F$mmunity Management and Common Property / of Coastal Fisheries in Asia and the Pacific: Concepts, Methods and Experiences

Edited by R.S.2, P meroy

International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management &I' ,3 4~35 Community Management md%nmon Property of Coastal Flsherles In Ash and the Paclflc: Concepts, Methods and Experiences

Proceedings of the Workshop on Community Management and Common Property of Coastal Fisheries and Upland Resources In Asia and the Pacific: Concepts, Methods and Experiences Silang. Cavite, Philippines 21 -23 June 1333

Edited by R.S. Porneroy

Published by the International Center for Llvlng Aquatic Resources Management. MCPO Box 2631, 0718 Makatl, Metro Manila, Phlllpplnes.

Printed In Manlla, Phlllpplnes

The ICLARM's Technical Series was developed In response to the lack of existing publlshlng outlets for longer papers on troplcal flsherles research. The Conference Proceedings Series consists of conference and workshop documents which synthesize and Interpret information, some ofwhlch may be new, and present new lnslghts Into exlstlng problems. All documents (other than abstract and summary papers) In these series are carefully peer reviewed externally as well as within ICLARM. Those published are thus equivalent to prlmary literature. Between 1.000 and 2.000 copies of each tltle are usually dissemlnated - sold or provlded In exchange or free of charge.

Pomeroy. R.S.. Editor. 1994. Communlty management and common and the Pacific: concepts. Conf. Proc. 45, 189 p.

Cover design by Ovldlo F. Esplritu, Jr.

iSSN 0 1 1 5-4435 ISBN 97 1-8709-56-8

ICLARM Contribution No. 1092. Contents

Foreword M./. WLLIAMS ...... v Acknowledgement ...... vi Abstract ...... vii Introduction RS POMEROY ...... 1 The role of government in coastal resources management A.C. ALCALA and Ef. VANDE VUSE ...... 1 2 Frameworks for understanding resource management on the commons D. FEENY...... 20 lnstitutlonal analysis, design principles and threats to sustalnable community governance and management of commcns E. OSTROM ...... 34 Property rights and coastal fisheries F. BERKES ...... 5 1 Changing the focus of coastal fisheries management K. RUDDLE ...... 63 Forest farmers and fishers as stewards of community resources M. RACELIS ...... 87 Research dlrected at developing local organizations for people's participatlon in fisheries management R.B. POLLNAC...... 94 Towards an integrated community management of coastal fisheries 1. KUMEN ...... 107 Planning and management of small-scale coastal fisheries K, KUPERAN VlSWANA7HANand N.M.R. ABDULLAH ...... 1 15 Creating dialogue and generating information H./. McAR7;HUR jR...... 124 The role of nongovernmental organizations in community-based coastal resources management C. Z ANONUEVO ...... 145 Problems encountered in the Implementation of a community-based h fishery resource management project R.E AGBAYANIand S. V. SlAR ...... 149 The Central Visayas Reglonal Project: experience in community-based coastal resources management R.M. BQfOS, /R...... 16 1 Community-based coastal resources management: the Palawan experience R.M. SANDAL0 ...... 165 I . Llst of Participants ...... 182 II. Workshop Program ...... 187 Foreword

esearchers in the social sciences are at the forefront of the urgent search for ketter ways of managing fisheries resources. The papers in the present volume contain a significant record of the search: they examine the concepts of community management and common property in coastal fisheries; and look at how community management operates in a range of past and present fisheries systems in Asia and the Pacific. All over the world, people are seeking viable solutions to the critical challenges of the management of stressed and degrading natural resources. More than in any other region. fisheries resources in Asla and the Pacific are important sources of food, income, jobs and cultural heritage. Over the recent decades, many governments have adopted management approaches suited to expanding, commercial fisheries development - relying on central control, monitoring and surveillance. Traditional management practices and codes of small-scale fishers often have been overlooked. The new approaches have often been ineffective in conserving resources and ensuring equity and economic efficiency in their use. Fishers tend to flout the government management arrangements or Find ways around them; and governments lack resources for their full implementation. Achieving more effective management will be complex but there Is a consensus that the way forward requires greater community involvement. A quick fix or an easy answer, however, does not exist. For example, a greater level of community management will need considerable capacity building so that the community can cope with managing the present stresses on the resources caused by increasing population numbers, degraded present state of resources and coastal ecosystems. Many of the complexities are discussed in this volume whlch is published as a contribution to the world's search for a way forward.

Meryl J. Wllllarns Director General International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management Acknowledgement

he workshop would not have been posslble without the Financial support of the TInternational Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Ford Foundation. The International Institute of Rural Reconstruction kindly provided the venue for the workshop. It would have not been possible to conduct the workshop wlthout the coordinating skills of Angie Aguito, Rocky Josue and Rachel Atanacio of ICLARM. Grants from lDRC to aid the publication of this book are also gratefully acknowledged. The proceedings were copyedited and organized with the able assistance of Rachel Africa and Anjanette Trinidad. Abstract

Is volume reports the proceedings of an International scientific meeting to document T"the concepts, methods and experlences in communlty-based management and common property management for coastal fisheries In Asia and the Pacific. A number of general conclusions and recommendations about coastal fisheries community- based management can be made from the papers and discussion at the meeting. The conventional wisdom that fisheries resources which are held as communal property are subject to eventual overexploitation and degradation and that a centralized management authority is needed to manage resources is not equivocal. Traditional community-based management systems have an important role to play in the management of coastal Fisheries. Recent investigatlon on community-based fisheries management has shown that when left to their own devices, communities of fishers, under certain conditlons, may use fisheries resources sustainably.

vli ROBERT 5. POMEROY Asian Fisheries Social Science Research Network In terna tional Center for Living A qua tic Resources Management MCPO Box 2631, 0718 Makati, Metro Manila Phili/pin es

Background control over coastal and marine resources: and socioeconomic differentiation and un- n many countries in Asia and the Pa- equal concentration of power within coastal I cific, national governments have increased cornmunitles. When community-level in- thelr role in the management of coastal stitutional arrangements for coastal fisheries fisheries. The role of local level control, management are undermined, the usual through traditional management and cus- common-property resource management tom, has correspondingly diminished. By regimes (in which group site and behavioral appropriating this control over coastal fish- rules are specified), have been, in many eries management, the national govern- instances, replaced by open-access re- ment has often underestimated the ca- gimes, a free-for-all with uncontrolled entry pacities of coastal communities, learned for resource use and the economic in- through often long and difficult experi- centive for the user to extract as much ence, to manage local fisheries resource of the resource as possible before oth- systems to meet their needs. In many ers do. instances, the national government has Fisheries management in the Asia-Pacific overestimated its ability to manage these region has been heavily influenced by the same resources (see Ruddle, this vol.). Western concept of the need For a centralized The dissolution of local level control administrative authority. This approach of coastal fisheries management has been, Involves little effective consultation with in part, the result of institutional restructuring the target beneficiaries and is often not under colonial admlnistrations: the rise suited to developing countries with limited of the nation-state; technological mod- financial means and expertise to manage ernlzation: population growth; increas- fisheries resources in widely dispersed ing efforts by private investors to gain fishing grounds. Western approaches to fisheries management have been dominated "ICLARM Contribution No. 1093. by the assumption of free access to the resource and lack of power of a single Increased local participatlon and institu- partlclpant in the fishery to prevent others tional restructuring have given greater from exploiting the same fishing grounds. control of resource management to the A further dominant assumption is that any community and resource users. fishery must be characterized by intense The advantages of community-based competition whlch will inevitably lead to resource management (CBRM) systems overexploitation and the eventual dissipation have been well documented In various of resource rents (profits), the so-called parts of the world (Korten 1986: Berkes "tragedy of the commons". Recent research 1989; McCay and Acheson 1990; on small-de coastal fisheries in developing Poffenberger 1990: Bromley 1992). The countries in Asia and the Pacific has shown, better known of these Initiatives have been however, that some degree of regulated In irrigation and social Forestry, but similar access, enforced at the local level through approaches are being applied in upland community Institutions and social practices, agriculture and wildlife. Communlty-based appears to be the rule rather than the management efforts in fisherles are pri- exception (Hviding and Jul-Larsen marily still in a developmental stage. This 1993). Is due in part to the complexity of coastal Without denying that the traditional and marine resource systems; the social systems of fisheries management can often and cultural structure of fishing commu- be inequltable and ineffectlve, state in- nitles: and the independent nature of fishers. terventions that have chosen to ignore Examples of community-based manage- them have seldom fared better. National ment in fisheries do exist, however, In governments have, for the most part, failed the United States (Acheson 1975),Japan to develop an adequate substitute for or (Ruddle 1985, 1989). the South Pacific complement to these traditional resource (Ruddle and Johannes 1985) and the Phil- management systems. The promotion of ippines (White 1989). nationalization or privatization as routine Community-based management strives pollcy solutions has not solved the problem for a more active people's participation of resource degradation and overexploitation In the planning and implementation of and, in many instances, has deprived large fisheries management. CBRM starts from portions of the population of their Ilvell- the premise that people have the Innate hood (Bromley and Cernea 1989). In this capacity to improve their quality of life. light, devolution of major resource man- Often what is needed is support to or- agement and allocation declslons to the ganize and educate people to mobilize local level may thus be more effective available resources to meet their needs. than management efforts of distant, un- The potential advantages of CBRM in- derstaffed and underfunded government clude effectiveness and equity. CBRM can agencies. be more economical in terms of admin- lstration and enforcement than national. centralized systems. CBRM involves self- Comrnunlty-Based Resource management where the community takes Management and responsibility for monitorlng and enforce- Co-management ment. CBRM provldes a sense of ow ier- ship over the resource which makes the The growing realization of the need for community far more responsible for long- a stronger community role in resource term sustainability of resources. This is management can be seen in a wide range accomplished by establishing a resource of programs and policles worldwide. Both management regime and rules of behavior for resource use. By making maximum can be a complex undertaking, which may use of indigenous knowledge and expertise, not yield immediate results. in addition, CBRM allows each communlty to develop many of the solutions to sustainable fisheries a management strategy whlch meets its management may lie in sectors outside own particular needs and conditions. CBRM fisheries. When combined with community/ permits a sufficient degree of flexibility economlc development and integrated and can easily be modifled. Involvement coastal resource management activities, of the community in the formulation and these concerns can often be addressed. implementation of management measures will lead to a higher degree of accept- ability and a stronger commitment to comply Rlghts, Reglmes and with the marlagement strategy (Korten Instltutlonal Arrangements 1986; Cernea 199 1 ). Community-based management is not. An essential ingredient for success of however, a panacea for resource any resource management system, whether management. It may not be suitable for communlty-based or centralized. is the wey fishing community. Many communities system of incentives and sanctions - rights may not be willing to or capable of taking and rules - for influencing individual behavior on the responsibility of CBRM. Not all of resource users and dependents. Thus, elements of fisheries management authority at the core of community-based can, or should, be allocated to the local management are the issues of property community. For many communities, rights, resource management regimes and economlc, social and/or political incentlves institutional arrangements. Specifically of to engage in community management may interest in CBRM are common-property not be present. The risks involved in regimes. Common-property regimes arc changlng fisheries management strategies forms of management grounded in a set may be too high for some communities of accepted rights and rules by a group and fishers. of resource users for the sustainable and Despite the many advantages of CBRM, interdependent use of collective goods. it is unllkely that local communities can A collective good is defined as a resource successfully implement fisheries managed and controlled by a group of management on their own. A more dynamic users (Pomeroy 1994). partnership must evolve. using the capacities Common-property management issues and Interests of the local community, have recently received much greater complemented by the ability of the national attentlon since they are felt to be critical government to provlde enabling legislation to the practical work on development and other assistance. This partnership can projects, primarily agriculture. forestry and be called co-management, where the fisheries (Bromley 1892).In many parts national government and the communlty of the world, rights to common property share authority. Community-based are all that separate the poor From management is a central element of co- destltution. It has been pointed out that management. The amount of authority that development planners must eventually the national government and the community deal, elther explicitly or implicitly, wlth have will differ and depend upon the country the issue of Institutional arrangements for and site-specific condltlons (Pinkerton 1989: property rights and rules over natural Berkes et al. 199 1 ). It should be noted resources (Bromley and Cernea 1989). that by itself, the planning and Renewed interest In the role of community- implementation of fisheries management level Institutions and the Importance of indigenous knowledge and traditional values throughout the region. an increasing number and institutions in the management of of community-based coastal fisheries common property is a result, in part, of management projects have been under- past failures of development projects and taken. These projects are being imple- the search for sustainable alternatives to mented through a variety of strategies. existing systems of resource use. This is good In the sense that a number The transfer of management control from of approaches to CBRM are being tried. local communltles to the national gov- It Is bad in the sense that many of the ernment has often resulted in the replace- project planners and staff are not fully ment of common-property regimes by open aware of past experiences In community- access. based management or of the recent, vast Depending upon the conditions of the literature on CBRM and common-prop- area and the resource, it may be more erty resources. Some projects are being appropriate to restore common-property carried out from "scratch", going through regimes than to promote privatization or the same. often unsuccessful processes nationalization. This 1s due in part to pre- as previous projects. There was a Felt need vailing sociocultural values of resource to bring together researchers and prac- users which often conflict with private titioners from around the region and the property,and past failures of nationali- world who could consolidate the concepts, zation (Bromley and Cernea 1889). Suc- methods and experiences in community- cessful common-property management based management and common-prop- may be found through a combination of erty resources in coastal fisheries. This approaches. The application of commu- pool of information could then be made nity-based management and exclusive use more readily available to their counter- rights, such as territorial use rights in fisheries parts in Asia and the Pacific for improv- (TURFS), presents one viable approach. ing project planning and implementation. Fisheries management policies in de- In june 1983, the International Asso- veloping countries are shaped through ciation for the Study of Common Prop- a convergence of institutional interests erty held its fourth annual conference In among resource users, resource Manila, Philippines. Earlier that year, the stakeholders, community, local govern- lnternational Center for Livlng Aquatic ment, national government and interna- Resources Management (ICLARM) in the tional agencies. Those concerned with Philippines approached the lnternational reorienting fisheries management to pro- Development Research Centre (IDRC) and mote social and sustainable policies need Ford Foundation to cofund a post-con- to recognize this convergence of insti- ference workshop focusing upon commu- tutions and interests ifthey are to restructure nity-baed management and common prop- them effectively. erty of coastal fisheries. The IDRC agreed to finance the workshop and suggested that a concurrent one on upland resources The Workshop would be valuable. The three-day workshop was held on It is within the context of the concep- 21 -23 June 1993,hosted by the International tual discussion above that an interna- Institute for Rural Reconstruction in Sllang, tional workshop on community-based Cavite. ICLARM organized the program resource management and common prop- for the coastal fisheries workshop and erty of coastal fisheries in Asia and the handled the local arrangements for the Pacific was convened. In recent years, uplands workshop, which was set up in turn by IDRC. Over 70 people from around of the Commons" ( 1W), common property the world attended both workshops. The and the necessity For centralized government proceedings of the uplands workshop have regulation OF Fisheries (Berkes 1 888: Berkes been published by lDRC (Thompson 1993). and Feeny 1990; Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom The general goal of the coastal Rsher- 1990; McKean 1992: Bardharn 1993; les workshop and Its proceedings was to Seabright 1993). These challenges to document the concepts, methods and established knowledge have been brought experiences in community-based man- about by the accumulation of more empirical agement and common-property resources evidence on common-property resources In Asia and the Pacific. These ideas would and community-based management systems serve as guidelines for wider dissemina- (NRC1986; Bromley 1992).This has resulted tion and utilization in the region. Four- in a new conceptual focus of inquiry based teen experts from Asia, the Pacific and on the role of institutions and property worldwide were invited to present pa- rights in resource management, the topic pers dealing with specific topics on the of the first three papers. above theme. (See the Appendices For David Feehy reviews a number of the workshop program, paper titles, au- frameworks, both conventional and more thors and participants). recent, For understandlng resource The workshop Itself was organized so management in the context of common that both the coastal fisheries and the property. Feeny emphasizes that recent uplands groups met together on the first literature in economics has recognized day to listen to and discuss three con- a fourth category or pillar oFvariables for cept papers on community-based man- describing economic systems - institutions. agement and common property. The two Together with resource endowments, groups then split up on the second and preferences and technology, institutions, third days to follow their own agenda. the 'rules OF the game", shape the They came back together briefly at the possibilities for economic activity. end of the thlrd day to present a sum- Institutional arrangements, in general, and mary of the papers and group discussions. property rights, in particular, form the nature of resource use and management OF the The Papers commons. Reviewing the works OF Hardin et al. The contrlbutions at the workshop are on the nature of common-property resource classlfled into three parts - concepts, meth- management, Feeny points out that more ods and experiences. The three concept recent theoretical and empirical studies papers review recent analytical Frameworks on the subject illustrate that while the and empirical evldence about common- Tragedy of the Commons approach should property resources and CBRM. The eight not be ignored, the conclusions it draws method papers discuss a variety of criti- are not unequivocal. Management cal issues and procedures For implementing mechanisms for common-property resources CBRM. The three experience papers, all need to acknowledge the importance of from the Philippines, discuss lessons learned incentives for cooperation and individual from ongoing and completed community- self-interest, as well as balance the claims based coastal fisheries management of multiple uses and users. The more recent projects. work argues that Institutions matter, as Recent works by a number OF researchers does the abillty to enforce collective and practitioners have questioned the agreements and innovate and accommodate conventional wisdom of Hardin's "Tragedy evolving challenges. Feeny concludes that "the frameworks imply a strong and central erty rlghts and management of coastal role for local knowledge" In developing fisheries worldwlde. This should include a strategy for common-property resource an abandonment of the conventional ideals management. of open access and centralized govern- Building on the general discussion of ment regulatlon. Berkes contends that many the different frameworks for understanding of the problems in coastal fisheries world- management of common-property re- wide are not due mainly to the resource sources, Elinor Ostrom discusses results users but to Western-trained resource from the study of common-pool resources managers who still confuse common-prop- using a specific framework of analysis. erty regimes with open access and are The Institutional Analysis and Develop- convinced of the necessity of a higher ment (IAD) Framework, developed by authority. Ostrom and her colleagues at the Work- Similar to Feeny, Berkes states that recent shop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis work on common-property resources il- at Indiana University, focuses on the Iden- lustrates that left to their own devices, tification of contextual attributes that shape communities of fishers may use stocks various action situations, i.e., resource sustainably under certain condltions. If management strategies. The IAD links the communlty-based management of flsh- characteristics of the physical world with eries Is to succeed, the conditions con- those of the general cultural setting of ducive to sustainable use of stocks by fishers the resource users; the specific rules-in- must be produced. This means that the use that affect the incentives individuals managers must create a management role face in a particular situation; the patterns for the community of flshers. Institutions of interaction among the resource users; must be built which enhance the capa- and the likely outcomes. bility of fishers for resource management, Recent research has applied this frame- including the reorganization of property work to common-pool resource systems rights. Berkes avers that co-management, worldwide. A result of this research has involving more participatory decision- been the identification of 'design prin- making, organized fishers' groups and ciples" which appear to characterize most incentives for cooperation, as mentioned of the robust common-pool resource in- by both Feeny ark Ostrom, is consistent stitutlons. While these design principles with sustainable coastal fisheries devel- illustrate that community-governed com- opment. mons can be sustainable, they are sus- The eight papers presented at the second ceptible to internal and external threats part of the workshop discuss the range to this sustainability. Ostrorn discusses of issues and procedures In the devel- these threats, as well as coping rnecha- opment and implementation of effective nisrns. The conclusion drawn from Ostrom's community-based coastal fisheries rnan- paper Is that while threats do exist to agement. effective and sustainable self-governed Building on Berkes' artlcle. Ken Ruddle common-pool resources, evidence reveals asserts that it is becoming increasingly that these resources and their institutions clear that CBRM systems may have an In many countries can be long-lasting. important role in the co-management OF Discussing the issues of property rights coastal fisherles. Reviewing various fisheries and in particular, common-property re- regulatory techniques In the context of sources. In the context of coastal fisher- small-scale tropical fisheries, Ruddle ad- ies, Fikret Berkes argues about the need vocates the property rights alternative in to reassess the policy implications of prop- which communities or groups of individual rlghts holders make and enforce thelr own suggests that fishers' cooperatives may regulatlons for a defined resource area. be the most appropriate form since It is such as the TUW concept. However, to probably the most widespread and well- succeed. the property rlghts approach must known formal organization of Fishers be nested in a system of traditional com- worldwide. While the literature Is replete munity-based management. Ruddle points with reviews of failed fishers' coopera- out that traditional community-based marine tives, recent studies have systematically resource management systems in the Asla- and quantitatively identified numerous Paciflc reglon are or were managed by factors influencing the relative success systems of property rights, defined user and failure of this type of organization. groups, defined resource terrltorles, and Pollnac asserts that these factors, when rights and rules which closely reflect so- used systematically, can provide a more cial organiations and local power structure. rigorous understanding on whether fishers' While recognizing that tradltlonal CBRM cooperatives can or should be used to systems have difficulties, Ruddle states facilitate people's participation in the that they have a future In a form of co- management process. '\ management with some higher level of \ohn Kurlen points out that the "corn-,. government. To be effective, however, munity" about which we talk so much in an explicit government policy will be community-based management has required regarding the scope and power changed slgnificantly with time as It has of communlty management, flexible to been incorporated into larger national and the needs of local communities. international systems. Social, economic. The inability of the state to slow down cultural, technologlcal, resource and in- or reverse environmental degradation has stitutional conditions of the community forced a rethinking of the problem and have altered and In many cases a variety its solutions. Grassroots movements for of conflicts have arisen. Before we can people empowerment. developed through begin to develop or reinvigorate com- years of struggle, are now flndlng sup- munity-based management systems. Kurien port in environmental Initiatives world- emphasizes the need to redefine and re- wide. Mary Racelis afflrms that people discover the "community" in the context who are organized, aware of their rights of today's social, economic and political and ready to exercise them, and partners1 realities. Rebuilding community must be In the planning and Implementation of undertaken through the establishment of resource management systems, can bring 'communlty property" over coastal wa- about sustainable development. People- ters, sociocconomic development, inte- centered resource management can en- grated multlsectoral coastal management, able an effective collaboration among flshers, \ and the forging of a new relationship with i nongovernmental organizations (NCOs), 'I the global society and economy. Kurien people's organizations, the government \ concludes that the coastal community has and others. /-+ changed and as such, our approaches to Richard Pollnac, building on the argu- community-based management must bal- ments made by Racelis for people's par- ance the forces which have brought about ticlpatlon in fisheries co-management. this change. specifies it further through fishers' co- Hal McArthur describes ways to enhance operative-type organizations. While various communicatlon between and among fishers types of fishers' organizations such as NWs and fisher groups and researchers, planners and stakeholder assoclatlons have been and development practitioners. With suggested for people's participation, Pollnac Increasing pressure on coastal resources from multlplc users, he suggests that prospect for adoption of co-management dialogue can resolve conflicts and produce in the near future. a consensus about sustainable resource Much has been written about the Inability management strategies. The various of national governments to slow down methods and techniques developed to or reverse the overexploitation and create dialogue with community-based d-egradatlonof coastal fisheries. In many clients can be grouped and evaluated in countrles In Asia. the role of the national terms of the underlying conceptual government is being replaced by NGOs orientation, the objectlves of the actlvity, which can facllltate development through the research framework used and the desired people's participation and community type of relatlonship with the community. organizing. What is the role of the national Of the three major conceptual orientations government and NGOs in resource for creating community dlalogue - transfer management7 Angel Alcala and Fred Vande of technology approach, agroecology and Vusse see a need for the government to participatory action research - McArthur recognize resource users as the real day- states that the latter two concepts are to-day managers of coastal resources. the most relevant to marine and coastal Discussing the Philippines, but resources management. Due to the acknowledging that the issues and complexity of coastal fisheries management. challenges It faces are similar to those various aspects of these two conceptual In other Asian countrles, they advocate orientations may need to be combined a more developmental than regulatory Into a research and intervention strategy approach of the government to to generate information and communicntion management. The government should for management. encourage and assist communitles and The management of small-scale coastal resource users in building their capacity fisherles requires, among other activities, to manage fisheries resources. Coastal planning and the setting of objectlves. communitles should be urged to move and this in turn needs a good understanding away from de Facto open access through of the fishers, their values and culture, the use of property rights to limit entry, the resource attributes, institutions and such as TURFS. the overall environment in which the fishers In the Phlllpplne setting. Grlito Monuevo operate. According to Kuperan and recommends a facilitative role for a service Mustapha, without prior knowledge of NGO, essential in helping build the nec- these attributes, any attempts to man- essary social Infrastructure for implementing age will often be met with serious re- community-based management. In do- sistance and noncompliance. The objec- ing its work, the NGO can assist In com- tives of the managers and the fishers can munity organizing, training and educa- often be different and conflicting. This tion, livelihood development, advocacy requires, as discussed by McArthur, the and financial resource mobilizatlon, creation of dialogue to develop a con- Aiionuevo argues that comrnunlty-based sensus to ensure effective management. management, to be effective and sustainable. Co-management can provide a forum for must assign property rights to the resource fishers to partlcipate in decislonmaking, base to Its direct stakeholders - the coastal as well as have the authority to make and communities and resource users. Moreover, implement regulatory decisions on their community-based management must move own. Kuperan and Mustapha conclude. beyond regulation and address the ba- however, that among the Southeast Asian sic factors which cause poverty among countries, only the Phillppines has a high the coastal inhabitants. Practical experience in community-based ship at both the community and project coastal fisheries management in the Asia- management levels. Pacific region is much more limited than The Central Visayas Regional Project in other resource systems such as irriga- (CVRP) had the objective OF addressing tion and forestry. Yet looking around the both land-based and marine resource man- region it is possible to find an increas- agement issues in four provinces in cen- ing number of coastal fisheries develop- tral Philippines. In addition, the project ment projects which implement CBRM strat- was to reinforce the Philippine govern- egies. This is especially true for the Phil- ment's regionalization or decentralization ippines, where since the mid- 19805, several program and develop both governmen- projects have begun to work with Fish- tal and resource users' capability to manage ers to develop community-based man- resources. agement systems for coastal resources. Fisheries was only one component of In the third part of the workshop, the three the large, World Bank-funded regional papers presented discuss experiences and project. Rafael Bojos recounts that CVRP lessons learned from three projects. recognized From the start that the resource The island-community of Malalison in users were the real managers and that central Philippines was selected by the the project should be carried out through Aquaculture Department of the Southeast a co-management approach. The CVRP Asian Fisheries Development Center staff and the government worked with (SEAFDEC) as a project slte to undertake fishers and the community to develop in- a multidisciplinary, development-oriented stitutional arrangements in resolving open- research on community fisheries resource access problems identified as the main management. The ongoing project has cause of resource overexploitation. Re- multiple objectives including the devel- source management interventions and opment of seafarming and searanching development activities were kept simple as alternative livelihood activities: com- and appropriate to meet the identified munity organizing and institution build- needs of the community. Community- ing; and regeneration of marine habitats. organizing activities were focused on the Rene Agbayani and Susan Siar of SEAFDEC barangay or village, the lowest govern- report that research and development ac- ment administrative level in the Philip- tivities have been undertaken simultaneously pines. Formal Memoranda of Understanding at the project site. Research conducted were approved by the Philippine govern- by SEAFDEC scientists are complemented ment to allow for secure resource access by community-organizing activities of an and management by users. Bojos con- NGO. Several problems have been en- cludes that project implementation must countered in project Implementation, such be participative. A sense of belonging and as high expectations among project par- responsibility for project success must be ticipants of immediate project benefits; imparted to the participants to encour- lack of coordination and communication; age them to join and sustain the project and unstable community leadership. In activities. dealing with these problems and in overall Started in the early 1980s, the project implementation, Agbayani and Siar multisectoral Palawan Integrated Area stress the need For open and continu- Development Project initially aimed at ous dialogue and coordination among re- improving agricultural production and searchers, development practitioners and natural resource management for the the community; clearly defined project Province of Palawan in the central western plans and objectives; and strong leader- Philippines. The project activities were expanded in the late 1980s to address Recent lnvestigatlons have shown that issues of environmentally sustainable when left to their own devices, commu- development through the Strategic nities of fishers, under certain conditions. Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan. One may use coastal resources sustainably. of the strategies of SEP was the promotion Fishers, the real day-to-day resource of CBRM through pilot-testing In dlfferent managers, must be equal and active par- resource systems, including fisheries. Rlcardo ticipants in resource management. An open Sandalo discusses the experiences of one dialogue must be maintained among all of these pilot-test projects, the Honda the stakeholders. Property rights to the Bay Resource Management Program resource must be assigned directly to its (HBRMP). stakeholders - the coastal communities In a slrnllar fashion to the other projects and resource users. The "community" must described above. HBRMP included the be relnvigorated through a multisectoral, beneficiaries/cooperators as co-implemen- Integrated approach to both resource man- tors and not mere recipients of project agement and community development. activities. Fishers were organized and project The community must be provided assistance activities reflected their priorities including to organize and develop the capability alternative livelihood, resource enhancement to take responsibility for resource man- and community development strategies. agement. Sandalo concludes that two primary el- Flsherles resource management insti- ements are critical for successful com- tutions have not kept pace with our tech- munity-based management: (1 ) the com- nological ability to exploit the resource. munity that utilizes a given resource is The result is that the management sys- organized, either formally or informally: tem fails to address the growing prob- and (2)the organized community actively lems of fisheries overexploltatlon; dissi- participates in project activities. The ca- pation and redlstrlbution of resource rents; pability of the organized community to and conflicts among different groups of take on the responsibilities of resource resource users. The starting point in the management must be established by the search for more viable and sustainable project staff at such a level that sustains institutions is to abandon the open-ac- project strategies and activities over cess ideals of the old freedom-of-the-seas time. principle and to recognize the failures of centralized management. A new manage- ment philosophy is warranted in which the fisher can once again become a part of the resource management team, bal- A number of general conclusions about ancing rights and responsibilities, and community-based coastal fisheries and working in a cooperative (rather than common-property resources management antagonistic) mode with the government can be made from the papers and dis- managers. Such joint management, or co- cussions at the workshop. The conven- management, is a rational extension of tional wisdom that fisheries resources held evolutionary trends in fisheries management as communal property are subject to over the past decades. eventual overexploitation and degrada- Commitment to CBRM should not be tion and that a centralized management taken lightly by either the community or authority is needed is not unequivocal. the government. The implementation of Traditional community-based management community-based management strategies systems have an important role to play. Is complex and takes time. Based on a new understanding ofcommon-property verslty of Oregon Press, Tucson. resource management, however, CBRM McKean, M.A. 1992. Success on the commons: a comparative examinatlon of the institutions provides a range of possibilities for sus- for common property resource management. tainable development of coastal fisher- J. Theor. Polit. 4(3):247-28 1. ies. NRC (National Research Council). 1986. Proceed- lngs of the Conference on Common Prop- erty Resource Management. Natlonal Academy Press. Washington. DC. References Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: the evolution of lnstltutlons for collective action. Acheson. J.M. 1975. The lobster fiefs: economic Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. and ecological effects of territoriality in the Plnkerton. E.. Editor. 1989. Cooperative management Maine lobster industry. Hum. Ecol. 3(3):183- of local flsheries: new directions for improved 207. management and community development. Bardham, P. 1993. Symposium on Management Unlverslty of British Columbia Press, Vancouver. of Local Commons. J. Econ. Perspect. 7(4):87- Poffenberger, M. 1990. Keepers of the Forest: land 92. management alternatives In Southeast Asia. Berkes, F., Edltor. 1989. Common property resources: Kurnarian Press, West Hartford, Connecticut. ecology and community-based sustainable Pomeroy. R.S. 1994. Common property regimes. development. Belhaven Press. London. Naga, ICLARM Q. 17(2):37-38. Berkes, F. and D. ~eeny.1990. Paradigms lost: Ruddle, K. 1985. The continuity of traditional changingviews on the use of common property management practices: the case of Japanese resources. Alternatlves 17(2):48-55. coastal Fisheries, p. 157-179. In K. Ruddle Berkes. F., P. George and R.J. Preston. 1991. Co- and R.E. Johannes (eds.) The traditional management: the evolution In theory and knowledge and management of coastal systems practlce of the jolnt administration of living In Asia and the Pacific. United Nations resources. Alternatives 18(2): 12- 18. Educational. Scientific and Cultural Organization. Bromley, D.W.. Edltor. 1992: Making the com- Jakarta. mons work. lnstltute for Contemporary Studies Ruddle, K. 1989. Social principles underlying tra- Press, San Francisco. ditlonal inshore flshery management systems Bromley. D.W. and M.M. Cernea. 1989. The man- in the Pacific Basin. Mar. Resour. Econ. 5:35 1- agement ofcommon property natural resources: 363. some conceptual and operational fallacies. Ruddle. K. and R.E. Johannes, Editors. 1985. Tra- World Bank Dlscuss. Pap. 57. World Bank. dltlonal marine resource management In the Washington, DC. Pacific bash: an anthology. UNESCO/ROSTSEA. Cernea, M.M., Editor. 1991. Putting people first: Jakarta. sociological variables In rural development. Seabright. P, 1993. Managing local commons: theo- Oxford University Press. New York. retical Issues in incentive design. J. Econ. Feeny. D..F. Berkes. B.J. McCay and J.M. Acheson. Perspect. 7(4):1 13-1 34. 1990. The tragedy of the commons: twenty- Thompson, C. 1993. Community management and two years later. Hum. Ecol. 18(1):1-19. common property of coastal fisheries and upland Hardin. G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. resources In Asia and the Pacific: concepts. Sclence 162( 12):43-48. methods arnd experlences. A summary of Hviding. E. and E. Jul-Larsen. 1993. Community- the Upland Resources Workshop. Environ- based resource management in tropical fisheries. ment and Natural Resources Division, Inter- Centre for Development Studies, University national Development Research Centre. Ot- of Bergen. Norway. tawa. Canada. Korten, D.C., Edltor. 1986. Communlty rnanage- Whlte. A.T. 1989. Two community-based marine ment: Aslan experience and perspectives. reserves: lessons for coastal management. Kumarlan Press, West Hartford, Connectlcut. 1nT.E. Chua and D. Pauly (eds.) Coastal area McCay, B.J. and J.M.Acheson, Editors. 1990. The management In Southeast Asia: policies. question of the commons: the culture. and management strategies and case studles. ecology of communal resources. The Unl- ICLARM Conf. Proc. 19, 254 p. The Role of Government in Coastal Resources Management

ANGEL C. ALCALA FREDERICK I. VANDE VUSSE Department of Environment and Natural Resouices Visayas A venue, Diliman, Quezon City Phi/ipp/nes

ALCALA, A.C. and F.J. VANDE VUSSE. 1994. The role of government In coastal resources management, p. 12-19. In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.)Community management and common property of coastal flsherles In Asla and the Paclflc: concepts, methods and experiences. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45, 189 p.

Background vide up to 30 t of fisheries harvest annu- ally f'rom every square kilometer or 60 times ilippine coastal resources are vast and the average harvest from the same area P"have great productive potential. There of open sea (Alcala and Comez 1985). are 18,000 km of coastline around 7.100 About one million families or six mll- islands with a total land area of about llon individuals depend on fisheries For their 300,000 km2. The Philippines' 200-mi livelihood and a Far greater number sup- exclusive economic zone (EEZ) encloses plement their diet with protein from the 2,300,000km of marine waters and the catch From part-time fishing or the glean- total annual fisheries production from this Ing of shallows at low tide. Fisheries products area is estimated at 2.2 milllon t. About are the major source of dietary protein, 75% of the total or 1.6 mlllion t are re- especially in rural areas. Fisheries resources portedly taken from municipal waters (1 5 of all kinds contribute 5% to the gross km from the shore) which comprise only national product each year. 11% (about 270,OM) km) of the nation's marine waters. This is because coastal shallows are much more productive than The Government's the open ocean and nearly one-thlrd of Legal Mandate municipal waters contain three of the most productive habitats - coral reefs, mangroves Natural resources in the Philippines are and seagrass meadows. A good quallty state property. Article XI, Section 2 of the Phllippinr coral reef, for example, can pro- 1987 Constitution provides that "All ... fisheries. forests or timber, wildlife, flora responsible for their protection and and fauna, and other natural resources are management but few are as restrictive on owned by the State." This section goes marine resource use as the Philippines. on to declare that "With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated"; "The ... development Exlstlng Sltuatlon and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision The Phillpplnes has an extensive and of the State" and "The State shall protect highly productive marine resource base that the nation's marine wealth ... and reserve provides livelihood and sustenance for a its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino significant portion of the population. A state citlzens." Article XIII, Section 7 adds a property management regime is clearly resource allocation provision which may spelled out in the law, but all is not well. be unique. "The State shall protect the rights Overfishing is widespread and well docu- of subsistence fishermen, especially of local mented (Dalzell and Ganaden 1987; Dalzell communities, to the preferential use of the et al. 1987).The productive potential of communal marine and fishing resources, coastal waters has been further compro- both inland and offshore." mised by pollution and damage to the most A series of laws provides various productive coastal habitats, coral reefs, government agencies with jurisdiction over mangrove forests and seagrass meadows. coastal resources and a mandate to protect Only about 30% of our coral reefs remain and manage renewable resources on a in good (25%)or excellent (5%)condition sustainable basis. The national agencies (Gomez et al. 198 1 : Gomez 1990)and over primarily responsible are the Department half of the mangrove forest area has been of Agriculture, particularly the Bureau of cleared to make fishponds, many of which Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, and the produce at levels well below their poten- Department of Environment and Natural tial (Camacho and Malig 1988). Resources (DENR), although more than 20 The concentration of fisheries wealth in separate national government agencies have coastal waters is oHen a source oFconflict a legal mandate that in some way impinges among those who seek to benefit from it. on coastal resource management. The Local Fishpond developers want to clear the Government Code of 199 1 transferred broad mangroves while small-scale fishers and powers over coastal resources from the wood product harvesters prefer to retain national government to municipal them. Industrial fishing vessels enter governments. These powers are to be municipal waters to compete directly with exercised within their respective municipal artisanal fishers and contribute to overfishing waters. there. Some fishers resort to Illegal and Thus, the management regime for all destructive fishing practices such as the Philippine natural resources is defined by use of dynamite and cyanide in an attempt law as one of state property (respublica). to increase their catch: however, they make However, the constitutional provision that the situation worse for themselves and reserves the use of,marine wealth for a everyone else by damaging the habitat that limited group. Filipino citizens, introduces supports the fish species they seek to the key element of a common property harvest. Reduced harvests for each fisher management reglme (res communis).Most translate into lower incomes and increasing countries of the world claim the natural poverty in rural areas. Fishers who watch resources within their boundaries and assign their catch diminish each year know they one or more government agencles to be have a problem but feel helpless as individuals to change their situation. They Philippine government agencies have often look to the government for assistance. been relatively ineffective in controlling Philippine law mandates a state-property dynamite Fishing for the very reasons cited management regime. However, given the above. Yet it is known that the vast ma- vast areas involved: the limited capacity jority of fishers oppose the use of explo- of the government to effect control; and sives and understand that it causes long- a lack of Functional communal management term damage to the fisheries: but as indi- systems, open access prevails in most places viduals they feel helpless to try control- most of the time. This condition has been ling this practice. However, where indi- categorized as cfe facto open access. viduals such as these have been organ- How did this situation come about7 Can ized and assisted by their local govern- any government with limited means ef- ment to take cooperative action against fectively manage coastal resources under dynamite fishing, success has been uni- a state-property regime? In attempting to formly high. formulate an answer to this question, three Recognizing that fishers are the real day- basic topics will be discussed: who actu- to-day managers of fisheries resources and ally manages coastal resources; the role organizing them at the village level to take of tenure: and the need for equitable re- positive steps in resource management are source allocation. important roles for the government. De- velopment nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that can assign Full-time workers Who Actually Manages at the village level are usually more ef- Natural Resources? fective than their government counterparts who can only make periodlc visits. It is common For personnel of the gov- ernment agency entrusted with the pro- tection and conservation of natural resources Role of Tenure to assume that the agency does in fact manage them. Laws are enacted and nu- Providing an individual or a group with merous rules and regulations are promul- secure tenure over a part of the resource gated by these agencies. To many, this is (either physical possession or the rlght to resource management. The government, beneficial use) serves both to restrict ac- however, does not have the capability. cess and to encourage greater concern for personnel and equipment needed to en- Improved resource management, although sure that its policies, rules and regulations the provision of tenure per se does not are enforced. The government must, in guarantee better resource management. reality, depend upon the people who daily Providing tenure also carries with it the use coastal resources to make proper potential for abuse if control of the resource management decisions. becomes concentrated in the hands of a Fishers decide each day if they will use few "lords of the sea", as suggested by dynamite, cyanide, fine-meshed nets or Christy (1982). The history of mangrove legal means of fishing. The government utilization in the Philippines provides some can work to influence these decisions but interesting examples of the various roles can only monitor relatively few fishers each tenure can play. day to enforce compliance with the law. Prior to 1975, mangrove areas could be Thus, effective resource management is alienated for fishpond development and really effective people management. This titled. Since then, the government has only is true everywhere in the world. leased areas up to 50 ha to individuals and 500 ha to corporations. About half of produced as much as the mangrove areas the Philippines' 450.000 ha of mangrove that were destroyed. forests have thus been cleared for While the major destructive force in development of an estimated 220,000 ha mangroves has clearly been fishpond de- of fishponds. Some 13 1,000 ha (59%) of velopment and a significant proportion of mangrove-derived fishponds are now the existing fishponds on government land privately held (Carnacho and Malig 1988). has been developed illegally, few cases The release of mangrove areas for fish- have been successfully prosecuted by the pond development continued through 1988 government. Conversely, there have been and sparked many protests by communi- many successful prosecutions for small- ties of small-scale fishers and mangrove scale mangrove firewood harvest, a prac- users who wished to retain the Forest. They tice that represents sustainable use in most seemed to understand and appreciate the instances. valuable contributions made by mangroves In 1990, the government altered its policy to coastal fisheries long before the scien- and began to grant traditional small-scale tific community did. Ironically, it was im- mangrove users secure tenure over existing possible then to get a 25-year renewable mangrove forest areas, provided they lease agreement over a mangrove area maintained the area as forest. The tenure unless one planned to destroy the forest instrument is the Mangrove Stewardship to create a fishpond. The government re- Agreement, a 25-year renewable lease. fused to issue a similar lease to anyone Where this approach has been implemented who wished to conserve the forest under with community organization and training a sustainable use system. in simple forest management techniques, In 1981, under Presidential Proclama- overharvesting for fuelwood has been tions 2 15 1 and 21 52, some 79,000 ha of eliminated, the forests are recovering and the best remaining mangrove forests were their contribution to coastal fisheries is unilaterally declared as mangrove wilderness increasing. (4.500 ha) and forest reserve (74,500 ha) Tenure can be a useful tool to restrict by the government. Communities that had access and provide a sense of ownership in many cases used these forests sustainably whlch can be a strong incentive for resource for generations were ordered by the gov- users to assume greater responsibility in ernment to stop. This "do not touch" policy management. Tenure, however. should not could not be enforced and the de hcto be awarded in isolation but rather in the open access prevailed. Traditional use context of an existing community continued within the proclaimed areas, as management system or one under active did illegal fishpond development. development. These policies led to situations where communities of mangrove users were faced with the imminent loss of their mangrove Equitable Allocatlon forests to a wealthy fishpond developer of Flsherles Resources from outside the community. As their pleas to preserve the forest had been ignored The Philippines has a large number of by the government, they cleared the for- artisanal fishers who depend on coastal est to create their own fishponds in an resources for their livelihood but their role attempt to retain control over their tradi- in the economy often seems little tional mangrove areas using the only means appreciated by the national government. that the government would recognize wlth The perception exists that artisanal fishers secure tenure. Few of these ponds ever do not contribute significantly to national (big city and/or export) markets, which is happening despite evidence of are better served by industrial Fisheries widespread overfishing and data in- and large-scale aquaculture. This viewpoint dicating that commercial fishing fleet persists despite statistics showing that horsepower should be reduced by 55% artisanal fishers routinely take 60-70% of (Dalzell et al. 1987). capture fisheries harvest, including, for example, most of the sashimi-grade tuna 3. Coastal resources management for export, and that aquaculture production problems are Further exacerbated when on average is well below international the legal system fails to perform standards. This bias is expressed in many equitably due to pressures From vested ways: several will be described briefly Interests usually those in high places below. with financial investments in industrial fishing, aquaculture or illegal Fishing. 1. The 1975 fisheries law (Presidential Nothing is more discouraging to a Decree 704) granted municipal gov- community striving to protect its ernments jurisdiction over municipal fisheries resources than to have clear- waters (3 nm or 5.6 km)but few specific cut violations go unprosecuted or mechanisms to exercise that jurisdic- strong cases dismissed for lack of tion. The same law authorized the interest on the part of government national government to issue indus- personnel. trial fishing licenses for use in waters 7 fathoms and deeper. A depth of 7 Artisanal fishers deserve their fair share Fathoms Invariably falls within municipal of fisheries resources. A great number of waters. This overlapping authority lives are affected when government ac- diminished the role of the local gov- tion (or inaction) denies this. Doubling the ernment and served to heighten the 2-kg average daily catch of an artisanal conflict between artisanal and industrial fisher with no corresponding increase in fishers. The Local Government Code effort will more than double his net in- (LGC) of 1991 now allows municipal come. This can have a profound effect on governments to ban commercial fishing Family life and can be achieved within months within their waters but effective en- after illegal fishing is stopped and com- forcement remains a problem. mercial fishing kept at least 5 krn okhore. Moreover, most of the artisanal harvest The national government has appar- already Finds its way into commercial ently been reluctant to limit indus- marketing channels so big city fish sup- trial fishing, possibly due to a con- plies need not be adversely affected. cern that Fish supplies in urban mar- The constitutional mandate that gives kets mlght be adversely affected. Mum- preference to subsistence fishers has sev- ami, a fishing method proven to de- eral possible implications. It can serve as stroy coral reek, was banned only after an effective check on the concentration a lengthy fight; the use of fish attracting of resource access control in the hands of devices (payao) that contribute to a few. However, it could also result in commercial overfishing (Floyd and perpetual poverty For fishers who would Pauly 1984) remains uncontrolled; and presumably lose their preferential rlghts drift nets that take porpoises, small to access as soon as their incomes rose whales and sea turtles in addltion to above the subsistence level. Without pref- tuna are being promoted locally al- erential access, their income could be ex- though banned internationally. This pected to fall again.

IAN R. ShA!T!-I MFMCF16L I !3?APY & DOZUA~EI~TA TI Jbl L 1 XI ILLARM the licensing of artificial reef clusters to lar community and the resources available restrict access and prevent ovefishing have to them. not received a favorable response. Some specific national government ac- Enactment of the LGC provides the po- tions would include the following: tential to solve many of these problems as It transfers control of most fisheries re- 1. Accept that there are Ilmits to natu- sources up to 15 km from the coastline ral production and a corresponding From the national government to local need to harvest within sustalnable governments. This is in part a legislative limits. response to the perceived failure of the 2. Gather and analyze adequate data to nationally run state-property management regularly assess the status of the re- regime to protect the interests of artisanal sources and provide direction for fishers. While the management regime under management policies and activities. the LGC is still technically one of state 3. Reduce the number of commercial property, the decislonmaking process has fishing vessels licensed by the national been brought nearly to the level of the government and make their licenses resource user. This bodes well for the es- area- and gear-specific. tablishment of what are effectively com- 4. Make the legal system work. It is not mon-property and private-property man- enough to have laws and organized agement regimes under the local govern- communltles to apprehend offenders. ment. Under a municipal ordinance, local The process must follow through to governments may now, for example, es- conviction and penalty when neces- tablish municipal marine sanctuaries or Ii- sary. cense artificial reefs. 5. Assist municipal fishers to organize and assume control over their fisher- ies resources. Development NGOs are Role of the Natlonal well suited to help with this task. Assist Government every municipality to develop a mu- nicipal fisheries ordinance that pro- If resource users rather than the gov- vides for effective and equitable fish- ernment are the real day-to-day manag- eries management. ers of coastal resources, then it is incum- 6. Support implementation of the LGC bent upon the government agencies en- because it complements community trusted with resource protection and man- resource management. agement to be more developmental than 7. Control water pollution to maintain regulatory in their approach. They should coastal productivity. This can be ef- encourage and assist communities to build fected through the application of an their capability to effectively manage their environmental impact assessment resources. This is true of industrial as well system. as artisanal fishers. Difficult decisions on 8. Develop good working relationships access limits must be made and are best with coastal communities and encour- done by organlzed and informed groups age them to assist the government of resource users. The major challenge to in the protection of endangered spe- the government then is to support local cies, such as sea turtles and dugong. communities and other fishing groups to 9. Carefully monitor resource manage- move away from de hcto open access to ment projects and practices and learn whatever combination of sustalnable man- From the observed successes and fail- agement regimes is suited to the particu- ures. Two recent Philippine examples that seek References to implement this approach are the en- actment by Congress of the National In- Alcala, A.C. 1981. Fish yields of coral reefs of Sumilon tegrated Protected Area System (NIPAS) Island, central Philippines. Natl. Res. Counc. Philipp. Res. Bull. 36: 1-7. In 1992 and the establishment of DENR's Alcala, A.C. 1988. Effects of marlne reserves on Coastal Environment Program (CEP) in 1993. coral fish abundance and yields of Philippine The NlPAS law accepts that people live in coral reefs. Amblo 17(3). E.D. and around declared protected areas; rec- Alcala. A.C. and Gomez. 1985. Fish yields of coral reek In central Philippines. Proc. Fifth ognizes their tenure; and seeks to involve Int. Coral Reef Syrnp. 5:52I-524. them in protection and management. It Anon. 1986. Marine conservation and development calls for the establishment of a Protected program. Flnal report and evaluation. Asia Area Management Board for each area and Foundation and United States Agency For In- ternational Development. Manila. 119 p. ensures that local representation will be Carnacho. A.S. and J.B. Malig. 1988. Brackishwater - prominent. The NlPAS law also provides fishpond development: status, management, a sound legal basis for the establishment regulation, Issues and problems. Paper pre- sented at the Workshop-Symposium on Man- of community and private-property man- grove Research, Environment Policy and In- agement regimes as a part of the park formatlon, November 1988. Quezon Clty, management plan to protect core areas. Phllipplnes. The CEP consolidates all of DENR's coastal Christy. F.T.. Jr. 1982. Territorial use rights in rna- rine fisheries: definitions and conditions. FA0 related activities. It stresses the manage-- Fish. Tech. Pap. 227. ment of coastal habitats by coastal com- ,+,I Dalrell, P. and R.A: Ganadcn. 1987. A review of munities under NlPAS or municipal-level theilsheries-for small pelaglc fisher"[; Phlllp- projects. Major objectives are to bring most pine waters. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatlc of the remaining mangrove forests under ,,,s Resources Tech. Pap. Ser. 1O(1): 1-58. Dalrell. P.. P. Corpuz, R. Ganaden and D. Pauly. cornrnunlty management as well as to assist 1987. Estlmation of maximum sustainable yleld coastal residents to pr~tectand manage and maximum economic rent from the Phll- major coral reef, seagrass and soft-bot- ipplne small pelaglc fisheries. Bur. Fish. Aquat. tom environments using the philosophy Resour. Tech. Pap. Ser. 1O(3): 1-23. + Floyd, J.M. and D. Pauly. 1984. Smaller site tuna and approaches discussed above. around the Phlllppines - can flsh aggregat- In summary, the government can play ing devices be blamed? INFOFISH Mark. Dlg. an effective role in coastal resources man- (5):25-27. agement at the national and local levels Gomez. E.D. 1990. Coral reef ecosystems and re- sources of the Phlllpplnes. Canopy Int. 16(5):5- by supporting the development of effec- 7. 10-12. tive management regimes by resource users. Gornet. E.D.,A.C. Alcala and A.C. San Diego. 198 1. Three key factors must guide this proc- Status of Philippine coral reefs. Proc. Fourth ess: (1) the recognition OF limits on natu- Int. Coral Reef Syrnp. 1:275-282. Savlna, G.C. and A.T. Whlte. 1986. A tale of two ral production; (2)the need to restrict access islands: some lessons for marine resource to sustain productlon; and (3) the provi- management. Envlron. Conserv. 13(2): 107- sion of equitable access conslstent wlth 113. the socioeconomic situation in the coun- try. Frameworks for Understanding Resource Management on the Commons

DAVID FEENY Centre For Health Economics and Poiicy Analysis and Department of C//n/ca/ Epldem/o/ogy and Biostatistlcs McMaster University 1200 Main Street West, Hamilton, Ontario L8N 325 Canada

FEENY. D. 1994. Frameworks for understanding resource management on the commons, p. 20-33. In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.) Community management and common property of coastal flsherles In Asla and the Paciflc: concepts, methods and experiences. ICLARM ConL Proc. 45. 189 p.

