of his book It Worked for Me (NDU/Katie Lewis); Sailors ready flight deck after aircraft launch aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt, Arabian Gulf, February 2018 (U.S. Navy/Andrew Langholf); DLIFLC hosted its 31st Language Day and honored 54 combat veterans of Vietnam War, Presidio of Monterey, California, May 2015 (U.S. Army/Steven Shepard) About the Cover In This Issue U.S. Marine fires M777-A2 Howitzer as part of 24-hour all-weather fire 2 From the Chairman support for coalition’s local partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces, Forum as part of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, 4 Executive Summary the global coalition to defeat ISIS By William T. Eliason in Iraq and Syria, June 1, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Matthew Callahan) 6 Introducing Information as a Joint Function By Alexus G. Grynkewich 8 Paradigm Change: Operational Art and the Information Joint Function By Scott K. Thomson and 69 Laying the Foundation Book Reviews Christopher E. Paul for a Strategic By-With- 114 Illusions of Victory Reviewed by Conrad C. Crane 15 The Practical Implications of Through Approach Information as a Joint Function By Edward F. Dorman III and 115 Anatomy of a Campaign Christopher P. Townsend By Gregory C. Radabaugh Reviewed by Williamson Murray 18 Globally Integrated Commentary 116 America’s First General Staff Exercises: Optimizing Joint 76 Why Not a Joint Security Reviewed by Randy Papadopoulos Force C2 Structure Force Assistance Command? By Stephen M. Gallotta, James A. By John Francis Jakubowski Covington, and Timothy B. Lynch Doctrine 118 Preparing for Tomorrow’s 24 Moore’s Law and the Challenge 80 A Holistic Approach to Problem-Solving Fight: Joint Concepts of Counter-sUAS Doctrine and Future Readiness By Stephen F. Nowak By Mark D. Newell By Andrew J. Loiselle 86 The Importance of 28 Outmatched: Shortfalls in 121 Exploring the Future Countering Threat Networks Lessons Learned in Joint Force Development Operating Environment By David Richard Doran By Gwendolyn R. DeFilippi, By Jeffrey J. Becker and Stephen Francis Nowak, and John E. DeFoor Special Feature Bradford Harlow Baylor 126 A New Approach to 34 An Interview with Joint Concepts Joseph L. Votel Features By Erik Schwarz 40 The By-With-Through 93 Climate Change and Operational Approach Urbanization: Challenges to 130 The U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security: By Joseph L. Votel and Global Security and Stability Eero R. Keravuori By Ronak B. Patel and Focus on Campaign Activities David P. Palotty IV By George E. Katsos 48 The By-With-Through Approach: An Army Command Perspective 99 Structuring Airpower to Win in 140 Joint Doctrine Update By Michael X. Garrett, William 2030: Designing a Joint Division H. Dunbar, Bryan C. Hilferty, of Labor Between Land- and and Robert R. Rodock Sea-Based Combat Aviation By Josh Wiitala and Alexander Wright 56 Fighting the Islamic State By, With, and Through: How 118 Continuing the Big Data Ethics Mattered as Much as What Debate: Enabling Senior By J. Patrick Work Leader Decisionmaking By Paul B. Lester, Pedro S. Wolf, 63 Sacrifice, Ownership, Christopher J. Nannini, Daniel C. Legitimacy: Winning Wars Jensen, and Delores Johnson Davis By, With, and Through Host- Nation Security Forces By John B. Richardson IV and John Q. Bolton General Dunford works aboard C-130 aircraft at Bagram Airfield before visit to Task Force– Southwest at Camp Shorab, Helmand Province, our operational source of strength is March 22, 2018 (DOD/Dominique A. Pineiro) the ability to project power where and when needed to advance U.S. interests and meet alliance commitments. This spurred dramatic tactical, operational, and strategic adaptations and accelerated modernization programs to asymmetri- cally counter our ability to project power. All the while, budget instability and the challenges of a decades-long campaign against violent extremism adversely affected our own modernization and ca- pability development efforts required to preserve—or in some cases restore—our competitive advantage. Additionally, the Joint Force lacks sufficient capacity to meet combatant command requirements. Over the past 16 years, we made a conscious choice to limit the size of the force to preserve scarce resources necessary for essential The Character of investments in immediate upgrades to critical capabilities. And requirements have not abated, as we assumed they would after major combat operations in War and Strategic Iraq and Afghanistan ended. As a result, global demand for forces continues to exceed the inventory. Landscape Have Finally, as a nation that thinks and acts globally, the United States cannot choose between a force that can address IS and Changed other VEOs and one that can deter and defeat state actors with a full range of capabilities. We require a balanced force ver the past two decades, the credibility of our alliances and limit our that can address the challenges outlined strategic landscape has changed ability to project power. North Korea’s in the recently published National O dramatically. While the funda- efforts to develop a nuclear-capable, inter- Defense Strategy and has the inherent mental nature of war has not changed, continental ballistic missile now threaten flexibility to respond to the unexpected. the pace of change and modern technol- the homeland and our allies in the Pacific. ogy, coupled with shifts in the nature of Iran routinely destabilizes its neighbors We Must Adapt to Maintain geopolitical competition, have altered and threatens freedom of navigation while a Competitive Advantage the character of war in the 21st century. modernizing its maritime, missile, space, Advances in technology and the chang- Advancements in space, information and cyber capabilities. Violent extremist ing character of war require that our systems, cyberspace, electronic warfare, organizations (VEOs), such as the so- plans address all-domain, transregional and missile technology have accelerated called Islamic State (IS) and al Qaeda, challenges and conflict. In the past, we the speed and complexity of war. As a remain a transregional threat to the assumed most crises could be contained result, decision space has collapsed, and homeland, our allies, and our way of life. to one region. That assumption, in we can assume that any future conflict These realities are why some have called turn, drove regionally focused planning will involve all domains and cut across today’s operating environment the most and decisionmaking processes. Today, multiple geographic regions. challenging since World War II. this assumption no longer holds true. Today’s strategic landscape is also ex- At the same time, the U.S. mili- Our planning must adapt to provide a traordinarily volatile, and the Nation faces tary’s long-held competitive advantage global perspective that views challenges threats from an array of state and non- has eroded. Our decisive victory in holistically and enables execution of state actors. Revisionist powers such as Operation Desert Storm was a wake-up military campaigns with a flexibility and China and Russia seek to undermine the call for our enemies; they observed that speed that outpaces our adversaries.
2 Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 We must also be prepared to make de- The National Defense Strategy estab- begins by assessing our ability to execute cisions at the speed of relevance. While the lishes clear priorities for the Department the strategy and compares our capabilities cost of failure at the outset of conflict has of Defense, and the National Military and capacities vis-à-vis our adversaries. always been high, in past conflicts there Strategy is nested within to provide a Assessment findings shape the devel- were opportunities to absorb costs and global framework for the Joint Force opment of comprehensive materiel and recover if something went wrong. Today, to operate across regions, domains, nonmateriel recommendations that inform that cannot be assumed, and our strategic and functions. We reoriented the Joint the Secretary’s priorities for investment, decisionmaking processes must adapt to Strategic Capabilities Plan to operation- concept development, experimentation, keep pace. Senior leaders require routine alize the strategy and developed Global and innovation. This approach is designed access to synthesized information and in- Campaign Plans to provide a framework to provide integrated solutions, across the telligence to ensure their ability to see the for planning an all-domain, transregional Services, which ensure competitive advan- fight in real time and seize initiative. approach to the challenges outlined in tage today and tomorrow. We must manage the force in a the National Defense Strategy. These Finally, we are reinvigorating strategic manner that allows us to meet day-to- plans are designed to bring coherence assessments to support all these efforts. day requirements, while maintaining to operations of all functional and geo- Assessments provide the analytic rigor to readiness and the flexibility to respond to graphic combatant commands. inform our ability both to meet the cur- major contingencies and the unexpected. The Joint Force is also improving rent strategy and to develop a future force To ensure that the Joint Force provides how it frames decisions for the Secretary that maintains our competitive advan- viable options and is in position to exe- of Defense in an all-domain, transregional tage. A cornerstone of this process is the cute when called on, our force posture fight. This begins by developing a com- Chairman’s Risk Assessment, which eval- must be optimized to strategic priorities mon intelligence picture and a shared uates our current ability to execute the and provide strength, agility, and resil- understanding of global force posture, National Military Strategy and provides a ience across regions and domains. which then serves as a baseline to test global perspective of risk across the Joint To arrest and, in time, reverse the operational plans and concepts through Force. And, in 2016, we published the erosion of our competitive advantage, realistic and demanding exercises and Joint Military Net Assessment for the our force development and design pro- wargames. By testing our assumptions first time in 20 years—benchmarking the cesses must deliver a Joint Force capable and concepts, exercises and wargames Joint Force against near-peer adversaries of competing and winning against any provide senior leaders with the “reps- today and comparing our trajectory over potential adversary. This future force and-sets” necessary to build the implicit the next 5 years. These assessments are must remain competitive in all domains, communication required to facilitate essential to provide an analytic baseline deny adversaries’ ability to counter our rapid decisionmaking in times of crisis. for everything we do—from planning strengths asymmetrically, and retain the Our force management processes are to force management and from exercise ability to project power at a time and evolving to support the objectives laid out development to force design. place of our choosing. in the National Defense Strategy. Setting Finally, we must further develop the globe begins by allocating resources There is no preordained right to leaders capable of thriving at the speed of against strategic priorities—optimizing victory on the battlefield, and today the war—leaders who can adapt to change, the way we posture capabilities globally United States faces an extraordinarily drive innovation, and thrive in uncertain, to support our strategy, provide strategic complex and dynamic security environ- chaotic conditions. The nature of war flexibility, and ensure our ability to re- ment. To keep pace with the changing has not changed, and, in a violent clash spond rapidly to the unexpected. Once the character of war, we must globally inte- of wills, it is the human dimension that globe is set, we are applying the concept of grate the way we plan, employ the force, ultimately determines the success of any Dynamic Force Employment to provide and design the force of the future. If we campaign. proactive and scalable options for priority fail to adapt, the Joint Force will lose the missions while maintaining readiness to ability to compete. JFQ The How of Global Integration respond to contingencies. In a global envi- To address these imperatives, we are ronment that demands strategic flexibility General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. adapting our approach to planning, and freedom of action, these adaptations Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decisionmaking, force management, and enable the Joint Force to seize the ini- force design. These processes are inter- tiative rather than react when faced with dependent and mutually reinforcing— multiple challenges. intended to drive the changes required To ensure our competitive advantage, to maintain our competitive advantage. we are implementing a process for force Over the past 2 years, we have made design that provides the Secretary with progress in each of these areas, but integrated solutions to drive the develop- more work remains. ment of a more lethal force. This process
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Dunford 3 American M1 Abrams and Romanian TR-85 tanks and personnel on training ground in Romania as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve, supporting security and stability in Europe, April 2017 (NATO)
Executive Summary
s I write, the new National As we set our course on being the $1 trillion to replace virtually all of our Defense Strategy (NDS) has best in the world and maintaining that nuclear force structure. At the same time, A been released. The NDS is position for years to come, how do we we continue to buy new ships, fighters important for its core (and timeless) preserve our working relationships with such as the F-35, and land systems. One elements: build a more lethal joint allies and partners? One of the growing wonders if a DOD budget of $700 bil- force, strengthen allies and attract new keys to security that has been a bit rocky lion per year or more, while well above partners, and reform the Department in recent years is our North Atlantic sequestration levels, will be sufficient to of Defense (DOD) for greater perfor- Treaty Organization (NATO) family. field and maintain this force. mance and affordability. It would be With conflict both actual and virtual on As I mentioned at the end of my sum- difficult to argue with this lineup; we NATO’s European northern and south- mary in the last JFQ, this edition brings have been reading reports for years ern flanks, how do we simultaneously a range of important articles from the about the combined impact of seques- field a more modern force and bring our Joint Staff and U.S. Central Command tration cuts to the force, the continuous alliance partners up to our standards? (USCENTCOM). In the Forum, we combat and supporting operations in This has been a constant question since provide an introduction to information every command resulting in reduced NATO was formed, but I believe this as the seventh and newest joint function. readiness, as well as the seemingly issue has never been more critical. Information joins command and con- endless multiplication of threats from Moreover, what about the ongoing trol, intelligence, fires, movement and the ground to space and cyberspace. issue of readiness needs versus force maneuver, protection, and sustainment But what kind of force does the United modernization? We are embarking on an per direction of the Secretary of Defense. States need in order to meet its mission important set of new and replacement Alexus Grynkewich, deputy director for of protecting the Nation? weapons systems including more than Global Operations (J39) on the Joint
4 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Staff (and I am proud to say one of my perspective on the approach, Michael delivered. Josh Wiitala and Alexander former Joint Advanced Warfighting Garrett, William Dunbar, Bryan Hilferty, Wright suggest the issue is structural and School students), provides us with a basic and Robert Rodock describe how the have a few new ways to help land- and understanding of how information qual- U.S. Army intends to operate with it. As sea-based combat aviation work together. ifies as a joint function. A key aspect of the lead U.S. tactical unit commander in As we are beginning to see the contours any joint function, as many joint profes- the recent fight to retake Mosul in Iraq of the power of big data in our lives, Paul sional military education graduates know, from the so-called Islamic State, J. Patrick Lester, Pedro Wolf, Christopher Nannini, is how the function fits into operational Work tells us how by, with, and through Daniel Jensen, and Delores Davis team art. Scott Thomson and Christopher made a difference in that victory. With up to discuss how strategic leaders can Paul suggest that adding information as the premise that great powers often get best make use of it. a joint function marks a paradigm shift the ends and means of a strategy to assist In Joint Doctrine, we have four for operational practitioners. For those in host nations correct, John Richardson important pieces from our friends at the joint force who will ultimately have to and John Bolton suggest the ways of car- Joint Staff J7, both north and south, all figure out the utility of information from rying out such a strategy are often chosen focused on the future. Explaining the a practical, pragmatic, and warfighting poorly, resulting in failure to achieve connections between joint concepts and perspective, Gregory Radabaugh helps success. They offer that recent successes future readiness, the deputy director decode the doctrine inherent in a joint in Iraq and Afghanistan are indications for Future Joint Force Development, function. Along with this new function the United States is now getting this clas- Andrew Loiselle, helps us to sort out and its implications, the Chairman and sic strategy element aligned correctly by the right balance between readiness and the joint community have been working applying the BWT approach. It is often modernization. Jeffrey Becker and John hard to better integrate the joint force. said of military operations that logistics DeFoor bring us insights on the world By planning and executing globally is key to success, and the BWT approach that the future joint force will operate in. integrated exercises, Stephen Gallotta, is no exception. Edward Dorman and Many recent JPME graduates will be fa- Timothy Lynch, and James Covington Christopher Townsend lay out the case miliar with the “Chairman’s Challenges.” argue the results will enhance command for achieving coalition logistics interoper- Erik Schwarz helps us understand how and control across the joint force. ability in a BWT operation. the development of new joint concepts Continuing our growing dialogue on the Our Commentary section has a range are being framed by them. George role of drones in modern warfare, Mark of ideas from our friends on the Joint Katsos returns with another article on Newell discusses the difficulties of devel- Staff and elsewhere, focusing on ideas focusing on combatant commander cam- oping doctrine to counter these threats, of how to improve the joint force. After paign activities, this time discussing the given that Moore’s Law is applicable to years of developing various approaches challenges with environmental security. the explosion of such platforms globally. to helping partners with security needs, Along with our joint doctrine update, Along with drones, we are still engaged John Jakubowski believes the best way we bring you three fine book reviews by in countering threat networks of many to permanently work these missions is reviewers who will be instantly recog- different kinds, which David Doran be- through the establishment of a Joint nizable to most of our readers, and the lieves have the joint force “outmatched.” Security Force Assistance Command. books they discuss are as worthy of your We have a Special Feature dedicated Next, Stephen Nowak offers us his attention as their reviews. to USCENTCOM in place of our JPME thoughts on problem-solving. A team No matter how the future turns out, Today section. I met with General Joseph from J7, Gwendolyn DeFilippi, Stephen the United States and the joint force will Votel, USA, at his headquarters to talk Nowak, and Bradford Baylor, has some continue to be central elements of how with him and his staff about their “by, interesting ideas on how best to use our the world is shaped. Key to that success with, through” (BWT) concept and lessons learned collection in order to de- will be the people who are a part of that about getting his views on a number velop the joint force. joint force, as they are what really matters of ongoing operations in that theater. This issue’s Features section does not when the hard problems come calling. He had just returned from Afghanistan shy away from wrestling with controver- Help them be ready. Write us when you where a major terrorist attack, claimed sial concepts, both old and new. Looking think you have some ideas that will. JFQ by the Taliban, had occurred in Kabul, at the effects of climate and urbanization killing 95 and wounding scores. General on security and stability challenges the William T. Eliason Votel noted this tragedy was important joint force will face, Ronak Patel and Editor in Chief to acknowledge, but he stressed that David Polatty discuss how coordination progress is being made there, in part between civilian and military authorities due to the focus on the BWT opera- is key to finding workable solutions. tional approach that he and his lead staff Airpower is one of those commodities officer, Eero Keravuori, detail in their that everybody wants, but few can accompanying article. Adding a Service consistently agree on how it should be
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Eliason 5 Airmen from 116th Air Control Wing, Georgia Air National Guard, monitor surveillance data while flying night mission aboard E-8C Joint STARS, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, July 2017 (U.S. Air National Guard/Roger Parsons/Portions of photo have been blurred for security and privacy concerns)
Introducing Information as a Joint Function
By Alexus G. Grynkewich
n July 2017, the Chairman of the reimagine what “combined arms” and deepen our understanding if we hope Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a change means in 21st-century warfare. to succeed in 21st-century conflicts. A I to Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine While the underlying nature of war- key part of this adaptation is to develop for the Armed Forces of the United fare remains constant, the character of a joint force that proactively uses and States, introducing information as a modern warfare continues to evolve. The employs information across a wide range new and seventh joint function. This economic and social revolutions wrought of activities. The incorporation of infor- issuance portends significant changes by the industrial age rapidly changed how mation as a joint function is but the first in how the joint force will plan and wars were fought and won in the 19th and step toward enhancing joint warfighting execute transregional, multidomain, 20th centuries. Leaders who grasped the and developing a future joint force able and multifunctional operations. As implications of those changes developed to dominate in the conflicts of tomorrow. such, it represents an opportunity to the strategies and designed operations Joint functions represent related that led to success, while those who did capabilities and activities placed into basic not were doomed to failure. Today, in groups to help commanders synchronize, the midst of an information age that has integrate, and direct operations. The Brigadier General Alexus G. Grynkewich, USAF, is the Deputy Director for Global Operations, Joint similarly transformed economies and soci- original six joint functions as described Staff J7. eties, we must likewise adapt our thinking in JP 1 are command and control,
6 Forum / Introducing Information as a Joint Function JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 intelligence, fires, movement and ma- completed electronic warfare strategy is The elevation of information as a neuver, protection, and sustainment. The driving a renewed focus on the use of joint function represents an important newly released JP 1 adds information to emerging electromagnetic spectrum sys- first step toward enhancing warfighting this list, stating: tems and technologies. across all domains and the information Ultimately, of course, war is a environment. The Joint Staff and Office The information function encompasses uniquely human endeavor. While of the Secretary of Defense are working the management and application of in- technology presents opportunities and together to build a game plan that will formation and its deliberate integration challenges by itself, it is the transfor- follow through on across the breadth and with other joint functions to influence mative effect of technology on human depth of doctrine, organization, train- relevant-actor perceptions, behavior, action societies that has had the most fun- ing, materiel, leadership and education, or inaction, and support human and au- damental impact on the character of personnel, and facilities. In the end, how- tomated decision making. The information war. The ability of individuals to access ever, it will be the efforts of the Services, function helps commanders and staffs information, from anywhere and at any combatant commands, and individuals in understand and leverage the pervasive time, has broadened and accelerated the field that will truly make this happen. nature of information, its military uses, human-to-human interaction across Each of those entities will bring forward and its application during all military multiple levels (person to person, person different perspectives, approaches, and operations. This function provides [joint to organization, person to government, experiences that will enrich the entire force commanders] the ability to integrate government to government). Social joint force. Our desire is that this collec- the generation and preservation of friendly media, in particular, enables the swift tion of articles in Joint Force Quarterly information while leveraging the inherent mobilization of people and resources will start an intellectual dialogue that will informational aspects of all military activ- around ideas and causes. Coupled with drive the community to experiment, exer- ities to achieve the commander’s objectives the inability of humans to fully control cise, and learn. I personally encourage all and attain the end state. the informational detritus that results readers to bring their best ideas forward from (and reveals) patterns of life in the in future articles. Only together can we The elevation of information in joint information age, these trends present ensure information as a joint function will doctrine—the first addition to the list in an opportunity for those most skilled in reach its full potential. JFQ 20 years—underscores the Department applying informational power. As the ac- of Defense (DOD) focus on how to companying vignettes illustrate, potential adapt in order to most effectively use the adversaries are already applying their skills Notes military instrument of national power to influence relevant actors.4 1 in a changing strategic environment. Within the changing environment, Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World Although conflict, violence, and war information may prove to be the pre- (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2016). endure, the methods through which po- eminent commodity and decisive factor 2 Ibid. litical goals are pursued are evolving due in military operations. As such, the 3 Cheryl Pellerin, “Project Maven to to technological changes.1 Technologies Chairman’s JP 1 issuance is a call to Deploy Computer Algorithms to War Zone such as autonomy and new forms of action for the joint force to move rapidly by Year’s End,” Defense.gov, July 21, 2017, available at
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Grynkewich 7 Information Systems Technicians monitor communication systems aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt, January 2018, Arabian Gulf (U.S. Navy/Alex Corona)
explains that “Effects in the physical and Paradigm Change informational dimensions of the IE ulti- mately register an impact in the human cognitive dimension, making it the Operational Art and the central object of operations in the IE.”1 The need for this addition to the joint functions has become increasingly Information Joint Function obvious to military leaders over time. It reveals itself in the difficulty of addressing By Scott K. Thomson and Christopher E. Paul gray zone challenges, which often displace the strategic utility of physical power; the survival of violent extremist organizations s Brigadier General Alexus years ago. General Joseph Dunford’s (VEOs) despite sustained physical pun- Grynkewich, USAF, states in the approval of this function is a vital step ishment; and in the rapid proliferation A preceding article, the Chairman on the pathway to achieve the endstate of, and the U.S. military’s reliance on, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved articulated in the 2016 Department information technology. During a recent information as the first addition to of Defense (DOD) Strategy for Opera- effort by the Joint Staff to update Joint the joint functions since the other tions in the Information Environment Publication (JP) 3-13, Information six were codified in doctrine over 20 (SOIE): “Through operations, actions, Operations, leaders recognized that the and activities in the IE [information joint force was already attempting to use environment], DOD has the ability to information as a function and that the Colonel Scott K. Thomson, USA, is a Psychological affect the decisionmaking and behavior time to institutionalize information as a Operations Officer in the Information Operations of adversaries and designated others to function was therefore overdue. Directorate at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Dr. Christopher E. Paul is a gain advantage across the range of mili- This change in capstone doctrine is by Senior Social Scientist at the RAND Corporation. tary operations.” The strategy correctly itself insufficient to solve contemporary
8 Forum / Paradigm Change JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 challenges. Without supporting efforts arguments against information as a joint engagements have concluded with the and adequate resourcing, little will function, discussing the way ahead, and death or wounding of every combatant change. The real work of institutional- highlighting the benefits of the new func- on one side or the other, but battles izing and operationalizing information tion to commanders. typically conclude with one side being de- is in stride throughout various DOD feated. Even the outcomes of operations components. If implemented boldly The Joint Force and the without an adversary, such as humanitar- and thoughtfully, the new function will Information Function ian assistance and disaster relief, hinge on cause military commanders, strategists, There are at least five reasons to elevate the perceptions, decisions, and resulting and planners to revisit and revise their information in joint force operations. behaviors of the assisted civilian popula- understanding of military operations First, the world has changed. Over tion. Perception, cognition, intention, and operational art. The information the past few decades, the IE has seen and decision—these are the terrain of the function will serve as a vital accelerant significant changes driven by evolving information function. for various developmental efforts, technology. The contemporary IE such as the SOIE, Capstone Concept can be characterized not only by its Changing Thinking about for Joint Operations, Joint Concept for unprecedented breadth, depth, and Objectives and Endstates Integrated Campaigning, Joint Concept complexity, but also by its ubiquity, During the 1973 negotiations to end for Operating in the Information hyperconnectivity, and exponential the Vietnam War, Colonel Harry Environment, and Joint Concept for growth. Second, our adversaries’ use of Summers, USA, remarked to a Vietnam- Human Aspects of Military Operations.2 information has changed. Adversaries ese officer that the United States never Indeed, the recently released 2017 seek and find asymmetrical advantage lost a battle in that war. The Vietnamese National Security Strategy (NSS) and over the joint force in and through the officer agreed, but retorted that while 2018 National Defense Strategy both IE, both allowing near-peer competitors Summers’s observation may have been repeatedly highlight threats to U.S. na- to become much more near-peers and true, it was “also irrelevant.”4 Indeed, tional security stemming from adversarial allowing those who we still unambig- Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, use of information. Skillful leveraging uously overmatch to gain advantage The Army, acknowledges that “lethality, of information power has enabled com- under certain circumstances. by itself, is not enough. If Army forces petitors and adversaries such as Russia, Third, the joint force is vulnerable do not address the requirements of China, and VEOs to realize important to attacks in and through the IE—not noncombatants in the joint operational gains in ways that our traditional views only in our networks and technical area before, during, and after battle, of war and warfare struggle to answer. communications, but also in our de- then the tactical victories achieved by The NSS is particularly direct in admon- cisionmaking processes, perceptions, our firepower only lead to strategic ishing that “U.S. efforts to counter the and will. Vulnerability to manipulation failure and world condemnation.”5 exploitation of information by rivals have or degradation of will includes the will Both Colonel Summers’s conversa- been tepid and fragmented. U.S. efforts to fight and the political will of the tion and ADP 1 reveal a concern that have lacked a sustained focus and have American people, both of which are many share about how the joint force been hampered by the lack of properly essential to the ability of the joint force understands planning and operations. trained professionals.”3 These docu- to operate across the range of military Many DOD leaders focus primarily on ments mandate that DOD, as part of a operations. Fourth, we cannot not lethality and battlefield dominance. whole-of-government effort, take the use communicate, and actions speak louder However, strategic success—not tactical of information power seriously. The in- than words. Every action and utterance victory—is what leaders must emphasize. formation joint function is an important of the joint force sends a message, The Vietnam War vividly exposed a situ- accelerant that, if properly implemented, intended or otherwise. This is part of ation where physical power alone did not should strengthen the joint force’s ability the inherent informational aspects of all produce the desired results, and our re- to achieve strategic aims across the range military activities. Furthermore, military cent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, of military operations. actions are often much more powerful where tactical victory has been common This article briefly answers a number and influential communications than but strategic success elusive, echo that of questions that this new joint function broadcast messages. If a picture is worth point. The relevance of lethality is further has prompted across the joint force. First, 1,000 words, then a Joint Direct Attack diminished in the contemporary operat- why must the joint force perform the Munition is worth 10,000. Fifth, all ing environment where our adversaries information function? Second, how must outcomes and endstates of joint force can displace the utility of physical might we change our thinking about objectives operations hinge on the perceptions and by operating below the threshold of war and endstates? Third, how must we decisions that lead to the actions and (gray zone operations) or operate in change our thinking about information? behaviors of relevant actors. Defeat of an loosely networked organizations that eas- We conclude by acknowledging and adversary, by whatever mechanism, is a ily reorganize and are therefore immune responding to a number of common cognitive outcome. Very few battles or
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Thomson and Paul 9 Airman analyzes coding necessary to maintain operational capabilities for power grid of simulated city as part of Cyber Security Incident Response Training (U.S. Air National Guard/Kayla K. Edwards) to systemic collapse when their members identify the actions necessary to enable influence must therefore become the lin- are killed or captured (VEOs). shorter term objectives (inaction, ori- gua franca of operational art. By focusing To avoid losing wars where we have enting in the wrong direction, retreat, on influence rather than simply “defeat” won all our battles and to gain the full movement to a vulnerable position, of an enemy (which is but one possible benefit available from the information waste of force or resources, civilian outcome of influence), we can avoid what joint function, we must change how we protest) as well as those necessary to the Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark think about objectives and endstates. endstate (demobilization, withdrawal, Milley has described as “the ‘tactization’ The descriptive language of the new cessation of force generation, abdica- of strategy.”6 If commanders express ob- joint function calls us to influence rel- tion of leadership, entering settlement jectives and endstates in terms of actions evant actor perceptions, behavior, and negotiations, suspension of legitimacy). and behaviors of relevant actors, the action or inaction in pursuit of the com- Specifying behavioral objectives and end- connections between tactical actions and mander’s objectives and endstate. To do states further enables mission command strategic results become clearer. this, commanders must specify objectives and mission tactics, as junior leaders can We must emphasize that this ap- and endstates in terms of required be- assess the likely impact of their choices proach is in no way intended to argue haviors and actions: identify the relevant on the actions and behaviors of the rele- that the joint force does not require actors (the troops in enemy formations vant actors and exercise initiative in the lethal overmatch. Such an argument and their commanders, surely, but likely absence of specific guidance. would be counterproductive and foolish. also enemy national leadership and Changing the actions and behaviors Lethality can be incredibly influential and supporting civilian constituencies) and of others is called “influence,” and remains essential to national defense. Our
10 Forum / Paradigm Change JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 mandate is to better plan the influential capabilities. IO is intended to coordinate The way we (the joint force) view effects of joint force activities to avoid and deconflict the use of information-re- ourselves and think (Service cultures) unintended consequences and to better lated capabilities (IRCs)—such as military overlays the use of operational art achieve strategic goals. information support operations (MISO), (planning and operating), and seems to military deception, civil affairs, electronic produce a fairly predictable range of plan- Changing Thinking warfare, and others—with each other and ning outcomes that inhibit our ability to about Information operations in general to achieve the joint competently leverage information. This Realizing that the information joint force commander’s objectives.9 Problems unfortunately narrow range can prevent function has vital technical implications arise when we refer to information as an clear and creative thinking and critically in areas such as cyber and electromag- “operation,” separate from other opera- impede achieving favorable strategic netic spectrum operations, it is the per- tions. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces outcomes. suasive psychological aspects of informa- of the United States, defines operations as a When the joint force uses physical tion that remain frustratingly elusive to “sequence of tactical actions with a com- power, it creates far more information the joint force. We have identified the mon purpose or unifying theme.” Since (and potentially, influence) than any key terrain for implementing the infor- the joint force generates information of the IRCs. The Air Force dropping a mation joint function as operational simply by operating, how can operations “MOAB” (GBU-43/B—the so-called art—the way joint leaders plan, execute, and IO remain logically separate? mother of all bombs) in Afghanistan, and assess operations. While this real- Commanders and staffs frequently the Navy maneuvering a carrier strike ization is evolutionary in its origins, it miss the inherent relation between phys- group off the coast of North Korea is possibly revolutionary in its effect on ical capabilities and information—and unannounced, or the Army or Marines military operations. The origin of calcu- misunderstand the largely intangible conducting exercises in Europe near the lus provides a useful illustration: rather nature of information. Even if misun- Russian border all create large volumes of than being the spontaneous discovery derstood, positive rhetoric from senior information—information that affects the of profoundly new ideas, the invention leaders illustrates their sincere apprecia- perceptions, cognitions, intentions, and of calculus was the result of incremental tion for the importance of information. decisions of a range of relevant actors. improvement over existing mathemat- In practice, though, field-grade leaders The information function, once woven ical knowledge. Yet this incremental who do the heavy lifting during planning into operational art (and supported by improvement had a profound effect on frequently relegate IO to a segregated important low-density expertise), stands mathematical practice and application. staff function. If the J6 can establish to enable commanders to better antici- General John Hyten, USAF, com- network operations, or the J4 can handle pate the strategic effects of their actions. mander of U.S. Strategic Command, sustainment, both with minimal input Information is as vital tactically as believes that the “military that figures from the J3, why can the J39 not simi- it is strategically. Iraq and Afghanistan out how to control information will larly perform IO in a vacuum? On most provide numerous examples of tactical be the most powerful military on the staffs, IO remains a secondary effort operations working at odds with desired planet.”7 General Hyten’s is but one that supports maneuver, is allocated strategic outcomes because they did not among a chorus of senior leader voices minimal resourcing, holds minimal space contribute to the desired perceptions expressing the joint force’s mandate to in base orders, and is given little focus and behaviors of relevant actors. General elevate the importance of information during operational updates to joint force Stanley A. McChrystal, USA (Ret.), in plans, operations, and investments. commanders.10 observed that an “inability to understand Business as usual carries far too much This segregated application of IO our surroundings often left a burned- risk to national security. typically focuses on the integration of out building or a cratered road—a stark Most military leaders who hear “in- a narrow subset of IRCs. The implicit symbol of our shortcomings—and wasted formation” will instinctively equate the thinking equates information with themes precious time in the overall campaign. function with information operations and messages, and assumes that the com- Waging such campaigns, designed to per- (IO), but the two are not analogous. munication of themes and messages is suade people to behave in a certain way is IO has been a joint capability for many something that happens separate from— complex.”11 years, but many continue to skeptically and in a supporting role to—operations. It is imperative that we reorient view it as a marginal military activity or as However, all military activities have our approach to operational art toward a failing enterprise.8 If IO is marginal or inherent informational aspects because influencing relevant actor perceptions, failing, it is first a problem with the way they change the way adversaries, popula- behavior, action, or inaction in order to leaders understand the importance and tions, and allies perceive and act on their address this complexity. If we express ob- functioning of information, and second, a environment. The use of information is jectives and endstates in terms of actions logical failure in doctrine. ultimately about generating effects that and behaviors desired of others, we will Doctrinally, IO is simply a coordi- achieve objectives, and as noted above, avoid many missteps and produce more nating staff function that has no organic you cannot not communicate. predictable enduring strategic outcomes.
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Thomson and Paul 11 Information, along with the other joint •• “We already do this.” focused on a commander’s endstate functions, will support the pursuit of •• “This will cost the Services combat or the relatively minor inclusion of in- those outcomes.12 capability.” formation considerations in plans and It remains unclear what the eventual operations. While planners inherently “This Is Not Our Job.” This assertion fate of IO as a doctrinal construct will direct operations toward a commander’s usually emerges when one mentions the be. IO could remain in doctrine, or its desired endstate, the explicit behavioral word influence. But even conventional purpose could simply be absorbed into component is typically absent. In those combat operations have a purpose larger the staff through other means. As DOD cases, planning toward behavioral out- than destruction. There, the purpose is to views on information power evolve, and comes that support strategy is implied defeat the will of the enemy in traditional as the Joint Staff works through the rather than specified. Furthermore, the Clausewitzian terms. But “will” is incom- implementation of the information joint best routes to persuasion and influence plete by itself. It is the will for somebody function, what is clear is that the elevated are assumed rather than planned using to do something, and that means that any importance of information requires a new valid behavioral analysis and informed realization of will is actually some form paradigm that far surpasses the tradition- by a knowledge of behavioral science. It of behavior. The will to resist or the will ally limiting IO construct.13 is true that units “execute IO,” but, as to fight are embodied in actions and The eventual fate of IO as a doctrinal stated earlier, IO is often a separate and behaviors. We only know we have broken or staff construct aside, a willingness to supporting staff activity. To be effective, an enemy’s will when it stops fighting express commanders’ objectives in terms information must not only be understood or resisting, and it begins to engage in of others’ actions and behaviors and to as central to how objectives are stated, defeated behaviors, such as fleeing or bake informational considerations into but also fully integrated with other capa- surrender. If the behaviors of relevant base plans will not alleviate the need for bilities (and functions) in pursuit of those actors define strategic success or failure, information-related expertise. If any- objectives. and objectives and endstates are specified thing, the new emphasis on the role of “This Will Cost the Services Combat in these terms (as they should be), then information increases the need for such Capability.” There may be limited influence is the ultimate purpose of the expertise. As commanders and staffs seek merit to this concern. For example, the joint force. to use all available military capabilities to Army does not have the MISO forces “This Cannot Be Done.” Some critics influence the actions and behaviors of rel- it needs to support long-term stability deny the possibility of effectively specify- evant actors, they will need to understand operations—something that became ing objectives and endstates in behavioral the predictable and common patterns in obvious during the heights of operations terms. Surely this is not how commanders human behavior and the means by which in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, the and staffs habitually plan, but it is far information is collected, disseminated, Intelligence Community is simply not from impossible. Planning toward be- and processed. yet ready to support the information havioral outcomes is not only possible, While all leaders will need to possess function, and this function will affect but it is also routine for certain elements basic knowledge of the IE, information intelligence investments in all the Services of the joint force. MISO already has an function, and IRCs, they will often also and some defense agencies. However, analytical process called target audience need the support of highly educated two facts stand out. The first is that ex- analysis, focused on understanding the subject matter experts in order to realize cellent tactics and physical capability are behaviors of relevant actors, and which the full potential of information. The irrelevant if they do not achieve strategic is used to plan and shape MISO efforts fact remains that human behaviors are aims. Physical destruction rarely defines to influence (routinely including physical notoriously challenging to diagnose, strategic success. More often, strategic actions as well as communication).14 understand, and change. Both the in- success is defined by collective social Military deception, being behaviorally telligence and IRC communities must behaviors. Second, implementing the focused, is similar in nature. A rich body possess the education and skills to assist information function is not an argument of literature reveals the effectiveness of the commander in the technical and for massive investment in influence applied behavioral planning approaches psychological aspects of information capabilities. While new investments are to policy implementation by governments as it relates to plans, operations, and necessary, the first and most effective ap- around the world. Typically referred to as assessment. proach is to better use the force at hand behavioral economics, these approaches by improving the way the joint force rely on social and cognitive psychological Challenging the Strawman employs its current assets. Information- research to dramatically improve policy When presenting an argument elevating related capabilities are less expensive than outcomes defined by human behavior.15 the importance of information and physical combat power capabilities. The That the joint force has yet to adopt these behavior, routine objections surface: Marine Corps is already reorganizing its methods makes them no less valid. information-related force structure into “This is not our job.” “We Already Do This.” This state- •• Marine Information Groups, showing “This cannot be done.” ment usually refers to either operations •• a willingness to invest in new structure.
12 Forum / Paradigm Change JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Airmen work with 179th Airlift Wing Communications Flight, presented with Air Force Lieutenant General Harold W. Grant award for best communication flight in Air National Guard, January 26, 2018, Mansfield, Ohio (U.S. Air National Guard/Joe Harwood)
It has even assigned a three-star deputy planning process, will largely define our inherently link tactical actions to strate- commandant for information. Service ability to harness the power of informa- gic outcomes defined by relevant actor capability and capacity count, but ulti- tion to enable strategic success. Simul- behavior. mately, adopting the information joint taneously, we must improve the Joint Targeting and assessments are the function is about clearer thinking. Intelligence Preparation of the Oper- final big pieces of the puzzle. Targeting ational Environment (JIPOE) process must account for both a short- and The Way Ahead as contained in JP 2-01.3. Since JIPOE long-term focus. Some concerns, such as Those involved in the efforts to imple- feeds course of mission analysis and countering propaganda or moderating ment the information joint function course of action development, it must crises to dampen negative effects, are realize that they are trying to solve enable the staff to produce solid analysis immediate in nature. However, targeting a strategically important, but inher- of the drivers of human behavior so the must focus just as intently on long-term ently ambiguous, complex problem. commander understands how best to strategic objectives and account for the The Joint Staff has already issued the execute the information joint function. fact that enduring changes to human change to JP 1 and is in the process of Vague statements in doctrine accom- behavior are far more likely to take years analyzing and implementing changes plish little. The Intelligence Community than days. Therefore, we must consider to down-trace doctrine such as JP 3-0, needs specific processes to assess the modifying JP 3-60, Targeting, to support Operations, and JP 3-13, Information existing and likely behaviors of relevant the information function. Evaluating Operations. The decisive point for real- actors. Perhaps making the MISO target campaign success remains an elusive izing the potential of information as audience analysis process an intelligence problem to solve. A behavioral focus a joint function will rest in improving responsibility and integrating it as part in plans and operations, enabled by the two other pieces of doctrine, though. of JIPOE would be a logical place information function, may produce tangi- Sharpening JP 5-0, Joint Planning, spe- to start. This could enable staffs to ble progress toward this end.16 cifically operational design and the joint produce logics of behavior change that
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Thomson and Paul 13 8 The way ahead for implementing the Commanders will be able to measure Jerome Lynes, deputy director for Joint Education and Doctrine, Joint Staff J7, notes joint function is not purely doctrinal. campaign success by evaluating emer- that “IO [information operations are], anec- The Office of the Secretary of Defense gent behavior of relevant actors that dotally, one of the most misused terms in the is revising policy to enable the joint defines strategic outcomes rather than DOD Dictionary being used variously to mean force to better operate in and through focusing too intently on the physics of the integration of the IRCs [information-re- the IE. Professional military education fighting. In 2009, then-General James lated capabilities], public affairs, strategic com- munication themes, and talking points.” Email must thoroughly educate leaders at all Mattis stated that “capturing percep- message to authors, August 24, 2017. levels—from initial entry through strate- tions is the new ‘high ground’ in today’s 9 Maneuver and fires, for example, as well as gic-level education—on both technical conflicts, as the moral is to the materiel public affairs—an IRC that does not fall under and psychological aspects of information as three is to one.”18 It is time to capture IO. 10 for both offensive and defensive opera- that ground.19 JFQ Isaac R. Porche III et al., Redefining In- formation Warfare Boundaries for an Army in tions. The Intelligence Community must a Wireless World, MG-1113-A (Santa Monica, devote resources to the analysis of social CA: RAND, 2013), available at
14 Forum / Paradigm Change JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Soldier with 780th Military Intelligence Brigade sets up cyber tools overlooking mock city of Razish at National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, May 5, 2017, as part of Army Cyber Command–led Cyber- Electromagnetic Activities Support to Corps and Below Initiative (U.S. Army Cyber Command/Bill Roche)
The Practical Implications of Information as a Joint Function
By Gregory C. Radabaugh
he importance of understand- amid an erosion of the U.S. military’s geographically based operational ing the informational aspect competitive advantage in a security structure and associated command T of the operating environment environment marked by challenges and control (C2) architecture. Future was underscored by the Chairman of from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, conflicts “will spread quickly across the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s addition of and violent extremist organizations multiple combatant command geo- Information as a Joint Function (IJF) (VEOs). As the Chairman articulated graphic boundaries, functions, and in a recent change to Joint Publication in his 2016 posture statement, conflict domains. We must anticipate the need 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of with one—or a combination—of our to respond to simultaneous challenges the United States. This change comes adversaries will be transregional, mul- in the ground, air, space, cyberspace, tidomain, and multifunctional (TMM) and maritime domains.”1 in nature. This represents a marked Among the many challenges affecting shift from how past conflicts were operations in and across all the domains Gregory C. Radabaugh is Director of the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center, Joint fought and will put significant stress on are advances in information technology, Base San Antonio, Texas. the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) which have significantly changed the
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Radabaugh 15 Soldier with Expeditionary Cyber Electromagnetic Activities Team, 781st Military Intelligence Battalion, conducts cyberspace operations at National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, May 9, 2018 (U.S. Army Cyber Command/Bill Roche) generation, transmission, reception of, and attitudes, the joint force will require (and their associated capabilities and and reaction to information. As high- an understanding of how relevant actors processes); all require a collective under- lighted in the Joint Concept for Operating perceive and understand information. standing of the implications and character in the Information Environment, “these In all domains, every friendly action, of the warfighting domains and IE. The advances have increased the speed and written or spoken word, and displayed or Services are pursuing new ways of think- range of information, diffused power over relayed image has informational aspects ing and training and new technologies to information, and shifted sociocultural that communicate a message or intent.4 collect and distribute data for situational norms. The interplay between these three Commanders must also be alert that awareness coupled with real-time report- provides our competitors and adversaries red actors will interpret blue activities ing of the changing battlespace.5 Mission additional opportunities to offset the through the lens of their personal world command in the IE, for example, entails diminishing physical overmatch of the views, regardless of the intended message. commanders giving subordinates the flex- world’s preeminent warfighting force.”2 With IJF, commanders must now ibility to adjust a theme, narrative, and This three-way interplay affects each understand the centrality of dynamic message as the situation dictates. of the warfighting domains and their integration of information with other Fires. Commanders will be more activities in the information environment joint functions (C2, fires, intelligence, likely to consider the employment of all (IE). For example, operations in the movement and maneuver, protection, available weapons and other systems. The land domain will increasingly take place sustainment) in order to positively alter Marine Corps has recently established an among, against (in the case of VEOs), relevant actor perceptions and behaviors Information Marine Expeditionary Force and in defense of civilians. Civilians will in a TMM security environment regard- to build and sustain effective offensive be the information targets and the objec- ing national security objectives. cyber and electronic warfare operations tives to be won, as much as an opposing Command and Control. Information and associated intelligence support. force.3 Similarly, since deterring conflict is integral to planning for and synchroniz- Fires and information also extend to the also hinges ultimately on perceptions ing operations involving disparate entities synchronization of information-related
16 Forum / Practical Implications of Information as a Joint Function JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 activities such as military information of adversary attack. Thus, commanders foundational aspects of combat power support operations with hard assets like a must integrate OPSEC into sustainment and the way in which DOD accomplishes GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast planning as they do in planning other programming and budgeting actions, (the so-called Mother of All Bombs) to aspects of operations. IJF will serve to create a joint force of blunt adversary uses of ideas, images, In addition to enhancing joint war- tomorrow more capable of and organized and violence designed to manipulate the fighting today, IJF in joint doctrine will to leverage the inherent informational United States and its allies. play a significant role in three ways. First, aspects of all military activities to achieve Intelligence. Commanders can be while policy generally drives doctrine, on the commander’s objectives and enduring expected to place increasing emphasis on occasion a new application of an extant strategic outcomes. The ultimate result the integration of intelligence disciplines capability within doctrine may require will be that joint force commanders are and analytic methods to characterize, the creation of policy. In the coming able to dominate the informational aspect forecast, and assess the IE. Moreover, months, senior-level forums (for example, of their operating environment (the IE) they will be more inclined to emphasize the Information Operations Executive the same way they dominate land, sea, air it early in the planning process due to Steering Group) comprised of policymak- space, and cyberspace. JFQ the long lead time needed to establish ers, operators, and doctrine developers information baseline characterizations can be expected to work collaboratively and properly assess effects in the IE. A to develop effective and integrated policy Notes major challenge will be characterizing the and doctrine for the joint force. 1 informational battlespace in a way that Second, joint doctrine provides Posture Statement of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., before the Senate Armed Services enables commanders to visualize it in the the foundation for joint training and Committee, March 17, 2016. same manner as the land, sea, air, space, education. As such, curricula from 2 Joint Concept for Operating in the Infor- and cyberspace battlespaces, enabling precommissioning programs to general mation Environment (Washington, DC: The them to fully integrate informational and and flag officers continuing education Joint Staff, September 1, 2017, draft version physical power. programs will be revised to reflect the 0.80). 3 General Sir Rupert Smith described this Movement and Maneuver. This func- informational aspects of all military construct as “war amongst the people.” See tion includes moving or deploying forces activities. Rupert Smith and Ilana Bet-El, “Military into an operational area and maneuvering Finally, while not the explicit goal of Capabilities for War Amongst the People,” in to achieve objectives. In developing plans IJF, its incorporation into joint doctrine Adapting America’s Security Paradigm and ranging from freedom of navigation to opens the possibility for changing the Security Agenda, ed. Roy Godson et al. (Wash- ington, DC: National Strategy Information those intended to prevent a crisis from way DOD programs and budgets for Center, 2011). worsening and allow for de-escalation operations in the IE. Joint functions are 4 Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the (flexible deterrent options), IJF will pro- generally aligned with Joint Capability Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, vide a means for commanders to more Areas (JCA), which are collections of DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013). 5 tightly align the movement of forces with like-capabilities functionally grouped to David L. Goldstein, Enhancing Multi-Domain Command and Control . . . information activities to influence rele- support capability analysis and investment Tying It All Together, U.S. Air Force Focus vant actors. Every physical activity has an decisionmaking. JCAs are aligned with Area (Washington, DC: Headquarters De- informational component. Functional Capability Boards, which partment of the Air Force, 2017); and Mark Protection. The protection function assist the Chairman in accomplishing his A. Milley, Multi-Domain Battle: Combined st in part includes conserving the joint statutory responsibilities of assessing risk Arms for the 21 Century (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, force’s fighting potential by making and making programmatic recommen- February 2017). friendly forces difficult to locate and dations. Now that information is a joint strike. Integration of protection and function, changes within the Planning, information—particularly regarding Programming, and Budgeting Execution military deception and operations security process could follow, making needed (OPSEC)—will be critical to antiaccess/ investments for operations in the IE area-denial operations, where the joint more visible (such as creating a separate force will have to maneuver undetected Information JCA). over strategic distances through multiple The integration of the IJF with the domains. other six joint functions offers new Sustainment. Sustainment is the opportunities for developing and con- provision of logistics and personnel ducting operational art and design. IJF services necessary to extend operational will result in the development of execut- reach. Management of information and able plans to deal with future conflicts information systems is critical to sus- that are TMM in nature. Moreover, given tainment and will be a significant target the importance of joint doctrine to other
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Radabaugh 17 Air Force pararescuemen assigned to 48th Rescue Squadron and French air commandos provide cover after moving simulated patient into Eurocopter EC-725 for aerial transport during personnel recovery scenario in southern Arizona, November 7, 2017, as part of Angel Thunder (U.S. Air Force/Andrew Lee)
Globally Integrated Exercises Optimizing Joint Force C2 Structure
By Stephen M. Gallotta, James A. Covington, and Timothy B. Lynch
ncreased complexity among emerging faces responding to them.2 A primary on combatant commander (CCDR) and challenges in the strategic environ- challenge, revealed in a brief exam- higher authority integration. Despite a I ment requires adjustments in how ination of the joint force’s history, is number of limitations, the CJCS GIE the United States prepares for future creating a clear approach toward global approach is the most proactive, effective, challenges.1 Chairman of the Joint integration to enhance Department of and innovative means to create the Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Joseph Defense (DOD) strategic planning and necessary planning and organizational F. Dunford, Jr., recognizes not only execution. Taking on this challenge, the changes to confront today’s increasingly the complexity of the environment, Chairman is creating a Globally Inte- complex strategic environment. but also the challenges the joint force grated Exercise (GIE) structure focusing The Approach Without the benefit of a definitive leg- Commander Stephen M. Gallotta, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, USN (Ret.), is currently serving islative mandate and lacking command as an Exercise Planner in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7. Lieutenant Colonel James A. Covington, USA, authority, the Chairman is utilizing the is currently serving as the Branch Chief, Readiness and Assessments, in Joint Force Headquarters– Department of Defense Information Networks, J35. Major Timothy B. Lynch, USA, is a Field Artillery GIE to drive the joint force toward officer currently serving as a Joint Targeting School Instructor. understanding the requirements for
18 Forum / Optimizing Joint Force C2 Structure JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 global integration.3 On January 12, Case Studies: JCS Evolution President Roosevelt.”8 Still, the JCS was 2017, General Dunford issued the The United States has a history of not a statutory body, and its members 2017–2020 Joint Training Guidance adapting the force to address emerg- were still under the command of separate (2017 JTG). CJCS Instruction 3500.1, ing challenges. Two landmark pieces Cabinet officials. Joint Staff Joint Training Policy and of legislation reveal the innovative, With the impending threat of com- Guidance, transformed the emphasis in iterative, and effective transformation munist expansionism in the post–World CJCS-sponsored joint force exercises. of the national security organization War II strategic environment, President Unlike previous guidance focusing on toward enhancing unity of command Harry S. Truman moved to streamline exercising, and thereby developing and unity of effort. The first case study, the national security system, pursuing functional capabilities (for example, the National Security Act of 1947, what he called “unification.”9 The re- cyber operations, targeting processes, enacted as a response to experiences of sulting National Security Act of 1947 fires, defeating antiaccess/area-denial World War II and in anticipation of the reshaped the U.S. national security networks, and interagency coordina- challenges by the coming Cold War, framework and created some of the most tion), the 2017 JTG focuses on the laid the foundation for today’s national important national defense institutions. “4+1” problem sets, cross–combatant security framework, establishing DOD, It eliminated the Cabinet rank for the command (CCMD) coordination, with a Cabinet-level Secretary, Central Service departments, making them senior leader development, and global Intelligence Agency, and Joint Chiefs of subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. integration.4 Furthermore, in the Staff, among other changes. It also created the authority for and defi- 2017 JTG, General Dunford uses his The second case study, the Goldwater- nition of combatant commands (called training authorities to align training Nichols Department of Defense unified commands). requirements to his vision of strategic Reorganization Act of 1986, aimed at im- For the JCS, in particular, the act complexity, a vision characterized by the proving interoperability or unity of effort provided the “statutory standing, with 4+1 problem set in a transregional, mul- among the military Services. It mandated a list of assigned duties, and it became a tidomain, and multifunctional (TMM) jointness in officer management and estab- corporate advisory body to the President, environment. lished a Joint Staff led by an officer who the Secretary of Defense, and the Establishing essential characteristics was the senior military officer, indepen- National Security Council.”10 Despite for exercises, the Chairman directs that dent of any Service, and answered only to the act’s intent to provide unity of effort, joint training must the President and Secretary. These trans- it remained incomplete because it did formative pieces of legislation demonstrate not provide a single voice to represent reflect the strategic environment and •• the continuing effort to streamline and the Services’ warfighters. The Service its respective challenges improve force management, information secretaries, although subordinate to emphasize global integration across •• use, and decisionmaking in the national the Secretary of Defense, remained the the 4+1 problem set security structure to better address security principal warfighters—building, training, span the range of military operations •• challenges. and fighting their forces accordingly, and enable the joint force to innovate. •• National Security Act of 1947. independently. These characteristics, and the eight Prior to 1941, the United States did not Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. associated required elements, introduce a have a formal entity like the Joint Staff. Thirty-nine years after the 1947 National new level of sophistication and challenge The advent of World War II, however, Security Act, Congress, again seeking for CCDRs to fully integrate the strategic brought change. Soon after Pearl Harbor, to improve unity of effort, profoundly considerations of the real-world 4+1 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt reshaped the national security structure. problem set into their exercise programs.5 and Prime Minister Winston Churchill Goldwater-Nichols was a groundbreaking Leading this effort, the 2017 JTG also established the Combined Chiefs of Staff bill that significantly altered the orga- directs that the as the supreme military body for strategic nization and operation of DOD and its direction of the Anglo-American war military components.11 The impetus for Joint Staff will establish a training pro- effort. To meet wartime demands, the Goldwater-Nichols was the recognition gram designed to improve its ability to United States informally established a that inter-Service rivalries were creating integrate global activities, resources, strat- JCS from the existing Service chiefs.7 command and control challenges for egy, and risk management, and provide The JCS quickly adapted and grew CCDRs and the Secretary. The system the best military advice. This program will into a warfighting organization. Several resulting from the 1947 act allowed involve a series of tabletop exercises, senior committees, planning teams, and agen- counterproductive inter-Service rivalry leader seminars, and wargames culminat- cies, with the intent of tackling tough to persist. These rivalries manifested ing in an annual event linked to a CCMD joint problem sets between Services and themselves in myriad ways, and peace- Tier 1 exercise that enables the Joint Staff allies, developed almost immediately. time activities (such as procurement to exercise internal strategic decisionmak- Although the JCS held an unofficial and creation of doctrine) were tailored ing and global synchronization processes.6 role, it remained “directly responsible to for each Service in isolation. Similarly,
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Gallotta, Covington, and Lynch 19 wartime activities of each Service were suggestions reflect an interest in trans- with the best military advice. Second, largely planned, executed, and evaluated forming DOD structure from region- the strategic leadership’s capacity for independently. These practices resulted ally based, with regional CCMDs, to timely military decisionmaking, which in division of effort, an inability to profit threat-based. Other recommendations General Dunford argues is unable to from economies of scale, and inhibited retain the regionally based structure “frame decisions and act in a timely the development of modern warfare but seek to create an apparatus to manner,” must be improved by making doctrine.12 This contributed to significant enhance globally integrated operations. some “fundamental changes . . . to our underachievement of DOD capability and What is needed, proponents argue, organizational construct.”22 placed national security at risk. All the is “an organization that thinks and The GIE structure envisions two specific provisions of the bill were aimed acts both globally and jointly”—but types of exercises differentiated by the at solving one problem: “the inability of they differ on who should lead the level of Joint Staff and joint force partic- the military Services to operate effectively organization, with recommendations ipation. Type 1 exercises “would involve together as a joint team.”13 running from the Chairman, Joint Staff Joint Staff developing events to rehearse The bill’s development, a result of J5, a civilian within DOD (such as the DOD leaders against national strategic almost 5 years of effort and analysis by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), objectives with whole-of-government/ Congress and the Pentagon, focused on to a new organization altogether.18 All whole-of-society focus.” In these exer- improving interoperability among the these ideas share one common charac- cises, Joint Staff and OSD leaders would Services at an operational level. The act teristic: there is no precedent or experi- be the “primary training audience with made a number of significant structural ence to judge the potential to enhance participation by all relevant combatant changes to DOD, increasing the powers global integration. What is needed then commands.”23 Type 1 exercises would of the Chairman and the CCDRs, while is a mechanism to evaluate how DOD be Joint Staff led, with interagency se- removing the Service secretaries and would enhance globally integrated nior-leader participation. Type 2 exercises chiefs from the operational chain of com- operations. are similar except that they will be CCDR mand. By requiring joint education and led, with two or more CCMDs and the duty assignments, Goldwater-Nichols has, Globally Integrated Exercises Joint Staff as the primary training audi- in the intervening years, created a force That mechanism is GIE. To execute ence, exercising a 4+1 challenge.24 comprised of officers trained and expe- the Chairman’s direction in the 2017 In both constructs, the Joint Staff rienced in joint operations. Ultimately, JTG, the Director of Joint Force will be a primary training audience, and Goldwater-Nichols went beyond unity of Development (J7) is developing the the scenarios, constructed from the effort to unity of command. GIE program.19 The program serves real-world strategic and political environ- two functions: to assess and align Joint ment, will involve the 4+1 challenges in a The Challenge Staff processes as the global integrator TMM environment. The lessons learned Today, 30-plus years after the enact- and to “create opportunities for [senior from these exercises will provide the ment of Goldwater-Nichols, there is a leaders] to increase their understanding Chairman with a body of evidence from growing movement to reexamine the and experience for globally integrated which he can advise the Secretary about national security structure in light of operations and strengthen their ability how best to execute globally integrated the increasingly complex and different to work effectively with the Joint operations. By doing these events on no strategic environment.14 Both Armed Staff, CCMDs, Services, interagency, less than an annual basis, across the range Services Committee chairmen, Senator and Allies and partners, to address of military operations and at different John McCain (R-AZ) and Represen- global integration/TMM threats.”20 stages of the conflict continuum, the tative Mac Thornberry (R-TX), have Ultimately, the intended endstate is to Chairman will establish the necessary voiced concerns about how well Gold- develop mechanisms to enable the Joint conditions to experiment with different water-Nichols is performing.15 In the Force and Joint Staff/Office of the Sec- approaches toward achieving global Senate, the Armed Services Committee retary of Defense (OSD) to operate at integration. The current goal is for a held hearings in mid-2016. It heard the speed of war. Type 1 exercise, with all (or most) of the from a variety of commentators, gath- Because the GIE provides CCDRs CCMDs, in fiscal year 2020.25 ering information about the current and higher-level authorities the ability Lessons learned from the first GIE structure and improvements that could to exercise the joint force as a whole in event that occurred in October 2017, be made.16 Comments ran the gamut time, space, and purpose while evaluat- where the Joint Staff and OSD partic- of suggested reforms, from ending ing global risk, it addresses two major ipated in a U.S. Northern Command CCMDs and transforming DOD into strategic-level concerns.21 First, the and U.S. Strategic Command exercise, three major commands (Global Strike, inability of the joint force to execute as demonstrated challenges in staff pro- Defense, and Presence) to transforming a whole undermines the Secretary and cesses, structure, and tools, which are CCMDs to threat-focused (rather than Chairman’s responsibility to provide the now being reviewed and addressed at the regionally focused) commands.17 These President and National Security Council flag/general officer level.