Common-Property Resource effects on the stock of fish. Subtractablllty (or rivalry) Is thus a salient characteristic of erkes et al. (1989) defined common- most marine resources. B property resources as 'a class of re- Similarly, upland resources suit the defi- sources for which exclusion is difficult and nition. The physical nature of forests is such joint use involves subtractability" (see also that exclusion is costly. In addition, at least Oakerson 1986; Ostrom 1986; Feeny et al. some uses are competitive. Clearing 1990. E. Ostrom instead used the term swidden cultivation and logging may pro- common-pool resource; see Ostrom 1990, mote soil erosion and a deterioration in water Ostrom et al.. in press). Most marine re- quality downstream. sources fit this definition. For migratory The definition of a common-property species, the problems of defining bounda- resource implies two major classes of man- rles or excluding potential users (harvest- agement issues. First, mechanisms to regu- ers) of the resource are obvious. Exclusion late access to the resource to handle the is also problematic for more sedentary re- exclusion problem, are needed. Second, the sources such as lobster. In addltion, as Is level of exploitation among authorized us- well known in the fisheries literature, the ers must be regulated to deal with the effort of one fisher may affect the current subtractability or rivalry problem. Thus, any productlvity of another as well as the fu- successful management regime will have ture productivity of all fishers through its to address these two fundamental problems. The Four Plllars they are also contingent on the "rules of the game" - institutlons. Common-property resources are man- There are three basic categories of in- aged within the context of a larger economy. stitutions: constitutional order, institutional Until recently the literature in economics arrangements and normative behavioral presumed that such a system could be codes (Feeny 1988b). The constitutional adequately described by specifying three order refers to the fundamental rules about major categories of variables: resource how society is organized - the rules for endowments, preferences and technology. making rules. institutional arrangements Now that It has come to be understood are created wlthin the rules specified by that the complex nature of institutional the constitutional order. These arrange- arrangements in general and property rights, ments include laws, regulations, associa- in particular, need to be described, a fourth tions, contracts and property rights, a key pillar, Institutions, should be specified (Feeny topic of this paper, Normative behavioral 1988b; V. Ostrom et al. 1988; North codes refer to the cultural values which 1990). legitimize the arrangements and constrain Resource endowments refer to the land, behavior. Normative behavioral codes also labor and capital (both human and physi- include the conventional wlsdorns of so- cal) available for use in economic production. ciety about how things work. The consti- Resource endowments include the nature tutional order and normative behavioral of the climate, topography and other im- codes evolve slowly; institutional arrange- portant elements of tRe ecosystem. ments may be more readily modifled. Preferences refer to the goals of the Together, the four pillars affect the pos- exploiters of the resource. What are the sibilities for the evolution of technology resource users trying to achieve? How do and instltutions. Nevertheless, the normative they rank desired outcomes? What are their behavioral codes and existing institutional tradeoh among competing and sometlmes arrangements may be the facilitators or confllcting goals? inhibitors of the creation of new institu- The third basic component of any eco- tional arrangements to improve resource nomic situation is technology. It describes management on the commons (Feeny the array of production possibilities. Tech- 1988b: Buck 1989; Ostrom 1990). nology includes information on how to combine Inputs to produce outputs. Tech- nology reflects knowledge accumulated over Property Rlghts and time, including both the formal scientific Property-Rights Reglmes and experiential types. Changes in tech- nology, such as the introduction of chain A key set of institutional arrangements saws or trawlers, clearly have the poten- is a system of property rights. Property tial to affect resource management. rights are a key element in the descrip- The first three pillars, resource endow- tion of any situation involving common- ments, preferences and technology, are property resources. Property rights assign important in shaplng the possibilities for benefit (and cost!) streams derived from economic activity. However, to understand the utilization of a resource. the operation of the economy, it is im- In general. "property as a social insti- portant to describe the overall Institutional tution implies a system of relations be- structure of the society and economy. tween individuals.... it involves rights, duties, Although the outcomes depend on the powers, privileges. forbearance, etc., of amount and nature of the resources available, certain kinds" (Hallowell 1943). Property rights are then a bundle of characteristics: (Bromley and Chapagain 1984: NRC 1986). exclusivity, transferability. inheritabillty. The group excludes others From harvest- alienability and enforcement mechanisms ing the resource and manages its use among (Hallowell 1943;Alchian and Demsetz 1973; members of the group. This type of prop- Barzel 1989; Schlager and Ostrom 1992). erty-rights regime was common among Property rights define the uses which are traditional artisanal fishing communities legitimately viewed as being exclusive and and is found in a number of contempo- who has these exclusive rights. Rights also rary coastal fisheries throughout the world, have a temporal dimension comprising the including Atlantic Canada, Japan and Mlcro- present and future. The Institutional arrange- nesia. Many village woodlots have also ments Include mechanisms for defining and been held as communal property. enforcing rights, consisting of not only formal Under state property, resource rnanage- procedures but also social custom and the ment is under the authority of the public legitimacy and recognition of rights sector who regulates both access and uti- (Hallowell 1943;Taylor 1988).Enforcement Ilzation. The regulation of flshing in na- depends on a constellation of supporting tional waters and tree cutting in state for- arrangements and mechanisms including ests are examples. courts, police, Financial institutians, the legal In private property, an individual (or profession, land surveys, resource man- household) Is assigned the rights. In the agement authorities, record-keeping system context of fisheries, aquaculture is often and titling agencies in addition to the so- conducted under private-property rights. cial legitimacy of property rights. Similarly, in the context of the uplands, There are Four basic categories of property crop lands are often held as private prop- rights For common-property resources: none erty. (or open access), communal, private and All or some ofthese categories of property state (or crown) (Berkes et al. 1989; Feeny rights may exist in a single society for dif- et al. 1 'WO).' Under open access, rlghts ferent tracts of land or resources. Further- are left unassigned. The lack of any ex- more, there are circumstances where the clusivity implies the absence of an incen- same resource can be categorized under tive to conserve, and therefore often re- more than one regime. For instance, ex- sults in degradation of scarce resources. clusive rights to crop production may be Until recently, most marine resources outside assigned to Individuals while grazing rights of 3-, 12-, or 200-mile coastal zones were are communally held by members of a vil- effectively held in open access. Forest re- lage. Likewise, Fishing rights may be held sources have often been treated similarly. communally while navigation rights over Under communal property, exclusive the same body of water are characterized rights are assigned to a group of individuals by open access. Thus, property rights For upland and marine resources are often 'The term "common property" sometimes refers to layered in space and in many cases stag- that classified as communal in the system used here. gered in time. Although in practice, re- but also applies to open-access situatlons. More gen- sources are often held in overlapping cat- erally. common-property refers to situatlons wherein egories of property rights, it is nonethe- excluslon Is dlFRcult and use Involves rivalry. To avoid confusion, group ownership Is therefore labelled as less important to distinguish the resource communal, rather than common-property rights. For from the property-rights regime in which more on these distlnctlons. see Berkes et al. (1989) It is held and also to describe the nature and Feeny et al. (1990). E. Ostrom (1990) preferred of the property-rights regime accurately. common-pool resource instead of common-property resource. and common property, rather than com- Moreover, it is essential to distinguish munal property. de jure property rights from cle hcto. Many common-property resources are classified Nature of sociai and as state property, their de jure designa- economic context tion. In practice. however, access is often left unregulated and de facto the resource This category includes information on is held in open access. In other cases, re- preferences and institutions that pertain sources held as state property are in fact to the resource, as well as social norms available for expropriation by privileged and cultural endowments. Is the nature of friends of those in power while the coer- the society such that it is easy or difficult cive power of the state is used to exclude to organize resource users? What is the ordinary citizens. nature of markets For the produce derived from exploiting the resource? Do fishers sell their output for local consumption or Framework for the Analysls to an export market7 Clearly, the size of of Common-Property Resource the market may affect the incentives for Management harvesting the resource.

Oakerson (1986. 1992) specified a simple Decisionmaking arrangements framework around which one can organ- ize information about any management This category describes the institutional regime for common-property resources. arrangements that govern access to and The original Framework was comprised of the utilization of the resource. The four elements: the technical and physical decisionrnaklng arrangements Include nature of the resource; the decisionmaking mechanisms for dispute settlement and arrangements; patterns of interactlon; and enforcement. The arrangements may in- outcomes. More recently, a fifth element volve multiple levels of authority consist- (In part based on the work of James T. ing of local. provincial and national. Thomson), the nature of the social and economic context, has been added to Patterns of interaction complement the information in the first category, the technical and physical na- Given the information on the physical ture of the resource. The framework closely nature of the resource; the nature of the parallels the four pillars described earlier. social and economic context (including the Each category will be described in turn. size and nature of the market for the products derived from exploiting the resource); and the decisionmaking arrangements that Physical attributes of the resource influence lndlvidual behavior -what strat- and nature of technology egies do individuals adopt? Do they co- operate to manage the resource on a sus- This category describes the resource tainable basis? Or do they free ride on the endowment and technology. It glves in- restraint of others and violate communal formation on the capaclty of the resource agreements governing resource use7 system; its boundaries; the nature of the technologies available for its exploitation; the natural rate of reproduction or renewal Outcomes: efficiency, equfw of the resource; and the physical ease or and sustahbility difficulty of regulating access to the re- source. A number of useful (and for the most part not mutually exclusive) criteria can be used to evaluate outcomes. Among them vate property or to government control are economic efficiency, equity and (Hardln 1978; Bajema 1991). sustalnability. (Of course each of these has a variety of definitions). The framework proposed by Oakerson Emerglng Themes (1986. 1992) can be used to describe a resource management situation at a point A number of recent works, however, in time. It can also be a diagnostic tool to question the predictions of Hardin's TOC identify the elements in a situation that approach concernlng the fate of common- might be associated with unfavorable out- property resources, e-g..NRC (1986); Berkes comes. In this context, it can be "back and Feeny (1990); Feeny et al. ( 1990): and solved" from outcomes to underlying char- Bromley (1992). The empirical record Is acteristics (examples of this type of analysis far from unequivocal. Although are provided in Ostrom 1990). Finally, the overexploitation and degradation have framework can be used iteratively over time occurred, their incidence Is not excluslve to help understand the evolution of re- to situations of communal property or open source management systems (Thomson et access as implied by the TOC argument; al. 1892). degradation has also happened under pri- vate- and state-property regimes. Siml- larly, successful resource management is Proposltlons from "the Tragedy found under communal, private- and state- of the Commons" property rights regimes. Apparently the TOC argument Is oversimplified. Evidences Our understanding and analyses of com- from a volumlnous case study literature, mon-property resources, in the natural and recent experimental studies and theoretical social sciences and in the formulation of developments all serve to qualify and en- public policy, have been profoundly in- rich the simple propositions embodled in fluenced by a set of germinal papers in- the TOC approach. cluding those by Gordon (1954), Scott This body of evidence will be discussed (1955) and Hardin (1968). briefly in an effort to examine important In the conventional wisdom derived from and sometimes overlapping categories of Hardin, Gordon and Scott, it Is argued that assumptions that underlie the TOC and all resources held in common will Inevi- Gordon-Scott (G-S) approaches about in- tably suffer overexploitation and degra- dividual motivations: characteristics of dation. This prediction was based in part individuals; nature of existing institutional from a confusion of open access and com- arrangements; interactions among users munal property. The concluslon was also of the resource; the ability of users to create inferred from an appreciation of the Im- new institutional arrangements; and the plications of subtractability. Users of the behavior of regulatory authorities. resource would collectively be better off It is important to describe the explicit if they all exercised restraint; any given and implicit assumptions made In both the individual, however, could do better for germinal work of Gordon and Scott, and himself by cheating on the collective agree- Hardin. In the TOC/G-S model, resource ment. users are assumed to act as if they were In Hardin's tragedy ofthe commons VOC) profit-maximizing firms. In their model, version of the conventional wisdom, there resource users (or firms) are essentially are two basic solutlons to the problem: identical - firms are homogenous and lack the transfer of the resources either to pri- distinguishing characteristics. The classic TOC/G-S model also assumes open access nomics literature and even more forcefully to the resource for all. Property rights are in the development economics literature, not allotted and property rights to har- utility rather than profit maximization of- vest of the resource stock are assigned only ten provides more powerful insights and by "law of capture". Furthermore, individuals analysis in situations in which there is no (firms) are assumed to have no direct contact clear separation between the household or interaction with each other and to be and the firm (Singh et al. 1986; De Alessi powerless to alter the institutional arrange- 1990). Thus. resource users have prefer- ments to affect the outcome. In this set- ences for leisure that affects labor supply. ting, as the incisive analysis of Gordon, The concept of the household-firm in which Scott and Hardin demonstrates, each re- production and consumption decisions are source user will take into account only his interdependent is applicable. own marginal costs and revenues and ig- Resource users also have nonpecuniary nore the fact that increases in his harvest goals and preferences including an appre- affect the efforts of other resource users ciation of the aesthetics of the envlron- (as well as perhaps the health of future ment (Karpoff 1985: Charles 1988).Such stocks of the resource). preferences have important implications; e.g.. a willingness to sacrifice some mon- etary gains for nonpecuniary rewards (De Alessl 1980; Becker 1993). Thus, higher incomes are traded off for the enjoyment One way to characterize the TOC/G-S of the livelihood and the lifestyle. argument is that individuals are assumed Finally, altruistic motives are also rel- to be myopic, oriented only to short-term evant. Cdtural norms, ideology and value gains. This conclusion results from the systems appear to affect the degree of free assumption of profit mnximizatlon, open riding (e.g.. Andreoni 1888; Buck 1989; access and law of capture which implies Feeny 1992). Evidence for altruism (in the that it is individually rational to ignore the context of the social sciences defined as effects on others or the future. In such an failing to act in one's own narrow self-in- environment, people act as if their rnoti- terest) must be interpreted carefully and vatlon was short-term gain even if that is in a balanced fashion. Complete free rid- not an accurate description. Thus, the ar- ing appears to be uncommon: but so is gument In the TOC/C-S approach that re- its complete absence. Social norms mat- source users behave myopically springs ter but may be insufficient to eliminate or from assumptions concerning the institu- control free riding when an enforcement tional environment as well as the under- mechanism is lacking. Nonetheless, self- lying motivations of the users themselves. interest does not appear to account for It is, however, clear that even when indi- all behavior. viduals are operating in environments such as the one presumed by TOC/G-S, they are aware of the effects of their current Characteristics of indlviduais actions on others and the intertemporal nature of resource rhanagement. In the TOC/G5 approach, individuals are Furthermore, their motivations are not assumed to be identical; firms are homog- accurately described as profit maxlmizntion. enous and therefore interchangeable. This The standard economic theory of the Arm assumption greatly simplifies the analy- is overly restrictive (Charles 1988).As was sis and was an important part of the original discovered decades ago in the labor eco- demonstration by Gordon and Scott of the incentives for economic overexploltatlon ethical norms that stressed sharing and in situations involving open access and cooperation, limited exploitation to sus- therefore free entry. As a description of tainable levels. A similar story can be told the nature of individuals and firms Involved for many upland resources. in the exploitation of the resource, how- In modern times, however, virtually all ever, the assumption of homogeneity ls resources are de jure subject to state regu- often inaccurate and sometlmes mislead- lation. Thus, the descriptive accuracy of ing. There are often considerable dlffer- the assumption of open access is sharply ences among individuals and firms in terms limited. Furthermore. the analytical impli- of the size and scope of their operations; cations of the assumption are potentially their abilities, education and experience; misleading. the degree of their lifetime commitment In addition, de facto there are often to the industry; their preferences over systems of informal communal property nonpecuniary aspects of their employment; rights. The informal and formal commu- their cultural values; and the technologies nal property rights systems as well as they employ. This heterogeneity has im- prlvate and state property serve to llmlt portant implications for political economic entry into the exploitation of the resource. analysis and the effects of regulation Free entry is not an accurate description. (Johnsonand Llbecap 1982; Karpoff 1987: Neither is Free exit. In many cases, re- Hackett 1992). source users have invested heavily in industry-specific human and physlcal Nature of existimg institutfonal capital which are not readily transferred arrangements to other industries. The TOCIG-S approach argues that the The germinal analyses of Gordon, Scott free rider problem is so severe that users and Hardin assumed an open-access, free- will be unable to organize effectively to entry and free-exit regime. The assump- coordinate strategies or provide enforce- tion of the lack OF property rights, formal ment mechanisms. It is assumed that agents or informal, was crucial for obtaining strong Ignore the actions of others in formulat- unambiguous predictions concerning out- ing their own strategles. There are, how- come - the eventual degradation of the ever, many counterexamples. Fishers are resource. Much of the subsequent litera- able to communicate with each other and ture derived from the G-S model and TOC devise cooperative strategles. Slmilarly, approach assumed either open access or a number OF Informal and formal enforce- state property. The standard literature has ment mechanisms have been observed. In typically Focused on only two property the Maine lobster fisheries, vlolatlons of regimes and thus has limited relevance in InFormal prlvate property rights to harvesting a variety of other commonly found insti- sites are met with gear destruction (Acheson tutional environments (e.g., Barzel 1989; 1989). More severe social sanctions and Schlager and Ostrom 1992). violence follow when milder sanctions are Yet before the modern era of powerful Insufficient to enforce property rights and governments, many fisheries were subject harvesting regulations. both to formal and informal property-rights systems and regulatlons. Typically, tradi- Interactions among tional hunting and gathering groups de- resource users Rned and enforced exclusive harvesting zones. In addition, customs served to regu- The metaphor used by many to summarize late intragroup use and when coupled with the TOC/G-S argument is the single-period prisoner's dilemma (PD) game.z In the PD defection-dominates-prediction of the game, defection Is the dominant strategy single-period PD game into one in which and thus overexploitation of common cooperation is a viable approach. resources is the prediction, even though both agents would be better off by Abl/lty to create new InstItutiona/ cooperating. Hardin directly appealed to arrangements this argument in developing his prediction. The relevance of the slngle-period PD is, In the TOC/G-S approach, resource us- however, limited. First, resource ers are powerless to create new arrange- management problems are usually ments to prevent the demise of the re- multiperiod ones. Thus, the game is played source. The costs of creating and operat- more than once, allowing scope for viable ing new institutions are indeed important cooperathe strategies to avoid the "tragedy" (Johnson and Libecap 1982; Rose 1991). (e.g.. Godwin and Shepard 1979; Kreps The creation and operation of these new et al. 1982: Berkes and Kencc 1987). In lnstitutlons is indeed a form of collective theoretical and simulation studies, tit-for- action and subject to free-rider problems. tat has proven to be a robust strategy which Nonetheless, agents are sometimes able resists challenge from others. (In a tit-for- to alter the set of institutional arrangements tat strategy, a player cooperates unless to create new forms that better address another defects. In the event of defection, their resource management problems. In- the player defects on the next round of shore fishers are capable of innovating new play to punish the original defector, and arrangements (Berkes 1985; Pinkerton then resumes cooperative play.) 1989). An important factor that affects Furthermore, Hirshleifer and Rasmusen institutional innovation by resource users (1989) demonstrated that in a finite-perlod is the nature of the political system. Japa- game, just a little morality, enforced for nese fisheries law legitimizes communal instance by social ostracism, is enough to ownershlp of inshore fisheries by village- make cooperation a dominant strategy. Thus. based cooperatives. Turkish fishers are able the multiple-period context of many to exploit the laws on cooperatives to obtain common-property resource management exclusive and enforceable rights to lagoon situations provides scope for learnlng and fisheries. In contrast, long-standing com- the evolution of rules and new institutional munal property rights without formal rac- arrangements that convert the stark ognitlon have often been insufficient to prevent incursions as in the case of the

Zlnthe basic PD game, each of the two players can displacement of artisanal fishers by trawlers cooperate or defect. In the orlginal formuiatlon, the in Northeast Brazil (Cordell and McKean prosecutingattorney has suffldentevldence to convict 1992) and the demise of informal ethnic two prlsoners of a petty crime but lacks sufficient management of the California fisheries evldence wlthout a confession to obtain a convic- tlon for a more serious crime that he Is sure they (McEvoy 1988). committed. The attorney interrogates the suspects separately, offerlng a I -year sentence each If both Behavlor of regdatoty authorities do not confess: 3 months for the person who con- fesses and 10 years for the other who does not; and 8 years each If both confess. In the context of There ls no expllclt model of regulatory flsherles. IF both players cooperate, for Instance to behavior in the G-S model. The norma- restrict their catch, they would both receive a pay- tive criterion used In the C-S approach to oFfof 5. 2 iF they both defect (refuse to restrict thelr evaluate the effects of policy is one of catch): and if one defects while the other cooper- maximizing net social benefits. There is, ates. 8 for the defector. 1 for the cooperator (Luce and Ralffa 1957). however, an implicit model of behavior for regulatory authorities in Hardin's TOC ecological knowledge, a great deal of approach. The implicit assumption is that potentially valuable information, obtained regulators will act in the social interest - through years of experience and obser- that state property will be managed in the vation, is lost. A number of studies high- public interest. light the depth and usefulness of these A large number of case studies, how- knowledge bases (e.g.. Ruddle and johannes ever, provide evidence to the contrary. 1985; Berkes 1989).Although this knowl- Efficiency or social justice does not ap- edge is seldom articulated in the language pear to have been the objective of many of the scientist or manager, it can irnpor- regulatory initiatives. In fact, the use of tantly complement and sometimes even state power to convert de hcto comrnu- substitute for scientific studies. nal property into de jure state property, Similarly, the wse for professional rnan- but cle facto open access, has contributed agement and regulatory approaches of- to the decline of fisheries and upland re- ten places too much faith in the accuracy sources in many jurisdictions. Similarly, the of the formal scientific knowledge of the damages imposed by the unregulated use resource. In fact, the degree of uncertainty of air, land and water resources in the in- about ecological relationships and popu- terests of industrial and urban users have lation dynamics has sometimes been pro- often jeopardized rural communal man- found. For instance, precise information agement regimes. on the determinants of fish populations A useful analysis of the behavior of regu- and therefore the effects of human pre- latory authorities thus requires a detailed dation is often lacking (Munro and Scott description of the legal, political and in- 1985). Regulatory mechanisms which rely stitutional setting as well as an understand- on careful fine tuning of the resource stock ing of cultural attitudes, value systems and may therefore be unrealistic. conventional wisdom. In addition, the time horizon of officials in regulatory agencies does not, in general, correspond with that Predictions and policy impIicatlons of resource users with a life-long commit- of the TOC/G-S approach ment to the industry or to the interests of society as a whole. Negative consequences The TOC/G-S approach predicts the of actions taken by an official today that overexploitation of common-property re- will become apparent only after he expects sources. The policy prescription generally to have already left office are unlikely to Inferred from the standard approach is the be given much weight in decisionmaking. transfer of the resource to private- or state- Those consequences are, however, often property regimes. The conventional wis- very important both to resource users and dom relies on market/government success. the general public. In contrast, the case-study evldence is An important assumption which underlies more agnostic. It recognizes the poten- many regulatory approaches is that resource tial viability of communal. private and state users themselves, the participants in the propedy, as well as the potential for over- industry, are largely ignorant of the ecol- lapping systems of property rights and co- ogy of the natural systems which they management. The evidence indicates that exploit. It Is often assumed that profes- private property does not guarantee suc- sional managers with training in the natural cess and that In addition to government sciences are needed to formulate policy. success there is government failure (De Yet by providing little or no incentive for Alessi 1990; Feeny et d. 1990; Copes 1992). participants In the industry to reveal their For instance, a state-property rights regime in Thai forest lands has not promoted the ies, which include: (1) rules and institu- socially optimal exploitation of the resource tions matter; (2) sanctions and enforce- (Feeny 1988a). Likewise, private property ment matter; (3) free riding is Important in the absence of unitization in oil fields but less than complete; (4)norms and Ide- has contributed to dramatically inefficient 010smatter; (5)communication matters; outcomes (Libecap and Wiggins 1985). and (6) inforrnatlon matters. Just as evidence from recent case studies One very strong result emerges from casts doubts on the simplistic arguments the laboratory experimental literature. The of the TOC/G-S approach, evldence from rules of the game, institutions, do matter controlled laboratory experiments in social (Smith 1987; Roth 1988). Outcomes dif- psychology, political science and related fer systematically among experiments in disciplines questions the approach. which different rules are deployed. For Laboratory experimental methods play an instance, Ostrom et al. (1392) demonstrated increasingly important role in the social different outcomes in experiments with and sciences. Although case studies can be without sanctions permitted and with and illuminating and are likely to remain the without communication. Outcomes in set- mainstay of studies on common-property tings involving both communication and resource management, they do have sanctions are more efFicient than those with limitations. The management of common- neither or only one of the two character- property resources involves complex istics. interactions among human agents. A number of experiments have been Modelling such behavior is difficult. In designed to test major propositions in game addition, because of the size, complexity theory and public-goods theory. For ex- and interactive nature oFcommon-property ample, Isaac et al. (1985) Found that al- systems, natural experiments are difficult though Initial voluntary contributions for to interpret and hence provide only crude the provision of a public good were sub- tests. In the naturally occurring settlngs stantial (but below the optimal level), in of case studies. frequently many things successive periods, free-riding behavior change at once, making it difficult to derive became more evident. After five periods. unambiguous interpretations concerning the level of voluntary contributions was underlying causation. low, but still greater than zero - free rid- In contrast, laboratory experiments permit ing was less than complete. Similarly, Kim more definitive tests of analytical propo- and Walker (1984) discovered that indl- sitions and inductive generaliutions (Feeny viduals with high personal pay-offs from 1992). Furthermore, experiments may also the provision of the public good contrib- be used as a simple screening device for uted more than those with low pay-offs. the assessment of proposed new institu- Moreover, Isaac et dl. (1985) learned that tional arrangements. The argument is that allowing for communication among experi- ifa new proposal does not work in an ideal mental subjects - thus more closely imi- controlled environment, it is unlikely to tating the natural environment in which function in practice. (Asymmetrically, the most common-property resources are fact that a new institutional arrangement managed - did increase moderately the works In a laboratory setting necessarily level of contributi~ns,although the optl- implies that it will do well under natural ma1 level was still not achieved. Field conditions). Evidence on the importance of norms Generalizations relevant to common- and ideology comes from an impressive property resource management have array of experimental studies in social emerged from recent experimental stud- psychology, sociology, political science and economics. These studies indicate that free of individuals: nature of existing institu- riding is typically less than complete, even tional arrangements: interactions among in situations involving repeated play and resource users; the ability of users to cre- experienced subjects who have had the ate new institutional arrangements: and opportunity to assess the costs and ben- behavior of regulatory authorities often efits of free riding.3 Mestelman and Feeny appear to lack both descriptive accuracy (1988) provided results suggesting that and predictive power. Important lessons ideology ameliorates free riding but does from the TOC/G-S approach should not. not overcome it. however, be Ignored. In the absence of Again in an experimental context, Cass the ability to exclude others and in the and Edney (1978) demonstrated that the presence of rivalry, the outcome is unlikely provision of up-to-date information on the to be optimal. Individual self-interest is a condition of the resource and granting of powerful force and must be taken into private territorial usufruct both move the account in devising viable arrangements rate of exploitation closer to the optimal for the management of common-property level. A number of studies corroborate the resources. Mechanisms need to be incen- importance of comm~nication.~ tive-compatible. It is possible to synthesize the results Another important theme that emerges of recent analytical, experimental and case from the literature is that the important study work into prescriptions for policy. resource management issue is often not A prominent example of such an effort is the regulation of utilization of a particular the derivation by E. Ostrorn (1892) of eight resource but instead balancing the inter- design principles for crafting institutions ests of multiple uses and users (Scott 1979; (or rules) for self-governing resource-man- Munro and Scott 1985; Copes 1992). For aging organizations, namely: ( 1) clearly instance, many fisheries have both com- defined boundaries; (2) congruence between mercial and recreational users. In addition, appropriation and provision rules and lo- many fisheries share habitats with other cal conditions; (3) collective-choice arrange- uses and users, including hydroelectric ments; (4) monitoring: (5) graduated sanc- power, forestry, irrigation, tourism, navi- tions: (6) conflict-resolutlon mechanisms; gation and shipping, landfill and harbors. (7) minimal recognition of rights to organize; Upland resources are used for agriculture, and (8) nested enterprises. Because the forestry, habitat preservation, water re- reasoning behind the propositions is dis- sources management and others. The con- cussed elsewhere, these ideas will not be text in which resources are managed is dealt with in detail here. substantially more complicated than the simple one pictured in the TOC/G-5 ap- proach. Five key messages emerge from a review of recent theoretical and empirical studies. The assumptions of the TOC/G-S con- First, success and failure are not uniquely ventional wlsdom approach with respect determined by the system of property rlghts. to indlvldual motivations; characteristics Both success and failure have been observed under communal, private- and state- 3See for example. Cass and Edney (1978): Marwell property rights regimes. Second, Institutions and Arnes (1979, 1980, 1981 ); Alfano and Marwell maRer. Third, a key component of successful (1980); lsaac et al. (1984); Klm and Walker (1984); lnstitutlonal arrangements is the provision Andreoni (1988): and Feeny (1992). %ee for example, Dawes et al. (1977): Liebrand of incentives for cooperatlon. Fourth, another ( 1984); lsaac and Walker (1988). key element of successFul arrangements Is the ablllty to enforce collective Berkes, F. and A. Kence. 1987. Flsherles and the prisoner's dllemrna game: condltlons for the agreements. Flnally, a third characteristic evolution of cooperation among users of com- associated with success is the authority mon property resources. Metu 1. Pure Appl. and ability to innovate instltutlonal Scl. 20(2):209-227. arrangements to accommodate evolving Berkes. F. and D. Feeny. 1990. Paradigms lost: chang- challenges. Ing vlews on the use of common property resources. Alternatives 17(2):48-55. These messages have Important policy Berkes. F.. D. Feeny, 8.1. McCay and J.M. Acheson. implications. Among these is the impor- 1989. The benefits of the commons. Nature tance of local biological, ecological and 340(6229):9 1-93. institutional knowledge. Although general Bromley. D.W., Edltor. 1992. Maklng the commons work: theory, practlce and pollcy. lnstltute for principles and frameworks have broad Contemporary Studles Press. San Franclsco. applicability, the fiarneworks outlined above Bromlcy, D.W. and D.P. Chapagaln. 1984. The vll- also imply a strong and central role For lage agalnst the center: resource depletlon local knowledge concerning the physical In South Asla. Am. J. Agrlc. Econ. 66(5):868- 873. nature of the resource; normative behavioral Buck, 5. 1989. Cultural theo~yand management of codes; decisionmaking arrangements;and common property resources. Hum. Ecol. soclal and economic setting. The support 17(1):101-116. Cass. R.C. and 1.1. Edney. 1978. The commons dl- of the human capltal capability and social lemma: a slmulatlon testlng the effects of re- and natural science Infrastructure for the source vislblllty and terrltorlal dlvlslon: Hum. accumulation of such local speclflc knowl- Ecol. 6:371-386. edge then becomes a key component of Charles, A.T. 1988. Flshery socloeconomlcs: a sur- vey. Land Econ. 64(3):276-295. any development assistance strategy for Copes, P. 1992. lndlvldual fishing rights: some common-property resource management. lrnplicatlons of transferablllty. 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ELINOR OSTROM Workshop in PoIiticaI lheory and Policy Ana/ys/s Indiana University B/oomin@on, Indiana 47405 USA

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Instltutlonal Analysls and Interactions (regeneration or deforestation): Development Framework and the evaluative criteria applied to these patterns and outcomes (efficiency, equity, e Institutional Analysis and Develop- sustainability). Common-pool resources T"ment (IAD) framework is an evolving (CPRs) share two characterlstlcs of a physical method for identifying and analyzing in- world: (1) it is costly to develop institu- teractions between the physical environ- tions to exclude potentlal kneficlaries from ment and sociocultural and Institutional them: and (2)the resource units harvested realms (Klser and E. Ostrorn 1982; E. Ostrom by one individual are not available to others. 1986; V. Ostrom 1991; Oakerson 1992; Recent research projects have applied this Thomson 1992; V. Ostrom et al. 1993). Framework to develop a database on CPRs The framework links the characteristics of (particularly irrigation systems and inshore a physical world (such as forests) with those fisheries) located in different regions of the of the general cultural setting (the villages world (Schlager 1890: Tang 199 1. 1992; and harvesters that use forests); the spe- E. Ostrom et al. 1992; Schlager and E. ciflc rules that affect the incentives indi- Ostrom 1992). After more than a year's viduals face in particular situations (how developmental work, we have now de- forest products can be harvested, utilized signed a new database to record information and maintained); the outcomes of these about forest resources and institutions in many different countries (E. Ostrom et al. What is distinctive about the IAD frame- 1983). work, when contrasted to frameworks that Analysis of human actions and conse- are closely tied to a single scientific disci- quences frequently starts with a focal arena pline, is that all situations are viewed as as shown in Fig. 1. Examples include situ- being composed of the same set of ele- ations where individuals decide when and ments. Thus, while harvesting or market- how much to harvest of forest products ing timber or thatch differ in many important from different locations, whether to es- ways, these diverse situations can all be tablish a forest users' association, or to described by identifying and analyzing how fence off a particular part of a forest to particular elements constituting the situ- prevent animals from foraging within. What ations under analysis lead to the patterns arena is analyzed depends on the qucs- observed. These elements include identi- tions of interest to the analyst. The ana- fying: lyst wanting to examine recurrent struc- the participants; tures of situations must, however, find ways the positions they hold; of separating one situation from another the actions they can take; for the purpose of analysis. Further, indi- the information they possess; viduals who participate in many situations the possible outcomes: must also know the difference among them. how actions and outcomes are linked; The actions that can be taken in harvest- and ing timber are different from those in har- the benefits and costs assigned to vesting thatch or in selling either timber actions and outcomes. or thatch. An individual who is repeatedly These elements are themselves relatively mixed up about what situation he or she complex. Many different action situations is in, is not normally considered compe- can be constructed from them. At the same tent to take independent actions. time that the IAD framework stresses a

Physical material + Incentives conditions '7 1 community interactions

individual

Rules in use P LAOutcomes

Flg. 1. A framework for lnstltutlonal analysis. universality of working parts, it enables inquiry that we have pursued over time is analysts to examine unique combinations the study of long-lasting resource systems of these parts. The array of potential out- that are user-governed. Many of these comes that can be analyzed and evalua- systems have been studied in depth by tive criteria, such as equity, efficiency, perceptive scholars such as Robert Net- sustainabllity and adaptability, is also very ting, Daniel Bromley, Margaret McKean, broad. Moreover, these elements are them- Fikret Berkes, David Feeny and others. The selves constituted by a deeper layer of resources involved vary from irrigation attributes about a physical and material systems to mountain grazing lands and setting: the community within which a inshore fisheries. The most notable simi- situation occurs; and the specific rules-ln- larlty among them is the sheer persever- use that affect the structure of the situa- ance of these resource systems and insti- tion. tutions. The institutions can be considered Action situations are perceived to be robust in that the rules have been devised nested within at least three relevant tiers and modified over time according to a set of action. Operational level actions are of collective-choice and constitutlonal- decisions which occur whenever individuals choice rules (Shepsle 1989).In other words, directly affect variables in the world by these systems have been sustainable over doing such things as harvesting products, very long periods of time. Most of the worshipping at a forest shrine, planting environments studied are complex, uncer- seeds, building fences, patrolling the borders tain and interdependent where individu- of a forest or feeding leaves to their ani- als continuously face substantial incentives mals. Collective choice actions constitute to behave opportunistically. The puzzle a group's decisions about operational ac- addressed in Governing the commons is tivities, e.g., the actions taken at an an- how the individuals using these systems nual meeting of a forest users' associa- have sustained them over extended peri- tion to keep a forest closed for the har- ods of time. vest of a particular product except for a The specific rules-in-use differ markedly specified time. Constitutional choice ac- from one case to the next. Given this great tions are decisions about how collective variation, the sustainability of these resources choice actions will be made. An example and their institutions cannot be explained is the resolution of a forest users' asso- by the presence or absence of particular ciation to create an executive committee rules. Part of the explanation for the that will meet once a month to determine sustainability of these systems is based on joint activities to be undertaken. Consti- the fact that the particular rules do differ, tutional choices are frequently made without taking into account specific attributes of recognition that they are indeed creating the related physical systems: cultural world a future structure to make rules about an views; and the economic and political re- operational action. lationships that exist in the setti-ng.With- out different rules, appropriators could not take advantage of the positive Features of Design Principles of Sustainable a local CPR or avoid potential pitfalls that Community-Governed Commons could occur in one milieu but not in oth- ers. The IAD framework has been an under- A set of seven design principles appears lying foundation for all of our empirical to characterize most of the robust CPR studies of common-pool resources and institutions. An eighth principle marks the common-property regimes. One line of larger, more complex cases. A "design principle" is defined as a concept used either Congruence between appropr/atlon consciously or unconsciously by those and provision rules and /oca/ constituting and reconstituting a continuing condkions association of individuals about a general organizing principle. Let us discuss each Appropriation rules restricting time, of these design principles. place, technology and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and provision rules requiring Cf early deflned boundarles labor, materials and/or money.

Individuals or households with rights Unless the number of individuals author- to withdraw resource units from the ized to use a CPR is so small that their CPR and the boundaries of the CPR harvesting patterns do not adversely af- itself are clearly defined.' fect one another, at least some rules re- lated to how much, when and how differ- Defining the boundarles of the CPR and ent products can be harvested are usually of those authorized to use It can be thought designed by the resource users. Well-tai- of as a 'first step" In organizing for col- lored approprlatlon and provision rules help lective action. So long as the boundaries account for the perseverance of the CPRs of the resource and/or the individuals who themselves. Uniform rules established for can use it remain uncertain, no one knows an entire nation or a large region of it rarely. what they are managing or for whom. can take into account the specific resource Without defining the boundarles of the CPR attributes considered in designing rules- and closir~git to 'outsiders", local appro- in-use in a particular location. priators Face the risk that any benefits they In long-surviving irrigation systems, for produce by their efforts will be reaped by example, subtly different rules are used noncontributing users. At the least, those in each system for assessing water fees who invest in the CPR may not receive as to pay for water guards and maintenance high a return as they expected. At the worst. activities, but in all instances those who the actions of others could destroy the receive the highest proportion of the wa- resource itself. Thus, for appropriators to ter also pay approximately the correspond- have a mlnlmal interest in coordinating ing share of the fees. No single set of rules patterns of appropriation and provlsion, defined for all irrigation systems In a re- they should be able to exclude others from gion would satisfy the particular problems access and appropriation rlghts. If there in managlng each of these broadly simi- are substantial numbers of potential ap- lar, but distinctly different, systems. propriators and the demand for the resource units is high, the destructive potential of all users freely withdrawing from a CPR Coffectlve choice arrangements could push the discount rate toward 100%. The higher the discount rate, the closer Most individuals affected by opera- the situation is to that of a one-shot dl- tional rules can participate In modi- lemma where the dominant strategy of all fying them. partlclpants is to overuse the CPR lhe CPR instltutions that use this principle are able to tailor better rules to local circumstances since the individuals who '~hlssectlon draws In part on E. Ostrom (1990). dlrectly interact with one another and with the physical world can modify the rules Graduated sanctions over time so as to better fit them to the specific characteristics of their setting. Appropriators who violate operational Appropriators who designed CPRinstitutions rules are likely to receive graduated sanc- characterized by the first three principle* tions (depending on the seriousness and clearly defined boundaries: good-fitting context of the offense) from other appro- rules: and appropriator participation in priators, from officials accountable to these collective choice--should be able to devise appropriators, or from both. a good set of rules if they keep the costs In long-enduring institutions, monitor- of changing rules relatively low. ing and sanctioning are undertaken pri- The presence of good rules, however, marily by the participants themselves. The does not account for appropriators following initial sanctions used in these systems are them. Nor is the fact that the appropria- also surprisingly low. Even though it is tors themselves designed and initially frequently presumed that participants will concurred with the operational rules an not spend the time and effort to monitor adequate explanation For centuries of com- and sanction each other's performance, pliance by individuals who were not origi- substantial evidence has been presented nally involved in the initial agreement. It that they do both in these settings. does not even suficiently explain the con- To explain the investment in monitoring tinued commitment ofthose who were part and sanctioning activities in these robust, of the initial agreement. Consenting to follow self-governing CPR institutions, the term rules ex ante is an easy "commitment" to "quasi-voluntary compliance" (Levl 1988) make. Actually obeying rules expost, when is very useful. She uses the term to describe strong temptations are present, is the sig- taxpayer behavior in regimes where almost nificant accomplishment. everyone pays taxes. Paying taxes is The problem of gaining compliance to vduntaly in the sense that individuals rules-no matter what their origin-is fre- chooseto comply in many situations where quently assumed away by analysts posit- they are not being directly coerced. On ing all-knowing and all-powerful external the other hand, it is "quasi-voluntary because authorities that enforce agreements. In many the noncompliant are subject to coercion- long-enduring CPRs, no external author- if they are aught" (Levi 1988). Levi stressed ity has sufFicient presence to play any role the contingent nature of a commitment in the day-to-day enforcement of the rules- to follow rules that is possible in a repeated in-use. Thus, external enforcement can- setting. Strategic actors are willing to heed not be used to explain high levels of com- with a set of rules, she argued, when they pliance. In all of the long-prevailing cases, perceive that: (1) the collective objective active investments in monitoring and sanc- is achieved and (2) others also comply. In tioning activities are very apparent. These Levi's theory, enforcement is normally lead us to consider the fourth and fifth design provided by an external ruler although it principles: does not preclude other enforcers. To explain commitment in many of the cases of sustainable community-governed CPRs, external enforcement is largely irrelevant. External enforcers may not travel Monltors who actively audit CPR con- to a remote village other than in extremely ditions and appropriator behavior are ac- unusual circumstances. The CPR countable to the appropriators and/or are appropriators create their own internal the appropriators themselves. enforcement to: (1) deter those who are tempted to break rules and thereby (2)assure monitoring is a natural by-product of using quasi-voluntary compllers that others also the commons. obey. The Chisasibi Cree, for example, have The costs and benefits of monitoring devised a complex set of entry and authority a set ot rules are not independent of the rules related to the coastal and estuarine particular set of rules adopted. Nor are fish stocks of James Bay as well as the beaver they uniform In all CPR settings. When stock located In their defined huntlng appropriators deslgn at least some of their territory. Berkes (1987) described why these own rules, they can learn from experience resource systems and the rules used to to craR enforceable rather than unenforceable regulate them have survived and prospered ones. This means paying attention to the for so long: costs of monitoring and enforcing as well as the benefits that those who monitor Effective social mechanisms ensure and enforce the rules obtain. adherence to rules which exist by virtue A frequently unrecognized "prlvate" of mutual consent within the com- benefit of monitoring In settings where munity. People who violate these rules information is costly is obtaining the data suffer not only a loss of favour from necessary to adopt a contingent strategy. the animals (important in the Cree If an approprlator who monitors finds ideology of hunting) but also social someone who has violated a rule, the disgrace. benefits of this discovery are shared by all using the CPR, aswell as provides the The costs of monitoring are kept relatively discoverer a signal about compliance rates. low in many long-survivlng CPRs as a result If the monitor does notfind a violator, it of the rules-in-use. Rotation rules used had previously been presumed that private in Irrigation systems and in some inshore costs are involved without any benefit fisheries place the two actors most to the individual or the group. If information concerned with cheating In direct contact Is not freely available about compliance with one another. The irrigator who nears rates, then an Individual gathers valuable the end of a rotation turn would like to data from monltoring. extend the time of his turn (and thus, the By monitoring the behavlor of others, amount of water obtained). The next Irrigator the appropriator-monitor learns about the In the rotation system waits nearby for level of quasi-voluntary compliance in the him to finish, and would even like to start CPR If no one is discovered breaking rules, early. The presence of the flrst Irrigator the appropriator-monitor learns that others deters the second from an early start, and comply and no one is being taken for a the presence of the second irrigator prevents sucker. It Is then safe for the approprlator- the first from a late endlng. Monltorlng monitor to continue to follow a strategy Is a by-product of thelr own strong of quasi-voluntary compliance. If the motivations to use their water rotation appropriator-monitor discovers rule turn to the fullest extent. The fishing slte infractions, it Is possible to learn about rotation system used In Alanya. Turkey. the particular clrcumstances surrounding (krkes 1992) has the same characterlstlc: the vlolation; to partlclpate In determining cheaters are observed at low cost by those the appropriate level of sanctlonlng; and who most want to deter another cheater then to decide about continued cornpllance at that particular time and location. Many or not. If an appropriator-monitor flnds of the ways that work-teams are organized an offender who normally obeys rules but In the Swiss and lapanese mountain happens to face a severe problem, the commons also have the result that experience confirms what everyone already knows. There will always be times and rights to withdraw from the CPR (Design places where those who are basically Principle 1) and that effectively restrict committed to following a set of rules appropriation activities given local con- succumb to strong temptations to break ditions (Design Principle 2), the commlt- them. ment and monitoring problem are solved A real threat to the continuance of quasl- In an interrelated manner. lndlvlduals who voluntary compliance can occur, however, think a set of rules will be effective in pro- if an appropriator-monitor discovers ducing higher joint benefits and that moni- individuals who break the rules repeatedly. toring (including their own) will protect If this happens, one would expect the them from being gullible, are willing to appropriator-monitor to escalate the make a contingent self-commitment of the sanctions imposed in an effort to halt future following type: I commit myself to follow rule-breaking by such offenders and any the set of rules we have devised in all in- others who might start to follow suit. In stances, except during dire emergencies. any case, the appropriator-monitor has if the rest of those affected make a similar up-to-date information about compllance commitment and act accordingly. Once and sanctioning behavior on which to make appropriators have made contingent self- future decisions about personal compliance. commitments, they are then motivated to Let us also look at the situation through monitor other people's behavior, at least the eyes of someone who breaks the rules occasionally, to assure themselves that and is discovered by a local guard (who others are obeying the rules most of the will eventually tell everyone) or another time. Contingent self-commitments and appropriator (who also is likely to tell eve- mutual monitoring reinforce one another ryone). Being apprehended by a local especially in CPRs where rules tend to re- monitor when the temptation to break the duce monitoring costs. rules becomes too great has three results: (1) it stops the infraction from continuing Conflict resolution mechanisms and may return contraband harvest to others: (2) it conveys information to the offender Appropriators and their officlals have that someone else in a similar situation is rapid access to low-cost, local are- likely to be caught, thus increasing confi- nas to resolve conflicts among appro- dence in the level of quasi-voluntary com- priators or between appropriators and pliance; and (3)a punishment in the form officials. of a fine plus loss of reputation for rell- ability is imposed. In field settings, applying rules always The fourth and fifth design principles- involves discretion and can frequently lead monitoring and graduated sanctions-thus to conflict. Even such a simple rule as "Each take their place as part of the configura- irrigator must send one individual for one tion of principles that work together to day to help clean the irrigation canals before enable appropriators to constitute and the rainy season begins" can be interpreted reconstitute robust CPR institutions. Let quite differently by various individuals. Who me summarize my argument to this point. is or is not an "individual" according to When CPR appropriators design their own this rule? Does sending a child below 10 operational rules (Design Principle 3) to or an adult above 70 to do heavy physical be enforced by individuals who are local work meet this rule? Is working For 4 or 6 appropriators or accountable to them (Dc- hours a "day" of work? Does cleaning the sign Principle 4) using graduated sanctions canal immediately next to one's own farm (Design Principle 5) that define who has qualify for this community obligation? For indlviduals seeking ways to slide past or lenged by external governmental subvert rules. there are always ways to authorities. "Interpret" the rule so that they can argue they meet it while thwarting the intent. Appropriators Frequently devise their own Even individuals who intend to follow the rules without having created formal, gov- spirit of a rule can make errors. What ernmental jurisdlctlons for this purpose. happens if someone forgets about labor In many inshore fisheries. for example, local day and does not show up, or If the only fishers form extensive rules defining who able-bodied worker is sick, or unavoidably can use a fishing ground and what kind of in another location? equlpment can be used. So long as exter- If indivlduals are going to follow rules nal governmental omclals at least mlni- for a prolonged period, a mechanism for mally recognize to the legitimacy of such discussing and resolving what Is or Is not rules, the fishers themselves may be able a rule infraction is quite necessary to the to enforce them. But if external govern- continuance of rule conformance itself. If mental offlclals presume that only they can some individuals are allowed to free ride make authority rules, then It Is dlMcult for by sendlng less valuable workers on a local appropriators to sustain a rule-gov- required labor day. others will consider erned CPR over the long run. At any point themselves suckers If they send their when someone wishes to break the rules strongest workers who could otherwise created by the fishers, they can go to the produce private goods rather than external government and get local rules communal benefits. Over time, only children overturned. and old people will be sent to do work that requlres strong adults and the system will break down. If lndlviduals who make Nested enterprises an honest mistake or face personal problems that prevent them From following a rule Appropriation, provision, monitor- cannot find mechanisms to make up for ing, enforcement, confllct resolution their lack of performance In an acceptable and governance activities are organized way, rules can be viewed as unfalr and in multiple layers of nested enter- compliance rates decline. prlses. While the presence of conflict-resolu- tlon mechanisms does not guarantee that In larger systems. It Is qulte dlmcult to appropriators are able to maintain endur- devise rules well-matched to all aspects Ing instltutlons, It Is difficult to imagine of the provlslon and approprlatlon of that how any complex system of rules could system at one level of organization. The be retained over time without such mecha- rules appropriate for allocating water among nisms. In the cases described above, these three major branches of an irrlgatlon sys- mechanlsms are sometimes quite informal tem, for example, may not be suitable for and those selected as leaders are also the farmers along a single distributory chan- basic resolvers of conflict. nel. Consequently, among long-enduring self-governed CPRs, smaller-scale organi- zatlons tend to be nested in ever larger Minimal ~cognkionof organizations. It is not at all unusual to rights to organize find a larger. farmer-governed irrigation system, for example, with five layers of The rights of appropriators to devise organization, each with its own distinct their own institutions are not chal- set of rules. Threats to Sustainable availability; substitution of relative Cornmunlty-Governed importance of monetary transactions: Commons heterogeneity of participants: 4. transmission failures from one gen- The study of community-governed and eration to the next of the operational managed commons provides evidence of principles on which community gov- an immense diversity of physical settings ernance is based: and institutional rules relatively well- 5. turning to external sources of help matched to the local envlronment. It is too frequently; important to recognize, however, that not 6. international aid that does not take all community-governed CPRs cope effec- account of indigenous knowledge and tively with the array of problems they face institutions; over time. Some efforts at self-governance 7. corruption and other forms of oppor- fail before resource users even get organized. tunistic behavior; and Others break down within a few years. 8. lack of: large-scale institutional arrange- Others survive for long periods of time ments related to reliable information but are destroyed as a result of a variety collection, aggregation and dissemi- of conditions. One source of failure is in- nation: fair and low-cost conflict reso- stitutions that are not characterized by many lution mechanisms; educational and of the design principles. Earlier studies have extension facilities; and facilities For shown that small-scale CPRs with only a helping when natural disasters or other small number of these design princlples major problems occur at a local are more likely to fail than those that possess level. a larger number of them. However, even institutions character- ized by the design principles flounder. Thus, Blueprint thlnklng we need to speculate about other threats to community governance that arise from Blueprint thinking occurs whenever Field observations, theoretical conjectures policymakers, donors, citizens or schol- and empirical findings of scholars study- ars propose uniform solutions to a wide ing small-scale CPRs or related situations. variety of problems that are clustered un- The reader is cautioned that the next two der a single name based on one or more sections are far more speculative in na- successful exemplars. Korten ( 1980)called ture than the First two. It is important, this the "blueprint approach" and made a however, to share speculations so that devastating critique of its prevalence in further research and analysis can be di- development work at the end of the 1970s. rected toward improving the knowledge As he described it: claims OF some conjectures and reducing our confidence in others. Here are eight Researchers are supposed to provide threats to sustainable community govern- data from pilot projects and other ance of small-scale CPRs that I have come studies which will allow the planners across in different contexts: to choose the most effective project 1. blueprint thinking: design for achieving a given 2. overreliance on simple voting rules development outcome and to reduce as the primary decision mechanism it to a blueprint For implementation. for making all collective choices: Administrators of the implementing 3. rapid changes in technology, human, organization are supposed to execute animal or plant populations; factor the project plan Faithfully, much as a contractor would follow construction Overreliance on simple voting rules blueprints, s'pecifications, and schedules. An evaluation researcher Closely related to blueprint thinking is is supposed to measure actual changes the presumption that certain voting rules- in the target population and report either simple majority or unanimity-are actual versus planned changes to the the only rules that should be used in making planner at the end of the project cycle collective decisions. The problem that users so that the blueprints can be face is gaining general understanding of revised. and agreement to a set of rules-not simply having a short discussion and a pro forma Korten's critique is just as relevant in the vote. The extensive theoretical and em- 1990s as it was more than a decade ago. pirical studies growing out of social choice Even advocates of community govern- theory have demonstrated repeatedly that ance Fall into the trap of blueprint think- if the community members are strongly ing. Whenever a policy is adopted that divided on an issue, it is extremely unu- calls for the creation of large numbers of sual to find any rule that enables them to farmer organizations in a short period of achieve a final decision that is stable and time, there is a potential threat of blue- reflects the preferences of those affected. print thlnklng. Sengupta (1991), for ex- Substituting a simple majority vote for a ample, descrlbed the efforts of the Sone series of long discussions and extensive Command Area Development Agency in efforts to come close to a consensus be- India to defend itself against questions raised fore making declslons that commit a self- in 1978 by policymakers as to why one governing community, may bring leaders part of its objectives was not being met to simply arrange agenda so that they win - "that pertaining to the formation of ir- in the short run. As soon as rules are seen rigation assoclatlons". The agency then as imposed by a majority vote rather than turned to 'the Cooperative Department to generally agreed upon, the costs of moni- frame model bylaws for the irrigation-specific toring and enforcement Increase. The group cooperatives called Chak Societies" has lost quasi-voluntary compliance and (Sengupta 199 1). The model bylaws con- must invest more heavily in enforcement tained 42 major and several minor clauses, to gain conformity. but failed to address how irrigation co- Similarly, reliance on unanimity prior to operatives might be similar to or differ- major changes may also challenge the long- ent from those established for other pur- term viability of a selfdgoverning society. poses. In the next year, 22 Chak Socie- Once formal unanimity is adopted, only ties were initiated in the Sone Command one person needs to hold out to delay area. But few of them performed in the decisions or impose high costs on almost way that policymakers thought they should, everyone else. The adaptability of a self- and the whole idea of registering irriga- governed system may be too rapid if only tion associations using the model bylaws simple majority votes are relied upon and was dropped. The only way to get a large too slow if only unanimity is used. number of organizations set up In a hurry is to have an organizational charter and constitution written for all units. Then one Rapid exogenous changes can simply call meetings and have peo- ple sign up. Such efforts result in large All rapid changes in technoloa, human, numbers of paper organizations and little animal or plant papulations; factor avail- else. ability: substitution of relative importance of monetary transactions; or the hetero- an organization recognize the importance geneity of participants are a threat to the of gaining general agreement, they will continuance of any self-organized system rarely push forward on a large project that whether it is a Firm in a competitive mar- is supported by only a minimal winning ket or a community-governed CPR. Indl- coalition. In such an instance, there are viduals who have adapted an effective way almost as many community members in of coping with a particular technological, opposition as those who support the project. economic or social environment may be But, if over time, the principle of gain- able to adjust to slow changes in one or ing general agreement to furure projects several variables if substantial feedback is prior to implementation is not conveyed provided about the consequences of these and accepted by those who later take on changes for the long-term sustainability leadership responsibilities, then decisions of the resource and/or the set of institu- receiving only minimal support may be tions used For governing that resource. They pushed forward. Leaders of communities may even be able to adjust to changes in who rely on minimal winning coalitions these variables that occur at a moderate for too many decisions, may resort to rate. The faster key variables change and patronage, coercion or corruption to stay the more variables that change at the same in power rather than depend on a foun- time, the more demanding the problem dation of general agreement. of adaptation to new circumstances. These Similarly, if those who are required to kinds of threats are difficult for all organi- contribute particular resources or refrain zatlons. Those that rely to a greater ex- from particular actions see these "rules" tent on quasi voluntary compliance are. as obstacles to be overcome, rather than however, more threatened than those who as the written representation of general are able to coerce contributions (Bromley underlying principles of organization, they and Champagain 1984; Goodland et al. may push for interpretations of rules that 1 886). lead to their general weakening. If each household tries to Find every legal way to minimize the amount of labor contributed Transmission faiiures to the maintenance of a Farmer-governed irrigation system, for example, eventu- Rapid change of population or culture ally the cumulative effect is an insuffi- may lead to a circumstance in which the cient maintenance effort and the unraveling general design principles of effective com- of the contingent contributions of all. If munity-governed institutions are not trans- one family tries to make a favorable in- mitted from one generation to another. terpretation of how much labor they should When individuals substitute rote reliance contribute, given the land they own, others on formal rules for an understanding OF soon discover it and those who would why these rules are used, they can ar- be favored by such an interpretation, begin gue on how to interpret the formal rules to use it as well. The total quantity of that undercur the viability of community labor contributed declines. Unless there organization. Relating this back to vot- is a community discussion about the un- ing rules, for example, the charter or derlying principles that can be used in constitution of a community organization interpreting rules, practices may evolve may specify that simple majority rule will that cannot be sustained over time. Then, be used in making decisions about fu- the danger exists that the unraveling con- ture projects and how the costs and beneFits tinues unabated until the community or- will be divided. If the founders of such ganization Falls apart. PumIng to external sources of construction of irrigation projects, plan- help too frequently ners attempt to deslgn projects that are "polltlcally attractlve." Thls means that A threat to long-term sustainability can politicians who support such expenditures be the availability of funds from external can claim that the voters' funds are being authorities or donors that appear to be "easy Invested in projects that wlll produce more money." These can undercut the capabili- food and the cost of Ilvlng. ties of a local Institution to sustain itself over time. Thls Is particularly dentIn regard to farmer-governed irrigatlon system^.^ lnternatlonal ald that Ignores Monetary resources for constructing, op- IndIgcnous knowledge and erating and maintaining irrigation systems Instltuflons are frequently contrlbuted by the taxpay- ers of the natlon In whlch the lrrlgatlon To convince external funding agencies system Is located or the taxpayers of those that major irrigation projects should be nations providing economic assistance. funded through loans or grants, the evalu- When these funds are used, the financial ative selection crlteria by these agencies connection between supply and use is have to play a prominent role In project nonexistent. Whether the resources so design. Projects designed by engineers who mobilized are directly invested In the con- lack experience as farmers or training as struction and operation of irrigation sys- institutional analysts, are frequently ori- tems or are diverted for individual use by ented toward winning polltical support or politicians or contractors depends on the lnternatlonal funding. This orientation does professionalism of those involved and on not lead to the construction of projects active efforts to monitor and sanction di- that serve most users (i.e., small-scale farm- versions of resources. When the farmers ers) effectively or encourage the invest- themselves are involved In the construc- ment of users in their long-term sustenance. tion and operation of irrigation systems, Inefficiencies occur at almost every stage. they provide low-cost monitoring of how At the same time, this inept process leads resources for these activities are used. This to the construction of projects that gen- is lost when the users are not involved in erate substantial profits for large landholders construction or operation. Expensive au- and strong political support for a govern- diting systems are then needed, but rarely ment. supplied. Consequently, a considerable Processes that encourage looking to portion of the mobilized resources is di- external sources of funding make it difficult verted to purposes other than those for to build upon indigenous knowledge and which they were intended. institutions. A central part of the message Further, the design of projects is ori- asking for external funds is that what has ented more toward gaining the approval been accomplished locally has failed and of those who release funds than toward massive external technical knowledge and providing systems that solve the problems funds are needed to achieve "development". facing present and future users. To con- In some cases, prior institutional vince politicians that large chunks of a arrangements are not recognized at all. national budget should be devoted to the Thls has three adverse consequences: ( 1 ) property rights that resource users had slowly achieved under earlier regimes are