20 Forum / Optimizing Joint Force C2 Structure JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Soldier assigned to 1st Battalion, 501st Aviation Regiment, transmits information via field radio during Exercise Combined Resolve VIII, at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, June 8, 2017 (U.S. Army/Michael Bradley)
Limitations but the vast majority of CCMD exercises the chain of command. Under law, the Working as limitations to the Chair- are limited to a single command and its Chairman is responsible for “formulating man’s approach is the existing process components and, necessarily, provide no policies and technical standards, and for exercises that are, first and foremost, opportunity to conduct globally inte- executing actions, for the joint training a series of exercises by a single CCMD grated operations. of the Armed Forces.”26 This is broad au- and focused on three things: The second limitation is capacity. thority within the sphere of joint training A fully globally integrated exercise will and includes the requirements set forth in exercising existing theater operation •• require participants to step away from the 2017 JTG. Regarding global integra- plans and operation plans in concept their assigned duties to engage in the tion, the law provides, in form exercise. These are busy people and orga- CCMD staff processes •• nizations that do not have the bandwidth matters relating to global military stra- component training objectives •• to perform their normal duties on top tegic and operational integration—[the (which generally revolve around the of participating in time-consuming exer- Chairman is responsible for] (A) pro- warfight). cises. This challenge will, inevitably, limit viding advice to the President and the While these are not unworthy exercise the scope and tempo of the program. The Secretary on ongoing military operations; objectives for the commands involved, ideal, and the goal, is an annual global and (B) advising the Secretary on the this format routinely lacks the critical exercise involving all, or most of, the allocation and transfer of forces among dialogue with a higher authority, or CCMDs, exercising a 4+1 crisis scenario geographic and functional combatant other interested same-tier actors. There along with senior interagency partners commands, as necessary, to address are few exercises with multiple CCMDs and allies. transregional, multi-domain, and multi- involvement and even fewer with re- A third, perhaps more fundamental, functional threats.27 al-world strategic policymakers involved, limitation is the role of the Joint Staff in
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Gallotta, Covington, and Lynch 21 Amphibious assault exercise during Cobra Gold 2018, at Hat Yao, Thailand, February 16, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Olivia G. Ortiz)
The Chairman, then, has a critical responsibilities, is not advisable without growth and innovation required to create role regarding the deployment of forces first testing them in a globally integrated and examine the necessary connective to achieve global integration, but is not exercise. Because the GIE introduces tissue across combatant commands, the the decisionmaker. Indeed, as General real-world strategic and operational interagency community, and with the Dunford frequently points out, there challenges in an exercise environment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. As the is only one “global integrator” within the lessons learned not only will uncover GIE series develops under CJCS stew- DOD, the Secretary of Defense.28 how CCDRs work best with one another, ardship, it will require buy-in, patience, but also, through several iterations, and dedicated participation from the Recommendation create a shared understanding, as well as Joint Staff and combatant commanders The limitations in the GIE construct developing the processes, structures, and to reorient the joint force. The timeline, should not dissuade its utilization. tools necessary to achieve global inte- with exercises programmed over the up- Like any new concept, it requires the gration. Using the strategic exercises to coming years, is aggressive but necessary necessary time, space, and iterations to develop methodologies to accommodate to demonstrate to Congress that another meet the Chairman’s intent. As noted, the requirement for globally integrated reorganizational piece of legislation is not there is no shortage of recommenda- planning and operations creates an op- required or that a best solution has been tions for tackling the globally integrated portunity to help steer the joint force exercised and found effective. JFQ operations challenges. The risk to these through this transition. potential recommendations, while The Chairman’s GIE approach is the likely well informed, is that they remain most deliberate, effective, and innovative Notes untested. Placed into a military planning means to drive the necessary planning 1 context, choosing one of these potential and organizational joint force changes Valerie Strauss, “The Difference Between ‘Complex’ and ‘Complicated’—and Why recommendations is similar to pursuing to confront today’s increasingly complex It Matters in School Reform,” Washington a course of action without analyzing it. challenges. Although limitations exist Post, August 8, 2014, available at 22 Forum / Optimizing Joint Force C2 Structure JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 complex-and-complicated-and-why-it-matters- World War II (New York: Columbia University Force for a Trans-Regional Threat Environ- in-school-reform/?utm_term=.fba311ad182e>. Press, 2009), 267; William Inboden, “The ment,” Real Clear Defense, January 4, 2017, 2 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff No- National Security Act Turns 70,” War on the available at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Gallotta, Covington, and Lynch 23 Soldiers with 254th Regiment (Combat Arms), New Jersey Army National Guard, fly RQ-11B Raven small unmanned aircraft system at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, July 11, 2016 (U.S. Air National Guard/Mark C. Olsen) Moore’s Law and the Challenge of Counter-sUAS Doctrine By Mark D. Newell As I reflect back on four decades of service in uniform, it is clear that the pace of change has accelerated significantly. —General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. n 1965, Gordon Moore, co-founder The continual miniaturization, mass innovative application have created of the Intel Corporation, made his production, proliferation, and improve- several challenges for a joint force tasked I now famous prediction that the ment of integrated circuits and micro- to establish a defense against them. Not “number of transistors incorporated processors have introduced powerful least among these challenges has been the in a chip will approximately double computing technology into every aspect development and dissemination of useful every 24 months.”1 More than 50 years of modern life. counter-sUAS (C-sUAS) doctrine. later, his prediction has not only held One of the many modern applications true, but also the implications of what of the integrated circuit is in controlling History and Context is now called Moore’s Law define the small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS). At first glance, Moore’s Law appears to combat environment for the joint force. Commonly referred to by the name describe the potential growth of a single drones, commercially available sUAS technology through miniaturization. have increasingly become a weapon of What is unique about the exponential Lieutenant Colonel Mark D. Newell, USAF, is a choice for nonstate actors with limited miniaturization of transistors, though, Joint Doctrine Strategic Planner on the Joint Staff. resources. Their rapid evolution and is their foundation. Transistors form the 24 Forum / Moore’s Law and the Challenge of Counter-sUAS Doctrine JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 basic building blocks of integrated cir- designated RC aircraft between 0.55 and under $180.8 On the high end of the cuits and microprocessors, which in turn 55 pounds as “sUAS” and began regulat- spectrum, 20 hours of endurance, cruising act as the computational core of almost ing their activities in an effort to manage speeds of 50 mph, and a 22-pound pay- every piece of electronic technology. the growing numbers operating in the load can be purchased for just $17,000.9 For each reduction in transistor size United States. As one indication of the Given the availability and capability of over the last five decades, computing scale and pace of UAS growth, this year’s these systems, the joint force, along with capability has increased, while produc- FAA Aerospace Forecast predicts as many the entire U.S. defense apparatus, has sig- tion costs have decreased. The increased as 4.4 million sUAS will be registered in nificantly increased its focus on countering affordability for consumers has resulted the United States by 2021.2 If accurate, their capability at home and abroad. in broad market penetration. Today, this would amount to a 400 percent in- transistor and microprocessor technol- crease over the next 5 years.3 Change and Challenge ogy are ubiquitous; they touch every In keeping with Moore’s Law, the evo- aspect of modern life including the Terrorism and Budget lution of sUAS technology continues to weapons systems of the joint force and With the steady rise of international accelerate. An examination of new, mar- its adversaries. Although it is doubtful terrorism over the last two decades, bad ketable ideas in the field makes one of he understood it at the time, Moore actors around the globe have actively the better illustrations of this point. A predicted the dawn of a technological sought low-cost, readily available 2014 report showed a total of five new age no less significant than the indus- technology that can be weaponized for UAS patents were published in 2001.10 trial revolution in the 18th century. their purposes. Predictably, they have The same report showed 12 new Despite the fact that weapons tech- found and embraced the sUAS as an patents published in 2003, 22 in 2005, nology in every sector has transformed economical tool in their arsenal. The and a near perfect exponential increase rapidly over the last 50 years, the evolu- decade-long pursuit and evolution of every 24 months through the end of tionary pace of sUAS has been particularly terrorist organizations’ use of sUAS is the reported period, where it indicated startling. These systems seem to have detailed in a 2017 report by the Middle that 372 new patents were published burst onto the battlefield with remarkable East Media Research Institute.4 What in 2014.11 Even if each of these patents and fully developed capabilities. In truth, began in 2004 with a 20-minute sUAS only represents a small but measurable this perception is not entirely accurate, reconnaissance over Israel by Hizballah5 increase in capability, the rate of sUAS as the capabilities of today’s sUAS were has evolved to a point where so-called evolution is daunting. nurtured in what amounts to a global cot- Islamic State fighters routinely use The effort to establish and deploy tage research and development program. sUAS to drop grenades on U.S. special C-sUAS capability within the joint force While the weight of military effort was operations forces in Iraq and Syria.6 has been remarkably expeditious. Even focused on replicating manned aircraft Concerns for the future, however, lie a casual Internet search for “C-UAS” capabilities in larger UAS, anything under much closer to home as the Department reveals a significant uptick in government 50 pounds had been essentially relegated of Homeland Security has advised outreach to industry in 2016. Phrases to the realm of hobbyists. American citizens that terrorist groups are such as Joint Urgent Operational Need12 Quietly in garages and basements actively pursuing “new technologies and and government-sponsored C-UAS com- around the world, remote control aircraft tactics, such as unmanned aerial systems petitions focused on evaluating “Hard enthusiasts incorporated each advance- and chemical agents that could be used Kill” technologies13 are prevalent in the ment in miniaturization and processing outside the conflict zones.”7 While the results. The same search also reveals an capacity into their hobby. Smaller radios technology and tactics to defend against outpouring of industry response. Dozens allowed greater range with less weight. larger UAS have existed in the form of of new technologies and adaptations Miniaturized cameras were incorporated antiaircraft capability since the dawn of of existing ones have been rapidly de- that could transmit real-time data to aviation, sUAS pose a new and unique veloped, and just as rapidly fielded for operators wearing virtual reality headsets. threat. Small and maneuverable enough to evaluation on the battlefield. Powerful microprocessors and Global elude most surveillance and early warning With the support of innovative in- Positioning System receivers created radar systems, they are also quiet and dustry partners, U.S. Central Command aerodynamic stability and allowed com- therefore difficult to detect. In the United is meeting the C-sUAS challenge with plex propulsion configurations and the States, aside from FAA registration, there deliberate action. In response to the capability to preprogram routing beyond are no restrictions on the purchase of immediate nature of the sUAS threat, radio range. These advances, along with military-grade sUAS. People interested in the command has deployed over 100 ever-decreasing entry-level costs, greatly acquiring a capability via the Internet will different experimental C-sUAS systems expanded the global remote-control find that they can purchase a quadcopter throughout the theater.14 Ranging from (RC) aircraft market. with its own camera system, capable of man-portable to large fixed-base systems, In December 2015, the Federal 12-minute flights, controlled with a cell all are undergoing operational evalu- Aviation Administration (FAA) phone, and delivered to their home for ation by the joint force in the combat JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Newell 25 ally speaking, doctrine should be both aspirational and instructional. It should capture the best ideas and practices from across the formation, boil them down to their essences, clearly articulate them, and present them back to the formation as achievable goals and stan- dard procedures. This description is in line with the Chairman’s Memorandum 5120.01A, Joint Doctrine Development Process, which requires joint doctrine to reflect “extant practice” and capture “lessons learned.”16 It also illustrates how the efforts of the joint force are synchronized through common under- standing and expectation. One prerequisite to capturing, documenting, and disseminating extant practice is the establishment of the extant practice itself. In other words, it is difficult to describe how things are normally done when they are not done in any particular way. The same can be said for the durabil- ity of the extant practice. If the way things are done changes at an interval shorter than the doctrine development timeline, any doctrine produced will be of limited value. This is particularly challenging regarding joint doctrine, where new submissions are thoroughly vetted by a joint doctrine development community of 264 representatives from combatant commands, Services, and other stake- st th Marine with Company Bravo, 1 Battalion, 6 Marine Regiment, prepares to fly Mark-2 Instant Eye holders. Over the past 20 years, joint during Infantry Platoon Battle course as part of Deployment for Training on Fort Pickett, Virginia, August 15, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Michaela R. Gregory) doctrine development timelines have been streamlined from 21 months in 1996, to environment.15 Once sufficient data have current C-sUAS systems has completed. 17 months, and again this summer to 12 been collected, the field will be narrowed This moving target, which is increasingly months with the implementation of the and a subset chosen for larger scale pro- harder to hit, is the challenge implied by Adaptive Doctrine initiative.17 Even with duction and deployment. Were it not for Moore’s Law. If there is one aspect of the these significant improvements, capturing the evolutionary rate of sUAS, this pro- C-sUAS effort more difficult than keep- rapidly evolving C-sUAS practices in joint cess would be relatively straightforward. ing pace with sUAS evolution, it might doctrine remains a challenge. Unfortunately, as the current ex- be producing useful C-sUAS doctrine. The approach the C-sUAS doctrine perimental C-sUAS systems are being community has taken is to balance evaluated in the field, teams of designers Doctrine and Adaptation specificity and accuracy while favoring and engineers are already working on The concept of military doctrine bears timeliness. That is to say they have pur- the next generation. A thumb through brief discussion because it often means posely provided an intellectual framework the science and technology periodicals different things to different people. that allows efficient communication of at any bookstore yields articles about There are essentially three levels of ideas in the short term, while avoiding artificial intelligence, autonomous sys- military doctrine: Service, multi-Ser- some of the specificity that might become tems, swarm tactics, and more. Given the vice, and joint. Where multi-Service inaccurate by the time it is published. current rate of evolutionary change, it is doctrine may be specific to two or more Within the joint force, the Army gets full entirely possible that the next generation Services, joint doctrine is published by credit for the groundwork that it laid in of sUAS technology will be deployed on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of C-sUAS doctrine. In October 2016, as the battlefield before evaluation of the Staff for use by all the Services. Gener- the first experimental C-sUAS systems 26 Forum / Moore’s Law and the Challenge of Counter-sUAS Doctrine JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 were being deployed, the Army released technology. By maintaining a conceptual for the West as ISIS Launches First Attack Drones (Washington, DC: Middle East Media Research an unclassified C-UAS strategy that had approach, this framework is presented Institute, February 21, 2017), available at as its stated purpose “to integrate and with the expectation that combatant JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Newell 27 Soldiers from Expeditionary Cyber Support Detachment, 782nd Military Intelligence Battalion (Cyber), provide offensive operations in support of 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, during seizure of town at National Training Center, Rotation 18-03, Fort Irwin, California, January 18, 2018 (U.S. Army/Adam Schinder) Outmatched Shortfalls in Countering Threat Networks By David Richard Doran ur adversaries employ threat cue from Sun Tzu, in many areas they to compete with us below the threshold networks to create conditions are winning without fighting, but by of traditional armed conflict is a critical O in the operating environment employing means that we consider first step to identifying opportunities that undermine international order nonmilitary. These persistent simul- to exploit, disrupt, or degrade threat and rule of law—without triggering taneous efforts unbalance joint force networks. However, the increasing a decisive military response. Taking a footing by causing regional instability, convergence of legitimate and illicit damage to legitimacy, degraded access, networks complicates our ability to gain conduits for weapons and fighters, and the level of understanding required ultimately pathways for attacks against to do this effectively. A dilemma thus Lieutenant Colonel David Richard Doran, USA, is a Joint Strategic Planner in the Office of Irregular the homeland. Understanding how ensues: Commanders are encumbered Warfare, Joint Staff J7. adversaries use threat networks globally with problems for which the optimal 28 Forum / Shortfalls in Countering Threat Networks JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Leaders and planners must embrace Finally, military adversaries use them to a deeper understanding of the role that avoid direct military engagement (even threat networks play in shaping the attribution) while gaining relative advan- global environment so that they can tage against the joint force, making them effectively counter them and prevent ad- hard to defeat. versaries from threatening U.S. interests. As a military function, CTN is some- Achieving this seismic shift in how we what of an orphan. It is not exclusively think about threat networks will allow us a problem that the joint force owns to harden our blue network, closing gaps outright, but one requiring integration of and seams that adversaries are otherwise military and nonmilitary applications of able to exploit. It requires a comprehen- national power. Threat networks are not sive approach—spanning organizational, exclusively a counterterrorism problem. functional, and institutional boundaries— We cannot waive it off as an unconven- to develop an integrated framework for tional warfare problem or one with a countering threat networks (CTN). special operations forces solution. We Threat networks are described in joint certainly cannot shrug it off as simply a doctrine as those whose size, scope, or diplomatic or law enforcement problem. capabilities threaten American interests. We also cannot afford to pigeonhole These networks may include the underly- CTN into one or two lanes or job jars; ing informational, economical, logistical, there must be cross-functional ownership. and political components to enable these We have to operationalize key players networks to function. These threats from within each element of national create a high level of uncertainty and am- power to work together in a concerted biguity in terms of intent, organization, effort, combining their unique skills and linkages, size, scope, and capabilities. authorities. It is this constellation of orga- They also jeopardize the stability and nizations and entities that makes up the sovereignty of nation-states, including the enterprise involved in countering threat United States.1 networks. While there is a broad range of Consider Russian organized crime, capabilities that can be brought to bear Chinese drug trade, North Korean in the effort, CTN skill-sets generally fall weapons proliferation, Iranian terror into the following disciplines: exportation, financing, and recruiting by threat network targeting the so-called Islamic State. What do all •• counter-threat finance of these have in common? Among other •• law enforcement (or only) solutions are often nonmil- things, they actively employ nonmilitary •• counter-message itary, representing a condition that is enabling networks to achieve strategic •• counter–transnational organized anathema to our culture and, as such, objectives within what we call the Gray •• crime incongruent with our processes. Zone, Phase 0, and competition short counternarcotics The joint force is not postured to of armed conflict.2 Joint planners must •• counterinsurgency effectively counter these threat networks navigate an operating environment made •• counter–weapons of mass at a level that matches, or much less over- increasingly more complex by the de- •• destruction matches them. Historically, when faced liberate employment of these networks. friendly network engagement with emerging challenges that could Decisionmakers rely on analysts and •• counterterrorism not be addressed using extant practices, planners to develop comprehensive threat •• social network exploitation processes, or capabilities, such as the pro- pictures and associated response options •• publically available information liferation of improvised explosive devices and plans, but these are often incomplete •• exploitation or weapons of mass destruction, we did for several reasons. First, these networks cyber operations not accept a casual, disjointed approach often manifest across the spectrum of •• information management to countering them. Accordingly, we threat activities as decentralized, fluid, •• counterintelligence. should not attempt to counter threat and resilient webs of loosely connected •• networks through ad hoc ways and means nodes, making them hard to illuminate. but rather adopt a deliberate approach, This is further complicated by the diverse 2017 CTN Study rooted in policy, enshrined in doctrine, natures of these networks, which range The Joint Staff J7 Office of Irregular instilled in our institutions, and under- from illicit to legitimate or somewhere in Warfare (OIW) conducted a study to stood throughout the joint force. between, making them difficult to target. review and optimize the enterprise JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Doran 29 deliberate approach designed to max- From Coordination to Collaboration to Integration imize the benefits of combining joint “After 9/11, the U.S. Government was compelled to confront its weaknesses force and partner capabilities. We tend to in interagency coordination, and while we have made tremendous progress in look at individual aspects and segments the intervening years, I believe we have mostly exhausted the strategic value of threat networks through functional we could derive from improved coordination. This explains why, over the past “soda straws.” We orient and fixate on several years, we have increasingly been using the word collaboration—which the commodity and do not pay sufficient requires far more than just information-sharing and operational synchroniza- attention to the enabling networks. This tion. It requires doing things together as an interagency team for temporary is akin to treating the symptom and ig- but important purposes. We have made even more strategic progress because noring the disease. Moreover, a holistic of our transition to collaboration, but I believe we are starting to see the limits regimen for treating a disease should take of how far interagency elements temporarily doing things together can take us. advantage of all appropriate approaches, “My personal view is that the next necessary phase, which will admittedly be not only those remedies that relieve the harder than both coordination and collaboration, is integration. This will require symptom for a time. Threat networks us to more permanently bring previously disparate elements and efforts of the are like complex, adaptive, and resilient interagency community together into enduring structures and strategic missions, organisms that evolve in order to survive. where more government elements spend large portions of their careers working The approach to treat them must be outside of their originating organization or agency. This will be both difficult robust enough to be formidable, yet agile and uncomfortable for many of us, but I believe that a world in which our enough to keep up with their changing future adversaries and challenges will defy both our geographic models and our modes and methods. This requires an department-by-department practices on a global (as opposed to country or even organizational construct that coordinates regional) scale demands this of us.” policy and processes, prioritizes resources, and integrates with other departments, —Lieutenant General Michael K. Nagata, USA agencies, international partners, and even Director for Strategic Operational Planning the private sector and academia. National Counter Terrorism Center Third, we should become comfort- able in supporting roles. The joint force cannot defeat threat networks alone. involved in countering threat networks.3 joint planners is to lump CTN and its In the same vein, we cannot effectively The director of the Joint Staff tasked associated activities into some sort of compete with our military competitors OIW to examine joint force CTN catch-all subset of counterterrorism. As without addressing the threat networks operations and activities, with the goal demonstrated in previous examples, CTN they employ. Traditionally, we have a of strengthening transregional collabo- applies to all challenges within the current bias for immediate, decisive action on ration and integration with U.S. Gov- threat framework and conceivably any the objective. However, defeating threat ernment and other mission partners.4 that might emerge. Given this common networks often requires a modicum of The study included a literature review link that spans the challenges presented patience and will not normally result in a and an extensive series of site visits and in the National Military Strategy, it is crit- military finish. Thus, we have to depend stakeholder engagements with represen- ical to infuse both the approach and the on our partners and allies to fill roles tatives from the combatant commands capabilities into our overarching strategy that we cannot. Interagency teaming is and other governmental organizations. guidance and ensure effective translation critical to countering and defeating threat The study identified five areas in and nesting in subordinate plans at all networks. which the joint force is not optimized to levels.5 These plans (for example, global The joint force must become com- empower our components, institutions, as well as combatant command campaign fortable with bringing resources to bear and partners to work in concert in a de- plans) should effectively address the in support of an interagency partner liberate, integrated approach to address ways our adversaries have successfully because the optimal finish might be an ar- the global array of threat networks. In operationalized military and nonmilitary rest and prosecution—and the action arm short, while there are eddies of CTN instruments of national power to achieve might be a law enforcement agency. This excellence within the joint force, our objectives. Once CTN is firmly rooted in requires enormous trust and confidence collective efforts to confront threat net- plan and campaign development, regular across organizational lines. It cannot be works remain mostly aspirational and our assessment of how we are doing should surged, but rather, it must be cultivated commitment to be a good partner in this follow. over time in an environment that com- endeavor is imperfect at best. Second, we are employing an ad hoc pels something more than coordination First, we are not adequately inte- approach to CTN. The joint force, and and collaboration—true integration. grating CTN into strategy and plan the U.S. Government generally, does Furthermore, planners cannot develop development. A common misstep by not organize CTN activities through a the full range of options available against 30 Forum / Shortfalls in Countering Threat Networks JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 threat networks without meaningful part- ner involvement in all phases of planning. We need cross-cutting, specific policy guidance directing increased integration with partners across the range of activi- ties, exercises, planning, and execution. Most important, we need authority, flex- ibility, and permission to support, rather than lead, in most CTN efforts. Fourth, we do not educate, or- ganize, train, and manage people to conduct CTN activities. Joint force leaders and planners often fail to link threat network activities directly to na- tional security interests. Consequently, they fail to see how countering these networks can achieve military objec- tives. This may be because we have not educated our people about the importance of these adversaries or the capabilities resident in the joint force and its partners. Additionally, there is no meaningful demonstration or war- gaming as to how these capabilities can be integrated into operational planning to achieve desired outcomes, such as a scenario where the finish is not a major military operation, but one that still achieves its military objectives. We do not invest in the develop- ment of joint force personnel with specialized CTN skills as we do with more conventional or special operations specialties. In the few areas where we have invested in training (for example, counter-threat finance, counternar- cotics, border security), we have not developed career tracks and incentivized our people to stay in them long enough to become experts. Furthermore, we do not prioritize or synchronize liaison officer (LNO) placement to or from our partners and allies. This means that the person representing DOD to our Air Force KC-10 Extender aircraft refuels F-22 Raptor aircraft over undisclosed location, September 26, partners may not be properly qualified 2014, before strike operations in Syria (DOD/Russ Scalf) to deliver a message consistent with Secretary of Defense and Chairman We need to improve joint doctrine, process that ensures the messenger, and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. training, education, and leader de- thus the message, are properly placed. Likewise, LNOs whom our partners velopment to institutionalize general Fifth, we do not manage and share embed with us may or may not be in and specialized CTN knowledge and information well. This is not exclusively the best position to effectively represent better integrate CTN into professional a joint force problem, but we can at least their organizations’ capabilities or au- military education. Likewise, we need improve our own foxhole. The lack of thorities within critical processes, such to improve career management in these common data management across com- as campaign development or opera- skill-sets. We also need to optimize our batant commands, between commands tional planning. LNO exchanges through a coordinated and Service components, and with JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Doran 31 Sailor stands watch in combat information center on dock landing ship USS Harpers Ferry in South China Sea, August 4, 2016, supporting security in Indo- Asia-Pacific region (U.S. Navy/Zachary Eshleman) partner organizations at best impedes diplomatic, law enforcement, military, the table and pull in relevant stakeholders efforts to synchronize plans, activities, and so forth), anticipates technological to do more than just admire the problem and assessments. At worst, it is the critical advancement, and is concerned with together, but, rather, coalesce around point of failure in successfully illuminating enabling a globally connected joint it and form viable solutions. Joint force and dismantling threat networks. Because force—and mindful of a globally con- leaders should capitalize on this capacity these networks operate across functional nected and unconstrained threat. and look for opportunities to gain con- and geographic boundaries, they stress sensus regarding various problem sets the Intelligence Community’s collection How to Strengthen a and elucidate their potential as serious and analysis networks, challenging our Broader CTN Effort? national security threats. capacity to triage and disseminate mean- It is important to recognize that the The joint force has inherent strengths ingful intelligence. Vital intelligence then joint force is not required or expected that include the capabilities to provide dies on the vine of disjointed information to do it all when it comes to CTN; it force protection; mobility; secure com- structures and outdated data management would be impractical to try. Interde- munications; intelligence, surveillance, and sharing policies. pendence with our partners should and reconnaissance support; operational This severely degrades the most be part and parcel of our paradigm. planning; and logistics. The joint force can elemental CTN function: illumination However, we must be willing to bring apply these capabilities to contribute to of the networks we need to target. to bear our strengths that serve to the effectiveness of a friendly network by Consequently, it prevents planners and empower partners, even if it seems like providing planning frameworks and leaders from seeing the entirety of a the heaviest lift in the effort at times. •• support given threat, including its connections to This does not obligate us to take on a identifying, locating, understanding, enabling networks. We need an in-depth leading role every time, despite expec- •• illuminating, and targeting threat study of DOD information management tations to the contrary. networks policies, practices, and capabilities that At the same time, however, we should looks across communities (intelligence, leverage our ability to put a problem on 32 Forum / Shortfalls in Countering Threat Networks JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 •• assisting mission partners in count- er-threat finance CTN in Action •• building partner capacity Operation Gallant Phoenix is a task force comprised of law enforcement, •• denying safe haven military, and intelligence professionals from the United States and over 20 •• conducting direct action, including partner nations. International and interagency mission partners are collocated capture operations and the use of in a fusion center where they benefit from the diversity of functional experts, lethal force against lawful targets a collective of legal authorities, and an environment conducive to real-time •• assisting mission partners in counter- information-sharing. Stakeholders all share a common purpose and build ing threat mobility and cross-border enduring relationships based on trust. The operation leverages unique partner movement, including detection and capabilities, authorities, and access in order to develop intelligence into usable interdiction information or unclassified legal process that enables partners to finish a •• identifying and understanding the target through the application of appropriate mechanisms. While the joint capabilities, interests, will, and intent force leads and facilitates this model, the interagency and international part- of friendly networks ners are included at every opportunity to develop the greatest and broadest •• conducting information operations impacts against adversaries. that attack, disrupt, sabotage, subvert, and deceive adversary capabilities and a coalescing propensity to the table, Special Operations Command–Europe, Special conducting offensive and defensive Operations Command–North, Special Oper- •• laying the foundation for a formidable cyber operations ations Command–Pacific, Special Operations network of cross-functional partner- •• supporting and complementing U.S. Command–South, Central Intelligence Agency, ships. Some organizational introspec- Defense Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforce- strategic messaging and communica- tion is certainly required before we can ment Administration, Drug Enforcement tion activities.6 truly embrace a more integrated model. Administration–Special Operations Division, Joint Special Operations Command, National To prevail against our adversaries in Counter Terrorism Center, National Guard Conclusion this ubiquitous struggle, however, we Bureau, Joint Task Force (JTF) Ares (U.S. Our adversaries purposefully use threat need to be open about our limitations, Cyber Command), JTF-North, JTF-West networks in diverse and innovative ways address our shortcomings, and become (Department of Homeland Security), Joint to unbalance military efforts and hold comfortable with and proficient in Interagency Task Force (JIATF)–National Cap- ital Region, JIATF-South, JIATF-West, Joint at risk our partnerships, objectives, and our role as the best enabler we can be, Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization, Joint even our national interests. But where propelling our partners to score the big Information Operations Warfare Center, Joint there is risk, there is often opportunity. wins. JFQ Intelligence Operations Center (U.S. Pacific The joint force can take advantage of Command), Joint Intelligence Operations the complex and chaotic operating Center–Europe, Global Engagement Center (Department of State), Narcotics and Transna- environment by pushing hard for Notes tional Crimes Support Center (Department of increased integration of efforts across Defense), National Joint Terrorism Task Force 1 Joint Publication 3-25, Countering Threat the U.S. Government and with inter- (Federal Bureau of Investigation), National Networks (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Targeting Center (Customs and Border Protec- national partners. This enhanced state December 21, 2016), 1-1. tion), Organized Crime and Drug Task Force of interorganizational integration will 2 David A. Broyles and Brody Blankenship, (Department of Justice), Army Terrorism and pay dividends in the long term, partic- The Role of Special Operations Forces in Global Crime Investigative Unit, Center for Advanced Competition (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval ularly against state adversaries who can Defense Studies, Counter-ISIL Finance Cell, El Analyses, April 2017). force their own whole-of-nation unity Paso Intelligence Center, National Intelligence 3 Countering Threat Networks Study, Phase University, Operation Gallant Phoenix, U.S. of effort. Operation Gallant Phoenix I Report (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Council on Transnational Organized Crime. demonstrates how we can capitalize on November 17, 2017, draft report ver. 7). 5 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of an opportunity to bring diverse func- 4 The Office of Irregular Warfare team Staff’s Five Priority Challenges: 4+1 refers to visited over 40 commands and organiza- tional and organizational capabilities China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent tions. Engagements with larger organizations to bear on a problem, and then apply extremist organizations. generally included multiple discussions with 6 Countering Threat Networks Campaign- this model across numerous threat net- subordinate staff elements to gain both exec- ing, White Paper (Washington, DC: The Joint works, irrespective of the commodity utive and mid-level perspectives. The follow- Staff, December 8, 2016). the network moves. The expansion and ing lists many of the key engagements: U.S. convergence of global threat networks Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, demand that we adapt, and the joint U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. force is in the best position to lead that Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations effort to shift the collective paradigm. Command, Special Operations Command–Af- We can bring great operational capacity rica, Special Operations Command–Central, JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Doran 33 going on in the world, we can afford to take a brigade and get it to focus on something unique and let it go. But given our commitments around the world right now, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, we really do need to make some investments in how we do this. I think what we’ve learned in [U.S. Central Command] is that the application of by, with, and through is really situation-de- pendent. There isn’t a one-size-fits-all model, but there are some basic precepts. Adding a little rigor would be helpful. JFQ: Do you believe the current concept of the by, with, and through approach is broadly applicable to the point where the joint force should examine its DOTMLPF [doctrine, organization, training, mate- riel, leadership, personnel, and facilities] development? General Votel: I do. The scale on which we’re doing this approach in the USCENTCOM AOR [area of respon- sibility] merits looking at it in a broad manner like DOTMLPF. With the Army standing up its Security Forces Assistance Brigade [SFAB], I think we see leadership aspects, equipping aspects, relation- ship-building aspects, and situational training—and the logistics aspects that go General Joseph L. Votel, USA, along with that—so I think that it is not Commander, U.S. Central Command a one-off, but requires a much broader approach to understand and implement. An Interview with JFQ: Who bears the cost of this approach? General Votel: The Services. They cer- tainly absorb a significant cost in their training base and force structure and all Joseph L. Votel of the things that go along with that. But I think the combatant commanders also share a burden in this—informing the pro- cess and making it clear in terms of what JFQ: You state that “by, with, and another way to talk about ends, ways, we need out in the theater to do this and through” is not a doctrine, but more of an and means. I look at this idea as a way to what the peculiarities are that ought to operational approach. Does there need to be approach some of this. That’s where we be driving this. There is certainly a shared a doctrine, or would that inhibit the flexi- arrive at the discussion of by, with, and responsibility between the combatant bility of the approach? through as an operational approach. We commands and Services. I acknowledge apply it on a broad scale now, and I do that the Services pick up the heavier bur- General Joseph L. Votel: First, the way think that it merits becoming doctrine. den on the development of the capability. that I think of by, with, and through is When there are not a lot of other things 34 Special Feature / Interview with Joseph L. Votel JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 JFQ: What gaps do you see in the com- them successful. As we often talk about it, looks like and how it should unfold, mand to be able to meet this approach? in Iraq, our job was to help our partners but ultimately, it’s the prime minister fight—not fight for them. The capabilities and leadership who are going to make General Votel: One of the gaps is having to do that—whether it’s ISR [intelligence, decisions. While in that case they were the best-trained forces for the mission. surveillance, reconnaissance], the intel- receptive to our advice, they didn’t always Our approach in Iraq and Syria has ligence system, targeting system, strike take it in terms of where we should go been by, with, and through—and it has capability, or route clearance packages to now and where we should go next re- been advising. We have leveraged good move stuff around, plus medical capabil- garding the nature of types of operations people, really great officers, great NCOs ities to take care of our people and make we were doing. We have to recognize [noncommissioned officers] who had sure we can respond—all have to be built that they are calling the shots, and in to try to understand the situation and into this approach, so it is not cheap. It the context of the broad campaign plan, adapt to it as much as possible. What we is not an economy of force, but it does we have to recognize the proper path to ignored was all of the other stuff that remove some of the aspects of us owning success, even if it’s not the ideal path. We went along with making this successful: it as opposed to our partners owning it, have to be willing to endorse that. How do our partners operate in a by, which is what we want. with, and through approach? How do they orchestrate communications? How JFQ: How would you reconcile the compet- are they tied into enabling capabilities to JFQ: How do you know you have arrived ing national interests between the United really make advise and assist work? There at “mission accomplished”? States and its partners? When does this are some significant gaps in that. I think come into consideration when developing whenever we look at something like by, General Votel: We have to identify end- this relationship? with, and through and we look at that as states. For example, how do we know an extra duty or something that some- we’ve accomplished something in Raqqah, General Votel: In terms of balancing our body morphs to in a combat situation, we in northern Syria? We know because, in interests versus their interests, [one way] are suboptimizing. Professionalizing the the wake of our operations, the Raqqah might be in developing a partnership. approach, “doctrinalizing” the approach, Civil Council, demographically repre- First and foremost, it is about making is an important step to take. senting the people, has emerged, and they sure we know what their true motives and are driving the majority of the stability intentions are—and in the areas where operations. There is a Raqqah Internal we diverge, making it clear the areas we JFQ: If by, with, and through can be re- Security Force designed not only to sup- can or cannot support. I think that’s very source-intensive in training operations and port stability operations but also to protect important. One of the things we always it subordinates our interest, why is this the the population and prevent a resurgence talk about is the critical skills people need way forward? of [the so-called Islamic State]. When we in order to apply this approach effectively. transition and see such indicators, that’s There are three of them. One, we have General Votel: One of the key things what shows the approach worked. These to communicate effectively with our we’ve learned about by, with, and through types of overt indicators of ownership and partners—candidly and frankly—about is that he who owns the effects owns the moving forward with stabilization are the the things happening and things we can impact these operations generate. What strongest signs of progress. and cannot do. Second, we have to build we strive to do through this approach is to trusting relationships. This is the founda- keep the ownership of the problem, and tion of everything. They must be able to its aftermath, with the affected people. In JFQ: In 2008, General [David D.] trust that we are going to follow through Iraq, it’s the Iraqi Security Forces, and in McKiernan’s staff showed him a curve on on commitments. Third, we have to de- Syria, it’s the Syrian Democratic Forces how we were improving force structure for velop an ability to provide advice. That’s [SDF]. In many ways, that’s the more the Afghan police and army. It was a hyper- advisors providing advice at multiple lev- burdensome aspect of military operations. bolic curve and at some point, the United els. Those three attributes are important How do we transition to local governance, States would depart, and the Afghans for forces and particularly for leaders in local security for consolidation, stability, would have their own security. The prob- this environment. and reconstruction? The earlier we can get lem was that they were never able to show the local or host-nation forces involved, they were making progress on the curve. the better. That’s really key. But to do Ultimately, the locals have to own this. JFQ: Are you able to get a sense of other that, the approach requires advisors in nations’ by, with, and through operations the right locations, sometimes fixed sites, General Votel: That’s right. One of the in your AOR, and how does this construct sometimes with our partners forward. things we have to understand is that apply to operating within the coalition? In There are a variety of ways to do this. It locals call the shots. In Iraq, we can have some cases, it is not a single country you are really is about enabling them and making a view in our mind of what the campaign dealing with, but it’s a group of countries. JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel 35 Afghan National Security Forces role players talk to combat team leader assigned to 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade during simulated event at Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, January 13, 2018 (U.S. Army/Zoe Garbarino) General Votel: With the coalition in Iraq JFQ: In the same vein, what do you con- continued to gain momentum, it became and Syria, we have nearly 70 countries sider a suitable partner to do by, with, apparent that this was something we could and entities involved. Everybody under- and through? What are the national-level build on. We knew our Kurdish partners stands and gets the by, with, and through sensitivities under consideration? Can would need Arabs to operate in areas out- approach by combat advising, and they you take us through the calculus of your side of traditional Kurdish lands. What we generally understand the concept. It is im- partnership with, for example, the Syrian saw was a really interesting dynamic with portant to understand the various national Democratic Forces? Arab groups recognizing Kurdish success. caveats. There are national restrictions We had this alignment that came together that countries put on their forces in terms General Votel: I think the SDF is a good between Kurds and Arabs because they of where they can operate or the type of example of how the by, with, and through knew they were joining a successful or- operations they can do. I will refer back to operational approach works. We do have ganization. We built on this, which was the Inherent Resolve coalition in Iraq and to go back to 2014 when we first had about the time we began to recognize the Syria, understanding the strengths and the contact with the small Kurdish element nature of this organization isn’t defined limitations—the caveats—for our partners around Kobani, with their backs against by ethnicity, but a common enemy—the was really important. And then being able the border absorbing a vicious assault Islamic State. That’s how we ultimately to leverage those contributions in a way from the Islamic State at their prime— partnered with the SDF. that kept them a part of the coalition in a when they were powerful and moving Eventually, we pushed down into the valued way. We have nations whose contri- to seize terrain. Our recognition of that areas with Arab majorities, and we saw butions are key because they stay in fixed element and our assistance to it in its the composition of the force change. It locations and do training for organizations breakout from Kobani was the start. From became more Arab than Kurdish. If we we bring to those locations. This allows there, the fighters expanded into what looked at the force that took Raqqah, an U.S. forces, once we understand coalition had been historical Kurdish areas and we Arab city, it was about 80 percent Arab capabilities, to focus on the things they can continued to support them. We learned and 20 percent Kurd. Syrian Kurds always do, which often is combat advising. Part this was a competent, well-led force. played a key role in leadership—one of and parcel are national authorities. Frankly, They were fighting on their own land, so their strengths. They communicated, they we’ve been well-supported in the author- they were motivated and organized with had a broader view, and they had good, ities, so we want to employ the different their own equipment and capabilities. solid coalition relationships. We build on parts of the coalition in optimal ways. They were receptive to support. As they that. They have been very receptive to the 36 Special Feature / Interview with Joseph L. Votel JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 advice and approach we recommended, JFQ: How do your chosen partners gain the environment. Incoming leaders will which was the annihilation of the Islamic legitimacy, especially after conflict, when monitor VTCs [video teleconferences] to State, requiring a detailed clearance of the military element of national power has get a head start. But the most important these areas. This was something both of essentially completed its main task? How aspect is training. This is the doctrinal us wanted to do, so there was a natural do you transition from a warfighting role approach. A couple of weeks ago, the and successful alignment. back to peacetime? sergeant major and I visited the Fort Polk Obviously, the friction has been with Joint Readiness Training Center to see our [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] General Votel: It goes back to legitimacy, the Army’s first Security Forces Assistance partner, Turkey. Turkey does not view and, certainly in Iraq, the government Brigade going through training. What we the YPG [Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, or there has exerted its writ in these areas. saw was quite impressive. It was a pur- People’s Protection Units] or the Syrian What we look for is a transition after posely built exercise designed to create a Kurds the same way. They view them major combat operations have ended, number of situations and scenarios that as part of a broader terrorist group, the with local governance stepping forward these advising teams would experience. PKK [Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or and local security coming into place. This They do it multiple times, so they can Kurdistan Workers’ Party], which they’ve is actually a little easier in a place like Iraq learn, get after-action reports, and then been fighting for a long time. Turkey than it is in some other areas because there move on to the next situation. Out of has a legitimate concern about its border is a recognized sovereign government, that training, the advisor teams begin security, which goes toward under- there is a structure in place, and there are to understand the basic precepts, the standing the dynamics and reconciling provincial, district, and local government basic things they have to do. They start these as we go. We see this in activities structures. Where it does become more of developing a capability before they actu- going on today; this is not something a challenge are places like Syria or Yemen ally deploy. This is the most important completely resolved. It requires a care- where we don’t have those, and we have thing—to make sure we have a deliberate ful and deliberate balance. Today, we ungoverned spaces. Then we have [to] try training path for our deploying forces. It have two principal objectives: Support to develop demographically appropriate also requires patience. You can’t expect to Turkey in its legitimate concerns about local government structures. That’s what go in and have relationships immediately; its border security to protect it from we’ve tried to do, particularly in Syria. You they have to be developed. Their ap- terrorist organizations while, at the same can see this in Raqqah, Manbij, and Deir proach may be a little different from ours, time, complete the military defeat of the ez-Zor. In a number of other locations we which requires patience. Islamic State. Balancing these requires a see local governance structures stand up full-court press, not just militarily but also and take responsibility supported by local diplomatically and politically. security forces. It’s important to transition JFQ: What about this approach would be security responsibilities from the broader applicable in some other way in a more con- fighting force to local security forces ventional war? In any way does it diminish JFQ: How do you keep such a force from focused on protecting the population and the ability to deter a conventional fight? shifting its mission, such as from going helping bring stability. It is a challenge against the Islamic State to doing some- in places where there isn’t a recognized General Votel: I am sure it could. If thing else counter to what the Syrian governance structure. While that may not we have just taken a U.S. infantry bri- government might like? be the final form that governance takes, in gade and we have now given them an my view, it’s how it begins and we have to advise-and-assist mission, it is a leader-in- General Votel: I think it goes back to build on that. tensive approach. What we end up doing communication and relationships and is paying the price in readiness for that making sure we lay out the left and right organization. That is why it’s so import- limits of the relationship and what we JFQ: From an American tactical point of ant for the Services to look at how we are willing to do. We had to make some view, how does the American unit deploy- doctrinally and organizationally do this. things very clear with our partners; we ing go from no understanding of by, with, The first SFAB is purposely organized. It would not support operations against the and through to being ready to go forward is more efficient, and it is more effective regime. That was not our mission. Our and pick up where others left? as to what it’s going to do. It will help mission is to defeat the Islamic State. We the Army preserve readiness for the other would not support the unilateral political General Votel: That is a great question. I things it needs to do. ideas they wanted outside that mission. will just speak for my Service, the Army. This requires constant discussion. We We have done a really good job of this. have tried to keep the focus on the defeat When we identify replacement units, we JFQ: What have you seen in the evolution of the Islamic State. Keeping ourselves often see leaders communicating back of by, with, and through in several theaters, aligned on that has helped keep our part- and forth to understand and gain situa- that is, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan? ners aligned as well. tional awareness and an understanding of JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel 37 train and organize, bringing together a number of different entities in order to create this hybrid organization we have referred to as the SDF. In Lebanon, where we work with the Lebanese Armed Forces, we take a different ap- proach, mostly focused on training and developing processes and capabilities to make them able to conduct operations as opposed to U.S. forces being with them. The approach is adaptive in the sense that we are learning more about the underpinnings and precepts of by, with, and through. Adaptability is being able to understand our partners, the environ- ment, the objectives, and then being able to devise the optimized approach. JFQ: I would like to talk about Afghanistan. What hope do you have this approach will improve our chances of get- ting to some sort of peaceful resolution? General Votel: I am always hopeful. Syrian Democratic Forces trainees, representing equal amount of Arab and Kurdish volunteers, stand Regarding our advisory efforts, what we in formation at graduation ceremony in northern Syria, August 9, 2017 (U.S. Army/Mitchell Ryan) are building on is an investment over a long period of time in the Afghan General Votel: In our article [imme- In Iraq, there is an established army National Security Forces. We are building diately following this interview], we that, when we left in 2011, had been on some exquisite capabilities they have. talk about three examples. Yemen, Iraq trained largely in counterinsurgency. In The Afghan special operations capability and Syria, and Afghanistan. I am not 2014–2015, they found themselves in is first class. They are effective. They rely so sure it is as much about evolving as major combat operations. Their training on the coalition to help them, but they about adapting. If we look at a place like and development had to change. We had are aggressive, and, frankly, they have Yemen, our interests are principally fo- to make them into a force that could go not lost a fight—and they are doing the cused on CT [counterterrorism]. It just in and do a 9-month operation in a city majority of it. We are building on that, we so happens there are Arab nations down of nearly 2 million people, Mosul, and be are expanding that capability, and we will there that share the same objectives. able to sustain. That required a different continue to provide advisory capability They have relationships with Yemen approach. Now that Islamic State–con- to them at a tactical level that will help forces on the ground. What we see is an trolled territory has been liberated, we them stay that way. The broader Afghan approach using unique U.S.-enablers. are going back to ensure they cannot forces have improved as well. They are We are providing advise and assist to reemerge. We are moving from a force offense-oriented, and the leadership in Arab partners who, in turn, are provid- doing major urban combat operations to charge of them is much younger. They ing advise and assist to Yemen partners. one doing wide-area security. We have to have trained under a Western standard, as Again, we are drawing on their language be adaptable and help our partners. The opposed to a mujahideen or an old Soviet capabilities, their cultural sensitivity, good thing is we did all of that against model. There is a generational change of their deep understanding of tribes and the backdrop of an established military leadership here that is much more accept- history, to help them do the CT mis- that had a Ministry of Defense, processes, ing of the type of warfare we’re teaching. sion. At the same time, we bring our schools, and camps that we could leverage. We have things like the Afghan Air Force. capabilities. That has helped build the In Syria, we are working with a com- It is small, it is capable, and it is growing. capability of our Arab partners. Yemen pletely indigenous capability that does I would not want people to think the presents a unique hybrid approach not have the backing of a state and is advisory capability is all about the ground; where we enable a partner, who in turn, very localized. This requires a different it is also about the air. If you want to see enables another partner. We have had approach. We have to build some insti- Afghans really happy, it is when their A29s some success. tutional capability, places where we can are supporting their forces. This is success. 