Thls and the next two sectlons draw on E. Ostrom swept away and the poor lose substantial (1992). assets: (2) those who have lost prior investments are less willing to venture; tities, users demand greater quan- and (3)the status of indigenous lcnowledge tities, and the result is excess de- and institutions is generally downgraded. mand. One consequence is that the inputs acquire new value; the admin- istratively created shortage creates Corruption and other forms of an economic premium for those who opportunistic behavior acquire them. Another is that, at the mandated price, the market cannot All types of opportunistic behavior are allocate the inputs; they are in short encouraged, rather than discouraged, by: supply. Rather than being allocated ( 1 ) the availability of massive funds to through a pricing system, they must subsidize the construction and operation be rationed. Those in charge of the OF large-scale irrigation projects and (2) regulated market thereby acquire the the willingness (or even eagerness) of capacity to exercise discretion and national leaders to subsidize water as a to confer the resources upon those major input into agricultural production. whose favor they desire. ... Corrupt exchanges between officials and private contractors are a notorious and Public programs which distribute farm prevalent form of opportunism; corrupt credit, tractor-hire services, seeds, payments by farmers to irrigation officials and fertilizers, and which bestow access are less well-known, but probably no less to government managed irrigation widespread. Free riding on the part of schemes and public land, thus be- those receiving benefits and the lack of come instruments of political organi- trust between Farmers and officials, as well zation in the countryside of Africa. as among farmers, are also endemic. Moreo- ver, the potential rents that can be de- Thus, there is an added dimension to rived from free irrigation water by large-scale rent seeking in many developing coun- landowners stimulate efforts to influence tries. The losses that the general consumer public decisionmalting as to where projects and taxpayer accrue from rent-seeking should be located and how they should activities are one dimension. The second be financed. Politicians, for their part, win aspect of rent seeking in highly central- political support by strategic decisions ized economies is the acquisition of re- concerning who will receive or continue sources needed to accumulate and re- to receive artificially created economic tain political power. All forms of oppor- rents. tunistic behavior, therefore, are exacer- Bates (1987) explained many of the bated in an environment where an abun- characteristics of African agricultural policies dance of funds is available for the con- by arguing that major "inefficiencies persist struction of new and Frequently large-scale because they are politically useful: eco- irrigation projects that provide subsidized nomic inefficiencies afFord governments water. This is exactly the political and means of retaining political power". Part financial milieux that irrigation suppliers of Bates' argument relates to the artifi- have faced during the past 40 years in cial price control for agricultural prod- most developing countries. Developed ucts. The other part of his argument concerns countries have made vast amounts of money the artificial lowering of input prices. available to developing countries through bilateral and multilateral loans and aid When they lower the price of inputs, agreements. private sources furnish lesser quan- Lack of large-scale supportive up groundwater exploration in India may instItutIons lead to the massive destruction of groundwater basins rather than a firm ba- While smaller-scale, community-gov- sis for long-term growth. erned resource institutions may be far more Similarly, the lack of a low-cost, fair effective In achieving many aspects of method for resolving those conflicts that sustainable development than centralized spill out beyond the bounds of a local government. the absence of supportive. community is also a threat to long-run large-scale institutional arrangements may sustalnability. All groups face internal or be just as much a threat to long-term sus- intergroup conflicts that can destroy the tenance as the presence of preemptive large- Fundamental trust and reciprocity on which scale government agencies. Obtaining so much effective governance is based. If reliable Information about the effects of the only kind of conflict resolution mecha- different uses of resource systems and nism available is either so costly that most resource conditions is an activity essen- self-governed CPRs cannot make use of tial to long-term sustainability. If all local It, or so blased, then these conflicts can communities have to develop all of their themselves destroy even very robust in- own scientific InFormatlon about their physi- stitutional arrangements. cal settings, few would have the resources to accomplish this. Let me use the example of the impor- Methods for Coping with tant role of the United States Geologic Survey Threats to Sustainabillty in the development of more effective, lo- cal groundwater institutions in some parts There are no sure-fire mechanisms for of the country. It is important to stress addressing all of the above threats. Three that the Geologic Survey does not con- methods are not frequently mentioned as struct engineering works or do anythlng important in increasing the effectiveness other than obtain and dissemlnate accu- of self-governed institutions: ( 1 ) the creation rate information about hydrologic and of associations of community- governed geologic structures within the country. Some entities; (2) comparative Institutional re- water users could contract the Geologic search that provldes a more effective knowl- Survey to conduct an intensive study of a edge base about design and operating local groundwater basin and the cost would principles; and (3) developing more ef- be shared by water producers and the fective high school and college courses Geologic Survey. It then becomes public on local governance. information available to all interested parties. The Geologic Survey employs a highly professional staff who relies on the most Creating assoclatlons of community- recent scientific techniques. Local water governed entities producers obtain the very best available information From an agency that is not trying Those who think local participation is to push any particular future project in which important in the process of developing it may be interested. Many countries, such sustainable resources and their more as India, that do have large and sometimes effective governance are often committed dominating state organizations lack agencies to dolng a good deal of 'community that provide public access to high-qual- organization." All too frequently! this type ity information about resource conditions of organiution is conceptualized as fostering and consequences. Recent efforts to open a large number of community groups at the same level. IF community organization Rigorous cornparat/ve is fostered by nongovernmental Institutional research organizations (NGOs) which then provide staff assistance and some external resources, In addition to the type of information the entities may flourish as long as the exchange that those involved in self-gov- NGOs remain interested, but wither on the erning entities can undertake on their own, vine when the NGOs turn to other types it is important to find ways of conduct- of projects. A technique that draws on our Ing rigorous, over-time comparative re- lcnowledge of how self-governed institutions search that controls for the many con- operate is helping to create associations Founding variables that simultaneously affect of community organizations. As discussed performance. For instance, folk medicine above, most large-scale user-governed had frequently been based on unl

FIKRET BERKES Natural Resources institute University of Manitoba Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T ZNZ Canada

BERKES. F. 1994. Property rights and coastal fisheries, p. 51-62. In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.) Community management and common property of coastal fisheries in Asia and the Pacific: concepts, methods and experiences. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45, 189 p.

or freely available to all. Exclusion may Summary be approached through traditional man- agement methods, such as territorial use- isheries resources, subject to indi- rights, and cooperative-based or com- Fvidual use but not to individual pos- munity-based exclusive fishing areas. session, provide the classical example It can also be addressed through some of common property. By definition, all of the current scientific management common-property (or common pool) re- techniques which accomplish much the sources share two characteristics: (1 ) same purpose through license limita- it is costly to exclude potential users tion and the allocation of individual trans- From gaining access to the resource (the ferable quotas (ITQs). problem of exclusion); and (2)each per- The problem of subtractability may be son's use of the resource subtracts from approached by making and enforcing the welfare OF others (the problem of rules to limit short-term individual interest subtractability). These two characteristics and to protect long-term, collective provide the starting point for any dis- interest. Rule-malting and enforcement cussion of property rights in coastal fish- by government agencies everywhere have eries. been both difficult and costly. Thus, there In the case OF marine resources, the is renewed interest in many parts of the exclusion problem is closely related to world to involve fishers in management. the "Freedom of the seas" principle, the But no community of fishers carries out idea that seas should be open access its business in isolation: purely communal fisheries exist hardly anywhere in the 1988) encapsulates the conventional wis- world. Thus, practical solutions to the dom: subtractabllity problem revolve around some appropriate mix of communal and ...it is possible to manage fisher- state management regimes (or co- ies successfully, provided three facts management) for coastal fisheries. are kept in mind. (I),Left to their Reliance purely on the government own devices, fishermen will over- has blinded Fisheries resource manag- exploit stocks. (2) Those stocks are ers to the broad range of possibilities extremely unpredictable. (3) To avoid offered by systems that involve various disaster, managers must have ef- degrees of user self-management. But fective hegemony over them. integrating communities of fishers into the management process requires, in Note that two of the three "facts" are the first place, the creation of incen- germane to community management (no tive structures for users to fish sustainably. one is questioning the unpredictability The exclusion problem almost always of stocks). Those two "facts" compel us, requires government management to help as does the consequence of "freedom enforce rights. The subtractability problem in the commons (which) brlngs ruin to needs the building of institutional ca- all" (Hardin t968), to do something to pability for self-management. In sumL control those Fishers. policy implications of a reassessment For many managers, this means a better of property rights in coastal fisheries and tighter kind of government man- of the world Include the abandonment agement. Even in cases in which the re- of open-access ideals and the notion sources are privatized by the allocation that government regulation is sufficient. of ITQs, the allowable catch still has to It also calls for institution-building In be calculated and total fishing effort con- fishing communities to establish co- trolled. a very major job for any one management regimes towards the sus- entity. A large amount of literature testifies tainable use of resources. to the difficulties of regulating fishing . .L-- effort (e-g..Larkln 1988).Stock assessment costs and administrative costs of regulating and policing have been escalating. For Introduction and Context example, Macdonald ( 1980) calculated for Prince Edward Island fisheries in Canada It is ultimately desirable to develop that: integrated resource management sys- tems which include the human dimen- ... with administrative costs and sub- sion. More and more managers emphasize sidies of $13 million, It cost more that fisheries can only be managed with than $41 million to produce $28 due regard to communities of fishers. million worth of fishery products A major dllemma has, nevertheless, ... However, If a more kindly view persisted. On the one hand, many agree of the PEI fisheries performance Is that fishers have to be integrated Into taken (i.e.-assuming the opportu- management systems. But on the other nity costs of labour to be zero) then hand, many managers hold the view that it costs as low as $25 million to users cannot be trusted wlth the resource. produce $28 million. If this view An article in The Econornlst(l0 December Is taken. then it cost $13 million in government fundlng to produce Hlstorlcal Background: Hobbes, something less than $16 million In Rousseau and Grotlus income to fishermen and process- Ing workers. The current 'crisis In the world's fish- eries" (McGoodwln 1990) has historl- The concentration of management pow- cal roots wlth respect to managers' as- ers and responsiblllties wlth government sumptions and management philosophies. agencies is not only costly; it is admin- The conventional wisdom In fisheries istratively inefficient. Other branches of circles ("left to their own devices, fish- management science have discovered ermen will overexploit stocks; manag- over the years that complicated regu- ers must have effective hegemony over lations are counterproductive. Such find- them") reflects the thinking of an era ings have compelled the wiser manag- that glorified technologlcal elitlsm, and ers to take into account the self-regu- created a bureaucratic elite to manage latory abilities of workers. In many fields the affairs of the state. The develop- of management, managers are turning ment of technocratic-bureaucratic controls to the view that the person who does was identified and analyzed by the German the job knows It best. sociologist Max Weber In the early twen- The irony in the field of marine re- tieth century. The separation of the user sources is that fisheries managers had from the manager and the governed from been heading. until recently, in the di- the governor is usually explained in terms rection of tlghter government controls, of the rise of the modern state whose whereas those In other fields of man- affairs had become too compllcated for agemmt (and who have already "been ordinary citizens to handle. The debate there") are moving towards devolution, over self-governance has In fact much deregulation. decentralization and co- deeper roots. operative management. The popularity In the 1600s In Britain. Thomas Hobbes of the Japanese model of business man- argued In Leviathan ( 165 1) for the ne- agement may be seen In this Ilght. The cessity of a higher authorlty. He was current interest in community-based fish- convinced that soclety needed the ab- eries may also be viewed from this per- solute dominance of a sovereign ruler spective. as the source of law. People were ln- To summarize, the conventional wisdom capable of collective action towards thelr In marine resources management has common good, Hobbes argued, and the favored strong, well-informed, centrallzed rule of law had to be exogenously im- controls (Hanna, in press). But there is posed. By contrast, Jean-lacques Rousseau ample evidence over the years that in France (On the social contract. 1762) centralized controls have not worked developed the antithesis of Hobbes' (MacKay 1993). As part of the process solution. The rule of law was endog- of rethinking coastal resources manage- enous to soclety rather than externally ment. It Is informative to reflect on the supplied by a Leviathan. A hlgher au- history of management philosophy that thority was not necessarily needed: It separated the resource user from the was possible. for Rousseau, to have egali- manager; perceived the need for a "higher tarian agrarian comrnunltles In which peas- authorlty": and made a managerial axlom ants regulated thelr affalrs 'under an out of the "freedom of the seas" prin- oak tree." clple. Hard-nosed fisheries managers have Among Western-trained fisheries man- been Hobbesians; they have always con- agers, however, the confusion between sidered Rousseau's kind of thinking as res communes and res nu//ius persists Usoft" and "romantic". The managers of despite notable efforts by scholars such enormously successful Japanese busi- as Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop ( 1975) nesses would probably disagree. Now and a series of recent major works (McCay combine with Hobbesian attitudes a and Acheson 1987; Berkes 1989; Ostrom second cherished Western notion, the 1990; Bromley 1992). To set the record "freedom of the seas." Hugo Grotius wrote straight, many continue to confuse com- The freedom of the seas ( 1608) to jus- mon property with open access (Pomeroy tify the Dutch trade in the East Indies. 19934. The basic differences between The sea, he argued, was limitless and the two regimes are shown in Fig. I. could not become the possession OF Note that in the absence of common- anyone but was, by nature, suitable to property institutions to receive and the use of all. The limitless sea of Grotius evaluate feedback from the resource and is said to be the basis of the fundamental a common-property regime to regulate assumption of "freedom of the seas." the behavior of users, one ends up with a notion which persisted more or less a runaway positive feedback loop that until the 1982 Law of the Sea. will lead to a "tragedy of the commons" The point to emphasize is that "free- (Hardin 1968). dom of the seas" and an open-access In some non-Western cultures. marine approach to marine resources in gen- resources are not regarded as open access, eral were deliberate and essential to and coastal marine areas have property colonial trade. Grotius did distinguish status comparable to that of communal among res nu//ius (no one's property land. Such resources are held as res but could be acquired), res communes communes by communities of users under (collective property) and res publica (public well-defined resource-use rules, although property). But Grotius' legacy has been not under outright ownership in the that the sea, while res communes. is Western sense. Contemporary examples also free, limitless and cannot be owned. of such communal property marine This assumption makes marine resources, resources may be found in Fiji and Solomon In effect, res nu///us. Islands (Baines 1989) and in coastal Japan

Table 1. A sampllng of tradltlonal flshery and lntegraed resource-management systems. System Country/region Resource type or Function Reference

lrlal Japan coastal Rshing Ruddle ( 1989) valll Adrlatlc, Italy lagoon fishing Lasserre and Ruddle ( 1983) prud' homle France lagoon and coastal fishing Ternpler ( 1985) tambak Java. Indonesia brackishwater fishponds Lasserre and Ruddle ( 1983) acadja West Afrlca lagoon fishing, grazing Lasserre and Ruddle (1983) dlna Mall fishlng. farming, grazing Moorehead ( 1989) ahupua 'a Hawall watershed and adjoining marine Costa-Pierce ( 1987) puava Solomon Islands lnterconnected sealand Ruddle et dl. (1992) vanua FIJI lnterconnected sealand Ruddle et al. ( 1992) tablna w yap lnterconnected sealand Smlth (1991) Resource users

property regime

uResource

A. Feedback in potentially sustainable B. Feedback in unsustainable common-property systems open-access systems

Fig. 1. A system vlcw of the differences between common-property and open-access systems.

(Ruddle 1989). A sampling of traditional in press). In other areas. such as Hawaii, flsherles systems from diverse reglons well-documented ancient management of the world is given in Table 1. These systems have completely dlsappeared set the stage for the discussion of (Costa-Plerce 1987). In yet other areas community management of flsherles. (Philippines, Indonesla), tradltlonal coastal There is a great wealth of information marine management systems have been from the Aslan-Pacific region about the poorly documented or dlfflcult to flnd. traditional marine resource management It should be noted, however, that the systems. Country-by-country surveys existence of traditional systems is helpful show, however. the great variation In but not essential for the development the persistence and health of these systems of common-property instltutions. (Ruddle, In press). Functional systems Community-based management systems exist only in areas where traditional marine can arlse. If conditions are appropriate. tenure has been legally recognized and in areas which lack tradltlonal systems protected by the government (Ruddle, (Berkes 1986. 1987). Common-Property Framework it may be held under. As explained in more detail by Feeny (this vol.). there The approach outlined here starts with are four basic kinds of such regimes: Grotius' concepts, modified to distin- 1. open access (res ndlius) which is guish res communes from res no///us actually no management regime at (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975). It all: property rights are absent and addresses, in effect, the central debate access is free and open to all: between Hobbes and Rousseau. It has 2. private property in which the claim become an approach used by a grow- rests with the individual or the cor- ing number of workers, not only in Fisheries poration; but also in wildlife, forestry, grazing lands, 3. state property (respubfica) in which mountain ecosystems, irrigation and claim and sole jurisdiction lie with groundwater resources. the government; and Common-property resource rnanage- 4. communal or common property (res ment has become a truly interdiscipli- communes) In which the resource nary area, with contributions from econo- is controlled by an identifiable com- mists, anthropologists, ecologists, so- munity of users. ciologists, geographers, political scientists These four categories are ideal ana- and planners (Feeny et al. 1990). As lytical types. Nevertheless, examples are reviewed by Feeny (this vol.), common- available that fit each category reasonably property resources, as a class, have two well (Table 2). Many other resources. characteristics which distinguish them however, are held under regimes which from other kinds of resources: (1) the combine the characteristics of two or difficulty of exclusion, that is, control more of these types. In fact, this is true of access to the resource: and (2) to some extent for the cases in Table subtractability, that is, the capability of 2. For example, the use of lTQs in Ca- each user of subtractlng from the wel- nadian Lake Erie effectively privatized fare of others. To these, one may add harvesting rights, while the stock tech- boundary problems as a characteristic nically remained state property. The especially pertinent to regional Fisher- particular system only worked because ies in which the geographic range of of effective self-poiicing of quotas among the resource does not match adminis- fishers and processors. The example there- trative or communal boundaries. As shown fore combines private. state and com- by Ostrom (this vol.), this issue poses munal property regimes (Berkes and a serious obstacle to management success, Pocock 1987). as the requirement for clearly defined Likewise, both of the examples of state boundaries is at the top of the list of property in Table 2 contain some elements design principles for long-term stabil- of communal property. User-groups are ity of common-property Institutions. involved in fisheries management under Almost all living resources of the sea the (US Federal) Fishery Conservation are common-property (or common-pool) and Management Act (FCMA) (Young resources by the above definition, ex- 198 1 ) but perhaps not very effectively. cept for some of those under aquaculture. In the United States northeast coast But a given resource may be held un- groundfish fisherles, there are cases of der a variety of management regimes effective community-based management (Ostrom 1988: Bromley 1992). There is (McCay 1980). Despite ingenious ways nothing inherent in the resource itself in which some groups of fishers restrict that predetermines the kind of regime the access of other potential users to Table 2. Property rlghts reglrnes as applled to marlne resources. Regime Example Reference

open-access Oceanla flsherles Johannes ( 1978) during colonlzation Gulf of Thalland Tlews (1975) fisheries prlvate exclusive or monopoly Scott ( 1955) Propew flshlng rlghts lndlvldual transferable Berkes and Pocock ( 1987) quotas state US northeast coast Young ( 198 1 ) Property Rsherles under FCMA Paclfic salmon fisheries, Marchak et al. ( 1987) Canada communal Japanesecoastal fisheries Ruddle (1989) ProPertY cooperatives reef and lagoon tenure Ruddle and Johannes ( 1985) In the Paciflc

the resource (McCay 1980), there is no der international regimes. There are natural official limitation of these fisheries so differences among these rnarlne envl- that actual management, in effect, ronments In terms of pulsing and cy- combines state property, communal cling behavior (Fig. 2). Thus, the nature property and open-access reglrnes. The of the fisheries is also different in these Canadian example, by contrast, is under environments (Hammer et al. 1993). and limited entry; there is no open-access so are the appropriate management re- element here, but neither is there much gimes. communal property (Marchak et al. 1987). The basic idea of matching the resource and the regime is not new and has been suggested before, for example. In a study Matchlng the Resource of Turkish coastal fisheries. Local-level and the Reglme management provides a feasible arrange- ment for managlng 'small-scale fisheries Resources differ in the difficulty with In which the community of users is rela- which property rights may be established. tively homogeneous and the group size For example, enclosed aquaculture ar- relatively small". In contrast, for "larger- eas may be owned outright by their users, scale, more mobile fishing fleets, com- as with agricultural land. They may also munity-level management is less likely be owned by the state and leased to to work" and the assignment of fishing individuals and cooperatives. Aquaculture rights, such as transferable quotas may may be considered to be at one end of be more appropriate (Berkes 1986). In a contlnuurn which extends through la- another example, a comparative inves- goons and semi-enclosed areas, to in- tigation was carried out on the man- shore fisheries within bays and estuar- agement of Barbados and Jarnalcan fish- ies, to coastal fisherles carried out by eries. Communal property regime made small-scale fishers, to those undertaken sense for Jarnalcan fisheries, predoml- by intermedlate-scale fisherles, to off- nantly inshore and reef-based, with shore flsheries requiring extended trlps. communal trapfishing terrltorles in some and finally to open-ocean fisheries un- areas. By contrast. Barbados fisheries Flg. 2. The archipelago, coastal, offshore and open-ocean ecological systems arc Integrated. How- ever, they are qulte dlfferent In terms of pulslng and cycllng behavlor. the frequent pulses In the nearshore system and the ablllty to recycle matter. continuously recelved from the offshore areas. glve rlse to a more dlverse and reslllent system. Coastal flsherles, dependent on the resources In a testrlcted coastal area. have co-evolved wlth the dynamlcs of the ecosystem. The offshore flsherles have taken advantage of the much hlgher magnltudes In pulslng fish specles. These dlfferences em- phaslze the cross-scale nature of flsherles managmnent and the need for coordlnatlon for future sustainable management. Source: Hammer ct al. (1993). were relatively large-scale and offshore, encountered with lTQs indicates that and license and quota management (state privatlzation is not likely to be a universal property with privatization of harvest solution (Copes 1986; Berkes and Pocock rights) made more sense (Berkes 1987). 1987). Thus, it is possible to sort out different State property regimes make more and kinds of fisheries wlth respect to more sense as the scale of fishing op- management regimes which are more erations, and hence the ability of fish- likely to be appropriate. In so doing, ers to deplete the stock, increase. How- one could at least rule out some of the ever, beyond the 200-mile Ilmit, state combinatlons that make relatively little governance is effective only in combl- sense. Private property, wlth allocated nation with International agreements; quotas, may be reasonable for offshore otherwise, an international "tragedy of fisheries in which fishing units are relatively the commons" is obtained. Near the shore. few, large in size and amenable to policing. state property regimes are senslble in In Inshore and coastal fisheries, by contrast, combination with communlty manage- ehforcement of privatized rights is likely ment, that Is, in co-management arrange- to be troublesome, and privatlzation of ments (Pinkerton 1989). harvest rights may probably create equity Finally, communal property regimes problems with the traditional users of are more sound at the small-scale end these resources. The range of problems of the cpntinuum, and less and less so towards the other end. However, even the first research question is: Is there in these coastal, small-scale fisheries. an Identlflable cornmunlty offishers government regulation still has a place. whlch can control access to the re- Examples for the enabling role of gov- source? ernment include the exclusion of out- A second general condition pertalns siders from a resource which is under to circumstances within a community communal management, as in the case of users that permit the evolution of ef- of Japanesecoastal fisheries (Ruddle 1989), fective communal property lnstltutions and the enforcement of conservation regu- (Ostrom 1990); that is, can the com- lations so that all users can benefit from munity ofusers make and enforce its increased production (Delos Angeles and resource-use rules? Hardin's ( 1968) Pelayo 1993). "tragedy of the commons" would corn- pletely reject this possibility, in keep- ing with Hobbes. But we know now that the "tragedy" is a very limited and in- complete view of reality. Many groups of resource users can and do create ap- The Hobbesian approach favored by propriate Institutions for resource use many Western resource managers, ex- (Ostrom 1990; many cases in the pre- emplifled by the quotation regarding viously cited volumes). the necessity of manager's hegemony One central task is to examine and. over fishers, is based on the dominant where possible, to create the conditions culture and values of resource manage- conducive to the sustainable use of stocks ment science. The recent accumulation by communities of fishers. FImt, we need of a great deal of evidence on the po- case-speclfic information to characterize tentlal sustainability of community-based user-groups and the scale of the flsheries. flsherles management systems indicates Generalizations are risky; many fisheries that we may do well to review some of around the world do not clearly fall into our assumptions about the behavlor of categories of small- or large-scale (Berkes fishers. These findings challenge. for and Kislalioglu 1989). Second, data on example, the 'fact" that "left to thelr group size and homogeneity of fishers own devices, fishermen wlll (necessar- are essential (e.g., Berkes 1986). Third. ily) over-exploit stocks". Instead. we need knowledge on the existence of any to look for the system-stabilizing feedbacks common property Institutions in a given such as those in Fig. 1. fishery or among a group of users is Our best evidence is that, left to their helpful. Perhaps as a fourth task, we own devices, communities of fishers may should examine the management use stocks sustainably under certain con- objectives that underlie a given case study. ditions. The investigation of these con- Charles (1988) observed that 'normative dltlons is consistent with research agenda single-objective analyses tend to find being developed at the International favour pr,marily in 'industrial' fisheries", Center for Living Aquatic Resources Man- whereas "multiple-obj xtive socio- agement (Pomeroy 1993b), the Beijer economic analysls has been preferred International lnstitute for Ecological in developing or 'inshore' flsheries." In Economics, the Caribbean Natural Re- any given case, we need to know sources lnstitute and elsewhere. The flrst managers' explicit or implicit objectlves. general condition pertains to the ex- In some situations. the behavior of clusion of other potential users. Thus. managers may be as crucial to the management outcome as the behavior ponent of any effort to reorganize property of fishers1 rights in fisheries. The emphasis on managers becomes As Hanna (1990) observed. marine particularly relevant if we accept the resource management lnstitutlons have proposition that a mix-and-match of re- not kept pace with our technological sources and regimes is necessary. Man- ability to exploit these resources, First, agers need to be willing and flexible the starting point in the search for more to seek the regime appropriate for the vlable and sustainable institutions is the fisheries at hand. Fishers are not always abandonment of open-access Ideals of alone to blame for the failure of a fish- the old principle of "freedom of the seas." ery. As Marchak et al. (1987) put It, Second, the failure of centralized man- "instead of talking about the 'tragedy agement compels us to abandon pure of the commons', we should be con- Hobbesian approaches, or rather to bal- cerned with the tragedy of mismanaged ance Hobbes with Rousseau in the new state property" In fisheries. management philosophy. The fisher can Community-based management of Ash- once more become a part of the resource eries is never entirely free of its con- management team, balancing rights and text of government resource manage- responsibilities, and working in a co- ment policies, whether explicit or im- operative (rather than antagonistic) mode plicit. Communal fisheries are viable even with the manager. Such joint rnanage- in countries such as the Philippines where ment, or co-management, is a rational there is little evidence of communal extension of evolutionary trends in Rsh- property regimes for marine resources. erles management over the past dec- For example, McManus (1988) argued ades (Rettig et al. 1989). Co-rnanage- that traditional community rights over ment that: ( 1 ) involves more participatory coastal resources in the Lingayen Gulf decisionmaking; (2) creates conserva- can be rejuvenated. This would involve tion incentlves by empowering fishers "the organizing of fishermen into legally to reap the benefits of their own restraint; and traditionally recognized groups that (3) enables cost-cutting in research and would have the clout to be stewards enforcement: and (4) sets policy objectives of their resources." more in tune with fishers' social and Deregulation and decentralization of economic needs, is consistent with sus- management, and devolution of authority tainable development planning for coastal in flsherles, as in other fields of man- fisheries. agement, can be accomplished only if both government managers and users are willing and have the capability. Cre- References ating a role for fishlng communities in resource management is not easy, if there Aklmichl. T. and K. Ruddle. 1984. The historl- cal development of territorlal rights and is no cultural background of self-regu- fishery regulatlons In Oklnawan Inshore waters. lation and no stewardship ethic. Even p. 37-38. In K. Ruddle and T. Aklrnlchl (eds.) with such a background, community- Maritime Instltutlons In the Western Paclflc. based management will likely Fail if there Senri Ethnol. Stud. No. 17. are major problems with exclusion, Balnes. G.B.K. 1989. Traditional resource man- agement in the Melanesian South Paclflc: subtractability and boundaries. Institution- a development dllemma, p. 273-295. In building to enhance the capability of F. Berkes (ed.)Common property resources. fishing communities for resource rnan- Belhaven. London. Berkes. F. 1986. Local-level management and agement will probably be a major com- the commons problem: a comparatlve study systems. 8101. Int., Spec. Issue No. 4. ofTu@ish coastal flsheries. Mar. Poky 10:215- Macdonald. R.D.S. 1980. Flsherperson's Incomes. 229. and Inputs and outputs in the flsherles sector: Berkes, F. 1987. The common property resource the PEI case. Can. Issues 3(1):25-35. problem and the flsherles of Barbados and MacKay. K.T. 1993. Sustainable management of Jamaica. Envlron. Manage. 1 1 :225-235. fisherles resources: common property Is- Berkes. F.. Editor. 1989. Common property re- sues. Fourth Annual Common Property,Con- ~OU~COS:ecology and community-based ference. Manlla. June 1993. sustalnable development. Belhaven, Lon- Marchak. P.. N. Guppy and J. McMulian, Edi- don. tors. 1987. Uncommon property. The fishlng Berkes, F. and D. Pocock. 1987. Quota management and fish-processing Industries In Brltish Co- and 'people problems": a case history of lumbia. Methuen. Toronto. Canadlan Lake Erle Rsherles. Trans. Am. Flsh. McCay. B.J. 1980. A Flsherperson's cooperatlve, SOC. 1 16:494-502. limited: lndlgenous resource management Berkes. F. and M. Klslalioglu. 1989. A comparatlve In a complex soclety. Anthropol. Q. 53:29- study of yleld. Investment and energy use 38. In small-scale flsheries. Fish. Res. 7:207- McCay, B.J. and J.M. Acheson. Edltors. 1987. 224. The question of the commons. The culture Bromley. D.W., Editor. 1992. Making the com- and ecology of communal resources. Unl- mons work. institute for Contemporary Studies verslty of Arlzona Press. Tucson. Press. San Francisco. McGoodwln. J.R 1990. Crisis in the world's flsherles. Charles, A.T. 1988. Fishery socloeconomics: a Stanford Unlverslty Press. Stanford. survey. Land Econ. 64:276-295. McManus, L.T. 1988. The coral reefs of Lingayen Clrlacy-Wantrup. S.V. and R.C. Bishop. 1975. "Com- Gulf: a challenge to resource management. mon property" as a concept in natural re- Trop. Coast. Area Manage. 3(2):8-1 1. sources pollcy. Nat. Resour. ). 15:7 13-727. Moorehead. R. 1989. Changes taklng place In Copes. P. 1986. A crltlcal revlew of the lndi- common-property resource management In vldual quotas as a device In flsherles man- the Inland Nlger Delta of Mall. p. 256-272. agement. Land Econ. 62:278-29 1. In F. Berkes (ed.) Common property resources. Costa-Plerce. B.A. 1987. Aquaculture in anclent Belhaven, London. Hawall. BioSclence 37:320-330. Ostrom. E. 1988. Institutional arrangements and Delos Angeles. M.S. and R. Pelayo. 1993. The the commons dilemma. p. I01-1 39. In V. nearshore fisheries in Central Vlsayas. Phll- Ostrom. D. Feeny and H. Plcht (eds.) Re- ipplnes: an Impact evaluation report of CVRP- thinking institutional analysls and devel- I. Fourth Annual Common Property Con- opment. International Center for Economlc ference. Manlla. June 1993. Growth, San Franclsco. Feeny, D.. F. Berkes. 8.). McCay and J.M. Acheson. Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: the 1990. The tragedy of the commons: twenty- evolution of institutions for collective ac- two years later. Hum. Ecol. 18(1):1-19. tion. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Hammer. M.,,A. Jansson and B. jannson. 1993. Pinkerton. E., Editor. 1989. Co-operatlve man- Diverslty change and sustainablilty: Impli- agement of local fisheries. Unlverslty of Brltlsh cations for flsherles. Amblo 22:97-105. Columbia Press. Vancouver. Hanna. S. 1990. The eighteenth century Eng- Pomeroy, R.S. 1993a. Clearing up some mlscon- llsh commons: a model for ocean manage- ceptlons: open-access vs. common-prop- ment. Ocean Shoreline Manage. 14: 155- erty. Naga 16( 1):40-44. 172. Porneroy. R.S. I993b. A research framework for Hanna. 5. Co-management. In Limited access coastal flsheries co-management Institutions. management: a guidebook to conservation. Naga l6(l): 14-16. World Wlldllfe Fund and Center for Marine Rettlg, R.B., F. Berkes and E. Plnkerton. 1989. Conservation. Washington. DC. (In press). The future of fisheries co-management: a Hardin. G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. multidisciplinary assessment, p. 255-27 1. Science 162: 1243- 1248. In E. Pinkerton (4.)Co-operative management johannes. R.E. 1978. Traditional marlne conser- of local fisheries. Universlty of British Columbia vation methods in Oceania and their de- Press. Vancouver. mise. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 9:349-364. Ruddle, K. 1989. Solving the common-property Larkln. P.A. 1988. The future of fisheries man- dilemma: village flsherles rlghts in Japa- agement: managlng and fisherman. Fish- nese coastal waters, p. 168-184. In F. Berkes eries 13(1): 3-9. (ed.) Common property resources. Belhaven, Lasserre, D. and K. Ruddle. 1983. Traditional London. knowledge and management of marine coastal Ruddle, K. Traditlonal community-based marine resource management systems In the Asia- of rnarlne resources coastal management Paclflc reglon: status and potential. ICLARM. plan for Yap State, Federated States of Mlcro- Manila. (Unpubl.). nesla. Resour. Manage. Optlm. 8:155-165. Ruddle. K. and R.E. Johannes, Edltors. 1985. The Tempier, E. 1985. Mode de rCgulatlon de I'effort tradltlonal knowledge and management of de peche et le r&le des prud homles de coastal systems In Asla and the Paclflc. patrons-pecheurs. lnstltut Fran~alsde Re- UNESCO-ROSTSEA, Jakarta. cherche pour I'Exploltatlon de la Mer Ruddle, K.. E. Hvldlng and R.E. Johannes. 1992. (IFREMER). Issy-les-Moullneaux. Marlne resources management In the context Tiews, K. 1975. Flshery development and man- of customary tenure. Mar. Resour. Econ. agement In Thailand. Anlm. Res. Dev. 1 :57- 7:249-273. 72. Scott. A.D. 1955. The fishery: the objectives of Young, O.R. 1981. Natural resources and the state. sole ownershlp. J. Pollt. Econ. 63:l 16-124. Universlty of Callfornla Press. Berkeley. Smith. A. 1991. Tradltlon and the development Changing the Focus of Coastal Fisheries Management

KENNETH RUDDLE Matsugaoka-cho 11-20 Nishhomiya-shi, Hyogo-ken 1562 /span

RUDDLE. K. 1994. Changlng the focus of coastal fisheries management, p. 63-86. In R.S. Porneroy (ed.) CommuniQ management and common properly of coastal fisheries in Asia and the Pacific: concepts. methods and experlences. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45. 189 p.

lntroductlon Traditional systems of fishing rights and tenurial relationships of small-scale fish- ontemporary fisheries management, ers to resources and resource areas have Cbased on famlllar bioeconomic mod- been documented throughout the world, els, has generally not been able to either particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. In foresee or overcome the now equally fa- many parts ofthat region, traditional man- miliar and intractable problems in coastal agement systems are often common-prop- fisheries worldwide. It is common knowl- erty regimes where access to a particular edge that most problems and errors have territory is limited to a defined user group; occurred in the fisheries of temperate-zone operational rules are specified; and con- developed countries. Yet, the same trol resides in traditional local authorities. bioeconomic models that have been less Many systems were either deliberately or than successful are still those generally rec- inadvertently weakened or destroyed by ommended for fisheries development and colonial administrations, and replaced by management In Third World contexts. This centralized fisheries institutions nominally is ironical, "... first because in many Thlrd responsible for all aspects of fisheries World societies there already exist sophis- management, from policy formulation ticated fisheries management systems well- through enforcement (Ruddle 1994a. b). adapted for local use; second, because Where that occurred, community-based similar systems also exist (although often systems of marine resource management extra-legally) in many parts of the First were not usually replaced by more effec- World; and third, because many such Third tive central or regional management in- World systems might be readily adaptable stitutions. Neither has nationalization nor for managing Fisheries in the First World" privatization policies usually resulted in (Ruddle et al. 1992). more effective resource management. Rather, the cumulative effect of this re- externalitles. In other words, it focuses on structuring of fisheries management has trylng to manage what is unknown (and been the impoverishment of fishery re- perhaps Inherently unknowable), and thus sources and fishing communities. Compared wnmanageable. It is also predlcnted on the to the scope of the problems facing gov- generally false assumption of 'open ac- ernment agencies attempting to manage cess" and implemented by regulatory Inshore Fisheries, their administrative and measures which are often complex: far from technical abilities are generally relatively having been wholly successful; and un- weak. As a result, devolution of resource suited to Third World conditions. management and allocation decisions to local communities, within the framework The erroneous assumption of co-management, Is increasingly seen of open access as an alternative to ineffective manage- ment undertaken by distant, understaffed The "tragedy-of-the-commons model" and underfunded government agencies. (Hardin 1968) Is the prlnclpnl.Western theory This paper examines varlous shortcomings held to account for problems In certain of conventional fisherles management. The fisheries, according to the dynamics elabo- characteristics of traditional community- rated by Gordon (1954) and subsequently based systems of management are then refined by other economists. But this model summarized, based on the Asia-Pacific is gounded in the erroneous notion that region. Policy alternatives regarding the the misuse of fisheries resources stems from future adaptation of such systems to a the institution of common property, which modern management role are then exam- was, and unfortunately often still Is, mis- ined. takenly assumed to be synonymous wlth "open access". Thus, fisheries must be managed to mitigate the selfish and my- The Context of Flsherles opic behavior of fishers, consequent upon Management fisheries being a classic example of a 'com- mon property" (meaning "open access") In any fisheries, there exist four actual resource. This has been widely viewed as or potential focl of problems that require the predominant pattern of individuals. The management (Table 1 ). Conventional fish- proposition asserts that inherent in the eries management focuses on fish stocks exploitation of common property resources and stock externalities and assumes an open- are the tendency to physical wastage of access resource regime. Thus. it has con- the resource: an incentive to centrated on modelling the biological and overexploitation by users, leading inexo- physical flow of fish resources and through rably to the now famlllar tragedy of the fishing grounds, and in implementation, commons; and an inclination toward eco- on attempting to manage the resultant stock nomlc wastage vla overcapitalization of

Table 1. Actual or pottntlal focl of flsherles management problems. Focus Definition