38 Special Feature / Interview with Joseph L. Votel JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 It also translates to the maritime environ- all of our forces over a broad area.) We them develop their Cultural Support ment, such as the work we do with some also need to take care of them medically. Teams and professionally develop some of the coastal forces in the Arabian Gulf. These things add up. This is the cost we of the women in these organizations. pay for any military operation. Soldiers The program has been well accepted and still have to eat and move, even with a by, sustained. In my last AOR trip, which JFQ: Are there cyber and informa- with, and through operational approach. I do every month, we spent some time tion-sharing challenges with this approach? in Jordan. One of the events I went to was our delivery of the top-of-the-line General Votel: There are cyber security JFQ: Is this just SOF [special operations UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. They had challenges in technology and certainly in forces] on steroids? How is this different a demonstration as part of the ceremony, the information- and intelligence-sharing from proxy warfare? and they had some of their pilots standing areas. We have made improvements over by, and they were proud of the fact that time, but we have a long way to go. I General Votel: I do not think so. We two of the pilots in these cutting-edge would share with you that recently we have drawn on the SOF experience of helicopters are women. They see that concluded a CIS-MOA [Communications the Green Berets. This has been part and embrace it themselves. I think it is an and Information Security Memorandum and parcel of their mission since they important thing to reinforce. of Agreement] with the Egyptians that have come into existence, so they have Our partners also emulate us. One of allows us to have commonality with in- developed some doctrines, some real the key things we do and that comes out formation processes. This is a pretty big keen approaches, and we should leverage in our by, with, and through approach deal. It has taken us 20 to 25 years to get those. When we look at an organization is the example we set of professionalism, in place. This will be a watershed for us. like the Iraqi army, we simply do not have the example we set of values-based ap- We have to recognize some of our really enough SOF elements to meet all of the proaches to the things we do. I have had good partners still communicate over un- partnering needs. We have to rely on our partners tell me they want us to come secured, unclassified Internet. That is how conventional forces. It is not a replication and help them with an operation. When they pass their information, and we are of SOF; it is an operational approach we I ask them why, they say we bring a level trying to interface with that. That poses a are applying in different areas. of legitimacy, and they know we are significant challenge. going to hold them to a high standard, The sharing of information through and they will be better for it. I do not technology is important. If we looked at JFQ: What about the role of women? think we can underestimate what may be some of our teams forward, we would Several of the female commanders of the perceived as an intangible aspect of these see a lot of tablets and technology, and SDF are brigade commanders of those units relationships. Our partners do emulate us that is how we are communicating. There doing the fighting. In the future of by, without necessarily trying to recreate us is a training aspect to this, and there is a with, and through, do you see more roles for in their own image. network aspect. We have a lot of bilateral female infantry commanders? relationships. Sometimes these relation- ships do not work as well in a coalition General Votel: This is important. It took JFQ: Do you have any closing remarks? where we have many partners. This is us a little while to recognize that we were an area where we do have to continue missing 50 percent of the population General Votel: Thanks, Bill. We to work to reduce the obstacles and because we did not have anybody who appreciate your coming down and frictions. There are good reasons why we could communicate with women and supporting us. This is a unique way of have these prohibitions and other sharing children or communicate our objectives approaching operations, particularly arrangements in place. We should have effectively. As we set up the Cultural in USCENTCOM. Even as good as those. But we have to recognize when we Support Team and Marine Lioness pro- we are, we cannot replicate what our principally rely on a by, with, and through grams, we basically increased our ability partners bring. The idea of by, with, approach, part of that is to enable our to talk to the people, and we doubled it and through is one that resonates in this partners with intelligence. immediately because we could talk with area. It has become the principal way When I went to talk with [Colonel everybody. The role of women com- we approach things. We need to begin a J. Patrick] Work, who led our advisory manders in the SDF is prominent, and, professional discussion of this and share team in Mosul, about his concerns, moreover, the lead commanders in several ideas. Ultimately, the Services will have he discussed managing bandwidth of these prominent areas were women. to want this and buy into it. Part of my and power—power generation for I do not necessarily know we have to responsibility, part of my burden, is to their teams. Our teams are mobile and correspondingly have a female advisor do contribute to the intellectual discussion forward, and we had to get power gen- that, but it does require an understanding of this approach. That is what Joint Force eration capacity to them. (By the way, we of the culture. We have had some effec- Quarterly is helping us do right now. We have to make sure we logistically support tive programs with the Afghans, helping are very grateful for that. JFQ JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel 39 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician assigned to Commander, Task Group 56.1, explains underwater navigation system to Kuwait naval force technicians during training evolution as part of exercise Eager Response 18, Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base, Kuwait, January 8, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Louis Rojas) through U.S. authorities and partner agreements. By, with, and through has The By-With-Through proved agile, adaptive, and tailorable in pursuing American interests in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility Operational Approach (AOR). Moreover, this approach will become increasingly useful globally in a complex, resource-constrained environ- By Joseph L. Votel and Eero R. Keravuori ment with advantages from use before, during, and after conflict. The U.S. military must organize, resource, and Our approach is by, with, and through our Allies, so train the joint force to operate by, with, and through with greater efficiency that they own these spaces and the U.S. does not. and effectiveness with various types of partners and whole-of-government —Secretary James N. Mattis involvement. Executing this approach in current and future multipolar and resource-constrained environments he U.S. Central Command requires common understanding and (USCENTCOM) definition of the development of joint force doctrine. T the by-with-through (BWT) oper- ational approach is that operations are Overview General Joseph L. Votel, USA, is Commander of led by our partners, state or nonstate, Regional conflicts can arise when state U.S. Central Command. Colonel Eero R. Keravuori, USA, is Division Chief of the Combined Strategic with enabling support from the United or nonstate actors do not have the Analysis Group, CCJ5. States or U.S.-led coalitions, and capacity and resources to resolve their 40 Special Feature / The By-With-Through Operational Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 conflicts locally, potentially putting U.S. Although for USCENTCOM it is mil- in Yemen. The BWT approach in this interests in the region at risk. Tradi- itarily focused, by, with, and through case is a hybrid or multilayered example tional U.S. military solutions can inhibit complements the whole-of-government involving a stable ally as the regional local responsibility for resolving those approach to regional conflicts that impli- partner, who in turn is enabling a local problems and may even provide oppor- cate U.S. national interests. partner in Yemen. This is also an example tunities for adversaries to challenge With this definition and broad of using the BWT operational approach and reverse the legitimacy of “foreign concept, the discussion is presented in support of aligned regional interests: power” solutions. Also, despite an invi- in two parts. In the first part, several countering al Qaeda in the Arabian tation of the host government, a large USCENTCOM examples are discussed Peninsula (AQAP). Specifically, the and protracted U.S. military presence to develop a better understanding of the United States contributes counterterror- is often perceived as an invasion or an BWT approach. These examples assist the ism advising, intelligence, and logistics occupation by significant numbers of explanation of essential components in capabilities to the UAE as part of an Arab the host-country’s citizens. Aware of decisions on where, when, with whom, coalition targeting AQAP in Yemen.5 In these challenges, Secretary of Defense and how the BWT approach is used. an additional layer, U.S. military support James Mattis stated, “U.S. forces Based on USCENTCOM experience, the enables UAE, with its greater cultural, have evolved to work by, with, and second part identifies strategic and oper- historical, and tribal knowledge, in its through our allies”1 and would defeat ational selection criteria, advantages, and own BWT approach to enhance the the so-called Islamic State (IS) “by, risks that must be considered at the onset capabilities of local Yemeni counterterror- with, and through other nations.”2 The and reassessed throughout execution. ism forces in the common fight against current USCENTCOM Theater Strat- Ultimately, how this approach impacts AQAP.6 Supporting allied missions by, egy states, “‘by, with and through’ is an the joint force and considerations for with, and through our regional partners important component of our strategic current and future doctrine and readiness is one way to secure common interests approach,”3 and “we choose to prevail are presented. and share responsibility and resource ‘by, with and through’ . . . nations that burdens. Furthermore, it exemplifies how share our interests.”4 The USCENTCOM AOR the joint force could use the approach to As this approach gains increasing Current examples in the USCENT- reassure and strengthen existing alliances usage, it is important to address what it COM AOR of BWT operational and deepen interoperability as envisioned entails and its implications for the joint approaches include: in the 2018 National Defense Strategy.7 force. The phrase has many potential Afghanistan. Contrastingly, the interpretations; therefore, along with the •• Multilayered approach to counterter- Afghanistan mission gradually evolved definition above, a conceptual framing rorism in Yemen into a BWT approach as recognition of of its meaning is necessary. The BWT •• U.S. Forces–Afghanistan’s Operation the need for domestic legitimacy and operational approach seeks to achieve Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) ownership increased. In 2001, the United U.S. national interests by engaging and •• North Atlantic Treaty Organization States entered Afghanistan to destroy al enabling partners’ local and regional (NATO) Operation Resolute Support Qaeda and defeat the Taliban without capabilities and leadership. Through (ORS) in Afghanistan an accurate appreciation for the Afghans’ American authorities and partner agree- •• Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in capacity to retain these gains.8 General ments, joint force enablers can support, the campaign against IS. Stanley McChrystal, USA (Ret.), re- organize, train, equip, build/rebuild, and flected that in Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, advise partners’ security forces and their After several interviews and discus- the adversary was able to ratchet up and supporting institutions from the tactical sions with the leadership involved in these down both the size and composition to ministerial levels. operations, the recognized value of a of its forces to counter U.S. strengths. By, with, and through is not yet a BWT operational approach is consistent, The U.S. military was employing greater doctrine or a strategy or a formal military as are some of the concerns. The compo- numbers of conventional forces and gain- program. Instead, it is considered an op- sition and application of U.S. support to ing increasing ownership of the problem.9 erational approach to be used during the each of these conflicts are not identical. In Afghanistan, this cycle culminated with course of security cooperation activities In each, U.S. force structure and em- the conclusion of Operation Enduring or military campaigns. The approach ployment reflect the agile and tailorable Freedom and the start of OFS and ORS, pursues more culturally acceptable and nature of a BWT approach and illustrate both taking a BWT approach to the durable solutions by developing and the unique challenges that develop in the problem. supporting partner participation and various conflicts. ORS is established under a Status of operational ownership. By, with, and Yemen. Before exploring larger scale Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the through is a way of conducting military efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, Afghanistan government and NATO. activities and operations with less direct it is worth exploring the operational The SOFA authorizes NATO forces to combat employment of U.S. forces. approach supporting counterterrorism provide noncombat training, advising, JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel and Keravuori 41 and assistance to the Afghan National forward operating base advise-and-assist significant change from the previous mil- Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).10 programs to expeditionary advising pro- itary involvement. As Brigadier General The United Nations Security Council grams that accompanied Iraqi Security John Richardson points out, in 2008 the adopted Resolution 2189, welcoming Forces into its operations to liberate Iraqi U.S. military was still telling the Iraqi mil- ORS as an expression of the international territory. Similarly, U.S. and coalition itary what to do and when to do it, even commitment to Afghanistan stability and special operations forces (SOF) in Syria when the Iraqis were the lead element. the financial sustainment of the ANDSF operated near the forward line of troops Although the United States and its coali- through 2020.11 The execution of the with the partner unit of action. In Iraq, tion partners were building ISF capacity, current BWT approach in support of the force-protection concerns initially limited their ownership of the conflict was inhib- ANDSF fosters domestic legitimacy and the influence that our enablers could ited by our lack of tactical patience to let ownership of Afghan security by its indig- provide.14 It is now recognized that them lead.15 Lieutenant General Stephen enous security institutions and bolsters partnering at the right level with the unit Townsend further notes that in 2007, the international legitimacy for the mission. of action creates better use and influence Iraqis did not ask for the surge of U.S. Even so, in 2016 and 2017, it was from the enabling assets. troops to fight the insurgency. In 2014, recognized that the mission and ANDSF In the USCENTCOM AOR, this is by comparison, the Iraqi government were still facing challenges in maintaining often, but not always, at the brigade level. asked the world for help. The differ- consistent progress against the Taliban. Advising with a broader set of expertise ence in operational success, Lieutenant Several of the commanders we inter- and down to the kandak (battalion) level General Townsend states, was not in ISF viewed, with multiple tours in Iraq and in Afghanistan will be the third evolution capability from 2007 to 2014. No Iraqi Afghanistan, noted that the limited mili- of this lesson, integrating the support unit was fully manned, equipped, or tary progress of a BWT approach was not into echelons closer to the unit of action trained in 2014, but in marked contrast based on the method but on the means. to create even more proficiency and with the Iraqi units of 2007, many units The preponderance of USCENTCOM efficiency from a BWT approach. The partnered with U.S.-coalition enablers enablers were committed to the priority impending military defeat of IS in Iraq were now fully willing to fight.16 The mission in Iraq and Syria, and the mission and Syria, and the subsequent availability alignment of interest, their confidence in in Afghanistan was conducted as an econ- of enabling capabilities, allows for prior- our support, and the investment of the omy of force.12 Senior leaders determined itizing resource increases in Afghanistan. host nation have been key to this change. that, in order to achieve more durable With increased enabling resources at Iraq also serves as an example that operational success, advisor teams were lower levels, the Afghanistan operational the BWT approach is not inexpensive needed at lower headquarters echelons realignment aims to further capitalize on and not necessarily less resource-inten- of the ANDSDF. While defeating the the BWT approach and help the ANDSF sive regarding enabling support than a IS remained the priority, there were not better secure the gains on the ground. comparable unilateral action undertaken more advising and enabling forces for OIR. While U.S. involvement in Iraq by the U.S. joint force. The capacity of the Afghanistan mission. Additionally, started in a similar way to Afghanistan, the partner and type and stage of conflict the SOFA initially limited advising to the the operation against IS represents a determine the enabling resource require- ANDSF corps or corps-equivalent level.13 distinct change from the preceding op- ments. Operations like Iraq, Syria, or In a unilateral approach, the change in erations. The BWT approach included Afghanistan, however, require a sufficient advising levels would simply be a sub- ground combat by Iraqi Security Forces level of resources for the problem to ject of resource availability. In a BWT (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Forces both provide the partner an operational approach that included a host-nation (SDF) supported by a 60-country U.S.- advantage and sustain it until conflict partner and broad coalition of NATO led coalition. The coalition role included termination. Thus, the appropriate mix Allies and partners, additional negoti- building partner capacity for ground and availability from a large spectrum ation to modify the NATO and U.S. combat and advise, assist, accompany, and of enablers including airpower, artillery, bilateral agreements with Afghanistan, enable missions. Additionally, coalition intelligence, cyber, and sustainment, and revision of coalition governments’ fires and precision airstrikes targeted all as well as possible civil, infrastructure, commitments to ORS, were necessary aspects of IS leadership, formations, infra- and humanitarian capacities, need to be preconditions to increase advising and structure, and resources. Backing all this considered before taking a BWT opera- enabling resources. was joint sustainment, communication, tional approach.17 In supporting the ISF The BWT operational approach is and intelligence, surveillance, and recon- joint force, the cost included persistent adaptive to evolving operational and naissance forces and assets. overwhelming support from all those tactical conditions as well as the partner’s Iraq. In Iraq, with the U.S. an- capabilities in higher levels to compensate capabilities and limitations. In Iraq, U.S. nouncement of OIR in 2014, the United for the developing ground force capabili- and coalition forces had reevaluated the States also announced that the coalition ties and longer operational timelines. The location and echelon of their support. there would be supporting, not direct- resourcing cost was high, but considered The result was the transition from static ing, operational objectives. This was a acceptable given the increased partner 42 Special Feature / The By-With-Through Operational Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Iraqi soldier assigned to 7th Iraqi army division participates in assault movement training at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, January 13, 2017, as part of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (U.S. Army/Lisa Soy) confidence, ownership, and success military-to-military partnership for a relationship with moderate and vetted and the much-diminished risk of U.S. range of common interests.19 armed Syrian opposition groups that casualties. Syria. A significant difference in the pledged to fight against IS rather than Just as the partnerships may need BWT approach from Iraq to Syria is the the Syrian regime. This difference—part- initial robust support as in Iraq, or availability of a host-nation state partner. nering with a nonstate armed group right-sizing increases in U.S. and coa- The United States and its coalition part- rather that a partner-nation’s armed lition advisor teams as in Afghanistan, ners determined that the Syrian regime forces—required a different supporting there can also be a transition to decreased was either unwilling or unable to prevent force structure to enable the vetted Syrian numbers. As mentioned, with the military IS from launching attacks against Iraq, opposition light infantry capabilities successes in Iraq, the need for U.S. forces the United States, and its coalition part- rather than Iraq’s joint force capabilities. partnering below the division level is ners from within Syrian territory. Because The lack of host-government support diminishing.18 Compared to Operation cooperation with the Syrian regime was complicated logistical support and U.S. Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring politically untenable to the United States and coalition force protection, putting a Freedom missions that debated the and its partners, the coalition had to turn greater reliance on SOF trainers and ad- amount and length of U.S. force presence to other actors on the Syrian civil war visors, air support, and transfers of arms needed for long-term stability, in OIR battlefield. The considerations of suitable and equipment to the SDF. the domestic Iraqi forces are the hold, partners having aligned interests meant While a BWT approach generates build, and stabilize forces that can remain differentiating those forces seeking U.S. greater domestic legitimacy for the part- indefinitely. As this continues, the transi- assistance in the civil war from those ner, the lack of U.S. short- and long-term tion from the BWT operational approach willing to focus on defeating IS. Congress operational control over the partner and suggests evolving from a BWT partner- provided the executive branch the initial its agenda can have strategic concerns. ship for a specific interest to a traditional Syrian Train and Equip authorities,20 al- Partnering with the SDF, led largely by lowing the military to start a transactional Syrian Kurds, created strategic stress with JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel and Keravuori 43 Turkey, which is only magnified by the partnerships is the limited scope of mil- ment involvement, as well as the size notion of SDF ownership versus U.S. itary interest and the tenuous nature of and nature of the partner up to the host control. It also presents an ongoing po- the success. For instance, in Syria, the country government, are considered. litical challenge to the legitimacy for U.S. SDF faces uncertain domestic security Domestic Concerns. These concerns involvement from the Syrian regime and due to political, ethnic, and historical are paired with factors determined from its partners. tensions separate from IS. Military ac- the specific conflict situation, including In Syria, the partnership with the SDF tions to address these sources of domestic the type and stage of the conflict or is pragmatically focused on the defeat of SDF security exceed U.S. and coalition threat, availability of partners and their IS. The SDF’s legal status under inter- authorities, which are focused on the current contribution or capacity, and national law and in juxtaposition to the defeat of IS. This keeps the partnership regional and international involvement.24 Syrian regime limits the evolution of the transactional and risks a divergence of An evaluation of the stage of conflict and partnership as compared with Iraq and interests. In Iraq, internal domestic con- the capacity of the partner assist in deter- the government’s ISF. This is not meant cerns, including Iranian influence and mining the appropriate type of activity to imply that future partnerships are not Kurdish autonomy, are reminders that required. This may include any range of possible with nonstate groups like the the military BWT operational approach operations from building partner capacity SDF; rather it implies that these partner- cannot overcome all of the domestic and security force assistance to counter- ships support distinct U.S. interests with tensions or issues that may have led to or insurgency and foreign internal defense appropriate authorities and policies. In exacerbated the conditions that generated to offensive counterterrorism operations. Syria, the United States did not select IS. There is also a need for interagency This also provides clarity to the most a BWT approach simply to develop an and international involvement on the constraining factor, which is the required indigenous partner. It did so because it ground. In Afghanistan, the competing supporting forces and sustainment levels was a more effective operational approach pressures from Pakistan, Russia, and do- needed to ensure the host partner’s prog- to degrade, defeat, and destroy IS in a mestic power competitions are somewhat ress, parity, or overmatch—and ultimately country that the United States had no more balanced by a more robust interna- secure the shared U.S. interest. diplomatic relationship with. tional commitment. Governmental and The U.S. national interests at stake are Host Legitimacy. In all three cases, international efforts need to join early on determinants of where the joint force op- military gains made in support of U.S. and follow through beyond the limited erates along these spectra. These concerns interests are not secure if they rely solely military role to diminish the risk posed by center on the value of the endstate of the on military partnership. As pointed out rogue or revisionist actors. conflict to U.S. national interests and the in Building Armies, Building Nations, immediacy required. When the United the development and support of the Future Considerations States is facing an existential threat, the military, and the resulting legitimacy The BWT operational approach and the BWT operational approach is not suit- through ownership and success in the examples of its current employment in able due to its risks from partner, rather conflict, are not sufficient by themselves the USCENTCOM AOR reveal that than U.S., ownership of the outcome.25 for long-term nation-building or sta- it encompasses a spectrum of char- Similarly, if there is a vital national interest bility. The host-partner military needs acteristics. One end of the spectrum regarding how and when the conflict is development of its role as a bridge to a is the realm of low-visibility advisory concluded, then by, with, and through national identity.21 This resonates with assistance by small teams, with limited may again not be recommended.26 Secretary Mattis’s assertion that the enablers, partnering with small groups Another factor is the level and American example of military and civic of indigenous actors like the counter- leadership by the Armed Forces in con- leadership in shaping partners’ views terrorism support in Yemen. As the sideration of the political sensitivity of of social responsibility is as important conflict intensifies, U.S. involvement U.S. involvement and the type of conflict. as the technical proficiency.22 To foster becomes increasingly more overt. The This factor helps define the intended vis- this potential, the whole-of-government supporting leadership mix shifts from ibility of the American role (from limited participation in a BWT approach should unconventional warfare, irregular to overt), SOF and conventional force be sought from the onset. According to warfare, and counterterrorism experts mixture, number and type of enablers, Lieutenant General Terry Wolff, USA to more counterinsurgency, foreign and extent of other U.S. agency involve- (Ret.), the hard-won legitimacy of the internal defense, and conventional ment. In times of political constraint, ISF and government of Iraq will not last offensive warfare units and leaders in providing only U.S. military supporting in the liberated areas if they are not able increasing numbers, as seen in Iraq capabilities reduces the political tension to turn on the lights, get the water flow- and Afghanistan. Also increasing with of employing significant frontline combat ing, or open the schools in a popularly expanded U.S. involvement are the forces. With effective leadership and sup- acceptable timeframe.23 number of joint force resources like port, this may allow addressing interests U.S. and International Interests. fires, intelligence, and sustainment. that would be less accessible through Another factor existing in all of these Finally, the degree of whole-of-govern- other approaches. 44 Special Feature / The By-With-Through Operational Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Marines with 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Crisis Response–Central Command, conduct Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel exercise, October 8, 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/Trever Statz) Leadership. A significant advantage of The mitigating factors begin with first dispersed formations in the SFAB would a BWT operational approach is host-part- finding a willing and capable partner also require high performing noncom- ner ownership and durable outcome and ensuring aligned interests. Second is missioned officers.32 supporting U.S. national interests. To sustaining a committed, reliable, and du- Lieutenant General William Beydler, achieve this outcome, a BWT approach rable supporting and enabling presence.29 commander of Marine Corps Forces requires a leadership actively engaged in Through the provision of sound advice Central Command, commented that the sourcing and coordinating the enabling and reliable application of resources and 4-month Marine Expeditionary Unit resources and advising as a trusted agent, enablers, the American leaders involved rotation cycle approach does not match while allowing host partners to control provide tangible value to the partner up with the importance of relationships.33 employment, timelines, and direction.27 nation, thereby allowing the development A service force management process This type of supporting leadership from of trust and influence on the alignment of that allows a persistent unit alignment, the United States leverages the capabilities interests.30 as with SOF teams being sent back that host nations have and the primary Having the right quality of leaders to the same location, as suggested by leadership they can contribute. This was for this approach is essential. Lieutenant Special Operations Command Central the case in Iraq, where the Iraqis, with General Stephen Townsend, USA, Command Sergeant Major Marc Eckard, increasing confidence in committed sup- considers that leaders must first be USA, is another possible way to address port, selected other routes, objectives, and experts in their field, whether that is this challenge.34 Finally, the naval per- timelines of their own choosing rather direct action, fires, intelligence prepara- spective provided by U.S. Naval Forces than only those preferred by the United tion of the battlefield, or sustainment, Central Command commander Vice States. Accepting host state or nonstate and also be comfortable in a mission Admiral John Aquilino is that informa- leaders’ ownership of the fight reveals the command role without traditional tion-sharing in the maritime domain is commitment and risk tolerance of host mission control.31 Those commanders possible, but it is much harder to advise forces in meeting their own and U.S. in- interviewed contend that the experience and assist on someone else’s bridge.35 terests. This is essential for legitimacy with in a supporting and advising role relied Regarding leadership characteristics, the people, one of the shared advantages heavily on and complemented rather than Colonel Patrick Work’s Mosul experience of a BWT approach, especially in counter- degraded their primary wartime training. highlighted anticipation, agility, and insurgency scenarios.28 USCENTCOM Command Sergeant inquisitiveness as traits that improved the Empowering the partner leadership Major William Thetford, USA, noted support provided and the influence gained in this way, however, creates risk to U.S. that significant reliance on mission com- during this approach.36 Training for these objectives and operational timelines. mand and relationship-building in smaller and other necessary characteristics like JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel and Keravuori 45 historical context, language, and culture Lieutenant General Jeffrey Harrigian, operational circumstances and congres- are more common for SOF, but are no the U.S. Air Force’s Central Command sional concerns. As the specific situation less important when conventional forces commander, noted that an equivalent develops and support required changes, are employed. This also includes the po- structure does not exist in the Air Force however, new or revised authorities may tential of focusing military leaders’ careers and that training an indigenous air force be necessary. Congress does not operate on developing relationships with regional has significantly longer timelines.41 at the speed of war, creating a lag be- security partners and with regionally fo- Another component of risk is the tween need and the legislative solution. cused interagency counterparts. The force lethal threats to employed enablers. This presents a further requirement on will also need to develop ways to reward Enablers from the joint force may include commanders and planners to anticipate this type of leader development.37 sustainment and mobility; intelligence, evolutions of enabling requirements Sustainment and Enablers. Another surveillance, and reconnaissance; and and advocate early for the necessary area that impacts the success of the ap- kinetic and nonlethal fires. These enablers authorities. proach is sustainment of the host and the allow our partners to sustain themselves Further complicating this risk is the enablers. Lieutenant General Michael in the conflict. When provided with lack of joint doctrine supporting a BWT Garrett, U.S. Army Central commander, American leadership and commitment, operational approach. There is need for notes that, at equivalent levels, the sus- U.S. partners have demonstrated in- doctrine concerning large-scale conven- tainment force is not organized to support creased confidence and determination to tional forces conducting operations that the broadly dispersed footprint of a prevail. While this often lowers the risk include security force assistance; building Brigade Combat Team in this approach.38 from employment of a comparable num- partner capacity from the ministerial to USCENTCOM’s J4, Major General ber of U.S. frontline ground combatants, tactical levels; and various mixes of train, Edward Dorman, USA, commented that the lethal risk to the various types of advise, assist, accompany, and enable earlier involvement in sustainment partner- aircraft enablers, logistics operations, and missions.45 ships needs consideration for operationally advisers remains significant.42 With whom to partner our resources effective support, resource management, In interviews and discussions, import- carries significant implications for the and longer term outcomes.39 ant considerations were voiced suggesting U.S. authorities granted, military re- The BWT approach is often mistaken that adversaries will seek ways to adapt quirements, securing U.S. interest, and for an inexpensive approach to warfare. to and counter this approach. To begin, endstate or transition. Ultimately, the This is a misperception. This approach Lieutenant General Harrigian describes partnerships in a BWT approach change still requires significant financial expen- the enabling mission and associated de- when U.S. interests are secured or di- diture. Reducing the use of U.S. forces creased risk as relying on the assumption verge from the partner’s interest. The for direct combat operations creates less of air superiority, which is no longer a potential follow-on relationship depends control of the timelines and decreased certainty.43 It is in a contested air domain on the nature of the partner, success of efficiency of resource expenditure. where adversary airpower may disrupt the the partnership, and subsequent U.S. Therefore, the duration of the conflict supply lines or degrade other supporting interests. Transition following from and amount of resource consumption forces’ freedom of maneuver. Secretary BWT partnerships augmenting stable ally are potential strategic risks to joint force Mattis takes a position in his Summary states, such as the U.S. relationship with readiness in general and carry broader of the 2018 National Defense Strategy the UAE concerning Yemen, may be the U.S. economic implications that must that every domain is now contested.44 most straightforward. Highly transac- be mitigated. This requires continual The joint force must factor in this state tional relationships with nonstate actors vigilance of resource consumption, since, of domains with expected adaptations by remain the more challenging to transition as the USCENTCOM J5, Major General adversaries to degrade the BWT approach without authorities or policies that follow George Smith, USMC, cautioned, trad- and associated exposure to enablers. through. Finally, all the examples of con- ing tactical risks for strategic ones is not a Authorities and Doctrine. All flicts and partners require avoiding the viable long-term plan.40 of this requires the appropriate legal development of dependencies and rec- The joint force can react and adapt to framework and authorities for partner- ognizing mission limitations and mission meet the needs of a BWT approach when ing and resourcing. A major risk is that accomplishment. there are limited competing requirements permanent statutory authorities do not and the force is given enough time. exist to enable partner forces in this kind Concluding Imperative Creating a sustained capability requires of conflict. Colonel Matthew Grant, The U.S. military has a significant role developing the requisite capacities within USA, USCENTCOM Judge Advocate, in securing and maintaining American the components and a complementary expressed how specific legislation to national interests. The BWT operational joint doctrine. The Army SFAB and Field provision regular and irregular forces in approach identifies partners with spe- Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan was required cific shared interests, preferably held provide a conceptual starting point in each case—and the authorities in each by them at an equal or higher national for components for the advising role. instance were tailored to the particular value. The U.S. joint force leverages 46 Special Feature / The By-With-Through Operational Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 7 24 the partner’s leadership and increases Summary of the 2018 National Defense Colonel Eric S. Strong, USA, com- Strategy of the United States of America: Sharp- mander, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, its capacity and ownership for greater ening the American Military’s Competitive Edge 1st Armored Division, telephone interview by legitimacy and durability of the outcome. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, authors, October 25, 2017. This approach, done with the purpose 2018), 9, available at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel and Keravuori 47 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters fly over armored vehicles loaded on transport trucks during Army Day 2018, February 9, 2018, Kuwait Naval Base, Kuwait (U.S. Army/Ty McNeeley) The By-With-Through Approach An Army Component Perspective By Michael X. Garrett, William H. Dunbar, Bryan C. Hilferty, and Robert R. Rodock The Counter-ISIS Campaign has entered its third year, and we are on track with the military plan to defeat the terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria. Our “by, with, and through” approach and operational-level simultaneity strategy are working, and our partner forces continue to build momentum across the battlespace as we pressure the enemy on multiple fronts and across all domains. —General Joseph L. Votel, USA n 2018, as the United States enters its 17th year of conflict in the Middle I East, the Army’s 2018 campaign plan directs an endstate to be “ready Lieutenant General Michael X. Garrett, USA, is Commanding General of U.S. Army Central (USARCENT). to respond to threats from near-peer Colonel William H. Dunbar, USA, is Chief of the Commander’s Initiatives Group, USARCENT. Colonel competitors and nonstate actors.”1 Bryan C. Hilferty, USA (Ret.), is a Senior Strategic Planner in the Commander’s Initiatives Group, USARCENT. Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Rodock, USA, is a Planner in the Commander’s Initiatives Land forces in U.S. Central Command Group, USARCENT. (USCENTCOM) have adopted an 48 Special Feature / The BWT Approach: An Army Command Perspective JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 operational approach of “by, with, approach “to address the challenges that comes along with it. For example, and through” (BWT) to achieve this of shaping operational environments, is there a difference between a Security endstate. U.S. Army Central (USAR- preventing conflict, prevailing during Force Assistance Brigade conducting ad- CENT) remains front and center, large-scale ground combat, and consoli- vise-and-assist missions versus a Brigade straddling the line between the com- dating gains to follow through on tactical Combat Team? How does the brigade plexity of developing national strategy success.”3 The description of the four commander execute his predeployment and the complication of operational operations—shape, prevent, large-scale training to conduct advise, assist, accom- feasibility to support the combatant ground combat, and consolidate gains— pany, and enable missions while deployed commander’s mission. USARCENT, is the deliberate way and provides the versus advise, assist, and enable missions? as the Army Service Component start for USARCENT’s analysis to de- What tools, models, and planning factors Command for USCENTCOM, is scribe BWT as an operational approach. could a sustainer use to maintain the responsible for shaping the theater, FM 3-0 explains the bridge between the operational reach of the joint force when coordinating theater security cooper- deliberate ways and available means as units are employed in an other-than-doc- ation, and preparing forces for unified mechanisms: either defeat (enemy-fo- trinal manner? land operations. The USCENTCOM cused) or stability (civilian-focused). USARCENT intends for this article commander succinctly described the BWT is an operational approach that to describe the current environment and foundation of the USARCENT role accounts for the gray areas between a mitigation for the challenges of fighting in the joint fight when he asked, “It solely enemy-focused or civilian-focused BWT in order to trigger additional really is all about logistics, isn’t it?”2 mechanism to synchronize available thought and analysis in the joint commu- For USARCENT, logistics is having means within deliberate ways to achieve nity. In addition, USARCENT desires to the right capability at the right place desired ends. BWT is an operational elicit dialogue and complement ongoing at the right time—all while anticipat- approach that embraces the introduction analyses by the Mosul Studies Group in ing the next requirement and setting of partner forces, which mitigates U.S. Iraq, develop the Expeditionary Advisor conditions for its success. This article risk acceptance calculus and leads to an- Packages in Afghanistan, and deploy provides the USARCENT perspective ticipated, greater potential for enduring Security Force Assistance echelons in Iraq on how it accomplishes its mission with regional stability. and Afghanistan. BWT as the operational approach and Currently, USCENTCOM executes demonstrates the need for the joint the BWT operational approach by Evolution force to come to a common under- task organizing and distributing force Challenges inherent in the BWT standing of what executing operations packages across the joint operational method of war confronted USARCENT within a BWT operational approach, area to provide enabler support to a from the time it established the initial and all associated terms, means. partner’s maneuver forces. Such dis- Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) USARCENT describes the BWT persion presents inherent challenges to Headquarters for Operation Inherent operational approach as conducting command and control, force protection, Resolve (OIR) in 2014. The same chal- military campaigns primarily by em- and sustainment, particularly medical, lenges persist as USARCENT serves ploying partner maneuver forces with maintenance, and logistical support. as the Coalition Forces Land Compo- the support of U.S.-enabling forces Although U.S. maneuver formations are nent Command for USCENTCOM, through a coordinated legal and diplo- mostly absent, BWT stresses historical while maintaining responsibilities as matic framework. A brief review of how models for consumption of U.S. fires. the Theater Army and Army Service USARCENT has come to describe BWT USARCENT supports the joint force by Component Command. In each of as an operational approach sets the foun- managing these issues on an ad hoc basis these roles, and at various times, USAR- dation for the following discussion and from an adjacent friendly country using CENT has adapted and maintains agility request for further analysis. Specifically, available resources that were allocated for within its organizational architecture describing BWT as an operational other purposes. to accomplish all missions assigned by approach requires a common under- Fighting BWT is not a new concept the geographic combatant commander standing to frame the dialogue. in either USCENTCOM operations (GCC). Frequently, these solutions call Although the term strategy is not over the last 16 years or military history. for the use of capabilities and resources defined in the Department of Defense However, understanding the effects of originally allocated for other missions (DOD) Dictionary, it is commonly executing BWT within the current polit- to include deterring malign influence understood as how to achieve desired ical and strategic environment in terms and hostile aggression throughout the ends through deliberate ways using of force generation, operational sustain- region. USARCENT is greatly enabled available means. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, ment, and tactical execution requires in its efforts to provide this support by Operations, offers a method to under- shared understanding across the joint leveraging the proximity of the friendly stand the deliberate ways to approach a community as friction exists associated nation of Kuwait and the relationships military problem and provides a doctrinal with BWT and the family of terminology developed there during more than JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Garrett et al. 49 Infantry squad with 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, assaults first of two buildings during platoon live-fire lane, January 28, 2018, during Omani-U.S. exercise Inferno Creek 2018, near Thumrait, Oman (U.S. Army/David L. Nye) 20 years of continuous presence and its inception in describing special oper- surrogate forces in the Middle East. From engagement. ations forces’ activities in low-intensity 1955–1975, Western powers fought a The phrase by, with, and through conflict, it has evolved to describe con- proxy war through Southeast Asian armies originated decades ago as a component of ventional activities in multidomain battle. to stop the spread of communism. From the definition of unconventional warfare. The lack of clear definition results in 2005–2011, the United States, mired in The 2003 edition of Joint Publication challenges at the tactical and operational counterinsurgency in Iraq, took advan- (JP) 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special levels, while also having implications for tage of the Anbar Awakening to fight the Operations, defined unconventional war- the strategic level of warfare. discontented Iraqi insurgents with and fare as: A brief historical review shows how through the Sons of Iraq. Each of these different warfighting applications of examples provides historical context to a broad spectrum of military and paramil- the terms by, with, and through met the development of present day applica- itary operations, normally of long duration, with varying levels of success. Whether tion of BWT. predominantly conducted through, with, or fighting to maintain an empire, thwart In years past, BWT could be viewed by indigenous or surrogate forces who are the spread of communism, or turn the as an operational approach in an econ- organized, trained, equipped, supported, tide in a mired conflict, military forces omy of force environment. Today’s fight and directed in varying degrees by an ex- have used the tenets of BWT. From against the so-called Islamic State (IS) is ternal source. It includes, but is not limited 1899–1902, fresh from the victory of hardly an economy of force mission from to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, the Spanish-American War, the United the standpoint of whole-of-coalition op- intelligence activities and unconventional States sought to quell the Filipino inde- erations. Presently, BWT describes how assisted recovery.4 pendence movement by using indigenous the United States applies the warfighting forces to destroy entrenched partisans. functions, minus U.S. maneuver, in its Both understanding and applying From 1916–1918, the British fought fight alongside major partners willing to BWT have evolved over the years. From to maintain an empire fighting with commit thousands of troops to decisive 50 Special Feature / The BWT Approach: An Army Command Perspective JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 action. The lack of common understand- in fighting BWT to the joint force Figure. By-With-Through Risk ing of what BWT is, and the addition is real. Although its description is of the family of terms to accompany beyond the scope of this article, the Risk to Mission Shape BWT, result in challenges at the tactical Goldwater-Nichols Department of Train and operational levels while also having Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 implications for the strategic level of war- prescribes the relationship between the Prevent fare. A comparison with Operation Iraqi Services and, specifically, the command Advise Enable Freedom (2003) draws a stark contrast to relationship between geographic com- Assist Equip the BWT approach. The 2003 campaign batant commanders and their assigned Risk Consolidate Gains was a conventional fight employing component commanders. Following, Accompany combined U.S. arms to defeat a mostly there are certain responsibilities each conventional enemy. However, following component command owes to the Large-Scale the initial, successful invasion, the need joint force. For example, USARCENT Combat Operations to place coalition partners at the fore- provides air and missile defense to key Risk to Force front of operations emerged. While this locations within the USCENTCOM practice led to an anecdotal understand- area of operations (AOR). In addition, ing of the BWT approach, the present USARCENT, through its Theater Sus- allocated to respond to other more resource-constrained environment tainment Command, manages and dis- existential threats, it is then left to the demonstrates the need for a thorough tributes munitions for the joint force. Service component to ensure the GCC doctrine, organization, training, materiel, Although these are just two of the understands the associated risk to the leadership and education, personnel, facil- responsibilities that USARCENT pro- ability to respond to other contingencies. ities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) analysis. vides, it must balance risk to mission USARCENT supports two named The 2017 USCENTCOM Posture and risk to force while executing BWT. operations in the USCENTCOM AOR, Statement states: Thus, the Army’s warfighting functions Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) and provide a valuable way to identify OIR. It exercises force protection respon- [The] Counter-ISIS Campaign has examples of mitigating risk. A visual sibilities for the Multinational Force and entered its third year, and we are on description of risk overlaid on the Observers treaty organization in Egypt’s track with the military plan to defeat the deliberate ways and available means is Sinai Peninsula, home to an active branch terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria. depicted in the figure. of the Islamic State. It directly executes Our “by, with, and through” approach and Mission Command (Command tasks associated with the deterrence operational-level simultaneity strategy are and Control per Joint Doctrine). Army and theater security requirements of working, and our partner forces continue forces assigned to the USCENTCOM Operation Spartan Shield (OSS) in all to build momentum across the battlespace AOR are one-tenth the number as- but Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. as we pressure the enemy on multiple fronts signed to the U.S. Pacific Command At the operational level, there is only one and across all domains.5 AOR and one-fourth the number in source from which to draw forces should the U.S. European Command AOR. the Department of the Army choose not Fighting BWT is not fighting coun- All other forces are present in response to resource new deployments. As a result, terinsurgency. Rather, fighting BWT is to to needs-based requests for forces. In the Army Service Component Command prevent the rise of an insurgency at the the course of meeting GCC need for must carefully articulate the risk to exe- conclusion of operations. To optimize Army forces, the Theater Army is the cuting its OSS mission in its support to USARCENT’s support to the GCC and first echelon to review a request for ad- either OIR or OFS. to apply lessons learned to the greater ditional capabilities. Often, the process In the USCENTCOM AOR, Task joint force, the U.S. military would bene- of force generation leads to a denial Force Spartan (TF Spartan), a mobilized fit greatly from a shared understanding of of additional capability from outside Army National Guard division head- the implications of successful execution of the theater and a directive to employ quarters, supports OSS, OIR, and OFS fighting BWT to force generation, train- capabilities already present for other pur- with deliberate planning and detailed ing, executing, and sustaining the force. poses. This alternative sourcing process risk mitigation practices. The high is documented in the form of a Theater number and wide variety of dynamic Implications Coordinated Assistance request from the and unprogrammed missions conducted The Army’s warfighting functions warfighting headquarters to the GCC. by its arrayed forces continue to affect provide a useful framework to describe USCENTCOM uses the request process manning, equipping, maintaining, and the implications of present-day applica- to manage resource allocation across employing the force in support of both tion of fighting by, with, and through. its three joint operations areas. Absent operations. Despite this admittedly Army-centric an explicit policy decision that under- Major General Blake Ortner, TF context, the impact of challenges writes the drawing down of capabilities Spartan commander from December JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Garrett et al. 51 Lieutenant General Michael Garrett, left, U.S. Army Central commander, meets with Brigadier General Mark Odom, 82nd Airborne Division deputy commander for operations, during battlefield circulation of Iraqi area of operations in Erbil, Iraq, February 27, 2016 (U.S. Army/Jake Hamby) 2016 to July 2017, stated in his exit in- USCENTCOM’s transfer of authority capabilities that the Army must possess to terview that the task force: from USARCENT to CJTF-OIR for the accomplish missions in support of policy repositioning of High Mobility Artillery goals and objectives.8 had elements that were tasked for the Advise Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers in and Assist missions, but they were tasked order to be more responsive to the fluid Examples of nondoctrinal employments across huge geographic areas. So, what that tactical situation on the ground in Iraq. incurring increased risk include: often meant is that you have the battalion Major General Ortner summarized the commander [who’s] running the [tactical risks to the OSS mission in deterring •• Attack Weapons Teams (AWT) (2x command post] up in Mosul, you’ve got his malign influence and hostile aggression AH-64s) are executing geographi- [executive officer] down here in Kuwait across the Middle East: cally dispersed operations and with a managing the rest of the forces, the staff command-and-support relationship is split between the locations. . . . So, what Leaders at all levels are being asked to step separate from its company headquar- you have is each location ending up with a outside of their normal responsibilities and ters. The Combat Aviation Brigade reduced force, reduced staff planning and lead and mitigate risk beyond what they operates with limited maintenance things like that. So, that could constrain the were trained to do. They are also being and refueling in an undefined logis- mission command capability a little bit.6 asked to employ their equipment and forces tics supply situation. TF Spartan outside of what would be normal [Mission depends on the Air Force to execute The general also noted a mission Essential Task List] or [Army Universal operational movement in the command adjustment that supported Task List] mission requirements. In prac- absence of organic Army transporta- mission accomplishment: “some of the tice, not all of these efforts or employments tion capabilities. command and support relationships are success stories, but the challenges, and •• TF Spartan HIMARS International were working against OIR and us. So, resultant solution sets, are in line with Standards Organization OIR are in working with OIR and ARCENT, we what was derived in the [Army Operating deployed in 2x launcher teams adjusted some to improve combat oper- Concept]—guiding future force develop- called Light HIMARS Packages. ations.”7 As an example, he referenced ment through identification of first order Technically, the HIMARS units are 52 Special Feature / The BWT Approach: An Army Command Perspective JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 designed to fight in four launcher of prior intelligence-sharing agreements storage and distribution capabilities are platoons where each platoon includes among partners can hinder the sharing hard-pressed to provide sufficient stocks a required Fire Direction Center. In of technologically derived information to the point of use, and the industrial the smaller configuration, sergeants from U.S. sources. For the counter-IS base is severely taxed to meet manufac- are independently executing mission fight, this challenge was somewhat over- turing demand. Brigadier General Robert command of these centers. While come by the development of a tailored Harter refers to this unexpectedly high they have been generally successful, Middle East Stabilization Forces intelli- expenditure of artillery munitions with the situation calls for anticipatory gence-sharing caveat. his observation, “BWT is more logistically training of noncommissioned officers Inversely, U.S. forces are unable to intense than if our forces were doing this who may find themselves in this role. use human intelligence generated by ourselves. Particularly intensive in the use •• The 420th Engineer Brigade forms partner nations to fill gaps in their situ- of precision fires. . . . The Iraqis under- cross-functional teams and detach- ational understanding. American forces stand maneuver, but sustainment in their ments below the level presumed in must determine a means to achieve effi- formation is not there yet.”12 doctrinal task organization. These ciency in the development of a common Major General Paul Hurley, com- small teams are “commanded” by operating picture and situational aware- manding general, 1st Theater Support staff sergeants who are controlled ness in coordination with partner forces Command (1st TSC), from June 2015 to by special operations forces’ ele- having different technology, language, June 2017, wrote, “Waging war against ments through loose command and and culture. [the Islamic State] with a limited U.S. control relationships, and faced Fires. The current BWT fight relies military presence requires nondoctrinal with making tactical- and operation- on precision fires, and the U.S. military logistics solutions to support coalition, al-level decisions in the execution of delivers fires more accurately now than at U.S., and host-nation forces. . . . Without their mission. any time in history. BWT, in effect, trades the authorities, access, and logistics struc- the effects of precision-guided munitions tures of the past, the 1st TSC’s challenge In an opposing view, Colonel for the lethality and fire discipline of is two-fold: providing operational and J. Patrick Work, an on-the-ground troops on the ground. Combined arms tactical logistics to U.S. forces while advise-and-assist (A&A) brigade com- doctrine calls for unified fire and maneu- simultaneously providing material and mander, noted, “There is no loss of ver to mass effects, seize and maintain supply support to the Iraqi forces.”13 chain of command because our [tactics, initiative, and cause multiple dilemmas Indications are that BWT inhibits the techniques, and procedures are] not re- for the enemy.11 Iraqi army and Syrian development of U.S. partners’ tactical corded in doctrine. Perhaps this mission defense forces instead depend heavily on and operational sustainment beyond profile epitomizes mission command. fires to disperse or attrit enemy forces what is necessary to conduct the close . . . Bandwidth might be the most im- prior to the seizure of terrain through fight. It may be the case that so long as portant class of supply to A&A. Power maneuver. This Iraqi and Syrian practice the United States is willing to establish generation may be number two.”9 of employing fires to achieve the effect and pay for upkeep of lines of commu- Movement and Maneuver. Army of eliminating enemy resistance without nication for major operations, partners forces are conducting movements in Iraq complementary maneuver required fire will continue to rely on that support. As and Syria, but not maneuver because missions in such number that the risk Major General Hurley noted, “Coalition the current form of BWT calls for the of error or collateral damage greatly partners in the region rely too heavily on reliance on a partner’s maneuver force increased. To protect civilians, as well U.S. logistics expertise and equipment to in the battlefield geometry. JP 3-0, as U.S., coalition, and partnered forces, achieve operational capability.”14 Joint Operations, defines maneuver as from collateral damage, the use of USARCENT provides medical and “Employment of forces in the operational relatively scarce precision munitions is maintenance support to partners and the area through movement in combination preferred, which greatly increases their joint force through tailored, nondoctrinal with fires to achieve a position of advan- rate of expenditure. Additionally, fires packages. These packages demonstrate tage in respect to the enemy.”10 Although employed in the course of BWT oper- the requirement for a scalable force not used for direct ground combat, there ations are typically dynamic rather than as outlined in the Army Vision 2025. remains a requirement for U.S. infantry deliberate, making predictability of usage However, the decentralized employment in other traditional roles. In CJTF-OIR, rates and resupply forecasting slightly of small elements (HIMARs sections, small advisor teams often have a full pla- more complex. AWTs, Sentinel Radar systems, sustain- toon of infantry for force protection. Sustainment. BWT is at least as logis- ment packages), and constraints on the Intelligence. The U.S. military has tically intensive for U.S./coalition forces number of Soldiers deployed, stretch the the most capable intelligence architec- as traditional operations, especially when ability of the maintenance and supply ture in the world and focuses a variety supplying munitions in support of indirect systems to uphold the readiness of critical of intelligence assets in the fight against fires. As a result of the increased expendi- systems supporting the Combined Joint the Islamic State. However, the absence ture of precision munitions, the allocated Operations Area (CJOA). Maintenance JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Garrett et al. 53 support relies heavily on civilian field When we throw some extra advisors, now we mobility, and the human dimension of our service representatives who in turn depend have to ask for a route clearance package Soldiers in a hazardous environment cre- on military-provided transportation and because . . . more advisors, more networks for ates risk if there is not added preventative security to move to remote and austere them to move to and from the roads, now and reactive capacity.18 locations around the battlefield. The we’ve got more roads to clear.15 concept of traditional unit basic loads for While BWT seeks to increase the likeli- supplies and spares is not employed, and Because these forces are not readily hood of accomplishing political objectives formations rely on a just-in-time concept available, planners must forecast and and decrease the risk to U.S. forces in the of support. request the capabilities far in advance or close fight, it increases the risk to strategic To match partners’ operational tempo the tempo of operations must slow to and tactical mission accomplishment. and extend operational reach, BWT re- await their arrival. The tactical mission is placed at risk in quires basing from multiple contingency Operational headquarters must bud- relying on the decisionmaking processes operating locations. While this places get for forces to support base operating and priorities of partners, while risk to the advisors and support with partner forces support requirements, and this mission overarching strategic mission is increased where they are most critically needed, the has further taxed the limited logistics when objective endstates and those of requirement to provide logistics at each forces available to provide BWT support chosen partners diverge. of those locations requires sustainment in the CJOA. Major General Hurley Finally, USARCENT executes packages (forward logistics element) in wrote that “U.S. logisticians are meeting BWT operations at an increased risk to ever-smaller numbers with less robust this nondoctrinal workload using a man- its steady-state requirement: deterring capabilities. The sustainment architecture ning-restricted sustainment footprint that malign influence and hostile aggression that coalition and partnered forces rely is arguably inadequate for the task.”16 while setting conditions for transition to on is continually modified to provide the USARCENT and 1st TSC always accom- combat and shaping the environment to maximum possible support to a rapidly plished the mission, but DOTLMPF-P mitigate threat. Of course, the elimination changing CJOA within the constraints of improvements can reduce risk and im- of all risk is an unachievable, and probably U.S. policy and the political sensitivities prove efficiency. an undesirable, objective. As an Army War of coalition partners. Protection. BWT mitigates the risk College professor noted, “In war, risk is Bureaucratic customs processes to infantry and armor Soldiers who a zero-sum game where combatants have associated with conducting operations historically have the highest incidence to make tradeoffs between risk to them- in sovereign nations also challenge the of casualties, but it increases the risk to selves, the mission, and noncombatants. distribution and transportation networks other forces distributed across the battle- Eliminating the risk to noncombatants within the CJOA. For example, the need field that are dependent, in some cases, places this risk squarely on combatants to use commercial line-haul carriers over on local forces for force protection. Major and the mission. If combatants also refuse inadequate road networks, as well as lim- General Martin stated, “To achieve that or are not able to accept sufficient risk, ited airfield capability and an insufficient access and to build that relationship you then it all falls on the mission, which is number of movement control units, lessen must have people forward [who] are not often itself sacrificed.”19 the effectiveness of the current CJOA commuting to work, but they are living distribution network. Maintaining effec- there with them and with that it works Initial Doctrinal Thoughts tive control and accountability over the very well. But there are risks associated The joint force should commission a distribution of weapons and equipment in with that.” He continued, “This envi- study resulting in a doctrinal definition a semipermissive environment also contin- ronment forces commanders to spend a of BWT and a framework for BWT ues to be a significant logistical challenge. lot of time assessing risk because it is not operations, similar to the effort put Others have noted that the lack of something that you look at episodically or forth in the development of counterin- available force structure constrains oper- periodically. It’s a thing you must contin- surgency doctrine. The outcomes of this ational flexibility. Major General Joseph ually assess over time.”17 study would better enable planning and Martin gave an example of the request for In referring to another dimension of resourcing the BWT fight, and it would an advisor team: Soldier risk, Colonel Work noted: provide warfighting headquarters, force providers, and other key stakeholders You . . . have to understand that the tail Protecting ourselves and our partners is a common frame of reference for dis- that is supporting that advisory team has to a top priority. Risks include illness and cussing the requirements and objectives be accounted for. So, when you say “advisor injury. . . . I spend much of my time evalu- for BWT operations. At endstate, the team,” you’re looking at an infantry pla- ating and mitigating risk with our [Task study could create doctrine for adapting toon plus a couple of staff officers, let’s say Force Advise and Assist] commanders. . . . employment of smaller formations with that’s forty people. However, there’s an ad- Consider the roles of chaplains and behav- enablers through leveraging the Mosul ditional five or ten people we have to add to ioral health specialists as well. Distributed study and Center for Army Lessons the [Brigade Support Battalion] or whoever. forces, potential limitations to ground Learned embeds. As demonstrated in 54 Special Feature / The BWT Approach: An Army Command Perspective JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 this article, USARCENT offers the fol- defense establishments to build force generation to advance the tactical lowing definitions for consideration to defense relationships that promote fight, organize actions in time and space start a more deliberate analysis: specific U.S. security interests, toward the theater strategic objectives, develop allied and friendly military and account for grand strategic and •• By, With, and Through: Operational capabilities for self-defense and mul- political goals. To support the shared framework to conduct military tinational operations, and provide understanding and address the indispens- campaigns primarily by employing U.S. forces with peacetime and con- able roles of three key agents in the BWT partner maneuver forces with the tingency access to a host nation. system—local forces, U.S. forces, and support of U.S. enabling forces •• Security Force Assistance: DOD activ- political leadership—USARCENT offers through a coordinated legal and dip- ities that contribute to unified action that the BWT operational approach is lomatic framework. by the U.S. Government to support conducting military campaigns primarily •• Train: Planned instruction to partners the development of the capacity and by employing partner maneuver forces about a particular skill or type of capability of foreign security forces with the support of U.S. enabling forces behavior in a permissive environment. and their supporting institutions. through a coordinated legal and diplo- Includes tactical tasks such as marks- matic framework. JFQ manship and how to use equipment as well as higher level skills such as Conclusion intelligence fusion, combined arms From demonstrating U.S. might in Notes integration, and large unit tactics. response to an attack on the homeland 1 Advise: Provide subject matter and removing a ruthless dictator, to Army Campaign Plan (Washington, DC: •• Headquarters Department of the Army, 2018). expertise, guidance, and counsel to declaring mission accomplished and 2 Joseph L. Votel, email message, June 8, partners before they carry out mis- forcing manning levels, to renaming 2017. sions. Usually one-on-one or in small operations and declaring end dates, 3 Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washing- groups and with an informal give and the United States continues a series of ton, DC: Headquarters Department of the take as in a graduate course. operational deployments in the Middle Army, 2017). 4 Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint •• Assist: Provide subject matter East. The current (although undefined Special Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint expertise, guidance, and counsel in current doctrine and lacking shared Staff, 2003). to partners while they are carrying understanding) operational approach 5 Senate Armed Services Committee, State- out assigned missions. The advisor to fight by, with, and through partners ment of General Joseph L. Votel on the Posture remains behind the close area. yields certain risk that commanders of U.S. Central Command, March 9, 2017, available at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Garrett et al. 55 Paratroopers with Charlie Battery, 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, rotate M777 155mm howitzer in preparation to engage militants with artillery fire in support of Iraqi and Peshmerga fighters in Mosul (U.S. Army/Christopher Bigelow) Fighting the Islamic State By, With, and Through How Mattered as Much as What By J. Patrick Work n January 2017, the 2nd Brigade a simple framework: help the ISF and and approach—how we advised—offer Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Divi- hurt IS every day. Naturally, we had useful examples and angles for leaders I sion, deployed to bolster the Iraqi missteps, but our team also served ISF to ponder as we consider future excur- Security Forces (ISF) in the campaign and coalition commanders well on sions with this style of high-intensity to annihilate the so-called Islamic some terribly uncertain days. Specifi- security force assistance.1 State (IS). Task Force Falcon joined cally, how we advised ISF commanders the coalition advise-and-assist (A&A) was as important as what we advised Organizing Principles effort with 2 weeks remaining during them to do in order to win. We mixed Our mission under Operation Inherent the 100-day offensive to retake east innovative concepts and straightfor- Resolve (OIR) proved infinitely different Mosul. For the next 8 months, we ward tactics to attack IS by, with, and than the exhausting, firsthand combat wrestled a complex environment with through the ISF, yet the entire effort that many of us experienced in Iraq always centered on our partners’ lead- from 2003 to 2008. For example, a ership and ownership of exceptionally typical American Soldier’s experience Colonel J. Patrick Work, USA, is Commander of the nasty ground combat operations. during Operation Iraqi Freedom’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division. Several of our perspectives on mindset “troop surge,” whether battling Shia 56 Special Feature / Fighting the Islamic State: How Mattered as Much as What JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 militias or the Salafist forebears of IS, empowers our partners to defeat [IS] mil- throughout the formation. We certainly was that Americans did the deadliest itarily in order to help the government of defeated IS in Ninewah Province to- work, as Iraqis observed. Moreover, the Iraq establish sufficient local security and gether, but the fact remains that ISF ISF that we supported were also not set conditions that contribute to broader troops bore the weight of the violence the same broken groups that collapsed regional stability.” A key was remaining on some astonishingly brutal days. The during the IS rampage of 2014. Our goal-oriented when it was hard; our job human costs to the ISF were massive over OIR journey was dramatically different was simply to help the partners that we Mosul’s 9-month struggle to defeat our than both of these circumstances, and had dominate IS. nations’ common enemy. I sensed that we adjusted our mindset and approach Along these lines, our combat advisers our by-with-through ethos was on track accordingly. had little control over partner decision- once our teams began to consistently Admittedly, the initialism ISF may making, preparation for combat, or use terms such as them, they, and their carelessly overhomogenize our partners’ execution of operations. Importantly, our rather than us, we, and our. Our language capabilities; each of the three cohorts had commanders embraced being advisers mattered because how we spoke reflected its own distinct personality, and our ac- first, accepting that most meaningful how we thought about our partners’ count will bring some of this to life. This decisions and moves were clearly in the leadership and ownership of operations. collection of host-nation troops often hands of the Iraqi government. Indeed, Accomplishing our mission was obviously demonstrated tremendous willpower and senior ISF commanders required vast central, but it was not more important assumed the lion’s share of the physical support and encouragement at times, than how we accomplished our mission. risk no matter which uniform they wore: but they generally took full responsibility Iraqi army, Federal Police (FEDPOL), or for their operations. Our A&A teams, Lethal OCT Network: An Counterterrorism Services. Still, warfare logisticians, and artillery troops proved Imperfect Analogy by, with, and through the ISF was hard infinitely flexible; advisers could never Anyone who has experienced a combat work that highlighted three interrelated fall in love with ISF plans because they training center (CTC) rotation has a principles that can help inform how joint changed so frequently. Moreover, our useful model for comprehending Task leaders think about, resource, and lead two-star and three-star commanders’ Force Falcon’s core organizational and A&A operations: advisers do not get to flagship concepts saturated our approach. operational concepts. Fundamentally, choose their partners, advisers do not Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend the CTC’s observer-controller-trainer control their partners, and advisers must of CJTF-OIR was clear that we were to (OCT) network wraps itself around a put their partners first. help the ISF fight. Stated another way, rotational unit with a parallel structure First, coalition combat advisers did our A&A teams did not close with or connected by dependable communi- not get to choose their partners. Each of take the ground from IS, but instead cations and disciplined information our A&A teams had cause for frustration navigated a fascinating quest of influ- flows. The network’s goal is to help at times, but some partnerships were encing ISF without any authority over unit commanders improve their warf- clearly more challenging than others. ISF. Additionally, Major General Joseph ighting craft, largely by helping them Indeed, some ISF were reluctant at times. Martin of Combined Joint Forces Land see the opposing force (OPFOR), the Some of their commanders demonstrated Component Command (CJFLCC)-OIR ill-structured environment, and them- inconsistent levels of know-how, and, championed “nested, multi-echelon en- selves. The OCT network may even feel on occasion, the cohorts’ agendas were gagement” to help the coalition optimize intrusive at times as its nodes maintain more competitive than cooperative. On its influence with our partners. Like any contact with the rotational unit at every the other hand, we found that IS rallied coalition warfare, the host-nation force echelon. Finally, assuming competence around cunning jihadists who exploited came first; however, our approach to is the network’s anchor point, many of Iraq’s sectarian politics and commanded fighting by, with, and through ampli- the same traits that make A&A teams an intoxicating Salafist narrative of mar- fied our Iraqi partners’ leadership and effective also distinguish the most useful tyrdom. In the end, despite being vastly ownership. OCTs. Empathy, humility, and patience outgunned, small, organized IS units Thus, Task Force Falcon upheld truly matter. continued fighting through the battle the ISF as the preeminent member of Perhaps most important, the OCT of Mosul’s final days in mid-July. Our the coalition against IS. We measured network is not embroiled in “fighting” mission statement not only reflected our our success only through our partners’ the OPFOR or the burden of external pursuit of Combined Joint Task Force– success. This mindset is worth empha- evaluation. Therefore, OCTs routinely OIR’s (CJTF-OIR) interests, but also sizing because, frankly, superbly capable achieve a level of shared understand- how we worked to steady the episodic teammates can lose sight of the partners’ ing that outstrips the rotational units’ imbalance of determination between our centrality at times. To condition our team understanding. Of course, they are not partners and the enemy: “Task Force to always consider the ISF’s goals first, all-knowing; plenty of conversations occur Falcon—by, with, and through ISF in our leaders openly discussed the impor- without OCT oversight, and they peri- everything it does—advises, assists, and tance of empathy, humility, and patience odically misread events, personalities, or JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Work 57 trends. Still, the network is well-postured diverse, spanning divestitures of military people. And our people did not advise to provide vertically aligned insights, equipment and supplies for vetted part- ISF institutions—they advised other perspectives, and ideas that help the rota- ners, fires and counterfire, civil-military people. The fight to liberate Mosul was tional unit advance against the OPFOR in advice, and the deadly work of helping a decidedly human story of grit and an uncertain environment. An imperfect ISF liberate the people of Ninewah. willpower, and the key ISF characters analogy, for sure, but thus far we have Steering our decentralized, dynamic, in the story had their own personal only discussed similarities that attend to and diverse A&A enterprise called for an relationships, tensions, motivations, and the advise side of A&A operations. enduring set of guideposts that lined up fears. Uncomfortable discussions were As for the assist aspects, we should our decisionmaking and risk evaluation the natural order of things, and sturdy begin by picturing the same OCTs processes. As we entered the A&A fray relationships with our partners helped armed with enormous amounts of secure of Mosul in January, Task Force Falcon us get past them. Rule #1 for us was bandwidth, intelligence capacity, and organized around five big ideas: profoundly unassuming: “Listen.” And strike capabilities. Moreover, imagine Rule #2 was nearly as simple: “Maintain that this lethal OCT network’s mission, •• Protect ourselves and our partners. contact.” Only by staying with key ISF or moral obligation, includes attacking •• ISF are always the main effort.2 commanders much of the time, and the OPFOR relentlessly to ensure the •• Attack IS. listening to them all of the time, did rotational unit wins. Now visualize this •• Share understanding. our A&A network begin to understand lethal OCT network as only one among •• Be agile—ISF should never have to how our partners saw IS, the environ- equals in an aggressive ecosystem that in- wait for us.3 ment, and themselves. This informs cludes special operations, joint, and other Rule #3: “Be realistic.” The battle of coalition stakeholders who are also united We concentrated on these ideas con- Mosul was exhausting for both sides. in their desire to thrash the OPFOR. stantly for nearly 9 months, and reevalu- Even as poorly trained and resourced as As inadequate as this comparison may ated their relevance on several occasions IS may have been at times, its leaders be, we all reason by analogy: Task Force as the campaign advanced. demonstrated remarkable conviction, Falcon operated like this fictional, lethal When I was a student at the Marine an inequality that helped extend such OCT network—only the stakes were Corps War College, preparation for a a murderous resistance. Expressed infinitely more deadly and complex. guest lecture by Lieutenant General Paul differently, by listening during carefully Our field-grade commanders wore two Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), introduced me orchestrated contact with the ISF, our hats, advising ISF corps or division com- to a mission command–styled concept team remained realistic about the advice manders in addition to their traditional that he dubbed “In Command and Out of we gave, as well as our own limitations responsibilities. Likewise, our compa- Control.”4 Along these lines, I envisioned in influencing the ISF’s fighting path ny-grade commanders advised Iraqi army commanding Task Force Falcon from the and pace. or FEDPOL brigades. Combat advising center, an intellectual schema blending We probably only saw the tip of the at these echelons maintained a natural the organizational strengths of hierarchies iceberg, but our A&A network would distance between our teams and the and webs that I had observed during prior have never had a chance of understand- savagery of close combat, and this space combat tours with joint special opera- ing Mosul’s unfolding story unless we probably reinforced our focus on helping tions task forces. The chain of command all committed to our relationships. our partners see the enemy, the environ- certainly remained intact, particularly our Lieutenant Colonel Jim Browning, ment, and themselves rather than doing commanders’ responsibility to help the adviser to 9th Iraqi Army Division the fighting for them. CJFLCC manage risk, but we knew the and commander of 2-508th Parachute brigade headquarters would get in the way Infantry Regiment, went so far as to fast Align Around the Big Ideas, of our teams unless we stayed “up-and- with his partners through Ramadan. Then Get Out of the Way out.” Also, our traditional roles in a typical As long as we answered the CJFLCC In addition to Task Force Falcon’s brigade hierarchy were far less notable commander’s information requirements, seven organic battalion-level headquar- than our A&A-specific responsibilities to we allowed the ISF commanders’ bio- ters and internal enablers, we integrated empower combat advisers at the tactical rhythms, specifically cultural habits like an eighth battalion-level adviser team, edge. Any leader’s control over people afternoon rest and late meals, to drive our a 155mm Paladin battery, and several and events naturally loosens at each higher task force–level battle rhythm. Indeed, other formal attachments or informal echelon of command; I tried to command teams at every echelon were sensors for partners. Our operational profile was our A&A network, never to control it. relevant atmospherics and answers to as geospatially decentralized as it was higher headquarters’ information re- dynamic—we had at least one platoon Relationships: Coin of quirements. By living and breathing the that operated from 14 different bases the A&A Realm ISF leaders’ biorhythm, we underscored, over the 9-month mission. Moreover, In its essence, Task Force Falcon directly and indirectly, the ISF’s primacy our A&A operations were functionally was not made up of people—it was in the fight. 58 Special Feature / Fighting the Islamic State: How Mattered as Much as What JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Iraqi Security Forces member provides security near patrol base in Mosul, June 22, 2017 (U.S. Army/Rachel Diehm) In particular, our A&A efforts with conversations several nights a week. Later replacement troops, combat systems, or Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir in the evenings, we frequently hosted ammunition any time soon. This gave al-Lami, the Iraqi government’s overall secure video teleconferences to connect our relationships, no matter how cozy, joint forces commander, framed and Staff Lieutenant General al-Lami in a transactional quality. Expressed very reframed a lively puzzle for senior, sub- northern Iraq with his partners, Major simply, Rule #4 was “Assist in order to ordinate, and peer special operations General Martin and later Major General advise.” The ISF senior commanders we commanders. He was a serious man who Pat White, in Baghdad. Meanwhile, I dealt with were well-educated, had seen evoked Dwight Eisenhower for his own often pumped similar contextualized extensive combat beginning with the ISF-internal coalition, and as his combat updates down and into our network of Iran-Iraq War decades earlier, and had adviser, I was physically with him on most field- and company-grade teams that watched senior American advisers come days and nights. I listened a lot during our were also listening, maintaining contact, and go for years during Operation Iraqi 150-day battle to liberate west Mosul, and pursuing realistic pieces to the ev- Freedom and Operation New Dawn. and we had several uncomfortable but er-morphing puzzle. Consistent dialogue Importantly, they also stood on the busi- candid discussions. After spending the throughout the breadth and depth of ness end of American military dominance day with Staff Lieutenant General al- our A&A network contributed to shared twice between 1991 and 2003, so they Lami, I would typically report insights to understanding and advanced our ability had little patience when they were tested the CJFLCC commander using a limited to help ISF and hurt IS. by inexpensive off-the-shelf IS drones or flag officer email distribution in order Still, it took more than energy and when coalition strike cells developed the to help inform our nested, multiechelon listening to earn our partners’ trust. situation before directing precision fires. engagement across the team of teams. ISF commanders were pragmatic when In fact, our predecessors from the 2nd After hitting send on these brief mes- evaluating risk; they fought knowing the Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne sages, we often followed up with phone Iraqi government may not be sending Division (Air Assault), wisely coached us JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Work 59 to prepare for this assist in order to advise ideas to guide our decisionmaking and 1. Advise. Our teams helped ISF paradigm. “Money talks” in combat activities. Like all senior-subordinate commanders think through their tactical advising, too. Ninth Iraqi Army Division relationships, ours were stressed on and logistics problems with an eye toward leaders appreciated Lieutenant Colonel occasion, but I genuinely trusted all exploiting opportunities, assessing risk, Browning’s symbolic show of friendship eight of our field-grade commanders. and making sober decisions on how to during Ramadan, but what they really Also, our role was critical in informing apply finite resources. Through nested wanted was for him and Command a unified coalition view, so we tirelessly multiechelon engagement, Task Force Sergeant Major Curt Donaldson to keep and transparently overcommunicated Falcon pressed consistent messages at striking IS on the final days of close com- with our higher headquarters to help every echelon. In fact, we frequently bat in Mosul and Tal Afar. them understand the campaign from the helped the CJTF or CJFLCC command- A commonsense feature of relation- ground up. Our commanders also ex- ers be our finishers. Both were key drivers ships was probably the most significant pected everyone in our A&A network to of coalition combat advising as they en- to our mission—strong relationships do their jobs, regardless of their distance gaged at the executive levels to influence encouraged accountability in the part- from the combat action. There were no ISF activities, all the while reinforcing our nership. Notably, coalition advisers extra Soldiers on our team. More directly, nested message from the top-down. joined FEDPOL senior leadership for the there were no extra minds. Our leaders 2. Assist. Our partners rarely used the first time as the ISF’s counterattack on and Soldiers at every echelon had to con- red pen before designing a scheme of Mosul began. Obviously, there was some tinuously solve emerging problems across maneuver. Therefore, some of our most interest-mapping for both sides to do, the warfighting functions. Finally, we important assistance to them was coach- and occasionally the stress and slaughter organized the art and science of mission ing intelligence-driven operations. First, of the FEDPOL’s attack in west Mosul command to get the right information to our A&A network shared intelligence caused passionate reactions. For example, the right leader at the right time so that information and products to the extent the FEDPOL’s three-star commander he or she could make useful decisions in that we were allowed. As we helped the fired our A&A team at least a couple of an ever-changing environment. ISF prepare to attack Tal Afar in August times. Even so, the team that Lieutenant 2017, we actually arranged the entire bri- Colonel John Hawbaker and Command All Six “As” of A&A Operations gade intelligence enterprise to help them Sergeant Major Brian Knight led re- Through the Lethal OCT Network understand which attack axes exploited mained remarkably goal-oriented. Their analogy, we introduced a handful of the IS’s most vulnerable defenses. The value best military advice—delivered with em- concepts inherent to A&A operations. of our advice was found in their execu- pathy, humility, and patience—as well as A3E—advise, assist, accompany, and tion. Our partners dominated IS in a their punishing strikes against IS set them enable—entered the coalition lexicon 12-day blitz to retake the city. up to push back when coalition interests before Task Force Falcon arrived in Assist’s lethal expression was obvi- were ignored. This brings us to Rule #5: Iraq. The third A, accompany, ostensi- ously precision fires. After IS conquered “Never lose sight of your own interests, bly delineated the riskier forward pos- Mosul, it prepared a formidable defense and use your leverage.” To be clear, ours turing of combat advisers to help accel- for more than 2 years before the ISF was never a carrot-and-stick relationship. erate the counter-IS campaign. For Task launched the counterattack in October It was much more of an equal partner- Force Falcon, we never knew the differ- 2016. The defense involved a monstrous ship—their success was our success. Yet ence; there was no before and after per- mortar capacity, a legion of suicide car at times, we had to dial our types and spective for us to have. Because we tran- bombers whose high-payoff target list amounts of combat support up or down, sitioned while the ISF were still fighting was topped by ISF tanks and engineering promote or expose ISF commanders’ in east Mosul, our combat advisers had assets, and droves of IS infantry. The ISF reputations with key Iraqi government to cultivate relations with ISF generals stubbornly moved through this medley influencers, or shift priorities to exploit while in contact. Thus, close proximity of violence for 9 months, reinforced by aggressive ISF action elsewhere. Again, to ISF commanders on the battlefield coalition strikes from artillery, attack CJTF-OIR had interests, too. was always a signature component of helicopters, jets, and bombers. Meeting More so than any other experience our mission, so we may have intuitively the ISF requirement for responsive and in my 22 years of commissioned service, leaned toward a handful of “As” other precise fires, more so than other form of Task Force Falcon’s fight by, with, and than advise, assist, and accompany as we assistance, gave our partners confidence through the ISF epitomized central con- honed our A&A mindset and skill-set in on the hardest days. cepts underpinning the Army doctrine of Mosul’s cauldron of violence. 3. Accompany. As discussed, Task mission command. We were empowered All six “As” and the nuanced concepts Force Falcon was operating forward for dramatically decentralized operations and challenges they represent are security with ISF brigade, division, and corps because we kept the CJTF and CJFLCC force assistance lessons that we learned commanders upon arrival in January. commanders’ intents front of mind fighting by, with, and through the ISF. Predictable and persistent contact with always, using the already discussed five ISF commanders was crucial to building 60 Special Feature / Fighting the Islamic State: How Mattered as Much as What JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Military working dog team with 380th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron completes detection training scenario at undisclosed location in Southwest Asia, January 10, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Tyler Woodward) relationships of trust and accountability, immensely to us. During frequent times on the CJFLCC commander and senior but accompanying them also fed our of crisis, we encouraged all of our advisers staff in Baghdad to help us posture our efforts to assure, anticipate, and be agile. to continually remind the ISF that they A&A capabilities. Accompanying the ISF gave our combat could count on us and that their success Even as we transitioned the A&A advisers a strong sense for the combat’s was our success. mission to 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain direction and intensity. This helped our 5. Anticipate. As we discussed the Division, the ISF plan was evolving daily Lethal OCT Network provide timely and A3E profile previously, I mentioned my as the start of the Hawijah offensive useful assistance at the point of decision proposal for a more relevant third A, but approached. As we departed, CJFLCC while also offering perspective to promote there is more to the story. Major General was organizing a medical evacuation shared understanding and unity of effort. Martin actually countered with another architecture without absolute certainty of 4. Assure. During my last battlefield insightful candidate, anticipate. To be ISF intentions. The incoming team was circulation with Major General Martin clear, the ISF we enabled during OIR arranging its fires architecture and basing before he departed in July, I offered did not issue combat orders or rehearse posture with an eye toward maximum my observation that the third A in A3E operations. In fact, senior commanders flexibility in order to absorb late change. should stand for assure, not accompany. normally returned from Baghdad just in Nothing was first order in Iraq’s politi- We have countless examples of how our time for the start of another bloody phase cal-military environment. As stated, Task physical presence, ideas, or fires—or a of the attack. When our partners departed Force Falcon could never fall in love with confluence of these inputs—gave ISF northern Iraq during the transitions, we a plan, and we continuously challenged commanders the confidence to keep continued to overcommunicate and main- our own assumptions. Our A&A network attacking. In fact, I now have a new tain a disciplined battle rhythm to ensure had to always listen, maintain contact paradigm for what nonlethal contact our A&A network’s shared understanding with our counterparts, and apply the fun- can mean. In OIR, when I was not with in spite of lapsed Iraqi communications. damentals of mission command in order Staff Lieutenant General al-Lami, we In fact, during these periods, our partners to make the best decisions we could. maintained contact. For the very reason only occasionally felt compelled to call us However, when we sensed increased of assurance, quality translators mattered with essential updates, so we relied heavily risk, the commanding general or I JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Work 61 than merely advising and assisting. Still, the campaign was incurably human, and naturally, relationships mattered. Solid relationships kept everyone goal-oriented on frustrating days, and our connections introduced a deeper accountability to the partnership. Finally, we kept a consistent azimuth guided by five big ideas, and we never lost sight of the coalition’s interests. By breaking down IS in their own way, the ISF leadership and ownership of the battle of Mosul embodied the essence of warfare by, with, and through a part- ner whose success was the very measure of our success. I still clearly remember the day I sensed the ISF mass was finally toppling the enemy’s Juhmuri Hospital fortress in west Mosul. It was the visible beginning of the end for IS, and our part- ners were still leading the day’s deadly work. They continue to do so today. JFQ Member of Iraqi federal police awaits next movement on streets of recently secured airport during offensive to liberate West Mosul, March 2, 2017 (U.S. Army/Jason Hull) Notes would direct clarifying questions to Staff In Their Own Way: The 1 Lieutenant General al-Lami, discussing Essence of Warfare By, Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooper- ation (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, May resource tradeoffs with him in a transpar- With, and Through 23, 2017), II-8, cites Department of Defense ent manner. It was a privilege to represent our Instruction 5000.68, while describing security 6. Agility. One of Task Force Falcon’s Army and our storied division with force assistance: “With, through, and by. De- guiding ideas was that the ISF should the coalition during OIR. We are also scribes the process of interaction with foreign never have to wait for us. Our command- honored to have served under two security forces that initially involves training and assisting. . . . The next step in the process is ers and teams nimbly changed directions tremendous divisions during the drive advising, which may include advising in combat in response to updated Iraqi government to help the ISF dominate our nations’ situations (acting ‘through’ the forces).” decisions or emergent opportunities to shared enemy. We could not have been 2 Perhaps not as self-evident as it may damage IS. In fact, 2nd Battalion, 325th prouder of our partners as we departed appear, we lifted this central theme from Lieu- Airborne Infantry Regiment, support to Iraq in September; the ISF had liberated tenant General Stephen Townsend’s seminal th Tactical Directive #1, his command direction the 15 Iraqi Army Division near Badush well over 4 million people and 40,000 that arguably unlocked unrealized coalition is a superb example. While the battle kilometers of terrain and more than a potential for responsive, precision lethality. His of Mosul still raged, Staff Lieutenant quarter million people had returned message to advisers was “don’t make yourself General al-Lami decided to press the IS to their homes in Mosul. Perhaps the the main effort.” 3 disruption zone to the east of Tal Afar. He most heartening aspect was that Staff This is also a direct lift from Major General Joseph Martin’s overarching guidance shared his thinking with us during a rou- Lieutenant General al-Lami and the ISF to anticipate Iraqi Security Forces’ actions and tine key leader engagement on a Monday accelerated the campaign against IS fol- posture nimbly. I first recall Major General evening, and by Friday morning, Task lowing their victorious battle of Mosul. Martin emphasizing the necessity of anticipa- Force White Falcon was on the move. How we advised ISF command- tion during the Combined Joint Forces Land In a matter of 4 days, we synchronized ers—our mindset and approach—always Component Command–Operation Inherent Resolve Commanders’ Conference at Camp logistics, began building a new assembly mattered as much as the actual tactical Union III in Baghdad in January 2017. area, and integrated a battery of 155mm and logistical advice that we conferred 4 Paul Van Riper, “How to Be in Command howitzers that was previously based with during our mission to help ISF and hurt and Out of Control by Paul Van Riper 2,” our cavalry squadron. We kept it simple IS every day. We had to produce results YouTube video, 9:19, September 23, 2008, during these frequent jumps; there were to retain the ISF’s trust, and we are available at 62 Special Feature / Fighting the Islamic State: How Mattered as Much as What JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Peshmerga soldier loads ammunition into magazine in preparation for squad-based training near Erbil, Iraq, October 14, 2015, as part of Combined Joint Task Force– Operation Inherent Resolve (U.S. Army/Tristan Bolden) Sacrifice, Ownership, Legitimacy Winning Wars By, With, and Through Host-Nation Security Forces By John B. Richardson IV and John Q. Bolton reedom is not free, and it cannot fighting civil wars or insurgencies for Soviet troops crossed the Amu Darya be won by someone else. History both the good of that nation and the into Afghanistan, for instance, a limited F is rife with examples of great power’s self-interest. The great power’s expedition eventually became the cat- powers using their strength, military initial efforts often fail, leading to an alyst that ended an empire. Likewise, or otherwise, to assist other nations expanded commitment and eventual when the Athenians invaded Sicily, they quagmire where the power ends up thought their massive force guaran- pouring blood and treasure into a teed a quick victory, but the very size Brigadier General John B. Richardson IV, USA, losing cause. In short, the great power of their commitment caused them to is Commanding General of Train Advise Assist overestimates its ability to win peace for reinforce failure, ultimately suffering an Command–East (TAAC-E), Operation Resolute the weaker nation and allows a limited irrecoverable setback.2 Support, Afghanistan. Major John Q. Bolton, USA, is Deputy G3 and Brigade Aviation Officer for exertion to become a self-serving jus- When assisting host nations, great TAAC-E. tification for further sacrifice.1 When powers often start small but allow a JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Richardson and Bolton 63 pernicious haste to take hold, effectively operations. A BWT approach requires the George Washington understood that telling local forces “move out of the way; discipline to leverage traditional American Americans would have to fight, bleed, let us take care of this and you can be competencies, namely firepower, technol- and die for freedom and independence. in charge after we win.” This is a false ogy, and excellent logistics, into advisory Consequently, the Revolution depended narrative; a power that gets both the efforts that create local solutions rather more on the mere existence of the ends and the means right can still fail than mirror-imaging American methods Continental Army than battlefield by choosing the wrong ways to achieve because the American way of war is rarely victory.5 Washington knew foreign those ends. Speed and tactical efficiency right for partnered forces.4 troops, even mercenaries, could have do not win civil conflict; host-nation le- The critical question for the great won tactically, but would fail to achieve gitimacy combined with eventual tactical power is determining how it will assist the overall strategic goal—an indepen- victory does. These facts necessitate a host nations: What ways and means will dent America—because victories won conditions-based approach. it apply? Before answering this ques- by foreign allies would not legitimize tion, certain conditions must exist. The the Revolution. He declined early Transitioning to a host-nation government and its national French offers for troops to fight on BWT Approach security forces must be willing to own the American soil.6 A victory provided by After more than a decade assisting fight and sacrifice in order to be seen as foreign troops would have undermined host-nation security forces, the United legitimate by the population. They must the Continental Congress’s claim to States has learned from its mistakes. have skin in the game. Only once the legitimacy. Americans had to make Despite uneven commitment over the great power has viable partners who are the sacrifices and earn the legitimacy years, the Nation has maintained the willing to fight, minimize corruption, and required to win the postwar peace, even political will to continue assistance in maintain minimum transparency can it at the cost of a longer war. At the same Iraq and Afghanistan and has made a determine the scope and scale of its com- time, Washington understood his Army strategic adjustment in how it does so. mitment. No amount of foreign support needed resources, training, and assis- American forces are now helping Iraqis can create these conditions. tance to defeat the British. His officers and Afghans win their fights, build their The lifeblood of an insurgency is were not educated or trained in the art legitimacy, and earn the right to be seen popular support, so the insurgent must of war and needed expert advice, coach- as the defenders of their countries. This delegitimize the government, partic- ing, and mentorship. transition—from U.S. and coalition ularly its security forces, in the eyes of Washington embraced a BWT ap- forces leading the fight—to providing the people. To defeat an insurgency, the proach as a way to utilize French support. advisory support and assistance by, government must prove itself legitimate He wisely understood that France’s stra- with, and through (BWT) host-nation by providing security, good governance, tegic goal in the New World, weakening security forces allows the United States and essential services. Security provided Great Britain, aligned with America’s goal and North Atlantic Treaty Organization by the host-nation forces promotes of independence. While some Americans (NATO) to accelerate recent progress national loyalty, stemming from pride in are familiar with advisors such as France’s toward their strategic endstates. Specif- having their fellow citizens fight and win Marquis de Lafayette, Poland’s Thaddeus ically, coalition forces seek to train and their freedom. The population cannot Kosciuszko and Casimir Pulaski, and build host-nation security forces that perceive that their rights, freedom, or Prussia’s Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, are capable, competent, sustainable, and livelihood were won by foreign forces all Americans know it was Washington, seen as legitimate by the population. and then given to the host-nation gov- Nathanael Greene, and Henry Knox This way allows the United States to ernment. Sacrifice leads to host-nation who led the fight for their independence. resume its traditional strategic posture to ownership and national pride, paving the Americans own Valley Forge, Americans what political scientist John Mearsheimer way to legitimacy. Legitimacy leads to own Bunker Hill, and, in the end, calls an “offshore balancer” in the popular support for the government, and Americans own their freedom. Though Middle East, which allows its combat then disavowal of the armed opposition, French assistance was critical, Americans formations to prepare for other global insurgent, or oppressor, and eventual won the war. requirements.3 If by, with, and through reconciliation between the government Assisting partners is a critical compo- is the way to achieve strategic ends, it and the insurgent. Legitimacy is, there- nent of by, with, and through, though also requires particular means and con- fore, the strategic linchpin to defeating an commanders, strategists, and policy- ditions—namely, political will (strategic insurgency. makers frequently debate its meaning patience), viable host-nation partners, when defining the advisory mission. and realistic goals aligned with the host BWT and the American Assistance comes in many forms ranging nation. Importantly, it also necessitates a Revolution from equipment to enabler support unique military capability: troops trained Viewed through a modern lens, the (intelligence, fires), and, when opera- and equipped to advise host-nation American Revolution illustrates how tionally imperative, close combat. BWT forces rather than to conduct combat a BWT approach can work. General support is scalable, but the commitment 64 Special Feature / Winning Wars BWT Host-Nation Security Forces JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Iraqi federal police attached to 1st Battalion conduct class on squad tactics at Besmaya Range Complex, Iraq, February 8, 2018 (U.S Army/Antonio Lewis) of host-nation forces cannot be question- Iraq and Afghanistan, albeit using dif- Brigade Combat Team (BCT), we were able. Though the American Revolution ferent subsets of the approach. Employ- manned, trained, and equipped for would likely have failed without French ing the BWT construct, our forces combat, not advising. We conducted support, even at the final American vic- enabled success without becoming deci- daily combat operations, achieving good tory at Yorktown, the vital enabler—the sively engaged. Could the Iraqi Security combined tactical effects with our ISF French navy—remained largely out of Forces (ISF) have defeated the so-called partners, but did little to build their legit- sight. It was an American victory. To Islamic State (IS) in Mosul without imacy. While the ISF improved tactically American eyes the Continental Army, coalition support? No. Can the Afghan over 12 months of combined operations, acting as the tool of a viable government, government win without coalition they were no more legitimate in the won independence through its sacrifices advisors and enablers in 2017–2018? eyes of the population who saw them as during the hard years from Valley Forge Probably not. Nevertheless, our efforts American underlings. to Yorktown. Having earned the public’s have fostered achievement while not Even after years of experience, we trust, the Continental Army and militias undermining host-nation legitimacy. did not understand the importance of a helped legitimize the nascent American An examination of previous security viable host-nation partner who owns the Government. assistance efforts underscores the im- fight. Our shortsighted desire for tactical portance of this change in methodology. success came at the expense of strategic Host-Nation Forces During earlier phases of these conflicts, gains. We developed plans and brought Own the Fight we failed to appreciate the importance a token Iraqi element along during exe- Much the same as France assisted the of legitimate host-nation forces and the cution, calling our actions “partnered.” Americans over 200 years ago, Amer- requirement to promote their ownership We were first through the door on the ican forces find themselves assisting of the fight. From 2008–2009, I com- objective, we led evidence collection and host-nation forces today. Throughout manded an armored cavalry squadron site exploitation, we led the tactical ques- 2017, we had the unique experience to that was “partnered” with the 54th Iraqi tioning, and we planned the next target. see the BWT paradigm work in both Army Brigade. As an Army Armored With reflection and experience, I now JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Richardson and Bolton 65 BCT’s leadership and various special operations units serving as advisors. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) aligned these combat advisors with ISF counterparts to conduct advise, assist, accompany, and enable (A3E), an aggres- sive subset of BWT with advisors pushed to the division and brigade levels. Some advisors worked in ISF headquarters, some supported Iraqi artillery, and some were forward bringing close air support and intelligence, surveillance, and recon- naissance enablers to the fight. Regardless of the scale of advising efforts, the Iraqis owned the tactical fight—leading, planning, and fighting the enemy. They were bleeding and dying for their country during intense urban combat against a fanatical enemy. Had you told me in 2008 that over 1,000 Iraqi soldiers would die for their country during a single battle, I would have been incredulous; I never saw that level of sacrifice or ownership during previous tours. However, in 2017, I witnessed Iraqi sacrifice as they won their victory and solidified their legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people. Importantly, the Iraqi government was a viable partner. Government officials and the ISF worked with the coalition to achieve measured goals to improve overall governance rather than to enrich elites or a powerful minority. Moreover, the limited means we employed were sustainable with the political will avail- able. We provided expert advice, enabled Iraqi maneuver with coalition precision Member of Iraqi federal police holds discarded ISIS headband during offensive to liberate and secure West Mosul, March 2, 2017 (U.S. Army/Jason Hull) fires, assisted their logistics and intelli- gence processes, and assured them with ask myself, “How did our actions look combination of a viable Iraqi govern- our presence and counsel as casualties to the population?” and “Who did the ment, rebuilt ISF, limits on our own force mounted. When the fight was over, the Iraqi people see as winning their fight for and tactics, as well as lessons learned, en- ISF had defeated IS’s most determined freedom and peace?” When the United abled us to implement a BWT approach fighters, and the Iraqi people saw the ISF States departed Iraq in 2011, the ISF to aid the ISF fight against IS. The BWT as a legitimate security force that liberated were trained but did not own the victory. construct proved more effective than our the country. The Nouri al-Maliki regime’s sectarianism previous hands-on method of partnered In August 2017, I took command further affected legitimacy and left Iraq combat operations with coalition forces of Train Advise Assist Command–East without the viable government required in the lead. (TAAC-E) in Afghanistan. Our mission for long-term success. The IS invasion in A BWT approach comes in many was to advise and enable Afghan National 2014 verified our shortsighted approach. forms and is scalable based on mission Defense Security Forces (ANDSF). We In January 2017, I returned to Erbil and local factors, but the common partnered with the Afghan National to lead the Coalition Strike Cell and thread is the location and role of combat Army’s (ANA) 201st Corps and Afghan manage the enabler contribution to the advisors. To support Iraqi counter-IS National Police 202nd Zone. NATO’s Iraqi fight for Mosul. By this point, the efforts, American forces consisted of a Operation Resolute Support and 66 Special Feature / Winning Wars BWT Host-Nation Security Forces JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 USCENTCOM had fully transitioned time it deploys BCTs as makeshift advi- Employing a BWT approach requires to a BWT approach of train advise assist sor teams. This approach will not only strategic patience. Resolving civil strife, (TAA), another tailorable subset of BWT enhance advisor capacity but also allow ending a rebellion, or defeating an insur- that places advisors at army corps and min- Army BCTs to focus on mission essential gency are not quick endeavors. Excessive isterial levels. As in Iraq, the host nation tasks required to win the Nation’s high- foreign troops and external money, led the tactical fight, while our TAA efforts end and hybrid wars. coupled with a rush to leave, have the helped build capability and capacity by The SFAB is manned, trained, and potential to exacerbate the situation by improving Afghan institutional processes. equipped with the unique skills and at- delegitimizing the host-nation forces and All efforts, both military and civilian, fo- tributes that a BWT approach requires. inflaming local antipathies.12 The perni- cused on fostering the strategic linchpin of Making the SFAB a permanent organi- cious desire to “let us do it and leave” can legitimacy. At the tactical level, however, zation means the Army has codified the cause assisting forces to overcommit and there remained a requirement for combat hard lessons learned over a decade at war. inadvertently disincentivizes host-nation advisors to conduct warfighting function– BWT takes patience and acceptance of forces from fighting their fight. We end based training and staff advising at the local solutions. It can be frustrating—the up believing we are winning, when, in brigade and battalion levels. temptation to take the wheel and drive truth, we are losing or merely perpetuat- is constant, but combat advisors must ing a stalemate. To create strategic victory, Specialized Combat Advisors have the strategic understanding that the tactical actions must nest with a broad, To meet this need, USCENTCOM will Afghans must win for the Afghans. A sustainable approach.13 Previously, U.S. employ the Army’s newly created Secu- good combat advisor understands that his forces failed to create this situation in Iraq rity Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) or her contribution comes through advis- or Afghanistan; frustrated American and this spring—not to fight the Afghans’ ing counterparts by teaching, coaching, coalition civilian leaders saw 16 1-year fight but to advise ANA brigades and mentoring, and assisting when necessary. wars won at the tactical level, while strate- battalions. The SFAB provides the Combat advisors provide the expertise gic victory remained elusive. Army the means to more effectively needed to build viable, legitimate, and The past should be a guide. American accomplish the way of BWT.7 In the sustainable security forces. At the tactical forces lost few tactical fights against the fight against IS in Iraq, we pulled the level, Afghans can fight; they need institu- Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army, leaders out of Army combat formations tional experience and training in logistics, but still lost the war in Vietnam. Early to serve as improvised advisors. Like- mission command, and staff processes. in the war, policymakers felt Military wise, special operations forces acted as Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam—the conventional warfare advisors rather Strategic Patience BWT command of that war—was taking than performing their foreign internal As the United States enters the 17th year too long. They were promised a relatively defense (FID) and unconventional of forces deployed to Afghanistan, sta- easy victory if America deployed its divi- warfare (UW) missions. While generally bility in the country remains important sions and took over the fight. After quick successful, these stopgap solutions did to American strategic goals. Afghanistan success, everyone believed America would not always generate advisors with the provides an enduring counterterror- withdraw, transitioning control to the unique skills required to advise most ism platform and a source for critical Vietnamese. 14 Of course, the government effectively. The most effective BWT resources.10 The BWT way addresses the of South Vietnam never achieved legiti- approach requires the right leaders with critical aspects of ownership and legiti- macy and the American strategy failed. the right skills for advising, employed in macy and supports an offshore balancing By, with, through is a long-term the right context.8 The SFAB will bring strategy because by, with, and through investment. At the same time, the BWT this capability to Afghanistan. reduces the U.S. footprint. Conse- approach can sustain limited political SFAB advisors will partner with quently, a BWT approach allows the will by reducing the U.S. footprint in the ANA at the tactical level, bringing military to focus on other threats while the region, forcing local governments to experience, knowledge, and enablers to minimizing risk to force and mission. own the fight rather than executing an facilitate advising. By developing a unit Additionally, conditions in Afghani- American-led war. It takes commitment, specifically manned and trained for ad- stan have changed. We have a viable patience, and time to help man, train, vising, the Army is wisely mirroring the partner in a unified Afghan government and equip host-nation security forces. It Green Berets’ FID mission. FID, A3E, and ANDSF willing to fight for their requires discipline on the part of combat and TAA are all tailorable subsets of the country. In 2015–2016, ANDSF suf- advisors to allow host-nation forces to BWT approach; while FID focuses on fered heavy losses demonstrating their fight at their tempo and within their UW, the SFAB will conduct A3E with willingness to sacrifice—in 2017 they tactical limitations without taking over. their conventional counterparts, advising took ownership of the fight.11 In 2018, By, with, and through means Afghan them in combined arms maneuver.9 The they will demonstrate their legitimacy or Iraqi ways may not mimic American SFAB allows the Army to stop eroding by keeping pressure on the Taliban and solutions. Paradoxically, the tactically readiness of its BCTs and divisions each securing national elections. slower BWT approach is more likely to JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Richardson and Bolton 67 achieve an enduring strategic victory New from because it avoids the trap of rushing Notes to overcommit to a faulty strategy.15 1 NDU Press Pursuing a “let us do it for you” ap- Gabriel White, “Prospect Theory and the for the Center for the Study of Problem of Strategy: Lessons from Sicily and proach produces immediate tactical Dien Bien Phu,” Strategy Bridge, November 3, Chinese Military Affairs success but may create an endless, open- 2017, available at 68 Special Feature / Winning Wars BWT Host-Nation Security Forces JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Soldier assigned to 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, checks mortar data during fire mission in support of 9th Iraqi Army Division near Al Tarab, Iraq, during offensive to liberate West Mosul from ISIS, March 18, 2017 (U.S. Army/Jason Hull) Laying the Foundation for a Strategic By-With-Through Approach By Edward F. Dorman III and Christopher P. Townsend n a recent Joint Force Quarterly are inextricably linked to our extensive article, General Joseph Dunford network of partners and allies, which Major General Edward F. Dorman III, USA, stated, “allies and partners are our the Nation has leveraged since World I 1 is Director of Logistics and Engineering for strategic center of gravity.” This is also War II. This legacy continues at U.S. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). Major true at the operational level, as our Central Command (USCENTCOM) Christopher P. Townsend, USA, is a Foreign Area Officer and Chief of the Strategic partnerships allow us to “project power as it maintains a strong coalition of 28 Communications Branch in USCENTCOM J4. when and where necessary to advance nations with boots on the ground at The authors would like to acknowledge the national interests.”2 He went on to the operational and tactical levels to contributions of Colonel Martine S. Kidd, USA, and Larry Pleis, who provided feedback on early describe how U.S. global leadership bring about the military defeat of the drafts of this article. and the competitive advantage it enjoys so-called Islamic State. As one might JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Dorman and Townsend 69 imagine, the need for interoperability sustainment case to ensure the initial that we can build, field, and fight with across all warfighting functions is operating capability. However, achieving partner brigades in Iraq, Afghanistan, critical. Moreover, logistics interopera- true interoperability that maintains the and Syria; however, the costs of advising, bility—meaning common sustainment U.S. competitive advantage can occur assisting, accompanying, and enabling practices and processes—is an especially only through an enhanced understanding are almost prohibitive in the early stages. critical enabler for a strategic by-with- and analysis of partner nations’ logistics A strategic BWT approach could create through (BWT) approach. capabilities to include its systems, pro- offshore balancers allowing the United This article examines logistics cesses, and people. It is critical that we States to husband its organic capabilities interoperability as a critical but often un- move beyond the traditional “sharpen the for response to high-end threats. derestimated factor of coalition warfare, spear” applications focused on training Experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, which has links across joint, interagency, and equipping combat systems. We must and Syria continue to illustrate the intergovernmental, and multinational commensurately invest in developing true long-term costs that underpin a BWT environments. Logistics interoperability partner capacity with an interoperable strategic approach. Partner support in is critical to the future success of global logistics enterprise as its lifeblood to contingency operations is largely re- operations responding to transregional move us beyond the field level and simul- sourced with short-term programmatics, threats, but it requires dedicated efforts taneously develop the sustainment level single-year funding, ad hoc requirements in logistics security cooperation to build through a long-term view of life-cycle submissions, and an ad hoc approach to the foundation for a strategic BWT management. balancing partner needs with U.S. needs. approach. The real question, however, As a result, the Services, combat support is whether the United States can afford Why Interoperability? agencies, and our other national pro- the cost of ownership of such a strategy. The increased emphasis on a BWT stra- viders are constantly engaged in tough The ultimate answer is yes, but this tegic approach requires the world’s mil- resource decisions among competing top requires a comprehensive review of our itaries to become more interoperable. priorities. We consistently see this with current process and approach to security Success in warfare requires militaries to commodities like tactical vehicles and cooperation. The foundation of this develop and maintain reach, endurance, munitions. What may not be so obvious, enhanced security cooperation rests on and lethality; sustainment underpins all however, is that our current approach improved logistics interoperability and three because it directly relates to our to supporting a BWT approach severely enhancement of our current processes level of investment in materiel, capa- hampers long-term expansion of our and associated authorities. bility, capacity, and resiliency. Global industrial base capacity, Service reset RAND defines interoperability as threats require us to rise beyond the strategies, and other Service investment “the ability of systems, units, or forces capability of any one of our national objectives. Today, we have had to imple- to provide services to and accept services industrial bases and sustainment pipe- ment global controlled supply rates for from other systems, units, or forces, and lines. This is not a USCENTCOM precision-guided munitions because the to use the services so exchanged to enable problem but one that requires a truly consumption rate in current BWT fights them to operate effectively together.”3 globally integrated logistics enterprise has doubled the traditional U.S. expendi- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization across all combatant commands, agen- ture rates. definition of interoperability is the ability cies, and partners. In 1966, Geoffrey It is time to elevate the conversation. of “different military organizations to Blainey popularized the phrase tyranny There are ongoing simultaneous mul- conduct joint operations,” noting that of distance to talk about how remote- tiphase operations in multiple theaters. common equipment is not necessarily ness in geography can create chal- Threats manifest globally (China, Russia, required so long as the procedures, ac- lenges.6 Logistics interoperability and North Korea, Iran, and violent extrem- cess, and communication are present to focused logistics security cooperation ist organizations), and many of them facilitate combined operations.4 British efforts can help overcome this tyranny hover below the threshold of outright Army Major Susan Carson suggests through interoperable communications war in a gray zone that we must adapt that interoperability must be more than systems, common services, commod- to. Stability is essential to security, and coordination and cooperation, stressing ity-sharing, cooperative agreements, logistics interoperability is crucial to the necessity of interoperable communi- and aligned sustainment processes at all enabling all nations to contribute to that cations systems.5 All of these definitions echelons. stability. Humanitarian assistance and focus on the ability of disparate forces to Operations around the globe disaster relief efforts require us to be operate together in a common space. continue to grow more complex, but interoperable to better assist each other While security cooperation is a crit- interoperability efforts to date have in times of need. Unfortunately, it is a ical tool for enabling interoperability primarily focused on the tactical and op- rare event when even Foreign Military and BWT options, it usually focuses on erational levels of warfare, on maneuver Sales–equipped partners have arrived mis- materiel solutions sourced through the instead of the twin foundations of pro- sion-ready without ongoing U.S. enablers foreign military sales process, with a short jection and sustainment. We have shown and sustainment, or any real capability in 70 Special Feature / Laying the Foundation for a Strategic BWT Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Commander of Special Operations Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve provides assistant gunner support to member of 5th Special Forces Group during counter-ISIS operations in southern Syria, November 22, 2017 (U.S. Army/Jacob Connor) life-cycle management for their systems. institutions, develop cross-ministerial tional exercises in Jordan and Kuwait. The ongoing requirements of global relationships, mature civil-military rela- U.S. Africa Command stood up the peacekeeping operations and borders tionships, and provide economic capacity Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping increasingly threatened by transnational far beyond the military sphere and tactical and Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, and transregional threats require us to echelon. The good news is that we have with many programs that will increase work together to lay the foundation of repeatedly demonstrated our ability to capability and interoperability through this critical strategic center of gravity. work together as coalitions to address a shared understanding of the problems We must integrate to address these shared challenges. while providing the tools with which to challenges, for our ability both to counter address those problems. threats and to facilitate the creation of Building Partner Capacity U.S. Southern Command has been multiple dilemmas for our adversaries. Over the last couple of years, we have working diligently to communicate the In the immortal words of Benjamin improved our ability to work by, with, importance of reciprocal agreements and Franklin at the signing of the Declaration and through our partners through has had success with several countries of Independence, “We must, indeed, all concerted logistics interoperability that had previously been reluctant to hang together or, most assuredly, we shall improvements and efforts to build sign agreements with us. U.S. Pacific all hang separately.”7 Or as Dave Cate, partner capacity. In the USCENT- Command has been conducting partner director of Assessments, Monitoring, and COM area of responsibility, we have training on how to better use agreements Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary integrated partners in the provision of to achieve interoperability and conduct- of Defense, told attendees at a recent logistics through the reinvigoration and ing multiple multinational exercises such Logistics Interoperability Symposium, usage of multipartner ground lines of as the Rim of the Pacific and Talisman “we have to walk together and not just in communications such as the Northern Saber exercises. the same direction.”8 Logistics interop- Distribution Network in Central Asia U.S. European Command has helped erability will help integrate commercial and the Trans-Arabian Network in to establish critical prepositioned stock industry (depending on the maturity of the Persian Gulf. We have exercised locations in several countries to create the partner’s industrial base) with military interoperability through joint multina- a common equipment set that we can JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Dorman and Townsend 71 draw from in times of need. It has also longer realistic to expect that a single The lack of infrastructure maturity developed basing and port options that nation’s logistics enterprise can sustain is another limiting factor. We need to directly contribute to our efforts world- a diverse multifront, simultaneously work more on creating the kind of in- wide. U.S. Northern Command has multiphased, multinational operation. frastructure that can support a globally worked hand in hand with the United Even the American system is beginning integrated logistics enterprise. Whether Nations to provide capabilities that have to show signs of strain with operations it is through common procedures or directly contributed to expanding the in the Middle East and a growing need equipment along transportation routes reach of the World Food Programme to focus on South Asia. While we have or in solutions that minimize the seams through equipping and training partner achieved success at the tactical level between countries and regions, we must forces for humanitarian assistance and through a massive outlay of enablers, look at the enterprise as a system that, disaster relief operations. we have consumed our own strategic even with disparate parts, must work Many of our partners have fought readiness in the process. The ability of together. This means focusing on the by our side in Iraq and Afghanistan. any one nation to commit to and sustain agreements and authorities that enable Others are demonstrating the fruits of operations within and outside its borders us to work through multiple partners combined efforts by conducting human- is limited by its national resources and simultaneously to accomplish the mis- itarian, peacekeeping, and even combat the strength of its logistics enterprise. In sion. Cyber and other shared spaces are operations on their own. Efforts such coalition operations, however, nations increasingly relevant and will continue as the National Defense University in can pool resources and share supply to present new threats as our enterprises Kazakhstan and the Center of Excellence chains greater and faster than any could become more integrated and interopera- for Logistics in the United Arab Emirates undertake on their own. Geography is a ble. Flaws and weaknesses in one part of demonstrate our partners’ resolve to crucial factor, but true interoperability— the shared networks necessary to achieve strengthening the military as a profession based on our efforts to build partner interoperability are a threat to the entire and a pillar of their societies. Critical tools capacity—can shrink the globe. enterprise. With the rise of antiaccess/ such as defense institution-building and area-denial threats, truly capable partners the vertical integrated logistics approach Enduring Challenges can reduce reliance on vulnerable trans- help develop a shared understanding Building partner capacity (BPC) is portation systems for force projection of the challenges and requirements for more than just providing systems and and sustainment by developing alternate future success. Key leader engagement is equipment platforms. We have to pay means of supply and sustainment. occurring every day all over the world, equal attention to the human elements Simply pulling blood out of the whether at U.S. Embassies or through as well as enduring sustainment require- “blood and treasure” model of warfare the efforts of combatant and component ments. Too much of our focus has been magnifies the treasure requirement while commands. We have to take the paradigm on equipment, and not enterprise and sacrificing the infrastructure and econ- for intelligence-sharing and apply it across institutions. We provide contract solu- omy of scale inherent in the U.S.-centric the enterprise to things such as supply tions focused on performing a function method. Advise, assist, and accompany chains and support services, thereby rather than building a capacity, much efforts work at a tactical level but are fa- building truly interoperable partnerships. like sending a fisherman instead of a cilitating a false narrative of sustainability We need to understand our partners fishing teacher. A recent Government within the partner force because it creates challenges and successes, especially Accountability Office report found that a logistics dependency. While we try to where capacity developed through barely one-quarter of America’s BPC let partners take the lead in our current U.S. interoperability efforts have led efforts even considered logistics and operations, we are still doing sustainment to improved unilateral operations for sustainment, and only 1 out of 15 secu- for them in the interest of speed and ef- their forces. It is not an all-or-nothing rity cooperation officers (military offi- ficiency. We underestimate the true costs approach. We must also be cognizant cers charged with security cooperation of our efforts to create speed and tactical of partners who offer a niche capability management and execution at many efficiency, while ignoring the develop- that they can contribute to the fight. A U.S. Embassies) interviewed believed ment of a truly interoperable partner. core requirement for the BWT approach that their assigned country could sustain is ownership because partner legitimacy itself in unassisted operations.9 We need Vision for the Future cannot exist without ownership. U.S. to look beyond the tactical successes of The future of logistics security coopera- ownership does not create partner legit- current BWT efforts. We must expand tion is a truly integrated global logistics imacy; it carries with it higher costs and the aperture and work before, during, enterprise (GLENT) that we can rapidly does not incentivize self-sustainability. and after our capacity-building efforts expand or contract depending on While tradition holds that military logis- to assemble the strategic infrastructure, operational requirements, wherein each tics is a national responsibility, a quick systems, and processes that can sustain partner can contribute to and benefit survey of the history of warfare finds that and consolidate the tactical gains and from our collective strength and capabil- nearly all war is coalition-based. It is no lead to long-term sustainability. ity. This global logistics enterprise can be 72 Special Feature / Laying the Foundation for a Strategic BWT Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 thought of as a tree rooted in a coopera- Figure. A Global Logistics Enterprise tive logistics environment that builds our partners’ institutions to produce capabil- Enable Operations ities that enable operations (see figure). Roots. The base of the tree—the critical roots that globally integrated HA/DR logistics draws its lifeblood from—con- CT/CVEO PKO sists of four key areas that collectively Combat Borders establish the logistics environment that our interoperability will grow on. This is the core foundation that our efforts Produce Capalilities must be built on to avoid the continued E uipment Exercises Training Systems Integrated IMET creation of high-end combat unit that are Platforms Targeted Institutional unsustainable. Build Institutions First, we have to focus on trust and information-sharing. Unless we truly Institutional Expertise Engagements Assessment integrate and synchronize our efforts, Create Environment we cannot move forward. We have to be Trust Innovation Agreements Infrastructure honest with each other about capabilities Information-Sharing Industry ACSA Access, Basing, Overflight Relationship-Building Academia Borders, Customs, Port Usage Government Support and limitations so that we can address Streamlining Acquisition our internal challenges before they con- sume strategic readiness. The policy is in place, but our current efforts are not as good as they should be. The first step to ownership could be achieved through a improved capabilities at ports and in- integration and interoperability is com- new understanding of requirements and creased interoperability and interaction munication, which means we have to take recognizing the potential for expanded are an important consideration when responsibility for our own narrative. capacity or materiel production. convincing our partners of the value of Second, we have to leverage the inno- Third, interactions are all within the these efforts. Historic transportation net- vative potential of industry and academia limitations of our various political sys- works such as the Dwight D. Eisenhower to transform our processes and break tems. As such, we must have a concerted National System of Interstate and out of stovepipes. Efforts such as the effort to build a deep and lasting network Defense Highways and its inspiration of Defense Innovation Unit–Experimental of agreements from which we can con- the Reichsautobahnen in Germany both and SOFWERX, programs that seek duct the exchanges necessary for true demonstrate how defense infrastructure to break free of traditional acquisition interoperability—both in terms of logis- can have far-reaching national and global strategies by exploring and implementing tics agreements, as well as access, basing, economic benefits. solutions from industry and academia and overflight. When time is a critical Trunk. With the roots firmly estab- at the speed of technology, should be factor, we must already have these agree- lished, we must turn our attention to our models. We are exploring this pos- ments, even if they are not in daily use. the core strength of the tree. The trunk sibility at USCENTCOM through a We need to be able to turn capabilities of the GLENT underpins our military’s LOGWERX program and an upcoming on and off quickly and cannot be con- operational and tactical prowess. While symposium where we intend to commu- strained by a lack of previously agreed-on some force improvement is possible nicate some of our challenges to industry allowances. This process not only de- during operations, our partners come to and academic leaders in an effort to velops intergovernmental relations, but the fight with the tools and skills devel- gather potential solutions from outside it will also improve interministerial and oped prior to the conflict. We will need our sphere. New ways of war will require interagency relationships as we lay the to assess the capabilities of current and new responses to logistical challenges and foundation for improved communication potential future partners in an effort to innovative views on the capabilities and and cooperation. identify areas to improve partner capac- methods. We must integrate to the extent Finally, with shared operations come ity. BPC is essential to maximizing the possible respective industrial bases in our shared spaces. We have to transcend contributions of coalition partners but planning as a critical contributing factor the lines on the map that divide our must have clearly understood starting to sustainment capabilities. Maximizing nations and work together to develop and ending points. BPC efforts will vary the industrial base requires accurate the infrastructure and border crossing, with the level of partnership, for example, assessment and forecasting, along with customs, and port usage necessary to our five-eyes partners versus less mature an understanding of the demand signals operate as a truly combined force. The government partners or even surrogate that drive production. A lower cost of economic benefits to all of us from forces. Partner capacity carries with it the JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Dorman and Townsend 73 seeds of further improvements as capable activities in which we must continue our are another powerful tool that we need to partners can help develop others, creating engagement if we are ever to create the leverage for more than just operator-level a cascade of improvements and increased capabilities necessary to recognize the training. We need a focused effort to interoperability. fruits of our efforts. simultaneously train the individuals who Tools such as defense institu- The first branch is common and will shape and run the sustainment level tion-building and the vertical integrated interoperable equipment. Our security of a globally integrated logistics enter- logistics approach are critical to identifying cooperation efforts have always been suc- prise. Their familiarity with systems and and resolving potential weaknesses in our cessful in this regard, but for too long the processes—combined with the shared systems, particularly when considering in- narrow focus has been combat capabili- knowledge of how we work together—is teroperability. When we are assessing and ties. Even then, our model is more akin to a key component of interoperability and developing from a common framework, a rental car operation where we provide is essential to true integration. It will we cannot help but become more closely partners with equipment and replace it clarify the true cost of ownership while aligned. BPC includes coordination of when unserviceable, leaving sustainment building long-term capability and re- resources with multinational partners as and support to contracted solutions that ducing U.S. resource requirements, thus well as intergovernmental and nongovern- belie the true requirements and create a maintaining U.S. readiness and capacity mental organizations. BPC improves unity dependency and an enduring weakness. to address higher end strategic threats. of effort within the entire joint logistics We have to consider the equipment, Canopy. The canopy of our tree— enterprise and is an essential component systems, and platforms that will enable grown dense and capable through our of joint and coalition operations; individ- an interoperable logistics effort to sustain efforts to create a sound root structure, ual Services and partner nations seldom combined operations. Whether munitions solid trunk, and strong branches that it have sufficient capability to support a tracking and forecasting systems or trans- can rest on—represents our combined joint coalition force independently. BPC portation and engineering equipment, operational capacity. The fruits that this is an ongoing, long-term relationship the closer we can align our equipment operational capacity can sustain include development process that may not yield needs and operations, the better we can combat operations, humanitarian as- immediate results, but, if carried out as integrate and operate collectively. sistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping suggested, can quicken the training and The second branch is the exercises operations, border security, counter- equipping of a partner force or allow necessary to develop our capabilities terrorism/countering violent extremist coalition partners to share the cost of and create best practices from which to organizations, and any other operational ownership burden. Regardless of the po- conduct operations. Logistics cannot be requirement. Because we are integrated tential lack of quantifiable results, there are an afterthought in these exercises as it has and interoperable, we can seamlessly qualitative benefits that come through in- been in the past. Our focus is not only execute these operations while mini- vestment that may not manifest for years. on how we might tactically supply and mizing domestic costs and risks to our Key leader engagements and subject sustain these exercises, but also on how operations. We can, as General Dunford matter expert exchanges are another logistics can become a focus of exercises stated, “rapidly and flexibly project tool for aligning our efforts and sharing without detracting from the warfighting power across the globe, effectively cheat- our experiences, both successes and objectives. We must work to eliminate ing time and space.”10 challenges. It is through targeted en- the idea of “magic fairy dust” assumed Modern operations are a coalition gagement that we will grow together of most logistics considerations that atro- effort. We must continue to leverage our and further strengthen the trust that phies operator understanding of the true combined capabilities to streamline our our combined fates rest on. A long-term logistics workload associated with BWT services and support while eliminating engagement strategy must be the guide operations. Planners must be at the table overlaps that result in waste. We must rather than random visits based on early and often to ensure that they are pay particular attention to the seams proximity and other travel obligations. A exercising at a realistic and stressful level between our operations to ensure that global program similar to the U.S. Pacific so that we can test and improve our capa- no critical capability goes unaddressed. Command’s Area Senior Officer Logistics bilities and identify challenges in training These investments are twofold. They Symposium and the USCENTCOM that could prove devastating if we wait both improve our capabilities and reduce Gulf Cooperation Council Logistics until operations to discover them. the risk to future operations. Our efforts Interoperability Symposium that builds The final branch is the training to establish a collaborative interoperable on a series of regional symposia would necessary to develop and integrate our logistics partnership will pay dividends far go a long way toward developing global individual logistics enterprises. We must into the future where we become more logistics expertise. better leverage great programs like than the sum of our parts. Branches. From this trunk rise the International Military Education and three primary branches that support Training to train the logistics profession- Challenges operations through a globally integrated als on whom we will rely to support and Much as a tree does not grow over- logistics enterprise. These are the key enable operations. Mobile training teams night, developing a GLENT that creates 74 Special Feature / Laying the Foundation for a Strategic BWT Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 and enables global operational capacity requirements for external contracted sup- all partners. Logistics interoperability will require concerted effort, attention, port. We must move forward, especially developed through concerted efforts to and resources to include time. There at the strategic level, to begin building build partner capacity through logistics will be technical, organizational, and the framework on which our interop- security cooperation can supercharge political challenges to grow a fully erability and future success depend. We BWT outcomes so long as it is rooted in capable integrated GLENT. Our dif- must also consider the capabilities of our partner ownership to create legitimacy. fering practices, lack of interoperability, partners and the maturity of our relation- A strategic BWT approach based on and political environments are chal- ships. Interoperability efforts with mature building partner sustainment capacity and lenges. While we may have little say on partners may be less appropriate for those interoperability as opposed to our current the political wrangling between nations, with whom we operate on a bilateral tactical and operational BWT approach we can surely work toward improving agreement or contingency basis. will establish the solid foundation that interoperability and standardizing prac- will allow us to recognize savings in tices. We must build partner capacity Conclusion the costs of ownership. By establishing by leveraging a whole-of-government While we have made progress, we have concrete steps for the journey ahead and approach that lays the foundation and further to go. We will take that road clearheaded assessments of the needs and reduces the cost of ownership to a sus- together and all be stronger and better outcomes of our efforts, the marriage tainable level, whereby any future need off for having made the journey. It is of logistics and security cooperation will is addressable with a solution that is important that we look for and imple- provide benefits for years to come. JFQ ready to start and drive. ment the best advice, but we must con- Not all the steps from here to there sider how to best apply lessons learned are under our control, but we must to this unique enterprise. Blindly trying Notes develop a common understanding of to modify our actions without a clear 1 objectives. We must make the case to understanding of the goal and frequent Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “Allies and Partners Are Our Strategic Center of Gravity,” political leaders for the necessary author- azimuth checks is a clear path to frustra- Joint Force Quarterly 87 (4th Quarter 2017), ities and resources to develop the critical tion. There is a story that illustrates the available at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Dorman and Townsend 75 Volunteers from Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Naval Post Graduate School, and Middlebury Institute, along with cultural performers from all over California, celebrated Monterey’s 3rd Annual Language Capital of the World Festival on Sunday, May 7, 2017 (U.S. Army/Amber K. Whittington) Why Not a Joint Security Force Assistance Command? By John Francis Jakubowski he David L. Boren National implementation guidance over the Then–Central Intelligence Agency Security Education Act of 1991 years has been clear, and increasingly Director Leon Panetta stated, “Language T provides that the future national more urgent. Consider the following skills are the keys to accessing foreign so- security and economic well-being of statements. cieties, understanding their governments the United States will depend substan- President Barack Obama laid out and decoding their secrets.”3 Chairman tially on the ability of its citizens to a vision of a nimble, well-armed, and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen communicate and compete by knowing multilingual fighting force of the fu- stated, “No training is more crucial to the the languages and cultures of other ture—but not the one that was built to U.S. military than education in critical countries.1 Consistent with the law, fight land battles against the Soviets in foreign languages and cultures . . . the Europe. President Obama stated, “In flexibility of language training in the the 21st century, military strength will be military underscores the state of global measured not only by the weapons our flux.”4 And finally then-General Stanley John Francis Jakubowski is Supervisory Attorney at the U.S. Army Defense Language Institute troops carry, but by the languages they McChrystal stated, “Language training is Foreign Language Center, Monterey, California. speak and the cultures they understand.”2 as important as marksmanship, medical, 76 Commentary / Why Not a Joint Security Force Assistance Command? JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 unit drills, physical fitness, and other key that a student must achieve a 2+ in Services, suggest a renovation and training that you will conduct prior to language, a 2+ in reading, and a 2 in strategic relook is necessary, particu- deploying to Afghanistan.”5 speaking on the Defense Language larly when installation operation and There is no question that the ability Proficiency Test. Students who meet maintenance expenses and investment of Servicemembers to communicate and this standard on the aptitude tests are spending are added to the calculus. But connect on some level with multinational the cream of the crop. These students instead of strategically assessing future partners, security forces of other nations, typically are slated for tours of duty in language and culture training needs to and indigenous populations can be a key an intelligence capacity. Those who do meet probable missions, the Army is element of combat mission success.6 But not meet the standard find their way moving forward with more of the same: expectations regarding the definition back to their respective Services for use contracting for language training and of the word success for future military in whatever capacity the military deems translation services on an ad hoc basis. operations represent a challenge that the appropriate. As an example, the Defense Language Department of Defense (DOD) should The cost to operate the DLIFLC’s Interpretation Translation Enterprise embrace and shape. So far, the right at- language and training mission is about (DLITE) program is an Army acquisition tention has not been paid to the strategic $300 million annually.9 This figure effort awarding multiple contractors usefulness of foreign language training, does not include what the Army spends nearly $10 billion through 2027 to civil-military operations, and the need to to maintain the Presidio of Monterey, provide interpreting, translating, and develop regional cultural experts. California, which is in one of the high- transcription services for missions across The Government Accountability est cost-of-living areas in the country. the globe.13 DLITE provides contrac- Office (GAO) has repeatedly recom- Maintenance of the installation includes tual coverage for the support of forces mended that DOD adjust and improve expenses to keep operational barracks, engaged in humanitarian, peacekeeping, the visibility and sustainment of language administrative buildings, grounds, dining contingency, and combat operations. and culture training. In response, the facilities, health and dental clinics, and It also provides contractual coverage Services have seemingly retreated to recreation facilities. In addition, invest- for exercises and cultural familiarity and their respective and frequently duplici- ment spending to build new barracks and awareness missions in performance of tous stovepipe processes to assess their dorms, dining facilities, and other things day-to-day operations. The contract was Service-specific strategic language needs is another substantial cost. awarded by the Army Intelligence and and training focus areas. Generally, each The primary beneficiary of DLIFLC Security Command in March 2017 and, Service funnels language training re- efforts are intelligence activities and apparently, will be the go-to vehicle for quirements through various Service- and agencies, not the regional combatant foreign language support services and ca- DOD-level training and personnel sys- commanders. The needs of combatant pabilities needed to meet new, ongoing, tems. Eventually, the Defense Language commanders are separately managed by and changing mission requirements.14 Institute Foreign Language Center the Army as DOD’s executive agent, a The award of the DLITE contract (DLIFLC) receives an annual student role the Army assumed in 2005. The resulted in a great deal of fanfare. input. Pursuant to special statutory au- Army spent about $5.2 billion from 2008 According to press releases, the acqui- thority, DLIFLC hires language faculty, through 2012 to acquire translation sition team worked through countless many of whom are noncitizen natives and interpretation services for various long hours to develop, solicit, review, and from particular countries of interest. The contingency operations.10 In addition, select the best contract for the Army. The process is complicated and time-consum- the GAO has noted that language and team’s efforts amounted to 2.5 years of ing, as shifting and competing policies culture training to support the needs of accumulative man-hours, reviewing over and priorities clash with recruitment and contingency operations, predeployment 8,700 pages of procurement sensitive faculty employment efforts. training, and day-to-day military activ- information.15 The expense of putting DLIFLC trains approximately 3,500 ities are also separately handled by 159 together such a procurement must have Servicemembers annually to an estab- contracting organizations in 10 different been enormous, but in the end, there lished standard of proficiency in listening, DOD components.11 These activities is nothing particularly innovative about reading, and speaking modalities.7 The obligated approximately $1.2 billion on procuring interpretation and translation level of skill or proficiency in these areas is contracts for foreign language support services. The reality is that the contract measured on a scale of 0, which equates during the same time period.12 is a temporary solution rather than a fo- to “no proficiency,” to 5, which would cused reassessment of the strategic value suggest “native country proficiency.”8 Think Jointly of language and culture training. New There are students in eight different un- The process of enrolling and training mission imperatives, highlighted by the dergraduate education schools that teach students at DLIFLC, coupled with the establishment of the Army Security Force up to 40 different languages. complications associated with manag- Assistance Brigades (SFABs), demon- The graduation standard at DLIFLC ing multiple foreign language training strate the need for a strategic relook of is set at level “2+/2+/2.” This means interests and needs across the military JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Jakubowski 77 security force assistance missions and how have not been forced to think jointly. The across DOD. SFAC should mirror to language and culture training fit. Army, by and large, owns the security a significant degree the State Depart- It is interesting that efforts to elevate force assistance mission. And as the DOD ment’s Foreign Service Institute, be and focus on language and culture train- executive agent of language and culture jointly resourced, and be structured and ing as a strategic imperative is not isolated training programs, it is saddled with an staffed to ensure flexible and responsive to DOD. The GAO has issued several impossible task of coordinating Service- support to combatant commanders, reports highlighting the Department unique interests and needs. The Army has while at the same time meeting the of State’s persistent foreign language all of the responsibility but no means to more enduring, long-term needs of shortfalls.16 The ongoing difficulties at effectively manage and control the other the Intelligence Community. Initial State along with those at DOD identified Services’ language and culture training approaches to standing up the SFAC by the GAO in the management of lan- approaches. Each Service develops its might proceed as follows. guage and culture training processes, and own language training doctrine and First, we should recognize that our meeting language service needs around educational needs, resulting in duplicity, performance of security and assistance the world, would seem to warrant an competing efforts, and overlap. missions of the recent past—specifically exploration of new strategic approaches. As a rule of law advisor in in Iraq and Afghanistan—indicate inad- Yet it does not appear that much is Afghanistan, my observation of the equate language and culture training of being done to partner across the military Army’s approach to communicating, Soldiers and other Servicemembers. We Services, much less across the Federal understanding, and “decoding” Afghan can do better. Government. society may be best described as a plug- Second, there is clear recognition, Partnering is a focus du jour in the and-play process that often did not certainly within the Army, of the chal- Army and across the military Services. foster relationships or communication. lenges associated with security force Partnering initiatives with private enti- Instead, combat units attempted to assistance mission requirements. SFABs ties, communities, and local and state adapt by assuming roles for which they are a step in the right direction. Six governments are frequently, and often were not trained adequately. My mission SFABs are planned, along with a Military mistakenly, touted as win-win solutions to brought me in regular contact with State Advisor Training Academy at Fort perceived difficulties associated with some Department officials who were engaged Benning, Georgia. The academy will contracting processes. These days if you in activities that were ultimately directed train Soldiers to handle many postcon- are partnering with an entity—whether toward the same objective (that is, to flict security assistance and civil-military public or private—to meet a requirement develop judicial capacity and trust in the cooperation requirements. Language or mission need, it is viewed as progress, military and government). Our mission and culture will be a significant piece of even though the overwhelming evidence activities, specifically communicating and the training. In adapting to better meet indicates that best values are achieved connecting with Afghans at various levels the security force assistance missions, the when the private sector or state and local and capacities within the government and Army and DOD should consider explor- governments have to compete to deliver the Afghan National Army, overlapped ing synergies and collaboration across the a product or service. Creativity and a and at times conflicted in execution, re- Services, intelligence agencies, and State “sharp pencil” (that is, finding a way to sulting in frequent confusion and mixed Department. lower the price) forced by competition messages. One possibility might involve a review typically result in better quality and rea- The creation of SFABs and the of the training mission at the U.S. Naval sonable prices. DLITE contract may serve the Army Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Center for DOD does not seem to apply the well. A broader focus, though, is neces- Civil-Military Relations. The center’s same vigor to collaborations and part- sary. Army Chief of Staff General Mark core competencies do not include a nering across the Services or with other Milley is right on target with the creation language component, yet DLIFLC is Federal agencies. There is, however, a of SFABs as a strategic requirement that located a few blocks away. Collaboration shared mutuality of interest regarding will shape the success of future contin- between the Army and Navy for language security assistance missions and language gency operations.17 Now, the rest of training at NPS is nominal if it exists at and culture training among the Services DOD needs to follow his lead. all. Furthermore, it seems that mutual and across the Federal Government. This interest—and a partnering opportu- is not always true of the partnering initia- The Security Force nity—exist between the Military Advisor tives and agreements with state and local Assistance Command Training Academy and the training on governments and private entities often A joint, functional Security Force civil-military relations at NPS. Some pushed by the Services. Assistance Command (SFAC) should consideration toward consolidating and Part of the problem with the lack of manage security force assistance needs centralizing existing efforts of the Army partnering, as it pertains to security force of the combatant commanders and have and Navy, and an exploration of collab- assistance challenges and future language management oversight of language oration opportunities, is unreasonable. and culture training, is that the Services and cultural training requirements The entities could be carved out and/ 78 Commentary / Why Not a Joint Security Force Assistance Command? JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 or combined together and with DLIFLC meet security force assistance challenges at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Jakubowski 79 Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technicians look on as Icelandic coastguard helicopter takes off from field in Iceland during exercise Northern Challenge 2017 (NATO/Laurence Cameron) A Holistic Approach to Problem-Solving By Stephen F. Nowak espite George Santayana’s warn- The concept is simple: decisions Our adversaries are agile, innova- ing—“Those who do not remem- should be made by those with the best tive, and adaptive. They decide and act D ber the past are condemned to knowledge at the lowest level possible. In quickly. Since they do not adhere to laws repeat it”—we continue to forget what the field, this is understood—it is not the of war or norms of civilized society, they we have learned and fall into bad habits. wing commander or fighter pilot who de- have almost unlimited options. Although we have already determined cides if a plane is airworthy; that decision This article draws from lessons learned better ways to make decisions and solve is made by an enlisted aircraft mechanic. in the past in order to propose a process problems, we tend to forget them. Unfortunately, Servicemembers in staff for better decisionmaking and prob- positions and U.S. Government civilians lem-solving today. Its basic premise is that find that even minor decisions are pushed most problems could and should be re- up the chain of command. Imagine solved at the lowest level possible, should Captain Stephen F. Nowak, USNR (Ret.), is a history if Alvin York or Doris Miller had involve those who best understand the Program Analyst in the Joint Lessons Learned Division of the Future Joint Force Development requested permission and waited for ap- problem, and include the people who have Deputy Directorate, Joint Staff J7. proval before acting. the most to gain (or lose) by resolution. 80 Commentary / A Holistic Approach to Problem-Solving JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 The following is a circular letter from 7, 1941. The United States was now fact or condition of knowing something Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval forced to fight the Imperial Japanese with familiarity gained through experience Operations, during World War II. Notice Navy with what ships it had, while si- or association. Knowledge is powerful the date is over 10 months before the at- multaneously developing the tactics with because it combines information with tack on Pearl Harbor. The letter reads: which to do so. experience. However, partial information Admiral King was confident that his may lead to an incorrect conclusion. From: ADM Ernest J. King commanders would define tactics that Authority. Like beauty, everyone Subject: Exercise of Command Excess of were appropriate for their capabilities knows what authority is when they see Detail in Orders and Instructions and the situations they were facing. This it. The Department of Defense (DOD) 21 January 1941 would take experimentation—always Dictionary includes 132 entries for costly in wartime. As tactics were tried, various types of authority. The regular 1. I have been concerned for many years the commanders pooled their informa- dictionary is equally unhelpful. For our over the increasing tendency—now grown tion (lessons learned) with one another purposes, I propose we define authority almost to “standard practice”—of flag throughout the fleet. By mid-1942, as the ability to act on a decision. In large officers and other group commanders to roughly 6 months after Pearl Harbor, the organizations, by default, an individual issue orders or instructions in which their U.S. Navy became a force that presented lacks authority until it is specifically subordinates are told “how” as well as not only a challenge but also a threat granted by billet, assignment, or other “what” to do to such an extent and in such to the Japanese fleet, with the Battle of administrative action. detail that the “Custom of the service” has Midway (June 4–7, 1942) seen as the Combining Knowledge and virtually become the antithesis of the essen- turning point of the war in the Pacific. Authority. Ideally, the person with the tial element of command—“initiative of Admiral King’s confidence in his most knowledge and experience regard- the subordinate.” commanders did not alter his strate- ing a particular situation would be the 2. We are preparing for—and are now gic and holistic view. He realized that one to make a decision and have the abil- close to—those active operations (commonly commanders had access to significant ity to implement it. However, the larger called war) which require the exercise and data—so much data that it was difficult to the organization, the less likely this is to the utilization of the full powers and capa- separate the significant from distractions. happen. Often, the person with the most bilities of every officer in command status. Admiral King ordered all ships to estab- knowledge of a particular problem will There will be neither time nor opportunity lish a Combat Information Center (CIC) be an action or desk officer—a worker to do more than prescribe the several tasks to allow “full utilization of all available bee, if you will. On the other hand, the of the several subordinates (to say “what” sources of combat information.” While person with the authority to act will be perhaps “when” and “where” and usually, he described what a CIC would do, he at a higher rank; while he or she may for their intelligent cooperation, “why”); did not dictate how it should be done. have some degree of familiarity with the leaving to them expecting and requiring Again, different approaches were tried problem, he or she may lack the depth them—the capacity to perform the assigned throughout the fleet. On one ship, the of knowledge and experience of those tasks (to do the “how”). executive officer stood at the edge of the at a lower organizational level. Indeed, 3. If subordinates are deprived—as they radar room, watching the displays. When individuals with authority can delegate are now—of that training and experience he developed an understanding of the appropriate authority to subordinates which will enable them to act “on their overall situation, he would then relay that to allow them to make an intelligent own”—if they do not know, by constant information to the commanding officer decision and implement it. However, practice, how to exercise “initiative of and weapons officer. It was not elegant, in practice, it is likely that instead of the subordinates,” if they are reluctant but it worked and became the model for delegating authority to the person with (afraid) to act because they are accustomed the CICs throughout the fleet. knowledge, there will be the expectation to detailed orders and instructions—if they that knowledge can and will be trans- are not habituated to think, to judge, to Components for Decisions ferred to the person with authority. decide, and to act for themselves in their Solving problems is based on making a The most important decisions are several echelons of command we shall be in correct, or at least reasonable, decision those that solve a problem. In an in- sorry case when the time of “active opera- and then acting on it. There are two creasingly complex world, making and tions” arrives.1 main components necessary for a person executing decisions require two indi- to make a decision and implement it: viduals, each with half of the required War plans had always included the knowledge and authority. ingredients and who may not work to- Pacific Fleet as a—or, perhaps, the— Knowledge. Information is data that gether on a routine basis. In many cases, major player, but a significant portion of have been organized so that they can it is difficult to even define the problem. the fleet—especially the battleships—had be understood and which have been Frequently, the problem is not viewed been sunk or severely damaged during communicated to the appropriate deci- objectively, but is defined in terms of the the Japanese surprise attack on December sionmakers. Knowledge is defined as the decisionmaker’s preferred solution. This JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Nowak 81 Figure Communication Flow in a Bureaucracy flat one, which tends to increase the time to respond to a requirement. By compar- Types of Communication (width ison, small organizations with informal Senior Leader indicates quantity or authority) communication enjoy a high degree of DIRECTIVE integration, and individuals feel free to RESPONSIVE communicate directly with almost anyone Gatekeeper WORK INFORMATION INFORMAL else in the organization. The result is that flat organizations enjoy a faster response, greater agility, and adaptability. Middle Manager Middle Manager Peter Drucker, one of the most in- Formal Peer-to-Peer fluential forces in modern management, In Different Workgroup wrote that span of control has been replaced by span of communication: “The number of people reporting to one boss is limited only by the subordinates’ will- Action Officers As Directed Action Officers ingness to take responsibility for their own Within Work Group Within Work Group Informal Peer-to-Peer communications and relationships, up- ward, sideways and downward. ‘Control,’ it turns out, is the ability to obtain problem is frequently a result of, or exac- Communication from mid-level managers information.”3 Of course, by extension, erbated by, the organizational structure in to senior leaders is primarily responsive withholding information is also control, which the problem occurs. and generally formatted according to a which may contribute to the existence of prescribed structure. Communication to stovepipes or rice bowls. However, even DOD Organizational Structure a senior leader often passes through a sec- though such practices may benefit the DOD has 3.2 million employees, retary, aide, executive assistant, or other individual, they do not benefit the organi- making it the largest single employer in gatekeeper who decides which communi- zation as a whole. Anything that does not the world. The organizational structure cations the senior leader receives. encourage a holistic view tends to be a to successfully manage an entity that Upward communication from liability because intense focus on one area large and complex is almost always a non-managers to any leader other than tends to create blind spots in other areas. bureaucracy, which is neither inherently their own is generally discouraged if not Speed vs. Perfection. Generally, we good nor bad; it is merely one of many prohibited, even though there is organi- benefit from the ability to quickly define organizational types. zational benefit to such communication a problem, identify a solution, and imple- In the DOD bureaucracy, both uni- (see figure). When such communication ment it. Anything that needlessly slows formed military and civilian employees is approved, it is normally sent via several the decisionmaking process tends to be a are assigned a grade (rank), with an intermediate levels before reaching the liability. Similarly, anything that reduces equivalency between civilian and uni- intended recipient. Horizontal communi- our ability to be agile or innovative is also formed grades. There is a clearly defined cation within a single group tends to work a liability. General John Hyten, USAF, (and enforced) chain of command, which reasonably well, as does communication commander of U.S. Strategic Command, encourages a culture focused on rules, between groups at the management level. put it quite plainly: “Right now, we are standards, and rigid processes. A bu- The protocol for formal communications being outpaced by our adversaries. We’ve reaucracy provides stability, but it is not may require the message to be passed lost the ability to go fast and fail. Watch an effective platform for quickly making up one chain of command, transferred what our adversaries are doing. Look at and acting on decisions. As a result, the to another, and then passed down the Kim Jong-un. What he’s doing is testing, “weaknesses of bureaucratic structures second chain to the intended recipient. failing, testing, failing, testing, failing, test- are slower decisionmaking, high levels Communication by non-managers across ing and succeeding. . . . If you want to go of supervisor and managerial overheads, groups is more difficult, except on an in- fast, you have to empower people with the lack of employee freedom, and lower em- formal basis, which may depend more on authority and responsibility to execute.”4 ployee morale.”2 relationships and personal networks than Taking it a step further, the Chairman Communication. In large, estab- organizational processes. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), lished organizations, communication Communication may be dictated by speaking at a graduation ceremony at the is influenced by both rules and cul- organizational structure, but in turn it National Defense University, advised, “As ture. Effectiveness of communication dictates the effectiveness of a particular leaders, create an environment within is strongly affected by its direction. structure. Communication in a complex, which innovation, the questioning of Downward communication from senior multilayered organization tends to be conventional wisdom and creativity are leaders is generally directive in nature. complicated and less effective than in a not only allowed, but actually encouraged 82 Commentary / A Holistic Approach to Problem-Solving JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 . . . and assume you don’t have all the answers.”5 Our senior leaders can clearly see these needs and have communicated the issues quite clearly. However, we have yet to translate such ideas into action, and we may not have the luxury of time for a gradual change. In light of General Dunford’s and General Hyten’s advice, we need a way forward that empowers people who have knowledge and experience with both the authority and responsibility to make and execute decisions. We must encourage creativity and innovation. A different process could be tried as an experiment. If it succeeds, it could then provide a framework for solving future issues and problems. Fortunately, there is a nearly perfect environment in which to conduct such an experiment. A Computerized Conundrum. There are two deputy directorates—the Future Joint Force Development (FJFD) Deputy Directorate and Joint Training Deputy Directorate—located at the Joint Staff facility in Suffolk, Virginia. The missions of the deputy directorates are comple- th mentary and share many similarities. The Munitions Systems Technician assigned to 455 Expeditionary Maintenance Squadron reviews technical order data before building GBU-38 bomb, part of weapon system used on F-16C Fighting FJFD Deputy Directorate includes the Falcons, August 14, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Cohen A. Young) Joint Lessons Learned Division (JLLD), which collects information on observa- failed or failing state, information available include doctrine, training, education, tions, best practices, and lessons from in JLLIS concerning corruption would be planning, advising, and assessing readi- throughout the joint force. Some of this useful. When the Zika virus appeared in ness. The Chairman has developed and information is collected by teams of an- 2016, a number of JLLIS users accessed promulgated instructions as to how each alysts that, at the request of a combatant the lessons from the U.S. Ebola effort. of these responsibilities will be met. command, joint task force, Service, or The Joint Training Deputy Directorate CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3150.25F, Joint Staff, travel to the location in which provides a wide range of training support Joint Lessons Learned Program, states a particular issue is occurring. The team to the combatant commands, with ex- that “JLLP knowledge management then collects data by conducting inter- ercises being one of the most important is enabled by JLLIS, the DOD system of views and recording observations. The since they emulate actual combat oper- record for lessons learned. JLLIS facilitates data are analyzed in order to identify the ations to test a command’s capabilities, the collection, tracking, management, most significant issues (called findings), determine its readiness, and identify future sharing, collaborative resolution, and which normally lead to recommendations training opportunities. Training maintains dissemination of lessons learned to im- for improvement. its data on the Joint Training Information prove the development and readiness of Another JLLD component re- Management System (JTIMS). the joint force.”6 Title 10 also directs the views and analyzes data that have been Separate Computer Systems. The CJCS to formulate policies for the joint input into the Joint Lessons Learned two computer systems contain similar, training of the Armed Forces and coordi- Information System (JLLIS) by members and at times identical, data. Data useful nating military education and training. of the Armed Forces or interagency part- to one group may reside on the other’s CJCSI 3500.01H, Joint Training ners. JLLIS data are analyzed for trends, computer system. There are two systems Policy for the Armed Forces of the United anomalies, and significant issues. JLLIS because of procedural requirements that States, identifies “JTIMS [as] the enter- data flow in both directions and are acces- support the legally mandated duties prise solution available for use by all DOD sible by commands to prepare plans for of the CJCS. Federal law assigns these Components.”7 JTIMS interfaces with various operations or assignments. For ex- responsibilities in U.S. Code, Title 10, several other systems to “input to readi- ample, if a command were deploying to a Section 153. These responsibilities ness reporting in the Defense Readiness JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Nowak 83 Reporting System” and transfer training communication problem, a people com- Fifth, since this is an experiment, the and readiness data into the Joint Exercise munication problem, or both? In any team and the facilitator need to docu- Program.8 The relationship between case, it will take more effective commu- ment what they do, what the results are, JTIMS and JLLIS is described in detail nications among people to resolve this and any other observations that might in the Chairman’s Training Instruction. issue. Artificial intelligence is advancing, prove relevant. Enclosure D of the instruction instructs but so far computers are not able to au- Sixth, the facilitator would observe combatant commands to “establish and tonomously resolve such issues and must the process and provide periodic guidance conduct a deliberate observation valida- still depend upon human intervention. without micromanaging. It is important tion process to capture key overarching for the facilitator to allow the team to and cross-cutting observations and lessons A Holistic Approach develop and go through the expected four no later than event ENDEX [exercise ter- Based on the advice from the Chairman, stages—often called storming, norming, mination] plus 45 days; export validated General Hyten, and Admiral King, I forming, and performing. The facilitator TPOs [task performance observations] propose the following approach, which, will record observations related to both and TPEs [task performance evaluations] if successful, could provide a framework the project and the group dynamics. in JTIMS into JLLIS.”9 for resolving future issues. The team will examine the issues Defining the Problem. While the First, it is logical to assume that the related to the two deputy directorates and instructions seem to indicate a well-struc- people who use JLLIS and JTIMS on their computer systems, clearly define the tured system, when I tried to determine a regular basis know more about these problem, and determine what desired end- how the two computer systems inter- systems than anyone else. By user, I am state a solution should achieve. The team acted, the answers included: referring to those who input, manage, or would determine how to arrive there. analyze the data in either system. There Why use such a technique? Reiterating •• JTIMS and JLLIS currently can and are experts, like computer or software what General Dunford stated, “As leaders, do communicate. engineers, who may know how the create an environment within which in- •• The two systems cannot communi- binary data are processed, but we need novation, the questioning of conventional cate, but the next JLLIS software people who use the system as a tool to wisdom and creativity are not only allowed, release, scheduled for December support the warfighter. The functional but actually encouraged . . . and assume 2017, will enable this capability. expertise resides with the people who you don’t have all the answers.” Given the •• Combatant commands routinely input data, search for data, and most im- culture of DOD, one of the challenges will record observations, which are portantly, know what stakeholders need be that supervisors will want to help and entered into JTIMS. the system to do. get involved. The supervisors are commit- •• Appropriate issues are transferred Second, from among those users, ted to success and may not be comfortable from JTIMS to JLLIS. choose two JLLIS users and two JTIMS standing by while someone else handles a •• Data are not actually transferred users to work as a team to resolve this decision. It is hard to let go and let a junior from JTIMS to JLLIS; data must be problem in conjunction with the JLLIS employee take on a high-visibility challenge exported from JTIMS and then man- and JTIMS technical advisors as subject without a supervisor. ually entered into JLLIS. matter experts. The team would be In It Worked for Me, in the appropri- •• If a command (for example, a ship at required to clearly define the problem, ately titled chapter “Trust Your People,” sea) cannot directly access JTIMS or and, based on that definition, they would Colin Powell tells how he prepared JLLIS, it records observations using determine the endstate that would indi- President George W. Bush for his first a spreadsheet and then uploads it cate that they had succeeded in solving international trip to meet with Mexican when feasible. the problem. President Vicente Fox. He assigned two •• Those designing the exercises Third, the team would prepare a plan junior Mexico desk officers to brief the cannot access the data in JLLIS, detailing how to move from the current President. He did not know them—he which would provide them with situation to its desired endstate. The plan didn’t even know their names—but more current data to include in the would indicate how much time would be he knew that they would knock them- exercises. required to resolve the issue and identify selves out to do a good job. Secretary •• Since anyone with a Common Access what other resources would be requested Powell explained that there would be no Card or Personal Identity Verifica- to be successful. PowerPoint presentation and there would tion card can get a JLLIS account, Fourth, using a facilitator, bring the be no rehearsals. No one would speak there is no reason that joint training team and its supervisors together to dis- except those two junior desk officers: personnel cannot access JLLIS. cuss the project to ensure everyone has a common understanding. Remind the The day came; the President and his party To quote the old movie, “What supervisors that this is the action officers’ entered the conference room and took their we’ve got here is failure to com- project and a test of this approach to places on one side of my large conference municate.”10 Is this a computer problem-solving. table. . . . 