1. Flow of the resource Contlnued, regular avallabllity OF harvested fish 2. Stock externalities Econornlc. and therefore soclal, Impacts of harvesting lnteractlons among fishers 3. Technological (gear) externalitles Mutual Incompatlbility of various gear on a Rshlng ground 4. Asslgnrnent problems Competition for access to a resource(s) distributed unevenly in space and time the industry, and eventual impoverishment Techniques that Do Not of flshlng communities and immobility of Restrict Access labor. To counteract these inherent tendencies, Catch lim/tat/on or quota. Total allow- so the conventional theary runs. manage- able catch (TAC) Is now the standard tech- ment by authorities external to fishlng nique used in the developed world to regu- communities is required. It is generally late fishing effort. However, it is severely accepted that the replacement of common- limited because it can solve only problems property (meaning 'open access") regimes of resource conservation. Without the by systems of controlled access could ei- concurrent introduction of some form of ther eliminate or alleviate excess effort. allocation, overcapitalization will remain. Although there is no unanimous opinion Further, this regulatory technique is com- concerning the optimal design of such plex to apply and expensive to both op- systems, they have been widely imple- erate and enforce (Derham 1984: mented, together with catch quotas, gear Schowengerdt 1984). Calculation of TACs and/or seasonal limitations, Ilcensing, or poses problems. The accurate and current a combination of these and other elements. data (needed to indicate the percentage All share the common characteristic of of the TAC that has been taken, and so assigning fish harvesting rights to selected when fishing Is to stop) demanded by this indivlduals, who then receive all or part "information-hungry" (Caddy 1984) tech- of the economic rent created by the rc- nique are expensive to obtain, and the task duction in effort (Keen 1983). requires specialized personnel and daborate Generally, such schemes have been less networks of committees and working groups than successful, because they are both of- (Hoydal 1984). Although cheap, estimates ten costly to implement and administer, are oHen extremely inaccurate, because and have not eliminated the excess effort adoption of TAC is often accompanied by problem since they induce increased in- a deterioration of data quality and under- vestment by Fewer lndivlduals seeklng to reporting, since this regulatory technique improve their share of the catch. So it can- puts a premlum on cheating, which en- not be assumed that limited access sys- forcement fails to halt. Thus, expense and tems alone are either capable of reducing lack OF locally available personnel put the or eliminating the dissipatlon of resource TAC technique beyond the means of most rents, or that they are cost effective for gov- Third World countries. In troplcal ernment (Wllson 1987). Nevertheless, lim- multispecies fisheries, all such problems ited access has been advocated principally are exacerbated by the complexity of the for its supposed economic efficiency; po- fisheries, and by the problems of by-catches litical acceptability and resultant ease of and associated discards (so as not to ex- implementation; as well as a means of raising ceed the TAC and to concentrate the quota incomes in fishing wmmunities (Keen 1983). on only the most economically valuable species). Techniques for regulating flsherles Enforcement of TACs is extremely expensive, both in terms of data and In terms of changing the focus of coastal management. For the most part, high seas fisheries management, the important char- enforcement Is either impossible or too acteristic of regulatory technlques is whether costly. Point-of-first-sale monitoring and or not they restrict access to the fisher- quota enforcement are hardly more feasible, ies. Most techniques of conventional man- given the characteristics of tropical small- agement do not. scale fisheries (vide /nha). Thus, using TAC as a regulatory measure is not suitable for both those who can afford legitimate gear adoption by developing countries. and to Future harvesters. Banning trwl- Gear restrictions. Regulation of size and ers, as in Indonesia (Sardjono 1980),means spacing of net meshes, hooks and trap that distant fishing grounds may be openings has been one of the main methods underutilized, since they are beyond the used to control fisheries, by allowlng reach of small-scale fishing craft and gear. immature fish to escape being caught when Thls has negative impacts on economic small, and grow to an economically more eficiency and innovation. Again, without valuable slze before harvesting. One of entry limitation, area allocation, and the the major problems is the initial decline like, gear restrictions alone will probably in catch rates following their introduction. create more problems than they solve. Thus, fishers are required to sacrifice in However, they are usually adopted for the short term to reap long-term benefits. sociopolitical reasons. Further, owing to random fluctuations in Closed season. Thls regulation relies recruitment, for example, theoretically heavily on the relationship between catch predicted improvements are hard to detect per unit effort and stock abundance. There in practice, thus making the fishers sceptical. are two types. One prohibits fishing dur- This may not be economically feasible, ing the times of the year when there is a depending on whether the target is a fast- need to protect n particular stage of the or slow-growing species, resulting in IiFe cycle, e.g., spawning, or juveniles. Its circumvention of the regulation, and a disadvantages are: effort can be increased correspondlng increase in enforcement in the open season and it causes costs. discontinuities in supply, disrupting the This regulatory mechanism suffers from industry "downstream". The second type allocation problems. For example, if occurs as a response to fishing effort: when minimum mesh size regulations reduce the some predetermined catch rate that cor- catch of Fisheries aiming at young Flsh responds to a level of stock abundance is migrating inshore, then the resource will attained, the fisheries are closed. This regu- be reallocated to offshore fisheries which lation does not solve the problem of target them at a later growth stage. The overcapitalization either outside the sea- total economic yield would improve, but son (first type) or at the beginning of the the livelihood of the small-scale fishers season (second type). would be immediately jeopardized. In fact, Seasonal closures alone are largely in- in economic terms there would be no lasting effective. Further, they often tend to work benefit, since the increased income in the against small-scale fishers by allocating the offshore industrial fisheries would attract resource to the offshore, capital-intensive additional entrants to the point of rent fishery. dissipation, and the cost of regulation would Closed areas. Another method of pro- cause an overall economic loss to the tecting stock during certain stages of the fisheries. life cycle is area closure where fishing is Prohibition of certain fishing methods; banned. This technique has three main types of gear, such as trawls; and fishing problems: effort tends to concentrate on aids, like acoustic Ash-finders, has severe the boundaries of closed areas; pressure allocational repercussions. The ban on cheap increases on other species and the same but effective although extremely destructive species at different ages; and area closures methods of fishing, such as dynamiting are pointless if industrial fisheries target or poisoning, allocates the resource away the same stock offshore as it comes into from the present-day poorest fishers to closed inshore waters for spawning. This would be perceived as unfair by artisanal level of professionalism among local offi- fishers who work inshore. cials is not high. Areal closures are relatively easy and /nciiv/dua/ fish quotas. These are essen- cheap to monitor and enforce inshore, but tially a particular form of license that lim- not offshore. But like seasonal closures, they Its the right of access it grants to specific tend to be inequitable because they real- fisheries by specifying the amount of fish loate resources away from the Inshore Fisher that an individual operator is allowed to to the offshore operator. However, under land. This can be done by apportioning a some form of territorial selF-regulation by TAC among licensed fishers. While this fishing communities, both seasonal and areal regulatory technique has the advantage closures can be highly effective. of both restricting access and specifying catch amounts, it suffers from the drw- Techniques that Restrict Access back of administrative and enforcement expense. Lkensing. Access to fisheries is restricted Proper@ rights. The preceding regula- under this technlque because only persons tory measures have been applied to fish- with a license may operate in them. Li- eries where property rights are either weak censing has been seen as an effective way or ineffective. Where property rights ex- to control effort and ensure stock conser- ist, indlvldual rights holders make their own vation, if introduced early in the devel- regulations. There are various forms of opment of fisheries. More often than not, property rights in fisheries (vide infra). however, licensing is introduced when fish- The choice of which among those regu- eries are overcapitalized. Based on a cal- latory techniques to employ must depend culated maximum sustainable yleld (MSY), on local conditions. Inevitably the deci- issuance of license is limited to the number sion will be very much colored by the lo- of vessels and/or gear required to attain cal political environment. But, under the that figure. best circumstances, and to ensure a rea- A wide variety of licensing programs sonable likelihood of successful implemen- exists, reflecting differences in social, eco- tation, the following main factors should nomic and political conditions. Most are govern the choice oftdniques. They should based on historical precedent, with "grand- be supported by most fishers: amenable father clauses" permitting continued entry to gradual implementation and flexible to fishers with established precedents, enough to adjust to changing situations; however tenuous, owing largely to eq- encourage operations at minimum cost: uity considerations. Those that have more account fully for all costs of research, restrictions and conditions are time-con- monitoring and enforcement; and take full suming and expensive to administer. consideration of the allocational and em- Restrictions tend to be added to restric- ployment generation aspects of the fish- tions, as fishers find a way around pre- ing sector (Panayotou 1982). vious ones. The inherent characteristics of fisheries But licensing is ineffective when data limit the type of regulatory techniques that are Few and unreliable, and in the absence can be applied with any hope of success. of research. Data are hard to come by for In inshore tropical waters, the two princi- most tropical small-scale fisheries: since pal types of Fisheries to be regulated are catches are sold at many unmonitored rural coastal rnultispecies and sedentary spe- points, data gathering is usually' haphaz- cies. ard. Moreover, licensing programs are The diversity of species that character- difficult to enforce, especially where the izes tropical small-scale fisheries poses special management problems (see Pauly velopment and management of tropical and Murphy 1982). A major one is that small-scale fisheries. Tropical small-scale catch rates can decline substantially with fishing communities are characterized by increased harvesting, as has occurred wldely their reliance on inshore resources located in Southeast Asia, owing to "ecosystem close to home: limited alternative employ- overfishing" (Pauly 1988).Species change ment opportunities; use of small craft and toward smaller and less valuable species, simple gear (although often sophisticated with a higher proportion of "by-catches". techniques): and traditional community is the result. An important basis for man- norms of behavior. But there are excep- agement is that effort reduction results in tions. a more economically beneficial catch com- Seven important aspects of small-scale position over time, and increased catches fisheries must be considered in devising (Alcala 198 1 ; Russ 1985; Alcala and Russ management programs for them. 1990). 1. Fishing activities are limited geo- Related is the problem of fish size com- graphlcaiiy to small inshore areas because position and gear selectivity, since opti- craft are small and unmotorized; there is mu3mesh sizes vary by species. Further, usually no way to keep fish fresh: and the different species interact biologically, neighboring sea areas might be off-limits thereby complicating analysis of data on owing to territorial rights systems. Therefore. which management plans are predicated. opportunities for increased catches are lim- Thus, at the present state of knowledge. ited. regulation of effort and mesh size should 2. Fishlng communities are dispersed not be considered primary management geographidlyand often isolated in remote mechanisms for tropical multispecies fish- rural regions, since (unlike industrial fisheries) eries. they are not dependent on onshore Conservation of stocks is the principal infrastructure. They are thus difficult and management concern for fisheries for sed- expensive to develop and manage. entaty species. They are vulnerable to growth 3. Employment options are Iimlted and overflshing. Sedentary species can be ef- alternative jobs are scarce, although these fectively managed by the allocation of vary considerably, depending on local property rights. Where these do not exist context. Cultural factors, like caste systems or have been eroded and with no possi- that limit or preclude occupational mobility, bility of either creation or re-creation, such also limit employment alternatives, as does fisheries can be managed by area and sea- a lack of education and access to basic sonal closure and by size limits. Licens- information. Persistent indebtedness through ing for such fisheries is rare. Sedentary traditional credit systems also binds fishers species are particularly vulnerable to mo- to their communities and occupation, as bile gear that damage or destroy their well as the "ethos of the fisher" and the habitat, and should be protected from them related sense of subcultural identity. by zoning. Bioeconomlc models Fail to consider situ- ations where the opportunity cost of labor is zero or close to zero, and where there Characteristics of Troplcal exist strong barriers to exlt from the fish- Small-scale Flsherles eries sector. Also, conventional models and the management mechanisms to which they The experience and research of devel- give rise do not distinguish between the oped countries require considerable ad- capital and labor components of fishing aptation to be made relevant to the de- (Christy 1986). Labor costs are low but capital costs are high, and the two are often aspects, this limits the mobility of small- complexly interrelated In ways that are not scale fishers and socially prevents access well understood (Christy 1986). For ex- to other fishing communities. ample, crew sizes may be determined not 6. Economic rent extraction is affected just by work load, but by the social im- by the factors noted above. They combine perative to share limited economic oppor- to create market imperfections such that tunities and benefits. It is also dificult to fishers receive less than the free-market define the term "labor" precisely, since a price for their catch, yet pay excessively great many people onshore have a role in for inputs and usuriously for loans. These the fisheries system, as in Indonesia (Col- are the principal ways in which rents are lier et al. 1979: Emmerson 1980: Kendrick extracted. Secondary is the requirement 1993). Introduction of capital-intensive to share in small, traditional communities techniques can devastate these relation- and among kin, as well as other custom- ships, as well as heighten inequity and ary practices, such as ritual performance eventual conflict among segments of the and donation (Collier et al. 1979: Kendrick overall fisheries sector and within com- 1893). munities. In contrast, management that 7. Conflict is a characteristic of small- regulates capital equipment would give scale fisheries in the tropics, resulting pri- priority to preserving traditional employ- marily from its multispecies nature. Con- ment patterns and concepts of social eq- flict is essentially of two types: gear ex- uity and sharing. Thus, distinction between ternalities and target conflict, where the capital and labor components of fishing prime target species of one group of fish- effort is critical to the sound management ers is the incidental catch of another. The of tropical small-scale fisheries (Christy main source of conflict in Southeast Asia 1986). has been the development of the shrimp 4. Discount rates and future returns industry and the highly capitalized shrimp also militate against conventional West- trawlers using Rne-meshed nets and op- ern-style development. Small-scale fish- erating in inshore waters. Thus, they have ers are severely limited in their ability to a very high incidence of by-catch, up to reduce present catches in anticipation of 80°/o, of which a large proportion is un- future higher yields. Such behavior always dersized, immature specimens ofcommer- has associated costs. These may be as cially valuable fish (Sharom Majid 1984). extreme as hunger or even starvation in This problem led to the trawler ban in In- impoverished communities. Thus, although donesia (Sardjono 1980). Conflicts have dynamiting and poison fishing are destruc- been widespread and severe (Thomson tive of fish habitats, and so reduce or elimi- 1980). In Malaysia, for example, during nate future harvests, they will still be prac- the period 1970- 1973, they involved 1,200 tised if the only alternative is hunger. High boats, of which more than 60 were sunk, discount rates therefore make effective fish- and the death of 23 fishers (Smith 1979). eries management based on conventional in India, both life and property were lost Western-style concepts virtually impossible. as the result of such incidents (Silas and (They also illustrate the futility of planning Alagaswaml 1980). These conflicts are a for the fisheries sector alone, without con- symptom of both an institutional failure sideration of job creation in other economic in the allocation of natural resources and sectors.). a demand for decisions on the distribu- 5. Geographfcai and social territori- tion of wealth. Solving these is the essentiai d&is widespread among small-xale fishing first step to effective fisheries management communities. In contrast to its positive In developing countries (Christy 1986). The Property Rlghts to marine fisheries was discussed briefly Alternatlve by Crutchfield and Pontecorvo ( 1 969) and more comprehensively by Keen (1983, Fisheries management through systems 1 988). of specific property rights based on the In contrast, Wilson (1882) asserted that sole ownership of resources has been ad- no evidence shows that property rights vocated as the best way of averting the schemes are dearly superior to other fisheries "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968). management designs or that they are socially Where the fisheries are the property of a economical, given that the costs of rnan- sole owner, there is an inherent incen- agement should not exceed the social tive to manage them wisely to ensure sus- opportunity cost of the problem that led tainable and lower-cost harvesting into to the implementation of rules. But "clearly, the foreseeable future (Scott 1955). Here, given the dearth of detailed studies of sole ownership is invested in a manag- sole ownership management systems of ing agency with exclusive rights to con- marine fisheries, these various views re- trol catching and marketing (Keen 1983). main assertions in want of verification" But the potential of sole ownership as a (Ruddle 198813). fisheries management tool has been rela- Various forms of property rights in fisheries tively little examined, largely, it seems, exlst. These include territorial use rights because of ideology (Keen 1783), rather in fisheries (TURFs) (vide Infia). The TACs than as a consequence of any inherent can be allocated as individual transfer- weakness. able quota, a form of property right. as Yet the efficacy of sole ownership in in Canada and New Zealand. There has fish management has long been recog- been a growing recognition that prop- nized, at least in convehtional economic erty rights probably offer " ... the best possible terms, such as by Gordon (1953),who management option for scattered, remote concluded that private rights, group property and fluid, small-scale fisheries" (Panayotou rights, sole owner management, or taxation 1982). Particularly, awareness has increased appear to be the only ways of optimizing on the potential modern role of traditional fishing effort, and who observed that in systems of community self-management a monopoly, social optima and maximum For fisheries and coastal resources. But monopoly revenue could be coincident since many such systems have broken down, (Gordon 1954); by Scott (1 955). who to accomplish this would require a re- pointed out that management by sole moval of the factors responsible for that ownership would require a property that breakdown by: (1) a policy decision to embraced the entire asset; by Crutchfield explicitly allocate resources to small-scale ( 186 1) who argued that the principal need fishing communities and to divide the was to foster the formation of property resources among communities; (2) regu- rights that would permit the dismantling lation of entry into the fisheries: and (3) of contradictory and adhocfisheries regu- facilitating exit from the sector by the lations: by Crutchfield and Zeliner (1962). creation of employment alternatives who contended that hiring an optimal (Panayotou 1782). amount of labor and capital would maximize One approach to implementing prop- rents in such fisheries; and by Copes (1972), erty rights in small-scale fisheries is the who observed that net social beneMs under TURF concept (Christy 1982, 1,992). De- a public sole ownership agency could be centralization to create, recreate or pro- higher than under a private one. The ap- tect TURFs is a means of improved fish- plicatlon of the sole ownership concept eries management. The concept rests on the ability to defend an identifiable boundary Prlnclpal Organlzatlonal around a particular aquatic resource or Characterlstlcs of Tradltlonal resource assemblage. Thus, TURFs are best Community- based Flsherles suited to easily definable tracts of coast, Management Systems llke bays or estuaries, and to areas with- out actual or potential complex or incom- In many parts of the world, and espe- patible interactions of resource use. The cially in the Asia-PaciFic region, coastal TURFS also function best for sedentary rather fisheries are or were managed tradition- than migratory species and for passive ally by community-based systems of prop- (fixed) gear. erty rights and associated regimes OF rights The TURFs' advantage Is that through and rules that closely reflect social or- self-regulation, a local community of fishers ganization and local power structure. Such may itself select how to use its rights. systems seem not to have been based On the other hand, especially in hetero- principally on ecological conditions, which geneous communities where social co- would be the case were their primary pur- hesion is weak, they may be abused by pose resource conservation. Rather, as the elite who extract rents as free rld- would be expected, since property is a ers. social relationship that defines its hold- The TURFs also arise around Rsh ag- er's security of claim to a resource or to gregating devices (FADs) and artificial reek, the servlces or benefits it provides, they as in the Philippines, where the increased reflect a correlation among property, use of FADs for tuna has been accompa- property rights and social organization nied by the establishment of deIradoTURFS (Ruddle 1988a). Management systems In by the FAD owners, who control all Bsh- the aquatic domain often, but not always. ins activity In their vicinity (Christy 1986). mirror those on land. (But these have not prevented a very high In these traditional community-based rate of growth overfishing [Floyd and Pauly systems of marine resource management, 19841.) Artificial reefs placed on the seabed an individual's sea rights depend on his in parts of the Mediterranean to prevent or her social status within a corporate illegal trawling also provide habitats for community, which ranges from villages shellfish and Finfish. Exclusive rights to through clans, subclans and lineages, to these devices can then be allocated to the family. Resource territories and user local communities, as in Italy (FA0:GFCM groups are defined. Resource use is gov- 1984). erned by rules and controlled by tradi- One advantage of such property rights tional authorities who mete out sanctions systems is that for small-scale fishers, risk and punishments For infringement of regu- and uncertainty about resources and so- lations. Conservation For sustalnabie re- cial organization are reduced (Runge 1986). source use is a widespread objective of Risk and ill-affordable wasted effort are these systems (Ruddle 1988b; 1994a, b). greatly diminished because fishing behavior Is predicated on local knowledge of re- sources; socially, because cooperation and Authority reciprocity, among other values, are em- phasized, as Is long-term resource In these systems, resource control and sustainablllty: and by protection of the management is usually vested in tradi- resource through the exclusion of out- tional authority, whose nature varies ac- siders. cording to social organization. Four principal types can be recognized: traditional secular leaders, traditional religious leaders, spe- derived From it. Such a grant of authority cialists and rights holders. These utegories defines the uses legitimately viewed as Frequently overlap, and responsibility is exclusive, as well as the penalties for vio- divided and shared. lating those rights. The characteristics of property rights may vary situationally. Common characteristics are exclusivity; the Secular leaders - In many societies, right to determine who can use a fishing a group of traditional leaders or an ground; transferability: the rlght to sell, organization, usually some kind of "vil- lease or bequeath the rights; and enforce- lage council", manages marine re- ment, the right to apprehend and penal- sources by regulating the use ofcom- ize violators of the rights. The right of munity sea space and protecting re- enforcement, and in particular that to ex- sources against overexploitation. clude the free-riding outsider, is a key However, in many Pacific islands, in characteristic, for without it all other rights particular, land and sea are disposed are diminished either actually or poten- of by a chief, who exercises his au- tially. thority on behalf of the entire com- Almost universal throughout the Asia- munity. Pacific region is the principle that mem- Religious leaders - With a widespread bers of Fishing communities have primary role in conventional resource man- resource rights by virtue of their status as agement in the Asia-Pacific reglon, members of a social group. Such rights to these religious leaders can be tradi- exploit fisheries are subject to various tional, as In Indonesia and in parts of degrees of exclusiveness, which depends the Pacific Basin, or members of a on community social organization and local formally organized church. as In Sri culture. Most commonly, traditional flsh- Lanka. erles rights apply to areas, but superim- Specialists - Commonly, marine re- posed on these may be claims held by I sources are managed by fisheries individuals or groups to a particular spe- specialists, who functlon under some cies or to a specific fishing technology. form of higher authority. Such "mas- Traditional rights to marine resources ter Fishers" are particularly common may be exclusive, primary or secondary. in Paciflc Island societies. and may be further classified into rlghts Rights holders -These commonly have of occupation and use.' The relationships management authority over marine between the two main types, primary and resources. Frequently, this level of secondary, are an important and complex authority is vested in the senior per- characteristic of many traditional manage- son of a lineage, family or other small ment systems. in which overlapping and social groups. detailed regulations on the use of tech- nologies and particular species are wide- spread. Individual rights as subdivisions 'nested wlthln" corporate marine holdings occur widely throughout the Asia-Pacific Under traditional community-based sys- tems, marine resource exploitatlon is gov- 'Such tradltlonal rlghts are better deflhed as those erned by use rights to a property. A property to use rather than to own. Moreover, rights to use rlght is a claim, consciously protected by can be excluslve, since they can imply prlrnary rights holders' subsldiaty rlght to prwent others from uslng customary law and practice, to a resource certaln resources wlthln the area over which tradl- and/or the services or benefits that are tlonal control Is exerted (Pulea 1985). region. Rights of transfer and loan and shared Systems with "Nested Rights" property rights also occur. In some societies, rights to fisheries, which are usually to areas, are overlain Exclusive Rlghts by other rights, generally those to spe- cles and gear types. Most are quite sim- Exclusive rights have been handed from ple, like those to locations with stone fish generation to generation through ancestral traps. families, spirits or gods, and are validated One complex and unusual system of by historical-mythological associations. such rights is that of Ponam Island, Manus In the Pacific Islands, myths, legends and Province, Papua New Guinea, where oral history frequently allude to the in- ownership is composed of three main habitants' exclusive rights to their islands' independent and overlapping elements: resources (Pulea 1985). Subsequently, (1) reef and inshore marine waters, (2) fishing rights in defined territories have species and (3)flshing techniques (Carrier been defined by customary law. 1981; Carrier and Carrier 1989). There, ownership of tenured sea and reef areas is not exclusive, owing to strict limits set Primary Rights by these countervailing, nested rights.

Most commonly, these are rights to which a group or an individual is entitled via Right of Transfer and Loan inheritance (i.e., a birthright), by direct descent from the core of a corporate group. Some traditional management systems Primary rights are generally comprehensive, permit the permanent, temporary or oc- since only they confer access to all re- casional transfer of rights to other social sources within a defined territory. Inher- units. Often, temporary and occasional itance, ancestral interests, social obllga- transfer requires users to compensate rights tions and cooperative relationships within owners in cash or more commonly, in kind, a social group provide continuity of own- usually with a portion of the catch. In other ership and rights. societies, however, individual fishers are proscribed by either statutory or customary law from transferring their rights. Secondary Rights

Secondary rights are more limited than Shared Rlghts primary rights, often being restricted to specific fishing methods. They are acquired In some parts of the Asia-Pacific re- through affiliation with a corporate group, gion, areal rights are shared between or by marriage, traditional purchiue, exchange, among different corporate communities. as a gift, or as reciprocity for services. Commonly shared rights have deep his- Sometimes they may be Inherited. Sec- torical roots, and Invariably, sharing is ondary rights are often given to inland done only for the most productive wa- villagers lacking direct access to the coast, ters or where kinship ties are strong. particularly when their villages have historical and kinship ties with a coastal village. Rules Eligibility Rules

Rules give substance and structure to In addition to holding rights, in many property rights by defining how a right societies the persons who can actually is to be exercised, through specification engage in fishing are limited by community- of required, permitted and forbidden acts based, national or cultural rules. In a great in exercising the authority provided by many societies in the Asia-Pacific region, the right. Thus, whereas a right author- membership of a corporate descent group, izes a fisher to work a specific fishing ground, and thus inheritance, and/or residence are his options in exercising it are governed the only rules that must be satisfied in order by rules which may, for example, specify to become a fisher: in others, further gear type used or seasonal restrictions, preconditions must be met. Such eligibility among other limitations. The more complete rules include caste membership, gender a set of rights, the less exposed are fish- and skill level, among others. ers to the actions of others. Basic rules define the geographical areas to which rights are applied; identify those Intercommunity Access Rules persons eligible to fish within a community's sea space; adgovern access of outsiders. Access controls are applied to outsiders, Operational rules govern flshing behavior, people from other social groups. There is gear externalities, assignment issues, as often boundary permeability between well as specify unacceptable flshing behavior, rieighboring groups, a consequence of long conservation practices and distribution of friendship, kinship or other close association. the catch within the community. Boundaries are less permeable the more distant the "outsider" group is either socially or geographically. But increased commercial Definition of Fishing Territories resource use often leads to strong access controls, even for close neighbors. In the Asia-Pacific region, the sea terri- Throughout the Asia-Pacific region, the tory of a social group is commonly, but rights of outsider fishers are usually closely not always, defined by proximity or adja- specified by rules defining access condi- ' cency to its settlement(s), and by lateral tions. However, there is considerable vari- and seaward boundaries. As a general ation in local details. Invariably, such rules principle, the exclusive fishing territory of require that prior permisslon be obtained a community is the adjacent marine wa- before commencing fishing. Failure to do ters within the reef. But this varies con- so is usually regarded as trespass, the siderably according to both local history penalties for which can be severe. Corn- and the more recent processes of national monly, rules specify that some form of fee. modernization. compensation or royalty be paid once In most places, cornmunlties maintain permission has been granted. exclusive rights to all known adjacent sub- In some cases, outsiders seeking fish merged reefs, which are named and owned for subsistence are allowed free access, exclusively by particular families, clans, whereas commercial fishers might be municipalities. Islands, groups of islands granted access on payment of cash or kind, or atolls, as the local social organization or prohibited entirely. Almost universally, dictates. Seaward of the reek, the de- commercialization and "cornrnoditization" gree of exclusiveness of rights gradually result in a demand for fees or prohibition, declines. even when the target species has not traditionally been harvested by the "host" 1994a). It is important, therefore, not to community. Species restrictions are assume a priori that traditional manage- sometimes placed on outsiders. ment systems are intentionally conserva- tionist. Rather, local rationale and possi- ble conservational functions must be ex- Use Behavior Rules amined for in each case. If traditional management systems were Gear rules. Gear rules are prevalent in originally designed as a conservation the Asia-Pacific region. Gear perceived of measure (admittedly an unprovable assump- as harmful to fish stoclts or habitats is widely tion in most placesj, they would have been prohibited. Similarly, generally in the in- the most widespread one employed terests of equity, gear regarded as being throughout the Pacific Basin. Prevalent in too efficient or exacerbating socioeconomic the Asia-Pacific region is the imposition divisions within a community is also of- of closed seasons that Follow local knowl- ten banned. Many gear rules are estab- edge about the spawning periods of key lished to prevent gear externalities. Fish species and prohibit their capture during Temporal allocation rules. In many such times, together with other types of places, rules are enforced to promote both customary fishing regulations, often based orderly and equitable Fishing. Frequently, on nonecological rationale, such as reli- such rules limit the number of canoes in a gious taboos, that appear to have similar line, and ensure that the position of ca- conservational implications (Johannes 1978). noes is changed in a specific order, so all Such practices are not static. Some of fishers can share equally in the best spots. the new regulations that village commu- Lottery systems for allocating space-time nities devise to cope with changing tech- among fishing groups are widespread, es- nology and fishing practices are explic- pecially in South Asia. itly conservationist. fishing behavior rules. Almost universal A wide range of conservation rules was are local rules aimed at promoting orderly traditionally employed by many commu- fishing as well as protecting fish schools. nities in the Asia-Pacific region, especially Such rules are detailed and usually locally in Oceania (johannes 1978, 1981, 1982), specific. Examples include the ban on indi- to ensure sustained yields. Some were clearly vidual fishing with flares, in favor of group designed to conserve stocks; others also efforts: acceptable levels of noise; and the functioned coincidentally as conservation way in which boats and gear must be han- devices. Among these were the live stor- dled so as not to disturb schooling fish. age or freeing of surplus Fish caught dur- Species rules. Rules are common regard- ing spawning migrations; setting up of ing the harvest of certain species: for ex- closed seasons (particularly during spawn- ample, turtles are reserved for high-rank- ing); placing taboos on fishing areas; res- ing persons, such as chiefs in the Pacific ervation of particular areas for fishing during islands. Other rules forbid catching totemic bad weather; size restrictions (although this and sacred specles. was uncommon in Oceania); and. in re- cent times, gear restrlctions (johannes 1978).

Conservation Rules Distribution of Catch Rules The conservation intent within traditional community-based marine resource man- Rules defining access to harvested fish agement systems is controversial (Ruddle are widespread in the Asia-Pacific region. These are an extremely important set of widely used in Polynesian societies. rules in many societies, since in terms of Economic sanctions consist of monetary equity within a community, access to fish and in-kind fines, destruction of gear and once harvested can be as or more important forced labor, among others. Physlcal than access to fishlng grounds (Collier et punishment including death, was a fairly al. 1979;Kendrick 1993). Such rules include common penalty in the region, especially those to provision the family and throughout Oceania, for the vlolatlon of community; those required as subsequent rules. Supernatural sanctions are all- and continual repayment for the acquisition pervasive throughout the region, and fear of fishing rights; and those enmeshed in of them reinforces the other types of general community sharing, reciprocity and sanctions. related norms concerning equity and falmess (Ruddle 1994a). Determlnlng a Future for Tradltlonal Marlne Resource Monitoring, A ccountability Management Systems and Enforcement For much of the tropical world, tradi- If rights are to be meaningful, provision tional fishing rights are an ill-defined fac- must be made within the system for moni- tor that can be construed either as hin- toring compliance with rules and impos- dering the use and development of na- ing sanctions on violators. Under commu- tional Fisheries or in contrast, encourag- nity-based marine resource management Ing their effective use and management. systems in the Asia-Pacific region, moni- Two major problems commonly arise from toring and enforcement are generally un- traditional fishing rights: dertaken within the local community: re- 1 . that of providing "outsider" commercial source users police themselves, and are fishers access to underutilized grounds observed by all others as they do so. and species from which they are now For a variety of reasons, traditional au- excluded by traditional fishing rights thorities frequently imposed temporary or claimed by people who themselves permanent bans, as well as spatial, tem- do not fish commercially; and poral, gear or species restrictions on the 2. that of preserving the valuable role exploitation of marine resources. These played by social organizations asso- commonly took the form of taboos. ciated with community-based tradi- tional management systems and con- ventional rights. Sanctions Regardless of the precise legal situation, Individuals, groups, clans or villages, as Sanctions are widely invoked through- locally appropriate, claim exclusive Rsh- out the Asia-Pacific region for the infringe- Ing rights over certain areas. Further, de- ment of fisheries rights and the breaking spite their legal basis, or lack of it. such or ignoring of locally formulated rules claims will be zealously guarded. Thus, governing fishing and other marine resource outsider commercial fishing is not possi- uses. The four principal types of sanctions ble, and this hampers the development are social, economic, physical punishment of a modern, efficient, Inshore national fish- and supernatural. ery sector. That being the case, it has been Socia/sanctionsinciude ridicule, shaming, suggested that for Papua New Guinea, ostracism and banishment. Ridicule was legislation should be considered to oblige traditianal fishing rights holders to allow based on Its merits In terms of the rela- outsiders access to grounds that are not tive costs and benefits to the nation, re- fully exploited (Anon. 1979). glon and local community. This has the On the other hand, these inherent diP advantage of political acceptability, slnce ficulties need not preclude attempts to no changes are requlred, and tradltlonal transfer some of the underlying principles sentiments and rlghts are relnforced. The on which some traditional systems are disadvantages are that traditlonal rights based. However. much Interdisciplinary holders Incur no obllgations. such that research - based on combined human eco- development of other sectors will be dif- logical, biological and economic approaches flcult at best and imposslble at worst. - Is first requlred to elucidate those prln- Moreover, because thls process Is adhoc. clples, as well as to correct many of the solutions to problems wlll be piecemeal, misplaced concepts and erroneous Inter- and no guidelines will emerge for the le- pretations that have characterized some gal Interpretation of traditional fishing rights of the earlier research on the topic (Ruddle and thelr articulation with national devel- 1988a, b; 1994a, b). opment priorities. It is therefore at best a stopgap approach, slnce It is obviously unsatisfactory in the long term. Pdcy Alternatives for the Future of Systems Legislation to Dilute Traditional Clearly, some traditional community- Systems based management systems will have a future usefulness, both nationally and lo- This approach requires legislative action cally. But equally there will be valid grounds to curtail and strictly define the powers for either diluting, modifying or abollsh- of traditional rights holders. It could also ing outright other systems. Deciding which modify traditional management systems alternative course to follow will certainly to enable the use of certain fishing rlghts depend on national priorities. But it should areas for other economic activities, lnduding also be based on national fisheries man- commerclal fisheries. Under certain con- agement capacities. In virtually all cases, ditions, systems would be abolished en- however, the future of community-based tlrely. marine resources management lies in a form It makes little sense in terms of overall of co-management with some higher level national development to prolong unnec- of government. essarily the existence of community-based Essentlally, there are three basic alter- management systems that have outlived native poky approaches regarding tradi- their historical usefulness. Such a situa- tional community-based fisheries manage- tion arises most clearly near urban-indus- ment, particularly with respect to its rela- trial centers, where, depending on the tionship to the development of fisheries density of onshore developments, the in- and other economic sectors. validation of systems could also be justi- fied by the potential health hazard of fish taken from polluted waters. Weakening or Ad Hoc Approach invalidating traditlonal systems Is a course of action that can be justified where such Basically, this implies that no clearcut systems impede alternative and more policy is established and legislated for, and important uses of coast-marine space, as that each problem is resolved as it arises, in those parts of Japan where they have become a "living fossil" (Ruddle 1985, 1987. Invalidating traditional comrnunlty-based 1989, 1990). systems together with the local knowledge But some would demur. Johannes base that underpins them also eliminates (198813). for example, believed that the irk local policing OF resources, which results validation or weakening of systems Is un- In increased financial, administrative and justified, except where they are finely sub- personnel burdens on governments that divided through "nested" rights, since rights cannot handle them. In dispensing with such withln rights seem to have a great poten- systems "the government would thus be tial for problems, and little or none for con- disposing of services it got for free and as- servation. Regarding situations where tra- suming expensive new responsibilities it was ditional authority has lapsed beyond the ill-equipped to handle" (Johannes 198813). point of possible revival, as around urban As Bailey and Zerner (1992) observed of centers, Johannes (1988b) felt that Fisher- Indonesia: ies management may best be pursued by cooperatives. This was done in japan (Ruddle The Indonesian government is incapa- 1985, 1987). Nevertheless, this is no easy ble oFdesigning effective Rshery man- task, and failures have been legion. agement systems due to limited un- The advantages of this approach are that derstanding of the complex and highly it allows both commercial fisheries and other variable nature of fisheries resources. economic sectors to develop rapidly; clarifies Government management policies the issues; and defines the modern rights which fail to recognize local institu- of traditional rights holders. The disadvan- tions and economic needs may be cre- tages are that the approach is often politi- ating more problems than they solve. cally difficult and numerous implementa- Moreover, the Indonesian government tion problems would arise. In many cases, has limited ability to enforce what regu- the losses OF rent, administrative costs and lations are in place due to staff and problems, and possible social unrest would budgetary constraints. outweigh the economic and other benefits derived. Further, once systems were either But the ability of local community man- abolished or severely eroded, they would agement systems, based on a depth of tra- be dificult if not impossible to re-introduce ditional ecological knowledge, is quite the at some later date, should the need arise. opposite. However, apart from the excep- In many cases, community-based man- tions noted in the previous section, to be agement systems ought to be invalidated effective, these local rules require recogni- or weakened locally, but in the national or tion, acceptance and protection under state regional interest, such a policy implemented law. nationwide carries with it enormous costs. In many instances. practical This is particularly obvious in far-flung considerations, such as the inability ofa poor archipelagic nations, such as Indonesia, the and/or large nation to police its fisheries, Philippines. Kiribati, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands logically lead to the alternative of or Vanuatu, but no less in any developing community-based management. It has been nation that lacks the financial and physical demonstrated that under certain conditions. ability and personnel capacity to police its traditional systems represent a viable inshore waters. Solving this major problem solution to the inadequacies and of costs provides one of the most valid rea- inefficiencies of centralization and sons for retaining well-functioning commu- unisectoralization. Co-management is a nity-based marine resource management logical approach (Bailey and Zerner systems. 1 992). In those rural, mostly subsistence-level monitoring compared with Western societies, where conventional authority commercial fisheries. remains strong, enforcement and punish- 4. The zeal with which data are collected ment are often largely traditional. This can and analyzed, together with oFficial also be used to serve a modern purpose. enforcement of regulations and hon- Traditional punishment can be severe and esty among officials leaves much to feared more than that meted out by gov- be desired. ernment. as in Oklnawa (Ruddle and 5. Most governments are too poor (or Akimichl 1989),Palau (johannes 198 1 ) or fisheries have too low a priority) to Arneriwn Samoa (Wass 1882). As Wass implement conventional regulatory (1982) observed of American Samoa, systems required by open-access re- 'Management regulations instituted on the gimes or to handle the resultant prob- village level are much more effective than lems. those of the territorial or federal govern- ments because they are promulgated within the cultural context by traditional leaders Legislation to Reinforce but and, consequently, are more likely to re- SpeciFy the Scope and Power ceive the approval and fealty of the vil- of Traditional Rights lagers." Thus, where traditional authorlty remains strong, a communlty-based man- The advantages of this are a recognl- agement system can still provide a solid tion of historical and present situations and, foundation for modern fisheries manage- possibly, the promotion of resource con- ment. However. ironlcally. when such servation. That this approach would make authority is eroding or has disappeared, conventional development difFicult is cer- it is often the fault of the government (vide tainly not a bad thing, although many would supra). regard it as a disadvantage. The reduc- In summary, replacing a traditional system tion of the powers of the central govern- with "open access" would entail all the ment while placing responsibility on the discouraging results so familiar in open- rights holders would likely be construed access fisheries. In tropical small-scale fish- as a disadvantage by vested interests. eries, those problems would be com- However, this could be overcome by re- pounded by the following factors. inforcing the scope of traditional systems 1. The multlspecies nature of fisheries within a concurrently legislated Framework would require more cumbersome regu- of co-management. lations and correspondingly more Selecting among those three alternative enforcement than systems in temperate approaches is not easy; there are no quick waters. and simple solutions to the problem. In 2. The scantiness of biological data for the Asia-Pacific region, for example, the use in management and the large question of tradltlonal fishing rights is one percentage of the small-scale catch of the most interesting and vexing prac- used for subsistence would create tical, political and philosophical problems immense logistical problems in de- confronting fisheries management. If the veloping essential data sets from very present situation is maintained and rights widely scattered fishing communities. reinforced, fisheries development will have 3. The vast number of geographlcally to take place within the context of exclu- scattered flshlng units would cause sive properties, which is the historid pattern almost insuperable financial and of the Pacific. Full debate on the issue is logistical problems for regulation and required at vlllage, local and national Iwelr, and the national government should thor- Cradltlonal rights in an area (e.g., Johannes oughly appraise local governments and 1978). Nowadays many governments, villages of their rights. Before any actlon especially In the Pacific Islands, recognize Is taken, however, it is imperative that local the legitimacy of traditional management governments document the nature of ex- systems. When such systems are likely lsting fishing rights systems nationwide. to hamper Rsheries development, they particularly those that have been or are may reconcile through mediation the needs being exercised. of tradltlonal and industrial fishers. This Is sornetlmes done by cornpensatlng traditional rights holders for allowing access to outsiders (e.g., Johannes 1982; Baines Crlterla for Determlnlng a Role 1985).Thus, a balance is sought between for Traditional Management employment and rent for national Systems development. If maximizing economic rent is the maln johannes (1988a, b) and Johannes and government Rsheries objective, then it MacFarlane ( 1990. 199 1) suggested ba- should be determined if traditional rights sic criteria for determining whether ma- holders exercise their property rights in rine resource management should be tai- a manner that discourages overcapitalimtion lored to an existing traditional manage- as well as overfishing. When a traditional ment system or whether an entirely new system operates to discourage outsiders system should be created: (1) contribu- from entering heavily exploited fisheries, tion to conservation; (2) definition and thls helps limit overcapitalization. But robustness of rights; and (3) compatibil- overcapitalization may still occur within ity with government policy. the traditional rights-holding group The order is reversed here to better re- itself. flect what I regard as a more realistic pri- Such a performance test of the ability ority for evaluation, in what is after all a of a traditional management system to highly charged political process. Compat- forestall rent dissipation was performed ibility with policy - where oneexists -would in Sri Lanka by Panayotou (1984, 1989). be the principal basic criterion in most If fisheries are being managed successfully nations (Ruddle 199413). by such a system, then the members ought to be earning incomes above their opportunity costs, whlch can be estimated CompatlblIlty with Government by comparing what other socioeconomic Policy groups earn in other sectors. Incomes of boat owners and crewmen were estimated National development policies and and compared with their opportunity costs. fisheries policies within them, differ widely Boat owners were found to have average in objective and definition. But it should annual incomes ranging from USB1.1 SO be determined if policy favors maximizing (for traditional vessels) to US$5,000 (for rents, food or employment. The future 3.5 t-mechanized vessels). In comparlson. role, if any, of traditional resource owner-cultivators, sharecroppers, office management would vary depending on workers and state employees earned an policy priorities. average of less than US$500 per annum. Formerly, colonial governments often Crewmen earned an average of US$S/day, ignored or overrode traditional systems. 2-3 times more than the daily earnings granting access to industrial fishers lacking of agricultural laborers or unskilled and semi-skilled workers. In contrast, in Thailand Contribution to Marine Resources and the Philippines, where traditional Conservatiod systems of fisheries management have totally or largely disappeared, small-scale Although traditional management sys- flshers earn incomes far below their tems generally provide an incentive to opportunity costs, and must engage in a harvest in moderation, some rights hold- range of other economlc actlvitles to earn ers do not limit their own fishing pres- a living (Panayotou 1985). The relatively sure (e.g.. Polunin 1984; Carrier 1987). In higher incomes enjoyed by Sri Lankan fishers some communltles, for example, a causal were attributed to the efficiency of the relationship between the contemporary rates traditlonal restrlcted-access management of exploitation and future fish yields is not system. after competing hypotheses, such perceived (e.g., Carrier 1982,1987). Some- as religious prohibitions on Buddhists taking times this might be because there has been life, were rejected (Fernando et al. no such relationship, abundant supplies 1985). having always exceeded demand, as in parts of Melanesia where human population denslties are low, or in the Torres Strait Deflnitlon and Robustness Islands (johannes and MacFarlane 1991 ). of Flshlng Rights Later, when marine resources in such ar- eas are threatened by increased fishing The clarity of definition, strength with pressure, as when they become which they are upheld and permeability commoditized, for example, fishers may of fishing rlghts vary enormously. Thls is not recognize the need for conservation potentially a major difficulty. One main because there is no cultural precedent (e.g., problem might be precise determination Johannes and MacFarlane 1991). of the location of tradltlonal boundarles; But thls is not to say that traditional they may be impe&ctly remembered, and management systems serve no conserva- written record would but rarely permit a tion purpose. Almost universally, rights legal settlement of wnfllcting claims (e.g., holders limit fishing by outslders. Regardless Johannes 1982, 198813). Equally complex of motive, and although not guarantee- is the identification of traditional rights ing efficient marine resource management, holders. Deliberate relocation of settlements this is a vital prerequlslte for conserva- by churches or governments is compounded tlon In fisherles threatened with more recently by urbanization having overexploltation. dlmlnlshed the role of kin groupings, such The common assertion Is that the that individuals' rights are only hazily traditional practice of area or temporal recalled. Thus, efforts to resuscitate or closures on reek enhances fish stocks by: resurrect a traditional system under such ( 1 ) maintaining species abundance and circumstances might lead to territorial diversity and possibly enhancing these disputes and long-lasting confllcts (e.g.. characteristics over the long term: (2) lohannes 1982). Given such potential providing undisturbed breeding sites; (3) problems it is not surprising that governments might be loathe to codify qo evaluate a system In terms of Its actual or po- traditional tenure systems within state law. tentlal conservation value presupposes a prlor as- unless they have hrnctloned continuously sessment of whether or not rnarlne resources In- volved are now or llkely to be overexploited and/ or at least until historical times, as in the or degraded or destroyed by pollutlon, destructlve Solomon Islands (Allan 1957). flshlng practices or other human actlvltles. exporting biomass by emigration of adult months Following the breakdown of pro- individuals; and (4)exporting biomass over tective management compared with the a wider area via larval dispersal. However, same period while it was in operation, there there have been few direct tests to verify was a 54% increase in the total yield of this assertion through natural or manipulative reef fisheries. Their research indicated that experiments. This is a severe drawback, protective management maintained high since further advances in tropical coastal abundance of Ash in the reserve and re- fisheries management depend on sulted in significantly higher yields in ad- experimenting and testing empirically the jacent areas, presumably owing to the consequences of various management migration of adult fish. regimes (Larkln 1984). Other such tests have been performed In one such test, Alcala ( 1981 ) attempted on St. Lucia, in the Caribbean (Smith and to relate protective management to fish Berkes 1991 ) and some coastal lagoons yields at the Sumilon Island Reserve, Central of Ghana, West Africa (Ntiamoa-kidu 1991 ). Visayas, Philippines, which was closed to In both areas, the beneficial qualities of all fishing from 1974 to 1984. At 16.5 community-based fisheries management t.km-2-year over a five-year period, the areas were substantiated. adjacent to the reserve produced one of the highest average yields of any reef area in the world. However, because no data Conclusion were available on reef fish abundance at Sumilon before the reserve was established, Most nations face an array of dilemmas it was impossible to verify the assertion In determining rights and delineating re- that protective management caused the sponsibilities in marine resources manage- high abundance and species richness at ment and development. These include the site. But given the extremely high fishing deciding what institutions should manage pressure on Philippine reefs, it can be ar- and enforce regulations For subsistence gued that protective management was a fisheries; legal support for traditional regu- major Factor in maintaining the high abun- lation and enforcement: the managerial and dance of many species. Also in Central developmental role of the central govern- Vlsayas, Russ (1985) compared three sites ment in small-scale commercial fisheries; at Sumilon Island, Apo lsland and Balicasag the feasibility of centralized management Island, and Focused on Serranidae stocks, plans versus local decisionmaking; and the a highly favored target species worldwide, nature of the consultative and collabora- and therefore vulnerable (Randall 1982). tive process among fishers, local govern- Limited evidence in support of the first ments and national authorities. Initially these three of the assertions noted above is pro- look like local versus central jurisdictional vided by the Sumilon study. The fourth matters, but the underlying issues are policy, needs detailed research on the patterns and the means of managing marine re- OF dispersal and recruitment of coral reef sources and adapting traditional concepts fish. to modern needs and Frameworks, such Alcala and Russ (1990) reported further that the range from subsistence fisheries on a natural experiment to test directly to the highly commercialized industrial the use of area closure as a management fishing is served properly. strategy on Sumilon Island. After a ten- It is becoming increasingly asserted that year closure, protective management broke traditional community-based marine re- down in 1984, resulting in intensive fish- source management systems may have an ing by 100 municipal fishers. In the 18 important role in the co-management of inshore fisheries. That may well be the future to fisheries managers. They create for many such systems. But it is impor- dificulties. Not uncommonly, there- tant to exercise caution, lest yet another fore, governments and entrepreneurs poorly conceived, fisheries management attempt to either weaken or invali- fad blossom, with all the failures, disap- date them. pointments. disillusionment and wastage that would inevitably result. There are several important cautionary References points to be borne in mind (Ruddle 199413): 1. Verification of the assertions about Alcala, A.C. 1981. Flsh yleld of coral reefs of Sumilon traditional systems Is still lacking. Island, Central Vlsayas. Phllipplnes. Natl. Res. Counc. Philipp. Res. Bull. 36(1):1-7. 2. Wholesale transfers of concepts would Alcala. A.C. and G.R. Russ. 1990. A dlrect test of be hazardous at the very least, since the effects of protective management on abun- such systems. by definition, arise from dance and yield of tropical marine resources. the deeper cultural patterns of the J. Cons. CIEM 46:40-47. Allan, C.H. 1957. Customary land tenure In the British societies in which they are enmeshed Solomon Islands Protectorate. Report of the (Ruddle and Akimichi 1984; British Solomon Islands Special Land Com- Durrenberger and Palsson 1987).So. mlsslon. Western Pacific Hlgh Commission, Honiara. much more than an understanding of Anon. 1979. Proceedings of the South Coast Pro- just the local, traditional fisheries alone vinclal Fisheries Councll. Konedobu. 10-14 is required; entire nhtlonal systems September 1979. South Coast Provincial Fish- of fisheries production, particularly the erles Council, Konedobu. relationship between household (tra- Balley, C. and C. Zerner. 1992. Community-based fisheries management institutions in Indone- ditional) and capitalistic (modern) sia. Paper presented at the 1992 Meetings of production, need comprehension the Society for Applled Anthropology, Memphis, (Ruddle 1988a). 25-29 March 1992. 3. Traditional systems could be "fossil- Balnes. G.B.K. 1985. A tradltlonal base for Inshore flsherles development In the Solomon Islands, ized" through explicit, detailed legal p. 39-52. In K. Ruddle and RE. Johannes (eds.) definition in the terms of state law. The tradltlonal knowledge and management This may weaken the adaptive flex- of coastal systems In Asia and the Pacific. ibility of a traditional system (Ruddle UNESCO-ROSTSEA, Jakarta. Caddy, J.F. 1984. lndlrect approaches to regulation and Johannes 1985). of Fishing effort. Flsh. Rep. 289. Supp1.2:63- 4. The application of traditional knowl- 75. Food and Agriculture Organlation, Rome. edge and management practices to Carrier. I.G. 1981. Ownership of productive resources the solution of contemporary resource on Ponam Island. Manus Province. J. Soc. Ockan. 72/73:206-217. management problems is also a rela- Carrler. J.G. 1982. Conservation and conceptlons tively new approach, at least in Western of the environment: a Manus case study, p. terms, but is now the focus of con- 39-44. In I.. 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Librero and W.L. Collier (eds.) 62: 124- 142. Economics of aquaculture, sea-fishing and Hardin, G. 1968. The tragedy OF the commons. Science coastal resource use In Asia. Proceedings of 162: 1234- 1248. the Second Biennial Meeting of the Agrlcul- Hoydal, K. 1984. ICES procedures in formulating tural Economics Society of Southeast Asia, management advice, p. 215-230. Fish. Rep. Tigbauan. Iloilo. Philippines. 3-6 November 289. Suppl. 3. Food and Agriculture Organi- 1977. Agricultural Development Council, zation. Rome. Bangkok, and Phlllpplne Council for Agricul- Johannes. R.E. 1978. Reef and lagoon tenure sys- ture and Resources Research. Los Baiios. tems in the Pacific islands. S. Pac. Bull. 4:3 1 - Copes, P. 1972. Factor rents, sole ownership and 34. the optimum level of fisheries exploitation. Johannes. R.E. 1981. Words of the lagoon: fishing Manchester School Econ. Soc. Stud.40(2): 145- and marine lore in the Palau District of Micro- 163. nesia. University of California Press. Berkeley Crutchfield, ].A. 1961. An economic evaluation of '?' and Los Angeles, alternative methods of fishery regulation. J. , -'Johannes, R.E. 1982. Traditional conservation methods Law Econ. 4(10):131-143, and protected marine areas in Oceania. Ambio Crutchfield, ].A. and A. Zellner. 1962. Economic 1 1(5):258-261. aspects of the Paclflc halibut Industry. Flsh. Johannes. R.E. 1988a. The nature and relevance to Ind. Res. 1:I-173. Australla of research on traditlonal fisheries, Crutchfield. ].A. and G. Pontecorvo. 1969. The Pa- p. 30-41. In F. Gray and L. Zann (eds.) Tradl- ciRc salmon fisheries: a study of irrational tional knowledge of the marine environment conservation. Johns Hopklns Press for Resources in Northern Australia. Workshop Ser. 8. Great for the Future, Baltimore. Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, Townsvllle. Derham. P. 1984. The problems of quota rnanage- Johannes, R.E. 198813. The role of marlne resource ment In the European Comrnunlty context. p. tenure systems (TURFS)in sustainable nearshore 241-250. Fish. Rep. 289, Suppl.3. Food and marine resource development and manage- Agriculture Organization, Rome. ment in US-affiliated tropical Pacific islands. Durrenberger. E. P. and G. PAlsson. 1987. The grass University of Guam. Agana. roots and the state: resource management In Johannes. R.E. and J.W. MacFarlane. 1990. Assess- lcelandlc flshlng, p. 370-392. In B.J. McCay ing traditional fishing rights systems in the and J. M. Acheson (eds.) The question of the context of marine resource management: a commons: the culture and ecology of com- Torres Strait example. p. 241 -261. ln K. Ruddie munal resources. Unlverslty of Arizona Press, and R.E. Johannes (eds.) Tradltional marine Tuscon . resource management in the Pacific Basin: an Emmerson, D.K. 1980. Rethinking artisanal fisher- anthology. UNESCO-ROSTSEA. Jakarta. ies development: Western concepts, Asian Johannes, R.E. and J.W. MacFarlane. 199 I.Traditional Fishing in the Torres Strait Islands. Australian their signlflcance In reef flsherles research, p. Department of Primary Industries and Energy, 167-1 78. In The blologlcal basls for reel fish- Canberra. ery management. NOAA Tech. Memo. NMFS- Keen, E.A. 1983. Common property In flsherles: Is SEFC-80. NOAA. NMFS. Washington. D.C. sole ownership an option? Mar. Pollcy 7: 197- Ruddle. K. 1985. The continuity of tradltlonal man- 211. agement practlces: the case of Japanesecoastal Keen. E.A. 1988. Ownership and productlvlty of flsherles, p. 165-179. In K. Ruddle and R.E. marine fishery resources. McDonald and Johannes(eds.) The traditional knowledge and Wwdward Publlshlng Co.. Blacksburg, Vlrginla. management of coastal systems In Asla and Kendrlck, A. 1993. The erosion and relocation of the Paclflc. UNESCO-ROSTSEA, jakarta. local resource management institutions in a Ruddle, K. 1987. Admlnlstratlon and confllct man- Javanese fishery. Paper presented at the Fourth agement In Japanese coastal flsherles. FA0 Annual Meeting of the International Associa- Flsh. Tech. Pap. 273. Food and Agrlculture tion for the Study of Common Property, Ma- Organlzatlon. Rome. nila, 16-19 June 1993. Ruddle. K. 1988a. A framework far research on the Larkin, P.A. 1984. Strategies for multlspecles man- tradltlonal knowledge and management of agement, p. 287-301. In R.M. May (ed.) Ex- coastal systems, with particular reference to ploitation of marlne communities. Sprlnger coral reef Rsherles. Galaxea 7: 179- 184. Verlag. Berlin. Ruddle, K. 1988b. Social prlnclples underlylng tra- Ntlamoa-Baidu, Y. 1991. Conservation of coastal ditional inshore fisherles management systems lagoons in Ghana: the traditional approach. In the Pacific basin. Mar. Resour. hn.5(4):351- Landscape Urban Plann. 20:41-46. 363. Panayotou. T. 1982. Management concepts for small- Ruddle, K. 1989. Solving the common property scale fisherles: economic and social aspects. dilemma: vlllage flsherles rlghts In Japanese FA0 Flsh. Tech. Pap. 228. Food and Agricul- coastal waters, p. 168-184. In F. Berkes (ed.) ture Organlratlon. Rome. Common property resources: ecology and Panayotou. T. 1984. A resource sector with a dif- community-based sustainable development. ference: llmlted entry and competitlve mar- Belhaven Press, London. ketlng In Sri Lankan flsheries. Marga Bull. 7(2- Ruddle. K. 1990. The continuity of tradltlonal man- 3). agement practlces: the case of Japanesecoastal Panayotou. T.. Edltor. 1985. Small-scale fisheries fisheries. p.263-285. In K. Ruddle and R.E. in Asla: socloeconomlc analysls and policy. Johannes (eds.) Tradltlonal marlne resource International Development Research Centre. management In the Paclflc Basin: an anthol- Ottawa. ogy. UNESCO-ROSTSEA, Jakarta. Panayotou. T. 1989. Comments on Kenneth Ruddle's Ruddle, K. 1994a. A gulde to the llterature on tra- "The organization of traditional inshore fishery ditional community-based flsherles manage- management systems In the Paciflc", p. 86- ment systems In the troplcs of the Asla-Pa- 93. In P.A. Neher. R. Arnason and N. Mollett clflc reglon. Flsh. Tech. Pap. No. 869. Food (eds.) Rights based fishing: Proceedlngs of and Agrlculture Organizatlon. Rome. a Workshop on the Sclentlfic Foundatlons for Ruddle. K. 1994b. Traditional comrnunlty-based marlne Rlghts Based Fishing. Reykjavik. 27 June-1 resource management systems In the Asla- July 1988. Kluwer. Bordrecht, the Nether- Paciflc reglon: status and potential. ICLARM. lands. Manlla. (Unpubl.). P&y, D. 1988. Some deflnltlons of ovefishlng relevant Ruddle. K. and R.E. Johannes, Edltors. 1985. The to coastal wne management In Southeast Asia. tradltlonal knowledge and management of T~+l;oast.Area Manage. 3(1):14-15. coastal systems In Asla and the PadRc. UNESCO- Pauly, D. and C.I. Murphy. Edltors. 1982. Theory ROSTSEA. jakarta. and management of troplcal fisherles. ICLARM Ruddle. K. and T. Aklmlchl. Edltors. 1984. Marl- Conf. Proc. 9. 360 p. tlme lnstltutlons In the Western Paclflc. Senrl Polunln. N.V.C. 1984. Do traditional marine "reserves" Ethnol. Stud. 17. Natlonal Museum of Eth-. conserve? A view of lndoneslan and Papua nology. Osaka. New Guinean evidence. p. 267-283. In K. Ruddle Ruddle. K. and T. Aklrnlchl. 1989. Sea tenure In and T. Aklmlchl (eds.) Marltlme Instltutlons japan and the southwestern Ryukyus, p. 337- In the Western Pacific. Senrl Ethnol. Stud. 17. 370. In J.C. Cordell (ed.)A sea of small boats: National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka. customary law and terrltorlallty In the world Pulea, M. 1985. Customary law relating to the en- of Inshore Rshlng. Rep. 62. Cultural SUN~V~~. vlronment: South PaclRc reglon: 'an overview'. Cambrldge. Massachusetts. South Paclflc Commlsslon Environment Pro- Ruddle. K.. E. thrldlngand RE. Johannes. 1992. Marlne gramme, Noumea. New taledonla. resources management In the context of cus- Randall. J.E. 1982. Troplcal marlne sanctuaries and tomaw tenure. Mar. Resour. Econ. 7:249-273. Runge. C.F. 1986. Common property and collec- Development and Management of Small-Scale tive action in economic development, p. 31 - Fisheries, Section Ill, Food and Agriculture 60. In Proceedings of the Conference on Com- Organization. Bangkok. mon Property Resource Management. 21 -26 Smith, A.H. and F. Berkes. 1991. Solutions to the April 1985. National Academy Press. Wash- "tragedy of the commons": sea-urchin man- ington, D.C. agement in St. Lucia, West Indies. Environ. Russ, G.R. 1985. Effects of protective management Conserv. l8(Z): 13 1- 136. on coral reef fishes in the Central Philippines, kmith, I.R. 1979. A research framework for tradi- p. 21 9-224. In Proceedings of the Fifth tional fisheries. ICLARM Stud. Rev. 2. 40 p. International Coral Reef Congress, Tahiti. Thornson, D. 1980. Conflict within the fishing in- SardJono, I. 1980. Trawlers banned in Indonesia. dustry. ICLARM News. 3(3):3-4. ICLARM News. 3(4):3. Wass. KC. 1982. The shoreline fishery of Atnerl- Schowengerdt, L.N. 1984. Enforcement of foreign can Samoa - past and present. p. 5 1-83. In fishing quota allocations by the US Coast Guard. Marine and coastal processes in the Pacific: Fish. Rep. 289. Suppl. 3. Food and Agricul- ecological aspects of coastal zone manage- ture Organizatlon. Rome. ment. ROSTSEA-UNESCO. Jakarta. Scott, A. 1955. The fishery: the objectives of sole Wilson, J.A. 1982. The economical management of ownership. J. Polit. Econ. 63(2):1 16-124. rnuitispecies fisheries. Land Econ. 58(4):417- Sharom Majid. 1984. Controlling of fishing effort: 434. Malaysia's experience and problems. Report Wilson, J.R. 1987. Reassessing the contributions of of the Expert Consultation on Regulation of economics to the management of fisheries: Fishing Effort. Fish. Rep. 292. Suppl. 2. Food what we can learn from "institutlonal" eco- and ~~rlcultureOrganlzation, Rome. nomics. p. 529-554. In Proceedings of the Silas, E.G. and K. Alagaswami. 1980. County sta- International Conference on Fisheries, 10-1 5 tus report on India, p. 109- 136. In Proceed- August 1986. Universit du Quebec A Rimouski, ings of the 19th Session of the Indo-Pacific Rimouski, Quebec. fisheries Cornmission. Symposium on the Forest Fanners and Fishers as Stewards of Community Resources