84 Commentary / A Holistic Approach to Problem-Solving JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 I welcomed the President, introduced The importance of resolving prob- a technical skill. They describe how my key leaders, and then introduced the two lems without involving management in we should interact, not what tasks we action officers and turned them loose. . . . every one of them may not be obvious, should do. JFQ The two officers took off, and their perfor- but it is critical. The future—and the mance totally met my expectations. They near future at that—is dependent on our provided the President with everything junior civilian employees. As those in Notes he needed to know before he flew down to uniform rotate through staff positions, 1 Mexico. The President asked penetrating it is the civilian employees who provide Julius Augustus Furer, Administra- tion of the Navy Department in World War questions and got solid answers. When it was continuity. Today, well over half of civil- II (Washington, DC: Government Printing over, he expressed his satisfaction, thanked ian government employees are eligible Office, 1959), appendix 1, “Admiral E.J. King’s everyone with a handshake and a smile, and to retire. How long should we wait Philosophy of Command,” available at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Nowak 85 Special Forces fast-rope through center opening of helicopter at Hurlburt Field, Florida, April 23, 2013, during annual 2-week joint/combined tactical exercise Emerald Warrior 2013, designed to leverage lessons learned from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (U.S. Air Force/Colville McFee) The Importance of Lessons Learned in Joint Force Development By Gwendolyn R. DeFilippi, Stephen Francis Nowak, and Bradford Harlow Baylor he Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ourselves—and I don’t mean in the distant of Staff (CJCS) actively promotes future, I mean the not-too-distant future— T the importance of innovation, we’re going to find ourselves at a competitive experimentation, and learning. He disadvantage. That will be the cost of not Lieutenant Colonel Gwendolyn R. DeFilippi, made this explicitly clear in his address recognizing what needs to change, and not USAFR, Reserve Augmentation, is an Operations 1 Staff Officer in the Joint Lessons Learned Division to the 2016 graduating class of the affecting change in your organizations. (JLLD) of the Future Joint Force Development National Defense University: Deputy Directorate, Joint Staff J7. Captain Former CJCS General Martin E. Stephen Francis Nowak, USNR (Ret.), is a Program Analyst in JLLD. Bradford Harlow Baylor Those of you graduating today have to Dempsey also addressed the need for is a Senior Operations Research Analyst in JLLD. lead that change or we’re going to find learning: 86 Commentary / The Importance of Lessons Learned JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Our profession is a calling requiring collecting, aggregating, analyzing, and in- focused research to the lessons learned unique expertise to fulfill our collective tegrating lessons and best practices from community at large. responsibility to the American people, “pro- joint, interagency, and coalition opera- As mentioned, JLLD actively col- vide for the common defense and secure the tions in order to shape and advance joint lects lessons through experienced study blessings of liberty.” force development. The division’s desired teams that deploy to theater, collect data As professionals, we are defined by our endstate is that lessons are effectively through interviews and observations, and strength of character, life-long commit- applied through force development func- conduct timely analysis of operational ment to core values, and maintaining our tions, promoting learning across the joint issues. This provides immediate feedback professional abilities through continuous im- force to improve readiness, operational to the joint warfighter and input for provement, individually and institutionally. effectiveness, and leader development. transformational change to joint doctrine, This endeavor [advancing the The division actively collects organization, training, materiel, leader- profession of arms] requires all Joint Department of Defense (DOD)-wide ship and education, personnel, facilities, Warfighters to engage in a serious dialogue lessons learned through the employment and policy (DOTMLPF-P). JLLD studies to chart the way ahead to strengthen our of composite study teams and passively are normally conducted at the request of profession as we develop Joint Force 2020. through analysis of field observations and combatant commands, joint task forces, We must ensure we remain responsive and reports entered into the Joint Lessons or other military organizations con- resilient; the American people deserve Learned Information System (JLLIS). ducting real-world operations. They are nothing less.2 JLLIS is the DOD system of record focused on identifying unique challenges and enterprise solution supporting and the DOD response. Study products Both generals actively promote the the Chairman’s Joint Lessons Learned are typically vetted with the requesting need for a profession of arms to maintain Program. A complement to the overall organization, which is free to use the and expand its unique body of knowl- JLLD mission, it facilitates the collection, study as an internal product for improve- edge and expertise. The military invests tracking, management, sharing, collab- ment or to approve it for release. In many significant resources to achieve this orative resolution, and dissemination cases, it is difficult to measure the impact aspect of being a profession, including of lessons, which enable the five phases of specific study efforts because the learn- establishing a directorate within the office of the Joint Lesson Learned Program: ing benefits accrue over time. Whenever of the Chairman devoted to Joint Force discovery, validation, resolution, evalua- possible, JLLD studies are posted to Development (DJ7). This article delves tion, and dissemination. It also provides one or more appropriate networks, into the benefits of joint lessons learned automated workflow processes to elevate including unclassified or classified Intel and how they enable and enhance our observations from operations, exercises, Share, JLLIS, and the North Atlantic profession to maintain and expand our training, experiments, and real-world Treaty Organization (NATO) Battlefield unique body of knowledge and expertise. events and facilitates the discovery, vali- Information Combat Exploitation U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 53, dation, issue resolution, evaluation, and System. This process enhances the vis- defines the responsibilities of the CJCS. dissemination of critical lessons. ibility and sharing of lessons and best These include developing doctrine; The JLLIS construct allows approved practices across the force, including inter- formulating policies for joint training, mil- users across the Services, combatant agency and coalition partners. itary education, concept development and commands, Joint Staff, and interagency JLLD studies continue to cover a experimentation; advising the Secretary community both to input information wide spectrum of joint, interagency, and of Defense on development of joint (for example, observations, best prac- coalition operations. Below are sum- command, control, communications, and tices, after action reports, internal staff maries from several recent JLLD study cyber capability; and formulating policies assessments) and to provide an important efforts that exemplify the range of these for gathering, developing, and disseminat- reference for the planning process. Key operations and the organizations con- ing joint lessons learned. users and stakeholders include the Office ducting these operations. The importance of gathering, devel- of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint oping, and disseminating joint lessons Staff, combatant commands, Services, Decade of War Study learned cannot be overemphasized. National Guard Bureau, combat support This study was the JLLD response Today, we need real-world lessons learned agencies, as well as other joint, U.S. to the 2011 CJCS call for learning by the deployed young officer who is Government, and coalition partners. The the lessons of the past decade’s U.S. experiencing what works, what does not, JLLD additionally identifies and aggre- military operations.3 In the decade and what could—if certain changes were gates key findings and themes within a following 9/11, the United States made. This is mission of the Joint Staff Joint Capability Area framework on a employed its military in a wide range Joint Force Development Directorate’s quarterly and rolling fourth quarter basis. of operations to address real and Joint Lessons Learned Division (JLLD). The resulting observation report informs perceived threats from both nation- The JLLD executes the Chairman’s the internal active study process and states and terrorist groups, strengthen Joint Lessons Learned Program by provides an important reference point for partner-nations’ militaries, conduct JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 DeFilippi, Nowak, and Baylor 87 humanitarian assistance operations, poorly suited to operations other integrated the lessons from this study, and provide defense support of civil than major combat, forcing wide- in conjunction with the Continuum authorities in catastrophic incidents spread and costly adaptation. of eLearning, and produced a series of such as Hurricane Katrina. This wide •• Special operations forces (SOF)– short videos, one for each of the strate- range of operations aimed to promote general purpose forces (GPF) gic themes. These videos can provide a and protect national interests in the integration: Multiple, simultaneous, basic overview or help a senior officer changing global environment. large-scale operations executed in determine if the entire report should be In general, operations during the first dynamic environments required accessed. half of the decade were often marked by the integration of SOF and GPF, numerous missteps and challenges as the creating a force-multiplying effect European Perspectives Project: U.S. Government and military applied a for both. Security in the Baltic Region strategy and force designed for a different •• Interagency coordination: Synchro- The European Perspectives Project threat and environment. In the second nization was uneven due to incon- (EPP) is a series of studies conducted half of the decade, the joint force adapted sistent participation in planning, with partner nations. The combined to the operational environment and training, and operations; policy gaps; perspectives provide a strategic view became more effective. From its study resources; and differences in organi- about Russia’s behavior. The purpose of of these operations, JLLD identified zational cultures. the series is to gain a common under- overarching and enduring lessons that •• Coalition operations: Establishing standing and inform U.S., allied, and presented opportunities to learn and and sustaining coalition unity of partner leaders about perceived chal- improve—best practices that the United effort was a challenge due to com- lenges and potential solutions. Security States can sustain and emerging risk fac- peting national interests, cultures, in the Baltic Region is the first study in tors that it should address. These lessons resources, and policies. the series to be published.5 were derived from 46 studies consoli- •• Host-nation partnering: Partner- The Baltic Sea Region (BSR) includes dated into the report.4 ing was a key enabler and force Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (three The Decade of War study discusses the multiplier and aided in host-nation former Soviet states) as well as Denmark, 11 strategic themes that arose from the capacity-building. However, it was Finland, Germany, Iceland, Norway, study of the enduring lessons and chal- not always approached effectively or Poland, and Sweden. The United States lenges of the last decade: adequately prioritized and resourced. and Great Britain are critical external BSR •• State use of surrogates and proxies: actors. The BSR is important to Russia •• Understand the environment: A States sponsored and exploited for many reasons including: failure to recognize, acknowledge, surrogates and proxies to generate and accurately define the operational asymmetric challenges. •• Sixty percent of Russian maritime environment led to a mismatch •• Super-empowered threats: Individu- commercial trade transits the Baltic among forces, capabilities, missions, als and small groups exploited tech- Sea and goals. nology and information to expand •• Forty-three percent of Russian oil •• Conventional warfare paradigm: influence and approach state-like exports transit the Oresund straits Conventional approaches often disruptive capacity. (traditionally places of great eco- were ineffective when applied to nomic and political importance operations other than major combat, The Decade of War study briefly connecting Scandinavia with Central forcing leaders to realign the ways summarized each of these strategic Europe) and means of achieving effects. themes and provided recommendations •• The Oresund straits are the world’s •• Battle for the narrative: The United to the joint force. The Army used this third most strategic oil chokepoint. States was slow to recognize the study as the framework for a complete importance of information and the strategic-to-tactical crosswalk of its Russian rhetoric indicates that it is con- battle for the narrative in achieving organization, training, and equip- cerned about maintaining influence in objectives at all levels; it was often ping. The study also became part of this region. ineffective in applying and aligning the professional military education JLLD partnered with Finland, Great the narrative to goals and desired (PME) curriculum. This study led U.S. Britain, and Sweden to conduct a study endstates. Southern Command to request sup- of security in the BSR. The findings •• Transitions: Failure to adequately port in understanding the protection provided a shared understanding of the plan and resource strategic and oper- of civilians in its area of responsibility. Russian challenge and its implications to ational transitions endangered the Lessons from this study influenced how the United States, Europe, and NATO, overall mission. the United Nations (UN) approaches resulting in a common framework for •• Adaptation: DOD policies, doctrine, the protection of civilians in UN peace- potential countermeasures. The study training, and equipment were often keeping operations. Additionally, JLLD 88 Commentary / The Importance of Lessons Learned JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Swedish sailors assigned to HSwMS Karlsand climb aboard USS Oscar Austin, which supports theater security cooperation and forward naval presence in U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations, Baltic Sea, September 26, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Ryan Utah Kledzik) sponsors included the Joint Staff J5, J7, study is closer alignment among the par- Global Intelligence, Surveillance, and the U.S. European Command J5. ticipating countries as well as conceptual and Reconnaissance This study found that the BSR has frameworks for how future cooperation Early in 2017, the CJCS directed Joint been a source of innate tension be- might be enhanced to better mitigate Staff J7 to conduct a study on the tween Russia and the West. Geography, Russian threats. optimization of global intelligence, location, economic dependence, de- In addition to the real-time strategic surveillance, and reconnaissance mography, media penetration, politics, planning insights that this study has (ISR) in support of the U.S. Central and lack of a unified approach make the provided, many segments of the EPP Command (USCENTCOM). JLLD BSR vulnerable to Russian influence. effort are expected to provide timely and began a 90-day study focused on rec- Russia increased nonmilitary and military relevant material for professional devel- ommendations to enhance the combat pressure in the BSR in a long-term effort opment. In this case, JLLD produced effectiveness and efficiency of ongoing intended to enhance Russian security, as- an “EPP: Baltic Region” study video to DOD combat ISR and complementary sert great power influence, and confront provide background content for joint processing, exploitation, and dissemina- the West below the threshold of war. PME classes to engage in seminar-type tion operations. The key question JLLD BSR countries strengthened their defense discussions. addressed was whether current prac- postures and increased cooperation, JLLD is beginning the next phase of tices for prioritization, allocation, and but a collective approach to countering, the project—working with Great Britain employment of available ISR resources deterring, and de-escalating Russian and countries in Central Eastern Europe are optimized for combatant com- aggression proved problematic. Future (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, mands and joint task forces to achieve efforts must be founded on unity, defense and Slovakia) to better understand their their military objectives. The research capabilities, resilience, and deterrence. perspectives and evaluate how these per- team (composed of analysts from the The impacts of this work are still develop- spectives might shape future efforts. Joint Staff J7, J2, and J3) identified ing; however, it is clear that a result of the 4 findings with 11 actionable recom- JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 DeFilippi, Nowak, and Baylor 89 B-1B Lancer, 28th Bomb Wing, participates in Baltic Operations Exercise over Baltic Sea, June 9, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Jonathan Snyder) mendations as well as several important The second finding identified the recommendations associated with this overarching themes that were outside undisciplined processes for enterprise finding included enforcing the require- the study’s original scope. design, architecture, and establishing data ments for joint certification standards for The first finding revealed that joint standards, resulting in non-interoperable Service college managers and expanding policies, instructions, and doctrine have sets of systems and tools that introduced planners’ and leaders’ knowledge of not kept pace with the evolution of numerous inefficiencies into the ISR en- how to employ ISR. The latter portion ISR employment, resulting in ad hoc terprise. The recommendation stemming may include developing a curriculum for implementation and disparate orga- from this finding is that OSD should Services to use in their PME pipelines. nize-train-equip approaches. ISR growth enforce the provisions of DOD Directive The final finding revealed that joint has outpaced ISR policies and enterprise 5143.01, which require the Under force organization and manning have not management. There is a stark difference Secretary of Defense for Intelligence kept pace with the exponential growth of between the information outlined in (USD[I]) to serve as the focal point for the ISR enterprise. Newly collected ISR component doctrine versus joint doc- intelligence information systems’ interop- data cannot be incorporated if there is trine. Each Service conducts collection erability and governance processes. an imbalance in the number of person- management differently, including use The third finding described the nel assigned to collection; processing, of ISR assets. Recommendations for this deficiencies in joint force training and exploitation, and dissemination; and finding include providing guidance on joint certification standards necessary analysis. Recommendations included roles and responsibilities within the ISR for the required skills, knowledge, and ensuring that future platform acquisitions enterprise that will enforce overarching abilities at all levels within the ISR enter- are accompanied with commensurate directives and instructions and establish a prise. In short, the joint force needs to joint force organization, technology, and reporting requirement for better visibility professionalize ISR enterprise managers training; conducting a manpower study of ISR assets. in order to fully optimize assets. The to determine the appropriate manning 90 Commentary / The Importance of Lessons Learned JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 capacity to support PED and all-source an array of challenges in establishing command’s area of responsibility. The analysis; and minimizing the amount of an expeditionary base in an austere study focused on OCS at its headquar- unprocessed data by implementing the environment. Although limited in ca- ters and forward headquarters, Com- necessary PED manning and technology. pability, the use of a Service component bined Joint Task Force–Operation Inher- The USD(I), ISR Operations, is headquarters, coupled with key enablers, ent Resolve, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, leading an executive steering group opened the theater, supported immediate and subordinate Service components. (ESG) consisting of the Joint Staff operations, and provided time to prepare While the Armed Forces have J32, Joint Staff Vice Director J2, along for a tailored follow-on headquarters routinely used contract support, the with other senior representation from and response force. The 101st Airborne scope and scale of contractor use during the Intelligence Community (IC) to Division (Air Assault) executed a disci- Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation direct the implementation of the CJCS- plined operation that supported the lead Enduring Freedom were unprecedented. approved recommendations and way Federal agency (the United States Agency Significant contracting failures and re- ahead. The ESG will involve the IC in for International Development), avoided ports of massive fraud, waste, and abuse working groups that will focus on the mission creep, and enabled a timely and during this period prompted Congress recommendations, which should pro- orderly redeployment that included a 21- and the Secretary of the Army to create vide improvements for optimizing ISR day controlled monitoring regimen. independent commissions to assess resources. They will not, however, close Despite the success of the operation, the extent of damage and to develop the widening gap between ISR supply shortfalls were revealed in planning, poli- solutions to this crucial DOD and and demand. The current ISR enterprise cies, and preparedness across DOD, which Service-wide problem. The OCS concept evolved through an enduring fight against need to be addressed. Currently, epide- was developed and shaped as one of the violent extremist organizations (VEOs). miologists are greatly concerned about solutions to this problem set. The re- Only through an enterprise ISR strategy future and more dangerous global infec- duction of force structure and manning, with associated design/architecture tious disease outbreaks. While this report mission-specific force cap restrictions, and discipline can system integration, interop- was primarily written for the U.S. military, the continual introduction of high-tech erability, data analysis, and sharing occur. others, including U.S. departments and equipment all point to the fact that the Governed by a USD(I) defined structure agencies, healthcare organizations, and use of and diversity of contract support and architecture, the Services, agencies, nongovernmental organizations, may will continue to play a crucial role in mili- and partners will be able to provide an benefit from the discussion and recom- tary operations. Over the past decade, the ISR force that is flexible, adaptable, orga- mendations documented. Iraq and Afghanistan theaters combined nized, trained, and equipped to advance This study provided key input directly have employed more contractors than beyond the counter-VEO fight and pre- to the White House Ebola Lessons military personnel. pare for a near-peer competitor. Learned Summit and informed the Ebola The study team discussed OCS chal- report sent to President Barack Obama. lenges in interviews with numerous senior The DOD Response to More than 100 recommendations for leaders and subject matter experts repre- Ebola in West Africa strategic, operational, and tactical is- senting USCENTCOM, OSD, Joint Staff, This study analyzed United Assistance, sues were produced, which were used and the Services. These discussions made the DOD support operation for the to inform and improve joint doctrine, it clear that while the DOD OCS Action U.S. Government’s response to the education, training, and concept devel- Plan (FY2015–FY2018)—developed by Ebola crisis in Liberia in 2014–2015.6 opment. In addition, the study provided the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense The operation was the first U.S. military key lessons and a framework for U.S. (Program Support), Joint Staff Logistics operation to support a disease-driven Africa Command senior leader after ac- Directorate (J4), and the implementation foreign humanitarian-assistance mission. tion review. JLLD additionally produced approach taken by USCENTCOM J4 Initially, the Ebola outbreak seemed a Joint Knowledge Online instructional (CCJ4)—has been successfully guiding and to follow its normal pattern, but as video and two case studies: Rapid enabling OCS advancement, significant infected people traveled to cities to get Deployment into an Undeveloped Theater7 challenges from institutional and opera- medical care, the disease spread farther and Employment in Support of Interagency tional perspectives still exist.9 and quicker. Nongovernmental aid Partners.8 The study developed 9 critical findings agencies normally do not work with and over 40 recommendations; however, the military, but the disease reached a Operational Contract Support the most crucial challenges that will affect level that could no longer be managed The USCENTCOM Director for OCS progress are manning and training. without military logistics. Logistics (J4) requested that the JLLD Overcoming many of these challenges will The unique aspects of the mission, conduct a study to analyze and capture require substantial support and endorse- evolving DOD roles, lack of understand- lessons and best practices to operation- ment at the highest levels of leadership. A ing of the operational environment, and alize and institutionalize operational few of the key findings/recommenda- force projection shortfalls presented contract support (OCS) throughout the tions of the study include: JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 DeFilippi, Nowak, and Baylor 91 •• A commander’s establishment of and also works to reformat and repackage promotes the profession of arms and en- and involvement in contract review lessons-based knowledge in formats that sures that the body of knowledge remains processes were critical to contract are suitable for other applications. For ex- timely, relevant, and useful. Lastly, as the oversight. ample, the division frequently creates case modern nature of warfare continues to •• Ill-defined manning requirements, studies and educational vignettes that are rapidly change, the process of learning combined with training and edu- quickly transitioned into the JPME II must keep pace or we will find ourselves cation shortfalls, complicated OCS program at the Joint Forces Staff College. at a competitive disadvantage with our implementation; however, ongoing Regarding concept development, the adversaries. JFQ efforts have reduced gaps and division provides tailored inputs from advanced OCS institutionalization. lessons-based knowledge (whether •• Resource constraints, method of studies-based, JLLIS-based, or from Notes manning, and personnel turnover other sources) that can improve the de- 1 all challenged Operational Contract velopment of joint concepts. The JLLD Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., speech delivered at the graduation exercises of the National Support Integration Cell (OCSIC) ensures that all joint doctrine under re- Defense University, Washington, DC, June manning, with no identified institu- view (or development) benefits from the 9, 2016; video available at 92 Commentary / The Importance of Lessons Learned JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 After serious flooding in Haiti’s north, its government, with support of United Nations Mission in Haiti and other UN agencies, responded with evacuations, temporary shelters, and distribution of food and supplies, November 11, 2014 (UN/Logan Abassi) Climate Change and Urbanization Challenges to Global Security and Stability By Ronak B. Patel and David P. Polatty IV wo global trends that present itarian crises. Each trend individually monumental new challenges intensifies the risk for crises and makes T for civil-military coordination responses remarkably more compli- in humanitarian crises are urban- cated. The manner in which these two ization—the growth of cities across trends interact to drive and escalate the world—and climate change. The further crises is also becoming clearer. following article explains how these The humanitarian community has Dr. Ronak B. Patel, MD, is an Assistant Professor two trends and their interactive effects begun to address these challenges in of Emergency Medicine at the Harvard Medical School. Captain David P. Polatty IV, USNR, is a will increasingly complicate and test its operations by debating their impact Civilian Professor at the U.S. Naval War College. civil-military coordination in human- on coordination and thinking through JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Patel and Polatty 93 potential actions that can facilitate more For many, this will be unpredictable, national security interests over the next 20 resilient approaches to crisis prepared- sudden, and maladaptive displacement years. . . . The United States depends on a ness. Militaries, increasingly engaged within and across borders. This displace- smooth-functioning international system in supporting humanitarian missions ment will be increasingly into urban areas ensuring the flow of trade and market in both natural disaster and conflict where the majority of refugees now live.7 access to critical raw materials such as settings, face a rapidly changing envi- Both urbanization and climate change oil and gas, and security for its allies and ronment. Civil-military coordination in also collude to increase the global risk of partners. Climate change and climate these crises must be re-examined, and pandemics. The 2014 Ebola outbreak change policies could affect all of these—do- militaries must adapt to this shifting in West Africa and the recent Zika virus mestic stability in a number of key states, landscape in order to operate effectively epidemic demonstrate how infectious the opening of new sea lanes and access to with humanitarian actors. pathogens can have devastating conse- raw materials, and the global economy quences in a globalized and urban world, more broadly—with significant geopolitical Climate Change and Cities with increasing density and inadequate consequences.11 Climate change greatly exacerbates public health and healthcare systems. and complicates known threats affect- Previously self-limiting outbreaks can There have been numerous updates ing urban areas. The role that climate now enter the cauldron of urban slums since this initial assessment, culminat- change plays in driving and compound- that receive both migrants and displaced ing in the September 2016 release by ing natural disasters, displacement, populations within a dense urban land- the U.S. Intelligence Community and pandemics, and even conflict in cities scape, aggressively facilitating the spread National Intelligence Council of a mem- forces militaries to rethink how they of disease. Without the capacity to detect, orandum, Implications for U.S. National conduct humanitarian assistance and respond, and quarantine effectively and Security of Anticipated Climate Change. disaster response operations. The Inter- safely, growing cities fueled the Ebola This memorandum highlighted that governmental Panel on Climate Change epidemic in West Africa, threatening a climate change “will almost certainly (IPCC) predicts an average sea level rise pandemic. Climate change contributes have significant effects, both direct and of 0.4 meters by 2100 in the best and as well by dramatically altering environ- indirect, across social, economic, political, least-likely scenario, but projections with ments. Greater humidity enhances the and security realms during the next 20 unchecked emissions predict a rise of range and altitude of mosquitos, while years. These effects will be all the more up to two meters.1 Global temperature warming waters allow conditions for pronounced as people continue to con- is forecast to increase by 2 to 3 degrees cholera to spread beyond its typical lo- centrate in climate-vulnerable locations, Celsius by the end of the century cales, respectively.8 such as coastal areas, water-stressed keeping current emissions commit- regions, and ever-growing cities.”12 The ments.2 This rise in temperature alters Climate Change and Conflict nexus of climate change and urbanization precipitation and ocean atmospheric Climate refugees are, in and of them- present wide-ranging threats to not only patterns, increasing the severity and fre- selves, imperatives for humanitarian U.S. national security, but also global quency of storms.3 By 2030, two-thirds action, but they can also demographi- security and stability and the health and of the global population is expected to cally and economically stress local host welfare of potentially billions of vulnera- live within 100 miles of a coastline, with populations and lead to conflict. While ble people. over 1 billion people expected to live in no causal link has been proved, the low-lying coastal zones, those within 10 pathway is becoming more evident.9 Cities and Conflict meters of sea level.4 A majority of meg- Former Secretary-General of the United Humanitarian response in cities is acities, those with populations above Nations (UN) Ban Ki-moon cited the incredibly challenging, particularly in 10 million, contain this vulnerable geo- Darfur conflict as a potential example those afflicted by conflict. As power is graphic zone and climate change places of climate change–induced conflict, as typically defined by territorial control, these urban centers at risk.5 drought drove displacement and ulti- cities represent the most valuable Additionally, sea level rise and mately led to conflict.10 domain in conflict and serve as one warming have multiple destructive While climate change has historically of the principal metrics by which to consequences as they contribute to food been a polarizing topic in U.S. politics, measure control. Cities serve as the insecurity, drive population displacement, the Intelligence Community, in 2008, seats of power and the battlefields of and in some cases, conflict. Many experts prepared the National Intelligence modern conflict.13 Coordinating with predict that hundreds of millions of peo- Assessment on the National Security a humanitarian response in conflict will ple will migrate in the next few decades Implications of Global Climate Change to entail actively engaging these new urban due to environmental change that will 2030. This assessment notes that landscapes. The layout and density of cause drought and increase the salinity of these rapidly growing urban spaces freshwater sources, leading to food short- we judge global climate change will present concrete operational challenges. ages and loss of agricultural livelihoods.6 have wide-ranging implications for U.S. Large swaths of informal settlements, 94 Features / Climate Change and Urbanization JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Fire Controlman from USS Lake Erie works with Sri Lankan marines to repair levees in Matara, Sri Lanka, during humanitarian assistance operations in wake of severe flooding and landslides, June 12, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Joshua Fulton) or slums, which represent over 50 either to support logistics or provide disaster preparedness, and poor mitiga- percent of many urban environments, security, face a multitude of challenges tion efforts place populations at greater are a hallmark of growing cities.14 These that they may not have dealt with in risk for crises that will necessitate an are often unmapped areas, marked by the past and, therefore, have not been international humanitarian response.18 narrow ingress and egress routes and trained to effectively respond to. The very nature of humanitarian little to no lighting. Most have proved response is being rethought because of difficult or nearly impossible to police The Complexity of urbanization’s increasing complexity.19 and many have been ceded in all intents Urban Response Urban crises now entail a much broader and purposes to criminal elements.15 Due to rapid urbanization, over 50 variety of actors aside from international In fact, in many of these cities, state percent of the global population now aid agencies, state authorities, and na- authorities do not have a monopoly on lives in urban areas. This is accelerating tional militaries. There is a larger role power or violence, with multiple actors at a pace that will see the urban popu- being played by municipal authorities who are not bound by international lation grow to 66 percent of the global that increasingly lead and coordinate humanitarian law effectively in control total by 2050, while the rural population aid responses. Local community-based of many parts of the city. Displayed declines.17 Humanitarian response will organizations and nongovernmental most prominently in Latin American increasingly take place in these rapidly organizations provide goods and services cities, criminal violence has led to growing cities as they concentrate the before, during, and after a crisis, and may homicide rates that exceed violent death risks and hazards to natural and man- be a major source of on-the-ground ef- rates in some declared wars.16 Militaries made disasters. Unregulated growth, forts during an urban response. Similarly, that engage in humanitarian operations, deficiencies in basic services, inadequate the private sector provides the majority JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Patel and Polatty 95 of goods and services in urban areas, challenges to any current or future coordination in the pre-disaster phase. and they are an important part of the humanitarian response that will take Performing these activities in predictably initial response and recovery.20 This is place in or around a megacity. Most high-risk cities, where politically feasi- increasingly recognized by humanitarian international militaries do not specialize ble and in line with national interests, organizations that now engage in market or routinely train for urban operations. opens an area of military engagement in analyses and cash transfers, as well as Even the U.S. Army, arguably the humanitarian efforts as part of a poten- support markets, rather than simply deliv- world’s most capable modern ground tially larger grand strategy. Cities that ering hard goods. There are also myriad force, is not designed to operate in have existing military bases and ongoing stakeholders that must be taken into complex urban settings. U.S. Army activity present a logical starting point account, especially local communities af- Chief of Staff, General Mark A. Milley, with clear direct benefits for those mili- fected by the crisis, among other informal has publicly stated that the Service tary installations, the communities they and formal powerbrokers. As described “has been designed, manned, trained are collocated with, and overall efforts above, various powerbrokers may control and equipped for the last 241 years by all actors in the humanitarian ecosys- territory and even provide what tradition- to operate primarily in rural areas.” tem to improve responses. ally have been public services, such as a He further elaborated that the Army More frequent, realistic, and robust mafia organization providing electricity. needs to prepare “for operations in simulations and exercises with specific Humanitarian engagement in these urban areas, highly dense urban areas, involvement of municipal authorities, environments requires a deep contextual and that’s a different construct. We’re local nongovernmental organizations, and understanding of local communities. not organized like that right now.”22 stakeholders from selected cities, along Militaries coordinating with civilian actors Tragic recent and ongoing humanitarian with the UN and major humanitarian will face similar complexities, even when crises in relatively small cities, including agencies, may help improve humanitarian they refrain from the “retail” or service Aleppo, Syria (~2.5 million people in response and coordination in future crises. delivery side of the response. The very 2012), and Mosul, Iraq (~664,000 When appropriate, including international need to coordinate with numerous actors people in 2015), have highlighted the militaries in these simulations and exercises and authorities will necessitate a re-exam- unique dangers that exist to vulnera- may allow key relationships to form prior ination and modification, at the least, of ble people, medical responders, and to disasters and provide all actors with a standard operating procedures and tradi- humanitarian organizations in urban deeper understanding of challenges and tional frameworks for engagement. environments. Not only have these opportunities for improving coordination. The humanitarian community itself groups found themselves under nearly Also, frameworks and processes for coor- is reassessing its approach to coordina- constant attack by militaries and non- dination can be explored and tested in the tion in urban crises, with much of the state actors, but they also cannot easily non-acute disaster phase. above informing the new Urban Crises gain access to food, water, medicine, Various militaries are engaged in Charter released by the Global Alliance and other basic lifesaving needs. efforts to improve coordination (for for Urban Crises at the May 2016 Observing the death toll of hundreds example, U.S. Pacific Command’s Rim World Humanitarian Summit.21 This of thousands of innocent civilians in of the Pacific [RIMPAC] exercise), and charter emphasizes the need to promote Aleppo, Syria, from 2001 to 2016—and sometimes the efforts include key civilian a localized and holistic approach to then considering the fact that Aleppo is actors from the humanitarian response humanitarian response, with a detailed not even in the top 150 cities in the world community. From RIMPAC and other contextual analysis and local participation by population—should serve as a warning similar exercises and simulations, there and ownership of the process. These beacon for humanity to more effectively is an excellent opportunity to take best ideas have permeated various emerging think through future conflicts and hu- practices from civilian-civilian and mil- methods such as area-based program- manitarian emergencies in large cities.23 In itary-military coordination tools and ming as well as a settlement approach to these urban environments, comprehensive methods and learn from them to improve urban response. While the humanitarian civil-military coordination becomes an civil-military coordination. architecture continues to evolve to better even greater imperative to ensure that Taking global scenarios and long- deal with urban challenges, militaries access to vulnerable people is gained and term predictions of climate change down coordinating in these crises must similarly maintained until the conflict is resolved or to likely scenarios, over shorter time adapt, whether coordinating to support an enduring ceasefire is implemented. frames and for specific regions and cities, logistics, conducting engineering and may help identify hotspots—indicators infrastructure support, or providing pro- Opportunities for early warning—and develop tools that tection for a humanitarian mandate. Given the challenges for military engage- decisionmakers can use in urban plan- ment regarding the acute phase of an ning, forward deployment of resources, Military Operations urban humanitarian response listed disaster preparedness, and humanitarian Urbanization poses massive secu- above, there may be an increasing role response planning. These are shared in- rity, logistics, health, and healthcare and opportunity to improve civil-military terests among civilian and military actors 96 Features / Climate Change and Urbanization JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 U.S. Servicemembers assigned to Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa periodically visit children in Caritas Djibouti mission in downtown Djibouti to donate food items, toys, clothing and supplies, April 26, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Eboni Prince) and may very well serve as a rallying point both in urban environments and due to and conflict settings require focused dis- due to the perceived neutrality of diverse climate change. Academics from military cussion and reevaluation. A new model actors coming together in a “safe” aca- universities often have tremendous influ- or architecture for civil-military coordi- demic setting. ence on the development and evolution nation may be required as global chal- Similarly, shared tools and efforts to of military doctrine within their nation’s lenges become increasingly complex. understand and map the key actors and military. The same can be said for ac- Better communication remains a factors that influence and dictate the ademics from civilian universities who priority and becomes imperative in the security environment, particularly for vul- frequently work closely with, and often face of these new complex challenges. nerable populations, present a common deploy in support of, humanitarian or- Humanitarians tend to use open com- area for work. This may also encourage ganizations, and therefore can help drive munication platforms and new tech- a wider discussion on how militaries may process and framework improvements nologies such as Web-based assessment better comply with international human- for humanitarian responses. Expanding tools, crowd-sourcing, and open street itarian law or provide protection and opportunities for civil-military academics mapping; these innovative approaches access within humanitarian corridors in to exchange ideas in symposia, class- are pushing the envelope further. Mili- conflict environments. rooms, and simulations may only further tary communication systems, by design, Finally, increased interaction between accelerate improvements to civil-military are closed, often classified in nature, academics from civilian and military coordination efforts. and value information control. A new universities—specifically those engaged communications platform for shared in humanitarian research and education Conclusions resources may better enable aid agencies fields—allows a unique opportunity to The profound challenges that urban- and militaries to coordinate with each conduct research and writing that tackles ization and climate change present other, let alone with local actors that are some of the most pressing issues facing for humanitarian response and thus increasingly taking a more prominent vulnerable people and communities civil-military coordination in disasters role in humanitarian response. JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Patel and Polatty 97 Humanitarian actors may also have to Population Growth and Exposure to Sea-Level Post-Olympic Rio,” CBC News, February 24, Rise and Coastal Flooding: A Global Assess- 2017, available at 98 Features / Climate Change and Urbanization JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 General Dunford walks past B-52 aircraft during tour of Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, February 8, 2018 (DOD/Dominique A. Pineiro) he Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Structuring Airpower of Staff characterizes American T power projection capabilities as “a key military center of gravity” in the to Win in 2030 pursuit of 21st century U.S. interests.1 Potential U.S. adversaries understand this and are pursuing cost-imposing Designing a Joint Division of advances in missile technology and electronic warfare focused on pre- venting both the deployment and Labor Between Land- and employment of U.S. expeditionary forces. These technologies, along with Sea-Based Combat Aviation their associated operational postures, are known collectively as antiaccess/ area-denial (A2/AD) and have been By Josh Wiitala and Alexander Wright the subject of rigorous analysis across the Department of Defense (DOD) for nearly a decade. This series of studies gained high- level attention in 2009 when Secretary Lieutenant Colonel Josh Wiitala, USAF, is a B-2A Pilot and Inspector General, 509th Bomb Wing. of Defense Robert Gates authorized an Lieutenant Commander Alexander Wright, USN, is an F/A-18E/F Pilot and Executive Assistant to the operational concept known as Air-Sea Vice Director, Joint Staff J7 (Hampton Roads). The authors thank Lieutenant Commander Eric Daley, USN, Major Adam Shockley, USAF, and Colonel Anthony Feagin, USA (Ret.), for their contributions to an Battle (ASB). ASB sought to combine earlier version of this manuscript written at Joint Forces Staff College. American air and maritime forces in new JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Wiitala and Wright 99 KC-135 Stratotanker assigned to 340th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, refuels Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornet assigned to USS Theodore Roosevelt, performing precision airstrikes against six Taliban narcotic targets in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, December 7, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Jeff Parkinson) and novel ways that would “disrupt, (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) in destroy, [and] defeat” A2/AD systems order to more comprehensively leverage Service-Specific Plans in order to achieve joint objectives.2 ASB U.S. advantages in overcoming the “chal- To set the stage for the attributes was evaluated and refined for over 5 lenge of contested access and maneuver required in a genuinely joint force years in “more than two dozen Service, in the global commons.”4 structure, our discussion begins with a combatant command, joint and allied Going forward, the lessons learned depiction of the individual plans for the war games, experiments, studies and during nearly a decade of concept devel- Air Force and Navy for addressing A2/ exercises.”3 These evaluations not only opment must be translated into a joint AD in the air domain, beginning with illustrated the value of closer integration force structure capable of defeating A2/ the Air Force’s Air Superiority 2030 of air and maritime forces, but also re- AD and preserving America’s power Flight Plan (AS 2030).5 The overall lead vealed that “A2/AD capabilities evolved projection advantage. However, such a for the study, Brigadier General Alex more quickly than anticipated and could force structure will only be effective if Grynkewich, asserts American airpower only be dismantled at high levels of risk” it is pursued through a joint approach has been so successful in post–Cold under the ASB construct. to acquisitions from concept develop- War conflicts that “Many can no longer As a result, ASB was rescoped and re- ment through the operational fielding conceive of a world in which U.S. air vamped into a new joint concept termed of tomorrow’s warfighting platforms. superiority is not a given”; however, Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver This article elaborates on how a com- “the world has changed” with the in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). This plementary division of labor between a advent of A2/AD.6 As a result, AS new concept replaced ASB’s compar- next-generation, purpose-built carrier 2030 operates under the assumption atively narrow focus on defeating and air wing and land-based long-range that the United States “may no longer destroying A2/AD systems with the strike bombers could contribute to the be able to prevent adversaries from broader goal of “defeating an adversary’s air portion of JAM-GC’s multidomain operating within [its] own integrated air plan and intent.” JAM-GC also expanded vision for defeating both the “plan” and defenses.” Instead, U.S. airpower “will to encompass all five warfighting domains “intent” behind A2/AD. control [its] airspace for a discrete time 100 Features / Structuring Airpower to Win in 2030 JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 and over a limited area, as defined by Figure. Divergence of U.S. Fighter and Bomber the needs of the joint force team.”7 This Combat Radius Post World War II vision for airpower in 2030 coincides Conventional Conventional ission uclear ission riorit uclear i with the findings of a Defense Science 4,500 Board Task Force on Air Dominance and aligns well with JAM-GC’s admis- 4,000 B-52H sion that A2/AD capabilities have 3,500 B-36J B-2A progressed at a pace that makes ASB’s B-1B initial emphasis on destruction of A2/ 3,000 8 AD systems an overly risky approach. 2,500 Given this new operational environ- B-50D ment, AS 2030 envisions a multidomain 2,000 approach (air, space, and cyberspace) to 1,500 B-29 air superiority with four force structure Combat Radius (nm) P-51D P-47N considerations. Three of these are specif- 1,000 F-84F F-101C F-15C B-17D B-17G ically relevant to JAM-GC’s overarching 500 F-4E goals. The first consideration is range, P-40E F-22A 0 which is simply the ability to operate Bomber Combat Radius Fighter Combat Radius from distances outside the range of most antiaccess threats, making these threats Source: John Stillion, Trends in ir-to- ir Com at: Implications for Future ir Superiorit (Washington, DC Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2015), 52, available at “more manageable” and preserving the http //csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Air-to-Air-Report-.pdf . Air Force’s ability to field combat power.9 This consideration seeks to reverse the longstanding trend of ever-shrinking and lethal fashion.13 This consideration its future force structure from a plat- fighter range and ever-increasing bomber highlights what Chief of Staff of the Air form perspective and instead envisions range illustrated by the figure. Force General David L. Goldfein terms countering A2/AD with increasingly Second, AS 2030 advocates for a mix “War in the Information Age.”14 In this capable payloads able to mitigate risk and of “both standoff and stand-in capabili- new environment, “advantage will be enhance offensive operations. ties.” This force structure allows standoff achieved through the speed and integra- platforms to launch survivable muni- tion of information.” A Vision for Joint tions from safe ranges while survivable Like the Air Force, the Navy con- Airpower in 2030 stand-in platforms provide the timely ducted its own examination of the The JAM-GC team leads insist that A2/ targeting information to make such problem-set and proposed a slightly AD requires joint forces that are “dis- strikes effective. The stand-in portion of different approach to combating A2/AD tributable, resilient, and tailorable, as this force structure will be characterized within its own unique operational and well as employed in sufficient scale and by a counter-air and strike team com- budgetary environments. The essence of for ample duration,” and such attributes prised of the Air Force’s new penetrating this approach is articulated well by for- are certainly compatible with many counter-air (PCA) program and the mer Chief of Naval Operations Admiral of the traits envisioned by individual long-range strike-bomber (B-21) pro- Jonathan Greenert who stated: Service plans.16 The JAM-GC team is gram. In this construct, PCA provides clear, however, that its concept will not “air superiority . . . within the adversary It is unaffordable . . . to adapt a platform impose force structure requirements IADS [integrated air defense systems],” by replacing either it or its integral systems across the military Services. In short, while the new stealth bomber destroys each time a new mission or need arises. We JAM-GC “will not replace the Services’ “airfields and logistics targets” critical to will instead need to change the modular unique programming, requirements, adversary counter-air efforts.10 weapon, sensor, and unmanned vehicle and acquisition processes, nor will it Third, these standoff and stand-in “payloads” a platform carries or employs. direct any specific funding actions.”17 platforms are linked together by “new In addition to being more affordable, this However, if JAM-GC were allowed to concepts for multidomain command and decoupling of payload development from dictate a unique joint force structure control (C2) and new multidomain tac- platform development will take advantage from the ground up, it could provide tics.”11 Reminiscent of David Deptula’s of a set of emerging trends in precision the vision required to secure unity of “combat cloud” concept,12 this consid- weapons, stealth, ship and aircraft con- effort among the Services regarding the eration generates “a truly networked and struction, economics, and warfare.15 A2/AD threat. Given that the Air Force integrated family of capabilities” able to and Navy are looking at large-scale link and therefore leverage all the sensors In contrast with the Air Force’s plan, recapitalization of legacy combat aircraft and shooters in a given area in a seamless the Navy has already largely bought into over the next two decades, JAM-GC JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Wiitala and Wright 101 B-1 bomber conducts suppression of enemy air defenses training at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, July 15, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Sadie Colbert) should be the foundation for a division Some argue Air Force retirement of missions. This level of flexibility is of labor between air- and sea-based the EF-111/F-4G team without dedi- enabled by the F/A-18 family of strike combat aviation designed specifically cated replacements left the Service with fighters; however, such adaptability to negate the operational advantages critical capability shortfalls in the elec- comes at a cost. While today’s Super of A2/AD. Today’s Air Force and tronic attack (EA) and the suppression Hornets offer increased speed, maneu- Navy combat aviation forces fight well of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission verability, and overall survivability over together but are, with few exceptions, sets.18 But this critique seems to focus their fleet predecessors, the F/A-18’s built and scaled to fight independently on the small size of today’s EA/SEAD 370 nautical mile combat radius sig- of each other. If designed to depend on fleet rather than on today’s joint division nificantly reduces the carrier air wing’s each other for specific functions, such of labor, which actually represents a rare reach compared to previous generation a purpose-built approach could yield success in the longstanding pursuit of platforms, such as the A-7, with its efficiencies that make the force more joint force structure development. If a more than 600 nautical mile combat effective against emerging threats. purpose-built joint division of labor were radius.19 This dynamic will change One example of a purpose-built applied to other mission sets across the somewhat with the introduction of approach exists today in the partnership joint force, individual Services could the F-35C. In a stealthy configuration, between the Air Force’s penetrating long- develop platforms that intrinsically com- the F-35 will not be able to match the range strike community and the Navy’s plemented other joint capabilities from payload of the F/A-18E/F variants; electronic attack community. While inception through fielding. Applying this however, it has a lot to offer the fleet every carrier air wing has its own organic concept to the air superiority mission given its advanced sensor suite, next complement of EA-18G electronic attack illustrates what a purpose-built carrier generation datalink, low observable aircraft, the Navy also fields four expedi- air wing could bring to the fight against technology, and 613 nautical mile tionary squadrons that operate from land. A2/AD if partnered in a complementary combat radius.20 Yet as a multirole These squadrons consistently train and manner with Air Force long-range strike. fighter “optimized” for air-to-ground integrate with Air Force B-2s outside the missions, the F-35 will not be tailored normal carrier air wing construct. This The Purpose-Built to counter key aspects of the A2/AD longstanding operational relationship fa- Carrier Air Wing environment in the same manner as AS cilitates seamless integration between the Today’s carrier air wing is best described 2030’s envisioned PCA program.21 two communities and reflects a truly joint as a “jack-of-all-trades,” able to effec- This is where a truly joint force struc- division of labor for the electronic attack tively transition between counter-air, ture offers important advantages that and long-range strike mission sets. strike, SEAD, and counter-maritime extend beyond those gained by simply 102 Features / Structuring Airpower to Win in 2030 JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 developing joint platforms. If the Navy Table. Bomber Contributions to Conventional Combat Operations Since World War II (%) relied on Air Force bombers to provide Desert Allied Enduring Iraqi strike capacity and augment the count- Korea Vietnam Storm Force Freedom Freedom er-maritime capabilities of the carrier strike Percent Munitions 27 44 32 47 66 27 group, air wings could focus on the count- Delivered er-air and, to some extent, SEAD mission Percent of Combat 8 8 3 5 10 7 sets. Such a change to force structure Forces (USAF, USN) would not mean that every carrier air wing Source: Michael R. Moeller, U.S. Bomber Force: Sized to Sustain an Asymmetric Advantage for America would convert to this new arrangement; (Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, 2015), 13, available at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Wiitala and Wright 103 bombers able to “‘swing’ combat power value of this type of A2/AD approach Just over 30 years ago, DOD reorga- between widely separated theaters of implemented by the United States and nized under the Goldwater-Nichols Act operation” while being based “outside the its partners is clearly illustrated by the to close organizational seams between range of most enemy strike systems.”28 sharp reaction of competitor states to commanders and joint warfighters in This flexibility would be critical in taking even modest deployments of advanced order to win on the battlefield. Winning advantage of the temporary air superiority U.S. defensive technologies to key allies on tomorrow’s battlefield will require a created by both land- and sea-based PCA around the world.33 similar level of jointness to close seams aircraft in areas potentially separated by This approach does not diminish the in the acquisition process between long distances. Second, Deptula stresses absolutely critical task of modernizing tomorrow’s warfighting platforms. the importance of high survivability.29 American power projection. However, JAM-GC’s predecessor concept, As part of the stand-in force packages defensive approaches should be seen as ASB, envisioned this type of approach to described by AS 2030, the stealthy playing an important supporting role to acquisitions in a 2013 implementation B-21 will be survivable against high-end this enduring “source of strength” in the plan. It advocated for the development threats.30 Third, he discusses the need pursuit of 21st-century U.S. interests.34 of a “pre-integrated joint force” where for the versatility to adapt. This attribute Similarly, Service plans must continue “solutions and innovations are collabo- is best understood through his assertion to evolve as well. One area that deserves ratively developed and vetted to ensure that the next bomber should be known ongoing attention across both land- and they are complementary where appro- as a “long-range sensor shooter” that can sea-based aviation is the potential for priate, redundant when mandated by rapidly integrate new capabilities.31 As part teaming “good enough” unmanned capacity requirements, fully interoperable, of the purpose-built joint team envisioned aircraft with higher end manned plat- and fielded with integrated acquisition here, this attribute would be critical to forms. Given the high cost of combat strategies.”37 Whether this level of col- ensuring long-term interoperability with aircraft, the joint force must explore ways laboration is achieved within existing the rest of the networked force. Deptula’s of increasing capacity at an affordable mechanisms such as the Defense Planning depiction of the new bomber’s attributes price point in order to combine the Guidance, accomplished through tar- is important because it builds on yesterday highly capable sensors and networks of geted acquisitions reform, or pursued and today’s combat successes in a manner high-end platforms with the capacity of as part of a major reorganization on the that accounts for evolving threats, while lower cost unmanned aerial systems.35 scale of Goldwater-Nichols, building an modernizing the features that made AS 2030’s discussion of potentially effective joint airpower team for 2030 the bomber force such a critical part of “bending the cost curve” for massed will require a new approach that effec- American power projection since the start low-cost systems through advanced tively translates today’s visionary concepts of World War II. manufacturing techniques shows promise into tomorrow’s joint force structure. JFQ in this regard and could enable airpower, Evolving JAM-GC and AS 2030 as a platform-reliant force, to take the JAM-GC, along with Service-specific operational risks required to defeat A2/ Notes plans, provide a solid conceptual foun- AD at an acceptable cost.36 In short, ef- 1 dation for building an optimized joint fective manned-unmanned teaming may Michael E. Hutchens et al., “Global Com- mons: A New Joint Operational Concept,” Joint airpower force structure capable of be required to ensure airpower remains a Force Quarterly 84 (1st Quarter 2017), 135. winning in 2030. This does not mean, cost-imposing means of waging war. 2 Ibid., 135–136. however, that these concepts should not 3 Terry S. Morris et al., “Securing Oper- continue to evolve. For example, JAM- Conclusion ational Access: Evolving the Air-Sea Battle GC’s emphasis on preserving America’s A2/AD is changing the way America Concept,” The National Interest (March–April 2015). ability to conduct offensive operations projects power through the air. Blend- 4 Hutchens et al., 136. across the globe should not preclude ing the payload and range of Air Force 5 Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan: Enter- supplemental defensive approaches penetrating long-range strike platforms prise Capability Collaboration Team (Washing- when appropriate. In the post–Cold War with the counter-air and SEAD capabil- ton, DC: Headquarters Department of the Air world, most U.S. foreign policy interests ities of a next-generation, purpose-built Force, May 2016), available at 104 Features / Structuring Airpower to Win in 2030 JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 2–3, available at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Wiitala and Wright 105 North Carolina Army National Guardsman with Detachment 4, Recruiting and Retention Battalion, Joint Force Headquarters, exits simulated shoot house, pulling litter with simulated casualty, as competitor in 2013 Army National Guard Best Warrior Competition, Little Rock Arkansas, July 23, 2013 (U.S. Army/Betty Boyce) Continuing the Big Data Ethics Debate Enabling Senior Leader Decisionmaking By Paul B. Lester, Pedro S. Wolf, Christopher J. Nannini, Daniel C. Jensen, and Delores Johnson Davis n Joint Force Quarterly 77, Karl cannot compromise the organization’s Schneider, David Lyle, and Francis core value of trust: that the military Major Paul B. Lester, Ph.D., USA, is Director of Murphy presented a foundational will both provide for the national the Research Facilitation Laboratory, Office I of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army debate on the ethical use of big data defense and also look out for the best (ODUSA). Pedro S. Wolf is a Behavioral Scientist within a military context. The authors interest of its Servicemembers.”1 in the Research Facilitation Laboratory, ODUSA. offered several cases where the military It would appear that their concern Christopher J. Nannini is Program Manager at the Research Facilitation Laboratory, ODUSA. Daniel would benefit from improving its ana- was quite prophetic, as recent data C. Jensen is Director of the Army Analytics Group, lytical capabilities to leverage the poten- breaches in the private sector, govern- ODUSA. Delores Johnson Davis is the Senior tial that big data offers. Most germane ment, and military continue to shed light Professional for Integration (Human Dimension) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for to the current article, they argued that on the endemic challenges that persist Manpower and Reserve Affairs. “the collection and use of big data in the ethical use and protection of large 106 Features / Continuing the Big Data Ethics Debate JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 volumes of sensitive personal data.2 the Person-Event Data Environment harmonized with existing policies where Though some have claimed that the era (PDE), the operational information possible. In short, the working group of privacy is waning,3 both Federal law4 technology platform designed from the members concurred that emerging and Department of Defense (DOD) ground up with the ethical use and secu- HCE big data policy would be a new policy5 clearly state otherwise. Thus, we rity of Army personnel big data in mind. branch growing on the larger Army Data concur with Schneider, Lyle, and Murphy Later, we highlight some of the critical Management tree. Second, the paper that it is incumbent on DOD leadership machine learning and predictive analysis delineated how human capital data fit to safeguard personal data—the digital research already under way within the in a separate legal and ethical category representation of a Servicemember’s PDE that supports the Army’s personnel, from other data collected and stored military history—within its system and medical, and intelligence communities. by the Army, and further outlined how use the data ethically both for research We close by outlining key operational and the proposed use of human capital data and policymaking. Yet a key question strategic opportunities and challenges of should trigger deliberate ethical, legal, remains: How do we balance protecting applying this emerging technology to the and moral considerations. Quite simply, the best interests of Servicemembers and dynamic and complex human behavior both the Privacy Act of 1974 and Health maintaining their trust while also using we will face. Insurance Portability and Accountability available data and advanced analytics for Act of 1996 set a high bar for organiza- the good of the Defense Department? The HCBD Initiative tional use of personal information, which This is a question that each Service must Like other Services, the Army has exist- in turn should be used as a guide during answer. ing data stewardship strategy and policy strategic planning for the legally accept- In the 2 years since JFQ published the that broadly sets data goals and governs able use of human capital data. Third, big data ethics article, a multidisciplinary the management, storage, and security the paper identified five fundamental group of leaders within the Department of its data; this strategy is known as principles DOD must consider in any of the Army has worked toward an- the Army Data Strategy (ADS), while future HCE big data endeavor, described swering this question. The Federal the accompanying policy is known as in greater detail in the table. Government and DOD have exercised the Army Data Management Program The three objectives met via the white tremendous leadership to balance privacy (ADMP). Though the ADS and ADMP paper set the conditions for strategic management with big data technology present a comprehensive approach for planning intended to set key objectives for and training. DOD agencies now have an strategic management of the Army’s the use of big data in the human capital opportunity to consolidate data centers data and its information architecture, domain. Published in 2016, the Human and systems to reduce the number of both documents take a neutral position Capital Big Data (HCBD) Strategy disparate silos and fuse data results for toward unique characteristics of data echoed many of the strategic goals found analytics-based projects and decisionmak- and associated ethical, legal, and moral in the ADS and ADMP, particularly that ing. Likewise, information technology considerations. Thus, the Assistant data should meet VAUTI standards: systems with strong governance processes Secretary of the Army (Manpower and have emerged that place ethical, legal, Reserve Affairs) established a multi- •• visible by posting them to shared and moral considerations at the forefront disciplinary working group in 2014 to spaces and registering metadata of approving personnel and medical data begin addressing operational, security, related to structure and definition analytic projects. When coupled with and ethical considerations related to •• accessible to authorized users through recent big data policy decisions made the use of big data in the human capital those shared spaces and data services; within the Army Secretariat, current domain. A “big tent” approach was will be controlled in accordance with advances in this domain suggest that our taken as members from major com- the asset’s security-related metadata military is at a critical policy juncture, mands, information technology, military •• understandable by creating data presenting us with an opportunity to and civilian personnel, medical, training, models, integrating data, and iden- extend the debate on the ethical, legal, legal, law enforcement, marketing, and tifying requirements for information and moral use of Servicemember big research communities were invited to traceability data, as well as ensuring that DOD keeps participate. •• trusted by identifying authoritative pace with private-sector big data analytics What first emerged from this sources and making data storage and innovations. working group was a white paper that access structure In this article, we begin by exploring accomplished three objectives. First, the •• interoperable by complying with the Human Capital Big Data (HCBD) paper described how new data policy information exchange specifications initiative, an approved strategic policy related to the Human Capital Enterprise and establishing master data man- framework intended to integrate and (HCE) would need to be nested within agement and unique identifiers, coordinate the ethical use of the Army’s the Army’s existing data stewardship which will allow the same data to massive data stores by the research and policies, but that new HCE data policy be used across multiple systems and analysis community. Next, we introduce terminology (taxonomy) should be applications. JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Lester et al. 107 Table. Five Fundamental Principles of Army Big Data Policy Transparency Individuals are entitled to understandable information about how the Army collects data on them, who has access to that data, and how that data will be used and secured. A responsible enterprise approach must balance the tradeoffs made among privacy, security, and convenience. Privacy An individual’s right to privacy is fundamental. A breach of privacy can become a breach of trust between the organization holding an individual’s data and that individual, regardless if harm occurs. Collection of large amounts of data specific to an individual—even without the inclusion of personally identifiable information—cannot be assumed to maintain an individual’s anonymity. “Do no harm” All necessary steps will be taken by the Army to ensure that application and use of data maximizes benefits and minimizes harm to Army personnel, individually and collectively. Validity and verification Consequential or preemptive prediction applications of data will be held to accepted scientific standards of validity and verification with appropriate peer review before implementation within the Army. Security Datasets must be protected from both internal and external threats. This maintains the fidelity of the data and keeps faith with our people. Users access to Big Data, particularly as datasets are combined and stored together, needs to be specifically addressed. The HCBD Strategy also tackles Fourth, the Army must protect all Committee as subordinate to the Army several of the operational challenges dis- forms of HCE data—both personally Data Board, and consists of senior cussed by Schneider, Lyle, and Murphy identifiable information (PII) and pro- leaders from the Assistant Secretary of by outlining six guiding principles that tected health information (PHI)—at rest the Army for Manpower and Reserve should be practiced within the HCE. and in transit; doing so ensures that the Affairs, Deputy Chief of Staff G1 (Per- First, the HCBD data management cul- Army meets legal and regulatory require- sonnel), and Deputy Chief of Staff G8 ture must exist in a manner that reinforces ments while also maintaining the bond of (Resources). The committee is tasked trust within the Army culture. While the trust with its personnel. Fifth, individuals with directing the HCBD data gov- Service has a duty to share data when with data release authority, and those ernance process across the Army. For legally permissible, this legal requirement who conduct analysis or inference based example, the plan imbues the commit- should be balanced with the notion that on Army data, must receive appropriate tee with the power to review disputed Army personnel must also have confidence training and certification. Here, the requests for data access and make adju- in the accuracy, secure storage, and ethical HCBD strategy recognizes the expertise dicative decisions on sharing data. Addi- and legal use of the data. Second, the required in the emerging field of data tionally, the committee shall establish quality of any HCBD endeavor largely science and calls for the implementation data-sharing criteria; routinely review depends on systems engineering, hu- of certification standards for those who the ethical, moral, and legal sufficiency man-system integration, and user training. manage, analyze, and use HCE data. of conducting certain high visibility In most cases, high-quality data stem from Sixth, the Army must establish a stan- analysis projects; review and manage the having information technology platforms dardized process for the use of disparate HCBD data use agreements; and review that are engineered with traceable data data within the HCBD framework. This enterprise audits. quality metrics and objectives and are principle recognizes there are some data Beyond governance, the HCBD relatively easy to use by trained personnel. assets that, while unclassified, are highly implementation plan also establishes Third, a common lexicon and taxonomy sensitive and thus great care must be three categories of analyses supported are necessary to create an operating vocab- taken with their use and sharing (for by HCBD—descriptive statistics, policy ulary for shared situational understanding example, Provost Marshal General data, analysis, and research. The implementa- and transparency across the diverse silos of security clearance data, and others). tion plan recognizes that several research data. For example, a common term used and analysis organizations already have in the Army’s data environment is data From Strategy to extensive data access and management owner, which suggests that an individual Operationalization policies, such as the Office of Economic or organization managing data may make After publishing the HCBD Strategy, Manpower Analysis at West Point, Army final decisions about when and how the the working group moved toward Medical Command, Army Research data may be shared. Yet in most cases, preparing the HCBD implementation Institute, and others; those organizations individuals or organizations are actually plan, which was approved in August may continue to operate as they have, data stewards charged with the collection, 2017. The plan addresses governance, while still leveraging the governance management, and operational use of the ethical oversight, phasing and tasks for capabilities offered by HCBD. However, data, leaving decisions on data-sharing implementation, data management, and many organizations across the Army do to be made by a higher authority. Thus, associated technical processes needed to not have a long history with data ana- developing a common lexicon helps to support the HCBD enterprise. Perhaps lytics and are not resourced to establish standardize and codify the data-sharing most important, the implementation their own information technology and and governance process. plan establishes the HCBD Steering staff infrastructure to support big data 108 Features / Continuing the Big Data Ethics Debate JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Soldier with U.S. Army Reserve 312th Engineer Company fires M4 rifle paintball gun while opposing force member hides during urban operations training and building clearing procedures, April 18, 2015, at Camp Ripley, Minnesota (U.S. Army/Timothy L. Hale) analytics. The implementation plan there- problem after the Service’s suicide rate program’s effectiveness required massive fore calls for those organizations to turn exceeded the national average for the amounts of personnel, deployment, to the Person-Event Data Environment, first time. Because suicide is such a low training, family, and medical data, and HCBD’s enterprise architecture for big base-rate event (approximately 30 sui- the data needed to be gathered at mul- data analytics and data management. cides per 100,000 Soldiers), a significant tiple points across a long period of time. amount of data from a wide variety of Lastly, subsequent to an extensive legal The PDE sources was needed to properly study review in 2012, Army senior leadership The Person-Event Data Environment, the phenomenon, with even more data signed an agreement with the University operated by the Army Analytics Group needed to build predictive models. What of Pennsylvania to allow a consortium of and its Research Facilitation Laboratory, emerged was the Study to Assess Risk and researchers from across the United States serves as a key enabler for the HCBD’s Resilience in Servicemembers (STARRS), to use the PDE and its data to answer success. Initially established in 2008 as an epidemiological and neurobiological important research questions related a business intelligence platform with study of suicide involving world-re- to the mental and physical health of a limited scope focused on civilian nowned scientists.6 Also in 2009, Army Soldiers; though the research is done by personnel forecasting, the PDE added senior leadership directed the creation of consortium researchers, the projects are capabilities over time based on emerg- a resilience development program known governed by Army personnel. ing project requirements. Below, we as Comprehensive Soldier Fitness that In all three cases, each project led to describe three watershed events occur- was designed to address the endemic major advancements in the PDE system ring over the last decade that brought stressors of Army life.7 Because resilience or changes in philosophical approaches to the PDE to the forefront of the Army’s is characterized by equifinality (that is, how the Army used its human capital data. big data solution set. there are many pathways to becoming For example, while the STARRS project First, in 2008, Army senior leadership resilient and resilience is evident in many led to the accumulation of a vast array of set a course toward addressing the suicide aspects of a Soldier’s life), measuring the data from across DOD to study suicide, JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Lester et al. 109 this also opened a pathway for repurpos- First, privacy concerns coupled with Second, the PDE brings the re- ing the data for use by other research the ethical and legal use of data within searcher to the data rather than sending teams focused on different topics. Here, the PDE is paramount. Beyond the data to the researcher. One does not have processes were developed for establishing human research protections governance to search hard for examples where PII Data Use Agreements (DUAs), and elec- process previously described, data within or PHI on DOD personnel was exposed tronic workflows were developed to speed the PDE are also carefully managed due to losing a laptop or handheld de- the review and approval processes that by coupling security requirements and vice. Quite simply, the PDE is a private trigger access to the data. The emergence procedures outlined in the Army chief cloud computing environment, and data of the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness information officer/G6 ADMP with data that support approved projects within the project focused attention on the need for a de-identification best practices from in- PDE are not allowed to leave the cloud. comprehensive and integrated human sub- dustry. Typically, all individual identifiers Thus, researchers may access the PDE jects research governance structure within within datasets provided by stewards are cloud from anywhere in the world at any the PDE. Here, every project conducted either completely removed as the system time—even from an aircraft—provided in the PDE is reviewed by a Human ingests the data or, in some cases, are they have a network connection, an Protection Administrator for compliance encoded with special keys that are kept approved PDE account, and a computer with Federal and DOD guidelines re- on separate systems with separate encryp- with a Common Access Card reader and lated to the ethical and legal protection tion and firewalls. Some “low density” required software. However, they cannot of human subjects, and, if required, data, such as military or civilian rank, unit download data to their local machine. projects undergo additional reviews by identification codes, medical conditions, When researchers complete their analysis external scientists and are later reviewed and others are merged into groups. For and want to export their findings out of by Institutional Review Boards. Lastly, the example, colonels and general officers are the PDE, privacy specialists review the project with the University of Pennsylvania typically grouped into a single “senior export request within 24 hours to ensure showcased the value of the Army’s data leader” group, and exceptions to this pol- that item-level data are not part of the for not only answering important Army icy are granted rarely in order to prevent export package. This philosophy balances research questions but also examining re-identification based on demographic the on-demand and accessibility needs of important problems affecting the public, characteristics. So a study intending to the consumer with control and protec- such as cardiovascular disease. Here, the analyze data on female African American tion over DOD data. Army approves specific research questions general officers who are aviators, flew for Third, while still operating within posed by the consortium of university the 101st Airborne Division, and later de- its governance structure, the PDE will scientists. The Army in turn benefits from veloped a heart condition likely could not remove barriers to data access and lift the knowledge created, but does so at a be supported by PDE due to data policy administrative and technical burdens significant financial discount because the restrictions. Data within the PDE are from the research and analysis community university funds most of the research from held in separate enclaves—the “Staging whenever possible. For example, assume an external grant.8 Arrangements like the Enclave,” where data are merged to that the Army’s Medical Research and one described here not only highlight the support the need for each project, and Material Command funds 10 projects value of Army data but also underscore the “Analysis Enclave,” where data are at 10 universities, with each project a path toward decreasing the cost of re- first provided to a research team after requiring data from 10 different DOD search if handled carefully. being encoded for a second time—and systems. Theoretically, this would require researchers are never given access to the preparation, staffing, and approval of Why Use the PDE? the Staging Enclave. When data are 100 different DUAs between the Army While the PDE’s success in the last requested for projects, system adminis- and 10 different universities, each with its decade can be in part attributed to the trators monitor automated data transport own bureaucracies, potentially resulting amassing of data, there is more to the programs that assemble, de-identify, in thousands of hours spent getting the story than the clichéd, “If you build and position data for the research team. DUAs approved while losing even more it they will come.” In fact, a common In addition, for sensitive datasets (for hours not doing research. Additionally, all question we receive is, “What is PDE’s example, law enforcement and security 10 universities would theoretically have to special sauce?” The answer is not an clearance information), two-person con- accredit their own systems to meet DOD advanced machine-learning algorithm, trolled access is required, and, even then, Information Assurance requirements high-performance computing, or hard- administrator access is partitioned based to store military data, in turn creating to-get data; while the system has each of on domain (that is, some administrators additional burdens on the Army staff. those, they are not what set PDE apart. may access only medical data while others Our own internal analyses suggest that Rather, what makes PDE special is the may access only personnel data). Lastly, researchers working DOD-sponsored philosophical approach taken toward the PDE is fully auditable, with each ac- data-intensive projects within the human data management, which can be sum- tion within the system being logged and capital domain spend approximately marized in five tenets. monitored. 60 percent of their time and financial 110 Features / Continuing the Big Data Ethics Debate JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Servicemembers aboard USS Dwight D. Eisenhower paint starboard anchor gold, commemorating ship earning Retention Excellence Award for 2016, Norfolk, Virginia, March 28, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Anderson W. Branch) resources accomplishing these administra- Fourth, the PDE is a “digital data explored now, such as IBM’s Watson, tive tasks, leaving only 40 percent of the commons” that should be used by the Google’s DeepMind, C3IoT’s Ex remaining resources to be applied toward widest possible audience, necessitating Machina, and others. doing the actual research; the numbers breadth and depth of data and analytics Fifth, though the data mantra may look even worse when university overhead capabilities. Thus, while the data acqui- be “acquire once, share many times,” the is factored into the equation. Does it not sition team typically acquires new data PDE staff respects the rights and respon- make sense to do this in an enterprise assets when a new “demand signal” sibilities of data providers. For example, fashion? Should researchers not spend emerges (that is, a new project), the data within the PDE are categorized in more time doing what they are trained team also acquires data in anticipation of three ways. Data in the least restrictive to do—scientific research—rather than future needs. Likewise, the PDE offers “open” category are typically DOD focusing most of their efforts on meeting a wide variety of statistical platforms, assets that are widely shared across many administrative burdens? The PDE takes such as R, SAS, SPSS, STAT-A, Mplus, organizations repeatedly (for example, an enterprise approach to the data ac- and others, thus precluding individual demographic data) and are available to quisition process such that the PDE data researchers from having to purchase the any PDE user without additional reviews acquisition team writes and staffs “omni- software themselves, which further brings by data providers. Requests for data in bus” DUAs for the PDE system, rather down the cost of DOD research. Because the “restricted” category triggers the than for individual projects, thus making the PDE is a scalable architecture that workflow engine to send notifications to them scalable. Likewise, researchers using allows for layering in additional technical data stewards assigned to organizations the PDE do not have to be concerned capabilities, the system can adapt to new providing data to the PDE. Once the with system accreditation problems be- technology like the recently acquired stewards receive a notification, they may cause they are simply accessing a secure Hadoop cluster that allows for massive log into PDE, review the research pro- cloud; the Information Assurance require- parallel computational processing, or the tocols, communicate with the researcher ments for the PDE are handled by the inclusion of other high performance and requesting the data, and finally vote for system administrators. artificial intelligence capabilities being or against access to the data. The final JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Lester et al. 111 more narrowly on preventing involuntary attrition and medical readiness of those Soldiers in uniform, the Army Resiliency Directorate launched an initiative 3 years ago known as the Complex Behavior Models (CBM) project that couples ad- vanced machine-learning methodologies with the power of the PDE’s data stores. Because Soldiers attrite for many different reasons—personal choice, legal problems, medical ailments, and others—the goal of CBM is identifying health and resilience characteristics of Soldiers that in turn in- fluence personal readiness. To accomplish this, a team of scientists integrated over 40 PDE datasets—and intend to double that number in the coming years—to develop a suite of models that can pre- Commander of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve and XVIII Airborne Corps dict emerging problems, which could reenlists paratroopers of 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, result in involuntary attrition or medical 82nd Airborne Division, near Bartallah, Iraq, February 1, 2017 (U.S. Army/Loni Ayers) non-deployability with a reasonable level “closed” data category walls off the asso- program and the broader Ready and of accuracy. ciated data from all but those researchers Resilient capabilities that the Army The data requirements for CBM are who are invited to use it by the provider. has placed significant emphasis and massive and likely could not easily be Typically, data in the closed category are resources behind a preventive approach managed outside of a system like the collected by the researchers themselves toward improving Soldier psychological PDE. For context, a single integrated in the field and they do not wish to share health and resilience. While developing CBM dataset focused only on the the data with other researchers until their resilience may be the Army’s proximal Active-duty component consists of 387 project is complete. However, in keeping goal, a distal goal is to improve overall columns and over 25 million rows of with the digital data commons theme, personal readiness of those serving in data, resulting in over 9.8 billion cells we highly encourage those controlling uniform. And there is little question that of data. While this is a lot of data, it is closed data to transition them to a less improved personal and unit readiness are admittedly relatively small when com- restrictive category once they complete needed given the recruiting and reten- pared to data processed by organizations their project. tion landscape noted by senior Army such as Google, Facebook, Amazon, and leaders: Only 400,000 young people others. Yet CBM’s goals are to compute Research Under Way Now become eligible for military service outcomes much more complicated than In its current configuration, the PDE each year, and of those, over 250,000 online purchasing decisions or whether supports approximately 50 research and are needed to meet national recruiting someone will “like” another’s posting. operational analysis projects annually, requirements across all Services; within Here, CBM is using data to understand and all the projects fall within the human the Army, approximately 20 percent highly complex behavioral outcomes, and capital domain. As the HCBD program of Soldiers contracted never make it to the computational power required to run of record emerges, the concept plan calls their first duty station; approximately these analyses both continuously and on for investments to scale up both PDE’s 40 percent do not complete their first demand is significant. technical capability and staff to meet term of enlistment; only approximately the increasing demands of the Army’s 40 percent of West Point and 4-year Insider Threat broader research and analysis commu- scholarship ROTC graduates serve past The insider threat (InT) of malicious nity. Although the research domains 10 years.9 When taken together, the behavior by insiders, whether it is supported by PDE varies widely, we annual personnel churn within the U.S. on a network or violence within the highlight two projects that are likely of military costs billions of dollars while workplace, continues to be a challenge great interest to JFQ readers. also degrading military readiness. within DOD. Executive Order 13587, While we readily admit that there is Structural Reforms to Improve the The Complex Behavior no substitute for good leadership and Security of Classified Networks and the Models Project innovative recruitment and retention Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding It is clear from the Comprehensive strategies, the use of predictive analytics of Classified Information; the National Soldier and Family Fitness training should support these strategies. Focusing Insider Threat Policy; DOD Instruction 112 Features / Continuing the Big Data Ethics Debate JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 5205.16, DOD Insider Threat Program; something with data, the more import- Regardless of each Service’s chosen and the Army Insider Threat Directive ant question is, “Should we?” The path, the paramount requirement before provide guidance on the establishment HCBD Steering Committee is charged us all is to create systems that balance and conduct of InT programs. We with addressing this concern. Return- the data analytic needs of leaders while know from the work of the Defense ing to the CBM and InT examples, strengthening the bond of trust with our Personnel and Security Research Center once the machine-learning models are Servicemembers. JFQ and others that the InT problem is validated, how will Army senior leaders complex—there are many reasons why decide to operationalize the models someone decides to commit an InT within an ethical, legal, and moral Notes act, and there are usually many smaller governance framework? One option is 1 antecedent indicators that typically go to transition these models out of the Karl F. Schneider, David S. Lyle, and Francis X. Murphy, “Framing the Big Data unnoticed. Despite the wave of media PDE research environment and later Ethics Debate for the Military,” Joint Force coverage when they occur, InT acts are integrate them into carefully governed Quarterly 77 (2nd Quarter 2015), 16. exceedingly rare events. Statistically, leader decision support tools to assist 2 Jody Westby, “The Government this rarity makes predicting an InT act in making Army-, unit-, and individu- Shouldn’t Be Lecturing the Private Sector extremely challenging. al-level decisions that should help stave on Cybersecurity,” Forbes, June 15, 2015, available at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Lester et al. 113 At the same time those ideas were tribal resistance with its own brutality. being incorporated in what would be- Malkasian argues that both were neces- come doctrine in Field Manual 3-24, sary for the success of the movement, Counterinsurgency, the war in Iraq was but there were other important factors as beginning to turn with a movement that well. One was that as AQI’s power grew, would be called the Anbar Awakening. it challenged and marginalized tribal lead- Sunni tribes in that province rose up to ers, who then were motivated to regain resist al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and, along their positions of influence in a “violent with Soldiers and Marines, eventually ex- mafia-esque struggle.” Another important pelled those foreign fighters. This result condition that is most often overlooked was touted as one of the great successes was the “esprit de corps and cohesion of the new American approach to coun- within the tribes opposing AQI” during terinsurgency, and a model for future the period of the Awakening. Previous operations. Yet it did not take long after efforts to oppose al Qaeda had failed, but the United States pulled its forces out of this time losses did not break the resis- Iraq in 2011 for the province again to tance, and they persevered through tough fall under the influence of violent outsid- trials because of individual determination ers, this time from the so-called Islamic and social bonds. State (IS). Carter Malkasian—both a Malkasian provides three reasons for practitioner and chronicler of COIN the eventual rise of IS and reversal of whose War Comes to Garmser: Thirty the success of the Awakening. The first Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier two are directly related to the U.S. with- Illusions of Victory: The (Oxford University Press, 2013) is a drawal, which included diplomatic and Anbar Awakening and the modern classic of the genre—has again financial support as well as military forces. Rise of the Islamic State applied his astute analysis to another Without any outside restraint, the Nouri region unsettled by an insurgency. al-Maliki government quickly moved to By Carter Malkasian He concludes that the Anbar example marginalize and abuse the Sunni tribes Oxford University Press, 2017 should be a cautionary tale for anyone in Anbar. And the tribes fragmented. $27.95 280 pp. who believes the United States can cre- Without American resources they could ISBN: 978-0190659424 ate any kind of a lasting peace with just not provide goods and services to their Reviewed by Conrad C. Crane a short military intervention or change people or sustain security forces, while a regime and expect its replacement to traditional competitive infighting further stand on its own in just a few years. reduced their strength. IS was not only n Enforcing the Peace: Learning He describes his work as “a short able to exploit those divisions, but it also from the Imperial Past (Columbia book burdened with details.” It is a quick took advantage of widespread Sunni I University Press, 2006), Kimberly read, but clear in its trajectory. He begins popular support for their view of Islam, Zisk Marten recounts the dismal record by describing the origins of the conflict just as AQI had. of Western military interventions that in Anbar from 2003 to 2005, with There is much in this short book for could achieve temporary stability but particular focus on tribal dynamics. He military and political leaders to ponder. not foster any lasting political change. then concentrates in great detail on the Despite the apparent success of the Anbar Her solution is to lower expectations battle for Ramadi from 2005 through the Awakening, in the end the result there while extending presence; outsiders Awakening and collapse of AQI, much must just be added to the long litany of cannot shape the course of internal from personal experience. He concludes failed Western military interventions that political change but can maintain by describing the rise of IS and what les- Marten describes. Just as the FM 3-24 security for the lengthy period required sons can be drawn from the disappointing team realized, Malkasian argues that for equilibrium to be restored after a experience. Throughout, his narrative policymakers must understand that any society is disrupted. The team writing is informed by many insights about the American military intervention will have the new counterinsurgency (COIN) roles of key individuals on both sides in to be lengthy to accomplish any lasting re- doctrine for the Army and Marine shaping the course of events, shaped by sult—and should be planned accordingly. Corps in 2006 was quite aware of this first-hand observations. Perhaps a few thousand troops and some dilemma and that success in COIN is The two most common explanations money, as some have argued, would have always a long and costly process. The for the Anbar Awakening have been that kept Anbar stable and avoided the rise of team listed long-term commitment as it was the result either of enlightened IS there. He also cautions, however, that one of its most important principles. American leaders who used innovative “the course of an insurgency, an internal new tactics, or that AQI incited the conflict, or a civil war may be determined 114 Book Reviews JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 by unmalleable internal dynamics more hard, sharp end of combat and the the supposed wartime leader in push- than the actions of an outside power such making and coordinating of policy ing his colleagues or, for that matter, as the United States.” JFQ and operations. He has brought that himself into action. Chiefs of staff were wide-ranging experience to bear in an incapable of providing politicians with extraordinary account of the disastrous coherent or even sensible advice. They Conrad C. Crane is Chief of Historical Services at British campaign in Norway in the were incapable of cooperating, and the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at the U.S. Army War College. spring of 1940. they did not possess the competence What General Kiszely has managed required to provide their masters with to do is tie the thoroughly faulty strate- nuanced, realistic, or intelligent advice. gic decisions by the British military and Churchill was all for action but showed political leaders that led to equally faulty why he would need the irascible Field operational decisions that placed British Marshal Alan Brooke as a minder when troops on the ground in impossible situa- he became prime minister to prevent tions. Without a sensible effort to connect him from making disastrous mistakes. ends with the means available, what might But while all held their endless meetings, have been a major victory floundered the military seemed not to have devoted from the start, and the initial mistakes much time to training unprepared only exacerbated those that followed. troops for the terrible challenges of com- In a cabinet meeting at the begin- bat against the Wehrmacht. Moreover, ning of September 1939, Winston all the meanwhile in the winter of 1940, Churchill, finally added to the cabinet the Germans began ruthlessly preparing as First Lord of the Admiralty, pro- to launch Operation Weserübung, code posed that the Royal Navy mine the name for the amphibious assault on the Norwegian Leads (coastal waters) to cut Norwegian ports that would occur in off the flow of Swedish ore that moved early April 1940. through the port of Narvik during the The denouement came on April 9, winter when the ports were iced over. 1940, when the Kriegsmarine seized It was a sensible suggestion because virtually every major Norwegian port. Swedish iron ore was vital to the func- Immediately before the German inva- tioning of the Nazi war economy. sion, the British went ahead and mined But with considerable opposition the Norwegian Leads, a totally pointless from members of the cabinet, wor- action because the Baltic ice was already Anatomy of a Campaign: The ried about the impact of a violation of breaking up. At least they provided the British Fiasco in Norway, 1940 Norwegian neutrality, Prime Minister Germans with an excuse for the actions Neville Chamberlain refused to make they were about to undertake. British By John Kiszely a decision—and this inability sums up intelligence provided a rich lode of warn- Cambridge University Press, 2017 British strategic decisionmaking over the ings, all of which the politicians and $44.99 390 pp. next 7 months until the ruthless German military leadership totally ignored. After ISBN: 978-1107194595 invasion of Norway in April 1940. As the all, it was inconceivable that the Germans Reviewed by Williamson Murray future Prime Minister Harold MacMillan would undertake such a risky venture. noted, “It does throw a piercing light While the Germans were seizing the on the present machinery and method crucial Norwegian ports and airfields, ohn Kiszely had an outstanding of government, the delay, the vacillation, Churchill and Admiral Dudley Pound career in the British army. As a changes of front, standing on one foot sent the Royal Navy on a wild goose J major, he won the Military Cross one day and on the other the next day chase into the North Atlantic in the belief while leading his company of Scots before a decision is given. . . . The moral that the Kriegsmarine was attempting to Guards in the attack on Tumbledown of the history of these three months to break out there. Had the British reacted Mountain in the last days of the Falk- be drawn for the future is, to use Burke’s immediately, they could have destroyed lands War. During his career, he served phrase, ‘a proof of the irresistible opera- most of the German invasion force and in the bureaucracy in Whitehall as the tion of feeble council.’” virtually all the German navy. Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff So, the British political and military What followed was an inexcusable and served stints in British operations leaders took council of their fears. operational muddle as the British at- in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Iraq, Endless meeting followed endless tempted to pull together a strategy that finally retiring as a lieutenant general. meeting with no decision as to what would restore their disastrous initial He has seen war at both ends: the to do. Chamberlain was incapable as mistakes. Churchill was at his worst with JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 115 no one able to restrain him. Only his most facile assumptions, will send their officers, the head of the Bureau of Navi- splendid days as prime minister in the troops into combat unprepared to deal gation that managed careers, and one days to come would save his reputation with a living, adapting opponent. JFQ Marine officer, all led by the redoubtable from having another Gallipoli hung Admiral George Dewey, to offer it. From around his neck. Unprepared for the the outset, the General Board strove combat conditions that late winter and Dr. Williamson Murray has held numerous teaching to coherently align what we today term positions at joint professional military education early spring brought to Norway, British institutions, including the Marine Corps University, strategy, campaign plans, force structure, troops floundered in a muck of melting U.S. Army War College, and U.S. Naval War College. personnel, and ship design. snow and mud. To make matters worse, The author of this institutional his- British commanders on the ground were tory, John Kuehn, is a former naval contemptuous of the Norwegians, who aviator who earned his doctorate while were putting up significant resistance. At teaching at the U.S. Army Command and least the Norwegians recognized and had General Staff College. America’s First operated in such conditions. General Staff is an offshoot of his disser- It took the British, with their control tation-turned-book, Agents of Innovation: of the sea, nearly 2 months before they The General Board and the Design of the were able to launch an effective ground Fleet That Defeated the Japanese Navy attack on Narvik. Among those lead- (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2008). The ing the assault were two battalions of consistency between that book and this the French Foreign Legion, recently more comprehensive one lies in Kuehn’s arrived from Africa, who performed in conviction that military problem-solving outstanding fashion. As one of their is best revealed by understanding the de- officers commented, “Ah, it’s all very cisionmaker’s options and constraints. difficult. We are used to travelling on In the case of naval strategy and camels across the desert, and here you fleet designs, the constraints are many. give us boats and we have to cross the Innovation is not easy, and the Armed water. It is very difficult, but it will be Forces must design ships, procure equip- all right. I think so.” Acidly, a French ment, create doctrine, and plan wars with officer pointed out “that the British have degrees of uncertainty. Civilian leaders can planned this campaign on the lines of a swiftly change the context, while navies punitive expedition against the Zulus, are long-term investments with ships last- but unhappily we and the British are in ing up to 30 years, causing rivalries for the position of the Zulus.” Events in ship design authority. In America’s First France forced an Allied withdrawal in America’s First General Staff: General Staff, readers learn what happened early June, ending a truly badly run cam- A Short History of the Rise when a 1921 Service secretary openly paign that lacked strategic sense, military and Fall of the General Board proposed bold international cuts to a prin- effectiveness, and above all professional of the Navy, 1900–1950 cipal weapon system (battleships) to save military leadership. money, and subsequently agreed by treaty By John T. Kuehn For those who are really interested in not to improve bases. That second point U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2017 the study of war and the interrelation- robbed the U.S. fleet of vital infrastructure $34.95 320 pp. ship between strategy, operations, and needed for a protracted Pacific war. Only ISBN: 978-1682471913 tactics, General Kiszely has written an an organization that could assess threats, extraordinarily important book. If mili- Reviewed by Randy Papadopoulos recommend investments, and provide tary leaders fail to take the study of their top-level sponsorship for change could profession seriously, they will inevitably respond to such complexity, and Kuehn find themselves incapable of connecting his trim book explains the full persuasively demonstrates how the Navy’s means to ends. Nor will they be able course of the U.S. Navy’s General General Board provided that vision and ul- to provide sensible advice to politicians TBoard, its institutional forum for timately shaped innovation across the fleet. who have no background in military af- innovation, during the period from 1900 According to the author, the General fairs or who, as occurred in Iraq in 2003, to 1950. To remedy challenges identified Board grappled sequentially with changing are willfully ignorant. Moreover, perhaps during the Spanish-American War, Navy technology, World War I’s evolving lessons, most disastrously, generals who have not Secretary John D. Long established the post-1922 treaty limits to construction, taken the trouble to study their potential board as an experiment. The Secretary the Great Depression, World War II, and opponents will not understand the other realized he needed military advice, so the early Cold War. Throughout the pre- side of the hill and, on the basis of the he chose a mix of up-and-coming Navy 1941 period, the board sponsored studies, 116 Book Reviews JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 recorded testimony from witnesses (a rea- son historians appreciate it), and weighed the choices to be made. Its answers meant some ideas wound up discarded, as in fending off a single aviation service in 1925 before any procurement changes or realignment of careers took place. The book uses the records of the General Board, backed by a large help- ing of related literature. The only book missing is Dirk Bönker’s Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States Before World War I (Cornell University Press, 2012). Authors need not cite every book related to their work, but since Kuehn centers his argument on the Navy’s desire to create a Prussian-style “Great General Staff,” Bönker’s explicit comparison would have helped make his case. Was the General Board “America’s first From NDU Press general staff”? As a measure of the board’s value, on one occasion President Herbert Women on the Frontlines of Peace and Security Hoover chaired a daylong meeting with Foreword by Hillary Rodham Clinton and Leon Panetta the Secretaries of the Navy and State in NDU Press, 2015 • 218 pp. attendance. The specific 1929 issue was ne- This book reflects President Barack Obama’s commitment to advancing gotiating cruiser limits with Great Britain. women’s participation in preventing conflict and keeping peace. It is For the General Board to serve as the arms inspired by the countless women and girls on the frontlines who make control forum, while writing war plans a difference every day in their communities and societies by creating with the help of Newport, speaks to its opportunities and building peace. central place as the Navy’s strategy organ. Around the globe, policymakers and activists are working to empower There was nothing equivalent anywhere women as agents of peace and to help address the challenges they face as else in the U.S. Government of its day. survivors of conflict. When women are involved in peace negotiations, In sum, America’s First General Staff they raise important issues that might be otherwise overlooked. When explains how the U.S. Navy’s leadership women are educated and enabled to participate in every aspect of their societies—from growing the economy to strengthening the security grappled with rapid pre-1950 change. sector—communities are more stable and less prone to conflict. Through this work, Professor Kuehn pro- Our understanding of the importance of women in building and vides a collective intellectual biography keeping peace is informed by a wide range of experts, from diplomats of the Navy’s leadership for the period. to military officials and from human rights activists to development Among those leaders, pride of place must professionals. The goal of this book is to bring together these diverse go to Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor, voices. As leaders in every region of the world recognize, no country can who set up General Board practices reach its full potential without the participation of all its citizens. This before his death in 1904. Only more book seeks to add to the chorus of voices working to ensure that women than 40 years later, when it faced the and girls take their rightful place in building a stronger, safer, more changed context of the Cold War, a new prosperous world. Department of Defense, and a bureau- Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/ cratically stronger Navy staff, did its role WomenontheFrontlinesofPeaceandSecurity.aspx lose importance. That it took such a long time and an array of altered circumstances to negate the General Board’s influence is a testament to the value it offered. JFQ Dr. Randy Papadopoulos serves as the Secretary of the Navy Historian at the Department of the Navy. JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 117 Two Navy MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopters from USS George H.W. Bush take off during joint fire exercise with Army AH-64 Apaches from 3rd Battalion, 159th Attack Reconnaissance Battalion, 42nd Combat Aviation Brigade, and Air Force joint terminal attack controllers from 82nd Expeditionary Air Operations Squadron, on July 8, 2014, near Camp Buehring, Kuwait (New York Army National Guard/Harley Jelis) Preparing for Tomorrow’s Fight Joint Concepts and Future Readiness By Andrew J. Loiselle We need to learn to set our course by the stars, not by the lights of every passing ship. —Omar Bradley ilitary forces that quickly adapt ing to new situations underlies the to change usually prevail. It stereotypical conservatism of military M is difficult to adapt in the organizations, and it is borne in their near term, more so when there is an propensity to lean heavily on the lessons extended time horizon, but not adapt- of the last war and eschew radical Rear Admiral Andrew J. Loiselle, USN, is Deputy Director for Future Joint Force Development, Joint ing can exact a heavy toll in blood and change. But those who do not try to Staff J7. treasure. The high cost of not adjust- anticipate change risk surrendering the 118 Joint Doctrine / Preparing for Tomorrow’s Fight JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 initiative on the future battlefield. In To be sure, future joint force devel- Strategic guidance shapes joint the words of the new National Defense opment is necessarily speculative because concepts. The 2016 National Military Strategy (NDS), the joint force “cannot no one can predict the future. A com- Strategy established the strategic frame- expect success fighting tomorrow’s prehensive view of the future requires work for the joint force, identifying conflicts with yesterday’s weapons and wide-ranging, open-minded, and keen Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and vi- equipment.” Neither is “modernization analytical perspectives on anticipated olent extremist organizations (commonly defined solely by hardware; it requires challenges and solutions. Accordingly, referred to as the “4+1”) as the most change in the ways we organize and the Joint Staff J7 leads a deliberate, pressing challenges. From a force devel- employ forces.”1 collaborative approach to joint concept opment perspective, they typify possible Modernization also requires that development. The approach begins with scenarios that span the range of plausible we make informed choices between the educated judgments about the future bat- future military operations. Collectively, demands of the now and the demands tlefield, then determines how this evolved they call for an inventory of advanced of the future. The Chairman of the environment will affect the current joint capabilities and sufficient capacity to Joint Chiefs of Staff recently called for force’s ability to accomplish projected compete, deter, and win across the entire a balanced inventory of capabilities and missions. Joint concept developers range.4 The family of joint concepts ex- capacities to meet current challenges, for identify gaps in the current ability to tends this framework to 2035, examining forces positioned to manage strategic risk, meet future challenges and then propose how trends might create gaps in the and for joint concepts to address future solutions in the form of new operating current joint force’s ability to meet these challenges. He stressed that we “cannot methods and the DOTMLPF-P changes challenges and proposing solutions in the afford to choose between meeting today’s needed to achieve them. In both describ- form of concept-required capabilities. operational requirements and making the ing the future operating environment The combination of concept-required investments necessary for tomorrow.”2 and postulating solutions to forecasted capabilities shapes the future joint The U.S. military uses joint con- military challenges, the Joint Staff casts force and informs investments in future cepts to inform its investments in future a wide net to capture diverse views, readiness. The second article, “A New force readiness and, in the words of the compares competing predictions, and Approach to Joint Concepts,” discusses NDS, to “evolve innovative operational ultimately determines the solutions to how the family of joint concepts serves concepts.” Put simply, a joint concept anticipated challenges. The two following the Services, combatant commands, and proposes a way to employ the joint force articles discuss how and why the Joint other capability developers throughout to solve a military problem when existing Staff explores possible futures and then the Department of Defense (DOD). solutions are ineffective or nonexistent. develops joint concepts to address antici- From inception through implemen- The joint concept is the centerpiece of a pated future military challenges. tation, the Joint Staff methodology proactive approach to achieving future The Joint Operating Environment for concept development hinges on joint force readiness. It postulates a viable 2035 summarizes the Joint Staff’s extensive collaboration among DOD hypothesis for testing and ultimately leads understanding of the challenges and stakeholders, other governmental orga- to changes in doctrine, organization, opportunities ahead.3 The Joint Staff nizations, academic institutions, think training, materiel, leadership and edu- derives this understanding through tanks, and multinational partners. The cation, personnel, facilities, and policy consultation with hundreds of futurists production team includes members from (DOTMLPF-P). A joint concept pro- drawn from domestic and foreign gov- the Services, combatant commands, and vides a unifying vision for how the joint ernments, academia, industry, and think Joint Staff. Their research draws from force will solve an anticipated problem. It tanks. The objective is not only to deter- current strategic guidance, the Joint guides force development efforts across mine a broad understanding of possible Operating Environment 2035, Joint the entire community by providing a futures but also to spark debate and fos- Strategic Assessment, and other joint, focus on nested Service-centric or do- ter critical thinking about their military Service, and agency studies to identify fu- main-based concepts. The concept is not implications. The first article, “Exploring ture trends, implications, and challenges. doctrine, nor does it guarantee success. It the Future Operating Environment,” They also look beyond the joint force does, however, exercise the war-winning elaborates on the Joint Staff’s work to to other governmental and nongovern- ability to adapt and ideally improves the anticipate future challenges and oppor- mental organizations, academia, industry, joint force’s future readiness by getting tunities. It stresses the need to study and multinational partners to expand it mostly right, thereby reducing the joint operations within the context of understanding of the challenge and ex- amount of adaptation that will inevitably clear strategic and military trends and the plore potential solutions. Foreign military occur once the truths become apparent. importance of balancing well-grounded partners, in particular, provide valuable Joint concepts give us a head start on the intelligence assessments with diverse input based on unique perspectives or race to the technological and operational perspectives on possible futures. The expertise, especially as the United States high ground that will dominate the fu- exploration of possible futures sets the prefers to conduct military operations ture battlefield. stage for joint concepts. within a coalition whenever possible. JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Loiselle 119 Staff director approves concept recom- mendations and issues a memorandum to facilitate broad collaboration. Ultimately, the Chairman or Vice Chairman approves completed joint concepts after thorough staffing throughout DOD. The entire process takes 12 to 18 months to allow for thorough review and collaboration. From scouting the future joint oper- ating environment to proposing solutions to anticipated military challenges, wide-ranging participation is the key to success. The Joint Staff’s approach to concept development reflects the essen- tiality of collaboration and coordination in the governance process, production team composition, use of multiple external reviews, and comprehensive staffing. The approach not only ensures the concept is thoroughly researched and contains sound recommendations, but it also unifies multiple force development efforts across DOD, U.S. Government, and multinational partners. Ultimately, joint concepts inform the Chairman’s recommendations for balancing current and future readiness by providing well- grounded solutions to highly plausible challenges. JFQ Notes 1 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharp- ening America’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), 7, available at 120 Joint Doctrine / Preparing for Tomorrow’s Fight JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 8 and Norwegian army explosive ordnance disposal team participate in cold-weather endurance ruck march during Exercise Arctic Specialist 2017, Ramsund, Norway, February 5, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Seth Wartak) Exploring the Future Operating Environment By Jeffrey J. Becker and John E. DeFoor The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking. —Carl von Clausewitz, On War s we move past the plan of will alter the character of warfare Jeffrey J. Becker is a Futures Subject Matter the day, proceed outside of beyond recognition. Competent, com- Expert in support of the Joint Concepts Division, A the budget cycle, and venture petitive states will combine military Joint Staff J7, and author of the Joint Operating beyond the 10-year horizon of strategic and societal power to coerce others, Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World. John E. DeFoor is Chief of planning efforts, significant ongoing including the United States. Corrosive the Futures Branch, Joint Staff J7. changes in the security environment economic, social, and environmental JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Becker and DeFoor 121 of these errors—errors of indecision and false confidence—excuses military profes- sionals from considering and confronting change in the character of warfare. Thinking about the future lays the groundwork for the successful adaptation of our military. One example of a flawed view of future force requirements may be seen in the U.S. fleet immediately prior to World War II. A “mistaken belief” in the 1920s and 1930s might have been a conviction that the battleship would remain the cen- terpiece of the fleet, with aircraft carriers operating in support of scouting and raiding missions. The attacks on Pearl Harbor and battle at Midway quickly disabused the Navy of this conviction. But in the preceding years, thoughtful, structured investigation of the use of the aircraft carrier as the fleet’s main striking arm enabled rapid adaption and innova- tion. Admiral Chester Nimitz, reflecting on the Navy’s ability to adapt, stated that he “had not seen anything we had not prepared for—except the kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war; we had not visualized those.”3 What beliefs must we challenge today? New adversary stratagem and operational approaches will contest U.S. influence around the world, rupture relationships, and circumscribe our ability to protect our global interests. Will the current joint force be able to operate effectively when faced with antiaccess/ar- ea-denial capabilities, including contested logistics systems, loss of cyberspace, and a denied electromagnetic spectrum? Can we defend allies—and ourselves—against Sailors handle line aboard USS Green Bay, part of Bonhomme Richard Amphibious Ready Group, along subversion by great power competition with Embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, underway in U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations, Okinawa, short of armed conflict, hybrid and proxy Japan, April 8, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Scott Barnes) approaches, and cyber-enabled global forces will foment widespread, violent ideological insurgencies? disorder. Rapidly evolving technologies Why We Look Forward There are serious implications of will upend socioeconomic structures In the past, describing the future inaction in the face of these challenges. and threaten current joint force advan- security environment as “complex” Although the United States will likely tages. Understanding how these forces was good enough. Until recently, hard remain the world’s most powerful nation might reshape warfare does not come military choices could be