MARY RACELIS Ford Foundation MCP. 0.Box 19% Makatj, Metro Manila 1259 Philippines

RACELIS. M. 1994. Forest farmers and flshers as stewards of community resources. p. 87-93; In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.) Cornrnunlty management and common property of coastal flsherles In Asla and the Paciflc: concepts, methods and experiences. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45. 189 p.

proach to natural resource management has in recent years fallen upon hard times. n the mounting frenzy over our endan- The inabllity of state- or private-property Igered natural resources, traditional con- regimes to slow down, much less reverse, servationists have been quick to accuse environmental degradation despite authori- forest farmers and coastal fishers of envl- tarian tactics, has forced a redefinition of ronmental rape. They cite intenslve swidden the problem and 'its solutions. Underpin- cultivation as the despoiler of upland wa- ning this transformation has been the emer- tersheds, and overflshlng coupled with the gence of people-centered, sustainable use of poison or dynamite as the equiva- development movements. The resulting lent in coastal waters and coral reefs. Nothing alternative paradigm embodying an equi- less than strong punitive measures, they table, participatory, environmentally sound argue, can restrain these environmental and holistlc approach is Forcing out authori- criminals From performing their dastardly tarlan modes in favor of democratic ones. deeds. For many years, therefore - indeed to this day - upland dwellers have been har- Revltallzlng Stewardship assed by government forest guards bent on driving out 'squatters." Erring fishers Former forest 'squatters" are thus gain- face arrest, flnes or confiscation of their ing recognltion as citizens wlth a right to catch and equipment by the local police permanent tenure In their mountain habi- or military. Fortunately, the punltlve ap- tats or seaside dwellings. Those who have obtained secure tenure now have a stake munity resources re-establish thelr stew- in the protection and nurturing of their en- ardship over forests and coastal waters. vironment. The government's former po- licing role is shifting to one of service. The new orientation stresses people's steward- Shlftlng to Communlty ship capacities; guarantees their tenure Management rights: and affords them access to tools and technology, livelihood opportunities and People who are chronically poor, mal- basic services like health, nutrition, edu- nourished, in ill health; unsure of their resi- cation, housing, clean water and sanita- dential tenure and sources of livelihood; tion. and afraid of defying exploitative and en- Community-based nongovernmental or- trenched power groups can emerge from ganizations (NGOs) facilitate these devel- this vortex only if they find ways of exert- opmental thrusts through community or- ing significant control over the resources ganization, management skills training and around them. This transformation can come technology transfer. about through an empowerment process Where organized community groups of nurtured by specific catalytic forces. poor people once risked identification as "Communists", with its accompanying per- secution, the label has lost its meaning in Communlty organlzlns the aftermath of the Cold War. The result- ing democratic openness has led to a vir- Various modes of community organiz- tual explosion on the scene of NGOs and ing exist, some more effective than oth- people's organizations (POs). In the Phil- ers. Among the best in terms of sustainability ippines, the 1986 people power overthrow is basic issue organizing. Here community of the Marcos dictatorship accelerated this groups define, analyze and priorltlze the process. Local government initiatives, too, problems they face. These may Include evic- have grown in strength with the demise tion threats; poor quality seedlings from of top-down, centrallzed, authoritarian re- the government: an abusive policeman; a gimes of the left and the right and the rural health team reluctant to visit the vil- passage of local autonomy laws. Grassroots lage regularly; mangrove swamp conver- movements, honed by years of struggle. sions into shrimp cultivation ponds; dy- find further support in the global environ- namite fishing protected by,local officials: mental movem'ent's championing of citi- and others. A next step is for the people zen participation as crucial to genuine de- to identify power figures who are in a po- velopment. sition to change the situation but are usu- People empowerment, then, is intrinsic ally unwilling to do so. People then de- to the sustainable development paradigm. cide on actions they will take: work out It is also the basis for effective community strategies and tactics for confrontation and resource management. People aware of their negotiation; take action, then assess the rights and ready to exercise them; Luild- outcome collectively. The resulting prob- ing new forms oftechnology and information lem redefinition generates the next action- into their indigenous knowledge systems: reflection cycle. and convinced that government can pro- A series of victories enables formerly dis- vide basic social and support servlces while advantaged individuals to achieve through maintaining an orderly and peaceful envi- group action a sense of power and self- ronment - this is the context in which realization about their ability to address people as genuine stakeholders of com- and solve local problems. In the course of thls empowerment process, they also learn tripartite government organization-PO-NGO to plan and manage community concerns. partnership. While project organizing leaves Usually, trained local or outside organk- POs with the capacity to handle the Intro- ers initiate thls empowering process. fo- duced technology fairly efficiently even after cusing on the more disadvantaged peo- the departure of the NGO, they are less ple. Actual managerial projects come later able to tackle different types of projects as people's confidence In their awn effi- or address the recurring problems of in- cacy grows. In time, consclentlous, organ- equitable and arbitrary resource allocation ized groups learn to deal effectlvely with decisions by local or national power fig- both power and management issues on a ures. Combining issue-based, or empow- continuing basis even after outslde organ- erment organizing with project manage- izers or project initiators have departed. ment organizing therefore is a strategy worth Social development or project-based pursuing. organizingrepresents another mode. Here. Clearly, community organizing should outslde organizers have usually predeter- be recognized as a process of confidence mined the kinds of projects they will en- and solidarity building derived From people's courage a community to undertake, based actual experience of struggle to attain a largely on the outsider's afflllatlon and cor- common objective. Although confronting responding analysis of what the people the basic power issues is essential from need. Sometimes needs are defined through the beginning, success Is more likely when a participatory rural appraisal *heme, which groups start with small, manageable issues promotes joint learning and commits the wlthln that context, like demands for collaboratlng parties to carry out the re- improved seedlings or better transport sulting projects together. Particular thrusts facilltles for sending goods to the market. may range from health, family planning or As the groups analyze and learn from each nutrition to agrarian reform, forest conser- small victory or defeat, they gain tile vation, modern fishing technology and confidence to tackle lncreaslngiy complex women's income generation. Government resource allocatlon matters, like govemment extension agents and NGO technicians alike contract reforestation requirements, land focus on technology transfer and manage- titling and illegal loggers and trawlers. New ment training through collaborative com- values are reinforced, namely, solidarity, munity efforts. A variation on this is the fighting for one's rights and democratic community development mode that also community resource management. starts by helping people identify needs and problems but tends to prlorltlze these in the context of the agency's own service Security of tenure delivery capacity. A major difference between Issue-based If people residing in upland or coastal organizing and the various social devel- areas remain unsure of their tenure, they opment thrusts is the initial confrontation- are not likely to Invest their time, talent negotiation mode of the former versus the or hard work in their surroundings beyond collaboration-harmony relatlonshlps favored minimal survival levels. Hence, any pro- by the latter vis-a-vis powerful figures In gram aiming to foster sound community government or the private sector. In the resource management must necessarily face end. issue-based organizing combined with thls problem at the outset. It need not be sound project management activates solved before other project activities start, sustainability. This process is enhanced If but should be addressed concurrently with the govemment Forces are open to a genuine them. for subsistence; earn some cash income; Sensitivity to gender, age, ethnIcI@ acquire value-enhancing technology: and and soclal class gain access to markets so their families can survive and prosper and their children can These factors, too, have an important have a brighter future. While the professional bearing in the design of programs. Local forester rnay focus on reforestation and residents themselves may fail to include conservation programs, and the coastal these sector-specific concerns into their resource technician on minimizing damage planning. Men tend to undervalue the con- to fish and coral species, both need to tributions of women to production, even recognize that rural families must daily though the latter often handle a major if engage in a mix of activities whose priorities not dominant share of subsistence plus other change from one day to the next. If this is work. Encouraging women to speak out the fishing season, the father may go out and take leadership positions in commu- to sea while his wife dries and sells last nity matters must be a part of all comrnu- night's catch assisted by the children and nity organizing, not only for egalitarian rea- other family members. The following week sons but also for efficiency. Adults also may find the entire household weeding the ignore the volces 0f youth and children, irrigated rice plot; followed by a climb to and sometimes leave out the views of the their forest farm to harvest sweet potatoes, elderly as well. Ethnic minorities have lit- build soil-retaining rock walls, plant tree tle say in the deliberations of the major- seedlings or cut rattan for the market. ity, even though the land rnay have once Rural families must also address recurring been under their control, tilled according health problems. Many a farming couple to the precepts of indigenous knowledge have had to surrender valuable working about sustainable land and sea use. The time to illness, their own or more commonly wealthier families assume to represent the that of their children. Diarrhea brought about interests of the entire community, even by unsafe drinking water and exacerbated though their comprehension of the lives by inadequate food intake: unchecked of the poor shows little connection with measles epidemics stemming from out-of- reality or social justice. A balanced judg- reach immunization services; chronic colds ment is needed, therefore, to ensure that and chills leading to pneumonia-all of these these and other marginalized groups par- and more take their toll on people's lives. ticipate actively in deliberations about the Women in particular suffer hom too frequent future of their community. Targeting pov- childbearing, anemia, reproductive tract erty and then designing and monitoring infections and chronic malnutrition. Parents project activities with a systematic bias anxious to ensure the survival into adulthood toward the poor complete the picture. of at least some of thelr chlldren and convinced that a few of them are bound to die young will understandably resist family Attention to IIvelIhood and Its planning measures. Many of these illnesses soclocu/tural context and resulting deaths can be prevented by effective social service outreach programs Those who work with upland or coastal emphasizing preventive and primary health people for improved resource management care, nutrition, environmental sanitation, need to understand the problem from the education, responsible parenthood and people's holistic perspective. Given the women's health programs. context of structural poverty, most of the Pursuing a constantly changing mix of rural poor seek merely to grow enough food activities represents a typical survival strategy of poor families. Forest farmers and rows agalnst soil erosion. Fishing farnllies fishers have woven together over thsyears are more likely to follow the examples of an intricate tapestry of actMties to maximize thelr counterparts farther down the coast, their livelihood options and economic who have banded together and success- security. Kinshlp and broader alliance ties, Fully pressured local government officials reciprocal obligations, power relations, to stop trawlers from encroaching on thelr religious tenets and cultural values keep the territory. The men, women and youth who system going by clarifylng who should do manage these resources well should have what with whom. when, how and why. the opportunlty and financial support to External agents who demand prlority share their skills and conduct on-site train- attentlon to their single-facet program; Ing/learning workshops In nelghboring vil- ignore the wlde array of other demands on lages-farmers teaching farmers. fishers rural dwellers' time; and fail to integrate teachlng fishers. their own innovatlons into the people's lives cannot be serious about helping. Nongovernmental organfzations

Partners In Communlty It often takes an outsider to jar rural Management dwellers into alternative ways of thinking and doing. Accustomed to following tra- While the people of a community are best ditional risk-minlmizing patterns of resource situated to manage local resources most use and local power relations and also lack- effectively, they can benefit from the con- ing information on and control over new tributions of several important partners. technology, most follow the safe path of Among these are other forest farmers an3 repeating and reinforcing the known. lnto fishers with experience in modern commu- this plcture come NGOs committed to help- nity resource management; issue-based and ing local residents understand and adopt social development NCOs; academics com- promising new options. Their ideas, tralning mitted to participatory research wlth the and other forms of support lead to com- people; and enlightened government munity actions that can reverse the drift groups. Empowered community resource of inertia, transforming a once passive group management emerges from an organiza- of people lnto actlve managers and citi- tional process that highlights creative ten- zens willing to challenge the status quo. sion leading to healthy confrontation and The NGOs organize and facilitate rneet- negotlatlon, with mutually beneflclal col- ings, conduct learning workshops and llnk laboration as the outcome. the village with the outside world in pro- ductlve new ways. They serve as advo- cates for the interests of the poor among Expedenced forest farmer* government officials, local ellte and and ffshers pollcymakers. The best among these in- termediary organizations ensure, however, Probably the most credible promoters of that they do not speak for the people but new approaches and technologies are those enable people to think, decide. act and with whom one can Identiljt. Forest farrn- represent themselves. Since self-reliance ers will readily listen to and believe their Is their criterion for successful community peers who work side by side with them on organizlng, NCOs strive to wean POs away the farm, showing them how to build A- from any dependency that may have de- frames and retaining walls,or plant hedge- veloped earlier In the process. At the same time, the notion of NGOs university scholars conduct their research "working themselves out of a job" has come on community resource management. More under question in the light of long experi- of them must start by attempting to see ence. While POs should and do take over the world through the eyes of the com- the direction of their activities, the situa- munity, adjusting the conceptual frame- tions in which they operate change so rap- work for data gathering to reflect the peo- idly, with new opportunities continuously ple's insight. Problem identification with emerging, that NGOs able to stay on the the people and academics as coresearchers cutting edge of innovation benefitting POs will emerge from this framework and pro- can keep revitalizing their partnership with- vide a realistic guide to the subjects for out apology. The key element is to build a study, the specific information needed, the relationship of trust and equality in which selection of respondents, the types of analy- the NGO shifts from its initially dominant sis required, and the conclusions reached. facilitating role to one of technical assist- The people, assisted by NGOs, technicians, ance at the behest of the PO. government officials and academics, can thus devise sound solutions for enhanc- ing community resource management. Government offIcIals Participat'ing in a practical, productive ac- tivity can bring added beneFits to researcher Providing technology, services and ef- who can continue writing up the research fective governance is the role of public for their peers and advocating among officials. A people-centered development policymakers their scientific perspective. paradigm, however, demands a shift from now validated by the community. the traditional authoritarian, controlling and patronage mode of governance to a demo- cratic, enabling and egalitarian one. Thls Donors requires a new kind of public official, who is comfortable interacting with ordinary IF donors are to do their share in foster- people as equals; listens to and learns from ing community resource management, they them; is service-oriented; and builds his/ need to understand well the wide range her credibility through transparency in of situations at the grassroots level. Thls dealing with them. This model official also can be facilitated by visits to rural com- respects people's rights: recognizes the munities, where they can talk with POs made wlsdom of much of their indigenous knowl- up of men, women and youth actually en- edge; accepts the validity of their tech- gaged in resource management activities, nology in particular contexts; values their and ascertain the kinds of concerns that worldview and way of life; and takes quick alternatively drive and constrain them. Close and effective action to address their con- contact wlth community-based NGOs and cerns. Appreciating the salutary role played their linked urban-based networks, alliances by people-oriented NGOs constitutes part and federations Is crucial for keeping abreast of this new orientation in public adminis- of developments on that front. Following tration. the writings of participatory researchers will further expedite comprehension. Meetlng government officials not only In the capi- Academlc researchers tal but also in provinces, municipalities and villages will round out their information Acceptance of the alternative paradlgrn and better gulde their efforts toward giv- should likewise affect the ways in which ing useful grants or loans. of forests in developing countries. Forest resource development projects The world's resources are declining at that do not actlvely involve local us- such a rapld rate that unless new and im- ers wlll not succeed. aginative measures promising slgnifiwnt levels of success are established, succeeding All parties stand to benefit from the col- generatlons wlll have few benefits left to laboratlon of forest farmers and fishers, inherit. People-centered resource manage- NGOs, local and national government of- ment is the key principle of our time. As ficials, academic researchers and donors Senior Forest Speclallst Barin N. Gangull In a synergistic, mutual leamlng process (1993) of the Asian Development Bank yielding effectlve systems of community categorically stated: resource management. The real winners will be the people. their resources and envi- ...developmental asslstance to the ronment. forestry sector wlll succeed only if the projects make a deliberate attempt to bring about changes in policies which Reference will encourage handing over the for- ests to the community for manage- Gangull. B.N. 1993. Sustalnable management of forest ment and protection. Common re- resources: Issues for common property. Ab- stract of keynote address at the closing ses- source ownership and management slon of the IASCP Annual Meeting. Common regimes are the most effective insti- Property Resour. Dlg. 27. tutions for sustainable development Research Directed at Developing Local Organizations for People's Participation in Fisheries Management

RICHARD B. POLLNAC Department of Soc/o/ogy and Anthropology Universi& of Mode /s/and Kingston, NO2881 -0808 USA

POLLNAC. R.B. 1994. Research directed at developlng local organlzatlons for people's particlpatlon In fisheries management, p. 94-106. In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.) Community management and common property of coastal flsherles In Asla and the Paclflc: concepts, methods and experlences. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45, 189 p.

lntroductlon differences require a certain amount of incrementalism or "muddling through" to is paper has four primary objectives: develop policy directed at this type of co- T"first, to briefly review arguments for peo- management. Nevertheless, most govern- ple's participation in co-management ments, development banks and develop- through fishers' cooperative-type organi- ment agencies prefer project guidelines zations; second, to go over quantitative much more specific than an open-ended research directed at isolating factors in- type of incrementalism permits. As McCny fluencing success of these organizations; (1989) noted, research on "muddling third, to examine factors identified as po- through" projects enable "...more inbrmed tentially influencing the success of these incrernentalisrn in the Future." It Is argued organizations in ca-management: and fourth, here that quantitative research based on to outline a quantitative research agenda many such projects will reduce the amount directed at determining Factors associated of "muddling" necessary and more clearly with the success of the use of the fishers' specify where and why In a specific project organizations in co-management. The pro- an incrementalist approach is needed, thus posed research Is not expected to provide increasing the likelihood of success and a fool-proof, cookbook approach. Local cost-effectiveness. Use of Flshers' Cooperatlve- ity by an organization. Pressures applied type Organlzatlons to the individual can range from obviously In Co-management illegal (e.g., threats of bodily injury), to marginally legal (e.g., finding "cause" to To begin, It Is assumed that there is have the individual terminated from present suMclent justification for the claim that employment), to the legal (a wealthy vested people's participation, when appropriately interest instigating a costly, time-consuming used, can improve the fisheries manage- lawsuit against the individual petitioner). ment process (McGoodwin 1990). How Most private individuals could afford nei- then can such participation be implemented? ther the time nor the expense to defend There are numerous, obvious reasons that themselves against this type of legal ac- local organizations, rather than individu- tion. Such 'legal" maneuvers have occurred als, can efficiently functlon to facilitate frequently enough In the United States that people's participation in fishery manage- they are referred to by an acronym-SLAPP ment. One is the difficulty of determining (strategic lawsuit against publlc participa- an appropriate time and place to convene tion). Organizations would be less vulnerable a potentially large, heterogeneous group to such threats. of lndivlduals with interest in the fisher- It is thus relatively simple to establish ies. By approprlate is meant a time suit- that there are numerous reasons to advo- able to the work hours of fishers and other cate use of organizations to facilitate peo- interested parties and a locatlon conven- ple's participation in fisheries management. ient to all. Second Is the onerous and some- times impossible task of achlevlng agree- ment in a large group. The larger the group, Factors Influencing the success of the more people who will want to have flshers' organizations input, and the greater the chances for con- flicts to arise which will inhibit the The next question tackles the type of decisionmaking process. Involvement in fisheries management. If A third argument is that those who usually we eliminate the polar extremes (e.g., participate effectively in public forums dictatorlal management by government or directed at achieving people's partlclpa- self-management). most researchers dealing tion rarely represent the masses of peo- with this issue distinguish between ple who will be affected by proposed consultative management and cooperative changes. Effective participants are often co-management (e.g.,McGoodwln 1990). the relatively well-educated, wealthy elite Consultatlve management would involve who elther have or plan to have some in- establishment of government entitles which terest in the resource. The poor and less would consult with fishers' organizations educated frequently have difficulty flnd- before and during the preparation of lng time to participate, and when they do. management plans. The content, style and their lower level of education reduces the frequency of consultation will, of course. effectiveness of their input. It is assumed vary from system to system. Co- that the person or panel representing the management is succlnctly defined by members of the local organization at man- Plnkerton (1992) as '...power-sharing in agement meetings would be able to over- the exercise of resource management come these Ilmltatlons. between a government agency and a Fourth. obvlously an individual partici- community or organhtion of stakeholders." pant Is more vulnerable to pressure than The realization of this concept also Includes one supported by and delegated author- several variables such as content, structure. and most importantly, degree of power Jentoft (1 989), basing his position on sharing. For example, a precise description an extensive literature review and his own of any system of co-management must research experience, argued that fishers' evaluate the degree of rights and cooperatives provide an excellent organi- responsibilities of both the government and zational framework for their participation the fisher organization with respect to in the management process. He did, how- information generation, rulemaking, ever, indicate that the involvement of fishers surveillance and enforcement. Given the through cooperatives does not guarantee growing support For some type of co- successhd management: that perceptions management (Pinierton 1989a; McGoodwin of "unfairness" and conflicts can develop 1990), it will be the focus of this paper. among flshers within and among coop- The next question involves the type of eratives; and that the level of success of a organization. While various types of or- cooperative as a functioning organization ganizations such as nongovernmental or- Influences its effectiveness as an entity ganizations (NGOs) (Thomas-Slayter 1992), involved in management. regional native associations (Anders and Langdon 1989), fishers' wives' associations (Biro 1993) and others (Pinkerton 1989a, Facto~potentially influenc/ng the 1992; McGoodwin 1990) have been sug- success of flshers' organizations gested as facilitators for people's partici- pation in resource management, numer- It is essential to keep in mind the final ous researchers have provided evidence point mentioned above when assessing suggesting that fishers' cooperative-type the potential of fishers' cooperatives in assoclatlons' are appropriate for this ac- management, for two major reasons. tivity (eg., McCay 1980: Berkes 1986; First, one frequently finds inaccurate Jentoft 1989; Bailey and JentoFt 1990). statistics concerning the level ~Fwoperative Although this suggestion has detractors development in many countries. There are and potential problems (cf. Kearney 1985; many reasons for these inaccuracies (see McGoodwin 1990), it should be taken Pollnac 1987), but it should suffice to note seriously for two important reasons. First, that this author has spent much time in some management plans about to be irn- developing countries, bouncing over back plernented (e.g., the Lingayen Gulf Coastal roads in search of "on paper" fishers' co- Area Management Plan) include the use operatives only to And an empty build- of fishers' organizations (NEDA 1992). ing, rumors of "managers" who ran off with Second, the fishers' cooperative Is perhaps the funds, or nothing at all. Hence, be- the most widespread and best known formal fore deciding to use fishers' cooperatives organization among fishers worldwide. as a basis for people's participation in management, It will be essential to go beyond government reports on the exist- ence of the organizations and determine 'in many countries, cooperatives are subject to regu- their present 'levels of effectiveness as well iatlons which, in some cases, are viewed as too as structural capability to take on the ad- restrlctlve by fishers. As a means oFob:ainlng some of the benefits of a cooperative orga~iidlonwlth- ditional effort and responsibility of involve- out the restrlctlons, they sometlrnes create fishers' ment in management. This may seem ob- associations whlch perform many of the same functions vious, but I have observed fisheries de- as cooperatives. in this paper, the term "coopera- velopment projects based on nonexistent, tive" includes both formal and cooperative-type as- sociations. "on paper" fishers' cooperatives. Second, fishers' cooperatives are noto- Evaluatlng Fishers' riously difficult to develop (Pollnac 1988, Cooperatives 1991). In many areas, the failure rate is so high that the reputation of the institu- This section focuses on aspects of evalu- tion has been damaged.2This suggests that ating fishers' cooperatives as facilitators special care must be taken in projects aimed for people's participation In the Fisheries at developing fishers' cooperatives to management process. In situations where enhance people's participation In manage- the organizations are in the process of ment. formation, it is Important to evaluate the plans in terms of factors known to influ- ence relative success of fishers' coopera- Research to determine factom tives. Where there are pre-existing coop- Influencing the success or failure eratlves, current organlzational effective- of flshetx' cooperatives ness needs to be assessed along with evdu- atlon of factors that can be used to pre- A fair amount of literature reviews case dict sustainablllty of the organlzntion. If studles and research on factors influenc- the organizations are, or can be predicted ing the success or fallure of fishers' coop- to be relatively successful, they must be eratives (e.g.. JentoH 1986: Pollnac 1988, assessed as to whether they could or should 1991; Meynell 1990). Most of the case be used to facilitate people's participation studles and research Involved -individual In the management process. cooperatives or reviews of case studles which were difficult to compare due to dikrlng research approaches and lack of Cooperative success systematic data collection (e.g.. different researchers focusing on and recording dif- Review of project documents and other ferent categories of data). Only recently published literature led Pollnac ( 1988) to have researchers gone to the field and develop a checklist For fishers' organizational systematically gathered cornparable data development composed of 29 distlnct from a reasonably large sample of fishers' categories of information. He concluded cooperatives (see Poggie et al. 1888; Lubls that characterlstics of the occupation of 1990. 1992; Poggie and Pollnac 1991; marine capture fishing Influence sociocultural Pollnac et dl. 1991; Meynell 1990). These aspects of fishing communities that result studies have systematically and quantita- in the need for organizational development tively Identified numerous factors influencing methods different From those used for other or the relative success failure of fishers' occupatlonal subgroups, such as Farmers. cooperatives. These same factors need to The literature review (Pollnac 1988) w,&, be evaluated concerning existing and pro- in part, funded by the Unlted Nations Food posed organhtlons to be used to facili- and Agriculture Organization's Fisheries tate people's participation in fisheries man- Department, which commissioned 13 agement. authors In 1 1 developing countries to prepare case studles of 1 failed and I successful flshers' organlation, resulting in 26 case studies. Each case study was IFor example. In lndonesla the flshers' cooperatlve conducted using a slmllar format and Koperasl Unlt Desa-Mlna, referred to by Its lnltlals detalled questlonnalre to facllltate KUD, also stands for ketua uang dulu (head [of the cooperatlve] gets the money flrst) or kemana uang comparison. Many of the data categorles desa (where dld the vlllage money go?). In the questlonnalre paralleled those identified by Pollnac (1988),and the results acteristics. As discussed above, the fac- of the data analysis, for the most part, tor analysis of the cooperative success confirmed his conclusions (Meynell 1990). Indicators resulted in one factor. These These conclusions were tested more rig- analyses resulted in one dependent and orously in a comparative analysis of fac- six independent variables. tors influencing the success or failure of Zero-order correlations among these 48 fishers' cooperatives In Ecuador (Poggie variables indicated that among shrimp et al. 1988; Poggie and Pollnac 1 99 1; Pollnac culture cooperatives, entrepreneurial rnan- et al. 1891).This type of analysis control- agement style was the most important led For variance in national government predictor of cooperative success followed factors (e.g., legislation governing coop- by activities promoting social solidarity, eratives, number of agencies involved, then productive equipment. Other vari- degree of government involvement, etc.; ables were not significantly related to suc- see Pollnac 1988) and minimlzed variance cess. Among capture fishers' cooperatives. in the cultural context. The sample of co- factors promoting social solidarity (meetings, operatives also included shrimp mariculture social events, etc.) were most important, cooperatives, allowi~gtests of hypotheses followed by facilities. It is important to note concerning influence of aspects of the that facilitiespromoted solidarity by making occupation of marine capture fishing on the cooperative a convenient place for organization formation. Finally, the meas- socializing (e.g.. furniture. TV,toilet, lights). urement of degree of cooperative success Other variables, examined one at a time, went beyond the dichotomy of failure or (e.g.. community context, productive equip- success. Degree of success manifested a ment and entrepreneurial management range of values, being based on factor scores style) were not statistically significant pre- derived from a factor analysis of seven dictors of success for capture fishers' co- indicators of cooperative success. operatives. Best subset regression analy- Briefly, Pollnac et al. (1981) collected sis, which accounts for interrelationships informatlon From 48 fishers' cooperatives among the independent variables, Indicated along the coast of Ecuador. Information that the best combination of variables for included 17 items concerning community predicting success of both types of coop- context (e.g., types of services, schools, eratives was the managerial and social health care): 17 items about material prop- solidarity operatlng styles. However, while erty of the cooperative (e.g.. boats, mo- social solidarity operating style accounted tors, types of facilities); 18 items reflect- for 52% of the variance in success of cap- ing the operating style of the organiza- ture fisheries cooperatives, it contributed tion (e.g., behavior of members, charac- only 15% with respect to shrimp culture teristics of administrators, functions);and cooperatives, again indicating the impor- 7 items indicating relative success. tance of fostering social solidarity among Each category of items was factor- capture fishers. In contrast, managerial analyzed to determine if Interrelationships operating style accounted for only 7% of among individual items reflected some the variance in success of capture flsher- underlying commonality. The community les cooperatives. context, cooperative material and oper- The findings confirm many of the ating style Items were reduced to two di- conclusions in Pollnac (1988), as well as menslons each: basic arid advanced de- the basic argument that psychocultural velopment context: producthe and facilities adaptation to the occupation of capture cooperative material items; and manage- fishing selects a personality profile rial and social solidarity operating char- emphasizing self-reliance and independence -factors antithetical to effective cooperative lnfluencing success of the use of fishers' membership unless corrective measures cooperatives. are taken. These measures could include tralnlng and development of activities and facilities to promote social solidarity. Most Research Needs importantly, however, the more rigorous approach permits one to assess the relative Good quantitative research rests on a slgniRcance of different factors contributing foundation of careful qualitative research. to cooperative success or failure. .For As with the identification of factors Influ- example, It is argued that emphasis on encing the success oFfishersr cooperatives, factors Influencing soclal solidarity Is most early comments concerning use of coop- essential for establishing capture fisheries eratives in management were anecdotal, cooperatives. Such recomrnendatlons can after the fact, unsystematic interpretations. result in more efficient allocation OF scarce Jentoft (1989) made a first step from the development funds. anecdotal to the analytical by reviewing The foregolng discussion of cooperative the literature and conducting unstructured success has two purposes. The first, and Interviews to identify factors facilitating most obvious. Is to delineate the factors or inhibiting the involvement of flshers' useful for evaluation of these organizations. cooperatives in co-ma~gement.~Jentoft's The second, and less obvious, is to Illus- (1989) summary of critical factors facill- trate the type of methodologies necessary tating involvement include the: (1 ) exlst- for a more rigorous understanding of fac- ence of legislation delegating to flshers' tors Influencing the successful use of Fishers' organizntions the responsiblllty and au- cooperatives. thority to implement and enforce regula- Thus far. I am aware of only one rigor- tlons; (2) relatively small organizntlonal scale ous. comparative research project inves- in terms of size of membership and re- tigating factors influencing people's par- gional scope; (3) socioeconomic homo- ticipation in a marine management issue, geneity of the organization's members; (4) 1.e.. in 1 1 estuary management programs tradition of cooperation and collective action In the United States (Imperial 1993). A among members; (5)fishers' degree oftrust sample of respondents from each program in organizations; (6)existence of long-term, (ems.,program managers, publlc particl- multifaceted Interactions among members pation coordinators and cltlzen advisory or proposed members; (7) multiple func- committee chairmen) completed a ques- tions performed by the organization (e.g.. tionnalre concerning aspects of the pro- marketing, supply. as well as co-manage- gram, including outreach activitles and ment): and (8)nonincremental as opposed perceptions of degree and effectiveness to Incremental Introduction of the co-man- of publlc participation. Contextual variables agement Function. such as population density, percent of urban The eight factors mentioned above have land use, surface water area, dralnage area. been derived From case studies involving were also examined for their effects. co-management with fishers' cooperative- While not definitive. Imperial's (1993) type organbtions. If the measure of success research Is a first step in the rlght direc- tion, and Illustrates the type of research necessary for the Issues we are address- 3Not all of Jentoft's case studles were strlctly co- operatlve-type organlzatlons. The flshers' organl- ing here. The remainder of this paper will zatlons In the Lofoten flsherles were comrnlttees outline the elements to be considered In formed spedflcally for management purposes (Jentoft developing research for investigating f.rs and KrlstofFersen 1989). will rely on co-management, factors group practices self-regulation, the use of facilitating co-management, irrespective individual quotas may be an acceptable of organizational base, should also be management tool, if accepted cultural examined in a research framework. Pinkerton rrrechanisms rather than the market are used (1989b) derived 20 propositions concerning for allocatlng and transferring quotas." successful co-management in fisheries from Finally, several of the case studies clearly the case studies found in her book (Pinkerton demonstrate that ( 1 5) "...motivations and 1989a). Those not overlapping with the attitudes of key individuals can make or factors above are summarized below.4 break co-management ..." and there is a According to Pinkerton (1989b), favorable need for constant pressure by a core of preconditions for co-management include: one or more dedicated individuals. (I) a perceived crisis in stock depletion Several other researchers' observations on the part of Fishers and government: and can supplement Pinkerton's ( 1989b) Ilst. (2) a situation where fishers are willing to In a review of problems involved In insti- contribute financially. The best mechanisms tuting fisheries co-management, Felt ( 1990) and conditions for co-management con- also listed a number of factors influenc- sist of: (3) returning some of the wealth ing its success. Among those not sirnllar generated to the communities involved; to the above, Felt (1890) suggested that (4) using the same mechanisms to con- successhl co-management is positively serve and enhance both the fisheries and related to the: (1) amount of decisionmaking the cultural system: and (5) involving ex- authority granted to partlclpants: (2) de- ternal support and forums for discussion gree of equity in allocation of cost and (e.g., nongovernmental, for example, uni- restrictions among participants; (3)degree versity scientists) In co-management. Co- of involvement in enforcement: and (4) management operates best where (6)gov- amount of agreement In the content of ernment bureaucracy is small with a re- regulations and participants' perceptions gional or local mandate; (7) boundaries of the phenomena being regulated. As an can be clearly defined resulting in clarity additional factor, Doulrnan (1993) stated of membership and effective application that community-based management sys- of allocations and regulations; (8)crew as tems may be least effective in urban ar- well as skippers belong to the managing eas where customary practices have been body; (9)there is a higher authority to appeal weakened by inward migration. Flnally, to on questions concerning local equity: Pomeroy ( 1 99 1 ) pointed out that the short- ( 10) bureaucrats have direct Industry ex- run, survlval strategy of many subslstence- perlence and willingly work with fishers: level fishers, although rational given their (1 1) technical concerns such as stock site clrcumstances, is antithetical to manage- are separated from alloation decisions when ment directed at long-run productlvily of there are more than one group of the resource. In thls type of fisheries, co- stakeholders; (12) but both are made on management schemes will be more diffi- the same level when one large group is cult to Implement. involved; (13) opportunities exist for ln- Some of the proposed relationships listed formal problem solving among multlple above deserve further comment. While most stakeholders; (14) "...a culturally cohesive of the factors Identified by Jentoft (1989) as influencing the success of flshers' or- ganizations in co-management parallel those 4Fa~tors1, 2. 3 and 8 derived from Jentoft (1989) affecting the relative success of fishers' overlap wlth proposltlons 4. 8. and 9. 11 and 3, respectively. as orlglnally numbered In Plnkerton organlzatlons In general (Pollnac 1988). (1989b). two factors differ. First, It is suggested that multipllclty of functions beyond co-man- ing conditlons. The degree of adaptabil- agement would serve to reinforce the ity obviously depends on the specificity management function. It has been argued and flexlblllty of government guldelines elsewhere (Jentoft 1986; Pollnac 1988)that and/or directives wlthin which the organi- multiplicity of functions in fishers' organi- zation must work. It Is unrealistic to as- zations can lead to increased complexity sume that the government would delegate and conflicts that could alienate members. all management responsibility to the flshers Perhaps there is a nonlinear relationship with no guidelines whatsoever.= between organizational success in co- More explicitly, Ruddle (1987) noted that management and multiple functions-as the rules and regulations for fisheries co- the number of functions Increases, the operative associations set by the Japanese degree of success rises up to a certain point, Mlnistry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fish- then beglns to fall. For example, perhaps eries permit a wide latitude for Interpre- only one or two functions in addition to tation, facilitating adaptation to local needs co-management are advisable. Beyond that and fisheries conditions. Both the Lofoten relatively small number, the added corn- and Japanese cases suggest that the de- plexlty may lead to failure. This is an em- gree of specificity and flexlblllty of gov- pirical question that can only be resolved ernment guidelines is an important vari- through further research. able wlth a potential impact on the suc- Second Is the incremental Issue. One cess of flshers' organizations involved In case study revlewed by Jentoft (1989) co-management. suggested that Incremental implementa- Excluslvlty in fishing rights was men- tion of co-management through fishers' tioned by Jentoft (I 989) but not one of organitatlons may result in its operation the critical variables in his conclusion. Clearly. In a dysfunctional or hostile environment. exclusivity in flshing rights would act as a It is not clear if Jentoft referred to a social powerful incentive to join the cooperative; environment turned hostile by an island nevertheless, mere existence of a coop- of co-management or to micro-envlron- erative does not guarantee either successful mental differences (socioeconomic, cultural, cooperation among fishers or successful physical, etc.) whlch may affect implemen- co-management. It could, however. be a tat10.n. If it was the former, the degree of beginning (Ruddle 1987), as well as in- isolation of the community would be an fluence members' willingness to manage important consideratlon. Otherwise, with the latter, there is clearly a need for quan- titative analysis of these environmental S~sevldence accumulated. some researchers (e.g., factors influencing implementation success. McCay and Acheson 1987; Cordell 1989; McGoodwln In thls author's view, both aspects require 1990; Pollnac and Poggle 1991: Ruddle et al. 1992) questioned the ldeallstlc assumptlons In the early attention. 1980s on the ablllty of lndlgenous peuples or local Another essential consideration for co- cornrnunltles to manage thelr marine resources. operative success in co-management im- Although some of the early optlmlsm on the po- plicit in Jenfoft's (1989) review is the de- tentlal of ttadltlonal marine management was gcn- gree of an organization's freedom to fine- erated from a study of Occanla (Johannes1978). a look at the archaeology of the Paclflc provldes ex- tune the management options. Jentoft and tensive evldence of the negative Impacts of pre- Krlstoffersen ( 1989) noted that one of the hlstorlc peoples on the flora and fauna of thelr en- sallent features of the Lofoten (an island vironments (e.g.. Cassels 1984; Klrch 1984. 1985: group in Norway) fisheries co-management Dye and ~t&dman 1990). Thls Is not meant to Im- ply that the various forms of self- or w-manage- system Is Its adaptability to local varia- ment will not work; It merely suggests the need tions and flexiblllty In response to chang- for more research and a cautlous approach. the resource (Miller 1989). Miller (1989). conduct quantitative analysis of these various however, cautioned that exclusive access predictors in terms of both their interre- can be affected by technological changes lationships and relative importance in as well as by-catch, especially where ex- determining the relative success of such clusive access to a specific species is granted co-management programs. in an environment of open access to other The first step in this type of analysis would species. Impacts of technological changes be to operationalize the independent and on use rights have also been noted by several dependent variables. In some cases, this other researchers (e.g., Akimichi 1984; would be relatively simple; e.g., crew Matsuda and Kaneda 1984: Ohtsuka and members either are or are not members Kuchikura 1984: Pollnac 1984). Finally, of the managing body-a simple dichotomy: Pollnac ( 1984)reviewed evidence indicatlng the size of the management area can be that changes in levels of commercializa- relatively easily quantified in terms of square tion; human populatlon density; occupa- kilometers, etc. In other cases, e.g.. ho- tion structure: environmental features In- mogeneity of membership, measurement fluencing boundary definition; and species would be a bit more difficult. Cultural het- composition and distribution can have eficts erogeneity might be measured by the on use rights. Dahl (1988) provided fur- number of ethnic groups or relative sizes ther evidence emphasizing the Importance of different groups; economic heteroge- of some of these variables. Hence, if some neity on the basis of income distributlons: form of exclusivity in use rights will be technological heterogeneity by dlstribu- part of the co-management scheme, all tions of different gear types within the these variables must be considered as having organization, etc. Cohesiveness of social potential Impacts on the system. systems would be relatively difficult to Although not corroborated by a case operationalize, and would probably be study, lentoft (1989) also suggested that measured on an ordinal scale (e.g.,slightly, the more organizations involved, the fewer moderately or extensively cohesive). The the functions that can be delegated. Thls variables must be operatlonalized, how- was based on the assumptlon that large ever, in a manner that allows for reliable numbers of organizations with many re- comparisons among cases. source management functions would in- The dependent variable, success in co- crease the probability of interorganizational rmnagement, could be measured on a xale conflict. I would assume that the probability (or scales) derived from the ten items sug- of conflict is related to the density of or- gested by Pinkerton (1989b). These items ganizations in terms of the dispersal of the could be operationalized and factor analyzed target resource(s). This is again an empirical like the cooperative success scale discussed questlon for further research. above (see Pollnac et al. 1991)or used as The variables derived from the litera- ten independent indicators of success. In ture reviewed above are organized Into addition; it would probably be advisable the categorles' organizational context. to append a success measure deallng with membership and structure in Appendix 1. the status of the resource, e.g.. its main- These same varlables can be organized into tenance or Improvement since that is the the research framework suggested by primary objective of resource management. Pomeroy (1993). It can be argued that these Drawing the sample for such a study predictor variables should be considered would be an interesting problem. The first in all attempts to develop co-management wmpling universe that comes to mind is programs with fishers' cooperatives. Per- the thousands of inshore fishers' coopera- haps a stronger argument is that we should tlves in Japan.There, certain variables would apparently be held constant (q.g., cultural References homogenelty, legislation) whlle others would vary (e.g., size and density of co- Aklmlchl. T. ,1984. Terrltorlal rcgulatlon In the small- wale flshcrlm of Itoman. Oklnawa. In K. Ruddle operatives, technological heterogeneity, and T. Aklmlchl (eds.) Marltlme lnstltutions etc.). This would permit a study compa- In the Western Paclflc. Senrl Ethnol. Stud. 17. rable to the cooperative studies conducted Natlonal Museum of Ethnology. Osaka. In Ecuador (Pollnacet al. 1991) and Indo- Anders. G.C. and S.J. Langdon. 1989. Alaskan na- tive nghlstrategies. Hum. Organ. 48(2):162- nesia (Lubis 1992). Another approach, whlch 172. could maximize variance on the leglsla- Balley, C. and S. Jentoft. 1990. Hard choices In fishery tive and cultural varlables, would be to development. Mar. Pollcy 14(4):333-344. select case studies from various regions Berkes. f. 1986. Local level management and the commons problem. Mar. Poky 10(3):215-229. around the world, as was done for the Blro, E. 1993. North Carollna wlves gain power. Meyncll ( 1990) analysis. Finally, where a Natl. Flsherman 74(2):9. project is being implemented, a monitor- Cassels, R 1984. The role of prehlstorlc man in the ing and evaluation program targeting Iden- faunal extlnctlons of New Zealand and other Paclflc Islands. In P.S. Martin and R.G. Kleln tified variables would provide compara- (eds.) Quaternary extinctlons: a prehistorlc ble data across areas Involved in the project. revolutlon. Unlvcrslty of Arlzona Press. Tucson. Cordell. J. 1989. Introductlon: sea tenure. In J. Cordell (ed.) A sea of small boats. Cult. Survlval Rep. 26. Cultural Survival, Inc.. Cambridge, Mas- sachusetts. Dahl. C. 1988. Tradltlonal marlne tenure: a bask Quantitative analysis of factors influencing for artisanal flsherles management. Mar. Policy the success of flsherles co-management 12(1):40-48. Doulman. D.J. 1993. Communlty-based flshery using fishers' cooperative-type organiza- management: towards the restoratlon of tra- tions will allow one to determine devel- dltlonal practlces In the South Paclflc. Mar. opment tactics that need to be empha- Pollcy 17(2):108-1 17. sized under differing circumstances. Thus. Dye, T. and D.W. Steadrnan. 1990. Polynesian an- cestors and thclr anlmal world. Am. Scl. 78:207- scarce development funds may be allo- 215. cated more appropriately. "Muddling Felt, L. 1990. Barrlers to user partlclpatlon In the through" Is acceptable where project wsts management of the Canadlan Atlantic salmon are relatlvely low (in comparison to avail- flshery: If wlshes were flshes. Mar. Pollcy 14(4):345-360. able funds and personnel) and the scope Imperial. M.T. 1993. Publlc partlclpatlon In the na- is relatively narrow (e.g.. one fishery In a tlonal tstuary program: a descrlptlve and small region); It Is less easily justified when emplrlcal analysis. Unlverslty of Rhode Island. costs are relatively high and the scope is Kingston. Rhode Island. M.A. thesls. Jentoft. 5. 1986. Flsherles co-operatlves: lessons grand (e.g., involving 15 or 20 coopera- drawn from International experlences. Can. tives spread across a relatively large re- J. Dev. Stud. 7: 197-209. gion). In the latter case, focus on factors Jentoft.S. 1989. flsherles co-management: delegating (or combinations of factors) with the highest government responslblllty to fishermen's or- ganlzatlons. Mar. Pollcy 13(2): 137-141. probablllty of success is the most rational Jentoft. 5. and T. Krlstoffersen. 1989. Flshermen's approach, as well as being the one most co-management: The case of the LoRten fishery. likely to be funded. Only research, such Hum. Organ. 48(4):355-365. as that descrlbed above, will furnish the Johannes. R.E. 1978. Tradltlonal marlne conserva- tlon methods In Oceanla and thelr demise. information necessary for this type of ap- Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 9:349-364. proach. Kearney. J. 1985. The transformation of the Bay of Fundy herrlng Flsherles 1976- 1978: an experl- ment In fishermen-government co-rnanage- rncnt, p. 165-203. InC. Larnson and A. Hansson

In Ecuador. Hum. Organ. 50(1):43-49. Organlzatlon, Rome. RS. 1891. Small-scale flsherlcs management Ruddle, K., E. Hvldlng and R.E. Johannes. 1992. )C Ibm8qI and development: towards a wrnmunlty based Marlne resources management In the context approach. Mar. Poky 15(1):39-48. of customary tehure. Mar. Resour. Ecan. 7249- Ramroy. RS. 1993. A research framework for coastal 273. flsherles co-management Instltutlons. Naga Thomas-Slayter, B.P. 1992. Implementing effectlve 16(1):14-16. local management of natural resources: new Ruddle. K. 1987. Adrnlnlstratlon and confllct man- roles for NGOs In AMca. Hum. Organ. 5 l(2):136- agement In Japanese coastal Rsherles. FA0 143. Fish. Tech. Pap. 273. Food and Agriculture

Appendix 1. Factors potentially Influencing success or fallure of co- management systems using fishers' cooperative-type organizations.

1, Organizational context

Enabling legislation - Degree of generality and flexibility - Exclusivit in fishing rights - Amount o! decisionmaking authority granted to participants - Fisher involvement in enforcement - Distinctness of boundary definition Perceived crisis in stock depletion Small government bureaucracy with a local or regional mandate Tradition of cooperation and collective action Bureaucrats with industry experience willing to work with fishers Degree of urbanization Degree of dependence on fisheries for survival Technology Population density Species composition and distribution Level of commercialization Occupation structure Environmental features influencing boundary definition

2. Membership

Homo eneity of membership FishersB degree of trust in organizations Long-term,.multifaceted interaction among members Both crew and skippers as members Dedication of core mdividuals Financial contribution by fishers

3. Structure

a. Organization

Organizational scale Multiplicity of organization's functions b. Decisionmaking

Nonincremental introduction of management function Use of external support and forums for comanagement Higher authority for questions involving local equity Technical concerns such as stock size separated from allocation decisions where more than one group of stakeholders are involved Technical concerns such as stock size made on same level as allocation decisions when one large group is involved Opportunity for informal problem solving among multiple stakeholders c. Regulations resulting from co-management

Mechanism for returning some benefits to involved community Use of same mechanisms to enhance the fisheries and the culture Use of individual quotas within a culturally cohesive group with allocation and transferability based on accepted cultural mechanisms rather than the market Degree of equity in allocation of cost and restrictions Agreement between regulations and fisher's perceptions Towards an Integrated Community Management of Coastal Fisheries

JOHNKURIEN Centre for Development Stucfks Prasanthnagar Road Ullor, Thhlrovananthapuram 695 01 1, Kernla India

KURIEN, 1. 1994. Towards an Integrated communlty management of coastal flsherles, p. 107-1 14. In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.) Community management and common property of coastal flsherles In Asla and the PaclRc: concepts, methods and experlcnces. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45, 189 p.

The primary reason for this Is that the Intraductlon "community" referred to has undergone significant socioeconomic and cultural n the recent past, there had been a va- metamorphosis as a result of "Incorpo- I riety of initiatives aimed at creating an ration" into larger national and interna- awareness about the necessity of instl- tional ecological and economic processes. tutions at the community level for sus- We are therefore talking about a "com- tainable development and management munity" which has significantly altered of natural resources. The call for community its relationships both withln and with- development and management of coastal out. It also continues to be in a process fisheries is but a specific case of this rapldly of dynamlc transition. growing global preoccupation. Consequently, this paper Is structured Based on my academic background and along the following lines: first, a sketchy experience as a social activist working generallzntion of what the early community with coastal fishing comrnunlties. 1 want was probably like: second, a brief history to stress that integrated community man- ofthe incorporation process and the resultant agement of coastal fisheries can be as- breakdown of community in the coastal sured only by (1 ) a rebuilding of the 'com- villages; and third, the efforts taken to munity" in coastal villages and (2) the revive small-scale coastal nshing. Finally, simultaneous and conscious multisectoral measures are recommended to redefine and transnational awareness and action and rebulld the community which will take on the ecological and econornlc fronts. the new initiatives for an integrated and sustalnable community management of lncorporatlon and Breakdown coastal fisheries. of Comrnunlty

The process of lncorporatlon into the Early Communlty large socioeconomic fabric was lnltially primarily through the trade of the out- The Asia-Pacific region has had a long put of the sector-the fish. Fishers could history of maritime contacts for trade. It not llve by thls perishable commodity alone. was the sea-the samudrwhich brought A fisher who netted more than two flsh the old societies in the region closer to- had a 'surplus". The compulsion for trade gether. I have argued elsewhere that such thus came very early In the development a maritime tradition must have had its of the productive forces. origin In the humbler occupation of coastal With the advent of independence and fishing. These maritime contacts have left the modem state In most developing Aslan their mark on many coastal fishing com- countrles, the coastal fisheries were con- munities. The most obvious of these was sidered 'backward" and sought to be the strong exotic element In the craft and "modernized" through a variety of means. gear designs of many artisanal Bshlng com- As a result, the incorporation process was munities in the region (Kurien 1990); hastened through the input markets. The It can be argued that coastal commu- most popular of these were the introduction nities of the reglon had earlier been more of mechanized crafts and the use of ny- open to influences from other societies lon for net construction. This big dose of across the sea and relatively less to their capital was infused into the traditional own land-based neighboring communi- artisanal fishery presumably to rake the ties. This latter phenomenon is more pro- 'productlon of flsh for food by exploit- nounced in large nonisland societies like ing deeper waters more efficiently"' (Platteau India. 1989). This isolation and the compulsions of In general, these new technologies were a maritime occupation created a special introduced without due recognition of the psyche and culture among these com- existing artisanal fishlng methods or the munities, thus retarding their integration traditional community instltutlons whlch into the sociocultural and ecopolitical main- held the key to the customary-use rights stream of land-based society. of the coastal commons. This new pro- There was possibly a time in Asian so- duction-oriented approach to fisheries de- cieties when small communities were au- velopment introduced a strong element tonomously in control of the ownership of multisectoral linkages between the fish- and use of wastal fisheries resources through eries and the other sectors of the national various institutional forms. The lnstitu- and transnational economies. tlons were probably not all very egali- It is important to note that the Intended tarian, yet It is certain that due to so- objectives of the new development cially sanctioned community caring and sharing mechanisms, no one was too poor or destitute. 'Much of thls modem "hardware" was state-sponsored The Asian reality of today is remote and came largely frorn outslde the developlng Aslan frorn these idyllic village societies. However, wuntrles--Germany. Norway, Canada and Japan, the revival of some of these communltarlan to name a few. Rarely, If ever, were these Inputs accornpanled by the "software" of the manage- dimensions is still possible in some "is- ment rneasures/lnstltutionswhlch existed In these lands". countries. programs went adriff in most Asian countries the operators of larger mechanized boats, around the 1960s. One common factor partlcularly trawlers (Kurlen 199 1). can be Isolated for thls: the strong market An important dlmenslon of these conflicts. compulsions resulted In a continuing not usually hlghllghted. is that thelr in- demand for prawns for exp~rt.~ tenslty and ramifications depended largely This new productlon and export -ori- on who were the owners and operators entation also caused a major change in of the larger wssels. Across Asia, the owners the property reglme of the coastal wa- were rarely actlve fishers from coastal flshlng ters: what was untll then consldered a communlties. They were generally flsh "community heritage" was converted into merchants, Investors from outside the fish- an 'open-access" realm.3 The main ben- erles sector or nonfishers from among the eficlarles were lnvestors from outside the coastal vlllage communities. The owners fishlng communities who were best able were mostly nationals but often from an to control and manage these new capl- ethnlc group different from the coastal td-intenstve technologies for fish harvesting. communltles. Consequently, the pace and direction The crew of the mechanized vessels of coastal fisheries in developing Asia were belonged to diverse soclo-occupational thereafter largely determined by two groups in the economy but often came exogenous factors: investors from out- from the coastal cornmunitles themselves. slde the coastal flshlng communities, and The most common crew composition was the demands and preferences of the de- a mix of skilled workers ftom coastal fishing veloped world. communities and the relatively less skllled The incorporation process through the peasants and/or indigenous peoples of market was nearly total. Fishing villages different ethnlc backgrounds. In Isolated parts of South and Southeast These new ownership and occupatlonal Asia were Instantly "Ilnked" to japan and patterns have brought many socioeco- the Unlted States the moment they net- nomic changes Into coastal fishing com- ted prawns (shrimp), even if they con- rnunltles and deprived them of their earller tinued to use the most rudimentary craft relatively greater community harmony and and gear. equality. By the mid-1970s and well into the 1980s, Consequently, the often-mentioned "con- the coastal waters of Asia were ridden flicts between the coastal small-scale fish- with physical and socloecological con- ermen and the trawlers", were not with- fllcts between the vast majority of fish- out contradictlons from the perspective ers from coastal communities who con- of the coastal communlties. Moreover. tinued to use artisanal technologies and the inequalities in wealth and income be- tween the coastal fishworkers and the owners and operators of trawlers exac- erbated social tensions on land. =There had been a thrlvlng trade In dried prawns In most countries, the state had been among Aslan countries prlor to World War II, but inclined to view these conflicts at sea and thls never resulted In a contlnuing demand for prawns on land as 'law and order issue." They alone. Prawns were earller harvested uslng gill nets. enclrcllng nets and trammel nets In the seasons were rarely percelved as an expression when they came up to the surface coastal waters of dissent against a distorted fisheries de- From thelr usual habltat at the bottom. velopment process which deprived the many AsIan coastal flshlng communlties, a rich coastal artisanal flshing communities of traditlon consldered the coastal waters the herlt- age of "the dead, the Iivlng and those yet to be their commons and resulted in deprlva- born". tion not previously experienced by them. In the ultimate analysis, the conflicts stressing beachlanding craft rather than also reflected the breakdown of harbor-based vessels or outboard motor- "community" in the coastal fishing villages. fitted canoes instead of large mechanized trawlers. There was certainly no appre- ciation of the linkages among smallness Revlvlng Small-scale of scale: the nature of tropical coastal Fisherles resources; the knowledge systems of coastal fishing communities: and their traditional The late 1970s and the early 1980s- sociocultural institutions (Ruddle and that is, the middle of the phase of con- Johannes 1985). flicts in the fish economies of the region- Fortunately for us, some of the ency- saw a revival of academic Interest in small- clopedic knowledge of coastal fishlng com- scale coastal fisheries. The most concerted munities and their traditional institutions effort in this realm has emanated from for managing their resources as well as the International Center for Living Aquatic caring for individuals, have survived through Resources Management, thanks to the the modernization phase. Quite often, this perseverance of our late friend Ian R. Smith had happened because these communi- and his colleagues. The Food and Agri- ties were not Fully "incorporated" into the culture Organization (FAO)which had earlier divisive dimensions of modernization, or given technical assistance for the mod- as in some cases, they were able to "contain" ernization programs in Asia also took an modernization within the punriew of their interest in the said revival (Smith 1979; earlier institutions. We need to blend this Panayotou 1982). International donor agen- concern for scale with the revival of tra- cies began to review their assistance pro- ditional knowledge and community in- grams and sought to give a greater thrust stitutions to begin rebuilding community. to funding which explicitly promoted small- scale Fisherles. The 1984 FA0 World Con- ference on Fisheries Management and Rebulldlng Communlty Development, though preoccupied with the implications of the United Nations Given the socioeconomic realities of Conference on the Law of the Sea, was Asia, particularly South Asia, where pressure also pressured From within and without on coastal resources is still on the increase to maice significant pronouncements about and gainful employment opportunities the status of coastal communltles and the outside the fisheries sector are hard to role of small-scale fisheries in the future come by, it is my assessment that for another strategy for global fisheries management generation at least, the solution to the and de~elopment.~ problems in the coastal fisheries must be A closer look at these concerns shows found largely within the sector itself. that with a few outstanding exceptions, In the reality which confronts them, fishers the emphasis was entirely on the Issue have devised many individual survival strat- of scale alone. Concretely it merely meant egies to keep their necks above water. These have taken diverse forms ranging from investing in more fishing assets; 4Paraliel to thls was a conference of 100 smaii- devising various crew rotation and mu- scale fishworkers and thelr supporters from 34 countries tual assistance measures: taking to de- which highlighted the plight of coastal communi- ties and stressed the need to reorient fisheries structive fishing; migrating to other countries development and management to focus on their In search of jobs; turning to other sec- needs and aspirations. tors of the economy to eke out a living: and making efforts to rejuvenate the re- dividuals/groups, their realm of fishlng source (Kurien 1988). should be appropriately restricted to the Equally important have been their ef- specified area of access In the exclusive forts at collective action to pressure the economic zone. Fourth, such persons should state to Intervene, bring order into their be vested with the right of first sale of commons and initiate measures to man- thelr catch. age the coastal fisheries resources. The Under the stewardship of such a class best examples of these come from Indo- of workers and owner-workers, the coastal nesia, the Philippines and India. waters can regain their status of "corn- There are potentials and limits to both munity property". these forms of action by individuals and Such rebrrns are obviously rarely granted the state. The evidence, again from In- on a silver platter. They will only mate- dia and the Philippines, seems to be that rlalize if there is sufficient pressure from unless there is some form of medlatlon the grass roots. Again the evidence from between individual and state action, coastal the Philippines and from Kerala State in fishing communities face a bleak future. India gives room for optimism. The basic need of the times is there- fore to redefine and rediscover the "com- munlty" In coastal fishing villages in the Community development context of the socioeconomic and political realities. Rebuilding community implies not merely It is very unlikely that all those who regaining the rights to the coastal com- llve along the coastal zone today have mons but also simultaneous action on the common interests as regards the coastal socioeconomic development front. fisheries and their future. There is thus a Despite three to four decades of con- need to IdentlFy and bolster a core group sciously planned development efforts in among these communltles who can be- many developing Asian countries, coastal come the "beacons and guardians of the fishing communities continue to be at the sea" around whom one can envisage bottom of both the soclai and economic concentric circles of supportive interests. ladders. Changlng this situation is imperative At least three supportive conditions must if the galns from aquarian reforms are to be ensured to achleve this objectlve: (1) be consolidated and sustained into the aquarlan reform. (2) community devel- future. opment and (3) new relationships. Spelling out a general strategy to bridge the socioeconomlc gap between fishing and other communities would be a fu- Aguarlan reform tile exercise given the diverse sociopo- lltical considerations that determine the A key condition For rebulldlng wmmunlty degrees of freedom available for actlon will be the successful lmplementatlon of on these fronts. However, concretely, this an aquarian reform package. Initially, this calls for better organization of the fish has four facets. First. the right of access marketing activities to be able to earn to harvesting technology should be re- more income: better credit arrangements; stricted exdushrely to fishers. Second, there easier access to improved education and must be a ceiling on the number of units health facilities; and more job-oriented such persons can own. Third, with an skills for the youth and women. increase in the scale and capltal Invest- Based on my personal experiences in ment In the harvestlng unlts of such ln- community development work and an understanding of what Is happening in Ecologically, integrated community some other countrles, It can be said with management of coastal fisheries starts in confidence that people-managed and the forests. Economically. it begins in the people-controlled organizations supported yillage but Its linkages are often in Ja- by voluntary agencies are the best bet pan, the United States or Europe. There- to achieve a participatory and holistic de- fore, this strong multisectoral and velopment process In coastal fishing com- transnational dimension is totally outside munitles. the control of this community. This fact This is not to minimize the role of the seems often ignored in much of the discus- state and enlightened public policy In re- sions on community management. Thus. building community. To achieve this calls a more concrete explanation is called for. for a reorientation of fisheries develop- ment policy to focus more on the nature. human and social capital in the sector and Multlsectoral ecological action less on the manmade capital in the form of artifacts alone. The coastal Fisheries of a country are not just affected by the fishing activity in the seaward side of the coastal zone. New relationships They are also greatly influenced by all the negative externalities of the economic Rebuilding community is not achieved activities in the hinterland, largely via the by redefining and changing property re- links in the aquatic systems. lations and socioeconomic institutions alone. Increased silt loads due to deforesta- Reinstating the relationships of nurtur- tlon; reduced river water flow following ing, caring and sharing among humans dam construction; effluents from agriculture. and nature and among human kings them- industry, urban settlements and tourism selves is an intrinsic goal of this endeavor. which dumped into the rivers and the sea, In this context I see a very central role all affect the ecological integrity of the for women in the coastal communities, coastal ecosystems. In the initial stages, particularly those from fishing households. such externalities cause no harm. They Motherhood bestows on women the very are quite easily "managed" within the special trait of caring without counting eapaclties of the natural physico-chemi- the cost or being calculative about fu- cal processes in the coastal waters (Scura ture returns. Such values are essential to et al. 1992). underscore the need to move towards a However, a point Is reached when these "nurturing, caring and sharing approach" negative externalities "accumulate" at a to coastal fisheries. rate faster than they can be "absorbed", thus pushing the system to an ecologi- cal precipice. Integrated Communlty Most coastal ecosystems in Asia seem Management to have reached the fringes of this cliff. To retrace steps back to the plateau of Integrated community management ecological stability requires an awareness cannot be seen as an isolated project of of coastal communities that collective action the inhabitants in a series of coastal vil- on their part alone for the management lages who have been able to rebuild a of their common resources is only a par- community as sketched out above. tial solution, and a poor one at that. Since the 'sea starts in the forests", eries requires greater attention than it now cooperation from the 'upstream" sectors receives. This Is because a significant share of the economy is a prerequisite for to- of the value of the coastal fisheries re- tal success of the community venture. This sources"outputin developing Asian countries in turn implies a willingness on the part is obtained from exports to the devel- of these upstream sectors to regulate their oped world. There is no reason to ex- polluting and resource degrading activities. pect any change in these economic Iink- Such are the multisectorai compulsions ages In the near future. Consequently, of integrated community management of the nature and quantum of coastal fish- coastal fisheries. ing effort, even assuming community A beginning on this front calls for both management, will largely be dictated by state intervention and community action. consumer demand in Japan, the United We do see some new, enlightened, high- States and Europe. level state initiatives for more holistic eco- Will local community efforts for sus- system planning and project implemen- tainable coastal fisheries succumb to the tation. However, the earlier compartmen- insatiable demand for exotic tropical coastal tallzed approach has become very rigid seafood in the developed world? and It will take a long time before such The answer is a big "YES". integrated practices trickle down to the The solution to this dilemma is to in- lower levels of state administration. One tegrate community management efforts way to hasten this is for more concerted. with global initiatives to reduce the de- popular community action across sectors gree of discord in the nexus between of the economy. transnational trade and consumption My personal experiences of the latter patterns on the one hand and sustain- has been in assisting the National able community management of coastal Fishworkers Forum of India (a confederation resources on the other. of artisanal fishworkers' unions/assocla- To achieve this we need NOT ban all tions) to organlze an ail-India people's fish exports from developing Asian countries awareness jatha (march) In 1989 on the or stop the Imports of fisheries technol- theme 'Protect water. protect Ilfe". This ogy from the developed world. That would socioecologlcal march which covered about jeopardize the livelihood of millions of 5,000 km of coastline was uniquely spear- fishworkers. The need of the hour is to headed by the laboring men and women arrive at a proper balance-be it in har- of the coastal flshing communities-the vesting of the resource or the use of tech- beacons and guardians of the sea. They nology for fishing and related activities. were joined by many middle-class envi- For example, one of the most crucial ronmental groups, other workers' groups transitions in Asian coastal waters will and people's organizations from the "up- be a shift from using trawls (to catch prawns) stream" sectors of society. The march pro- back to the more passive and environ- vided a broad platform for creating aware- mentally benign nets for this purpose. The ness of the fact that our common iink- economic and ecological effects of "trawi- ages to life are through water! free prawn exports" have been partially demonstrated In Indonesia and can be done in other countries as well. Achievlng such transitions Is an important prerequisite for a long-term, integrated The transnational dimension of integrated community management of coastal fisheries. community management of coastal fish- But such transitions cannot materialize without the right signals to this effect from lntegrated community management of the developed world. For example, if the coastal flsheries-we will always be moving Japanese consumer movement can get towards it. But first we must make a firm their prawn importers to refuse prawns commitment in that direction. below a specified count/kilo from India, the salutary environmental and economic impact on coastal fisheries will be far greater References than all our costly efforts to manage the extremely socially and politically charged Kurien. 1. 1988. Studies on the role of fishermen's organlzatlons in fisheries management. FA0 conflict between trawler owners and small- Fish. Tech. Pap. 300:29-48. scale fishers. Kurlen. J. 1990. Collecthre action and common property resource rejuvenatlon: the case of people's artificial reefs In Kerala State. Indla. Paper presented at the IPFC Symposium on Artlfi- clal keefs and Fish Aggregation Devices as Resource Enhancement and Fisheries Man- The success of integrated community agement Tools, Colombo. management of coastal Fisheries at the Kurlen, J. 199 1. Rulnlng the commons and responses local level depends on an integration of of the commoners. UNRISD. Geneva. Swlt- zerland. rnultisectoral and transnational awareness Panayotou. T. 1982. Management concepts for small- and action. This can be achieved only in scale flsherles: economic and soclal aspects. the process of the struggle to rebuild com- FA0 Fish. Tech. Pap. 228. Food and'~~ri- munity in the coastal villages. The com- culture Organlzation. Rome. Platteau, J.P. 1989. The dynamics of fisherles de- munity focus is not necessarily in con- velopment in developing countries: a gen- flict with the need for multisectoral and eral overview. Dev. Change 20(4):565-598. transnational action. In fact, we should Ruddle, K. and R.E. Johannes. Editors. 1985. The tradltlonal knowledge and management of strive towards the ability to blend the two wastal systems In Asia and the Pacific. UNESCO- without losing the cutting edge of any ROSTSEA. Jakarta. of their respective concerns. Let this not 6cura. L.F.. T.-E. Chua. M.D. Pldo and J.N. Paw. be mistaken as a search for harmony and 1992. Lessons For lntegrated knowledge and management of coastal systems in Asla and coexistence; far from it. It is only a crea- the Paclflc. UNESCO-ROSTSEA. Jakarta. tive effort to balance countervailing forces. bmith, I.R. 1979. A research framework for tradl- In that sense, we may never reach an tional flsheries. ICLARM Stud. Rev. 2. 40 p. Planning and Management of Small-scale Coastal Fisheries

K. KUPERAN VISWANATHAN NIK MUSTAPHA RAJA ABDULLAH Un/vers/ti Pertaninn MaL?ys/a 43400 UPM, Serdang, Selangor Malaysia

KUPERAN VISWANATHAN. K. and N.M.R. ABDULLAH. 1994. Planning and management of small-scale coastal flsherles, p. 1 15-1 23. In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.) Community management and common properly of coastal flsherles In Asla and the Paclflc: concepts, methods and experiences. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45. 189 p.

Plannlng and Settlng ObJectlves e experience of fisheries management T"In Southeast Asia has shown that flsh- Planning and setting objectives for ing is a soclai and economic activity. As management requires a good understanding such, social and economic aspects have of small-scale coastal fisheries, the resource major impacts on management. These attributes, the traditional values of fishers, aspects of the fisheries system rekr to human the institutional arrangements and the and social elements which influence fish- overall environment in whlch the small- eries objectives and economic actlvlty. The scale fishers operate. Without prior problems and issues in planning and man- knowledge of these attributes, any attempts agement of small-scale coastal fisheries are to manage the small-scale fisheries will discussed In this paper. The approprlate- often be met wlth serious resistance and ness of co-management for small-scale problems of noncompliance. In fisheries coastal fisherles In the Southeast Asian literature, there is apparently no consensus region is also exarnlned. Some Irnplica- on, or even clear spelling out of, the exact tions for fisheries management in the re- meaning of 'small-scale coastal fisheries." gion are taken up. Smith (1979) and Panayotou (1985) provided some detailed guidelines for efficiency (e.g., canoes fitted with outboard classiQing small-scale fisheries in Asia. The motors or adjusted to handle new types small-scale fisheries are often described of nets). This deFinition ensures that the as fishing unlts consisting of kin groups small-scale fishing sector is characterized using small, occasionally powered boats by relatively low-capital intensity, since or none at all. Fishing is often part-time heavy infrastructure (anchorage and harbor and household income may be facilities) can be dispensed with, and me- supplemented by other nonfishing activities dium or large vessels are excluded. Small- of the fishers. The fishers normally use scale coastal Rshing communities are also traditional gear and investment levels are identified by a decentralized and scattered low, with capital often borrowed from those pattern of settlement since there is no need who market the catch. Catch per fishing to cluster around a harbor point. Fishing unit is low and up to half or more of the technologies are also relatively easy to catch most often does not enter organized acquire by traditional fisher communities market but is rather consumed by the fisher themselves due to the obvious line of con- and family. The fishing community is tinuity between the old and new techniques frequently isolated, geographically and and crafts, and reasonable investment costs. socially, and their income is much lower A second definition considers artisanal than the stated national poverty line. fisheries to be composed of all fishing units These fishers tend to operate in nearshore whose proprietors are actually involved areas where the resources are clearly in fishing operations, whether manual or overexploited. Besides declining catch, direct supervisory or coordlnatlon tasks. small-scale fishers also face competition This Implies that management Functions From illegal flshlng activities by commer- have not been completely specialized. In cial fishing boats. Small-scale fishers of- this paper, small-scale coastal fishers are ten feel that institutions enforcing regu- those who fit the descrlptions given above lations are not effective and thus, com- by Smith (1979). Panayotou (1985) and mercial fishers, especially trawlers, are able Platteau ( 1 989). to overfish in the coastal areas. The het- erogeneous nature of fishers operating in the nearshore areas with differing objec- Management objectives tives of resource utilization, will provide serious challenge to decisionmakers in Quite often there is a mlsunderstand- planning and managing small-scale fish- ing between declslonmakers and flshers eries. regarding management of the coastal fish- Platteau (1989) used two broad ap- eries resources. The standard package ap- proaches for defining small-scale coastal proach of management as practised by many fisheries. First, in technol~glcalterms, national governments may be in conflict artisanal or small-scale coastal fishing would with local condltlons. When fishers do not be composed of all beachlanding flshlng participate In or accept the programs. it units, whether of the traditional varlet- (e.g.. is felt that they are not actlng in their own canoes, rafts) or of a new type (e.g.. best Interest. However, they may be ra- beachlanding plywood boats). Defined thus, tlonal In their action because the two partles the small-scale sector is not technologl- have different economic strategies on re- cally stagnant; not only can it comprise source use. new types of craft (uslng new materlals Many small-scale fishers exist at the and designs), but also tradltlonal crafts which subsistence level and have a short-run, have undergone transformations to improve survival strategy oftaking care of themselves and their family each day (Pomeroy 1991). of his own animals and incurs only a share These fishers have limited mobility to seek of the costs resulting from overgrazing. alternative employment, and will utilize The result is the degradation of the pas- whatever resources are available to harvest ture land and loss of benefits to all herd- as much fish as possible. They prefer food ers. now rather than a continual flow into The second model is called the prison- perpetulty; in other words, these fishers er's dilemma game (Dawes 1973, 1975). have a very high dlscount rate concerning Here, individuals utilizing a natural resource the resource use. are seen to be similar to players In a non- In contrast, the government is prima- cooperatlve game who possess complete rily concerned with the sustainable use of information. Each player has a dominant the resource for food, employment and strategy in the sense that he is always better - resource rents. Therefore, any development OR choosing the strategy to defect no matter program to malntain the long-term pro- what the other player selects. When all ductivity of the resource will be consid- players pick their dominant strategy, a non- ered by the society as the rational eco- pared optlmal equilibrium is the result. A nomic strategy. From the government's non-pared optlmal outcome occurs when point of view, the logical economic strat- there is no other outcome strlctly preferred egy as percelved by fishers is irrational for by at least one player that Is at least as eventually it causes total destruction to good for the others. The fascination of the the fishery biomass. Nonetheless, these prisoner's dilemma game lies in the para- conflicting perspectives of resource man- dox that lndlvidually rational strategies lead agement anbe reconciled by incorporating to collectively irrational outcomes. both views into the fisheries management The third model is the outcome of Olson's strategy. More effective development pro- (1965) work on group theory. In his book, grams can be established if both the gov- The Ioglc of collecCive actlon, Olson chal- ernment and fishers develop new,-mutu- lenged the optimism expressed In group ally beneficial economic strategies. Thls theory that lndlviduals with common in- approach Is popularly known as co-man- terests would voluntarily act to try to fur- agement or community-based management. ther those interests (Bentley 1949; Truman 1958). Olson (1965) argued that "unless the number of Individuals Is qulte small. Resource management models or unless there is coercion or some other speclal device to make individuals act In In surveying the literature on manag- their common Interest, rational seif-lnter- ing natural resources. Ostrom ( 1990) bund ested individuals will not act to achieve that researchers use three major models the1r common or group interest. " He used to explain why natural resources are ex- the free-rider problem as a basis for ex- plolted to the point of endangerlng their plalnlng why individuals have little incenthre long-term economlc viability. The first to contribute voluntarily to the provision model, often called the tragedy of the of a good that benefits the group. commons. Is attributed to Hardin's (1968) Arising from the three models mentioned artlcle. Using a pasture land open to all above, poky prescriptlons for resource as an example of a natural resource. Hardin management dlfor regulations of various demonstrated that herders wlll be moti- kinds to protect natural resources and ensure vated to add more and more animals to long-term economic viability. Heilbroner the llmlted pasture because each herder (1 974) felt that strong government Is concerned only with the direct benefit interventloa would be necessary to achlwe control over ecological problems. Ehrenfield management and the benefits that may ( 1972) suggested that if "private interest arise from it. Co-management of small- cannot be expected to protect the public scale coastal fisheries may be an avenue domain then external regulation by public for improvement, wherein the national agencies, governments, or international government and the community could share authorities is needed." Carruthers and Sfoner authority. (I98 1) argued that without public control, "overgrazing and soil erosion of communal pastures, or less fish at higher average cost" Co-management of coastal would result. They concluded that "common fisheries property resources require public control if economic efficiency is to result From their The co-management concept can be development." An alternative recommend- considered an advancement in property ation has been establishing private property tights research because it examines fur- rights (Dernsetz 1967: Johnson 1972; Smith ther the interactions between fishing com- 1981 ; Welch 1983), which is particularly munities and regulatory regimes and does difficult in the case of the fisheries resources. raise questions on the universal validity What is evident from the policy prescrip- of the "tragedy of the commons" paradigm tions arising from the tragedy of the com- (Charles 1988). The existence of informal mons, the prisoner's dilemma and the logic property rights, territorial use rights, and of collective action is the call for an ex- informal contracting for the management ternal agent or authority for regulating the of a common property resource indicates resource or parcelling out rights of use. that self-interested individuals can work In many developing countries, centralized out arrangements among themselves to control of natural resources has been based manage a common property for their overall on such prescriptions. These prescriptions benefit (Ruddle and Akimichi 1984; Berkes have often failed to consider the experi- 1986; Made 1987; Pinkerton 1989). Pri- ences and capacities of local management vatization or state regulation may not al- systems and have tended to overestimate ways be essential to manage a common- the national government's ability to manage property resource. Apparently, a critical the coastal resources. In a number of cases, requirement for the success of any cam- a large amount of state resources is used mon-property management scheme is the to manage, often ineffectively, a resource extent to which fishers will voluntarily that does not generate enough rents to cooperate to advance their collective ln- pay for the high cost of centralized bu- terest at the expense of a short-term pri- reaucracies. vate interest. Essentially, the question is In the context of small-scale coastal flsh- what motivates fishers to voluntarily ad- eries, governments In most of Asia have here to regulations. Evidence shows that increased their role in management. The sf fishers willingly accept the regulations general tendency is to reduce completely as appropriate and consistent with their the authority of local communities through existing values. the regulatory agency will legislation and the establishment of insti- gain legitimacy with the fishers, thus re- tutions that provide a minimal partlcipa- ducing noncompliance with the regulatlons tory role for fishers In the management of (Kuperan 1992). It is in securing legitimacy the coastal resources. The general outcome that co-management promises to be a better has been a greater difficulty of govern- fisheries resource management arrange- ment agencies in communicating to coastal ment. fishing communities the need for resource Co-management of coastal flsherles Management characteristics therefore means that government agencies and fishers, through their cooperative 1. The Fishers/fishers' organizations par- organizations, share responsibilities for ticipate in wrltlng and implementing management functions. Governments regulations. formally recognize informally enforced 2. Regulations in place are enforceable regulations by the fishers themselves. A and enforced. part of the regulatory power is transferred 3. Reasons for regulations are understood From the government to fishers' by the Fishing industry, enforcement organizations. Therefore, they not only personnel, resource managers and participate in the declslonmaklng process, scientists. but also have the authority to make and 4. The resource managers and fisheries Implement regulatory decisions on their sclentlsts are visible and can be per- own. sonally identified by Rshers/fishers' organizations.

Well-managed small-scale coastal flsherles Can co-management ensure well-managed coastal flsherles? Universally acceptable properties of well- managed small-scale coastal flsherles can One of the key arguments for the co- be categorized into two separate charac- management approach is that it attempts terlstics (Miller 1990). They are given here to use fisheries management systems well- as a prerequisite for discussing how co- adapted for local conditions. In particu- management can lead to this ideal. lar, effort is made to recognize custom- ary marine tenure (CMT) systems for the management of local marine resources. Resource characteristics The essence of CMT systems is people managing and negotiating access to valued 1. The quality and quantity of resource marine resources, each individual or group habitats are maintained. acting from a firm basis within a social 2. Catch is stable and is managed to system. Knowledge of the environment change by only a moderate amount. will indicate where a fisher should fish e.g., a factor of less than 1.3, in suc- to maximize the catch, but marine ten- cessive years. ure regulations constrain these choices 3. Market demand, processing capac- to where fishing may legitimately take ity, resource yield and fishing capac- place, according to rights held or permissions Ity are well-matched. sought (Ruddle et al. 1992). The CMT 4. Annual yield predictions are avoided, systems thus have fisheries management but if required, are based on recruit as but one aspect of their role in society year-class strength and yield per re- and history, and contain a number of cruit rather than on an assumed stock- opportunities for achieving ecologically, recruitment relationship. economically and socially integrated ap- 5. Resource waste is low: discards and proaches in resource management. Hviding bycatch are less than 30% of the yield ( 1990) considered CMT as basically sys- to the fishery, and the yield per re- tems of social relationships that involve cruit is at least two-thirds of the maxi- participants and operators. declsionmakers. mum. Insiders and outsiders. The systems are generated, maintained and transformed duced internal conflict as a basis for alle- in social process. viating poverty among fishers and increasing To understand these processes, an aware- society's overall returns. In most South- ness of certain basic social principles un- east Asian tountries, except Papua New derlying their dynamics is required. Ruddle Guinea, active fishers far exceed the re- (1988) identified six underlying principles quired number under a socially optimum for the South Pacific: (1) sea rights depend fisheries management. Sound management on social status; (2) resource exploitation therefore entails the creation of other outlets is governed by use rights; (3) resource- for fishers such as employment opportu- use territories are defined; (4) marine re- nities in aquaculture, processing, mining sources are controlled by traditional au- and tourism. To handle these issues, greater thorities; (5) conservation is traditionally central control of the fisheries is seen in and widely practised: and (6)sanctions and most of Southeast Asia. punishments are meted out for Infringe- Traditional sea tenure systems that may ment of regulations. These principles are have existed in the region have been largely to a large extent consistent with the char- replaced by centralized government con- acteristics outlined above for well-man- trol often originating from the colonial aged small-scale coastal fisheries. The experiences of each country. The author- question now is to what extent the prln- ity for planning and management of the ciples outlined by Ruddle (1988) are dis- fisheries resources often lies in a govern- cernible in the Southeast Asian setting. ment department that makes decisions on effort restrictions and allocation of fish- Ing grounds. There is often little or no role Management of Small-scale for fishers or fishers' organizations to par- Coastal Flsherles In ticipate in the planning and management Southeast Asla process. Most of the fisheries plans have specific development objectives such as It is now almost unlversally accepted 'to attain and maintain self-sufflclency in that much of the coastal regions of Southeast fish production" in the case of the Philip- Asia have been overfished. The govern- pines, and 'to make optimal use of fish- ments of these countries (Brunei Darussalam. ery resources" in Malaysia. Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillppines, Singapore, The market economy Is well-developed Thailand, Myanmar and Papua New Guinea) In most of Southeast Asia, wherein fishlng are working to attain sustainable improve- communities are quite integrated. In the ments in the socioeconomlc conditions of case of Malaysia, a political system based small-scale fishlng communities. They see on the concept of a federation of 13 states the need to maxlmlze the net economic provides centralized power to the federal and social benefits from the flsheries. They government to manage the fisheries. are also grappling with the issue of allo- Coupled with an almost free market system, cating the country's limited marine fish- this has almost removed any form of CMT eries between small-scale fishing commu- that has any serious support from fishing nities and Industrial fisheries to minimize comrnunitles. In his study of social relations confllct between the two. In Malaysia. In- of production in rural Malay society, Bailey donesia and Thailand, explicit political ( 199 1 ) concluded that in fishing attention Is given to income and wealth comrnunitles, moral economy values have distribution issues among different ethnic long been relegated to the cultural dustbin, groups. Most governments recognize the Coordinating the efforts of fishers through need for well-managed fisheries with re- cooperative formatlon or encouraging their collective participation in rural development cultural sense to the different fishing com- programs Is a far more challenging munltles could be marshalled for improved proposltlon. He found that fishing resource management. There is greater communities do not have a pre-existing prospect for using CMT as found in the organiational capacity to build cooperatives Pacific Islands (Ruddle et al. 1992) withln which are often seen as an important a co-management framework for some of institution for the co-management of the coastal fisheries in the Philippines and flsherles. The cursory evidence on fishing Indonesia. In Indonesia, however, the ten- comrnunlties in Malaysia and a well- dency for a strong central government may established centralist fisheries management impede the prospects for co-management. system polnt to a limited scope for co- In the case of Malaysia and Thailand, management. the move towards a regional management What has happened in most of South- of their fisheries would be in the right di- east Asia, except Papua New Guinea and rection. This will enable greater flexibility some parts of the Philippines, Is the trans- in the incorporation of the specific differ- formation from traditional sea systems to ences in resource and socioeconomic char- centralist state-controlled resource man- acteristics among the regions in the fish- agement regimes. We argued earlier that eries management plans. co-management does satisfy the requlre- The ranking of the prospects for the co- ments of well-managed small-scale coastal management approach for the coastal fish- flsheries. The question now is: is there a eries of Southeast Asian countries (Table prospect for co-management in the Rsh- 1 ) is based on some of the factors discussed erles of Southeast Asia? The answer is above. It is also interesting to note that perhaps yes or no depending on which except for Myanmar, those countries that country we are considering. The transfer have exhibited high economic growth rates of power to local comrnunlties to man- and with a good record of managing the age flsheries resources may not be an at- overall economy are ranked as having low tractive proposition to many governments prospects for co-management. This is ex- in Southeast Asia. In Malaysia, for exam- pected as communities that have found ple, the co-management idea is unlikely governments failing badly are more un- to be politically feasible and the political likely to believe that centralized govern- and legal framework in the country strongly ment-based approaches to managing the favors central control of resource manage- fisheries will be successful, as in the case ment. The general feeling among politi- of the Philippines. Its high prospect for cians and resource managers in this small co-management is largely due to a changed country with a multi-ethnic society is that political climate which shifts more respon- common property resources can only be sibilities to local governments and encour- best managed by a centrallzed authority. ages the active participation of The implementation of the co-management nongovernmental organizations in com- approach will similarly be difficult in countries munity development. like Thailand and Brunei Darussalam where the trend Is For centralist control of resources. The Philippines and Indonesia, on the other hand, may have better prospects for co-management as these countries are geographically dispersed and made up of This article addressed the issues of many Islands. Localized marine tenure planning and management of small-scale systems that make both ecological and coastal fisheries in Southeast Asia. The Table 1. Prospects for the adoptlon of the co- velopment. World Bank Staff Work. Pap. 496. management approach for coastal flsherles In Washlngton. D.C. southeast Asla. Charles. A.T. 1988. Fishery socioeconomics: a sur- Country Rank vey. Land Econ. 64(3):276-295. High Average Low Dawes, R.M. 1973. The commons dilemma games: Brunel Darussalam x an n-person rnlxed motive game with a domi- nating strategy for Res. Bull. Myanmar x defection. ORI 13:l-12. lndonesla x 1975. Malaysia x Dawes, R.M. Formal models of dllemmas In Papua New Gulnea x soclal decision making, p. 87-108.In M.F. Kaplan and Schwartz (eds.) Human judge- Phllipplnes x 5. ment and declsion processes: formal and Slngapore x rnathernatlcal apprmches. Academic Press. New York. Demsetz, H. 1967:Toward a theory of property rights. Am. Econ. Rev. 62:347-359. understanding of the resource attributes Ehrenfield, D.W. 1972. Conserving life on earth. and the objectives of small-scale fishers Oxford University Press, New York. as distlnct from the goals of the state or Heilbroner, R.L. 1974. An inquiry into the human central agency is crucial to ensure effective prospect. Norton, New York. Hardln, G. 1968.The tragedy of the commons. Sclence management of the coastal fisheries 162: 1243-1248. resources. Community-based management Hvldlng. E. 1990. Keeping the sea: aspects of ma- is seen as an alternative and possibly rine tenure In Marovo Lagoon. Solomon Is- improved approach for managing common- lands, p. 1-43. In K. Ruddle and R.E. Johannes (eds.) Tradltlonal marine resource management property resources such as fisheries, The In the Pacific Basin: an anthology. UNESCO- increased legitimization of the regulatory ROSTSEA, Jakarta. agencles through communlty participation Johnson, O.E.G. 1972. Econornlc analysls, the le- in the regulatory and management plans gal framework and land tenure systems. J. Law Econ. 15:259-276. is expected to ensure better compliance Kuperan. K. 1992. Deterrence and voluntary com- and thus reduce management costs. The pllance with the zoning regulatlons in the prospects for adoption of the co- Malaysian flshery. University of bodeIsland. management approach among the countries Ph.D. dissertatlon. Miller. R.J. 1990. Propertles of a well-managed in Southeast Asia are however varied, with nearshore flshery. Flsherles 15(5):7-12. only the Philippines given a high rank. Olson, M. 1965.The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard Unlverslty Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. References Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: the evolution of lnstltutlons for collective actlon. Cambridge Unlverslty Press, Cambridge. Balley. C. 1991. Soclal relations of productlon In Panayotou. T.. Edltor. 1985. Small-scale flsherles rural Malay society: comparatlve case stud- In Asia: socioeconomic analysls and policy. ies of rice farmlng, rubber tapping, and flsh- International Development Research Centre. lng communltles. InJ.J. Poggle and RB. Pollnac Ottawa. Ontario, Canada. (eds.) Small-scale fishery development: w- Plnkerton. E.. Edltor. 1989. Cooperative manage- clocultural perspectives. International Center ment of local fiherles: new directions for for Marlne Resource Development, Unlverslty Improved management and community de- of Rhode Island. Klngston. Rhode Island, velopment. Unlverslty of Brltlsh Columbia Press, htley. A. 1949. The process of government. Prlndpla Vancouver. Press, Evanston. Illlnols. Platteau, J.-P. 1989. The dynamlcs of flsherles de- Berkes. F. 1986. Local-level management and the velopment in developing countrles: a gen- commons problem: a comparatlve study of eral overdew. Dev. Change 20:565-597. Turkish coastal flsherles. Mar. Pdlcy 10:2 15- 4 brnemy, RS. 1991. Small-scale Rsheries management 229. ' and development: towards a communlly-based Carruthers. I. and R Stoner. 1981. Economlc as- approach. Mar. Pollcy (]anuary):39-48. pects and pollcy Issues In groundwater de- Ruddle. K. 1988. Sodal prlnclples underlying tradltlonal Inshore fisheries management systems in the Smith. R.J. 1981. Resolving the tragedy of the com- Pacific Basin. Mar. Resour. Econ. 5(4):35 1-363. mons by creating prlvate property rights in Ruddle. K. and T. Aklmichl. Editors. 1984. Mari- wildlife. CAT0 J. 1 :439-468. time Instltutlons in the Western Paciflc. Na- Truman. D.B. 1958. The governmental process. Knopf tional Museum of Ethnology. Osaka. Press, New York. Ruddle. K.. E. Hviding and R.E. johannes. 1992. Welch. W.P. 1983. The polltlcal feasibility of full Marine resources management in the context ownership property rights: the cases of pol- of customary tenure. Mar. Resour. Econ. lutlon and fisheries. Pollcy Sci. 16: 165-1 80. 7(41:249-273. Wade, R 1987. The management of common property Smith. I.R. 1979. A research framework for tradl- resources: Rnding a cooperative solution. World tional fisheries. ICLARM Stud. Rev. 2. 40 p. Bank Res. Observ. 2(2):219-234. Creating Dialogue and Generating lnformatlon

HAROLD 1. McARTHUR, JR. College of Tropical Agriculture and Human Resources Hawaii Institute of Tropical Agrlculture and Human Resources University ofHa wall at Manoa Gllmore Ha// 202, 3050 Ma//e Way Hono/u/u, Ha wall 96822 USA

McARTHUR, H.J., JR. 1994. Creating dlalogue and generating Inforrnatlon, p. 124-144. In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.) Community management and common property of coastal fisheries In Asla and the Pacific: concepts, methods and experiences. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45, 189 p.

ful way. Even more scarce are statements of the desired relationship between the onsiderable attention has been given researchers and the villagers. There are many C( o tools and techniques designed to approaches to enhancing interaction be- generate dialogue between development tween community groups on one hand, practitioners and community-based client and researchers, planners and development groups. The bulk OF this effort has Focused practitioners, on the other. The value and on promoting communication between ag- potential impact of a particular method or riculture researchers and Farm families. The approach depend on the goals of the in- general premise has been that through such teraction and the nature of the relation- interaction, researchers will gain an un- ship established with the client groups. derstanding ofconditions within which most Rhoades and Booth (1982) noted that small farmers operate and be better able techniques of interaction likely to elicit farmer to develop technologies applicable to their knowledge and views can be learned: unique conditions. however, there will be no incentive to do Funding proposals generally mention so until reward systems are altered to reflect techniques that will be used -togenerate the importance of field experience. farmer input. Research reports commonly Chambers ( 1389)went even further to argue describe the rationale and/or goals of farmer/ not only for the recognition of the value community participation. Seldom, however, of fieldwork, but also far the need to promote are procedures for involving villagers and a major reversal in roles if researchers are their impacts documented in a meaning- to establish truly collaborative learning relationships with villagers. Clearly, it Is means of an informal interview, during the easier to state what approaches and attitudes diagnostic and technology evaluation stages are desirable than to Implement the required of the research process. The collaborative changes (Farrington and Martin 1988). and collegiate modes have been associ- The investment in and use of a particu- ated with a process referred to as farmer lar methodology to create dialogue with participatory research (FPR) (Farrington and community-based clients is directly related Martin 1988). Unlike the contract and con- to the objectives of the community, the sultative modes, collaboration involves anticipated mode of interaction and the continuous interaction between researcher desired relationship with the community. and client and may ultimately lead to or Researchers can vary in their objectives entail a collegiate relationship Focused on in initiating interaction with community strengthening the capacity of the client groups. Projects and research programs group to develop its own problem solu- that have involved dialogue with commu- tions and development options. nity-based clients have generally Focused The various methods and techniques that on either technology assessment and trans- have been developed to assist research- fer, rural resource management, or em- ers in communicating with villagers can powerment for community-based problem be grouped and evaluated it1 terms OF the solving. Agriculture researchers and bio- underlying conceptual orientation, objective physical scientists concerned with prob- of the activity, research framework used lem identification, farm research and tech- and type of researcher-client relationship nology assessment have generally selected envisioned. This paper will briefly summarize different methods from those used by so- a process for generating meaningful dia- cial scientists and development practitioners logue and discuss the key techniques and interested more in fostering client partici- their potential application to coastal re- pation and local level empowerment. sources management and development. Certain techniques and tools such as rapid rural appraisal (RRA), mapping and dia- Process: Deslgnlng a Strategy gramming are common to different con- for Generating Effectlve ceptual orientations and research frame- Dlalogue works (Table 1). The key factors that vary are who leads the process; what kind of Once the objective of the dialogue has interaction is generated; and who is the been established, researchers can select primary beneficiary. In the case of the transfer an appropriate mode of interaction. In of technology (TOT) approach, the researcher reviewing various formats of on-farm cli- is in control OF the dialogue process which ent-oriented research (OFCOR). Biggs (1 987) Is used primarily to identify or verify the identified four models of researcher-farmer exlstence of certain problems usually as- interaction: contract, consultative, collabo- sociated with production. This diagnostic rative and collegiate. In the contract mode, process provides a base on which research the relationship between researcher and priorities are established and on-farm tri- farmer consists of little more than an agree- als are designed by researchers. ment allowing the researcher to use or rent Within the context of agroecology, some a field for the purpose of conducting on- of the same tools are used to help farm trials. In the consultative mode, the researchers gain an understanding of most prevalent form of interaction in the complex interactions between human social implementation of farming systems research systems and environmental systems. Here, (FSR). the farmer is consulted, usually by the emphasis is on environmental Table 1. Generatlng community dialogue. Conceptual Objectives Research Tools and Relatlonshlp Antlclpatcd orlentations frameworks techniques wlth cllent outcomes Transfer of Technology Farmlng Rapid rural Contractual, Technology/ assessment systems appraisal (RRA) consultative management and transfer research (FSR) practice to improve production

Agroecoiogy Rural resource Agroecosystem RRA, partlclpant Consultatlvc Systems analysls of research analysls (AEA), observation, rapid agroecosystem wlth human ecology hlstorlcai appralsal recomrnendatlon for research (RHA), researcher Improved resource maps, researcher management flow diagrams, transect analysis

Participatory Community Farmer partlclpa- Farmer-back-to- Collaborative, Varlous products action research development and tory research farmer (FBTF), collegial with ernphasls on (PAR) em~owerment (FPR), farmer- expert farmer Increased capaclty Flrst-and-last approach (EF), for indlgcnous approach (FFL) partlclpatory rural leamlng and appraisal (PRA), problem solvlng particlpant obscr- vatlon, farmer flow diagrams. transect analysis. matrix ranking. farmer fleld schools. farmer laboratories

management and farmer knowledge rather ity, diversity, equitability, solidarity, au- than agriculture and/or livestock production. tonomy and adaptability (Conway 1984, In participatory research, the focus Is on 1985, 1987; Patanothai 1991). This can villagers as active participants and teachers then be used as a basis for further policy in a process OF collaborative learning and analysis and recommendations. With FPR, problem solving. Each of these approaches diagnosis often leads to the identification involves interacting with rural residents of a particular intervention and/or coop- in the diagnostic phase of project erative development activity (Fig. 1). development, but the results are very different. The focus of the diagnosis and the re- Methodology sulting product can vary greatly depend- ing on the conceptual orientation and the Three distinct conceptual orientations, research framework employed. In FSR, namely, TOT, agroecology and partlclpa- diagnosis generally leads to some form tory action research (PAR), have provided of experimentation related to the generation a base for the development of most of the and/or assessment of potential technologid methods and techniques for enhancing improvements. In agroecosystem analy- dialogue between researchers and rural sis (AEA), diagnosis results in an evalua- villagers. This section will not summarize tion in terms of different system proper- each of these orientations. Rather, it will ties-productivity, stability, sustain-abil- attempt to illustrate how certain kinds of I Policy analysis \TiGaK=

J Flg. 1. The process of establlshlng effective dlalogue begins wlth establlshlng a clear set of objectives whlch wlll Influence the content and focus of the lnteractlon and the cholcc of methodology and speclflc techniques to be used. objectives are related to specific research energy and materials within and between frameworks that in turn influence the se- human social systems and environment. lection of the field methods that foster AEA Is the framework of choice. If the different types of client relationships (Flg. emphasis is on helping people solve their 2). own problems, one of the participatory If the primary purpose of the interac- approaches is the most appropriate kame- tion is to develop a diagnostic base which work upon which to develop an interac- gives priority to agriculture research and tion strategy. technology assessment, It Is likely that FSR In FSR the crop, field and farm household will provlde the dominant research frame- are the key variables of concern. The work. If the researcher's objectives are emphasis is on how farm families can better focused more on resource management manage the resources under their direct and understanding the flow of knowledge, control to improve agricultural production. Steps in initiating community-based dialogue

(Step 1') Determine objective

Technology assessment Resource systems management Community empowerment

(Step 2) ldentify relevant client groups

Cooperative managers Bank officers Money lenders Farmers Fishers Village heads Extension agents School teachers Fish traders Women Poorest of the poor Innovative farmers Entrepreneurs

(Step 3) Determine desired relationship I Contractual Consultative Collaborative Collegial

Define initial content and focus

Key topics Minimum data set Critical factors

(Step 5) Select approach and methodology I FSR AEA FPR

(Step 6) Identify appropriate tools and techniques

RRA RHA PRA Transects Flow diagrams Matrix ranking

(Step 7) Initiate interaction and dialogue

Evaluate impact

- Fig. 2. Steps In lnltlatlng community-based dlakgue.

The larger physical and social environments the watershed; agricultural fields, including are of interest only to the degree to which water management systems; and human they influence farm household production residence and resource management strategies. With AEA, understanding human- patterns. In FPR and other participatory 'environmental interactions is the main focus approaches, farmers are the top priority. OF investigation. The critical elements are Here the emphasis is not on technology transfer or environmental management, but degree of researcher-Imposed focus and rather on human resource development. control (Table 2). Matrix ranking is inter- In the case of FSR technology improvement esting in that it has both intrusive and is the core concern. With AEA, the central nonintrusive characteristics. It requires issue Is resource management. The FPR informants to assign ranks or scores to a stresses learning from and bulldlng upon series of items significant in their environ- indigenous social and technical knowledge ment, such as tree species and crop vari- and/or training of farmers in scientific eties. The selection of items to be ranked problem-solving methods. and the criteria by which they are scored are provided by the Informant, not the re- searcher. The process had been used by Tools and Technlques Robert Chambers and others (Mascarenhas et al. 199 1 ) to rank trees against different The various methods and techniques uses in India. Centro lnternacional de commonly utilized in communicating with Agricultura Tropical scientists have used villagers and community-based clients can farmer rankings of bush bean varieties to be categorized into one of three groups ensure that they pursue field trials on va- depending on the degree to which they rieties acceptable to local producers and interrupt and/or influence the behavior or consumers (Ashby et al. 1989).Thus, this responses they are attempting to record technique is intrusive because it frames or measure. In the social sciences, the various behavior, but in terms established by and methods used in interacting with research meaningful to the community residents. subjects are usually classified as either Whether a technique is considered in- intrusive or nonlntrusive. Tests that require trusive or nonintrusive is not necessarily subjects to perform particular tasks and related to the quality or validity of the in- highly structured survey instruments are formation it is likely to generate. A per- considered to be Intrusive in that they frame son who uses nonintruslve observation the informants' behavior and limit the range techniques without proper training may of acceptable responses. Hidden cameras end up with a biased dataset less reliable and unidentified observation, where the than information that a skilled Interviewer subjects have no idea that they are being can generate through informal interviews observed or in any way evaluated, fall under and good survey instruments. One tool is the category of nonintrusive measures. In not necessarily better than another. Each assessing tools and techniques associated has its own strengths and limitations. Tools with community-based research, three should be selected according to the kinds categories, intrusive, semi-intrusive and of information needed; the condition in nonintrusive, can be used to indicate the whlch they will be used; and the skllls and

Table 2. Technlques for community-based research and data collection. lntruslve Semi-Intrusive Nonlntrusive

Formal surveys Informal Interviews Undeclared observation journals/actlvity logs Semistructured obsewatlon Researcher sketch maps Farm record keeplng Matrix ranklngs Matrix rankings Researcher-managed trlals Farmer flow diagrams Researctier diagrams Farmer/research walks Indigenous experimentatlon Farmer-managed trlals Transects interests of the researchers who will use ongoing observations of behavior and lo- them. Productive dialogue and informa- cal practices. It is often very useful to de- tion generation usually involve the use of sign the interaction that makes it possi- several tools which allow the researchers ble to check for consistency data collected to compare and verify data obtained From from various sources by tools using dif- differentsources and processes. This kind ferent levels of intrusion. Such patterns of of cross-checking (Fig. 3) is called 'trian- cross-checks are illustrated in Figs. 3 and gulation". Such planned triangulation, a 4. basic principle of RRA (Chambers 1987, Observation can provide the base for 1990; Grandstaff et al. 1987), provides a initial hypotheses that can generate top- strong internal reliability check to a proc- ics and issues for discussion in informal ess that some feel lacks the objectivity and interviews. The interview responses con- rigor of quantitative research. Observations firm and/or correct the initial observations can be used to generate topics and ques- and both can provide input to the design tions for informal Interviews with villag- OF formal surveys if a higher level of sta- ers. The responses of informants can be tistical analysis is required. in a similar fash- compared with each other and against ion, farmer diagrams, often drawn on the

Relationship of different tools and techniques ground, can be used to correct researcher tailored to his or her needs and those of sketch maps. Resource-flow diagrams pro- the local participants. duced by villagers (Lightfoot et al. 1991) can reinforce and often expand informa- tion generated through informal Interviews. Rapld rural apprafsal No single tool, no matter how power- ful, is sufficient in and of itself to gener- Rapid rural appraisal is one of the most ate broad-spectrum dialogue and In-depth widely used techniques for interacting with information required for research, devel- villagers and conducting community-level opment planning and community problem diagnostic surveys for rural research and solving. Each tool or technique has its own development. The term RRA is generally strengths and limitations. Based on the used to refer to an interdlscipllnary team objectives of the interaction and the de- exercise that results In timely and cost- sired relationship, the researcher will se- effective information for the design of ru- lect a particular set of tools and techniques ral research and development intervention

Flg. 4. Trlangulatlon among dlfftrent data sources. efforts. It Is both a process of learning about Even when implemented by well-trained communities and a way of organizing people teams, RRA is generally a researcher-con- and resources for collecting and analyzing trolled process that focuses on identify- information. Ideally, it starts a process of Ing development constraints and oppor- continuous learning by the researcher that tunities for change, and understanding the results in a tentatlve list of problems, op- flow of resources, energy and information portunities and potential strategies. through a given system during present Under the RRA rubric, a number of tools conditions. The process, in and of itself, and techniques have been used (e.g.. single does not necessarily generate a continu- informant interviews, group interviews,. ing relationship of mutual learning and mapping of village resources and flows, problem solving between the researcher transect analysis, fieldwalks, structured and community residents. It is also tem- observation, seasonal calendars) to Facilitate poral in nature, usually providlng only a the interaction with and collection of in- single snapshot of what is happening in a formation from rural villagers. The RRA community. process is based on a paradigm that views the world as consisting of multiple sets of interactive variables subject to rapid Rapid historhi appraisal change and a high degree of uncertainty (jamieson 1987). In such environments, A process which may be referred to as communication and cooperation with rural rapid historical appraisal (RHA) can be used villagers are considered essential for to assess the degree of change that a com- understanding rural problems and Issues, munity or subsystem (i.e., rice production) monitoring trends and proposing viable has undergone over a designated period solution strategies (Grandstaff et al. 1987). of time. This process assumes that all so- As a process, RRA attempts to bring to- cial and environmental systems are under- gether essential information gathered from going change. The primary purpose of RHA secondary sources and from primary in- Is to document indicators of the nature, teraction with rural residents to design causes and speed of past change in a given and plan for research and/or development community. Often, change in a commu- action. nity system is related to technological, One of the core principles of RRA is the economic, social and political transitions use of interdisciplinary teams. This approach that have taken place on a regional, na- provides strength and depth that come tional and global level. Utillzlng ethnohistory, from focusing the minds and hands of sldlled informal interviews, village and district researchers from different backgrounds on records and secondary sources. WA at- a single problem. Ironically, this strength tempts to reconstruct a comparative his- has emerged as one of the approach's main torical summary of key changes that have limitations. For the most part, RRA exer- taken place in the village and the country cises have been carried out by teams of during specific time periods, usually within national and expatriate scientists with two to three generations, depending on external donor support. The process has the availability OF elderly informants. been more a part of external donor-driven Rather than a substitute for traditional and nongovernmental organization (NG0)- historical methods, RHA is a brief look sponsored projects than an integral corn- backwards that is highly dependent on ponent of national research and extension informant recall of key events and situations programs which tend to be organized along related to particular village practices. The commodity and disciplinary lines. farther back one goes in the reconstruction, the greater possibility of selective reall methods attempt to increase researcher and inaccuracy of quantitative data. The awareness and appreciation of indigenous only control of these weaknesses is knowledge and experience. Farmer map- triangulation with information from multiple ping, concentrating on socloeconomic dis- informants and historical documents (census tinctions and location of and access to re- production records, old maps, accounts sources, and matrix ranking, are examples written by professional historians, etc.) of PRA techniques which provide oppor- The following sample (Table 3), taken tunities for villagers to share their knowl- From the RHA portion of a follow-up RRA edge and preferences with researchers. study conducted in a Vletnamese village These techniques are more apt to result (McArthur et al. 1993), illustrates how in collaborative and collegial relationships increases in rice yields are directly related than the more researcher-dominated RRA to a series of physical, technological, so- methods. cial and political changes over a 50-year Although an increase in mutual under- period. The historical summary allows one standing between researchers and farm- to identiFy particular sets of events that ers is desirable, the concept of reversals have contributed to significant growths In has certain lirnitatlons. Baker (199 1 ) sug- production and deterrnlne the likelihood gested that farmer demands could result that similar circumstances will occur in an underinvestment by researchers in again. issues pertaining to sustainability. Given intra- and interhousehold variations in pri- orities, often related to differences in gender, Participatory rural appraisal wealth and residence location (Feldstein and Poates 1990). Baker claimed that in Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) Is a the end, researchers would ultimately have process that has emerged in response to to decide whose concerns are most com- the shortcomings of RRA with respect to pclllng and how to incorporate these into involvement of villagers in the diagnostic research priorities. and priority-setting process. It is based on Given the potential conflict between the assumption that for lasting change to researcher and villager agenda, it would occur, community residents must partici- appear that some kind of balance, rather pate in an active colearning process with than a complete reversal, in farmer and researchers. For this to happen, a reversal researcher roles is desirable. To this end, in roles must take place. certain techniques have been developed For poor farmers to be served well, which give the farmer, or flsher in the case Chambers (I 989) argued that a series of of coastal areas, greater control over learn- reversals must occur so that the farmer's, ing, research and evaluation without di- rather than the researcher's analysis, be- minishing the scientific contribution of the comes the focus of research priorities. He researcher. Kenmore ( 1 Wl ) suggested that called for a process in which researchers the plateau of yield increases related to work with and learn from farmers. This theme improvements in water management, fer- of reversals is at the core of several PRA tilizer technology and genetic engineer- techniques, including the farmer first and ing had been reached. He felt that farm- last (FFL) process (Chambers and Ghildyal ers, rather than technology, would be at 1985)and the farmer back to farmer (FBTF) the center of the next wave of production approach (Rhoades and Booth 1982). By increases. To this end, he argued for an placing the farmer and his or her inter- additional investment in the training of ests as the primary focus of attention, these farnier trainers. This 'expert farmer" ap- 134

Table 3. Chronology of events and agricultural changes In Nguycn Xa vlllage, Vletnam (McArthur et al. 1993). Perlod/date Vletnam Nguyen Xa vlllagc French colonial rule Double cropplng of tradltlonal rlce varletles wlth no use of fertlllzer, second crop often lost to flooding: Arrlval of Japanese troops In lndontsla ylelds from 60-70 kgasao-'

Formulation of Vletmlnh Hlgh degree of tenancy: most land owned by 51 famllles

End of French rule1 Vletnam under Japanese Influence

Surrender of Japan: Vletmlnh selzes power Strong vlllagc support of Vletmlnh reslstance flghtcrs: Ho Chl Mlnh's declaration of Independence French troops stationed In Dong Hung Dlstrlct

Outbreak of Franco-Vietnamese war

France creates "State of Vletnam" under former Emperor Bao Dal

Major defeat of French by Vletmlnh along Rcsldents fortlfy vlllage and repel three attempts by VletnamIChlna border: dlrect US mllltary ald French forces to move through Nguyen Xa on offensive to French In Vletnam agalnst Vletmlnh; 92 villagers kllled defcndlng vlllage from French soldlers

French defeat at Dlen-Blcn-Phu: lnltlatlon of Land Reform

Geneva Agreements; dlvlslon of Vletnam

Rectlflcatlon of land reform errors In the north

987 mau of land redlstrlbuted to former tenant farmers: two crops of tradltlonal rlce varletles grown wlth use of manure and compost. ylelds range from 70 to 80 kgesao.'

Formatlon of Rrst hamlet level cooperatlve

Formatlon of Natlonal Llberatlon Front of Maln canal constructed: ylelds avcragc 100-130 South Vletnarn kg'sao.' wlth Improved water management

Number of cooperatives varlts from 1 to 16

Flrst electrlc pumps Installed

lntroductlon qf US ground troops In South Vletnam

Beglnnlng of sustalned US bomblng In North Vletnam

Local forces shoot down a US plane near Cau Nguyen Brldgc

End of sustalned US bornblng of the North 681 men conscripted lhto mllltary sewlce; 265 famllles lose a son In the war

Model lrrlgatlon and water management system completed wlth 3 gates and 7 pumping statlons; year-round water control to 90% of tleld areas

Collapse of Salgon Chvernment Yleld Increases from 6.000 to 10.000 plus kg.hi-' wlth Unlflcatlon of Vletnam lntroductlon of hlgh-yleldlng varletles (1966- 1984)

Chlncsc lnvaslon of Vletnam

Llmlted lntroductlon of household contract system In agriculture proach is at the core of an innovative In- interactions. When transformed into a series tegrated Pest Management Program in of overlays (Fig. 5). one participatory map- Indonesia that uses farmer field schools ping exercise can produce an amazing to train villagers in AEA and experimen- amount of information and suggest key tal techniques. Farmer groups conduct relationships between the physical envi- collaborative research with university-trained ronment, or the resource base and the social personnel who live in villages and oper- system. ate "village laboratories". Drawing on Some anthropologists have questioned nonformal education as a theoretical base. whether the ability to produce graphic this process involves the generation of local representations varies among different ecological knowledge through culturally cultures and societies, particularly those appropriate group exercises. In this process, that do not have a rich graphic arts tradi- researchers contribute a framework and tion. Although the universality of this ap- methods for scientific investigatlon, but proach remains to be fully established. the problems and practices to be studied mounting evidence (LightFoot 1990; are farmer-selected. Farmers adopt meth- Rhoades et al. 1890; Lightfoot and Minnick odology to become better research pat- 1991; Chambers 1992; Mascarenhas 1992) ners and crop/fleld managers. Kenmore's suggest that villagers respond well to these hypothesis was supported by a series of techniques which can offer important recent studies in the Philippines (Pingali insights to indigenous knowledge and et al. 1990a, b) that suggested that farm- resource management systems. ers who have used their own knowledge To achleve maximum effectiveness, it and innovation In fine-tuning the manage- is necessary to do more than simply request ment OF existing technology have produced that a villager draw a map. The researcher rice yields in Laguna province that sur- should facilitate a process of sequentlal pass those of the International Rice Re- discovery with such probes as : Can you search Institute (IRRI). point or show me where the best farmland is located? Why is this so? Who owns or uses this area? Was it always like this? Can Gmphlc tools and techniques you show or mark where the rich people live? etc. In thls way, the mapping or A number of graphic techniques for diagramming exercise provides not only gathering and analyzing field data have a product, but also an important contribution been developed to be used in conjunc- to the dialogue process. tion with the informal intervlew and other Transects can be a useful tool for creat- key RRA and PRA tools. The most com- ing dialogue with villagers and analyzing mon forms of graphic representations in- field data. They can range from a very simple clude researcher- and farmer-drawn maps, illustration of the relationship among to- resource-flow diagrams. transects and matrix pography, agricultural production and resi- ranking. When researcher sketch maps are dential patterns to more complex dlsplays compared with those drawn by local resi- of resource flows and human activity and dents, it is often possible to compare fea- residential patterns as indicated in Figs. 6 tures significant to the researcher with those and 7. When used to its fullest extent. important to the 1-1 residents. When used creating transects is an Intensive process as a base for further open-ended questions, that both displays information and gen- graphic tools such as crude maps can provide erates hypotheses for further exploration. rich sources of information concerning im- Matrix scoring is a method commonly portant soclal and environmental system associated with PAR that provides the Enterprise map Topography and hydrology map I P

Map area taken up by each enterprise

Social map Transect

I Land I Uplnnd I Midland I ~huf1 tvP lowland soil I ( Silty loam I I ~rops I ice I I I Wheat I I Mungbean 1 I Trees I Mango 1 Lichi I C~~NS

Livestock I Goats and fish I Cattle I

Problem 1 Soil I fertility I I Drainage I

I Flg. 5. Agroecorysttm maps (Lightfoot et al. 1989). vlllager a high degree of controlled researcher. The end production of a session participation in the dialogue process. While in which village women in India ranked the researcher indicates the key issues he sources of supplementary income is or she is interested in learning about, such illustrated in Fig. 8. as tree species or bean varieties, the villager Like all the other field tools associated decides what items will be ranked and the with RRA and PRA, graphic techniques have criteria that they will be measured against. their own strengths and Ilmitatlons. Used As such, this process puts the vlllager In In association with other tools, they are a true dlalogue. rather than in a simple an important component in the growlng response mode in interacting with the array of methods for enhancing productive

I Influential technology I

processing V@

Flg. 6. Factors Influ- Economic policy-management and organization cnclng land use In the \ / mldlands of Vletnam (Cur et al. 1990). Dunglmanure

Fish Rice Fish

Homestead Midland Lowland Deepwater Canals, upland terraces swamp ditches am I rivers

I !r Flg. 7. Typlcal bloresource flows between enterprises and land types in an Aslan Integrated agriculture-aquacukure farmlng system (Llghtfoot 1990). communication among researchers, focuses on those resources under the farm- practitloners and village partners in er's direct control (Shaner et dl. 1982). but development. does not address the possibility that the researcher and the farmer may not recog- nize the same set of resources. Applications to Communlty- The first step in looking for ways to based Resources Management improve the efficiency and/or productivity of Indigenous resource systems is to The notion of "resource" is a social struc- determine what elements in the system ture (Rambo 199 1). A particular object or are considered resources by both the material From the natural or social envi- researcher and the village residents. Informal ronment is only a resource if it is consid- interviews and mapping exercises can assist ered to have value and meaning by a par- in identifying a list of locally defined ticular society. When researchers move from resources. In addition, a researcher also their own culture and that of the univer- needs to recognlze that people can see sity and the experiment station to rural the same element as a resource, but relate villages, it is possible that they can bring to and manage it very differently. Some with them. as part of their world view, a people consider trees as a resource because perception of resources that does not match of their value as a source of building material. with that of the local residents. Farrnlng fuel and profit. Other people see trees as systems research, for example, explicitly an important element of the ecosystem Sample rapid historical appraisal timeline

- -- Matrix ranking can be used for ranking items such as: cro?s; varieties, types and breeds of livestock; trees; fodders; supplementary income generating activities; etc. This example of nonagricultural livelihoods in Godavellagudda village was done by the village women after selecting their own criteria.

Staff: Elias Participants: P. Lakshinarayana Suresh Krishnappa Padmovath Gangulamana Gangojamana

Flg. 8. Sample rapld hlstorlcal appraisal tlmellne (Mascarenhas 1992). that needs to be maintained because they munally owned and who has use and ac- protect the watershed, control erosion and cess to it can vary. Lamug (1 989) noted provide a natural habltat for many species that in the highland areas of the Philip- of fauna. Some people assign a special pines, tribal groups who have tradition- spiritual role and meaning to trees. ally practised kaingh, or swidden agriculture In many parts of Asia, certain trees are believe that custom and historical use considered the home of spirits and cer- patterns determine land-use rights and tain groves of trees are viewed as sacred boundaries. No individual owns a single grounds. In the northern Phillppines, vil- piece of land. In contrast, lowland farm- lagers can show you the trees where various ers who have migrated into the upland spirits and nonhuman residents live areas feel that any forest land they have (McArthur 1977). In the highlands of Central cleared and farmed is thelrs. What peo- Vietnam, many of the Montagnard tribal ple are willlng to do with a resource, be it groups recognize water spirits and avold a forest, lake or coral reef, can depend greatly building dams or wells that would cap- on such factors as the relationship between ture these spirits (McArthur 1970).In Laos, legal ownership, on one hand, and tradi- the Lao Theung (midland Lao) groups tional use and historical rights, on the other. manage and conserve certain trees in "sa- The RRA, which combines primary data from cred" groves (McArthur et al. 1992). To interviews and observation with second- gather information on this level of mean- ary source material on the area, can be an ing and its subsequent implication for re- important tool For understanding the critical source management, it may be necessary factors that affect people's access to and to tap some of the deeper, nonvisible and use of particular resources. nontechnical aspects of the indigenous knowledge system. In-depth ethnographic interviews and case studies are often helpful Impllcatlons for Use In the in collecting this level of information. Coastal Zone In a similar fashion, participant obser- vation of different agricultural practices can Pressures from population growth, also provide important clues to how peo- urbanization and industrialization in many ple relate to their resource base. While aaas have resulted in increasing competition working on a soil management research among different Interest groups for access project In an Indonesian transmigration to and control over a decreasing ccmmunity, Coikr ( 1991) discovered that environmental resource base. Such one ethnic group refused to hoe, while competition is perhaps greatest in coastal another group were avid hoers. This ob- areas, which traditlonally have had the servation led her and the other research- greatest concentration of human ers to look deeper at the soil and at in- settlements. They also are generally closer digenous knowledge systems for an ex- and within easier access to major urban planation. Thls was not a frivolous task, centers than the upland areas. They often even for the agronomists and sol1 scien- involve the use and management of multiple tists, because they needed to be sure that and interdependent common-property the methods they were using to incorpo- resources-mangroves. beaches, coastal rate fertilizer into the soil in their field tri- waters and coral reek. Such human and als would not be rejected on some cul- physical environments provlde an Ideal tural grounds. living laboratory in which to utilize. refine In addition to how a resource is defined, and expand the exlsting dlagnostic tool the issue of whether It is privately or com- kit. For thls adaptation to occur, research- resldents In expressing and critically ers must first ascertain their level of in- analyzing their preferences with respect terest and commitment to community-level to the management of a given resource. work and define their principal objectives Working through this process wlth indi- and the kind of relationship and ultimate vlduals or groups representing different outcome they hope to achieve. These de- stakeholders could provide a basis for pro- cisions will facilitate a logical selection of ductive dialogue among groups and as- tools and techniques appropriate to the sist In the clarification of different agenda researchers' major objective and the an- and views of resources and how they are ticipated relationships with the host com- manifested withln a historical and sociolegat munity. This decision process will also context. expedite learning the use of different tools Feeny (thls vol.) suggested four key ele- and techniques as the researchers will al- ments that must be considered in under- ready know what they want to achieve and standing resource management on the which techniques wlll probably be the most commons: (1) the resources; (2) the pref- useful. Once this level of preparation has erences (desired outcomes, trade-offs) of been attained, It will be possible to look the various users; (3) the technology used for ways in which the specific techniques to exploit the resources; and (4) the insti- may need to be modified for use in coastal tutions and rules that govern behavior and areas. interaction among users. When looking at Individual and group interview tech- such common-property resources as coastal niques, walking tours and mapping exer- mangroves, bays, seagrass meadows and cises work well in defined, semi-isolated coral reefs, it is critical to recognize that village communities where there is a relative sustainable management systems will re- homogeneity of resource management quire partnerships among a range of us- interests and practices. In coastal areas ers and stakeholders lncludlng local fisher where inshore waters are being increas- groups, municipal governments and vari- ingly polluted by urban and industrial waste; ous national agencles. Dr. Angel Alwla. where local Ashers may be competing with Secretary of the Phllippine Department of urban-funded commercial operations; and Environment and Natural Resources, in where the same reefs that provide a habi- discussing the role of the national gov- tat for fish and attraction for tourists are ernment in coastal resources management being destroyed at alarmillg rates, some (thls vol.). noted that 20 different agen- new techniques may need to be devel- cies have a mandate that impinges one oped. Collaboratlve and collegial relation- way or another on coastal resources. ships may be harder to forge. We may have Pomeroy ( 1993) suggested that sustain- to look to other fields such as decision able management must involve a work- sciences for conflict resolutlon and for ideas ing partnership between these government on how representatives of competing, and agencies and local user groups. He referred perhaps hostile, interests can be brought to this partnership as "co-management" Into effective dialogue with each other as where the national government and the well as with researchers and development local community share authority for fish- workers. One research orientation that may eries management. be useful in dealing wlth multiple In developing an effective framework stakeholders is analytical hierarchy proc- for such co-management, researchers and ess (AHP) (Saaty and Kearns 1985). This community development workers need to computer-based decision tree technique determine the appropriate roles and rela- could assist both researchers and coastal tionships that each group should have with the various stakeholders and comanagers. Farmer first. Intermedlate Technology Publl- For example, it may be easier and more cations, London. Baker, D. 1991. Farmer-participatory research: suitable for NGOs to establish long-term reorientatlon, not reversal; African-farmer-based collegial relationships with Rsher groups experimentation. J. Farm. Syst. Res.-Ext. and local government agencies. Researchers, Z(1): 125-147. S.D. on the other hand, may find it more use- Biggs. 1987. Proposed methodology branalyzlng Farmer participation in the ISNAROFCORstudy. ful and cost-effective to develop consultative Agrlc. Adm. (Res. Ext.) Network Newsl. 17. links with national government agencies Overseas Development Institute, London. and collaborative relationships with NGOs Chambers. R. 1987. Shortcut methods in soclal In- and people's organizations (POs) actively formation gatherlng for rural development projects, p. 33-46. In Proceedings of the 1985 involved in helping local groups work out International Conference on Rapld Rural Ap- effective co-management strategies. pralsal, Khon Kaen Unlverslty, Thailand, 2-5 Of the three conceptual orientations September 1985. R. discussed in this paper, TOT, agroecology Chambers. A. Pacey and L.A. Thrupp. Editors. 1989. Farmer flrst: farmer Innovation and ag- and PAR, the last two seem the most rel- ricultural research. lntermedlate Technology evant to coastal resources management. Publlcatlons, London, UK. While it is critical to understand the bio- Chambers, R. 1990. Rapld and partlclpatory rural appralsal: past. present and future. Paper pre- logical, physlcal and technological aspects sented at Chieng Mai Unlverslty, 23 Novem- of the resources, it is equally important ber. to comprehend the various market attributes Chambers, R 1992. Methods for analysls by Rrm- and external social, political and institu- ers: the proksslonai challenge. (Mlmeo). Chambers. R. and B.P. GhIldyal. 1985. Farmer flrst: tional forces that influence the behavior farmer lnnovation and agrlcultural research. of the various stakeholders and comanagers Intermediate Technology Publlcatlons, Lon- (Oakerson 1992). The objective is to de- don. velop a research and intervention stmt- Colfer, C.J.P. 1991. Toward sustainable agriculture egy that combines the aspects In the humld tropics: building on the tropsolls of experience In Indonesla. TropSolls Bull. 91- agroecology and PAR Into a single alter- 02. Soil Management Collaborative Research native process capable of generating the Support Program. Raleigh, North Carolina State. key resource system and institutional data Conway. G. 1984. What Is an agroecosystem and why is it worthy of study? In A.T. Rambo and necessary for documentlng and compar- P.E. Sajlse (eds.) An introduction to human ing different management strategies. ecology research on agricultural systems In While the challenge may seem forml- Southeast Asla. Unlverslty of the Phlllpplnes dable, the old adage- "where there's a at Los Bailos, Laguna. will, there's a way" is ever true. If researchers Conway, G. 1985. Agroecosystem analysls. Agrlc. Adm. 2O:3 1-55. and practitioners are willing to learn from Conway, G. 1987. The propertles of agroecosystems. each other and from previous experience Agric. Syst. 24:95-1 17. and to try something different, ways can Cuc, L.T., K. Glllogly and A.T. Rambo, Editors. 1990. Agroecosysterns OF the midlands of Northern be found to generate and build upon ef- Vietnam. Occas. Pap. 12. East-West Center fective dialogue wlth the multiple inter- Environment and Policy Institute, Honolulu. est groups who all have a stake In sus- Farrington. 1. and A. Martin. 1988. Farmer partlcl- tained management of the coastal zone. patlon In agricultural research: a revlew of concepts and practlces, Occas. Pap. 9. Agrl- cultural Admlnlstratlon Unlt. Overseas Devel- opment Instltute. London. References Feldsteln, H. and S. Poates. 1990. Working together: gender analysls In agriculture. Kunmarlan Press. Ashby, J.A.. C.A. Quiros and Y.M. Rivers. 1989. Hartford. Farmer partlclpatlon In technology develop- Grandstaff. W.S., T.B. Grandstaff and G. Lovelace. ment work: work wlth crop varletles. In R. 1987. Summary Report. In Proceedlngs of the Chambers, A. Pacey and L.A. Thrupp (eds.) 1985 lnternatlonal Conference on Rapid Ru- ral Appralsal. Khon Kaen Unlverslty. Rural opment Foundation, Salgon. Systems Research and Farmlng Systems Re- McArthur, H.J. 1977. Adolescent peer group and search Projects. Khon Kaen, Thailand. sociallzatlon in the rural Philippines: a soclo- Jamleson, N. 1987. The paradigmatic slgnlflcance ecologlcal perspective. University of Hawali, of rapld rural appralsal. In Proceedlngs of the Honolulu. Hawall. Ph.D. dissertation. 1985 lnternational Conference on Rapld Ru- McArthur. H.J.. K. Chansina. T. Charoenwatana, 6. ral Appralsal. Khon Kaen Unlverslty. Rural Phoengnotha and G. Uchara. 1992. The Systems Research and Farmlng Systems Re- agroecosystem of Ban Semoun in swidden search Projects, Khon Kaen, Thailand. agroecosystems In Sepone District, Savannakhet Kenmore. P.E. 1991. How rice farmers clean up the Province, Laos PDR Report of the 1991 SUAN- environment, conserve biodiversity, ralse more EAPI-MAT Agroecosystem Research Workshop, food, make higher proflts: Indonesia's Inte- 20 June-2 July 1991. Savannakhet Province, grated pest management-a model For Asla. Laos PDR. SUAN Reglonal Secretariat, Khon FA0 Rice IPC Programme, Manila. Kaen, Thailand. Lamug, C.B. 1985. Rapld rural appraisal of upland McArthur, H:].. N.V. Hoan. G. Uehara and V. Ton. agmecosystems. In P. Sajise and A. Terry Rambo 1993. Key hlstorlcal events that have Influ- (eds.) Agroecosystems research In rural re- enced the evolution of agricultural produc- source management and development: se- tlon and resource management In Nguyen Xa lected papers presented at the SUAN-EAPI Vlllage. In A. Patanothal (ed.) Land use Regional Syrnposlum on Agroecosystem Re- sustainability in a hlghly lntenslve cultivation search. 18-22 March 1985, Baguio City, Phil- and densely area in the Red River Ipplnes. Unlversl@ of the Philippines at Los Delta of Vietnam. Southeast Asian Universi- Bafios, Program on Envlronrnental Sclence and ties Agroecosystem Network. Program on Management and Southeast Aslan Universi- Envlronment. East-West Center, Unlverslty of

1 ties Agroecosystem Network. Hawall. Honolulu, and Center for Natural Re- -Llghtfoot, C. 1990. Partlclpatory methods for eco- source Management and EnvironmentalStudles. logically sound agriculture. In R.E. Rhoades, Hanoi ~nlv&rslt~and Agricultural University V.N. Sandoval and C.P. Bagalanon (eds.) Aslan No. 1. Hanol. Tralnlng of Tralnors oh Farm Household Di- Oakerson. R.J. 1992. Analyzlng the commons: a agnostic Skllls. User's Perspective with Agri- framework. 1nD.W. Bromley (ed.) Making the cultural Research and Development, Instltute commons work: theory, practice and pollcy. of Forest Conservatlon, University of the Phll- Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Fran- lpplnes at Los Baiios, Laguna. Phllipplnes. cisco. -Llghtfoot, C. and D.R. Minnlck. 1991. Farmer-first Patanothai, A. 1991. Agroecosystems concept In qualitatlve methods: farmer's diagrams for rural resource management. Paper presented improving methods of experimental design at the SUAN-EAPI-CRES Conference on Hu- in Integrated farming systems. J. Farm. Syst. man Ecology. 1 1-1 3 July, Hanol. Re$.-Ext. 2(1):57-70. Pingali. P.L.. P. Maslcat and Ma. V. de Vera. 1990a. .Llghtfoot, C.. N. Axinn. V.P. Slngh. A. Botrall and Phlllpphe irrigation infrastructure: digression G. Conway. 1989. Tralnlng resource book for trends for Luzon. 1946-1989. Soc. Sci. Div. agroecosystcrn mapplng. lnternational Rice Pap. 90-03. lnternatlonal Rlce Research Insti- Research Instltute, Los Baiios. Laguna. Phil- tute. Los Bafios. Laguna. Ipptnes, and Ford Foundatlon. New Delhi, In- Pingall. P.L.. P. Moya and E. Veiasco. 199Ob. Post- dia. 125 p. green revolution blues in Asian rice produc- Llghtkt, C., R Noble and R Morales. 1991. Tralnlng tlon. Soc. Sci. Dlv. Pap. 90-01. lnternatlonal resource book on a participatory method for Rice Research Instltute, Los Bafios, Laguna. modelling bioresource flows. ICLARM Educ. Pomemy. RS. 1993. A research Framework for coastal Ser. 14. 30 p. flsherles co-management Instltutlons. Naga, Mascarenhas, J. 1992. Partlclpatory rural appralsal ICLARM Q. 16(1):14-16. and partlclpatory learning methods: recent Rambo, A.T. 1991. The human ecology of rural re- experlences from MYRDA and South India. source management In Northeast Thailand. Forests. Trees. Land. People Newsl. 15/16: 10- Farmlng Systems Research Project. Khon Kaen 17. Unlverslty, Khon Kaen. Thailand. Mascarenhas. J. et al.. Edltors. 1991. Participatory Rhoades. R.E. and R.H. Booth. 1982. Farmer-back- rural appraisal. In Proceedlngs of the Febru- to-farmer: a model for generating'acceptable ary 1991 Bangalore PRA.Trainers Workshop. agricultural technology. Work. Pap. 1982-1, RRA Notes 13. lnternational Instltute for En- Soclal Science Department, lnternational Ru- vironment and Development, London. ral Systems Research and Farming Systems McArthur. H.J. 1970. Understandlng the Montagnards: Research Projects. lnternational Potato Center. notes and observations. Comrnunlty Devel- Llma. Peru. Rhoades. R.E.. V.N. Sandoval and C.P. Bagalanon. Saaty, T.L. and K.P. Kearns. 1985. Analytical plan- Edltors. 1990. Asian Training of Tralnors on nlng: the organlzatlon of systems. Pergarnon Farm Household Dlagnostlc Skllls. User's Per- Press, Oxford. spectlve with Agricultural Research and De- Shaner. W.W.. P.F. Philtpp and W.R. Schmel. 1982. velopment, lnstltute of Forest Conservation. Farming systems research and development: university of the Phlllpplnes at Los Banos, guidelines for developing countries. Westview Laguna. Philippines. Press, Boulder. The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations In Community-Based Coastal Resources Management

CARLITO T. AAONUEVO Tambuyog Development Center, Inc. Room 108-A, Phillpplne Social Sclence Center Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City and Department of Economics UnIversity of the Philippines at Los Banbs Los Bafios, Lnguna Philipplnes

A~~ONUEVO,C.T. 1994. The role of nongovernmental organlzatlons In communlty-based coastal resources management, p. 145-148. In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.) Community management and common property of coastal flshcrles In Asia and the Paclflc: concepts, methods and experiences. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45. 189 p.

To execute the coastal resources management component of the program in I2 bays, the government contracted date. some writers, agencles and sec- the services of NGOs primarily to do T"tors, including the government and community organlzing and carry out multilateral institutions, have asslgned a alternative livelihood projects. Other critical role to nongovernmental examples are the United Nations organizations (NGOs) in natural resource Development Programme-Global Environ- regeneration, protection and management mental Facility (UNDP-GEF) Small Grants programs, in general, and communlty- Program that commenced in 1992 and based coastal resources management assigns the implementation of community (CBCRM) programs, In particular. Here in projects to NGOs and people's the Phillppines. one could cite the "critical organizations; and the National Integrated role" attributed to the NGOs by the Aslan Protected Area System (NIPAS) program Development Bank and the government of the Department of Environment and in implementing the Fishery Sector Program. Natural Resources to be funded by GEF through the World Bank which also CBCRM essentially is a response to open- highlights the role of NGOs in the protection access regimes that surely and eventu- and management of natural resources. ally lead to the depletion of fisheries re- Notable also is the legal mandate given sources. Such is brought about by the to NGOs by: the Local Government Code Institutional vacuum or the weak articu- to participate In the local development lation of property and management ar- council; the NIPAS Act to sit in the local rangements that characterizes an open- Protected Area Management Board; and access situation. This in turn breeds the Presidential Executive Order that created overfishing, the use of destructive fish- the Philippine Council for Sustainable ing gear, and the wanton dumping of wastes Development to participate in monitoring and pollutants into the country's fishing the implementation of Agenda 21 by the grounds. Such a situation occurs since Philippine government. everybody has virtually complete autonomy Such an assessment recognizes the in- to use the resource and no one has the creasing influence and expanding role NGOs effective ability to keep any potential user play In effecting changes in Philippine out. The resource is subject to the rule society, in general, and in the grassroot of capture and belongs to no one until it comrnunitles, in particular. It is also a result is in one's possession or actual use; thus, of the relative effectivity and dynamism no property rights exist under an open- of NGOs in their conduct of development access situation. work. Since the basic problem is the unclear/ But such recognltlon and assignment nonassignment and ineffective articula- of role are not due to a unified frame- tion of property rights, coastal resources work. In fact, different writers, agencies management must go beyond the regu- and institutions define such a role from lation of fishing efforts; the curtailment varying perspectives and motivations. Thus, of illegal fishing methods; and though there is a general slmiiarity in the microlivelihood projects like backyard swine llnes of work, such as community organizlng and poultry mislng. The beginning of a and livelihood programs, in essence the meaningful and effectual response is the roles assigned by different sectors are not reverse of the problem, the clear assignment the same. of property rights to the state, private This paper attempts to define such a Individuals and communities. The choice role from the polnt of view of a service of what property reglme to adopt could NGO working with Filipino fishers, llke not be made in a vacuum. One must take the Tambuyog Development Center. Into account the Philippine social, polltical and economic context: the current dis- mal state of our natural resources; and Framework the factors behind it. Theoretically and legally, coastal resources The framework of the role of a service In the Philippines are state properties. NGO like Tambuyog in a CBCRM program But historically and in actuality, these are could only be formed from: (1) the rec- virtually open-access resources due to ognition of the basic "property rights" Ineffective management and differential problem of an open-access resource llke enforcement of regulations in their use. fishery and its resolution in the Philip- In short, even with the new Local Au- pine socioeconomic and political context, tonomy Act, we are not optimistic about and (2)the precarious state of the coastal state property regimes. At the same time. resources. given a weak state, held captive by rent seekers, strengthening state property thelr sanctions and incentives are inop- regimes will be contrary to the general erative or being eroded. usually because public clamor for a robust and healthy of factors beyond the control of the com- civil society as expressed by the worn- munity. Most of these are macro in na- out phrase "people empowerment." ture which Include government policies, The most familiar property regime is the prevailing economic climate, among private-property rights. Any adherent of others. mainstream economics will tell us that Because of the very nature of CBCRM, the best option to remove the open-ac- advocates of privatization of open-access cess externality and to have an efficient resources would argue that the cumber- resource allocation is privatization. Indeed, some decisionmaklng process would imply that may be true in the dream world of higher transaction costs compared to a perfect competition, but not in a Third private-property regime. This process is World country like the Philippines wherein exacerbated by the fact that our colonial concentration of ownership has not only and current history has been biased against wrecked havoc on the resources but has community-property rights and has vir- also led to the misery and abject pov- tually erased traditional arrangements and erty among the people. Such circumstances practices that produce and reproduce a ultimately add to the degradation of open- community-property regime. But the notion access resource bases, the forests, riv- of transaction cost here would be rela- ers, lakes and seas. The current condi- tive and culturally specific-for a long- tions of Laguna de Bay attest to this. marginalized community, such a cumber- Community property is in essence "pri- some process will not be considered a vate" property for a particular group. This cost but a benefit. means that all others are excluded from the community and decisionmaking. In this setup, individual co-owners have rights Agenda and obligations. Generally, the only vi- able option for the rational resource use With the foregoing discussion, we could and management in our country is a CBCRM say that the real agenda in the coastal program with a community-property re- communities is building the necessary social gime at its core. As a system, CBCRM is infrastructure in setting up CBCRM. This broader than the set of possession and would mean enhancing the capability of actual use of the fisheries resource. It includes the coastal communities in managing their use rights, exchange rights, distribution resources. Such would entail community entitlements, a management scheme and organiutions. which refer to autonomous an authority instrument as means of ef- and self-reliant bodies: and institutions, fective management. It has a built-in struc- meaning social arrangements that pro- ture of economic and noneconomic in- duce, reproduce and strengthen the com- centives that encourage compliance with munity-property regime. existing conventions and institutions. Such A community organization must be a structure emanates from the assump- empowered to manage the coastal re- tlon that the behavior of al! members is sources in such a way that will arrest the subject to accepted rules, which are trans- continuing resource degradation and in- parent. Today, even with our "confused" crease the existing stock. This could only culture, conformity with norms is still an happen if a real management buildup effective ~nctionagainst antisocial behavior. program is put in place. At the same time, Unfortunately, a lot of these norms, with these organiutions must be strengthened so that the people in the countryside would of the people in the coastal communi- be able to redlscover and exercise their ties to manage their own lives and re- inherent capacltles to decide thelr own sources. Thus, the role of an NGO could fate and that of thelr Immediate envlron- only be at best a "partner" agent if the ment. real end goal is people empowerment. In that sense. the objects of the program become the subjects as well. Our Role In doing its facilitative role in helping set up the necessary social infrastructure Given the framework and agenda, the of CBCRM, the Tambuyog Development role a service NCO must take could only Center assists the coastal communities be facilitative, in the sense that the real In the following components: (1) com- actors in CBCRM are the people in the munity organizing; (2) research (social, coastal communities. Resource manage- technical, policy): (3) training and edu- ment, to stress the point, is not only building cation: (4)socioeconomic work/livelihood: the capacity of the resource to renew It- (5) networking and advocacy; and (6)fi- self but more so, enhancing the capabilities nance and resource mobillzatlon. Problems Encountered in the Implementation of a Community-based Fishery Resource Management Project'

RENATO F. AGBAYANI SUSANA V. SIAR Economjcs Section, Research Division Aquaculture Department Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center Ti'ba om, Ilollo 502 1 Phllipplnes

AGBAYANI RF. AND S.V. SIAR. 1994. Problems encountered In the irnplementatlon of a communlty- based flshery resource management project, p. 149-160. In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.) Community management and common property of coastal flsherles in Asia and the Paclflc: concepts, methods and experiences. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45. 189 p.

mariculture (Bailey 1988). Mangroves provlde a slgnlficant support for fish and e destruction of the Philippines' coastal shrimp communities (Sasekumar et al. 1992). 'I"ecosystem has reached crisis propor- Of 448.3 10 ha of mangroves existing in tions (Lacanilao 1989b). Coral reek, which 1968, only 25 1,574 ha remained In 1976. account for 9-25% of total flsh produc- Despite the existence of a "thicket of tion (Carpenter 1977; Murdy and Ferraris laws and regulations" (World Bank 1989), 1980) have been so damaged that only the destruction of the country's coastal 6% are in excellent condition. based on resources has continued unabated over the llvlng coral cover (Gomez and Alcala the years. The World Bank (1989) iden- 1984). Siltation; fishing methods like mum- tified the following organizational prob- ami, kayakas and blasting; and the use lems concerning the management of the of cyanide (Carpenter and Alcala 1977) country's natural resources: inappropri- are largely responsible for the destruc- ate mandates; iesource Ilmitations: confusion tion of the country's coral reefs. Man- arising from bureaucratic reorganirations; groves, a multi-use/multl-user coastal potential for corruption in line agencies resource, have been transformed Into a charged with managing natural resources; privately owned and single-purpose re- ineffectiveness of local governments: and source when they were cleared for shrimp lack of empowerment of user groups. Lacanilao (I9894 proposed the bllowlng agement (CBCRM) offers a significant op- strategies to arrest further destruction of portunity to improve the livelihood and Philippine coastal resources: (1) integration quality of Ilk of millions of poverty-stricken of economics and ecology into lawmak- flshers. The dual objectives of enhanc- ing and decisionmaking systems; (2) ilng the coastal envlronment through ac- population control that goes beyond family alve involvement of the community and planning programs; and (3) coastal en- of Improving the socioeconornlc condi- hancement programs that will replenish tlons through alternative livelihood need depleted resources. This set of strategies the support of community organizations, provided the context within which the social scientists and development work- Southeast Aslan Fisheries Development ers in applying CBCRM techniques in Center's (SEAFDEC) integrated seafarming selected fishing communities. The objectives and searanching project was formulated. of the project are to: The project addresses the issues of de- 1. develop model marine hatchery-nurs- graded coastal habitats, dwindling fish ery systems of selected species for stocks, failure in law enforcement, and culture and release of juveniles; the need for alternatlve livelihood op- 2. provide additional livelihood through portunities. cultivation of appropriate finfishes, The Philippine government through the seaweeds, molluscs and crustaceans: Department of Agriculture launched the 3. regenerate fish habitats such as coral Fishery Sector Program (FSP) to address, reek, seagrass beds and mangrove among others, the alleviation of poverty swamps; of flshers through the development of al- 4. increase Rsh stock by releasing ju- ternative livellhood activities and reha- veniles of suitable species; bilitation of coastal resources. The FSP 5. develop the community into a strong has adopted the community-based ap- and organized association and grant proach of coastal resources management it territorial use rights to manage the through greater community participation. project site; and The Local Government Code of 1991 pro- 6. extend the seafarming and searanching vided the policy structure of decentral- activities to other fishing communities. izing the management of coastal resources The community-based strategy entails to the local government units (LGUs). In- four major interventions: ( 1 ) deployment tegrated management of coastal resources of concrete artificial reefs (ARs) for en- will need the collaborative involvement hancement of fish habitat; (2) granting of social scientists, biologists, develop- of territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFS) ment workers and flshery managers. to solve the problems brought about by ineffective law enforcement; (3)community organizing and institution buildlng; and Community Flshery Resource (4)alternative livellhood activities. These Management Project of four interventions are integrated and com- SEAFDEC/AQD plementary and should not be taken in isolation. In 1991. SEAFDEC's Aquaculture De- This is SEAFDEC's first attempt at partment (AQD) started implementing its participatory research involving biologists, Community Fishery Resource Management social scientists and community workers. Project after a year of site selection. The The lack of an effective system of integrating development- oriented research on the the multidisciplinary research studies and community-based coastal resources man- relating their objectives to community organizing has resulted In problems in membershlp In fishing association; and the implementation of the project. (7) presence or awareness of This paper presents the two-year ex- nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). perience of SEAFDEC in project imple- Out of flve candidate areas in the islands mentation, wlth emphasls on problems of Panay and Guimaras, Malallson Island encountered in the process, as well as was chosen as the pilot site. community-organlzlng activities. A small island of 55 ha and 74 house- holds, and lying at 1 125' north latitude and 122 east longitude. Malalison is lo- Pllot Slte cated on Panay Island, central Philippines, and belongs to the municipallty ofculasi, A slte selection process using blophysid province of Antlque (Fig. 1 ). Only 12 ha and socloeconomic criteria was under- of the total land area comprise the vil- taken. The biophysical criteria considered lage, while 33 ha are classified as refor- the conditions of the coastal habltats, i.e., estation area. Only 3 ha are riceland; the coral reefs, seagrass beds and mangrove rest of the land is covered with coconut, areas and site suitability for deploying black myrtle and @/I-/p//(Leocaena sp.). Ak.The socioeconomic criterla used were: There is also about a hectare of fishpond ( 1 ) fishing as major occupation; (2) fish- which is seldom used. One side of the ing income below poverty level: (3)control island is exposed to amihan or northeast of fishing practices; (4) use of fishing credlt; monsoon, while the other side is open (5)potential for alternative livelihood; (6) to habagat or southwest monsoon.

Flg. 1. Malallson Island: the pllot rlte of the Corn- munlly Flshcry Resource Management Project. &4 59 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65 and onr Age

Flg. 2. Age structure of Malallson Island populatlon (30 Aprll 1991).

Malalison has a young population of erty threshold of P2,654per month, 75.3% 431 (Fig. 2). More than half are younger of households lived below the poverty than 20, 29% are 9 years old and younger. level in 1990. There are more females than males. Subsistence fishing Is the primary means of livelihood of the islanders (Fig. 3).This occupation refers to a widespread pat- tern of economic activity which involves heavy dependence upon small-scale pro- duction of marine resources, largely for home consumptlon, and for sale or ex- change in nearby households or markets, again for immediate home consumption (Szanton 1971 ). The heads of 55 house- holds are fishers; some members ofvarious households are also engaged In fishing. Prlmary level (Grades 1-4) Is the high- est educational attainment for majority of the population (Fig. 4). The island has only a primary school with two teach- ers. Chlldren have to attend the elementary school at Culasi. across the channel. Majority of the vlllagers are poor. In 1990, half of the household populatlon earned an annual income of less than P1 5.000 (Fig. S).' Based on a 1988 pov- Occupation

Flg. 3. Prlmary occupatlon of household heads In Malallson Island. coastal assessment and seafarming tech- nlques while the socioeconomic studies are on traditional fishing boundaries and TUWs, and economic utilization of resources. Community organizingand institution buiid- ing are facilitated by an NGO. the Par- ticipatory Research. Organization of Com- munities and Education ~owardsStrug- gle for Self-Reliance (PROCESS)Founda- tion Inc. Seaweeds farming is the initial cooperative livelihood activity implemented by the association with technical and fi- J nancial support from SEAFDEC. Flg. 4. Educational attainment of population aged 8 years old and over, In Malallson Island.

(In thousands,+)

Flg. 5. Household Income dlstrlbutlon, 1990. In Malallson Island.

Actlvltles Research

Complementary activities on research. The research team is composed of community organizing and alternative live- biologists, an aquaculture economist, a lihood are simultaneously being under- rural sociologist, a seaweed expert and taken. The biological research focuses on technical assistants with background in fisheries. A technical assistant and an aide of ARs: and determines the legal and social are assigned full-time on the island. Implications of granting exclusive use rights The following research activities are being to the Fishermen's Association of Malallson conducted: Island (FAMI). 1. Resource assessment - a detailed 4. Seaweed cultivation - is composed survey on organisms and a description of two substudies, namely, "Bottom-line of physiw-chemical properties of the waters and floating raft methods of seaweed cul- in the site. Organisms being surveyed in- tivation" and "Cage culture of grouper clude seagrasses, seaweeds, corals, fish and seaweeds". The objectives of the study and other invertebrates. The percentage are to: ( 1) develop a seedbank and dem- of cover of hard and soft corals, algae, onstration farm for seaweed farming; (2) seagrasses: species composltion, dlver- monitor the growth rate and condition sity and abundance of fish populations of the test plants and production of the and other Invertebrates associated with seaweed using three variants of the long- . the reef are being assessed through un- line technique, as well as the envlron- derwater Ilk-form transect techniques using mental factors which may influence these SCUBA. Water quality parameters such variables; (3) demonstrate the mechan- as pH, temperature, salinity and turbid- ics of seaweed and finfish cage culture; ity are monitored on a quarterly basis. and (4)undertake economic assessment Samples are analyzed for dissolved oxy- of seaweed farming singly or in polyculture gen, suspended sollds and nutrient con- with finfish in cages. tent. This study is on its second year and will be continued for another three years. 2. Economic utilization of resources Community orginlzlng and - identifies and evaluates present and institution bulldlng potential utilization of resources to for- mulate policies and projects that would The long-term goal of conserving and lead to optimal resource use for the benefit regenerating coastal resources through of the communitjr. Rapid rural appraisal a sustainable, community-based approach techniques like semi-structured and key requires a strong, self-reliant people's informant interviews, direct observation, organization. The success or failure of AR mapping and village transect preparation deployment and the granting of TURFS are employed in preliminary data gath- to the fishers' association depend, to a ering. Fig. 6 shows the agrofishery transect large extent, on the knowledge, capa- of Malalison identifying water- and land- bilities and attitudes of community members based resources, problems encountered regarding sustainable coastal resource use. by flshers and opportunities for utlliza- When Malalison was chosen as the project tion of other resources. Respondents for site, no formal people's organization existed group Interviews are usually composed on the island. An informal group of fishers of six married couples. The second phase called MICA (Malalison Island, Culasi, of the study employs a structured ques- Antique) was engaged in a fishing activity tionnaire regarding income derived from called duldog, the island's version of muro- the use of fish resources and invertebrates ami, a fishing method declared illegal by like sea urchin and sea cucumber. the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic 3. Investigation of traditional marine Resources since 1986. In November 1990, boundaries and TURFS - documents the FAMl was organized through the initiative existence of sea tenure practices; explores of the municipal government of Culasi, the social consequences of deployment and registered with the Securities and Midland S Wine -ihwsrll d.IdY I Water rgmxl I

mmut star @. axcnl*,papa(a. wwamsu)a i*t, W my& W,kana. w, gumw W. =Sara &a [Wh. mago, gemehia sta WleUcaM Forage, etc. wirer (fa hwb) gum. m.pWer t* rm @a,kmr

Fig. 6. Agroflshey trrnsect of MakUson Island. (from a lolnt Animals caaba, mrken SEACDEC/ICLARM Rapid Rural Apprkl Trdnlng, September t 991 1.

my. icelaundng. fish virq firhwnd~rq.nel-, taal&lng, ~table

fallha mmm, amd hsbadry 1Nd bee nmq,rhdkrati dl ding 1l"erlar ~"€5 Exchange Commission on 24 June 1881. officers and potential young leaders. Topics The members of MICA joined FAMI. discussed included basic leadership skills. Being a research institution with no organization development and manage- experience in community organizing, ment, project development and rnanage- SEAFDEC consulted with NGOs in Antique ment, cooperative development, basic and chose PROCESS Foundation, Inc. as financial management, basic paralegal its partner NGO. knowledge, and ecology and environment The foundation has a wide experience protection and conservation. The offic- in organizing and mobilizing fry gather- ers' training programs were usually 3- ers and fisher communities not only in to 4-day live-in seminars held outside Antique but in other provinces in Panay Malalison. Since participants are usually as well. A Memorandum of Agreement breadwinners, a replacement income of was entered into by SEAFDEC/AQD and PSO/participant/day was provided. The PROCESS for the latter to undertake a training foundation facilitated FAMl's membership program and assign a full-time commu- in a regionwide federation of subsistence nity facilitator in the island. farmers' and fishers' organizations. Moreo- The long-term objectives of commu- ver, representatives of FAMl also attended nity-organizing activities are to: other capability-building workshops and I. empower the people in Malalison meetings organized by PROCESS. through effective and efficient par- ticipation in socioeconomic and po- litical activities: 2. facilitate people's organization and community access to and control over In 199 1, experiments in a low-tech- resources and provide opportunities nology, low-financing, labor-intensive and means of production; seaweed farming using Kappaphycus 3. develop skills and capability for self- alvarezli were undertaken to showcase reliant, self-managed sustainable a livelihood activity on the island. Sea- organization, projects and community: weed farming is not new to the island- 4. inculcate values and promote aware- ers, however. It was started by a family ness of and a proper attitude towards of a young fisher in 1989, and by 1990, environmental conservation; and three families were already engaged in 5. identify, explore and implement ap- the activity. Seaweed farming on the Is- propriate, indigenous and innovative land Is beset by two problems: (1) planting technologies as well as sustainable could only be done during the northeast alternative livelihood projects. monsoon as the area suitable for seaweed The community referred to is composed production is exposed to the southwest of FAMl members, who are primarily house- monsoon, and (2)nonavailability of seedlings hold heads. in nearby communities. In 199 1, nobody Training programs are conducted through engaged in seaweed farming because of lectures. The outputs of each training session the latter problem. are group reports from the participants The favorable results of the SEAFDEC done through workshops. Ten training pro- experlments encouraged several mem- grams, including a mid-year assessment bers of FAMl to try seaweed farming in workshop, were held in 1992. Of these, January 1992. Although production per two were on membership orientation and farmer was high, the aggregate volume one was on gender sensitivity. The other was less than a ton whlch did not attract training programs were exclusively for buyers. The harvest was sold at a breakeven price. This experience, however, did not strategy of project implementation. The discourage the fishers. In December 1992, short- and long-term socioeconomic benefits FAMl decided to venture into seaweed to the community were emphasized to farming. SEAFDEC provided an interest- get the cooperation of potential beneficiaries. free seed money of P 10,000 which FAMl The high expectations of community lent to 50 participating members. The loan members are an offshoot of this presentation. covered the cost of seedlings and some A case in point is the community members' materials. As agreed upon during gen- desire for the immediate construction and eral assembly meetings, FAMI gets 5%2 deployment of Ah. This could provide of sales of each participating member. employment and business opportunities SEAFDEC continuously provided technl- for the community through the demand cal assistance before and during the farming for gravel and sand, and services. However, period. At present, most of the partici- the decision to construct ARs will be based pants have two croppings and the last on data regarding biological and physical harvest will be in June before the onset properties of the coastal waters, engineering of the southwest monsoon. The targeted designs and socioeconomlc considerations total production is about 3 t. on potential use conflict. This information Other livelihood activities have been will come from ongoing research studies. identified by FAMI. Hog raising is high The readiness of the association to manage on the list because of the availability of the site for AR deployment is another indigenous feeds like coconut meat and consideration. The area for ARdeployment ipil-ipil leaves. Cage culture (nursery and is the same site where TURFS would be growout) of selected finfish species like declared. The impatience of beneficiaries milkfish, grouper and siganids is being over the long time to construct and deploy considered. Experimental runs on these ARs has caused irritation between FAMl commodities would be undertal

RAFAEL M. BOJOS, JR. 10-C hinbow Village Pardo, Cebo Ci@ 6000 Philippines

BOJOS.RM., JR 1994. The Central Visayas Regional Project: experlence In community-based coastal resources management, p. 16 1 - 164. In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.) Community management and common property of coastal fisheries In Asia and the Paclflc: concepts, methods and experiences. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45, 189 p.

lntroductlon of this paper, utilized about 10% of the overall project budget. e Central Visayas Regional Project (CVRP) The history of CVRP extends back to 1975 Tin the Philippines was a pilot project when Filipino planners and World Bank staff intended to address resources manage- recognized a causal relationship between ment issues, among others, In the four prov- the continuing degradation of renewable inces of Central Visayas, or Region VII, and natural resources and increasing poverty to strengthen the government's program in rural communltles. Forest cover was of decentralllmtion. Prepared in 1982, It shrinking; topsoil eroded rapidly from upland was implemented for 8.5 years from July slopes belng farmed with lowland rowcrop 1984 to December 1992. The total project methods; coastal waters were overfished; cost was estimated at US$44 million with and highly productive fisheries habitats like financial assistance from the World Bank. coral reek and mangrove brests were being Using the watershed as the planning unit. destroyed. three primary project components - up- Decllnlng harvests from degraded re- land agriculture, soclal forestry and sources combined with rapid population nearshore fisheries - were supported by growth resulted in Increasing poverty among activities in infrastructure, Institutional forest occupants, upland farmers and strengthening of regional government artisanal fishers. Most of these resources agencies, applied wmrnunications, research, users were aware of the problem as they training and technical assistance. The watched their harvests and income dwln- nearshore fisheries component, the topic dle year by year. It was also recognized that to effectively Responsible for much of the resources address the numerous resources manage- degradation. they were also the only ones ment issues involved, the devolutlon of who could undertake rehabilitation and many decisionmaking powers from the sustainable management over the long term. central offices to the regional level would 3. The ability to provide and secure long- be required. term tenure over portions of the resource The prlmary objectives of the nearshore was seen as an important means of re- fisheries component were: shlctlng access and of encouraging sus- to assist coastal communities to im- tainable management practices. prove and sustain the productivity of 4. Nearly all the interviewed small-scale thelr coastal waters; fishers related problems that were symp- to increase the income of small-sale tomatic of serious overfishing. However. fishers and profitability of their oc- scientific data were not available to con- cupation; and firm or deny that conclusion. In addition, to strengthen the government's pro- the responsible national government agency gram of decentralization. was still assisting fishers to acquire bet- The CVRP was implemented at 5 coastal ter hear to reach the great untapped re- sites in 4 provinces which included 16 sources in the sea. The regulatory frame- municipalities and 182 villages (barangay) wrkdid not provide adequate mechanisms along 223 km of coastline. Organized fisher fa management by local governments. Thus. communities were greatly involved in the project design focused on rehabilitating development project planning process, degraded coastal habitats and prohibiting implementation and perlodic monitoring. access of those who used illegal and habitat- Project staff that stayed permanently in destructive methods, although the need the coastal project sites served as facilitators. for harvest management as well, was evi- community organizers and trainors to the dent to project planners. fishers.

Assumptlons Project objectives were to be attained During project preparation, several re- wing a community-based approach which source assumptions were made by project included the following basic aspects: planners that shaped project design, like 1. The community would be the lead the following: agency, not a government agency which 1. While Philippine law provided for a WIS the usual practice. Sustainable resources state property management reglme, the management could only be implemented government lacked the capability to ef- and institutlonalized wlthln the commu- fectively enforce its fesource management nity if the members were properly organ- regulations. The resulting situation in the i-d and trained to develop the needed government-owned forests, upland and capability. coastal waters Is best described as de hcto 2. Resources management interventions open access. This lack of effective control were kept simple and appropriate to the on resources access was determined to needs identified by the community. Im- be a root cause common to all forms of plementation was by coastal residents and

- ~ ~ -- ~- ~- the control of illegal fishing and in an overfished environment, not through other habitat-destructive activities; the provision of additional flshing gear or mangrove reforestation and rnan- boats. agement; 8. lmplementation would be done in the construction, placement and two stages: (1) determine if the approach management of artificial reefs; would work and if so, (2) institutionalize the protection of all coral reek and the successful approach in the community, the establishment of marine sanc- local governments and government sup- tuaries including 10-15% ofthe total port agencies. reef area within a municipality; 9. To facilitate devolution of limited small-sale mariculture; and decisionmaking power and to provide secure later in the project, the use of resources access, the following points were deepwater fish-attracting devices settled with national government agen- harvested only by handlines. cies in a formal Memorandum of Agree- 3. Development activities focused on ment signed in June 1984: the barangay or village, the lowest level The then Bureau of Forest Devel- of government organization in the Philip- opment would issue Stewardship pines. The Barangay Development Coun- Agreements, a 25-year renewable cil (BDC) was activated as the primary plan- lease in mangrove and other for- ning and implementing body. The BDC could est land areas. This was the first be expanded and made representative of long-term tenure instrument offered the village and would provide a direct link by the government to forest oc- to the government system. Groups of vil- cupants who had previously been lage residents were also organized to im- considered "squatters". plement resources management activities The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic of mutual interest to members. Resources agreed to (a) allow 4. As more villages were organized, municipal fishery ordinances, their activities, particularly the control of including those establishing illegal fishing, were federated at the mu- municipal marine sanctuaries, to nicipal and then the site level. be approved at the regional rather 5. Community organizers involved the than at the national level; (b) permit community in situation analysis, includ- the licensing of artificial reef use ing the identification and prioritization of so that access could be controlled: Issues. Key Issues identified by the village and (c) stop the use in Region VII were addressed in as a constructive, of muro-am/ and kayakas, two nonconfrontational manner as possible. fishing practlces destructive to coral While coastal resources management Is- reefs. sues were always among those with the 10.Project funds were released dlrectly hlghest priority, the community was as- from the Department of Budget and Man- sisted to deal with priority nonresources agement in Manila to the Project Ofice management issues as well. based in Cebu Clty without passing through 6. Communlty development and tech- another national government office. Project nical workers lived in their respective tar- Site Managers based at the five Site Man- get villages where they served to stimu- agement Units also had their own late and support community action rather checkbooks and were authorized to dis- than as community leaders. burse up to USB3.000 per transaction, 7. Livelihood of fishers would be im- provlded the item was in their approved proved with better resources management workplan and budget. The direct fund flow and fiscal autonomy by Slte Managers rea- Ing a better scheme of community-based sonably facilitated implementation and was management. unique at that time. In summary, the Intent of CVRP was to work with fishing comrnunlties to try to d~evelopwhat is now termed co-manage- Results ment of coastal resources. Although CVRP was Implemented by a specially created For 8.5 years, the coastal fishers' asso- government entity, the methods used were ciations developed the knowledge and skills those of nongovernmental organizations. in the rehabilitation and management of the nearshore fisheries. Some reglonal re- source management regulations were References' imposed by the national government like the ban for the operations of muro-ami At) (AsIan lnstltute of Journallsrn). 1988. An exter- nal evaluatlon of the Central Vlsayas Reglonal and kayakas in coastal waters. However, Project, p. 1-36. Asian lnstltute of Journal- several equally Important resources man- Ism, Manlla, Phlllpplnes. agement issues were not formally addressed, P#x. J.C. 1989. Community-based resources man- such as the user rights to artificial reefs agement: the experience of the Central Vlsayas Reglonal Project-I, p. 185-190. In T.E. Chua and the official recognltion of coral reefs and D. Pauly (eds.) Coastal area management with sanctuary that were identified, estab- In Southeast Asla: pollcles, management strat- lished and managed by the fishers' asso- egies and case studies, ICLARM Conf. Proc. ciations and the community. This situa- 19. 254 p. Barkes F.. D. Feeny, B.J. McCay and J.M. Acheson. tion prompted most municipal government 1989. The beneflts of the commons. Nature authorities to pass ordinances supporting 340(6229):91-93. the fishers and the community's resources Bolos, R., Jr. and F.J. Vande Vusse. 1988. Report of management activltles. the Workshop on Artlflclal Reefs Development and Management. ASEAN/Sf/88/GEN/8. Since CVRP was a pilot project, it was Penang, Malaysia. recognized at the outset that the motives CVRP (Central Vlsayas Reglonal Project). 1983. and means to act collectively would open Nearshore Rsherles. Work. Pap. 3.61 p. Central up better policy alternatives to the com- Vlsayas Regional Project, Cebu, Philippines. CVRP-I (Central Visayas Reglonal Project-I). 1991. mon-property problems in the coastal ar- Progress report. Central Visayas Reglonal Project- eas which resulted in dwindling fish catch. I, Cebu, Philippines. (Berkes et al. 119891 defined common- CVRP-I (Central Visayas Reglonal Project-I). 1992. property resources as "a class of resources Technology documentation. Central Vlsayas Regional Project-l. Cebu. Philippines. for which exclusion is difflcuit and joint Dt 10s Angeles, M.S. and R.T. Pelayo. 1992. Im- use involves subtractability".) pact evaluatlon report. Central Visayas Reglonal The CVRP's position then was to try Project Phase I (CVRP-I). Phllipplne Instltute developing a mechanism where the coastal for Development Studies. Makatl. Metro Ma- nila. Philippines. fishery shall be jointly managed by the YndeVusse, F.J. 199 1. A community-based resource organized marginal fishing communities 1'' management approach to address Phllipplne and the government so that users' rights coastal resource degradation and overfishing. would be equally recognized in the man- p. 387-393. In L.M. Chou et al. (eds.) Towards an Integrated management of tropical coastal agement of resources classified under com- resources. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 22, 455 p. munal and state property. Although it was World Bank. 1983. Staff appraisal report, Central anticipated that operationally, joint resources Vlsayas Reglonal Project. Washington. DC. USA. management may create some overlap- 30 p. ping functions, the practice of co-manage- 'Except for Berkes et al. (1989). all are project out- ment can be put into place, thus initiat- puts. Community-based Coastal Resources Management: the Palawan Experience

RICARDO M. SANDALO PaIa wan Council for Sustainable Deve/opment Provincia/ Agricu/tura/ Center Ira wan, Puerto Princesa City P. 0.Box No. 45, PPC, 5300 Pala wan Philippines

SANDALO, R.M. Community-based coastal resources management: the Palawan experience, p. 165- 181. In R.S. Pomeroy (ed.) Community management and common property of coastal fisheries in Asla and the Pacific: concepts, methods and experiences..ICLARM Conf. Proc. 45, 189 p.

formulated In the late 19805. Consequently, pilot-testing activities were undertaken is paper hopes to share the experi- by PIADP in the different areas of the T"ences learned by the Palawan Integrated province. Area Development Project (PIADP) rela- Speciflcally, this paper highlights one tive to community-based resources man- of the relevant pilot-test projects: the Honda agement (CBRM). Bay Resource Management Program The project components of PIADP which (HBRMP),implemented from June 1989 may in one way or the other have the to December 1990. nature of a CBRM, as defined in this pa- Here are some basic assumptions and/ per, are presented. When PIADP was or understanding of community-based launched more than a decade ago, CBRM coastal resources management (CBCRM) as a development strategy was not yet and its related terms: in full use. 1. "Resources management" is the uti- During the later stage of PIADP imple- lization of natural resources with due mentation, however, CBRM was recog- respect to and recognition of sound nized as a potent strategy towards sus- ecological processes. tainable development. For the Province 2. A "community" in relation to CBRM of Palawan (Fig. 1 ), this came about when is a social organization not necessarily the strategic environmental plan (SEP) was synonymous to a village (barangay) or municipal government. its 3. 'Community-based" denotes the geographical boundaries could be participation of the organized members defined in relation to its adjacent and/ of a given community in activities or surrounding land or water resources. benefitting and/or affecting the com- Thus, a community could be a group munity. of households in an upland area, an 4. CBRM is a strategy undertaken through association of fishers, an irrigators' the active participation of an organized associatlon, lowland residents, an community. organization of coffee growers, 5. CBCRM specifidly refers to the coastal etc. resources and adjacent cornmunitles. PIADP: a Brlef Background The SPIADP expanded its coverage by targetting the northern mainland, the island Officially launched in 1982, PIADP Phase municipalities, as well as continuing the I was a multisectoral seven-year project development efforts in the southern and funded through a US$47-million loan from central mainland covered during the first the AsIan Development Bank (ADB), a 7- phase, or effectively, the whole Provlnce million grant from the European Economic of Palawan. Aside from projects in Phase Community (EEC) and a counterpart from I. SPIADP now includes fisheries support the Philippine Government. It has 14 com- services, an integrated health program ponents which focused on agricultural and women-in-development as additional development as the key sector comple- components. This paper shall focus on mented by essential infrastructure and social PIADP 1's CBRM experiences. and institutional services. The integrated area development strategy in Palawan was designed to: ( 1 ) develop the agriculture CBRM and PIADP I sector in areas with the greatest potentials; (2) improve external transport services Of the 14 project components under and access to population centers and ag- PIADP I, only four en be classified as di- ricultural areas; (3) strengthen support rectly in consonance with the concept of services and develop farming systems and CBRM-communal irrigation, rural drink- production technology appropriate to local ing water supply (RDWS), upland conditions; (4) expedite the issuance of stabilization and integrated environmen- land tltles: and (5) build up absorption tal program (IEP). and implementation capacities. Under communal irrigation, the man- The project area covered the whole main agement of water for rice production was island of the province (about 1.2 million handled by an Irrigators Service Asso- ha) but concentrated on its central and ciation (ISA). The facilities of the RDWS southern parts where 60%of the 400,000 component were managed through the inhabitants live and where the potential Rural Waterworks and Sanitation ASSO- areas for agriculture are situated. After ciation (RWSA). Upland stabilization aimed 1988, the project was allowed to be ex- to offer alternatives to the environmen- tended for another two years within which tally destructive shifting cultivation (lo- 99% of its total targets were attained. cally called kaingin) practices by upland As a multl-agency project, it was imple- farmers in three specific pilot sites. Fi- mented by the Departments of Agricul- nally, IEP hoped to provide the rational ture (DA), Environment and Natural Re- framework towards sustainable develop- sources (DENR), Public Works and High- ment in the province by formulating a ways (DPWH), and Health: Central Bank SEP that recognized the importance and of the Philippines; National Irrigation relevance of CBRM. Administration (NIA): and PIADP Office, which was then under the National Council on Integrated Area Development. Communal irrigation On 27 September 1990, the US858- million loan for Phase II or the Second implemented by NIA, this project com- Palawan IAD Project (SPIADP) was signed ponent covered 4,500 ha broken down between AD0 and the Philippine Govern- into several communal schemes averag- ment. Formally launched in 1991. It is ing 250 ha each, scattered throughout scheduled to end by f 996. the central and southern mainland Palawan. For each communal irrigation system. e.3.. lack of credit and postharvest an ISA was organized by a cornmunlty facilities, deforested watershed. organlzer deployed by NIA who stayed in the area for about one-two years. The organization of lSAs was required by NIA Rural drinklng water supply prior to the actual design of the irriga- tion dam and its canals as these ISAs had The DPWH Implemented this compo- to participate as early as the design stage. nent, completing 456 Level 1 and 2 Level During construction, the ISA members I1 water supply systems throughout the provided a certain amount of equity (in central and southern mainland of Palawan. cash or in kind), and the association moni- A Level I system is either a shallow or tored the progress (including financial) deep well constructed near a group of of the project. Upon completion, the ISA 10-1 5 households. On the other hand, a had to formally accept the irrigation system Level II system stores water in a reser- and manage the scheme. From the or- voir and delivers it through several com- ganizing up to the turnover stage, NIA munal faucets located in strategic polnts conducted several trainings aimed at en- withln the community. As in the irriga- hancing ISAs' organlzatlonal and tech- tion component, the establishment of RWSA nlcal capabllities on water management. was a prerequisiteto the actual construction The performance of these irrlgatlon 'of the system. The RWSAs were trained systems after turnover, however, varied on the actual maintenance of the wells. (i.e., on cropping intensity, production, In contrast to the irrigation component, organlzatlonal cohesiveness, self-reliance however, no cornmunlty organizer was or dependence on NIA). Several lSAs assigned to each RWSA. Obviously. em- became Inactive; complaints from ploying one organizer for each of the 400 downstream farmers in terms of or more RWSAs was unimaginable. Rather, nonavailability of water were noted; as the group of households merely presented well as reports of nonincrease in cropping a list of officers and members to DPWH intensities and/or productivity; and lack as proof that they were already organ- of credit and inadequate postharvest lzed as an RWSA. Consequently, cases facilities. However, some irrigation systems of Ill-maintainedwells were noticed (about are still performing well now and have 50% of the total number of wells did not achleved their desired expectations. produce any potable water). Moreover, In summary, the following were ob- despite the insistence of DPWH that RWSAs servations on the project in relation with malntain the wells, several instances oc- the concept of CBRM: curred wherein RWSAs demanded that 1. The organization of lSAs was a pre- DPWH replace the spare parts (even a requisite to the actual design and slmple bolt) for the well. construction of the irrigation facilities. Throughout PlADP I, the following were 2. It was assumed that the ISAs' organized observed on the drinking water supply members actively participated through- component: out the process. 1. The organization of RWSA was a pre- 3. As the irrigation facilities were turned requlslte to constructlon. over to ISAs, the latter took the re- 2. There were several reports of con- sponsibility in management, thus pro- tractors constructing (and sometimes moting self-reliance. abandoning) the wells without no- 4. Problems encountered by lSAs were tifying the village officials and/or sometimes beyond their capability, RWSA. 3. Training on maintenance was inad- tives and later organized as such. Upon equate. project phaseout, these cooperatives were 4. The RWSAs' sense of ownership and envisioned to manage their own affairs, responsibility for the wells was not such as marketing their products, acquiring noticeable. inputs, continuing the practice of improved 5. However, some RWSAs actively main- upland farming system, etc. tained their wells. Among the three pilot sites, Salogon at Brooke's Point remained the most properly maintained and operating even after project Upland stab//fzation phaseout. A significant observation in re- lation to this is that, of the three sites, Realizing the threat posed by shifting the farmers in Salogon opted to have a cultivation in the uplands perpetuated by communal stewardship contract while the tribal communities (at the time of PlADP other two chose the individualized con- feasibility studies, in contrast to the present tract. where majority of kalnglneros are Chris- The following were also observed: tian migrants), this project was imple- 1. Organizing the beneficiaries was not mented through DENR to pilot-test farming a prerequisite to receive the benefits systems in three sltes which would sta- from government. bilize upland areas. In this regard, the 2. Majority of the beneficiaries (about Tagbanuas and the Palawans (tribal groups) 120 households For each site) remained were the main project beneficiaries. It was in their areas and were no longer seen envisioned that through demonstration practising shifting cultivation. and persuasion, these tribal communities 3. Ofthe two tribal groups, the Palawans would no longer practise kaingin, stay had a more closely knit social organi- in the same area and apply more eco- zation than the Tagbanuas who in- logically sound farming systems, with better cidentally were regularly in contact economic returns. Throughout the project, with Christian lowlanders. the staff, consisting of a forester-team leader and several community organizers-tech- nologists, stayed on site with the farm- Integrated environmental program ers. Stewardship contracts (in consonance Due to the sensitivity of Palawan's en- with the Integrated Social Forestry Pro- vironment, with its rich natural resources gram) were distributed. The beneficiar- vulnerable to threats of human activities, ies were also employed as laborers at the an environmental program was included demonstration area, while taught on various in the PlADP I package. Through scien- farming systems (e.g., contour farming, tific studies, several consultations with hedgerows, vegetative terracing) with the various sectors and after attempts to draft objective that these farmers shall apply a plan from 1983 to 1987, the "Strate- this knowledge on their own farms. Ba- gic Environmental Plan for Palawan Bo- sic amenities and services were provided, wards Sustainable Development" was finally such as drinking water, elementary edu- formulated in December 1987 by PRADP cation, housing materials and health Office and its consultants. services. A set of strategies, SEP was designed During the last two years of project to be the framework for the sustainable implementation (1989-1 990), the farmer development of the province, balancing beneficiaries were trained on coopera- the much needed development efforts and the malntenance of its ecological Integ- CBRM projects, were Implemented. For rity. One of SEP's strategies was the pro- purposes of this paper, the Honda Bay ex- motion of CBRM, as stated in one of Its perience shall be elucidated. objectives. 'to foster proper use and care of common resources by local commu- nities". Honda Bay: an Experlence In The main goal of SEP was "to improve Community-Based Coastal the living conditions of all Palawenos by Resources Management developing its land and water resources in ways that are economically viable, socially Located on the eastern side of main- equitable and environmentally sustain- land Palawan wlthin Puerto Prlncesa City, able". In attalnlng its goal, the following Honda Bay is large, approximately 28,000 were adopted as philosophies: ha with 12 charted islands (Fig. 2). The 1. Ecological viability - The physical islands are generally small, ranging from and biological processes that maintaln the 1.25 to 45 ha, and most are surrounded productivity of natural ecosystems must by extensive shallow coral reef platforms, always be kept intact. sand cays and mangroves. Coconuts are 2. Social acceptability - The people grown in flve of these Islands, namely, themselves should be fully committed to Fondeado, Fraser. Makesi. Meara and support sustainable development activi- Ramesamey. Assessment of the bay in ties: this could be realized by fostering equity the early 1980s showed a relatively good In access to resources and the benefits quality of coral reef, seagrass bed and derived kom them and through participative mangrove ecosystems. This is Indicative processes. of good feeding, breeding and spawn- 3. Integrated approach - This gives ing grounds of fish and other marine Ilfe. way to a holistic view of problems and Thus, Honda Bay is considered a major issues prevailing in the environment as well fishing ground in the province, especially as opportunities for cooperation and sharing In Puerto Prlncesa City. that will eventually provide the resources, Along the coast of Honda Bay, 15 of coordination and political will to actually the 19villages are directly dependent on implement and sustain SEP activities. To it for livelihood. In 1890, of the estlmated implement the mandate of the plan, the 2,500 households in these villages, 85% two congressmen of Palawan filed the SEP were engaged In Fishing, either as a pri- Bill in the House of Representatives in 1988. mry or alternative source of income. Tour- After being approved as House Bill 19576 ism establishments and facilities have started and later concurred in by the Senate, it to flourish along the beaches and in some was finally signed into law (Republic Act dthesmall islands, namely, Pulding. Meara 761 I) by then President Corazon Aquino and Ramesamey. The islands of Arreclfe. on 19 June 1992. While awaiting its le- Makesi, Bugins and Tadyo have become gitimization from 1988 to 1990, PlADP inhabited by permanent settlers. OMce embarked on an environmental in- With the increasing population pressure, formation and education campaign, research Fisheries resources are being depleted. and pilot-testing activities pursuant to SEP. Fish catch per unit effort had declined from Along this Ilne, the Tamlang Catchment 36.5 kg in 1985 to 8.4 kg In 1989. Thls Rehabilitation and Protection Project, the was attributed to the following: (1) lrawan Catchment Development Project and destructive fishing methods such as the Honda Bay Resource Management dynamite or blast fishlng; (2)encroachment Program, which could be considered as by transients using "more efficient" fishlng Legend:

Artificial rsel46h shelter $f Mangrove rehabilitalion @ - hook and llne geer @ Travel time Staticwry lln net - Land roue --- 12 Irm OWQY Sea route f ram PPC propar # Mueeel and o@er culture A Village maher

Ig. 2. ProJect sltes for Honda Bay Resource Management Program. methods (1.e.. trawl, minipurse seine and situation Is true not only In Honda Bay. ring nets) within the municipal or coastal The same problems are prevalent In other waters; and (3) destructive land-based coastal and marine areas of the province. activities such as logging and shifting But being a major Fishing ground near- cultivation causing erosion and siltation. est to Puerto Princesa Clty, Honda Bay slowly smothering the very foundation has become the focus of interest of as- of fisheries productivity -the mangroves, sessment studies. seagrass beds and coral reefs. In 1988, when PlADP Office negotiated Although there are existing laws against wlth EEC for funding support, the latter illegal flshlng practices, enforcement Is suggested that the office should start another story. There may have been a good Implementlng action-orlented and hlgh- turn-in of apprehensions, but culprlts are Imwprojects, rather than research studies. never really wnvlcted and punlshed. except Consequently. HBRMP was conceptualized. for payment of fees In amounts mlnlmal The problem then was that the funds compared to the value of thelr haul. The available (the unused portion of the EEC grant during Phase I) could suffice for less, the project focused on two com- only one and a half years of implementation. munities, Manalo and Sta. Cruz. The community-based approach was Barangay Manalo, with 279 households. believed to require a minimum of three of which majority are engaged in both years within which target communities farming and Fishing, was selected because should be closely supervised by the project It was a recipient of an earlier project by management. Nevertheless, it was an the Regional Fisheries Training Center (RFTC) opportunity to pilot-test the CBCRM of DA. Consequently, the beneficiaries of program within SEP. Meanwhile, the the said project who were organized by Planning Department of PlADP Office RFK became the participants of HBRMP. together with some technical staff of its Barangay Sta. Cruz, a smaller community other departments tasked to conceptualize with 90 households, 12 km away from the project, recognized the presence of Barangay Manalo is likewise composed regular programs by other agencies and of farmer-fishers. It was chosen due to the City Government that could be tapped Its potential for oyster and mussel cul- in sustaining the operations of the project. ture, considered an alternative to the ex- A Special Projects Unit under the Project tractive fishing methods. Management Department of PlADP Of- The HBRMP involved four major activities: fice was set up to undertake HBRMP, the project preparation, project impiemen- Tamlang Catchment Rehabilitation and tation, training and preparation of an area Protection Project and the Irawan Catchment management plan. Development Project. Within this unit, a three-member technical staff was formed to work on the finer points of the HBRMP Project preparation operational plan and to supervise its day- to-day activities. The team was composed Project preparation included review of a Team Leader - a fisheries graduate of materials regarding the situation in (major in business management) with ex- the project area: evaluation of the project tensive experience in project planning and design against actual field conditions implementation coordination in both gov- (in consultation with prospective ben- ernment and nongovernmental organi- eficlaries); establishment of linkages with zations (NGOs); a Project Development Institutions; and the selection of spe- Officer - an agriculture graduate expe- cific project sites and beneficiaries. These rienced in project planning; and a Com- provided the basis in the finallzation of munity Organizer - a fresh graduate In the operational plan whlch outlined the political science. objectives, approach and strategies, The team finalized its operational plan targets, schedule of activities and budg- after an ocular inspection of the area and etary requirement. some interaction with the target commu- The objectives of HBRMP were as fol- nities. These should have allowed sub- lows: stantial community participation in planning. 1. provide livelihood alternatives; But as experienced, time limitation cut 2. relieve the fishing grounds from short the process. The team opted to focus extractlve methods of fishing: on communities where organizing activities 3. enrich the natural breeding and feeding had been started by other agencies. As grounds of marine life: and wlll be discussed later, this resulted in 4. strengthen the community values both positive and negative impacts relative on environmental protection, to the success of the project. Neverthe- cooperativism and self-reliance. The objectives did not Include direct 3. Technical assistance must include the intervention on law enforcement as the beneficiaries' secondary occupation team opted to employ "positive strokes" such as farming, usually upland. which focused on the needs of people 4. Aslde from structured semlnars/work- and the ecological habitat. The proposed shops, on-the-job trainings shall be project cost amounted to P494,OOO (Ta- facilitated by the staff by working and ble 1). maximizing the beneficiaries' partici- The program on CBCRM, as outlined pation. by SEP and as pilot-tested by HBRMP, 5. Inputs of other developmental in- intended to harness the communities in stitutions (i.e., DA, DENR. City Gov- the proper use and protection of the coastal ernment) shall be harnessed and re- resources within their locale. Basically, inforced by starting where these agen- this allowed the communities the prior- cies have left off or coordinating/align- ity right to use the resources while as- ing activities with their ongoing pro- suming the primary responsibility to protect grams. these resources. Consequently, the fol- lowing were adopted as operational strat- egies: 1. Beneficiaries/cooperators shall be considered co-implementors and not Project implementation was done in three mere recipients of inputs, and if possible phases: (1) resource identification and must Le organized into working groups mobilization, wherein the levelling of ex- or associations. pectations between and among the pro- 2. Technologies to be introduced must spective coop era to^ s, the project staff and be complementary in nature and use the institutions was undertaken to de- simple methodologies. termine the responsibility centers and the

Table I. The cost of the Honda Bay Resource Management Project.

Activity Cost (P)

A. Project preparation 10,000 B. Project Implementation 17 1.600 - oyster and mussel nursery 20.000 - artificial reefs and fish shelter 15.000 - statlonary lift net 42,500 - seaweeds culture 12,500 - fish paste/fish sauce 12.000 - salt production - mangrove rehabilitation - village (barangay) market - hook and line fishing - gill net flshing - crab culture/aquasllviculture C. Training D. Preparation of area management plan E. Proiect administration - personnel 243,000 - office supplies 20.000 - travel 2 1.400

Total 494.000 ------counterpart each group was willing to share; were considered a fallback in case their (2) installation of structures; and (3) op- primary venture would fail. eration and maintenance as part of the It would also be interesting to consider production phase. the evolution of projects as conceived Throughout the process, suggestions by the beneficiaries: and recommendations from project ben- 1. When they decided to venture into eficiaries were encouraged relative to what seaweeds farming (which was then type of projects they wanted to pursue. encouraged by the city goverment), they adopt or change. In cooperation with various requested training from an existing institutionsand with the assistance of PIADP cooperatlve within the bay. Office, the project beneficiaries were able 2. The crab culture activity was an idea to start up and/or operationalize the fol- raised by one of the participants, for which lowing undertakings: PIADP Office requested the Mangrove Committee of the Ecosystems Research and Barangay Sta. Cruz (with 10 households): Development Bureau (ERDB) of DENR to I. oyster and mussel nursery, and train them. In this regard, the beneficiaries 2. artificial reefs and fish shelters readily accepted the ERDB staffs suggestion to undertake aquasilviculture which would Barangay Manalo (with 57 households): combine crab culture with mangrove and 1. stationary lift nets; nipa enrichment/rehabilitation. 2. seaweeds culture: 3. Gill-net fishing was initiated by the 3. fish paste/fish sauce; beneficiaries to maximize their time at sea 4. salt production; while attending to the seaweeds. 5. mangrove rehabilitation (12 ha); maintaining the mangrove plantation or 6. village market: drying the anchovies caught by stationary 7. hook-and-line fishing: lift nets. 8. gill-net fishing; and 4. The Fish paste and fish sauce projects 9. crab culture/aquasilvicuiture were identified by the wives of fishers operating the stationary lift nets. During project implementation and after 5. An offshoot of the stationary lift net training on cooperativism, the beneflci- project was snlt production to ensure supply aries/participants in Barangay Manalo of salt for the fish paste/sauce production. organized the Manalo Coastal Mangrove The salt in the area was originally bought Development Association Inc. (MCMDAI) from Mindoro Province through the city and registered it with the Securities and market. The boiling method was adopted Exchange Commission (SEC). since the critical period was during the -It might be surprising that wlthin a rainy season, instead of the usual solar span of one and a half years, the above method applicable only during summer activities within Barangay Manalo could months. be undertaken by a group of fishers whose 6. The village market was put up through association grew from 10 to 57 mem- the initiative of the association in cooperation bers. However, to attain thelr targets, with the village officials. the members divided themselves Into Inklally, the project staff proposed a set working groups, depending on their of relevant projects expressed in relatively Interests, except For the hook-and-line general terms to the prospectlve and glll-net fishing and the crab cul- beneficlaries: marlculture development. ture/aquasilviculture which were under- multiple fishing gear, processingof marine- taken by all members. These actlvlties based products, mangrove rehabilitation. training and extension services, and group was required to set aside 20-40% community organization. Notably, the of their net Income as contribution to the specific projects that later evolved, general Fund of the association which served conceptualized and implemented by the as their emergency fund in cases of calamity cooperators, fell under these project and as a reserve for project expansion. categories. The broad project intentions Because every member felt a rightful claim basically provided' guidance and leeway to a portion of the fund, it also served as for the beneficiaries to contribute their ideas a pull mechanism keeping the members in the detailed planning and operation of intact. the specific projects. Lessons learned on As a forerunner to the above financial project development became experiential management scheme, a 60-20-20 sharing rather than theoretical. Although not all arrangement was made of the proceeds of the projects at one time or another proved or income derived from the stationary lift to be successful. the working groups nets reinstalled for and by the beneficiaries. Involved had the chance to realize "what Sixty percent went to the fisher-cooperators; went wrong". This minimized "passing the 2096 to the Regional Fisheries Training Center buck" in cases of failures which usually (WC)within two years as repayment for resulted in disinterest and breakdown in the nets provided (retrieved from a stationary other project undertakings. lift net project undertaken by RJTC and the Grouping of beneficiaries prior to project original 10 members, prior to HBRMP); and implementation likewise cushioned the 20% to PlADP OHice to be availed of later adverse effect of disinterest in some of the by the fisher-cooperators as capital buildup members. There was always one or two or for calamities. Moreover, as agreed upon. members left to carry on the project and the 20% share of PlADP OHice was turned in some cases encourage new ones to join. over to the association upon evaluation Consequently, in the promotion of of its cohesiveness, proper operations and projects, selection of the appropriate project maintenance of the lift nets and sound mix was based on the varying interests, financial management. This money was later values and motivations of the beneficiaries. used by the MCMDAl members in installing It was apparent that full-time fishers were their village market and as seed capital more fickle-minded compared to fishers for members engaged in buy-and-sell who were also part-time farmers. This was operations of rice and fish. associated with the nature of their Meanwhile, in setting up the projects, occupation. Farmers tend to exercise more specifically the structures, the beneficiaries patience in tilling their lands and waiting were asked to provide labor counterpart. for the harvest season. Fishers can earn They were also infdrmed of the risks and income overnight. Mariculture and of course the possible benefits. This way, mangrove plantation, actually farming at thC beneficiaries became true partners of sea, were therefore.closely tied up with the project with a higher level of multiple fishing gear which are simple and commitment and not mere recipients of traditionally used In the area. inputs. Another motivational mechanism Reaching out to the beneficiaries also employed was financial management. Each meant collaborating with the other working group within MCMDAI was allowed government or nongovernmental to handle its sharing arrangements on instltutions operating in the area. The HBRMP income, recording and safekeeping. There actually became an experience of four were, however, a treasurer and an auditor agencies: RFTC-DA, Environmental to check-and-balance the statement. Each Management Bureau-DENR, the local governments (city and village) and PlADP the two ADMUs organized within the Honda Office. Working arrangements between and Bay area, SAMANMARLUC (Salvation, among these entities were both formal and Manalo, Maruyogon and Lucbuan) and informal, through a Memorandum of BACRUZ (Bacungan and Sta. Cruz), became Agreement or verbal understanding. In partners of the HBRMP staff and beneficiaries either case, synchronized movements at themselves. The beneficiaries at Barangay the top enhanced the acceptance of the Manalo, who were organized into the project by the community. This also allowed MCMDAI, affiliated with the sharing of experiences, both success and SAMANMARLUC ADMU while those at failure, that enabled improvement in style Barangay Sta. Cruz became members of of operation. the BACRUZ ADMU, and evolved later into The multi-institutional arrangement a cooperative called BACRUZ Coop. exposed the beneficiaries to linl

Lack of - towards work Logglns Forest - denudation +- Kamgm 4 Land tenure - (Slash-and- --c problems 1 burn farming) Absentee - Soil erosion

- Charcoal 1 making

- Flooding 4

Siltation 4 Destruction of marine resource- Dynamlte based I and cyanide Transient fishers with - wral reefs, - fishing more effldent gear seagrass compete wlth local beds fishers and mangroves

poor Unstable quality demand environmental protection laws -. -.

Flg. 3. Network analysls of development problems and constraints. Table 2. Loglcal framework matrlx.

Problem Development potentlal Strategy

Soclopolltlcal Soclopolltlcal 1. Strengthen local management ~eptlveattltude towards 1. Generally young ancl llterate unlts towards sustainable work populatlon development and self-reliance Poor health condltlon 2. Presence of organited groups 2. Educate the people on posl- Land tenure worklng towards communlty tive values and attltudes Inadequate drlnklng water development 3. Establish llnkages wlth govern- SUPP~Y 3. Area development management rnent/nongovernment support unlts dellneated by the city services government 4. Develop and promote Ilvell- hood alternatives that are economlcally and envlronmen- tally sound 5. Counterbalance utlllzatlon Econornlcs Econornlcs pressure on resources wlth 1. Lack of capltal I. Proxlrnlty to the clty proper protection and habitat enrich- 2. Lack of technology where flnanclng Instltutlons. ment measures, as follows: 3. Lack of draR anlmals lrnplementlng agencles and a. promotlon of posltlve 4. Pests and dlseases educatlonal servlces are based changes In land use (e.g.. 5. Low sol1 fertlllty tree parks In steephllls 6. Low flsh catch 2. Available technology on and stable upland farmlng 7. Low prlces of products approprlate Farming systems system In lowhlllsl; and flshlng rnethodologles b. enforcement of envlronmen- 3. Accesslblllty to market outlets tally crltical areas network (ECAN) wlth priority to restrlcted use zone whlch Envlronmental Envlronmental buffers the core zone: 1. Forest denudatlon. 1. Awareness of the people on c. establishment of communal lncludlng mangroves envlronrnental primlples is mangrove forest reserves; 2. lneffectlve enforcement of relatlvely hlgh and envlronrnental laws 2. Envlronmental damages have not d. establishment of a marine yet reached crlsis level/ reserve coverlng the whole lrreverslble stage of Honda Bay for development to guide the local contract worth PI. 16 million was awarded management Units in their future to MCMDAI by DENR Although the contract undertakings (Table 2 and Fig. 3).The results was approved by DENR In 1990, the of RRSA and its consequent network analysis mobllization Fund amounting to P108,OOO coupled with the vast experience learned was released only In May 1992. Between during the HBRMP Implementation make the signing of the contract and the release up a potential reservoir of knowledge, of the mobllization fund. PIADP Office. as outlined in the area management plan, through its original HBRMP team, provided that could guide future sustainable technical as well as administrative support development efforts and its actors not to. MCMDAI. This was an informal only in Honda Bay but also in the other arrangement without any funding from fishing grounds In the province. PIADP, speclfic to the activity. A one-year community-based project may not be adequate to successfully put In place what The aftermath has been started. But DENR's regular program on communlty-based mangrove After the implementation of HBRMP, reforestation proved to sustain certain a 100-ha three-year mangrove reforestatlon activities of HBRMP. At this time. MCMDAI has fully planted for resource management (i.e., technical the targetted 100 ha of tldal flat to mangrove skills and organizational cohesiveness) of species, inclusive of the 12 ha planted the organized community has to be to mangroves in 1990- 199 1 that have grown examined so that its activities and the to an average height of 1 m. Survival rate inputs or assistance provided by 'outsider for the total plantation is 75-80%. Replanting catalysts" (meaning government agencies in place of dead seedlings and maintenance or NGOs) will be sustained by the said of those that survive are being carried community. on by the officers and members of MCMDAI. Further, the members report a considerable improvement on their catch of marine Community organlzhg products within the mangrove. Some earnings from the reforestation As experienced by PlADP or at least contract are being utilized by members by two of its components, the establish- of MCMDAI for income-generating projects ment of an organization is a requirement such as piggery, fishpond, gill-net Fishing. prior to the actual delivery of services. mango spraying and handicrafts. However, it is observed that the more Other projects did not achieve successful projects are those where or- sustainability. The BACRUZ Coop and the ganizing is not a prerequisite; rather, the SAMANMARLUC ADMU were by organizntlon of communities just evolves themselves at the infantile stage at the after the people themselves recognize the time the projects were turned over. need For it. However, there is yet no es- Meanwhile, with the change of leadership tablished operating procedure as to when in the city government after the local and in what form the cornmunitles should elections in 1982, the ADMU Program be organized. On the other hand, it is was dissolved by the present administration. noted that to attain active participation Nevertheless, the protection of Honda Bay and sustainability, there is no room for a is currently pursued by the clty government "paper organlzntion". At stake are the dwin- through its revived Bantay Dagat Program dling natural resources. It will be court- (Operation Baywatch). ing disaster, if a group of individuals are Unfortunately, the other group-oriented merely organized on paper just to have activities (e.g..village market, saltmaking, the authority to exploit the fragile eco- aquasilviculture) suffered setbacks due to system. their premature Independence from the Meanwhile, in community organizing, managlng association. It is a must to consider the leadership pattern in the community, Including the kinship structure. In Honda Bay for ex- ample, if a prospective leader does not associate well with his kin, even the This paper would llke to put forward nonrelatives tend to look down on Rim. two prlmary elements in defining CBRM In a small community, where almost all or specifically CBCRM as a resources are somehow related, thls is very significant. management strategy: (1) The community Moreover, among tribal groups, the Salogon that utilizes a given resource is organized. USP exemplifies the utility of the socio- either formally or informally. (2) The sald cultural structure, i.e.. the dominance of organized community actively participates the panglima (tribal leader) in achieving in the proper management of the natural positive acceptance and effectiveness of resources. Consequently, the capability the program even after phaseout. A ctive participation need to enhance their capabiiity through training and information education campaign Aside from a very cohesive organiza- in whatever form. tlon as an assurance towards meaning- Again, this is dependent on the capa- ful and active participation of the com- bility of the project staff to train and support munity in an activity, the requirement for the related institutions to provide train- equity and counterpart from the community ing. In Honda Bay, one of the strategies is also an ektivestrategy. Further, flexibility adopted was tapping the assistance of in project design to provide leeway for the city government, RFTC and ERDB to the beneficiaries to input their ideas, needs, train the beneficiaries. The contacts with perceptions and ingenuity during plan- other institutions enhanced the capabil- ning and project execution is likewise an ity of the community. Later on they also important element to get their partici- provided the necessary linkages to sus- pation. Even financial management can tain their existing and proposed projects. be an incentive or disincentive for the However, the type of training and the beneficiaries to be involved and committed messages to be delivered through an in- to the project. formation education campaign should be Other factors to consider are the cred- properly designed to address the needs ibility, attitude and capability of the com- of the community. Otherwise, if these are munity organizers or the project staff. not relevant to their interest, the participation Specifically, the project staff must have of the beneficiaries cannot be readily the proper perspective on the role of par- expected. ticipants in the total effort. A case in point is when these workers consider the farmers a hindrance to the speedy completion of Sustainability the project. In addition, the organizers themselves should be properly or adequately Inherent to CBRM is the issue of trained. Quality time with farmers and sustainability. Organized communities, fishers is also important, and should not with the active participation and enhanced be wasted as they also have their own capabilities of people, logically point priorities - to feed their families. to the assumption that the communi- Actlve involvement is directly related ties sustain their resources management to the participants' need to have a sense activities. of ownership of and commitment to the project. If they themselves do not iden- tify with the project, as experienced by Pollcy-related issues the rural drinking water supply compo- nent of PIADP, then sustainability is not Community arganizing has become al- expected, thus making the exercise a waste most like a fad, similar to the phenom- in terms of time, money and effort. enal sprouting of NGOs. Every project proponent in an area is organizing ac- tivities. A farmer or a fisher becomes a Capability enhancement member of two or more associations to the detriment of his productive performance Relevant to the actlve particlpation of and ultimately that of the group as a whole. the community is the level of its capa- Most of his time is spent on organiza- bility to cope with the new responslbiii- tional meetings rather than on more sub- ties of managing the resource, thus, the stantive concerns - his livelihood. Meanwhile, a community can be con- it is not always the safe formula. There sidered the sociopolitical unit beyond the are also NGOs with questionable origins family in a society. In a situation where and intentions. development decisions come from the Finally, while the government Is vig- central government, the community be- orously pursuing environmental rehabili- comes only the recipient with no oppor- tation, little is done to protect the still tunity at all to be heard in policymaking. relatively intact ecosystems. In Honda Bay It is therefore ironical to promote CBRM for example, mangroves are being reha- when decisions to utilize the resources bilitated simultaneous with conversion of are always made at the top (i.e.. concessions other existing ones into fishponds, in are issued in Manila). addition to the indiscriminate and unchecked Moreover, in a country where politics cutting of the trees for housing materi- is almost accepted as a way of life, it is als and charcoal making. expected that CBRM will also be affected by political patronage and Interventions. Although politicians' involvement in com- Acknowledgement munity organizing is a welcome slgn, vested political interests in resource use and The author is grateful to the officers management are inevitable. On the other and staff of PlADP Office in Puerto Princesa hand, although an NGO may have the City, Palawan Province, for providing ref- advantages to achieve an effective CBRM, erences used in this paper. Appendix 1. List of Participants

Flsherles Group Dr. Rafael M. Bojos, Jr. '10-C Rnlnbow Village Mr. Renato E Agbayanl Pardo, Cebu City 6000 Economics Section. Research Division Philippines Aquaculture Department Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Dr. Somsak Boromthanarat Center Coastal Resources lnstitute Tigbauan, lloilo 5021 Prince of Songkla University Philippines P.O.Box 102. Hat Yal. Songkla 901 10 Thailand Mr. Mahfuzuddin Ahrned lnternatlonal Center for Living Aquatic Prof Parzival Copes Resources Management lnstitute of Fisheries Analysis House 20, Road 9/A Simon Fraser Unlversity Dhanmondi R/A. Dhaka 1209 Burnaby. B.C. V5A 156 Bangladesh Canada

The Honorable Dr. Angel C. Alcala Ms. Madelehe L. Dalusung Department of Environment and Natural International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Resources Management Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City MCPO Box 263 1,0718 Makati Philippines Metro Manila Philippines Prof Carlito 7: Aiionuevo Tambuyog Development Center Dr. E Brian Davy Room 108-A,Philippine Social Sclence Sustainable Production Systems Center International Development Research Commonwealth Avenue Centre of Canada Diliman, Quezon City P.O.Box 8500, 250 Albert Street Philippines Ottawa K1G 3H9 Canada ProL Flkret Berkes Natural Resources lnstitute Ms. Dolores Ariacine Diamante University of Manitoba lnternational lnstitute of Rural 430 Dysart, Manitoba NT2N2 Reconstruction Canada Sllang, Cavlte Philippines Dr. David Feeny Dr. Kenneth T: MacKay Centre for Health Economics and Policy 2 1 Amorsolo Street Analysis and San Lorenzo Village Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Makati. Metro Manila Biostatistics Philippines . McMaster University 1 200 Main Street West, Hamilton Dr. Harold/. McArthur Ontario L8N 325 College of Tropical Agriculture and Canada Human Resources Hawaii Institute of Tropical Agriculture ProL Elmer M. ferrer and Human Resources Tambuyog Development Center University of Hawaii at Manoa Room 108-A, Phillppine Social Science Gilrnore Hall 202, 3050 Maile Way Center Honolulu. Hawaii 96822 Commonwealth Avenue USA Diliman, Quezon City Philippines Dr. Gary Ne wkirk Coastal Resource Research Network Dr. /ohn D. Graham Biology Department International Development Research Dalhousie University Cehtre of Canada Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4) 1 Tanglin P.O. Box 101 Canada Singapore 91 24 Ms. Christi Noza wa Dr. /ean Frances 1/10 Haribon Foundation for the Conservatlon lnstitute of Philippine Culture of Natural Resources Ateneo de Manila University Suite 90 1, Richbelt Towers Loyola Heights, Quezon City 17 Annapolis St., Greenhills Philippines San Juan, Metro Manila Philippines Ms. Anita Kendrick Department of Rural Sociology Mr. Michael D. Pldo Cornell University international Center for Living Aquatic Ithaca, New York Resources Management USA MCPO Box 263 1, 07 18 Makati Metro Manila Dr. K. Kuperan Viswanathan Philippines Department of Natural Resource Economics Faculty of Economics and Management Dr. Richard B. Pollnac Universiti Pertanian Malaysia Department OF Sociology and 43400 UPM, Serdang, Selangor Anthropology Malaysia Unlversity of Rhode Island Kingston, IU 02881 -0808 Dr. /ohn Kurien USA Centre for Development Studies Frasanthnagar Road Dr. Robert S. Pomeroy Ullor, Thiruvananthapuram international Center for Livlng Aquatic 695 01 I, Kerala Resources Management India MCPO Box 263 1,0718 Makati Metro Manlla Mr. Sten Sverdrup-jensen Philippines lnternational Center for Living Aquatlc Resources Management Dr. Mary Raceiis MCPO Box 2631. 07 18 Makati Ford Foundation Metro Manila MC P.O. Box 1936 Philippines Makati, Metro Manila 1259 Philippines Dr. Ruangrai Tokrisna Department of Agrlcultural and Resource Mr. Yves Renard Economics Caribbean Natural Resources Institute Faculty of Economics and Admlnistration Clarke Street, Vieux Fort, St. Lucia Kasetsart University, Bangkok 10900 West lndies Thailand

Dr. Kenneth Rudde Ms. Anna belle Cruz- Trinidad Matsugaoka-cho 1 1-20 lnternational Center for Living Aquatic Nishinomiya-shi, Hyogo-ken 662 Resources Management Japan MCPO Box 263 1, 07 18 Makati Metro Manila Ms. Giseile PB. Samonte Philipplnes lnternational Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management Dr. Frederick /. Van de Vusse MCPO Box 2631, 0718 Makati Foreign-assisted Project Office Metro Manila Department of Environment and Natural Philippines Resources Diliman, Quezon City Mr. Ricardo M, Sandalo Philippines Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Mr. Rolf Wil/mann Provincial Agricultural Center integrated Coastal Fisheries Management Irawan, Puerto Princesa City Project P.O. Box No. 45, PPC, 5300 Palawan Fisheries Department Philippines Food and Agriculture Organization Vlale delle Terme di Caracalla. 00100 Rome Ms. Susana V. Siar Italy Economics Section, Research Division Aquaculture Department Dr. Eric Worby Southeast Asian Fisheries Development lnternational Center for Living Aquatic Center Resources Management Tigbauan, lloilo 5021 House 20. Road 9/A Philippines Dhanmondi R/A, Dhaka 1209 Bangladesh Dr. Wi//iarn D. Sunderlin lnternational Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management Uplands Group MCPO Box 263 1,0718 Makati Metro Manlla Dr. Sam Fujisaka Philippines lnternational Rice Research institute P.O. Box 933. Manila Dr. Elinor Ostrom Philippines Workshop In Polltical Theory and Poky Analysis Dr. Leo Alting von Geusau lndlana University Highland Research lnstitute Bloornington, lndlana 47405 MPCDE Foundation USA 1 371 1 Nantharam Road Chiang Mai 5000 Dr. Pharn Quang Hoan Thailand lnstitute of Ethnology National Center For Social Sciences Mr. Tom Gimenez 27 Tran Xuan Soan, Hanoi People's Upland Development Network Vietnam and Outreach, Inc. 7 Modesta Street, Mines View, Baguio Mr. Khamla Phanv//ay Philippines Nam Ngurn Watershed Study integrated Resource Centre Dr. /ulian Gonzalves Department of Forestry and Environment International lnstitute of Rural Reconstruction Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Silang, Cavite Vientiane Philippines Laos

Dr. Philip Hirsch Dr. Carol c/e Raedt Department of Geography People's Upland Development Network University of Sydney and Outreach, Inc. lnstitute Building 7 Modesta Street, Mines View. Baguio Sydney, NSW 2006 Philippines Australia Dr. Percy Sajise Dr. Y/anna lambrou lnstitute of Environmental Science and lnternational Development Research Management Centre of Canada University of the Philippines at Los Baiios P.O. Box 8500, 250 Albert Street College, Laguna Ottawa K1 G 3H9 Philippines Canada Dr. Benchapun Shina watra Dr. Le Trong Cuc Multiple Cropping Center Center for Natural Resources Management Faculty of Agriculture and Environmental Studies Chiang Mai University University of Hanoi Chiang Mai 50002 19 Le Thanh Tong Street, Hanoi Thailand Vietnam Dr. Ganesh Shlvakoti Dr. Evelyn Mathias-Mundy lnstitute for Animal and Agriculture Sciences Regional Program for the Promotion of c/o Bishnu Prasai Indigenous Knowledge in Asia Natraj Travel and Tours lnternational lnstitute of Rural Reconstruction P.O.Box 495. Rampur Silang, Cavite Nepal Philippines Dr. Suganclha Shrestha Mrs. Zelpha /eremias International Centre for Integrated Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Mountain Development 860 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City P.O. Box 3226, Kathmandu Philippines Nepal Ms. Flora Leocardo Dr. Chire Thompson Philippine Uplands Resource Center International Development Research De La Salle University Research Center Centre of Canada 2401 Taft Avenue, Metro Manila P.O. Box 8500, 250 Albert Street Philippines Ottawa K1 G 3H9 Canada Pastor Delbert Rice Philippine Uplands Resource Center Dr. Gautarn Yadama De La Salle University Research Center Campus Box 1 166 2401 Taft Avenue, Metro Manila Washington University Philippines Brown Hall. Brookings Drive St. Louis. Missouri 63 130 USA Excluslve Economlc Zone

Mr. Emmanuel Yap Mr. Jesus de la Torre Department of Geography Exclusive Economic Zone University of Sydney Fisheries Allied Division Sydney, NSW 2006 Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Australia 860 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City Philippines

Observers Mr. Dennis V. Uba Philippine Uplands Resource Center Mr. Levi Buenafe De La Salle University Research Center Philippine Uplands Resource Center 240 1 Taft Avenue, Metro Manila De La Salle University Research Center Philippines 2401 TaFt Avenue, Metro Manila Philippines Secretariat (ICLARM) Ms. N/va Gonzales Community Extension and Research for Angie A. Agulto Development Rachel C. Atanacio 2-A San Pablo St., Philam Homes Luz Dadula Quezon City Rachel C. Josue Philippines

Mr. Arjan Heinen Community Extension and Research for Development 2-A San Pablo St., Philam Homes Quezon City Philippines Appendix 11. Workshop Program

Workshop on Communlty Management and Common Property of Coastal Flsherles and Upland Resources In Asla and the Paclflc: Concepts, Methods and Experiences Sllang, Cavlte, Phllipplnes 21-23 June 1993

Monday, 21 june

Openlng Ceremonies Dr. R.S. Pomeroy. Welcome remarks Dr. /. Gonzalves, Dr. Y. Lambrou and Mr. S. Sverdrup-lensen. Messages Ms. C. Thompson.Announcements Dr. A.C. Alcala. The role of the national government in the protection of marine life

Coffee break

Common property and community management Dr. D. Feeny. Frameworks For understanding resource management on the commons

Lunch

Dr. E. Ostrom. Institutional analysis, design principles and threats to sustainable community governance and management of commons Prof F. Berkes. Property rights and coastal fisheries

CoFFee break

Dr. P.E. Sajise. Sustainable land use systems in the Philippines: some lessons learned Discussion Ms. Y. Lambrou. Introduction for uplands workshop participants Poster sesslon (uplands) Dr. L. A. von Geusau Dr. Q.H.Pham Dr. 5. Shrestha Ms. D. A. Diamante and Mr. C. Basilio Dr. C. Le Trong

Tuesday, 22 June

Flsherles workshop: concepts and methods for communlty management of coastal flsherles Dr. K. Rome. The evolution and changing focus of coastal fisheries management in Asia and the Pacific Dr. M. Race//s. Farmers, foresters and fisherfolkt stakeholders and activists in community resource managepent

Coffee break

Dr. R.B. Pollnac. Developing local organizations for people's participation in fishery management Dr. /. Kurlen. Towards an integrated communlty management of coastal fisheries

Lunch

Dr. N.M.R. Abdullah and Dr. K. Kuperan Viswanathan. Planning and management of coastal small-scale fisheries Dr. H./. McArthur. Creating dialogue and generating Information for community resource management: application of client-based tools and methods

Coffee break

Mr. X Renard. The Caribbean Natural Resources Institute: a case study in co-management research and advocacy Dlscusslon

Uplands workshop Mr. K. Phanvjlay. Case study Dr. S. Fujisaka. Pioneer shifting cultivation and social forestry revisited Dr. E. Ostrorn, Dr. C. cfe Raedt andMr. T: Gjmenez. Joint case studies Discussion

Wednesdav. 23 lune

Flsherles workshop: case studles and guiddlnes, ProL C.T. Afionuevo. The role of nongovernmental organizations in community-based coastal resources management Mr. R.F. Agbnyani and Ms. S. V, Slar. Problems encountered In the Implementation of a community-based fishery resource management Dr. R.M. Bo/os, jr. and Dr. F. Vande Vusse. The experience of community-based coastal resources management in the Philippines: Central Visayas Regional Project-I

Coffee break

Mr. R.M. Sandalo andMs. M.P. Dygico. Community-based coastal resource management: the Palawan experience Guidelines

Uplands workshop Dr. G Shivakoti. Alternative Interventions to assist farmer-managed irrigation systems in Nepal Final dlscusslon ~ ~. , (

Community management and common property of coastal fisheries In Asia and the Pacific: concepts, methods and experiences. ~.S. Pomeroy, Editor. t994. ICLARMConf. Proc. 45, t89 p. US$6 surface, , $10 airmail,P135. . I'

TITLES OF RELATED INTEREST . j, The rural context of giant clam mariculture in Solomon Islands: an.anthropological

study. E. Hviding. 1993. ICLARM Tech. Rep. 39, 93 p. US$5 surface, J $8 airmail, P100. ,J Coastal area management in Southeast Asia: policies, management strategies and case studies. T.E. Chua and D. Pauly, Editors. 1989. ICLARMConf. Proc. 19,254 p. Available in photocopied form at US$19 airmail, P175. Towards an integrated management of tropical coastal resources. L.M. Chou, T.E. Chua, H.W. Khoo, P.E. Lim, j.N. Paw, G.T. Silvestre, M.j. I Valencia, A.T. White and P.K. Wong, Editors. 1991. ICLARMConf. proc. 22,455 p. US$5 surface, $20 airmail, P125. Integrative framework and methods for coastal area management. T.E.\ Chua and L.F. Scura, Editors. 1992. ICLARM Conf. Proc. 37, 169 P' US$2 surface, $10 airmail, P50. . 1 I The management of coral reef resource systems. j.L. Munro and P.E. Munro, " Editors. 1994. ICLARMConf. Proc. 44, 124 p. US$5.50 surface, $9.50" airmail, P11 O. j f HOW TO ORDER II Enquirers from the USA, Canada and Central and South America should order directly from our exclusive distributor, the International Specialized Book Services. 5804 N.£. Hassalo St., Portland, Oregon 97213-3644, to whom payment should be directed using the aJrmaJ/ price. / Enquirers in Europe may order from Ernst S. Toeche-Mlttler GmbH. Versartdbuchhandlung, Hindenburgstrasse 33, D-61 00 Darmstadt, Federal Republic of Germany, using the aJrmaJ/ price. Enquirers from the Philippines may use the peso price and order directly from ICLARM. Enquirers elsewhere should address orders and payment (payable to ICLARM) in US$ by international money order, bankdraft or UNESCO coupons to: The Editor, ICLARM, MCPO Box 2631, 07 t 8 Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines. We can accept US$ checks only if from a US-based bank due to high clearance fees of other banks. AJrmaJ/ is strongly recommended.