deferred. Truly out to 2035, it will face threats that naturally or easily. Colin Gray, reflect- existential threats were few. We no longer might overwhelm its current military ing on this difficulty, observed that the enjoy that luxury. Balanced against the capabilities. Success in direct military outbreak of war often resembles a “race indecision inherent in complexity, we see engagements may not result in lasting between belligerents to correct the con- history as replete with audacious—yet political settlements—much less peace. sequences of the mistaken beliefs with ultimately erroneous—predictions about More urgently, inaction raises the pos- which they entered combat.”1 how the future would unfold.2 Neither sibility of outright military defeat of the 122 Joint Doctrine / Exploring the Future Operating Environment JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 joint force in battle and political accom- modation on an adversary’s terms rather Future Security Environment vs. Future than our own. These projected challenges Operating Environment demand continuous examination of the The Future Security Environment (FSE) refers to political, economic, social, joint force’s ability to secure the Nation or technological factors that influence national security. It is specifically today and tomorrow. designed to prepare the Nation for the full range of potential national security problems. The National Intelligence Council’s recent Global Trends: Paradox Doing Military Futures Right of Progress is an example of a well-executed FSE. For the joint force, there is a right way The Future Operating Environment (FOE) is a composite of the conditions, and a decidedly wrong way to think circumstances, and influences that may affect the employment of the joint force about the future of conflict and war. and abide by the decisions of a commander. An FOE prepares all or part of First and foremost, military futuring is the Armed Forces to anticipate and prepare for future military challenges (or not about identifying specific conflicts or potential opportunities). The Joint Operating Environment is the Joint Staff’s the trajectory of strategic relations with perspective on the FOE. specific competitors and adversaries. Nor Service futures efforts such as the Army’s Operational Environment and the should it seek to identify the location or Changing Character of Future Warfare or the Air Force’s Strategic Environment proximate causes of the next war. Assessment provide domain-focused perspectives linked to the broader joint view To be useful, military futures should of future warfare found within the Joint Operating Environment. focus on those factors and circumstances that will most directly affect the decisions and actions of future joint commanders. It should consider those international, peer competitor’s economy surpass our Intelligence Agency reporting. We must human, and technological factors that own? Is this nation truly a military peer? balance the desire for credibility with will drive conflict. It should develop a set These discussions are insufficient for sufficient open-mindedness and curiosity of competitive spaces that will alter the future joint force development. They do to ignore some of the certitudes that character of conflict. It should cultivate not tell us how conflict is changing. They anchor us to the present and the familiar. the intellectual agility and mental resil- do not focus on the military character of Innovation in futuring requires that we ience that will allow members of the joint potential adversaries and their evolving imagine a range of challenging—and force to have—much as Admiral Nimitz stratagem. They do not define how our even counterintuitive—conditions that intimated—a sense of déjà vu in the midst own missions, capabilities, and opera- might alter our world. The future will be of crisis. It is about understanding the tional approaches might need to evolve different from the present in important missions the future joint force will be to outpace our competitors. ways. It will not simply be a continuation asked to conduct and about ensuring the The Joint Staff must consider the of today. joint force has the tools and operational future to understand the implications of This balance between credibility and approaches it needs to win. Doing mili- change for the structure and function of innovation in our assertions depends on tary futures in the right ways will allow us the joint force. While appreciating the the targeted time frame. We should not to prepare the joint force, as a whole, to larger context of the future security envi- elect a time frame so close to the present be ready—both materially and mentally— ronment, our focus should be the future as to constrain or bound our view of pos- when the inevitable surprises arrive. operating environment and its effects on sible changes. But it should remain within Envisioning a future war is difficult, the joint force. a period in which we can reasonably particularly as we push beyond a decade. The second major sin is to place project trends based on the intelligence Because of this difficulty, we often default too much emphasis on technological record and historical experience. to a predictive rather than a preparatory advances. For the military futurist con- Finally, doing joint futures right mindset. Dr. Frank G. Hoffman suggests cerned with force development, this means engaging many different perspec- that thinking about the future “should means not fixating on the technology, tives and ensuring that creative friction is not be a senseless exercise in eliminating but rather examining its implications for integral to any conversation. Engaging uncertainty and making choices based the joint force. with partners may require unclassified on clear-cut prediction.”4 Pursuing such Futurists must think in terms of time. discussions to include other partners an exercise can lead to the two major This means that we must strike a balance across the Department of Defense, as “sins of military futuring,” both of which between credibility and innovation when well as with subject matter experts from divert us from thinking about the military making assertions about the changing the research community, universities and implications of strategic change. character of warfare. Credibility relies laboratories, and foreign partners. The first of these sins is to dwell on on thorough descriptions of trends Perhaps the most difficult part of grand strategy. What competitor is rising? grounded in the intelligence developed futuring is understanding where we as What nation might collapse? When will a through Joint Staff J2 and Defense a nation and a military force fit into the JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Becker and DeFoor 123 planners challenge assumptions and cast a wide net when seeking ideas. Using Futures to Support Military Change These ideas are important guideposts for the depiction of a future operating environment that addresses broad changes in the character of conflict. In fact, they guided the Joint Staff J7’s Joint Futures series of events and reports that led to Joint Operating Envi- ronment 2035 (JOE).5 Several versions of the JOE have been issued over the years. The Joint Staff continually mon- itors change in strategic, social, tech- nological, and military conditions and publishes a new JOE once, as then-Gen- eral James Mattis noted in 2010, “we have a sufficient understanding to make a new edition worthwhile.”6 This latest edition of the JOE ad- dresses a growing need for clarity as a number of pressing themes driving new and dangerous sources of military com- petition became apparent. It describes the future operating environment as driven by two distinct but related sets of security challenges. Contested norms describe military challenges resulting from in- creasingly powerful revisionist states and select nonstate actors that use any and all elements of power to establish their own sets of rules in ways unfavorable to the United States and its interests. Persistent disorder is characterized by an array of weak states that become increasingly in- capable of maintaining domestic order or good governance. Reflecting troubling combinations of strategic, social, and technological trends, F-15 Eagle traveled to Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, September 17, 2017, to participate in weapons the JOE notes that the future joint force system evaluation program as part of Combat Archer Exercise (U.S. Air Force/Beth Holliker) must be able to confront: broader world. International partner- our activities may be perceived by others •• persistent violent ideological conflicts ships remind us that the single most around the world. with transregional terrorist move- important factor in the future security Thus, doing military futuring right ments and cross-border insurgencies environment is often the United States should emphasize change in the oper- •• the ability of adversaries to threaten itself. The international community ating environment, not overly focus on U.S. territory and sovereignty and gives us a clear-eyed, dispassionate technologies, and account for evolving the freedom and autonomy of its perspective on U.S. strategic strengths, adversary stratagem and operational citizens weaknesses, advantages, and vulnerabil- approaches. It should balance credibility •• the reality of persistent great power ities. Our partners help keep us honest and innovation, and target a time frame competition, including long-term by forcing us to examine our own in which we can reasonably project technologically advanced adversary perspectives and assumptions, and how trends. Finally, the best military futures military modernization efforts and 124 Joint Doctrine / Exploring the Future Operating Environment JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 a range of new stratagem to impose •• compel or destroy to impose desired concept to address Gray Zone challenges their will changes to the international secu- at the cusp between peace and war. •• the contesting and disruption of rity environment and subsequently The Joint Operating Environment the use of global commons (mar- enforce those outcomes. 2035 defines the emerging problem set itime, electromagnetic, and outer and provides a foundation for focused space) in both peacetime and war by This span of missions will require a concept development efforts within the adversaries diverse set of capabilities and operational emerging family of joint concepts. As the •• the race to define and defend approaches. The joint force may not be National Security Strategy and National national sovereignty and freedom of able to meet the full range of missions Defense Strategy alter how we confront action in and through cyberspace with currently projected capabilities and and compete with great powers, increase •• the global and regional repercussions fiscal limitations. Today’s defense strate- the lethality of our forces, and rally the of shattered or forcibly reordered gies are driven by priority missions, which widest and most powerful set of allies regions around the world. are intended to ensure that joint concepts and partners for the arduous path ahead, account for the full range of potential we will assess the implications of these These military contexts drive an military responses. changes for the view of the future we have evolving set of future joint force missions. Future U.S. strategy will be defined articulated in the JOE. We will adapt and Each of these future missions in turn by a range of strategic goals, from adapt- refine our vision of the future operating demand new operational approaches and ing to future conditions to imposing environment and, perhaps, build a new capabilities. The future joint force must change and enforcing outcomes. A family JOE when the time is right. Adapting be prepared to support a range of po- of joint concepts should enable the future our joint capabilities through a structured tential national strategic goals including joint force to support a wide range of po- look at the future will continually focus adapting to changing conditions, impos- tential strategic goals. on seeking new operational military ing change, and enforcing outcomes. It advantages for the Nation and ensuring does this through a number of discrete The Future of the Future a future joint force with fewer “pre-war military tasks (for example, shaping or Operating Environment mistaken beliefs” than its opponents. JFQ containing conditions and consequences The ideas found within the JOE set or destroying an adversary’s will or capa- the stage for a more detailed evolution bility to resist). of operational concepts to organize Notes A set of 24 future joint force missions and employ joint forces in the future 1 is designed to encourage joint concepts operating environment. The JOE is the Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld & Nich- to address what the future force might entry point for “rigorously defining the olson, 2005), 43. need to do and be. Additionally, they military problems anticipated in future 2 For a discussion, see Lawrence Freedman, encourage wide-ranging conversations conflict.”7 Looking into the future in The Future of War (New York: Perseus Books, during concept development about how this way can accelerate new concepts to 2017). 3 we balance future missions. Where should support future strategy and thus identify John M. Lillard, Playing War: Wargam- ing and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War the joint force focus its future develop- a foundation on which to build endur- II (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc.), ment efforts in order to address the full ing U.S. military advantages. 2006. range of these potential missions? Should Dialogue with U.S. and international 4 F.G. Hoffman, “The Future Is Plural: we? Can we? partners about the future operating envi- Multiple Futures for Tomorrow’s Joint Force,” st The JOE defines the missions by the in- ronment informs numerous future force Joint Force Quarterly 88 (1 Quarter 2018), available at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Becker and DeFoor 125 by the rise of competent and com- petitive states; economic, social, and environmental challenges; and rapidly evolving technologies, these changes will necessitate innovation within the Department of Defense (DOD). Inno- vation must develop and employ new capabilities, organizational constructs, and approaches to warfighting to main- tain competitive advantage over a broad range of potential adversaries. However, plans for innovation within DOD must not start with a blank sheet of paper. Rather, the joint force should be pro- vided with a blueprint for innovation to channel creativity toward addressing specific operational challenges. Inno- vation aligned with strategy will help ensure that the future joint force will have the ability to stand firm, while at the same time maintain responsiveness to adapt and respond in new ways as the environment evolves. In the past, joint operating concepts were developed to describe how the joint force would execute military operations within a specific mission area.1 However, the 2016 National Military Strategy reoriented the strategic framework for the joint force, identifying Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations—commonly referred to as “4+1”—as the most pressing challenges.2 These challenges, when aggregated, serve to benchmark and inform capability Damage Controlman tests countermeasure 3 wash-down system on forecastle aboard USS development and defense innovation. Green Bay, Gulf of Thailand, February 9, 2017 To align joint concept development with (U.S. Navy/Chris Williamson) strategic guidance, the decision was made to adopt a challenge-based structure for future operating concepts. This change will enable the family of joint concepts, consisting of the capstone concept, joint operating concepts, and supporting A New Approach to concepts, to extend the challenge-based framework out to 2035 and will realize the Chairman’s vision for joint concepts “offering educated judgments about Joint Concepts future military challenges . . . defining future requirements and addressing By Erik Schwarz gaps in our existing approaches and capabilities.”4 Applying the challenge-based frame- he future operating environment work to the family of joint concepts will Lieutenant Colonel Erik Schwarz, USAF, is an Intelligence Officer in the Joint Concepts Division, will feature broad changes in provide real-world context to the envi- Joint Staff J7. T the character of warfare. Driven ronment in which the future joint force 126 Joint Doctrine / A New Approach to Joint Concepts JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 will be called to operate. This reinforces provide comprehensive options to meet a coherent set of force development clear thinking about the true character future strategic challenges. A capstone recommendations, senior leaders will be of future challenges and helps to guard concept will be developed when the better prepared to make capability and against building the force for the fight confluence of new concepts, strategies, capacity decisions that provide the joint we want rather than the fight we will lessons learned, and emergent challenges force with the inherent operational flexi- actually face. Regardless of future tech- necessitates an updated, unifying vision bility necessary to address any unexpected nological innovation, war will remain a for future force development. or emergent challenge. human endeavor, a competition between The capstone concept is developed By leveraging the joint operating and among belligerents. The contextual in collaboration with combatant com- environment and intelligence estimates, aspects of politics, history, culture, and manders and Service chiefs, enabling the joint operating concepts will project geography, as well as technological horizontal integration of force devel- future capabilities and strategies of the capabilities, must be considered as joint opment responsibilities and priorities. adversary out to 2035. These will be concepts propose new ways of operating. Much as the National Military Strategy is compared to anticipated U.S. and allied Ultimately, the challenge-based family the foundation for strategic integration, capabilities and strategies to expose short- of joint concepts will provide a blueprint planning, and resource allocation for the falls the joint force will face if the force for the joint force out to 2035 with the joint force out to 2025, the capstone development trajectory is not altered. fidelity to drive future force development concept forms this foundation for future The concept will then describe alternate and inform senior leaders as they make force development across the spectrum of methods of operating to mitigate these investment decisions today to prepare the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, shortfalls and identify the corresponding joint force for tomorrow. leadership and education, personnel, fa- implications for joint force development. cilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). Supporting Concepts. Supporting Family of Joint Concepts Joint Operating Concepts. Joint concepts describe how the future joint Joint concepts provide solutions to operating concepts that are synchronized force will execute a function, domain, compelling, real-world challenges, with and complementary to national or activity to allow a future joint force both current and envisioned, for which strategy provide a clear vision of how the commander to synchronize, integrate, existing doctrinal approaches and joint joint force may be called to operate in the and direct joint operations. Supporting capabilities are deemed inadequate.5 future operating environment. By estab- concepts may be specific to a joint operat- As the range of strategic goals evolve lishing touchpoints between strategy and ing concept or may support multiple joint and battlefield conditions, technology, a vision of future joint operations, joint operating concepts equally. Ultimately, and opposing force capabilities change, operating concepts arm the Chairman they will add depth and breadth to the the family of joint concepts provides an with the required information to balance compelling operational approaches overarching structure to address these near- and mid-term risk with long-term required to meet the challenges of the challenges in a comprehensive and stra- force development requirements. future. There is a significant library of tegically relevant way (see figure). When The Joint Staff, in coordination with active joint concepts that serve as the applied comprehensively, the family of the Services and combatant commands, baseline supporting concepts for the fam- joint concepts will support the Chair- are developing joint operating concepts ily of joint concepts.7 Future supporting man’s best military advice to alter the that correspond to the 4+1 priority chal- concepts will be developed as additional trajectory of future risk. lenges identified in the National Military conceptual gaps are identified during the Capstone Concept. The capstone con- Strategy. The joint operating concepts development of the challenge-based joint cept represents the Chairman’s unifying should not be viewed as a prediction of operating concepts. vision for how the joint force must adapt future conflict. Rather, these priority and evolve to counter future challenges. challenges are being utilized as bench- What Will the Challenge-Based It provides a common view of the future marks for future force development, Joint Operating Concepts Do? operating environment and vision for recognizing that adversaries are develop- The persistent degradation of joint force how the joint force will conduct globally ing capabilities and stratagems to exploit readiness resulting from 16 years of war, integrated operations. The National perceived vulnerabilities in our way of a deteriorating global security situation, Military Strategy’s Secretary of Defense war. Holistically, the 4+1 represent great and adversaries’ growing capability Global Integration annex defines global power competitors with modernized to contest U.S. military capabilities integration as “the arrangement of cohe- nuclear arsenals and advanced count- require fundamental changes to how sive military actions in time, space, and er-power projection capabilities, who we develop the future joint force. New purpose, executed as a whole to address export malign influence, pose threats to capabilities and weapon systems will be transregional, multidomain, and multi- homeland security and regional peace, necessary, but we will not be able to functional challenges.”6 The capstone and perpetuate violent extremism. By simply purchase competitive advantage. concept will incorporate and extend this integrating concept-required capabilities New operational approaches must be vision of globally integrated operations to from the joint operating concepts into developed so we can rethink how we JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Schwarz 127 USS Ronald Reagan, USS Theodore Roosevelt, and USS Nimitz conduct operations in international waters as part of three-carrier strike force exercise, Western Pacific, November 12, 2017 (U.S. Navy/James Ku) use existing capabilities, integrate new While joint operating concepts will assessments—particularly those from the capabilities, and present our adversar- inform future plans, it is important not to combatant commands—tend to focus ies with unsolvable dilemmas. Joint view them as operational or contingency on near- and mid-term challenges, they operating concepts will serve as the plans. Rather than address a specific provide useful insights into challenges foundation of operational adaptation to operational challenge, each joint operat- that current joint force commanders are convert potential military strength into ing concept will address the full span of facing and highlight areas where compet- actual combat power. missions while accounting for the transre- itive overmatch is eroding relative to the The decision to adopt the 4+1 gional, multidomain, and multifunctional 4+1 challenges. challenge-based construct for the joint aspects of the challenge.8 This broad The joint operating concept writing operating concepts has required a signif- approach will enable the operationaliza- teams require a detailed understanding icant shift in how we approach concept tion of the concepts by describing how of how each of the 4+1 challenges affects development. This new approach is the joint force must be integrated across national objectives, military capabilities, focused on meeting the operational functions, domains, organizations, and operational concepts, socioeconomic needs of a future joint force commander. geographic boundaries. trends, and threat perceptions from today Joint operating concepts should serve as To ensure operational relevance through 2035. To achieve this in-depth precursors for future plans, expanding of the challenge-based joint operating understanding, operations, planning, the options available to joint force com- concepts, the decision was made to write and intelligence subject matter experts manders by anticipating changes in the the documents at the classified level. This from across the combatant commands, character of war, delivering joint force has enabled the incorporation of Service Services, and Intelligence Community capabilities, and proposing alternate and combatant commander assessments, have been incorporated into the core approaches necessary to maintain com- wargame results, and intelligence prod- writing teams for each concept. This ap- petitive overmatch. ucts as the foundation for joint operating proach integrates diverse perspectives into concept development. While these the development process. Ultimately, the 128 Joint Doctrine / A New Approach to Joint Concepts JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 process of reexamining and revalidating force development requires integrated the challenges and proposed solutions joint force capability development, Notes serves to enhance the concepts’ credibil- resourcing, and prioritization from incep- 1 ity and utility. tion. To maintain competitive overmatch, The previous family of joint concepts contained cooperative security, deterrence Finally, by integrating the develop- the family of joint concepts must lead the operations, irregular warfare, major combat ment of the joint operating concepts Services’ concept and capability devel- operations, stability operations, and homeland across the Services and combatant opment processes by providing a single defense/civil support. commands, proposed solutions will truly standard for how the future joint force 2 National Military Strategy (Washington, reflect the aspirational goal of globally in- must operate. This will likely force us to DC: The Joint Staff, November 11, 2016), foreword. This document is CLASSIFIED. tegrated operations. The ideas will break rethink how we approach domain-specific 3 Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “Meeting Today’s the longstanding paradigm of Service concept development and drive hard Global Security Challenges,” speech, Washing- interdependence and drive the future choices about the future trajectory of ton, DC, March 29, 2016. joint force toward true integration. The Service capabilities. 4 Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “Maintaining a rd goal is to provide the future joint force Ultimately, the family of joint con- Boxer’s Stance,” Joint Force Quarterly 86 (3 Quarter 2017), 3. commander with a force capable of oper- cepts must serve as a shared point of 5 Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the ating and winning in the future operating departure for future joint force devel- Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, environment, however it may manifest. opment. The ideas in the concepts must DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorpo- be continually evaluated and refined rating Change 1, July 12, 2017), vi–9, available Integration through wargames, experiments, and at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Schwarz 129 U.S. Coastguardman watches as crew boat departs from Ardenne Venture after annual exam to ensure it complies with U.S. and international regulations prior to operating in U.S. waters and ports, San Diego, California, August 3, 2012 (U.S. Coast Guard/Henry G. Dunphy) The U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security Focus on Campaign Activities By George E. Katsos his article continues the discus- Government’s approach to environmen- sion on human security’s1 seven tal security with a focus on combatant T relevant dimensions: economic, commander campaign activities. food, health, environmental, personal, Populations rely on a healthy physical Colonel George E. Katsos, USAR (Ret.), is the community, and political.2 Comple- environment, primarily land, water, and Department of Defense Terminology Program menting previous Joint Force Quarterly air. Certain threats to the environment, Manager and a Joint Doctrine Strategist. He is also a former Politico-Military Planner and Deputy installments on health and food secu- whether from pollution, contamination, Director of Civil-Military Training. rity, 3 the following describes the U.S. natural resource depletion, or climate 130 Joint Doctrine / U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 change, know no borders and their campaign activities in support of environ- organizations (for example, the North hazardous effects can harm farming, mental security efforts. Atlantic Treaty Organization) to achieve fishing, and herding practices that sustain environmental objectives.19 human life. While human ambitions Legislative Actions and In 1988, the U.S. Government may inflame threats to the environment, International Engagement supported the establishment of the UN population movements can overwhelm U.S. environmental law beginnings can Intergovernmental Panel on Climate institutional capacity and generate the be linked to the Rivers and Harbors Change to identify political and eco- need for external intervention. Along Act of 1899,8 which protected navigable nomic impacts of human-induced climate with poor governance and environmental areas from negative human practices change and provide scientific options neglect, these challenges affect overall such as discharge or fill-in matter for adaptation and mitigation.20 More political stability, human security, and the processing without a permit. Since recently, the Environmental Protection global economy, making environmental 1946, Congress generated multiple Agency (EPA) signed a memorandum of security a pillar of national security. A environmental protection measures understanding with the UN Environment former National Intelligence Director such as laws on clean air,9 clean water,10 Programme to provide a framework for highlighted the connection between protection of land,11 protection and cooperation activities to protect human stability and security in the environmental preservation of life forms,12 and the health and the environment.21 The EPA context, “Unpredictable instability has disposal or recovery of hazardous also works with Environmental Canada become the new normal . . . extreme waste.13 Two laws that significantly under the Canada-U.S. Joint Inland weather, climate change, environmental affect Federal Government approaches Pollution Contingency Plan to cooper- degradation, rising demand for food are the National Environmental Policy ate on pollutant release measures that and water, poor policy decisions and Act of 1969,14 which requires detailed can cause environmental harm along inadequate infrastructure will magnify . . . statements of environmental effects for the shared inland border.22 While the instability.”4 all major Federal actions significantly United States ratified the UN Framework To better understand environmental affecting the environment, and the Convention on Climate Change treaty in security, two examples highlight U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973,15 which 1992, the President did not endorse the Government perspectives. The first is protects species from extinction. Also subsequent 1998 Kyoto Protocol to limit a report that describes environmental worth mentioning is the Comprehensive greenhouse gases, whether economically security as a process whereby solutions Environmental Response, Compensation, not feasible, politically unacceptable, or to problems contribute to national secu- and Liability Act of 198016 and Pollution factually impalpable to the United States. rity objectives and cooperation among Prevention Act of 1990,17 which provide In addition, although the United States stakeholders to prevent threats before for hazardous material cleanup and pol- did not ratify the 1994 UN Conference they affect national security.5 Another is lution prevention enforcement through on the Law of the Sea, it does follow laws a Department of Defense (DOD) policy efficiencies and cost effectiveness, protecting the marine environment.23 that defines environmental security as respectively. These measures combine to For a better understanding of how the a program that enhances readiness by protect humanity and domestic ecosys- government supports agreements, legis- institutionalizing the Department’s tems and curb harmful environmental lative actions, and forms of international environmental, safety, and occupational practices both at home and abroad. engagement, the following reviews the health awareness, making environmental The United States also provides executive branch’s approach to environ- security an integral part of daily activities.6 international assistance for global envi- mental security. For purposes here, environmental security ronmental initiatives within developing includes protecting human populations, countries. Under President Barack The Executive Branch wildlife, mammals, and ecosystems from Obama, U.S. participation in the Global The President’s National Security Strat- and curbing harmful practices that con- Climate Change Initiative (GCCI)18 egy articulates overarching policy goals tribute to environmental degradation.7 aimed to integrate changing climate con- that can involve environmental security With the government’s increasing role as siderations into U.S. foreign assistance approaches.24 Subsequent strategies a security provider and growing political through a range of bilateral, multilateral, and plans such as the U.S. Agency for focus on human security, the U.S. mili- and private-sector mechanisms. Efforts International Development (USAID) tary will most likely support an expanding include the promotion of sustainable Climate Change and Development role to protect national interests against and climate-resilient societies, fostering Strategy and 2013 Climate Action Plan threats to environmental security. In the of low-carbon economic growth, and support the National Security Strategy following sections, research and informal reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by linking environmental security objec- discussions form the following analysis: from deforestation and land degradation. tives such as reducing greenhouse gases history of U.S. policy and international The United States also participates with to political objectives.25 initiatives, executive branch strategy international organizations such as the Another tool the President uses to and organizational roles, and military United Nations (UN) and other regional establish overarching policy is authoring JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Katsos 131 an executive order. In 1970, one order Health, Water and Waste Systems, and pollutants, or contaminants. Under directed a national approach on envi- Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste;34 the NCP, the EPA leads on-scene U.S. ronmental issues by establishing the and U.S. Security Sector Assistance sup- Government efforts to remove and miti- independent EPA. It also created the ports building partner capabilities in gate oil spills and the release of hazardous National Oceanic and Atmospheric addressing common security issues.35 materials on land. The EPA also works Administration (NOAA) under the To analyze the breakdown of Federal closely with state regulators and industry Department of Commerce.26 Other environmental security efforts, the fol- stakeholders to coordinate development, notable orders were developed over the lowing overview captures them in three implementation, and enforcement of new last 40 years: Federal Compliance with categories: significant, additional, and and existing environmental standards. Pollution Control Standards ensures remaining. Additionally, the EPA manages environ- necessary actions are taken for the Significant Efforts. Both the mental science and technology programs prevention, control, and abatement of Department of State and EPA play sig- such as the Strategic Environmental environmental pollution with respect nificant roles in achieving global U.S. Research and Development Program to Federal facilities and activities;27 Government environmental security ob- (SERDP) through a memorandum National Oil and Hazardous Substances jectives. The State Department manages of understanding with DOD and Pollution Contingency and its National foreign affairs and conducts diplomacy the Department of Energy (DOE). Contingency Plan (NCP) provide or- for the President, which can result in Per the Department of Homeland ganizational structure and procedures foreign aid, security assistance, and eco- Security (DHS), the National Response for preparing for and responding to nomic development support to other Framework (NRF) identifies the EPA as discharges of oil and releases of hazardous nations. For State, USAID coordinates the lead agency for Emergency Support materials;28 Environmental Effects Abroad and integrates economic development Function (ESF) #10—Oil and Hazardous of Major Federal Action provides Federal and disaster assistance expertise and Materials Response.40 agency officials with responsibility for resources abroad. For purposes of this Additional Efforts. Other depart- authorizing and approving actions of discussion, USAID is categorized as an ments make substantial contributions pertinent environmental considerations;29 entity under the State Department as to U.S. Government environmental and Planning for Federal Sustainability in they both share one Cabinet Secretary.36 security efforts. DHS provides domestic the Next Decade revokes or replaces four Three strategic documents that provide security and coordinates Federal crisis re- previous orders and other public envi- organizational guidance on environ- sponse and recovery efforts through the ronmental laws.30 Most recently in 2017, mental security are the Quadrennial Federal Emergency Management Agency Promoting Energy Independence and Diplomacy and Development Review, (FEMA). DHS also supports environ- Economic Growth sponsors clean and safe State and USAID Joint Strategic Plan, mental security through cross-border development of our nation’s vast energy and USAID Global Climate Change and protection and prepares for mass migra- resources; however, it also revokes a pre- Development Strategy.37 As the principal tion in the Caribbean through exercise vious order to prepare the United States lead for governmental security-sector participation.41 Per the NCP and through for the effects of climate change.31 assistance, State oversees policies, pro- the U.S. Coast Guard, DHS leads on- The President also articulates spe- grams, and activities to engage with, scene U.S. Government domestic efforts cific national security policy through help build and sustain the capacity of, to remove and mitigate oil spills and haz- Presidential directives. Over the last and enable foreign partners to address ardous materials released into waters and 15 years, the following directives set their own common security challenges, adjoining shorelines. The Coast Guard conditions for improving environ- including environmental security.38 State also has a National Response Center that mental security and national strategy also arranges financial climate change ini- tracks reporting of oil spills and other development: U.S. Global Development tiative assistance so that USAID’s Office chemical releases.42 Policy emphasizes environmental se- of U.S. Foreign Disaster Relief Assistance The Commerce Department’s curity through the GCCI;32 National can administer and implement GCCI environmental objectives focus on under- Preparedness replaces a previous directive programs.39 For responses to domestic standing and predicting changes to the to better synchronize whole-of-govern- challenges, State manages international environment due to the frequency and se- ment responses to threats that include contributions of support. verity of extreme weather events.43 Under the environment; Implementation of The EPA is a non-Cabinet, stand- NOAA, Commerce provides access to the National Strategy for Countering alone government agency managed by a comprehensive oceanic, atmospheric, and Biological Threats supports biodefense Presidential-appointed administrator who geophysical data, and delivers scientific directives;33 Critical Infrastructure attends related Cabinet meetings. The solutions.44 NOAA also deploys scientific Resilience revokes a previous directive EPA develops national environmental support teams for pollution response that replaced another and identifies policies, regulations, and enforcement within the United States and monitors administrative sectors such as Food and regimes to safeguard air, land, water, and coastal tidal gauges.45 Agriculture, Health Care and Public ecosystems from harmful substances, 132 Joint Doctrine / U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Sailor surveys healthy reef off coast of Guantanamo Bay to assess and compare possible effects of recreational diving on ecosystem, Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, November 23, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Charles E. White) DOD supports environmental secu- through conservation, and manages the to radiological and nuclear emergency rity efforts primarily through its military Forest Service and Natural Resources events with scientific and technical exper- workforce. In support of capacity-build- Conservation Service. Its workforce tise.53 For domestic crisis response, DOE ing activities abroad, DOD contributes supports the health and vitality of the facilitates the restoration of damaged to engagement and prevention programs, agricultural sector that depends on clean energy systems and components as the surveillance and response systems, and air, land, soil, and water, as well as envi- lead coordinator for ESF #12—Energy.54 develops missions, resource requirements, ronmentally sound practices.50 In support DOE also manages the Nation’s Strategic and operational considerations posed by of crisis response, the Department of Petroleum Reserve.55 current and projected climate variations.46 Agriculture is delegated by DHS in the Remaining Efforts. Other depart- Organizational policies also establish en- NRF to lead ESF #4—Firefighting to ments maintain domestic capabilities vironmental security standards on issues protect the public, property, and the and may have equity in support of global such as low-level radiation waste practices environment.51 environmental security efforts. The and environmental restoration as well The Energy Department provides Department of the Interior manages the as inform commander environmental assistance and information regarding Nation’s public lands, minerals, national programs.47 DOD also participates in energy supply and system damage that parks, and has the responsibility of SERDP,48 provides temporary power covers infrastructure, environmental western water resource management and generation and grid repair,49 conducts management, civilian radioactive waste conservation of natural resources.56 The homeland defense, and provides Defense management, and hydroelectric power. Department of Transportation works to Support To Civilian Authorities (DSCA) It also ensures sound management increase energy efficiency, reduce green- through research, preparation, surveil- of the disposition of the national nu- house gas emissions, conserve water lance, and response efforts. clear arms complex and participates in resources, eliminate waste, and prevent The Department of Agriculture de- SERDP.52 Under the National Nuclear transportation services and facility velops markets, protects natural resources Security Administration, DOE responds pollution.57 The Department of Health JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Katsos 133 and Human Services via the Centers for activities revolve around mutual agree- by retreating Iraqi military forces and Disease Control and Prevention and ments and commitments to promote were intended to impede allied military Food and Drug Administration coor- long-term regional stability. Within advances and interoperability as well as dinates environmental health expertise limited military deployments, campaign damage the Kuwaiti economy.67 In 2016, in preparation of and during public activities include crisis response and DOD personnel gathered air samples in health emergencies.58 The Department contingencies that meet defined short- an allied Iraq and trained government of Justice enforces Federal pollution term requirements such as protecting forces to assist to control oil well and abatement laws to protect the environ- civilians. For large-scale military missions, sulfur plant fires ignited by terrorists.68 At ment,59 and the Treasury Department campaign activities are more complex, home, DOD—through U.S. Northern implements GCCI activities through in- standalone, and longer.63 Operational and Command (USNORTHCOM) or ternational organizations.60 Furthermore, tactical commanders also develop tasks USPACOM—leads homeland defense the National Aeronautics and Space in support of organizational policies and efforts against external threats, such as Administration (NASA) is an indepen- campaign activities through command weapons of mass destruction, delivered dent agency that tracks and characterizes environmental programs to mitigate neg- through and disseminated into the air. orbital debris in space.61 ative environmental effects and harmful DOD also conducts campaign activities As U.S. Government departments practices generated by military forces that to build institutional capacity of foreign continue to develop their own strategies affect local ecosystem, wildlife, mammal, forces against ecoterrorism (commonly to achieve national environmental se- and human survival. The following known as environmental terrorism). curity objectives, the future is uncertain sections categorize campaign activities Additionally, combatant commands in- on how the government will plan for a that counter negative effects and reform tegrate extreme weather-driven scenarios robust international workforce response existing practices within three physical into exercises to maintain U.S. military that includes environmental relief for elements of the operational environment: readiness capabilities and interoperability massive population movement and crit- air, land, and water.64 with foreign forces.69 ical public infrastructure failure.62 For Air. Air quality affects civilian popu- For disaster preparation and build- interoperability and educational reasons, lations and military personnel, as well as ing partner capacity efforts, DOD non-DOD organizations should keep technological equipment, instruments, personnel, under USNORTHCOM a watchful eye on their portrayal in and and communication systems. Pollutants and U.S. Southern Command participation in the development of U.S. such as carbon dioxide and other gases, (USSOUTHCOM), provide courses military joint doctrine—the core founda- radioactive material, or manufactured and conferences70 as well as hazmat tion of military workforce best practices. pathogens released into the air can response training with countries such as harm air quality and deposit hazardous Mexico and others in Central America, Military Campaign Activities materials in other locations (for exam- respectively.71 DOD also assists in do- Threats and their hazardous effects ple, through air plumes, acid rain).65 mestic environmental security efforts. can increase the risk of instability and Conditions created by severe weather In 2017, in support of response and conflict, requiring security institution climates and ozone depletion also can recovery efforts for Hurricane Harvey, involvement. DOD is one security negatively affect clean air. These hazards DSCA focused on assisting state and local institution that supports environmental can generate effects that produce smog, authorities in stemming toxic airborne security efforts when directed to do so, inflame wildfires, and increase ultraviolet emissions from dozens of damaged pet- but it also relies on stable physical envi- radiation that harm human health and rochemical plants and refineries around ronments for maximum interoperability. create uninhabitable environments. the Houston area.72 For curbing harmful In support of government activities, DOD campaign activities include foreign practices, DOD strives to mitigate air combatant commanders integrate humanitarian assistance (FHA), disaster pollution emissions through the transi- environmental considerations, such as relief, and DSCA. tion of fossil fuel usage to more biofuel in compliance and protection, into plans In 2011, DOD personnel under ships, aircraft, and vehicles.73 Additionally, and missions to prevent and mitigate U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) DOD conducts basecamp cleanup, devel- environmental degradation and other supported U.S. Government efforts ops alternatives to burning waste in open negative effects. However, this may not in Japan to conduct radiation recon- pits, protects endangered species and always be feasible due to competing naissance monitoring and mitigation wildlife, safeguards natural and cultural operational interests that commanders for the Fukushima nuclear reactor resources, and practices noise abatement. must assess, such as the inherent right response.66 In support of government Land. The quality of land affects of self-defense or combat. relief against deliberate contamination, the livelihood and survival of civilian While many terms describe DOD DOD personnel in 1991, under U.S. populations as well as the interoperability environmental security, this discussion Central Command, assisted the Kuwaiti and protection of military personnel. refers to them as campaign activities. government’s oil-refinery fire mitiga- Pollution and contamination from Under military investments, campaign tion efforts. Oil fires were perpetrated human practices can intensify land or soil 134 Joint Doctrine / U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 degradation. Activities such as deforesta- renewable fuels in buildings, facilities, alarms on sea level heights and military tion, overgrazing, poor sanitation, over and vehicles;80 and procuring renewable training.89 salinization, certain types of landfill, and energy on installations to increase resil- While DOD is committed to ensuring chemical or biological release can lead to iency in the event of commercial grid safe, secure, and stable water conditions,90 desertification, combustible vegetation disruption.81 DOD also monitors coastal some situations warrant alarm. First, wildfires, smog and smoke, increased erosion, sinking land, the effects of land- nuclear reactor accidents at sea and how greenhouse gases, severe weather cli- fills, threatened and endangered species to respond are real concerns. In 1982, mates, famine and drought, crop failure, habitats, regulated sites, and cultural Russia scuttled a radioactive submarine poverty, natural resource depletion, unus- resources.82 On basecamps and installa- that places today’s Arctic maritime en- able and inaccessible terrain, inability to tions, commanders provide oversight of vironment in jeopardy from radioactive produce foodstuff, and topsoil and vege- hazardous material, solid waste (garbage), leaks under water.91 Other examples tation absorption of foreign materials. wastewater, storm water, and land-farm- include coastal installation vulnerabilities In 2011, in support of U.S. ing of liquid spill management. from normal wind and high tide flooding, Government efforts to the Japanese Water. Naval and maritime forces less prevalent rising sea levels generated government, DOD personnel under operate on, under, or above the water to from ice shelf melting, and storm surges. USPACOM participated in foreign influence results on land.83 The quality On DOD’s largest naval base Norfolk consequence management in the form of water is worsened by pollution or Naval Station, normal flooding occurs at of radiological response at and around contamination from human practices.84 least once or twice a month due to rising the Fukushima nuclear reactor.74 Japan While water degradation affects potable waters and land erosion (also known continues to clean up and store hazard- water access, aquifer protection, legal as sinking land).92 For curbing harmful ous material from the accident on land fishing, or habitats,85 climate variations practices, DOD seeks to decrease sewage today.75 Besides disaster relief, DOD can affect frozen waters and Arctic cover discharge, coastal habitat destruction, provides support against deliberate land resulting in rising sea levels and changing impacts to mammals and other wildlife, degradation perpetrated by retreating shorelines from melting ice that threaten and clean water scarcity.93 For alternate forces such as critical industrial infra- population centers and water-based mil- energy usage, DOD develops and deploys structure destruction and scorched earth itary installations. The over pumping of alternate powered nuclear aircraft carriers policies. Pollutants on land can also seep groundwater can also lead to scarcity and and submarines, and their escort ships use into the ground and contaminate fresh depletion. advanced biofuel. Deployed assets also underground water supplies.76 DOD also In USPACOM, DOD personnel sup- perform energy conservation measures trains host-nation security forces on pol- ported U.S. Government assistance for during the course of normal operations.94 lution and spill prevention, conservation, the Fukushima nuclear reactor accident In the remaining physical area of the and environmental restoration. in 2011 to mitigate radioactive water operational environment known as space, At home, DOD leads homeland de- leaks from distressing local and maritime DOD under U.S. Strategic Command fense efforts against external threats such environments. In the previous year, DOD manages the DOD Space Surveillance as weapons of mass destruction delivered personnel under USNORTHCOM rein- Network to monitor satellites and on or from land and supports state and forced the government’s Gulf of Mexico certain orbital debris. Other campaign local efforts managed through DSCA.77 oil spill response with air and logistical activities include atmospheric pollution Recently, DOD personnel under support.86 Within other geographic com- (for example, rocket launch debris and USNORTHCOM cooperated with do- batant commands, campaign activities space litter) observation and its potential mestic authorities on hurricanes Harvey, can include building the capacity and threat to Earth. DOD also cooperates Irma, and Maria’s response and recovery resilience of other organizations through and shares responsibilities with NASA efforts to rebuild infrastructure, generate events such as oil spill drills87 and sharing for characterizing the contents of the power, and institute emergency protective information and best practices to address satellite area in space.95 Additionally, measures.78 DOD also strives to reduce topics on climate change, coastal erosion, within the information environment, energy consumption and enhance energy water management, waste management,88 organizations throughout DOD and its self-sufficiency, such as drawing on local rising sea levels, storm surges, and instal- U.S. Cyber Command, as well as civil- clean energy sources or using solar power lation resource management. At home ian entities including the independent during military operations to create against deliberate contamination, DOD National Security Agency, defend against technological and equipment efficiencies; leads homeland defense efforts against cyberspace intrusion that could generate promoting green programs and energy external threats such as weapons of mass infrastructure damage and remotely trig- initiatives to reduce vehicle reliance on destruction delivered from, on or imme- ger catastrophic environmental releases.96 liquid fuels through alternative fuel usage diately above water. For the Arctic, rising and on-board power;79 implementing temperatures, melting sea ice, thawing Populations care about and depend aggressive conservation and efficiency permafrost and shoreline erosion raise on clean environments. DOD support to efforts while repurposing energy through U.S. Government environmental security JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Katsos 135 By 2025, approximately 1.8 billion people will live in countries with absolute water scarcity, with 3.4 billion people living in countries defined as water- scarce, Manatuto, Timor-Leste, March 20, 2009 (UN/Martine Perret) April 5, 2012; UN General Assembly, 64th efforts will lessen anxieties that inflame of species extinction, combatant com- Session, “Human Security, Report of the Secre- root causes of community dissatisfaction manders and their forces should be ready tary-General,” A/64/701, March 8, 2010. 2 and put the legitimacy of governments to support U.S. environmental missions Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 24–25. and regional organizations into question. and continue to integrate environmental 3 George E. Katsos, “U.S. Government Ap- Although U.S. military forces participate security-related risk management into proach to Food Security: Focus on Campaign in environmental security efforts, it does normal planning processes and opera- Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 87 (4th Quar- not mean that they are immune to the tions. JFQ ter 2017), 112–121; George E. Katsos, “U.S. negative effects of the affected environ- Government Approach to Health Security: Focus on Medical Campaign Activities,” Joint ment. In the 2011 Japanese Fukushima Force Quarterly 85 (2nd Quarter 2017), 66–75. nuclear reactor incident, DOD personnel Notes 4 Caitlin Werrell and Francesco Femia, and responder ships suffered lasting “Worldwide Threat Assessment: Climate 1 contamination effects from radioactive Oscar A. Gomez and Des Gasper, Human Magnifying Instability,” Climate and Securi- Security: A Thematic Guidance Note for Region- water that emptied in the ocean.97 While ty, February 10, 2016, available at 136 Joint Doctrine / U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 February 24, 1996), 10–11. (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September and U.S. Agency for International Develop- 7 Human Development Report 1994, 28. 9, 2016), A-10. ment (USAID) strategic plan was published 8 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 23 UN Framework Convention on Climate in 2003; see FY 2014–2017 Quadrennial 1899, U.S. Code 33 (March 3, 1899), § 403, Change, May 9, 1992; UN Convention on the Diplomacy and Development Review (Wash- Chapter 425; 30 Stat. 1151. Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982; Kyoto ington, DC: Department of State, 2015); FY 9 Clean Air Act, Public Law 88-206 (U.S. Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on 2014–2017 Department of State and USAID Code 42, § 7401 et seq.), 88th Cong., 2nd sess., Climate Change, December 11, 1997. Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: Department December 17, 1963. 24 National Security Strategy (Washington, of State, 2014); USAID Climate Change and 10 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub- DC: The White House, February 2015). Development Strategy, 2012–2016, extended to lic Law 92-500 (U.S. Code 33, § 1251 et seq.), 25 The President’s Climate Action Plan September 2018 (Washington, DC: USAID, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., October 18, 1972. (Washington, DC: The White House, June January 2012), available at JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Katsos 137 Machinery Technician with Coast Guard Atlantic Strike Team arrives on scene for vessel removal operations in Ponce, Puerto Rico, November 19, 2017 (U.S. Coast Guard/Lauren Steenson) ance at Installations Outside the United States tions-continue-full-federal>. Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012–2016 (Wash- (Washington, DC: DOD, October 5, 2017, 50 JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation ington, DC: Department of Transportation, Change 1); DODI 4715.06, Environmental (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2016), 2016), 7. Compliance in the United States (Washington, A-B-1; “Environment Industry Study,” Final 58 Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2014–2018 DC: DOD, October 27, 2017, Change 1); Report, Industrial College of the Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Department of Health and DODI 4715.07, Defense Environmental Res- (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Human Services, March 2014). toration Program (Washington, DC: DOD, Oc- Spring 2012), 11. 59 Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2014–2018 tober 25, 2017, Change 1); DODI 4715.08, 51 National Response Framework (Washing- (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, Remediation of Environmental Contamination ton, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 41. Outside the United States (Washington, DC: January 2008); “Emergency Support Function 60 Lattanzio. DOD, October 10, 2017, Change 1); DODI #4—Firefighting Annex,” FEMA, available at 61 “Space Debris and Human Spacecraft,” 4715.13, DOD Noise Program (Washington, 138 Joint Doctrine / U.S. Government’s Approach to Environmental Security JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 “Environment and Security: Core Ideas and Planning (Golden, CO: National Renewable Interest, September 7, 2017, available at U.S. Government Initiatives,” SAIS Review 17, Energy Laboratory, August 2010), 1. JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Katsos 139 Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 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The President faces a national security environment shaped by strong currents: globalization; the proliferation of new, poor, and weak states, as well as nonstate ac- tors; a persistent landscape of violent extremist organizations; slow economic growth; the rise of China and a revanchist Russia; a collapsing Middle East; and domestic policies wracked by division and mistrust. While in absolute terms the Nation and the world are safer than in the last century, today the United States finds itself almost on a permanent war footing, engaged in military operations around the world. This book, written by experts at the Defense Department’s National Defense University, offers valuable policy advice and grand strat- egy recommendations to those senior leaders who will staff and lead this administration in national security affairs. The President and his staff, Members of Congress, and the many leaders throughout government concerned with the Nation’s security interests should find this book valuable. Their task is not an easy one, and this volume’s insights and reflections are offered with an ample dose of humility. There are no silver bullets, no elegant solutions to the complex problems confronting America and its leaders. This volume provides context and un- derstanding about the current national security environment to those in the Administration as they prepare to lead the Nation during challenging times. To those senior leaders who bear the heavi- est responsibilities, these policy insights may chart a course forward. The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior officers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them. Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/charting-a-course/ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY-NINE, 2ND QUARTER 2018 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit JFQ is available online at the Joint Electronic Library: articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, The Armed Forces Officer“This new edition of The Armed Forces articulates the ethical and moral underpin- nings at the core of our profession. The special trust in us by the Nation and confidence placed we protect is built upon this foundation. I commend members of our officer corps to embrace the principles of this important book and practice them daily in the performance of your du- I expect you to imbue these values in the next generation of leaders.” ties. More importantly, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1159223/the-armed-forces-officer/ New from NDU Press New from Officer The Armed Forces 2017 • 212 pp. ChairmanStaff: of the Joint Chiefs of Dunford, Jr., From the Foreword by General Joseph F. C. Marshall, then serving George “In 1950, the great Soldier-Statesman Secretary as the of Officer page for a new book titled The ArmedDefense, signed a cover Forces . That original Marshall, who later explained that was written by none other than S.L.A. version of this book Secretary Marshall had ‘inspired the undertakingpersonal conviction that American due to his military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground morally.’ ethically and it addressed an of the Cold War, emergence at the dawn of the nuclear age and the Written officer a strategy of nuclear deterrence, corps tasked with developing facing unprecedented deployments, and adapting to the creation of the Department- of Defense and other new orga nizations necessary to manage the threats of a new global order. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked