The China Environment Yearbook, Volume 5 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Yearbooks: Environment

The China Environment Yearbook, Volume 5 The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Yearbooks: Environment

International Advisory Board Judith Shapiro Guobin Yang Erika Scull

Volume 5

BEIJING 2011 The China Environment Yearbook, Volume 5

State of Change: Environmental Governance and Citizens’ Rights

Edited by Dongping Yang Friends of Nature

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011 This yearbook is the result of a co-publication agreement between Social Sciences Academic Press and Koninklijke Brill NV. These articles were translated into English from the original《环境绿皮书：中国环境发展报告 (2010)》Huanjinglü pi shu: Zhong- guo juanjing fazhan baogao (2010) with ﬁnancial support from China Book International, supported by the General Administration of Press and Publication and the Information Ofﬁce of the State Council of China.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISSN 1872-7212 ISBN 978-90-04-18302-5

Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. CONTENTS

List of Figures and Tables ...... ix

Acknowledgements ...... xi

Contributors ...... xiii

Preface ...... xvii Yang Dongping

Introduction ...... 1 Judith Shapiro

VOLUME OVERVIEW

Highlights of 2009: The State’s Responsibility and Citizens’ Rights ...... 7 Li Dun

PART I PUBLIC POLICY

Green Growth Impacts of China’s Financial Stimulus Package ...... 31 Zhang Ke

Calls for a Low-Carbon Economy: NPC Motions and CPPCC Proposals in 2009 ...... 47 Chen Hongwei

Progress in Environmental Information Transparency ...... 59 Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs and Natural Resources Defense Council vi contents

Regulations on Environmental Impact Assessment for Plans: Breakthroughs and Limitations ...... 71 Wang Shekun

China’s Role in International Climate Change Negotiations .... 81 Yu Jie

PART II LITIGATION

Public Interest Litigation against Illegal Construction of Two Hydropower Stations on the Jinsha River ...... 95 Xia Jun and Qie Jianrong

Environmental Public Interest Litigation: Seven Experimental Case Studies ...... 107 Lin Yanmei

Pollution Related Lawsuits Encounter Many Difﬁculties ...... 121 Zhang Jingjing

The Case of Yancheng Water Pollution: Problems in Judicature ...... 131 Feng Jia

PART III POLLUTION AND HEALTH

Alarming Environment and Health Incidents of 2009 ...... 141 Qie Jianrong

Environmental Crisis in Rapidly Developing Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and Shaanxi ...... 151 Yu Chen

Hidden Environmental Troubles of Resource Development in China’s Western Regions ...... 163 Yang Yong contents vii

New Pollution in Rural Areas: The “Home Appliances to the Countryside” Program ...... 177 Cai Yongfei

PART IV CONSUMPTION

2009: A Waste Crisis at a Crossroads ...... 187 Yang Changjiang

Promoting Sustainable Consumption ...... 197 Zheng Yisheng and Zhang Boju

Extravagant Water Consumption in Beijing’s New Bathhouses ...... 207 Hu Kanping

Restricted Use of Plastic Shopping Bags: The Way Out ...... 215 Mao Da

PART V ECOLOGICAL PROTECTION

Organizational Transformations at Nature Reserves: An Analysis of Tourism Development in Jilin’s Changbai Mountain ...... 227 Shen Xiaohui

Conservation Agreements: Incorporating Government-led and Community-based Initiatives ...... 243 Li Shengzhi, He Xin, Feng Jie, and Mao Chending

Biodiversity in the Context of Climate Change ...... 251 Lv Zhi

Crafting a Successful Vision for Wild Giant Panda Protection ...... 261 Wang Hao, Sun Shan, Chen Ai, and Lv Zhi viii contents

PART VI APPENDIX

Annual Indexes: Environmental Changes in China ...... 273

Terminological Glossary ...... 285

Index ...... 287 LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures

Figure 1.1: China’s low-carbon development route ...... 45 Figure 3.1: Comparison of PITI (2008) scores between cities in Guangdong Province and Jiangsu Province ...... 65 Figure A.1: Emission of industrial waste gas in China, 2004–2008 ...... 274

Figure A.2: Emission of SO2, 2004–2008 ...... 274 Figure A.3: Wastewater discharge in China, 2004–2008 ...... 276 Figure A.4: Wastewater treatment in China, 2004–2007 ..... 276 Figure A.5: Ammonia nitrogen discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2008 ...... 277 Figure A.6: COD discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2008 ...... 278 Figure A.7: Water quality of China’s 7 major water systems, 2008 ...... 279 Figure A.8: Water quality of lakes (reservoirs) with close governmental monitoring, 2005–2008 ...... 280 Figure A.9: Coastal water quality, 2007 ...... 282 Figure A.10: China’s industrial waste generation and disposal, 2004–2008 ...... 283 Figure A.11: Air quality in urban areas, 2004–2008 ...... 284

Tables

Table 1.1: Composition of the 4 trillion RMB stimulus package ...... 32 Table 1.2: Energy conservation and environmental protection details of the stimulus plans in the ten industries ...... 32 Table 1.3: Comparison of the energy consumption of major energy-consuming industrial products between China and international standards ...... 37 x list of figures and tables

Table 3.1: PITI scores of 113 cities in 2008 ...... 60 Table 3.2: Top 20 cities for PITI in 2008 ...... 62 Table 3.3: Ningbo’s PITI score ...... 63 Table 7.1: Experimental cases of environmental public interest litigation ...... 110 Table 13.1: Lifespan of home appliances ...... 180 Table A.1: Emission of industrial waste gas in China, 2004–2008 ...... 274

Table A.2: Emission of SO2, 2004–2008 ...... 275 Table A.3: Wastewater discharge in China, 2004–2008 ...... 276 Table A.4: Wastewater treatment in China, 2004–2007 ...... 277 Table A.5: Ammonia nitrogen discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2008 ...... 277 Table A.6: COD discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2008 and target for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) ...... 278 Table A.7: Water quality of China’s 7 major water systems, 2008 ...... 279 Table A.8: Water quality of lakes (reservoirs) with close governmental monitoring, 2005–2008 ...... 280 Table A.9: Water quality of China’s 9 biggest lakes, 2005–2008 ...... 281 Table A.10: Coastal water quality, 2007 ...... 282 Table A.11: China’s industrial waste generation and disposal, 2004–2008 ...... 283 Table A.12: Air quality in urban areas, 2004–2008 ...... 284 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The English edition of The China Environment Yearbook, Volume 5 is now available for our readers, thanks to the hard efforts made by dozens of dedicated volunteers and scholars. Our deepest gratitude and admira- tion are reserved for the article contributors—environmental experts, scholars, lawyers, NGO activists, and journalists—who, at the invi- tation of Friends of Nature, put together yet another monumental work on current environmental issues in China in the Green Book of Environment (2010). This was originally published in Chinese by the Social Sciences Academic Press as one of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Yearbook series. Our sincere thanks go to the Delta Environmental & Educational Foundation which has provided ﬁnancial support for The Environmental Yearbook project for ﬁve successive years. Our appreciation is also owed to a group of volunteers who provided informational support used in the text: Chen Yangwen, Chen Yixiang, Chen Qinqin, Hou Liwen, Li Nan, Li Yanling, Liu Xiaoyu, Pan Linling, Lu Xicheng, Su Donglin, Yang Fangyi, Tan Li, Tan Hua, Zhao Zhangyuan, Yanglei, Yang Shihe, Jin Hui, Huo Weiya, Ding Ning, Lai Weijie, Yi Shui, Carlos, Liu Jia, Su Yutong, Huang Shan, Peng Yan, Yi Yimin, Yu Xiaogang, Wang Yongchen, Wang Jin, Wang Jingjing, Ma Jun, Alex Wang, Zhang Yulei, Li Xiang, and Fan Xiao. They gave unreserved support to this project as they trust Friends of Nature and share with it the same goal of protecting the environment. The task of translation could not have been accomplished without the team work of volunteers, mainly graduate students from the School of English and International Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies Univer- sity (BFSU). The organizational work was shared by Wang Lili, Zhai Zheng, and Shen Changying, all three whom are teachers at BFSU. The following volunteers completed the draft translation of the various chapters of the Green Book, in order of the chapters translated: Zhou Yong, Zhou Yan, Wang Binghui, Song Wenjing, Wang Wanying, Li Xiang, Mu Xueru, Lu Bing, Yi Ran, Zhang Tingting, Zhang Xiao- ning, Zhang Xin, Zhang Jiajing, Shen Gaochao, Cheng Xiuxue, Zhang Wenwen, Zheng Xuan, Fang Fang, He Junling, Yang Yang, Wan xii acknowledgements

Feng, Zhao Zhe, Tao Xin, Ding Xiaoxi, Wei Yingying, Chen Jiahong, Tong Jing, Zhang Li, Zhao Yinghui, Gu Jieyan, Fan Juncong, Zhang Yuqing, Ren Xinxu, Wang Hailin, Jiang Feifei, Huang Xiaoqu, Xiao Fengying, Zhang Nan, Chen Xiaoxue, Zuo Chang, Xie Mingqi, Xu Lina, Tian Wei, Wei Yixiao, Cao Xingyang, Li Ruili, Cai Jindong, Song Jie, and Zhao Shengnan. The draft translation was revised by Wang Lili, Zhou Yong, Dai Ning, Deng Xiaowen, Zhao Fang, Cai Jindong, Wang Wenli, Qiu Feng, Chai Liang, Leeor Schweitzer, Cheng Huiming, Sun Fei, Zhang Baiqing, Song Yi, Ye Rufan, Chen Juebing, W. Chad Futrell, Shen Changying, Song Ying, and Gu Qing. Zhai Zheng made the list of special terms attached to each chapter and prepared the final glossary. We’d like to give especial thanks to two most dedicated volunteers. One of them is Zhou Yong who translated the long and informative Volume Overview and revised two chapters, and the other one is Cai Jindong who translated the Annual Indexes with numerous tables and figures and also revised one chapter. Erika Scull did the final editing for the whole book, and joined Professors Judith Shapiro of American University and Guobin Yang of Barnard College on the International Advisory Board. We are deeply grateful to this dedicated group for their support and wisdom. Finally, we would like to thank all the individuals and organizations who have offered their warm support to the Green Book translation project. We hope that you will continue to give your attention to the project and become more actively involved in environmental protection, a shared cause for all citizens who cherish nature and have a strong sense of responsibility for our common planet.

The Green Book Project of Friends of Nature Social Sciences Academic Press, Beijing Brill, Leiden CONTRIBUTORS

Throughout this volume, Chinese names are ordered according to standard practice in China, with surnames preceding given names. To add clarity to this ordering, surnames are provided in capital letters.

Chief Editor: YANG Dongping (杨东平), President of Friends of Nature, is a professor at the Beijing Institute of Technology.

CAI Yongfei (蔡永飞) is Vice Chairman of the Ofﬁce of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomin- tang. He has conducted extensive research in rural areas.

CHEN Ai (陈艾) is a member of the Peking University Center for Nature and Society.

CHEN Hongwei (陈宏伟) is a senior reporter and chief supervisor of the China Economic Times. Since 2005, he has been concerned with environmental issues in China. A member of Friends of Nature, he has conducted many investigations and interviews and has published a large of number of articles on the environment and natural resources.

FENG Jia (冯嘉) is a Ph.D. candidate for Environment and Resources Protection Law from China University of Political Science and Law. She is also a volunteer at the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims and a visiting scholar at Columbia Law School.

FENG Jie (冯杰) is a staff member at Shan Shui Conservation Center.

HE Xin (何欣) is a staff member at Shan Shui Conservation Center.

HU Kanping (胡勘平) is Deputy Editor-in-chief of the Environmental Protection magazine published by the Ministry of Environmental Pro- tection and one of the ﬁrst members of Friends of Nature. xiv contributors

LI Shengzhi (李晟之) is a staff member at Shan Shui Conservation Center.

LI Dun (李楯) is a professor and head of the Experts Network, Tsing- hua University Center for the Study of Contemporary China (CSCC) and executive director of the Social Policy Research Institute, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University. Professor Li is also an advisor with Friends of Nature.

LIN Yanmei (林燕梅) is an ofﬁcer at the ABA Rule of Law Initiative China Program. She focuses on environmental litigation.

LV Zhi (吕植), a professor at the College of Life Sciences at Peking University, is the director of Peking University Center for Nature and Society and Shan Shui Conservation Center. He is also a member of the Protected Areas and Biodiversity Task Force under the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Develop- ment (CCICED).

MAO Chending (毛晨丁) is a staff member at Shan Shui Conserva- tion Center.

MAO Da (毛达) is a Ph.D. candidate in Environmental History at Beijing Normal University. He is a member of the Non-governmental Plastic Bag Restriction Policy Research Group and a member of Friends of Nature.

QIE Jianrong (郄建荣), a member of Friends of Nature, is a senior journalist with Legal Daily specializing in environmental issues. She was recognized as one of the Best Journalists Reporting Environmental Issues for three consecutive years by Friends of Nature.

Erika Scull (International Advisory Board) has an MA from American University’s School of International Service in Global Environmental Politics and is a former Boren Scholarship recipient for her work on China’s environment.

Judith Shapiro (International Advisory Board) is Director of the Natu- ral Resources and Sustainable Development MA program at Ameri- can University’s School of International Service in Washington, DC. contributors xv

She has published extensively on modern and contemporary China, including Mao’s War against Nature (Cambridge, 2001), an account of China’s political campaigns to conquer the natural world.

SHEN Xiaohui (沈孝辉), a member and council member of Friends of Nature, is a member of the Chinese National Committee for Man and the Biosphere, and senior engineer of the State Forestry Admin- istration. He has done extensive research on protected areas, forests, wetlands, deserts, and wild animals in China and has been an activist in environmental protection.

SUN Shan (孙姗) is a member of the Peking University Center for Nature and Society.

WANG Hao (王昊) is a member of the Peking University Center for Nature and Society.

WANG Shekun (王社坤), a doctor of law and a post-doctor of the School of Law at Tsinghua University, is a member of the Center for Environmental, Natural Resources, and Energy Law of Tsinghua University. He participated in drafting the Environmental Impact Assess- ment for Plans.

XIA Jun (夏军) is a lawyer with the Beijing Zhongzi Law Firm with broad experience in environmental litigation.

YANG Changjiang (杨长江) is a journalist with the China Inspection and Quarantine Times. As a member of Friends of Nature, he is active on municipal refuse issues.

Guobin Yang is Associate Professor of Asian and Middle Eastern Cultures at Barnard College, Columbia University. Author of the award-winning book The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activ- ism Online (2009) and editor (with Ching Kwan Lee) of Re- Envisioning the Chinese Revolution: The Politics and Poetics of Collective Memories in Reform China (2007), he has also published widely on the development of civil society and environmental activism in contemporary China. He is a member of the editorial board of The China Quarterly.

YANG Yong (杨勇), a member of Friends of Nature, is deputy director of the Experts Committee of China Desertiﬁcation Control xvi contributors

Foundation and also the chief scientist for the Hengduan Mountain Research Committee.

YU Chen (喻尘), a journalist with the Southern Metropolis Daily, has been active on environmental pollution and public health issues over the past ten years.

YU Jie (喻捷), who holds a Ph.D. in Public Policy from the School of Government at Nanjing University, is head of the Climate Group’s Policy and Research Program in China and has participated in international climate negotiations for years.

ZHANG Boju (张伯驹) is Director of the Department of Research and Investigation at Friends of Nature and is a member of the executive committee of the Green Society Environmental Action Network (GSEAN). He was a UNEP Youth Advisor.

ZHANG Jingjing (张兢兢), a member of Friends of Nature, is the deputy director of the Public Interest Law Institute’s China Program and also a volunteer lawyer at the Center for Legal Assistance of Pol- lution Victims (CLAPV) at the China University of Political Science and Law.

ZHANG Ke (章轲), a senior journalist with First Financial Daily, is a council member for the Society of Environmental Journalists in China, the Capital Youth Journalists Association, and the Media Committee of the China Environment Culture Promotion Association.

ZHENG Yisheng (郑易生), a council member for Friends of Nature, is a research fellow at the Institute of Quantitative and Technical Eco- nomics (IQTE) of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS).

The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs is an NGO committed to promoting public participation in environmental protection and behavioral changes of enterprises by means of information disclosure.

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) is one of the most effective environmental action organizations in the United States. With law, science, and the support from its 1.2 million members, NRDC is committed to the protection of natural resources and the safety and health of the living environment for all life on the planet. PREFACE

Thanks to the continued joint efforts made by Friends of Nature and the Social Sciences Academic Press, The China Environment Yearbook, Vol- ume 5 is now presented to our readers. Since 2005, when the China Environment Yearbook project was initiated, Friends of Nature has committed itself to compiling a yearbook series which records, examines, and evaluates the interrelationships between the environment and economic development in China. It is our highest hope that the historical value of the yearbook series will increase with the passage of time. Despite some difficulties, the book is published annually. Maintaining the original principle in initiating the project, the current volume discusses major environmental issues from the past year, with the public interest as its focus and a non-governmental perspective as its unique vantage point. Like previous volumes, the current one also provides annual indexes making environmental information open and easily accessible. As will be seen in this volume, new trends emerged across the country in 2009 in environmental and social issues: frequent occurrences of health related events caused by environmental pollution triggered mass protest events which compelled the government to reflect on the causes of the present state of affairs; waste problems have become pressing issues and caught nationwide attention, arousing heated debates involving government, scholars, NGOs, and enterprises; as the largest developing country, China faced unprecedented international pressure on the issue of climate change, and its pledge and efforts to reduce carbon emissions have attracted close attention from the international community. Meanwhile, a low-carbon lifestyle has become a household concept and has been accepted as the right direction for social development. A large number of environmental problems emerged, most of which had actually existed for a long time but escaped public attention in the past. Indeed, these problems did not arise overnight, but were the result of unresolved issues that had accumulated over the years. Take the issue of the environment and health as an example. It is not by chance that health related events occurred so frequently in 2009. With the rapid economic growth of the past three decades, xviii preface consequences of environmental pollution, especially its adverse impacts on human health, were becoming increasingly severe and visible. What had been hidden in the background came out under a spotlight. As it is unlikely these problems will be resolved immediately, one can foresee that health related events will continue to occur with fairly high frequency. The volume also describes the strengthening of public participation in environmental protection and the rising awareness of environmental rights. Public involvement in many environmental issues is becoming deeper and wider than before, playing an important role in giving these issues greater social attention. For instance, the public actively participated in discussing waste problems. Discussions and debates covered important questions such as: Where should landfills and waste incineration plants be built? Should waste incineration plants be built at all? What are the pros and cons of waste incineration? Public participation explains the main reason why waste issues received a strong response and extensive attention, and at the same time have become a major driving force for finding a solution to these problems. This volume continues to give much attention to the effects brought by China’s environmental policies and the government’s environmental behaviors. Moreover, it proposes that laws will play a much more significant role in solving environmental problems: in 2009, more and more people realized that information disclosure was of great significance for improving environmental management mechanisms and overcoming obstacles caused by local protectionism, failure in abid- ing by the law, and inadequate fines for breaching laws and regulations. However, information disclosure was still at a preliminary stage throughout the country. There is huge room for improvement in this aspect. As the most important environmental legislation, Regulations on Environmental Impact Assessment for Plans specifies and improves China’s Law on the Environmental Impact Assessment. But some defects remain in these regulations in terms of the applicable scope, disclosure of information for EIA for plans, and assessment procedures. After years of pushing and preparing, progress was made in public interest litigation. For example, environmental courts were established in some cities and towns, allowing procuratorates, government environmental departments, and even non-profit organizations to bring public interest litigation in the capacity of prosecutors. This breakthrough brought hope to experts, scholars and environmental activists who commit themselves to promoting public interest litigation. preface xix

In recording, reviewing, and examining the environmental issues in China from a non-governmental perspective, The China Environment Yearbook, Volume 5 aims to speak the truth with facts and data. We hope that the book can serve as a window through which our readers will learn about the true environmental conditions in China.

Yang Dongping President of Friends of Nature February 2010

INTRODUCTION

China’s environmental challenges are so severe and so central to the manner in which China will “rise” that it is no exaggeration to say that they lie at the heart of China’s identity and the government’s ability to provide for the Chinese people. Indeed, the government’s legitimacy is at stake as it tries to achieve contradictory aims: It must provide an improvement in material living standards for a country whose hin- terlands are still desperately poor while simultaneously dealing with growing resistance to toxic pollution, industrial accidents, and the costs of manufacturing many of the world’s consumer products. You are about to read a remarkable document, the English ver- sion of Volume V in a series of Green China Yearbooks produced by China’s leading environmental citizens’ group, Friends of Nature. Like previous volumes, this book provides a precious window into China’s struggle to achieve sustainable development and offers a snapshot of the year’s trends from the Chinese perspective. It provides English- language readers with an insider’s view of debates and decisions that affect not only China but the planet. This volume chronicles several significant trends, as reflected in the subtitle, “The State’s Responsibility and Citizens’ Rights.” First and most obviously, there are numerous essays about the rise in frequency and scope of environmental litigation and citizens’ growing awareness of the use of the courts to resolve environmental disputes. Although contributors note shortcomings and weaknesses in the Chinese legal system, the very increase in the use of such lawsuits is a signal of rising confidence in rule of law and a growing sense that citizens have rights to a clean environment that the state has an obligation to enforce. Although the use of the Chinese courts on behalf of pollution victims is far from new, the strategy has achieved broader acceptance and marks an evolution in the traditional Chinese culture of dispute resolution, in which the impulse is to bring a petition to a higher authority or to attempt to resolve a conflict in a personalized fashion through influence or bribery. Second, the volume stresses the importance of sustainable development in national planning documents and central-level statements and commitments. Policy makers at the highest level of government have 2 introduction affirmed China’s commitments to deal with the country’s responsibility to mitigate global climate change, to improve energy efficiency, to carry out wide-scale conservation projects and stem desertification, and to continue to tackle the intransigent problems of water and air pollution. Although there is an enormous implementation gap, as the essays discuss, these expressions of intention and commitment from the highest leadership are remarkable and compare very favorably to policies in more developed countries. Third, the volume chronicles a shift in the strategies and activities of Chinese environmental non-governmental organizations, which remain constrained by the need to register with the government and haunted by the threat of being shut down. They are expanding the range of their traditional programs of environmental education and non-confrontational activities like trash pick-up, tree planting, and advocating for the protection of endangered species like the Tibetan Antelope; they are now assuming advocacy roles similar to those adopted by ENGOs world wide. For example, in 2009 they pres- sured the government to take greater responsibility for China’s role in climate change and more frequently served as legal advocates for communities victimized by pollution. They explored the use of tac- tics of “symbolic politics,” as pioneered world wide by groups like Greenpeace, putting up banners in public places and mounting actions designed to garner media attention. They took the lead to pressure the government for greater transparency in disclosing of pollution statistics while taking on powerful corporate interests such as Monsanto (for genetically modified foods) and Hewlett Packard (for failing to remove toxic components from computers). The adoption of these strategies represents a maturation of the Chinese environmental movement and an indication of activists’ increased confidence and willingness to take on politically difficult issues. It may also indicate that they feel safe to do so. The central government’s stated commitments to environmental protection provide them with tacit permission, even as these official pronouncements open up an avenue for “accountability politics” as citizens seek to hold government agencies to their word. Fourth, the volume provides a useful record of the major environmental themes, events and disputes in the year 2009, including controversies and protests over waste incineration plants, cadmium contamination, excessive lead levels in blood , and the ongoing struggle over dam-building on numerous rivers in Western China, most famously on the Nu River. Other prominent environmental issues introduction 3 included the connection between pollution and public health, appliance disposal in the West, and plastic bags, or “white pollution.” Also, as elsewhere in the world, the Chinese are starting to focus on the effects of climate change on protected areas. Finally, we must ask ourselves about the silences and omissions in this volume. What might have been too sensitive or controversial to publish? For answers, we may look toward ethnic minority areas like Tibet and Xinjiang, where the influx of Han Chinese and new infrastructure projects like the railroad to Lhasa are facilitating the extraction of resources, often with severe environmental consequences. We may wonder about environmental activists and ordinary citizens who have been detained or imprisoned as a result of their protests. We may ask about information censorship, monitoring of activist groups, and the risks of public participation. We may note top environmental officials’ candid statements about China’s dire environmental conditions, and wonder what political risks they face. We hope that future volumes will be able to cover such topics with increasing freedom and courage.

Judith Shapiro American University Washington, DC

VOLUME OVERVIEW

HIGHLIGHTS OF 2009: THE STATE’S RESPONSIBILITY AND CITIZENS’ RIGHTS

Li Dun*

Climate change has caused exceptional droughts, ﬂoods, snowstorms, heat, and cold. Pollution incidents that threaten human life and health have led us to perceive the severity of problems in our lives. How exactly has pollution control and prevention been carried out over the past two decades? There is a gap between what the data show and what we perceive and expect. What is behind these lingering environmental problems? What factors affect the government’s environmental policy formulation and implementation during China’s transformation? Can civil society, against the complex game of interests, give birth to new ideas and mechanisms that enable harmonious and sustainable development of human society, when environmental and climate issues have become politicized? These questions are explored in the China Environment Yearbook you are about to read.

I. Policies for Environmental and Ecosystem Protection and Government’s Actions

A. Political Commitment In 2003, Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and Chinese President stated, “Environmental protection should endeavor to let the people drink clean water, breathe clean air, and eat safe food; that is, letting them work and live in a good environment.”1,2

* Li Yifang contributed ideas to the analysis framework of this article; Li Xiang contributed much to information collection and data processing for the writing of this article. Their contribution is acknowledged. 1 Lu Cairong, “Scientiﬁc Development with Harmony between Humanity and Environment,” Guangming Daily, February 9, 2006. 2 Editor’s note: This is from an address made by General Secretary Hu Jintao at the Central Population, Resources and Environment Work Conference on March 9, 2003. 8 li dun

Likewise, the following contents of Hu’s report at the Seventeenth CPC National Congress should be noted: “Adhering to the basic state policy of conserving resources and the environment is vital to the immediate interests of the people and the survival and development of the Chinese nation. We must pursue comprehensive, balanced, and sustainable development . . . and build a resource-conserving and environmentally-friendly society.” An explicit and new objective was announced at the CPC Seven- teenth National Congress: transform China’s industrial structure, growth mode, and consumption pattern. On that basis, it was announced at the Congress that “we must give prominence to building a resource-conserving, environmentally-friendly society in our strategy for industrialization and modernization and get every organization and family to act accordingly.” Several other goals were announced at the Congress: promote restoration of ecosystems; build an ecological civilization; enhance our capacity to respond to climate change; and make new contributions to protecting the global climate.

B. Policy Preconditions: Party and Government Systems China is based on systems different from those of both developed countries and other developing countries, as the CPC’s authority has been written into the Constitution. This was reiterated in the Communiqué of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth CPC Central Com- mittee in 2009 that “the CPC is the key to everything in China.” CPC organizations are at the core of the leadership in people’s congresses, government agencies, and law enforcement bodies. This guarantees that the CPC’s guidelines and policies as well as decisions of CPC committees are carried out.3 The CPC’s leadership is implemented through bodies of state power. Moreover, the implementation of the CPC’s guidelines and policies has been institutionally and legally guaranteed by cancelling or merging similar or identical functional departments of CPC committees and government agencies; by government ofﬁcials doubling as CPC committee members; by increasing

3 “The CPC Central Committee’s Decisions on Major Issues Concerning Improv- ing Party Building (Full Text),” Xinhua News Agency, September 27, 2009, http://news .xinhuanet.com/politics/2009–09/27/content_12118429.htm. highlights of 2009 9 exchanges among ofﬁcials of CPC committees; through people’s congresses, governmental agencies, political consultative conferences, and the CPC leading legislatures; and by turning the CPC’s propositions into the state will through legal procedures.4 In addition, the CPC has emphasized over the past few years that CPC organizations should be established in the non-public sector and various NGOs so as to achieve full coverage by CPC organizations.5 They have stressed that the principle of CPC control of media organizations should always be adhered to, ensuring their control over public opinion. Moreover, the CPC values the inﬂuence of new types of media on public opinion and has been enhancing its internet propaganda team by means of legislation, regulation, and technical measures.6 China is a unitary state, where local governments are legislatively and administratively consistent with the central CPC and government agencies from the perspective of institutional arrangement. Therefore, the CPC and government agencies should be regarded as a whole when we comment on the government’s environmental and ecosystem policies.7

C. Policies for Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction, Pollution Control and Prevention, and Ecological Rehabilitation For the persistent problems of high energy and resource consumption and heavy environmental pollution, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) proposed to continue enhancing energy conservation and emissions reduction as well as environmental protection, after he explained in the Report on the Work of the Government (2009) the government’s investments and achieved objectives in those two areas.

4 “The CPC Central Committee’s Decisions on Building Up the Party’s Govern- ing Capacity,” People’s Daily Online, September 26, 2004, http://www.people.com.cn/ GB/40531/40746/2994977.html. 5 “CPC Decisions on Major Issues,” Xinhua News Agency. 6 “CPC Decisions on Building Up Governing Capacity,” People’s Daily Online. 7 Author’s note: It can be seen from the expanded explanations that “government” herein may include all state organs, hyper-state organs, or quasi-state organs. These are organizations whose establishment is determined by the State Commission for Public Sector Reform, and whose outlays are included in the national ﬁscal budget and ﬁnal accounting, and whose staff members are treated as national civil servants. 10 li dun

The following are the first four measures of the six proposed in the report that pertain to energy and resource conservation and the reduction of pollutants during energy use: 1) emphasize energy conservation in the three key areas—industry, transportation, and construction; continue work on the ten major energy conservation projects; implement energy conservation measures for power generators, boilers, automobiles, air-conditioners, and lighting products; 2) energetically develop a circular economy and clean energy; steadfastly save energy, water, and land; vigorously develop clean energy such as nuclear, hydraulic, wind, and solar power; promote the adaptation of clean coal technology for industrial applications; strictly enforce national standards for energy consumption and environmental protection; increase the use of energy-conserving technologies and products; promote comprehensive utilization of resources; 3) improve policies for conserving energy and protecting the environment; strictly enforce the system of standards, assessment system, and monitoring system for energy conservation and emissions reduction; 4) launch a nationwide campaign on the importance of energy conservation and emissions reduction, in which state organs and government-affiliated enterprises and institutions play an exemplary role. The fifth proposed measure concerned pollution control and prevention as well as ecosystem protection and rehabilitation: continue to intensify pollution prevention and control in key river valleys and regions; control the spread of stony deserts and desertification; carry out ecological conservation projects to build key forest shelterbelts, protect virgin forests, and bring the sources of dust storms affecting Beijing and Tianjin under control; protect water, forests, grasslands, wetlands, and other elements of ecosystems; comprehensively improve the rural environment; rectify and standardize the exploitation of mineral resources and develop and use marine resources wisely. The sixth proposed measure regarded China’s response to climate change and improving the capacity of disaster prevention and reduction.

D. Comparison between Policies for Energy, Resources, and Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction by Year Energy, resources, and energy conservation and emissions reduction were given critical importance in the government’s policies and initiatives in 2009. Reducing environmental pollution from coal mining and highlights of 2009 11 thermal power generation was proposed as early as 1981, although government policies were still oriented toward mining more coal as soon as possible.8 The government realized in 2001 that there was a widening gap between oil supply and demand, so it proposed to make use of overseas resources, create a reserve system for strategic resources (such as oil), and to save oil. Meanwhile, it proposed to find alternative energy in every possible way. Unfortunately, the government did not work on the second proposal with nationwide resources, so no significant results were achieved. Passed in 2004, the China Medium- and Long-Term Energy Development Plan Outline 2004–2020 (能源中长期发展规划纲要 2004~2020) proposed: 1) conservation of energy; 2) the dominance of coal with electric power at the core; 3) West-to- East natural gas transmission and West-to-East electricity transmission; and 4) procurement of and participation in developing overseas resources. It was not until 2008 that the government announced a policy to develop clean, renewable energy such as wind and solar power. As for regulations on energy conservation, the government proposed back in 1980 to formulate laws including energy consumption standards as well as relevant incentives and penalties. It proposed in 2005 to clearly define energy conservation and consumption reduction standards, with objectives and policies by industry. It proposed in 2007 to establish a responsibility system for energy conservation and emissions reduction objectives. In 2008, the government proposed to cancel or reduce the export tariff rebate for energy-hungry, heavily-polluting, and resource-intensive products and to establish a system of energy conservation and emissions reduction metrics, a monitoring system, an assessment system, and a responsibility system for objectives. The government also proposed in its policies to: give the highest priority to conservation; encourage the development and utilization of new technologies that enable energy conservation and consumption reduction; implement a compulsory elimination system for energy- hungry, resources-consuming equipment and products; encourage the development of energy-saving, environmentally-friendly vehicles and

8 From the 1981 report on the work of the government. The following quotes are all from annual reports on the work of the government. No more explanation will be given if the year is mentioned in the text. 12 li dun energy- and land-saving houses and public buildings;9 new projects must go through energy consumption and environmental impact assessment and those that do not satisfy standards for energy conservation and environmental protection must not be implemented; fully implement major energy conservation projects such as modification of energy-inefficient coal industrial boilers (and kilns) and regional combined heat and power generation (CHP); give high priority to the development of urban public transport;10 reduce the energy use per unit of GDP by about 20% and the total amount of discharged and discarded pollutants by 10%. Nonetheless, the result of implementation did not meet expectations by 2006. It was in 2007 when China first achieved reduction of both the chemical oxygen demand (COD) and sulfur dioxide emissions, two of the specified measures.11 The cumula- tive energy use per unit of GDP decreased by 10.08% by 2008, and the COD and the sulfur dioxide emissions decreased by 6.61% and 8.95%, respectively.12 In addition, the government proposed back in 2005 to aggressively promote energy- and resource-saving production and consumption modes and to develop new and renewable energy. However, China will have to work hard to see any significant results.

E. Policies for Water Pollution and Polluting Enterprises As for pollution control and prevention, especially extremely harmful water pollution, the government claimed in 1998 that pollution control and prevention in the Huaihe River Basin had achieved results after ﬁve years of efforts. Water in the river with Level IV quality or above accounted for 72%, which was much higher than in previous years, according to the ofﬁcial Report on the State of the Environment in China (中国环境状况公报) that year. The government claimed in 1999 that

9 State Council, “Report on the Work of the Government (2005),” Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China Official Website, March 5, 2005, http://www .gov.cn/test/2006–02/16/content_201218.htm. 10 State Council, “Report on the Work of the Government (2007),” Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China Official Website, March 17, 2007, http://www .gov.cn/test/2009–03/16/content_1260188.htm. 11 State Council, “Report on the Work of the Government (2008),” Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China Official Website, March 19, 2008, http://www .gov.cn/test/2009–03/16/content_1260198.htm. 12 State Council “Report on the Work of the Government (2009),” Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China Official Website, March 14, 2009, http://www .gov.cn/test/2009–03/16/content_1260221.htm. highlights of 2009 13 pollution control and prevention on the Huaihe River and Taihu Lake had seen preliminary results. Water in the river with quality at Level IV or above accounted for 100%, and water in the lake with quality at Level V or above accounted for 65% (data for the lake were unavail- able from that annual report published in previous years), according to that report. The government spent 15.2 billion RMB worth of funds from the issuance of national bonds primarily on pollution control and prevention in critical basins such as the Huaihe River and Taihu Lake in 2005, when water in the river with quality at Level IV or above accounted for 83%, which was higher than the 77.9% in 2001, 81.4% in 2003, and 80.2% in 2004.13 Water in the lake with quality at Level IV accounted for 67%, which was lower than the 100% in 2001, 2003, and 2004. It was stressed in the report on the work of the government in 2008 that the government would conduct pollution control and prevention on the “three rivers and three lakes” (三河三湖), namely, the Huaihe, Haihe, and Liaohe Rivers and Taihu, Chaohu, and Dianchi Lakes. Water in the Huaihe River and Taihu Lake with quality at Level IV or above accounted for 61.6% and 68.2%, respectively, in the year, suggesting that water pollution control and prevention remained difficult. It is necessary to stress that water with quality at Level IV or above is undrinkable and unsuitable for direct human exposure. Water at Level V is unsuitable for industries and may be used only for farmland irrigation and that water worse than Level V is unsuitable even for farmland irrigation. The government’s policies for water pollution include: focus on pollution control and prevention in major basins, regions, sea areas, and cities, and increase the centralized treatment ratios of urban sewage and garbage (2003); focus on water pollution control and prevention by enhancing industrial and urban pollution control and prevention, enhancing rural area-source pollution control and prevention and drinking water source protection, and implementing a stringent control system for the total amount of sewage (2005); enhance industrial wastewater control and prevention and successfully accomplish sewage treatment in major cities (2006).

13 State Council, “Report on the Work of the Government (2006),” Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China Ofﬁcial Website, March 15, 2006, http://www .gov.cn/test/2009–03/16/content_1260216.htm. 14 li dun

The central government provided financial support for 691 projects to prevent and control water pollution in major river valleys. In 2008, the government promised to: prevent and control pollution in key river valleys and regions, including the Huai, Hai, Liao, and Songhua Rivers, Taihu Lake, Chaohu Lake, and Dianchi Lake, the sources and routes of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, and the Three Gorges Reservoir area; implement the master plan for protecting the environment of the Bohai Sea; make stricter national standards for discharge of pollutants in key river valleys; intensify protection of rural drinking water sources, and work to control sewage and garbage pollution and industrial pollution in rural areas; and strengthen control of pollution from livestock and poultry farming, aquaculture, and agricultural nonpoint source pollution. Another measure for pollution control and prevention was to close down polluting enterprises, suspend their operations, merge them with others, or transform them to manufacture other products. The government proposed in 1981 that energy- and raw-material-consuming enterprises with long-term losses and heavy pollution must be closed down, suspended, merged, or transformed on a case-by-case basis. It proposed in 1989 that stringent control must be taken over the construction and production of energy-hungry, inefficient, heavily-polluting, small enterprises that produce calcium carbide, iron alloys, and electrolytic aluminum as well as small blast and electric furnaces and oil refineries. Eight years later, the government claimed that a lot of heavily-polluting enterprises had been closed down or suspended. In 1998, the government announced that it would close down or suspend a large number of enterprises that had been discharging or discard- ing excessive pollutants. Moreover, it claimed that it would continue removing the excessive production capacity of industries such as textiles, coal, smelting, petrochemical, building materials, electrome- chanical, and lighting and that it would uncompromisingly eliminate resource-consuming, heavily-polluting, small enterprises with outdated technologies and low product quality. Since 2000, the government has reiterated that it would continue to shut down these types of enterprises, and prevent them from moving to China’s western regions. The government claimed in 2003: “We used economic, legal, and necessary administrative measures to close a large number of enterprises that produced shoddy goods, wasted resources, seriously polluted the environment or were unsafe for production. This eliminated large quantities of old equipment and many obsolete technologies and production highlights of 2009 15 processes, and reduced the excessive production capacity.” They also reiterated: “We will prevent the transfer to the western region of factories and equipment which have been eliminated elsewhere.” In 2007, the government announced: We plan to close down small thermal power plants with total power generating capacity of 50 million kilowatts during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period. The target for this year is to close down small plants with a total capacity of 10 million kilowatts. In addition, we plan to close down outdated iron foundries with total production capacity of 100 million tons and outdated steel mills with total production capacity of 55 million tons during the same five-year period, with the targets for this year being 30 million and 35 million tons respectively. We will shut down more outdated production facilities in cement, electrolytic aluminum, ferrous alloy, coke, and calcium carbide industries. The government claimed in 2008 that “a large number of outdated production facilities were shut down. They include small thermal power plants with a total capacity of 21.57 million kW, 11,200 small coal mines, outdated iron smelting facilities with a total capacity of 46.59 million tons, outdated steel plants with a total capacity of 37.47 million tons, and cement plants with a total capacity of 87 million tons.” A single policy has been executed for nearly three decades. The structural and institutional reasons behind such a phenomenon must be examined. On the one hand, the central government hopes to eliminate energy-hungry enterprises that cause heavy pollution and waste resources. On the other hand, local governments regard those enterprises as the sources of fiscal revenue and evidence for their political performance. Finding themselves in a dilemma between different policies issued by the local and central governments, enterprises never think about their social responsibility. Given an uncertain outlook and unpredictable business risks, most of them opt to operate in a predatory way. It is imaginable how well banks execute the policy to “strictly limit loans to backward enterprises that consume high quantities of energy, are highly polluting, or are poorly performing in industries with excess production capacity,” in such a situation.14 In fact, these policies target small enterprises in favor of large ones. The fundamental problem lies in a lack of measures that radically change both the growth mode and the consumption pattern, and a lack of efforts to

14 State Council, “Report on the Work of the Government (2007).” 16 li dun research and devise mechanisms that satisfy sustainable development and that enable global leadership in high technology. Restriction and punishment are the only means available.

F. Announcement of Basic State Policies and Obstacles to Execution The Chinese government realized as early as the 1970s that there were problems with the environment. It claimed that it would control pollution problems within ﬁve years (1974 to 1979) and fundamentally solve them within a decade (1974 to 1984). It then said that it was resolved to control pollution by the end of 1980 and fundamentally solve it by 1985. It claimed in 1996 that it would strive to fundamentally curb the trend of worsening environmental pollution and ecological damage by 2000 with improved environmental quality in some cities and regions. The Chinese government realized back in 1978 that eliminating pollution and protecting the environment was an important task tied to public health. It said in 2005 that it would work harder to solve environmental pollution problems that seriously affect public health and safety. According to the Report on the Work of the Government (2007) (2007 年政府工作报告): “To ensure environmental safety, we launched the fourth annual nationwide campaign to punish enterprises that illegally discharge pollutants.” Later, the government formulated and implemented the National Environment and Health Action Plan (2007–2015) (国家环境与健康行动计划 2007~2015). The Chinese government has also realized that environmental issues are tied to all human beings, so they stressed in 1993 that environmental protection is an issue that all humans care about. With that in mind, they proposed to enhance international cooperation. Environmental protection was made a basic state policy in China in 1993. The government announced its sustainable development strategy in 1996. In 2001, they announced: “We have already reached the point where we cannot further develop the economy without making structural adjustments. Under the old economic structure and its crude manner of growth, products will not be marketable, and it will be impossible to sustain resources and preserve the environment.” In 2002, the government acknowledged that local protectionism remained despite serious ecosystem problems. They said in 2003 that “under no circumstances should we seek temporary economic development at the expense of the environment and resources.” In 2004, they said “the highlights of 2009 17 way the economy grows must change” and that “efforts are needed to boost the development of circular economy and clean production.”15 In addition, the government asserted that: it would protect resources and ecosystems with a strong sense of responsibility to the people and future generations; preserve the green mountains and clear rivers for posterity;16 and ensure that people will have clean water, fresh air, and a better environment in which to live and work.17 All this suggests that China has a long way to go when it comes to pollution control and ecological rehabilitation. As for the failure to meet standards for emissions reduction in 2007, it was explained in the report on the work of the government: The main reasons were: industrial restructuring proceeded slowly, while growth in heavy industry—especially in sectors that are high in energy consumption or are highly polluting—was still overheated; many outdated production facilities that should have been closed down are still in operation; and some local governments and enterprises failed to strictly comply with laws, regulations, and standards for energy conservation and environmental protection, and it will take time for relevant policies and measures to produce the desired results. In 2008, the government claimed that, as for challenges and risks facing China: Longstanding structural problems and the extensive pattern of growth remain serious problems. There is a lack of balance between investment and consumption, with the investment rate still running too high. Development of primary, secondary, and tertiary industries is not in balance. There is too much investment in primary industry, particularly heavy industry, and too little investment in the service industry. China’s capacity for independent innovation is still weak and the price paid for economic growth in terms of resource consumption and environmental pressure is too great. By now, these can be understood as the key to China’s environmental problems and for a long period of time to come.

15 State Council, “Report on the Work of the Government (2004),” Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China Ofﬁcial Website, Mar. 5, 2004, http://www.gov .cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201193.htm. 16 State Council’s Report on the Work of the Government (1999), Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China Ofﬁcial Website, March 5, 1999, http://www .gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201143.htm. 17 State Council “Report on the Work of the Government (2005).” 18 li dun

II. Enhancement of Citizens’ Environmental Awareness and Formulation of Mechanisms for Participation

A. Advancements in Citizen Actions: From Objection to Incineration to Garbage Classification When it comes to citizen actions relevant to the environment in 2009, the most notable one is the dispute concerning a waste incineration plant in Panyu District (番禹), Guangzhou. Numerous media organizations across China reported the incident. Moreover, CCTV, one of the leading media organizations in China, had reports and comments on it via its programs such as Economy 30 Minutes, News Probe, News 1+1, and Today’s Observation. The local government had planned to build a new waste incineration plant in Panyu District and received strong objections from residents living around the selected location. A survey showed that 97.1% of the 1,550 respondents objected to the project, because they feared that waste incineration would produce dioxin—a globally recognized carcinogen that does not exist naturally and is produced only through chemical synthesis. Dioxin can be produced by incineration of waste that contains chlorine (plastic, rubber products, and hospital waste). Guangzhou officials claimed: incineration-based power generation is the “only” choice to address the increasing garbage problem; the government is responsible for the people; and both the adopted technology and the emissions meet national safety standards and EU emissions standards, so pollutants such as dioxin can be emitted in a controlled way. The company claimed that its technology had no problems at all. Environmental science and engineering experts who support waste incineration and those who object (environmental protection and health experts) hold opposing opinions. On the other hand, the public expressed their objection by means of protests—around 10,000 people signed their names to a letter of objection posted at a square; banners were hung on streets; stickers for objection were posted on car win- dows; letters of complaint were sent to the government; and reasons for objection were explained via media whenever possible. There were several other protests against waste incineration plants in 2009. The construction of a waste incineration plant was suspended in Pingwang Town (平望), Wujiang (江), Jiangsu Province due to objections from local residents. Residents in Asuwei Village (阿苏卫), Beijing protested against the Asuwei Waste Incineration Plant planned highlights of 2009 19 by the local government. Protesters drove around the incineration- affected area in August, after two other identical projects in Liulitun and Gao’antun were protested. Additionally in 2009, citizen actions against such plants occurred in Nanchong (南充), Sichuan Province; Baigehu (白鸽湖), Shenzhen, Guangdong Province; and Putuo (普陀), Shanghai. Such actions occurred in Nanshan (南山), Shenzhen and Jiaxing (嘉兴), Zhejiang Province earlier in 2008. Waste incineration plants were built in places such as Nanjing, Jiangsu Province and Wuhan, Hubei Province in those two years despite objection from residents. A considerable number of media reports mentioned the case in which citizens succeeded in preventing the implementation of the Xiamen PX Project in 2007. CCTV News 1+1 mentioned another case in which Shanghai citizens took a “walk” on a square in front of the municipal government office building to object to the maglev project planned by the local government. With appeals from the public, the Guangzhou Municipal Govern- ment said that it would not start the waste incineration project as long as it did not pass the environmental impact assessment or there was strong objection from the vast majority of the public. However, the public said that they would still object to the project even if it passed the EIA, because they did not believe that the EIA organization was able to perform the assessment in an independent and responsible way. Meanwhile, they said they would strive to reduce garbage from its source and treat garbage classification in a serious manner.18

B. Need for Public Participation Mechanism People have come to see the hazards from environmental pollution and ecological damage from the perspectives of life and health over the past few years. They have realized that in development, there are differences in immediate interests, orientation of values, and propositions regarding incidents relevant to environmental pollution and ecological damage. These differences are found in opinions held by experts. How can we ﬁnd the equilibrium between these different groups of people and between current generations and future generations through the

18 “About Garbage: Public Opinion is Gold,” News 1+1 on CCTV, November 25, 2009, http://space.tv.cctv.com/act/article.jsp?articleId=ARTI1259163976893821& nowpage=0. 20 li dun market, rule of law, and balancing interests so as to realize harmony among human beings and between humans and the natural environment that they rely on? In fact, that question is tied to the common destiny of humanity. To answer that question, we must clearly understand the state of our survival. We must recognize what actions cause environmental pollution and ecological damage. We must also be aware of how to stop those actions and what is available to replace those actions. Making a choice is possible only when information is available; making a correct choice is possible only when sufficient information is available. In addition, our values affect our selection of and explanation for information when we make a choice as well as interactions between factors such as interests and the momentum of development. They decide our cognition, attitude, and actions in terms of environmental protection. They also decide public policies relevant to the environment formulated by a community, a region, a country, or even the whole world. So how can we make the voices of people with different interests, propositions, and ways of living accessible in public space? As a country in transformation, China is required to implement provisions in Article 31 of its Constitution to create mechanisms for the principles of “guarantee of rights,” “expression of appeals,” “coordination of interests,” and “mediation of contradictions.” These were clearly proposed in important documents by the CPC, thereby enabling sufficient debates on different ideas, enabling us to accept differences between us and other people, and take common actions under the principles of rule of law and good governance. It can thus be seen that human development and social advancement are a whole and rely on common conditions. Compared with what is mentioned above, a review of the Chinese public’s understanding and actions in environmental and ecosystem protection in 2009 shows that there were both remarkable advancements and deficiencies. All the mass incidents relevant to cadmium pollution in Liuyang, the excessive blood lead incident in Fengxiang, and objections to projects such as waste incineration occurred following pollution accidents which led people to worry about their health. Nonetheless, the shift from objection to waste incineration projects toward proposing to change their habits in order to reduce garbage and classify it shows that people are changing from passively responding to harms toward actively participating in pollution control and ecological rehabilitation. highlights of 2009 21

C. NGO Actions Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) relevant to environmental protection performed differently in 2009 when there were no apparent changes in the narrow space for their survival and actions. Some organizations are changing their focus from environmental education, promotion, and advocacy toward actions, including expressing their voices, guiding businesses or companies, and carrying out special and regional actions.

1. Expressing Voices Friends of Nature (FON) sent a proposal to representatives of the NPC and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Confer- ence (CPPCC) in early 2009, hoping to enhance environmental regulation over the government’s 4 trillion RMB stimulus package so that the growth would not come at the expense of the long-term objective of energy conservation and emissions reduction. Twenty-one environmental NGOs such as Green Earth Volunteers (GEV), FON, Global Village of Beijing (GVB), Green Watershed in Yunnan, and the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE) jointly published a letter of appeal on June 21. They called for review- ers’ attention to the status of rare ﬁsh on the verge of extinction in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, hoping that people would listen to their academic conscience and cast votes that withstand the test of time. Greenpeace, FON, GVB, GEV, IPE, Oxfam, and ActionAid jointly published the Chinese Civil Society on Climate Change (2009) on Novem- ber 17. More than forty NGOs ultimately signed that document to express their expectations for the United Nations Climate Conference in Copenhagen. In a unique way of expression, Greenpeace placed 100 small ice men made of frozen water from the sources of the Jinsha, Lancang, and Nujiang Rivers in Ditan Park in Beijing. The ice statues melting under the hot midday sun were intended to imply that climate change has made water sources worrisome in Asia, especially in China. They hoisted a large banner reading “Save the Climate” in front of big chimneys and cooling towers in a thermal power plant in the western suburbs of Beijing. They turned Yongdingmen, one of Beijing’s ancient city gates, into a gigantic countdown clock marking the time left till the UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen. Greenpeace managed to give Hillary Clinton, who was then visiting Beijing, an 22 li dun hourglass inscribed with the words “Time is running out.” They also gave Barack Obama a paper inscribed with words meaning it’s time to whip up the horse. In addition, they placed an advertisement in the Southern Weekend. The China-based Shan Shui Conservation Center (Shan Shui) held the Chinese Business International Forum on Climate Change in Copenhagen during the UN climate change conference. The Global Environmental Institute (GEI) held a side event on “Accelerating Technology Diffusion—Practices of Chinese NGOs.” The Alxa SEE Ecological Association (SEE) organized more than 200 Chinese entrepreneurs to announce A Declaration of Chinese Businesses at Copenhagen. In addition, the US-based Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) held a side event on “China and the World: Solving Climate Change through Practical, On-the-ground Collaboration.”

2. Taking Action against Enterprises By releasing the China Water Pollution Map and China Air Pollution Map in 2009, the IPE kept attention on the government’s investigations into illegal sewage discharge by enterprises and on environmental information disclosure from the standpoint of an NGO. With its unique door-to-door campaigns, Greenpeace protested in April 2009 against commercialization of genetically modified crops by Monsanto, a US-based food giant, and other overseas agrochemical companies in China such as DuPont, Bayer, and Syngenta. Outside the Hewlett-Packard (HP) China headquarters in Beijing in June, a Greenpeace activist wearing a mask to mimic the HP Chief Executive Officer Mark Hurd returned a “toxic PC product” to HP to protest against their failure to deliver on their commitment to remove toxic substances such as brominated flame retardants (BFRs) and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) from computer products by the end of 2009. Green- peace published a report titled Polluting Power: Ranking China’s Power Com- panies in July, claiming: “The environmental loss for the total amount of coal burned by the top ten power companies in 2008 was estimated at 87 billion RMB. The top three Chinese power companies together emitted more than the total greenhouse gas emissions of the United Kingdom in the same year.” Moreover, inefficient power stations and heavy reliance on coal are the two leading obstacles to addressing climate change in China. Greenpeace then published Poisoning the Pearl: An Investigation into Industrial Water Pollution in the Pearl River Delta and An investigation into Corporate Environmental Information Disclosure in China in highlights of 2009 23

October. For the former report, Greenpeace identified five facilities for sampling after visiting eight cities and fifty-three towns and villages and inspecting over sixty facilities in the region. The report says that “The pollutants being discharged by industrial facilities into China’s water systems contain various hazardous chemicals, including different types of heavy metals and organic pollutants. Often persistent, bio-accumulative, and toxic, hazardous chemicals pose a constant, long-term threat to human health and the eco-system into which they are released.” The latter report reveals that nine factories belonging to eight multinational companies all among Fortune’s 2008 global 500 (including Royal Dutch Shell, Samsung Electronics, and Nestlé) and sixteen factories belonging to ten Chinese companies in Fortune’s China 100 (including Sinopec, China Shenhua Energy Co., Ltd., and Aluminum Corporation of China, Ltd.) still refused to disclose their pollution discharge information even after they were reported on by local environmental authorities between May 2008 and May 2009 for exceeding pollution discharge standards.

3. Interaction with the Government Concerning the suspension of the construction of Ludila (鲁地拉) and Longkaikou (龙开口) hydropower stations on the middle reaches of the Jinsha River, the Chongqing Green Volunteer’s Union (CGVU) submitted applications for administrative reconsideration to the Min- istry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and the National Develop- ment and Reform Commission (NDRC) in July 2009. CGVU said that the administrative penalties for the companies concerned were made without complete and accurate use of the environmental impact assessment method and that the MEP had actually covered up some environmentally illegal activities. They demanded reconsideration of the current generally accepted practice—environmental impact assessments on the main and early works of a hydropower project are performed separately. Later on, CGVU agreed to take back the application submitted to the MEP after communication with MEP ofﬁcials. However, since the NDRC did not reply, the CGVU said that it might ﬁle an administrative litigation to a court for the NDRC’s nonfeasance. The IPE conducted a survey on the government’s environmental information disclosure in 2009, when it submitted multiple applications for environmental information from the government. IPE developed the Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI) with the 24 li dun

NRDC, assessing 113 Chinese cities for their disclosure of pollution source regulatory information in 2008, with a score and a rank for each city. Greenpeace published three reports on pesticides in vegetables and fruit sold at supermarkets, Beijing Organic Guide 2009 and Guide to Avoid- ance of Genetically-Modified Food 2009. They distributed leaflets outside supermarkets to explain to consumers both the harm of remaining pesticides in vegetables and fruit and those of drug-resistant genes of genetically-modified food. They received threats from supermarkets suppliers and others. The Ministry of Health (MOH) claimed that there were no safety problems with the fruit and vegetables analyzed by Greenpeace, who then replied that they welcome government agencies’ attention to food safety. Applications for information disclosure and administrative reconsideration, visits to relevant government agencies, and asking for accountability are relatively systematic approaches that environmental NGOs can adopt for a country in transformation like China. Gener- ally speaking, NGOs do not intend to confront the government or even organizations under it. Nonetheless, numerous large projects are still operated by local governments or are more or less related to them since China has just transformed from a planned economy. As a result, some actions against health-threatening pollution or ecological damage may collide with the practices of some government agencies that fail to comply with the CPC’s goal of changing the growth mode and the consumption pattern, controlling and preventing pollution, reha- bilitating the ecosystem, and guaranteeing the public health. The CPC stresses that it will guarantee citizens’ rights to information, participation, expression, and supervision. Therefore, the above-mentioned scenes are common. Some environmental organizations opt to work with the government. The Nature Conservancy (TNC) works with the Chinese government on multiple projects, such as biodiversity protection in northwestern Yunnan Province, smooth cordgrass prevention and management at Chongming Dongtan, and the creation of a bird migration protection network for wetlands in eastern China with China National Wetlands Research Center and Shanghai Forestry Bureau. They have put many funds into these projects. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) is engaged in advocacy and public participation along with cooperation from both the government and enterprises. They have worked with the Water Resources and Hydropower Planning and Design General Institute and the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) to edit and highlights of 2009 25 publish Overseas Planning Techniques for River Basins (国外流域规划技术). They have assisted in organizing the International Yellow River Forum (IYRF) for two years and they have signed a five-year cooperation MOU with the Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC). In addition, GVB worked with relevant organizations in Pengzhou (彭州), Sichuan Province to build LOHO Community to explore an approach to a low-carbon countryside in 2009. GVB has partnered with the Dongsi Sub-District Office of Chaoyang District, Beijing to promote the LOHO Community Initiative. Shan Shui worked to push the first forest carbon sink project in Sichuan Province. Wenzhou- based Green Eyes signed cooperative MOUs with five local forestry bureaus, which began to “buy services” from the NGO for promotion of wild animal protection.

4. Environmental Litigation Wuxi Municipal Intermediate People’s Court heard a case in which the All-China Environment Federation (ACEF) sued Jiangyin Port Container Co., Ltd. (江阴港集装箱有限公司) for environmental pollution in July 2009. It is believed to be the ﬁrst public interest environmental case with an environmental organization as the plaintiff in China. The CGVU ﬁled a lawsuit in the Wuhan Maritime Court against Yunnan Ludila Hydropower Co., Ltd. (云南华电鲁地拉水电有限公司) and Longkaikou Hydropower Co., Ltd. (华能龙开口水电有限公司) in August. It was another public interest environmental case. NGOs are resolved to break new ground in public interest litigation despite an uncertain outlook. In addition, both the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Vic- tims in China (CLAPV) of China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) and the TNC conducted rights maintenance and litigation for pollution victims, along with consulting and training in areas such as public interest litigation and environmental law.

5. Regional and Special Actions Green Hanjiang continued using its ship (also named Green Hanjiang) to measure the water quality of the Hanjiang River in 2009. Guardians of the Huaihe River set up ecosystem protection stations and encouraged villagers to participate as watchdogs, thereby creating a network that monitors sewage outlets along the river. Green Eyes carried out the Shark Protection Program in Guangdong Province. China Man- grove Conservation Network (CMCN) promoted voluntary mangrove 26 li dun forest protection in three municipalities and provinces, as it created a mangrove forest rehabilitation demonstration area on an island off of Xiamen City. The GEV continued its Ten Years Traveling along the Rivers Program along with an environmental reporter survey project. FON was deeply involved in activities such as garbage reduction in urban communities, relevant citizen actions as well as promotional events for media communication and decision openness. SEE continued promoting programs such as Ecosystem Protec- tion and Community Development in Jilantai (吉兰太), Sustainable Resources Utilization and Community Development in Chahantan (查汉滩), and Eco-agriculture and Community Development in Yaoba (腰坝).

6. Environmental Education and Advocacy of Actions Education and advocacy remain part of the work of some environmental NGOs. Campaigns have included encouraging people to pay attention to carbon emissions and to wear low-carbon clothes; carrying out Car-Free Day, Healthy and Environmentally-Friendly Walks, and bike outings; carrying out activities such as Turning Lights Off on Summer Solstice and Earth Hour; promoting smoke-free environments; holding forums; organizing awards events; and holding art and photo exhibitions.

7. Further Improvements in Philosophy and Governance Structure Environmental NGOs already showed obvious signs of maturity in philosophy and governance structure by 2009. Nonetheless, they were still weak and undeveloped as a whole with a narrow space for actions. FON clearly announced its vision, mission, core values, and goals of work. Greenpeace, which takes action to make positive changes and protect the earth’s environment and world peace, is a good example of an overseas NGO in China and they serve as a reference for Chinese counterparts.

D. Environmental and Ecosystem Protection: the States’ Responsibility and Citizens’ Rights If we believe that humans have rights to survival, health, education, dignity, and working under safe and healthy conditions and that the government should take responsibility for realizing citizens’ aforemen- tioned rights (all of which are covered by the International Covenant on highlights of 2009 27

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) signed by the Chinese government), then the government must also guarantee that citizens live and work in a toxic-free and healthy environment, that they have access to safe food and drinking water, and that they live in a pollution- free and ecologically-balanced environment. If we believe that the harmonious and sustainable development of society can be realized only through governments, enterprises, NGOs, and nonprofit organizations that comply with the concept of good governance as well as cooperation among individuals, communities, the international community and the world’s civil society, then guaranteeing the rights to open information, free expression of appeals and participation in public decision making, enabling citizens to exercise those rights by means of individual or organized actions, and making just legal remedies available when they are violated (all of which has been confirmed by the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China) are requisites for such development. We should understand that all previous wars, slaughter, bullying, and pursuit of wealth and luxury leading to over-exploitation of natural resources have worsened our environment. A worsening environment will in turn cause violation of human rights to life and health. Humans will have a bright future only when we go beyond the past, recognize, respect, and protect basic human rights, seek harmony among human beings and harmony between humans and nature, advocate moderate needs, update the world’s political landscape, and work together to control and prevent pollution and rehabilitate ecosystems. Today, we are already living in a world with diversified interests, propositions, values, and ways of living. It is already difficult for us to address current environmental problems such as climate change with old institutions, old ways of thinking, and old decision models. Will civil society grow up in China? Will the international community and the world’s civil society be able to work together and go beyond climate politics to regard individuals as a whole and to balance their interests? We may not have much time left.

E. Establishing a Binding Concept of Right to Environment and International Law Finally, it is necessary to highlight several remarks in the Draft Declara- tion of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment in the ﬁnal report of the Special Rapporteur of the former United Nations Commission on 28 li dun

Human Rights (UNCHR) in 1994. The wish for a binding provision in international law on the right to environment was ﬁrst written into the 1972 Stockholm Declaration: “Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being.” The UNCHR draft declaration appeared twenty-two years after the Stockholm Declara- tion and ﬁfteen years before now. Human rights, an ecologically sound environment, sustainable development, and peace are interdependent and indivisible . . . All persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment . . . This right and other human rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights, are universal, interdependent and indivisible . . . All persons shall be free from any form of discrimination in regard to actions and decisions that affect the environment . . . All persons have the right to an environment adequate to meet equitably the needs of present generations and that does not impair the rights of future generations to meet equitably their needs. PART I

PUBLIC POLICY

GREEN GROWTH IMPACTS OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL STIMULUS PACKAGE

Zhang Ke

Near the end of 2008, the global ﬁnancial crisis greatly impacted China’s economy. The Chinese government then announced a two- year 4 trillion RMB stimulus package, comprising of ten measures to bolster economic expansion. Beginning in the third quarter of 2009, China’s economy showed clear signs of recovery. However, the stimulus program, to a certain extent, revived some “high energy consumption, high pollution” projects. Therefore, China’s environmental protection efforts are experiencing more severe challenges in this new round of economic recovery and growth.

I. The Positive Effects of the 4 Trillion RMB Stimulus Scheme

With the 2008 financial tsunami spreading to China, China’s economy experienced a sudden decline after years of continuous growth, and 2008 became the toughest year of the new century. On November 5, 2008, Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) hosted an executive meeting of the State Council, and announced a two-year 4 trillion RMB stimulus package with ten measures to bolster economic expansion. On January 14, 2009, the stimulus package for automobile and steel industries was announced, and later for equipment manufacturing, textiles, shipbuilding, electronic information, light industry, petrochemicals, non-ferrous metals, and the logistics industry. By Feb- ruary 25, the stimulus plans for the ten major industries defined by the State Council had been introduced. The stimulus plans for the ten industries and their detailed rules were part of China’s stimulus package, which effectively served as a driving force for investment and consumption in related industries, and played a crucial supportive role in achieving the goal of “maintaining growth.” One year after the stimulus package, China’s economy showed signs of recovery. The growth rate in the first three quarters of 2009 reached 7.7%, which ensured the goal of “maintaining the growth rate 32 zhang ke of no lower than 8%” throughout the year. GDP data showed a clear V trend and a decisive turn for the better: starting from 6.8% in the fourth quarter of 2008, dropping to 6.1% in the first quarter of 2009, then rising steadily to 7.9% in the second quarter, and to 8.9% by the third quarter.1

Table 1.1: Composition of the 4 trillion RMB stimulus package Investment Areas Amount (billion) Percentage (%) Low cost housing projects 400 10 Rural area infrastructure construction 370 9.25 Key infrastructure (airports, railways, 1500 37.5 highways, and rural area electric fence facilities) Social undertakings (medical, 150 3.75 educational, and cultural projects) Ecological protection through emissions 210 5.25 control Innovation and industrial structure 370 9.25 adjustments Post-quake reconstruction 1000 25 Total 4000 100 Source: National Development and Reform Commission

Table 1.2: Energy conservation and environmental protection details of the stimulus plans in the ten industries Objectives, Tasks, and Measures Ten Key Industries Restructuring Technology Emissions Eliminating upgrade reduction backward production capacity Automobile √√√√ Iron and steel √√√√ Electronic information √ industry Logistics Textile √√√√

1 Liu Zheng, Ren Fang, Lei Min, and Wang Xi, “No Doubt about Completing the Goal of ‘Maintaining the Growth Rate Above 8%’ While There are Still Many Challenges in the Future,” Xinhua News, October 22, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet. com/fortune/2009-10/22/content_12299454.htm. green growth impacts of china’s financial stimulus package 33

Table 1.2 (cont.) Objectives, Tasks, and Measures Ten Key Industries Restructuring Technology Emissions Eliminating upgrade reduction backward production capacity Manufacturing √√√√ Nonferrous metals √√√√ industry Light industry √√√√ Petrochemical √√√√ Ship building Note: Data on logistics and shipbuilding is not available. Source: China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Devel- opment

According to a representative from the National Development and Reform Committee, the projects supported by the stimulus plan have developed smoothly. Thanks to the stimulations from the central government’s investment, remarkable success has been achieved. This can be seen from the following four aspects:

First, the stimulus played a crucial role in promoting social investment and stabilizing the economy. The momentum of social investment was strongly supported by the expanding central investment policy. The growth rate of social investment rose by 33.4% in the first nine months, an increase of 6.4% from the previous year. The investment structure was further optimized. Investments in areas of social welfare, such as agriculture, education, health care, social security, and culture, substantially increased from 42% to 72% compared with the same period last year. The GDP in the third quarter grew by 8.9%, increasing by 1 and 2.8 percentage points compared to that of the first half of the year and the first quarter, respectively. Second, the central investments laid a solid foundation for further strengthening the development of agriculture, farmers, and rural areas, while also improving people’s livelihoods. A series of projects related to people’s welfare were launched. More than 50% of the central investment in 2009 was used for rural livelihood projects. By August, China had built 11,000 health care service projects, refurnished rural area junior high schools with a total floor area of 4 million square meters, completed the construction of 270,000 low-income houses while 1.26 34 zhang ke million more were under construction, solved the water insecurity problem for 22.78 million rural residents, set up methane gas projects for 2.47 million households, and established 200 thousand kilometers of rural roads and 103 thousand kilometers of rural power lines. Third, the stimulus promoted the strategic adjustment of the economic structure and a change in China’s development pattern. The central investment program turned out to be very effective, by implementing policies such as distributing 20 billion RMB to adjust key industries, revitalizing and promoting small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), significantly increasing the speed of technological transformation in enterprises, and localizing major equipment. Additionally, a group of high-tech industrialization projects were launched to improve independent innovation capacity. In the process of expanding domestic demand and maintaining growth, energy conservation and emissions reduction were key points to support the development of ten energy conservation projects, facilities for urban sewage and garbage management, and water pollution prevention and control programs in important river basins. By the end of August, the capacity for treating sewage was 5.18 million tons per day, and garbage treatment was 16 thousand tons per day. This achieved water savings of up to 131 million tons and an energy conservation capacity of 6.69 million tons of standard coal. Fourth, steady progress was made in the construction of large infrastructure projects. Infrastructure construction is developing with an emphasis on relieving “bottleneck” restrictions, so as to prepare for the country’s long-term development. The construction of major railway projects has accelerated, including the Harbin-Dalian, Wuhan- Guangzhou, Southern Guangdong, and Guangdong-Guizhou railways, covering a total of 1500 kilometers. A group of large- and medium- sized water control projects like the South-to-North Water Diversion Project progressed smoothly, and around 1500 such projects were accomplished. The rebuilding of highways, airports, and city power systems was advanced in an orderly way. In order to further enhance the capacity for regional economic development, China adhered to the policy of people-oriented, nature-respecting scientific reconstruction, and accelerated the post-earthquake reconstruction of the Wenchuan (汶川) area of Sichuan Province. By the end of August, more than 505 billion RMB had been invested, accounting for 50.5% of the total, thus achieving the goal of investing over half of the total stimulus funds on time. For example, 73.4% of the housing investment in urban and green growth impacts of china’s financial stimulus package 35 rural areas had been completed, and infrastructure and public services facilities reached more than 40%. As a result, the planned three-year task was likely to be completed in two years.2 With the aim of enhancing the income of residents, especially those living in poverty, the economic stimulus package gave priority to social welfare projects, infrastructure construction, ecological protection, and post-earthquake reconstruction, especially in western China. In fact, many projects were environmental protection projects and others carried environmental benefits. According to information provided by the China Council for Inter- national Cooperation on Environment and Development, in the 4 trillion RMB stimulus scheme, 210 billion was directly committed to environmental protection projects (including emissions reduction and ecological protection), accounting for 5.25% of the total. These environmental projects included the reforestation of 2900 hectares of land, as well as raising the water supply capacity to 2.83 million tons per day; garbage handling capacity to 3,155 tons per day; pipe network to 2,548 kilometers; new chemical oxygen demand (COD) reduction to about 65,000 tons; chromium residue handling capacity to about 320,000 tons; energy conservation capacity to 6.16 million tons of standard coal; water conservation capacity to 120 million tons; and capacity of waste recycling to 2.7 million tons.3

II. New Environmental Pressures of the Economic Stimulus Scheme

In the report China Heads Toward a Green Prosperous Future: Environment, Energy, and Economy (中国迈向绿色繁荣——环境、能源和经济) by the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, the investment in protecting environment and ecology was listed in the scheme, but its percentage only accounted for 5.25%. As for the central budget in 2009, environmental investment actually dropped from 2.86% the previous year to 2.82%. If we take the

2 Press conference by National Development and Reform Commission on the implementation of the economic stimulus scheme, accessed October 27, 2009, http:// www.sdpc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwtt/t20091027_309183.htm. 3 Zhang Ke, “China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) Proposal to Cut the Capital Chain of ‘Two-High’ Enter- prises,” First Financial Daily, November 15, 2009. 36 zhang ke increased investment in ﬁxed assets into consideration, the environmental portion was quite small. According to statistics, the overall trend in environmental investment declined from 2001 to 2005, indicating that investment in environmental protection still lagged behind economic growth. The overall situation did not change much due to the great deﬁciency in environmental protection, even after carrying out the 4 trillion RMB economic stimulus scheme.

A. Severe Water Pollution According to Fu Tao (傅涛), director of the Water Policy Research Centre at Tsinghua University, approximately 70% of the raw water in over 120 large- and medium-sized Chinese cities meets standards, but the number may be lower than 50% if small cities are factored in. It is almost impossible to deal with the decrease in raw water quality because of obsolete water supply facilities and very few upgrades. Indeed, the water quality in more than half of the cities may be even lower than the standards in 1985. Since most water suppliers are not equipped with sterilizing equipment or water monitors in many of the small cities in western China, water security almost solely depends on the quality of raw water, much of which has been mixed with carcinogenic substances, mutagenic substances, teratogenic substances, and toxic and harmful dissolved organic matter. Experts believe that environmental problems return if no supportive measures are taken. For example, if a sewage treatment plant is built, but has no pollution pipelines because of lack of funding, the sewage treatment equipment could lie idle, and the plant could become an “image project.” According to the Ministry of Housing and Urban- Rural Development, half of the 1,400 sewage treatment plants around the country are almost idle now.4 Nanzhang County (南漳县) in Hubei Province is located in the Hanjiang River Basin (汉江流域), which is one of the drainage areas with the best water quality in China. How- ever, due to lack of facilities like a sedimentation tank, water in Nan- zhang County was so seriously polluted on May 28, 2009 that muddy water was running out of people’s taps.

4 Zhang Ke, “Experts: Pay Attention to the Environmental Work in New Environ- ment Projects,” First Financial Daily, March 2, 2009. green growth impacts of china’s financial stimulus package 37

Serious water pollution and obsolete water supply facilities have put enormous pressure on providing secure water, which may lead China to a period of frequent water pollution accidents.

B. The Resurgence of “High Energy Consumption, High Pollution” Projects Since proﬁtability of industrial enterprises has dropped dramatically, governments are facing increasing ﬁnancial pressures, which has resulted in weakening the investment abilities of energy conservation and environmental protection areas. “Since 2008, people have started to worry that some projects would be launched in an immature environment or before they passed the environmental impact assessment,” stated a report provided by the China Council for International Coop- eration on Environment and Development. “These problems have appeared in large numbers.”5

Table 1.3: Comparison of the energy consumption of major energy-consuming industrial products between China and international standards Projects China Advanced Consumption international gap in 2007 2000 2005 2007 standard (+%) Power consumption of coal 30.9 26.7 24.0 17.0 41.2 production/kwh/t Coal consumption of thermal 363343 333 299 11.4 power production/gce/kwh Coal consumption for thermal 392 370 356 312 14.1 power supply/gce/kWh Comparable energy 784 714 668 610 9.5 consumption of steel production/kgce/t (large and medium enterprise) Alternating current 15480 14680 14488 14100 2.8 consumption for electrolytic aluminum/kWh/t Comprehensive energy 1277 780 610 500 22.0 consumption of steel smelting/kgce/t Comprehensive energy 181 167 158 127 24.4 consumption of cement/ kgce/t

5 Zhang, “CCICED Proposes to Cut the Capital Chain of ‘Two-High’ Enterprises.” 38 zhang ke

Table 1.3 (cont.) Projects China Advanced Consumption international gap in 2007 2000 2005 2007 standard (+%) Comprehensive energy 25 22 17 15 13.3 consumption of ﬂat glass/ gce/ weight box Comprehensive energy 118 114 110 73 50.7 consumption of crude oil processing/kgce/t Comprehensive energy 1125 1073 984 629 56.4 consumption of ethylene/ kgce/t Comprehensive energy 1699 1650 1553 100055.3 consumption of ammonia/ kgce/t Comprehensive energy 1435 1297 1203 91032.2 consumption of sodium hydroxide/kgce/t Comprehensive energy 406 396 363 310 17.1 consumption of sodium carbonate /kgce/t Power consumption in 3450 3418 3030 12.8 production of calcium carbide /kWh/t Comprehensive energy 1540 1380 640 115.6* consumption of paper and paperboard/kgce/t Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China National Coal Association, China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association, China Non-ferrous Metals Industry Association, and China International Engineering Consulting Corporation

In February 2009, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) did research to understand the environmental situation among seventy-one pending or rejected projects in 2008. They found that the non-compliance rate was as high as 15%, including eight projects launched without permission, three of which had started operating. In addition, among the sampled 115 projects at the provincial and municipal levels, 24% were non-compliant, including projects before and after the 4 trillion RMB economic stimulus scheme.6 Since the primary goal was to stimulate economic growth, many large projects risk causing long-term damage due to their large scale

6 Zhang, “CCICED Proposes to Cut the Capital Chain of ‘Two-High’ Enterprises.” green growth impacts of china’s financial stimulus package 39 and geographical concentrations, even though they passed the environmental assessment.

C. A Possible “Carbon Lock-in” Liu Shijin (刘世锦), Deputy Director at the Development Research Center of the State Council, points out that, under the condition of strong investment stimulating economic growth, projects of high energy consumption and high pollution will resurge with all kinds of excuses. This may create a “carbon lock-in” situation. A “carbon lock-in” is a phenomenon which appears when a country constructs infrastructure for high carbon consumption with a life span of 50 to 100 years. Due to the inertia of industrial activities and economic scale, technology, policies, and the structure of systems will gradually lean towards a system based on fossil fuel. China is now involved in a rapid industrialization and urbanization process, and a large amount of infrastructure and equipment will be put to use within twenty years. Without advanced technology and equipment, as soon as this infrastructure is constructed, its whole life span will be locked into a mire of high energy consumption, high pollution, and high emissions. Environmental problems in China are caused by various factors, with the major ones being: the usage of “carbon locked-in” energy, a rapid growth of total energy consumption, a coal-dominated energy structure, and low efficiency of utilization. According to statistics, in 2008, total energy consumption was 2.85 billion tons of standard coal and the total production of primary coal was 2.6 billion tons of standard coal. Both were twice as much as those of the previous year. The excessive growth of energy production and total consumption caused a huge emission of pollutants (carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, fumes, dust, and so on). Even though in the past twenty years China has witnessed outstanding results in terms of improving energy efficiency— marked by an increase in the rate of energy conservation to 4%—the comprehensive consumption of energy remained around 30%, 10% lower than that of developed countries. In 2007, energy consumption per unit of GDP was reduced to 10.48 tons of standard coal per 10,000 USD, down from 11.9 in 2005. Yet, China still consumes as much as five to seven times more energy than developed countries.7

7 Zhang, “China’s Emission Reduction Capacity ‘Locked,’ High Emission May Continue for Decades,” First Financial Daily, November 27, 2009. 40 zhang ke

D. Environmental Protection Efforts Might Be Weakened According to experts, the economic crisis is affecting the environment in two ways. On the one hand it slows down the speed of economic development, and therefore reduces the consumption of resources; on the other hand, economic depression leaves enterprises with low profits, and therefore the top priority for them is to ensure profit- ability and to keep their employees. In this circumstance, enterprises will more likely choose profits over environmental protection. Some of the enterprises that have already installed environmental protection devices may stop using them, which will bring more serious environmental problems. Some experts are worried that “since the focus of the central government has shifted to expanding domestic demand and investing the 4 trillion RMB, which may evolve into a political task, the efforts made for environmental protection might be weakened.” Some experts have noticed that several policies related to environmental protection are going through recent changes in order to stimulate economic growth. For example, in The Notification on the Management of Environmental Impact Assessment and Registration under the Current Economic Situation (关于当前经济形势下做好环境影响评价审批工作的通知) issued by the MEP in December 2008, it was clearly stated that a green channel should be set for the projects that are beneficial to expanding domestic demand, especially those that are listed as national key projects for social welfare such as infrastructure, ecological construction, and reconstruction after the Sichuan earthquake. The green channel will help these projects launch and form a real economic workload as quickly as possible. “This might indicate that the Ministry of Environmental Protection will turn a blind eye at some projects of high energy consumption and high pollution, which means they are choosing economic growth over environmental protection.” Regarding the appeal to “never give up environmental protection in order to expand domestic demand” (绝不能因为要拉动内需而放弃环保要求), in 2009 the MEP declared more than once that with expanding domestic demand, work related to environmental protection would contribute to steady and rapid economic growth; while at the same time, they would continue to explore a new path for environmental protection with Chinese characteristics and would not withdraw their requirements for environmental protection. “Environ- mental protection serves a steady and rapid economic growth as well green growth impacts of china’s financial stimulus package 41 as controls the expansion of products of high energy consumption, high pollution, and high resource consumption.”8

III. The Funding of “High Energy Consumption, High Pollution” Enterprises

It is worth noting that, apart from the 4 trillion RMB investments, another flow of capital has posed a huge threat to environmental protection. A report on “green credit” released by the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, suggests that China owns a large amount of private capital. Due to high profits and a steady return, “two-high enterprises” (两高), enterprises with high energy consumption and high emissions, have attracted private capital investments. The report says that according to an investigation of the two provinces, Shanxi and Inner Mongolia, private capital is the main channel for SME financing in the “two-high” industries. For example, in the city of Lvliang, Shanxi Province, the outstanding loans of banks to “two-high” industries was around 7.3 billion RMB, while that of private capital was only a little higher, between 8 and 10 billion RMB. The survey conducted earlier by the China Banking Regulatory Commission also suggested that, in many regions with high concentrations of “two-high” industries—such as Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia—a great deal of private capital exists in the form of underground markets, supporting the “two-high” SMEs with a huge sum of capital. At the same time, many small- and medium-sized banks, especially for those whose major scope of business is in rural areas, also support the “two-high” SMEs with huge amounts of funds. This causes the government’s adjusting and controlling policies to be ineffective, and fosters a development pattern of focusing on economic interests while neglecting environmental protection. The net loans of state-owned commercial banks to “two-high” enterprises are also very high. According to surveys, by the end of March 2007, the net loans from the five biggest banks (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Bank of Communications) to

8 Chen Zewei, “Never Lower the Standard of Environmental Protection under the Background of Expanding Domestic Demand,” Outlook Weekly, Vol. 2, 2009. 42 zhang ke

“two-high” enterprises reached 1.3 trillion RMB, accounting for 11% of the total net loans of the five banks. In 2007, the net loans from the five banks to “two-high” enterprises increased 81.5 billion RMB, up by 6.5%. By the end of May 2009, mid to long term net loans from major financial institutions to “two-high” enterprises reached 2.3 trillion RMB, an increase of 23.43% from the previous year. Experts have said that part of the “two-high” projects might be driven by the 4 trillion RMB investments.9 Since 2006, the former State Environmental Protection Administra- tion, together with the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the People’s Bank of China, has conducted discussions and investigations on further improving “green credit” policies, and issued a series of policies in 2007. However, due to an imperfect policy system with a lack of communication of relevant information and an insufficient system of supervision, assessment, and restraints, “green credit” remains in its early stages. According to the report: “To some extent, ‘green credit’ policies gave private capital a chance to survive in the market, making it difficult to cut the capital chain of SMEs which severely violated environmental protection regulations. This is also an important reason why it is so difficult to ban enterprises with high pollutant emissions.10 The report suggested that, while implementing “green credit” policies for legal financial institutions, the government should also rein- force supervision and guidance for private capital. Regarding the feature of profit-driven and market driven private capital, the government should supervise “two-high” enterprises, severely punish those who violate the regulations, and private investors realize the high environmental policy risk behind the high profits.

IV. Promoting Green Investment and Developing a Low-Carbon Economy

Pan Yue (潘岳), the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, points out that under the global ﬁnancial crisis, restriction of carbon emissions is becoming a new “green barrier” from developed

9 Zhang, “CCICED Proposes to Cut the Capital Chain of ‘Two-High’ Enter- prises.” 10 Zhang, “CCICED Proposes to Cut the Capital Chain of ‘Two-High’ Enter- prises.” green growth impacts of china’s financial stimulus package 43 countries. If China continues with its “high carbon economy” without restrictions, it will soon face international containment. “Domestically and internationally speaking, it is a pressing need for China to completely transform concerning the pattern of production and living.”11 Wang Jinnan (王金南), Vice President and Chief Engineer of the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning of the MEP, suggests that the economic stimulus plan needs the “three-green” principles: 1) green investment, 2) green construction, and 3) green growth, in order to invest well on expanding domestic demand. First, the principle of green investment needs to be ensured. Wang Jinnan believes that there are two requirements for green investment. The ﬁrst is to ensure the investment in energy conservation, emissions reduction, and environmental protection under the economic stimulus plan. The second is to ensure investments into environmental protection in construction projects, to keep them from lagging behind. According to the stimulus plan, the amount of investment concerned with ecological protection and major energy conservation and emissions reduction projects is calculated to be 210 billion RMB. However, in the investment plan proposed by local governments, seldom do we see funds used for environmental protection. Wang Jinnan noticed that among the newly increased investment of 100 billion RMB in 2009, 12 billion was invested in energy conservation and emissions reduction, which was primarily used for major energy conservation projects and circular economy demonstration projects. According to the national Eleventh Five-Year Plan for environmental protection, the central government will need to invest 150 billion RMB. It has already invested 60 billion RMB from 2006 to 2008 and 27 billion RMB in 2008. More than 90 billion RMB remains to be invested. The key to green investment for the central government is the all-round implementation of the 90 billion RMB over the next two years. As for the second type, green construction, Wang Jinnan mentioned two requirements. One is to allocate the investment projects appropri- ately, according to the load capacity of the environment and the four types of main function. The other is that investment planning and projects should comply with environmental protection regulations and minimize the negative effects on the environment from the construction

11 Zheng Chunfeng, “Ministry of Environmental Protection Strives to Promote ‘Balanced Trade of Carbon’ in China,” Nan Fang Daily, November 24, 2008. 44 zhang ke process. Environmental protection departments should propose a complete set of green construction guidelines to guide the projects in the stimulus plan, in order to promote the use of environmentally friendly technologies for saving water, electricity, land, and material. The third is to insist on the principle of green growth. Wang Jinnan said that green growth is mainly demonstrated in two aspects. One is to increase the percentage of green production in GDP by developing green economic industries. The other is to contain the investment on “two high” projects and the rapid growth of industries that have surplus production capacity, and to adopt a “low energy consumption, low emission, and high efficiency” development pattern. An analysis made by the Development Research Center of the State Council showed that, if China does not change its economic development pattern by 2030, the annual average emission of carbon dioxide per capita will reach 8 tons, and the dependency on imported petroleum will exceed 80%. If China adopts low-carbon development, the country will reduce energy consumption in 2030 by 20% to 4.47 billion tons, and the average emission of carbon dioxide per capita will be 5.9 tons. After carbon dioxide emissions reach this peak in 2030, total emissions will increase more slowly or even decrease.12 Developing a green economy and low-carbon economy may be listed in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. Some experts have even suggested that a reduction of 20% of carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP should be a mandatory indicator. Mechanisms of energy price forma- tion should also be reformed. A new price system that can indicate supply and demand relationships, the degree of resource shortages, and the cost of environmental damage should be established in industries and fields such as mining, electricity, oil and gas, and city heating. In recent years, the green economy has become an important part of the national economy. It grows at roughly the same speed as the GDP in the same period, while investment in the green economy accounts for 8% of GDP. According to a preliminary estimate, there were 35,000 units in environmental protection related industries in 2006, with about three million staff. The total volume of the annual output value was nearly 600 billion RMB, with 52 billion RMB of profit.13

12 Zhang, “China’s Emission Reduction Capacity ‘Locked.’” 13 Zhou Yanling and Ji Yingde, “Wu Xiaoqing: Environmental Protection Indus- try Has Become an Important Part of National Economy,” China Environment, Sep- tember 9, 2008. green growth impacts of china’s financial stimulus package 45

“Twelfth Five-Year Plan” for Low-carbon economy Consumption pattern Land utilization Sustainable Industrialization Low-carbon energy Urbanization and Transportation

Technology Innovation

Market Mechanism

Rules and Regulations

Source: China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Devel- opment Figure 1.1: China’s low-carbon development route

A green economy obviously boosts the national economy and improves employment. According to research conducted by the Chinese Acad- emy for Environmental Planning of MEP, every 100 billion RMB invested in environmental protection will bring an increase of 143 billion RMB of GDP, 1 billion RMB of taxes and proﬁts, and 60 billion RMB of residents’ consumption, while at the same time 600 thousand new jobs.14 This is the real green growth that we are all expecting.

14 Wang Xinling, “Expanding Domestic Demand Needs Green Principles,” China Report, Vol. 11, 2009.

CALLS FOR A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY: NPC MOTIONS AND CPPCC PROPOSALS IN 2009

Chen Hongwei

Among the National People’s Congress (NPC) motions and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) proposals in 2009, forty-six CPPCC proposals involved a low-carbon economy (LCE). Their contents included a macro-strategy for the development of an LCE as well as low-carbon industries, buildings, transportation, and living. They called for the formulation of a national low-carbon strategy and put forward suggestions such as developing a national program and a roadmap for an LCE. This essay provides a summary of these proposals. With the global financial crisis, China turned its economic development strategy in 2008 from macro-control, prudent fiscal policies, and tight monetary policies at the beginning of the year to aggressive fiscal policies and loose monetary policies by the end of the year. With this background, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) sessions in 2009 focused on issues such as how to respond to the crisis, increase investments, and stimulate consumption. For instance, the Second Ses- sion of the Eleventh CPPCC received 5,571 proposals, of which 50% were about the economy. According to data from the CPPCC Pro- posal Office, CPPCC members paid the most attention to how to keep steady and relatively fast economic growth. Nonetheless, it was noteworthy that the number of proposals concerning environmental protection did not decrease. The number of proposals with “environmental protection” as one of the keywords amounted to 253, according to information the author obtained from the CPPCC. After examination, there were about 140 proposals that were indeed relevant to environmental protection, or 2.51% of all proposals, which was higher than the 2.06% proportion in 2008. This signals that with the implementation of China’s industrial restructuring strategy focused on energy conservation and emissions reduction, economic and environmental problems have been increasingly well 48 chen hongwei correlated. As for fields other than the economy, environmental issues are also drawing considerable attention from CPPCC members. The 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (commonly known as the Copenhagen Summit) made climate change a hot issue. To address the economic crisis, countries like the United States paid unprecedented attention to green energy, while increasing the world’s knowledge of the development of a low-carbon economy (LCE). With that background, the term “low-carbon economy” appeared frequently in NPC motions and CPPCC proposals in 2009. The author retrieved forty-six CPPCC proposals by using “low-carbon economy” as the keyword. Their contents included a macro strategy for the development of an LCE as well as low-carbon industries, buildings, transportation, and living.

I. Formulating a National Low-Carbon Strategy

A low-carbon economy is a combination of low-carbon development, industries, technologies, lifestyles, and so on. In the context of global warming, the need to develop an LCE to contain greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has become a global consensus. Some NPC deputies and CPPCC members believe that after the Charter of the United Nations and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), LCE may become another major regime affecting the global community or may even be regarded as the second Industrial Revolution. As far as China is concerned, developing an LCE is both an indication of a responsible China and a historic opportunity for sustainable development and transformation of China’s economic development pattern. According to statistics obtained from several CPPCC members, in 2007, each square meter of house built in China emitted about 0.8 tons of carbon dioxide; each kilowatt-hour of electricity produced emitted about 1 kilogram of carbon dioxide; and each liter of gasoline burned gave out around 2.2 kilograms of carbon dioxide. These ﬁgures show that China is obviously in a stage of “high carbon consumption.” Additionally, fossil fuel energy represents 92% of China’s energy mix, of which coal represents 68%. Coal also accounts for 78% of China’s power generation. Moreover, the acceleration of six energy-hungry industries, namely, energy, automobile, iron and steel, chemical, transportation, and building materials, makes the Chinese economy a typical high-carbon one. calls for a low-carbon economy 49

According to the preliminary design of its low-carbon roadmap, China will implement comprehensive measures such as pushing an LCE, implementing industrial upgrades and restructuring, developing clean production, decreasing carbon sources and increasing carbon credits, developing a circular economy and a clean development mechanism (CDM) across the board, advocating green consumption, and increasing efforts to innovate technologies for carbon neutraliza- tion, sequestration, and capture. Therefore, China will likely reach a turning point in the total carbon dioxide emitted by 2030, with carbon emissions per thousand RMB of GDP decreasing to less than 0.1 tons. This would be no more than 3 tons per capita, thereby achieving the country’s strategic goal of an LCE.1 To achieve those goals, the following proposals were recommended:

1) Bear in mind the idea that a “low-carbon economy is an important approach to scientific development”; push an LCE across the board; facilitate the transformation of the economic development pattern through economic restructuring and industrial upgrading; 2) Organize strategic research as soon as possible, paying attention to the stage where China is and its current energy mix; choose a nationally appropriate approach to an LCE—it is recommended that the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) work with the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) to formulate a national plan and a roadmap for an LCE; 3) Organize experts for an investigation on the carbon footprint in China by industry, sector, and region; calculate China’s carbon balance in accordance with requirements specified in the carbon source and credit form; create a scientific carbon budget system; complete a carbon trading model with Chinese characteristics and enact it by the NPC; 4) Formulate clear and stable incentive and support policies. In addition to internationally adopted ones, such as energy tax levying, financial subsidies, tax abatement and exemption, and loan interest

1 Feng Zhijun, Jin Yong, Niu Wenyuan, and Xu Dingming, “Low-carbon Econ- omy as a National Strategy,” Study Times, August 23, 2009. 50 chen hongwei

rate discounts and guarantees, creating a clear and stable policy framework is important; 5) Increase efforts in researching and developing critical and common technologies for an LCE; implement China’s climate change technology and its action plan for technologies enabling energy conservation and emissions reduction; improve management of LCE development; 6) Select 10 cities, 100 enterprises, 1,000 government agencies, and 10,000 households across China for LCE pilot projects and gener- alize their experiences nationwide; 7) Leverage the enthusiasm of governments, industry associations, enterprises, and the public to create the synergy for an LCE; 8) Take an active part in international exchange activities related to low-carbon energy and associated technologies; enhance exchanges and cooperation with developed countries in low-carbon energy and carbon capture and sequestration technologies.

II. Enhancing Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction to Achieve Low-Carbon Industries

Some CPPCC members suggested that in addition to the overall implementation of a low-carbon strategy in China, it is necessary to increase efforts in industries to save energy and reduce emissions. Spe- ciﬁc suggestions are as follows:

1) Develop a circular economy; manage pollutants generated during the process of production so that they are reduced, reused, and turned into resources; push energy conservation and emissions reduction through the development of a circular economy; realize the goal of energy conservation and emissions reduction by decreasing resource and energy consumption at the source; 2) Create an industry mix beneﬁcial to resource conservation; identify industrial projects that should be encouraged, restricted, or eliminated in the industry development plan, thus promoting the development of projects helpful to resource conservation and environmental protection; 3) Plan industrial development in different regions so as to leverage their respective advantages; determine economic function position- calls for a low-carbon economy 51

ing and industrial characteristics of every region so as to avoid similar industry mixes caused by poorly-planned investments and excessive similar projects; 4) Increase government investments in technology research and development; focus on supporting projects relevant to resource conservation and a circular economy; develop and use green energy such as solar, geothermal, wind, ocean, nuclear, and biomass; develop relevant technologies, equipment, products, and materials so as to push resource conservation by technological advancements; 5) Focus on energy conservation in major energy-consuming enterprises in industries such as iron and steel, nonferrous metals, coal, electricity, petroleum, chemicals, and building materials; encourage and support resource-saving enterprises in major industries, industrial parks, and in areas such as comprehensive use of minerals and bioenergy and recycling of used home appliances, tires, and paper so as to enable them to play a role as demonstrators; 6) Increase efforts to develop and apply energy conservation and emissions reduction projects based on information technology; leverage network infrastructures and various resources and organize technological researchers, manufacturers, and operators to work together in a better way, thereby developing and rolling out more energy conservation and emissions reduction application projects that meet the needs of individuals and organizations; pay special attention to the development of applications based on 3rd Generation (3G) networks; 7) Increase efforts to protect intellectual property; help organizations become more interested in researching, developing, and applying resource-saving and environmentally-friendly technologies and protect their legal interests; 8) Increase supervision of local governments to ensure that they are working hard to implement their part of the nation’s energy conservation and emissions reduction goals; 9) Given the particular situation it faces, China should encourage the import of resource-consuming products and control the export of the same products through tariff and export rebate policies while it participates in international division of work and cooperation. 52 chen hongwei

III. Developing Alternative Energy to Realize Low-Carbon Energy

The following proposals were suggested:

1) Review the existing alternative energy plan from the perspective of an alternative energy based industrial revolution; improve objectives of alternative energy development in the Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (十一五规划纲要); plan an alternative energy development strategy at a level no lower than the international average for the same period; 2) Create a complete resource database through an investigation of nationwide resources relevant to renewable energy and evaluation on the amounts of total and developable resources; make an overall plan and establish development objectives according to the world- wide situation and China’s demand forecasts; develop plans specific to wind, solar, biomass, and tidal energy; 3) Pay attention to the coordinated development of alternative energy and the economy so as to avoid overdevelopment in a time of strong demand for energy and improper deceleration of development in a time of weak demand; focus on the use of wind and solar energy while pushing the use of biomass, wind, and geothermal energy through pilot projects in a time of excessive hydropower development projects; 4) Rapidly promulgate statutes and regulations on energy conservation which support the newly amended Energy Conservation Law (节约能源法) that came into force on April 1, 2008; 5) Create an energy conservation standards system that includes management standards for energy used by equipment and enterprises, energy consumption limits per product unit, and product energy efficiency standards for end-use energy; implement energy-saving product certification and energy efficiency labeling systems; implement compulsory energy efficiency labeling and market access systems for energy-consuming products, such as vehicles, lighting, home appliances, industrial pumps, and fans; make a timetable to eliminate energy-consuming products and equipment such as incandescent lamps; 6) Promulgate a series of preferential policies relevant to taxes, subsidies, low-rate loans, faster depreciation, and assistance in exploiting markets so as to increase the alternative energy industry’s market competitiveness by creating, for instance, an alternative energy calls for a low-carbon economy 53

development fund; provide promising alternative energy companies with interest-subsidized loans and preferential tax policies; provide discounts for environmental protection and implement a CDM to let alternative energy developers benefit from reducing GHG emissions; oblige every industry to use alternative energy in accordance with their respective characteristics; 7) Create an energy pricing mechanism that reflects the energy supply and demand situation, considers the degree of energy scarcity, and facilitates energy conservation; step up energy price reform; implement differentiated energy pricing policies in accordance with industrial policies; 8) Reform the national energy management system by establishing a Ministry of Energy that will be responsible for formulating an energy transformation strategy, an alternative energy industry development plan and energy policies, and coordinate the relationship between energy companies and industrial policies; 9) Leverage China’s locational advantages and financial and technical strengths; borrow ideas from foreign experience in economic development; enhance international energy cooperation; introduce new technologies and processes for the development and use of renewable energy; 10) Increase investments in alternative energy infrastructure; increase the proportion of those investments in the 4 trillion RMB stimulus package; 11) Focus on demonstration by pushing a number of renewable energy development projects and nurturing large alternative energy enterprises so as to drive the development of the whole alternative energy industry; leverage existing resources of upstream and downstream industries in municipalities and provinces to create industry chains in areas such as wind, geothermal, and solar energy, wind-solar hybrid power generation, and green building; bring the market mechanism into full play while supporting the energy-saving service industry; issue polices and measures to further advance energy contract management as an energy conservation mechanism; 12) Create a registered energy management engineer system so as to solve the problem that energy users lack knowledge about energy conservation and the shortage of professionals in energy management. 54 chen hongwei

IV. Developing Low-Carbon Building

Low-carbon building is a systematic concept that runs through the whole process of planning, design, construction, management, and use. With regard to low-carbon building, some NPC deputies and CPPCC members suggested:

1) The government should compile and implement a green (or low- carbon) building encouragement and support catalog as soon as possible to push the development of green building in a comprehensive manner; issue a series of incentive policies such as: abating land value-added tax (VAT) and corporate income tax levied on green buildings or levying them at lower levels; giving green buildings more policy support in financing or giving certain subsidies for old urban area rebuilding; refunding individual income taxes to consumers who buy green buildings; rewarding or giving preferential tax treatment to developers who use alternative energy-saving materials and housing equipment; providing green building projects with fast review and approval in urban planning and auxiliary facility development; encouraging and supporting the participation of all sectors such as industry associations, financial institutions, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the development and promotion of green buildings; 2) Establish the position of a building energy conservation service and management industry and improve its development; add the energy conservation service and management industry to the Industrial Classification of National Economy (国民经济行业分类); label it as a tertiary industry and divide it into four categories: industrial energy conservation service and management sector, building energy conservation service and management sector, transportation energy conservation service and management sector, and public organization energy conservation service and management sector; determine the function of the building energy conservation service and management sector; 3) Enhance the policy system for the development of the building energy conservation service and management sector, including technology, deployment, financial, foreign trade, and fiscal and tax policies for the sector; focus on supporting four types of enterprises: consulting firms that provide investigation, diagnosis, and solution design services; financial companies that provide planning, financing, calls for a low-carbon economy 55

and implementation services; management companies that provide monitoring, operation, and control services; information companies that provide information release, exchange, and trading services; 4) Create a building energy conservation service system that is com- prised of the government, ﬁnancial, market, and technology services; create and/or improve three mechanisms in pushing the development of the building energy conservation service and management sector: improve the energy management contract (EMC) mechanism to increase ways of investment in building energy conservation; explore a CDM to attract private capital and enhance international cooperation; create a total energy consumption control mechanism to ensure the realization of the energy conservation objective; 5) Enhance the “greening” of large public buildings; create a relevant system to conduct “green” regulation over such buildings in the whole process ranging from design, construction, and testing to operation management; set reasonable energy quotas for new and existing large public buildings, of which the government’s energy conservation agency should examine the energy consumption regularly and levy high fees on the part of energy consumption beyond the quota; pay much attention to the development of green buildings in rural areas.

Building waste contains large amounts of sand, stones, ceramics, glass, wood, steel, and metal and mineral sheets, which can be widely reused and some of which are even rare resources. To improve the management of this waste, the following proposals have been suggested:

1) For the ﬁeld of building materials, it was suggested in relevant proposals that the use of advanced inorganic thermal insulation systems and new inorganic technologies, products, and processes should be generalized and that the use of polyphenyl wall insulation materials should be restricted; 2) Conduct a nationwide survey to understand the discharge of building waste and to establish a system of laws and regulations on the conversion of building wastes from construction and demolition into resources as soon as possible; introduce a mechanism of “ample reward and severe punishment” (重奖重罚); 3) Promptly increase funds for technological research on building waste recycling, thereby forming an integrated system that covers 56 chen hongwei

the collection, transportation, recycling, and reuse of building waste; develop various technological and management standards around the process of reusing building waste as resources as soon as possible; launch production line equipment for processing building waste into resources in a timely manner; 4) Relevant agencies should work together to frame corresponding industrial policies for converting building waste into resources, including: charging for the discharge of building waste; setting policies for the reduction of building waste; establishing preferential tax policies for the production of recyclable building materials; and implementing policies for the reuse of recyclable building materials.

V. Developing Low-Carbon Transportation

According to relevant proposals, the wide use of natural gas, an alternative vehicle fuel for petroleum products, will become an important measure for the development of low-carbon transportation. Relevant industrial policies should be developed and funds be increased to encourage the research and development (R&D) and production of natural gas fuel vehicles, thereby reducing environmental pollution caused by vehicle exhaust; develop taxation policies to encourage the use of natural gas vehicles by giving preferential tax treatment to natural gas fuel vehicle purchasers; encourage both state-owned and private capital to invest in the construction of natural gas ﬁlling stations, along with support and assistance in their construction. For new fuel technologies, some proposals suggested that much attention should be paid to the application of in-vehicle hydrogen generation technologies for which Chinese companies own intellectual property and that relevant government agencies need to work together to industrialize those technologies as soon as possible. The fuel cost of hydrogen hybrid vehicles produced with those technologies is claimed to be only half or less of the gasoline cost, and China’s existing ethanol resources and unparalleled methanol resources may be used as raw materials for in-vehicle hydrogen generation. As for the development of the new transportation industry, some proposals suggested leveraging China’s institutional advantage—the ability to centralize resources to implement important projects—and forming alternative energy auto companies as soon as possible based on the mode in which it develops large aircraft, thereby centralizing ﬁnancial and human resources to master core technologies. calls for a low-carbon economy 57

VI. Realizing Low-Carbon Living

Relevant proposals suggested raising public awareness to foster the sustainable consumption concept as compatible with sustainable development; conducting consumer education drives to cultivate consumer values in accordance with a modern ecological civilization with Chi- nese characteristics; saving resources and protecting the environment during consumption. They suggested increasing the government’s macro-control over consumption patterns and establishing a scientific and intelligent national measurement and monitoring system for green consumption, along with a scientific and rational national assessment system. They suggested that relevant laws and regulations should be developed and/or improved (including the Energy Conservation Law, Renew- able Energy Law (可再生能源法), Clean Production Promotion Law (清洁生产促进法), Renewable Resource Management Regulations (再生资源管理条例), Management Regulations on Recycling Used Home Appliances (废旧家电回收利用管理办法), and Management Regulations on Recycling Products and Packages Mandatory to Be Recycled (强制回收的产品和包装物回收管理办法), to regulate and guide consumer behaviors, to strengthen law enforcement and regulation, and to effectively restrain the waste of resources. In terms of supply, efforts should be made to increase the supply of green products, support the development of the remanufacturing industry, and provide the public with green products and services; plan and build remanufacturing industrial parks; create and improve a system of laws and policies for the industrialization of remanufacturing engineering technologies; formulate industrial development measures in terms of investment, financing, taxation, and human resources; increase investments in the industry. As for green product development, companies should optimize their green marketing strategies to increase the effectiveness of green consumption; enhance safety control over the production, processing, and sales of green products; push technological innovation to reduce product costs; create a storage and transportation system for green consumer goods. Some other motions or proposals suggested resuming daylight saving time, pointing out that if every Chinese saved 1 kWh of electricity per day due to the implementation of daylight saving time, then the country could save 153 billion kWh of electricity per year, or 1.8 times the designed annual power generation capacity of the Three Gorges Hydropower Station (84.68 billion kWh).

PROGRESS IN ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION TRANSPARENCY

Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs and Natural Resources Defense Council

On May 1, 2008, two regulations pivotal to the public’s right to know came into effect, namely, Regulations on Government Information Disclosure and Measures on Open Environmental Information ( for Trial Implementation). The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE) and the Natu- ral Resources Defense Council (NRDC) have jointly developed the Pollutant Information Transparency Index (PITI Index). In accordance with the Index, a preliminary assessment of the level of pollutant information transparency was conducted in 113 cities across China in 2008. This assessment project identiﬁes a primary level of environmental information disclosure. The average score for the 113 cities is only slightly over 31 points (in a 100 point range).

I. Independent Assessment Conﬁrms the Guidelines for Information Disclosure

Regulations on Government Information Disclosure (政府信息公开条例) and Measures on Open Environmental Information ( for Trial Implementation) (环境信息公开办法(试行)), which came into effect on May 1, 2008, are of landmark significance to the perfection of China’s environmental management system. According to international experience, greater environmental information disclosure is conducive to pollutant emissions reduction. In order to systemically assess local government’s enforcement of relevant laws and regulations and to specify the guidelines for information disclosure in the first year of the new regulations, the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) have jointly developed the Pollu- tion Information Transparency Index (PITI). In accordance with the index, a preliminary assessment of the level of pollutant information transparency was conducted in 113 cities across China in 2008. Apart from finding regional disparities, the assessment also aims to identify 60 institute of public and environmental affairs

good cases in pollutant information disclosure so that cities can learn from each other.1 Among the 113 cities, 110 are state-level key cities for environmental protection in the east, middle, and west regions of China, including Harbin, Jinan, Shijiazhuang, Changsha, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Urumqi.2 The pollutant information disclosure level in each of these targets was assessed, and scores and rankings were given by conducting quantitative and qualitative analyses of the systematization, promptness, completeness, and user-friendliness of eight parameters such as disclosure of violation records, disclosure of complaints handling results, information disclosure upon request, etc. The scores of these cities are shown in the following table.

Table 3.1: PITI scores of 113 cities in 2008

Ranking City PITI Ranking City PITI Ranking City PITI score score score

1 Ningbo 72.9 39 Ma’anshan 37.9 77 Qinhuangdao 21.2 2 Hefei 66.6 40 Jinan 36.2 77 Yueyao 21.2 3 Fuzhou 63.7 41 Jiaozuo 36.1 79 Anyang 21 4 Wuhan 61.2 42 Dongguan 34.3 79 Beihai 21 5 Changzhou 56.8 43 Chengdu 34.2 81 Jinzhou 20.4 6 Chongqing 56.7 44 Yichang 33.7 82 Hohhot 19.4 7 Shanghai 56.5 45 Zhuhai 33.4 83 Luzhou 19.2 8 Nantong 56.2 46 Yancheng 33 84 Yangquan 19 9 Taiyuan 55.4 47 Urumqi 32.7 85 Yan’an 18.8 10 Wenzhou 53.3 48 Xuzhou 32.6 86 Zaozhuang 18.6 11 Shaoxing 52.6 48 Zhengzhou 32.6 87 Shaoguan 18.4 12 Dalian 51.7 50 Daqing 30 88 Erdos 18.2 13 Wuxi 51.6 51 Shijiazhuang 29.5 89 Panzhihua 18 14 Shenzhen 51.1 51 Handan 29.5 90 Jining 17.8 15 Quanzhou 50.6 53 Yinchuan 28.9 91 Qiqihar 17.2 16 Kunming 49.4 54 Luoyang 27 92 Lanzhou 16.6 17 Beijing 49.1 54 Lianyungang 27 93 Jiujiang 16.2 18 Taizhou 48.4 56 Changsha 26.8 93 Kaifeng 16.2 19 Hangzhou 48 57 Tangshan 26.6 93 Anshan 16.2 20 Nanjing 47.2 57 Xiamen 26.6 96 Liuzhou 15.8 21 Suzhou 47 59 Guilin 26.1 97 Taian 15.6 22 Zibo 46 60 Xi’an 25.4 98 Yibin 14.4

1 Green Dragon River, an environmental protection NGO in Heilongjiang Prov- ince, also made a contribution to this assessment project. 2 The key cities for environmental protection are set according to the China National Environmental Protection Plan in the Eleventh Five-Year. The three assessed cities that don’t belong to the key cities for environmental protection are Dongguan, Yancheng, and Erdos. progress in environmental information transparency 61

Table 3.1 (cont.) Ranking City PITI Ranking City PITI Ranking City PITI score score score

23 Weihai 45.4 61 Tongchuan 25.4 98 Jinchang 14.4 24 Yantai 44.5 62 Zhuzhou 25.2 98Shizuishan 14.4 25 Guangzhou 44.4 62 Tianjin 25.2 101 Baotou 14 25 Foshan 44.4 62 Pingdingshan 25.2 101 Linfen 14 27 Yangzhou 44.3 65 Guiyang 24.9 101 Xiangtan 14 28 Chanzhi 42.9 66 Qujing 24.8 101 Baoji 14 28 Zhongshan 42.9 67 Wuhu 24.6 105 Zhangjiajie 12.8 30 Shantou 42.6 68 Chande 24.4 106 Datong 12.6 31 Huzhou 40.4 69 Chifeng 24.1 107 Zunyi 12.4 32 Jingzhou 40 70 Xianyang 23.3 107 Mianyang 12.4 33 Baoding 39.7 71 Nanchang 23.2 109 Benxi 12 34 Nanning 39.2 72 Rizhao 22.3 110 Karamay 11.2 35 Shenyang 38.8 73 Weifang 22.2 111 Zhanjiang 10.6 35 Mudanjiang 38.8 74 Jiaxing 22 112 Jilin 10.2 37 Qingdao 38.4 75 Changchun 21.7 113 Xining 10.2 38 Harbin 38.1 76 Fushun 21.6

II. Environmental Information Disclosure: Making Progress, but at a Preliminary Level

The preliminary assessment shows that progress has been made in environmental information disclosure in many regions of China. With respect to proactive pollutant information disclosure, Shanghai, Ningbo, Taiyuan, and Wuhan have systemically begun to disclose the records of local enterprises’ regulatory violations and exceeded standards, while cities such as Beijing, Chongqing, Fuzhou, and Jiaozuo perform well in the disclosure of the handling of letters, calls, and complaints. With respect to information disclosure upon request, Hefei, Qingdao, Kunming, and Zhengzhou distinguish themselves by active responses to information disclosure requests. Table 3.2 shows the top twenty cities in terms of each of the eight parameters.

Case 1: Ningbo, Zhejiang Province—Highest PITI Score of 72.9 among 113 Cities Ningbo performs well in the three most important indicators of the PITI, namely, disclosure of enterprises’ violations of regulations, standards exceeded, and accident record keeping; information disclosure upon request; and handling of letters, calls, petitions, and complaints about environmental problems and enterprise pollution. 62 institute of public and environmental affairs Disclosure upon request Discharge fees Environmental impact assessment document processing for project under construction and environmental acceptance check for completed projects Handling of letters, calls, petitions, and complaints about environmental problems and enterprise pollution Overall assessment of enterprise environmental performance Clean production audit results disclosure Table 3.2: Top 20 cities for PITI in 2008 Centralized control measures for pollution enterprises Disclosure of enterprise violations and standards exceeded records Total score (100 points) (28 points) (8 points) (8 points) (8 points) (18 points) (8 points) (4 points) (18 points) Index Rank Cities PITI 123 Ningbo4 Hefei5 Fuzhou6 Wuhan 72.97 Chanzhou8 Chongqing 66.6 63.79 Shanghai 56.8 61.210 56.7 Nantong 23.111 Taiyuan Wenzhou 56.5 21.412 18.6 Shaoxing 56.213 18.6 16.8 Dalian 5.614 55.4 53.3 4.2 Wuxi15 52.6 23.2 Shenzhen16 5.2 4.6 14.9 Quanzhou17 4.6 51.7 3.2 Kunming 22.4 3.2 19.9 5.818 51.1 Beijing 51.6 50.619 5.6 4.8 3.2 Taizhou 3.220 49.4 Hangzhou 6.4 6.4 6 11.2 5.6 Nanjing 19.9 4.2 5.4 5.6 49.1 14.5 5.6 48.4 48 1.6 4 0 0 5.6 3.2 47.2 4 6 3.6 0 3.2 0 5.6 1.6 19 4.6 16.2 5.8 3.6 11.2 2.2 1.6 4.6 5.6 14 16.9 3.6 7.2 1.6 5.2 6.4 3.2 3.6 3.2 3.6 16.9 16.2 7.4 4.6 3.6 7.2 5.3 6.2 14.7 0 0 1.6 3.4 14.4 0 0 11.4 3.2 2.8 3.2 6.8 16.2 0 6.8 4 2 3.2 2.8 7.2 3.6 0 14.7 4.8 16.9 3.6 2 12.8 2.4 3.6 2.8 15.4 0 4.2 2 7.6 14.4 2.2 16.8 1.4 18 0 12.8 5.6 3.6 14 12.8 16.9 7.2 3.2 1.6 0.2 5.6 12.8 3.2 15.8 2.8 5.2 3.2 2.4 5 11.6 0 0.2 0.2 1.6 2.8 3.2 1.2 5.6 3.8 14.4 3.2 11.6 16.2 0 17.2 0.2 2.2 2.6 17.2 12.8 8.8 4 progress in environmental information transparency 63

Table 3.3: Ningbo’s PITI score3 Item3 Enterprises’ violations Handling of letters, Disclosure upon request of regulations, standards visits, petitions, and (total of 18 points) exceeded, and accident complaints about records environmental (total of 28 points) problems and enterprise pollution (total of 18 points) Description In 2008, Ningbo and Petition and complaint Ningbo Environmental its Beilun District and case handling Protection Bureau replied Cixi County, disclosed information disclosures to IPE’s application more than 600 pieces include date, content, submitted in September of routine supervision response, and response 2008, asking for information. time of the case. All information on the responses directly administrative specify inspection and punishment cases. processing results. PITI score 23.1 points 16.2 points 12.8 points

The preliminary assessment result shows that in 2008, ‘Year One’ of pollutant information disclosure, PITI is still at the preliminary level. While the full score of the PITI is 100, among the 113 cities assessed, only four scored more than 60 points and thirty-two cities below 20 points. The average score for all the 113 cities was only slightly higher than 31 points.4

III. Information Disclosure and Economic Development

The preliminary assessment finds significant differences among regions with respect to the degree of environmental information disclosure. In general, eastern cities outperform cities in the central region, which in turn score better than western cities. The fifty-six cities assessed in the east of China have an average PITI score of 36.49; the thirty-four cities in the central region scored an average of 27.74; the twenty-three cities in the western region scored an average PITI of 22.60.

3 Three speciﬁc PITI scores of Ningbo in three main indicators in 2008. 4 For detailed assessment criteria, please see: http://www.ipe.org.cn/news/news_ view.jsp?BH=97 and www.greenlaw.org.cn/blog/?p=1191 64 institute of public and environmental affairs

However, a detailed analysis shows there is no deﬁnite relationship between environmental information disclosure and regional location. In the central and western regions where the disclosure level is relatively low, Wuhan, Chongqing, and Taiyuan have exceptional performances. Meanwhile, in eastern coastal provinces, where pollutant information transparency generally stands at a high level, very poor performances have been found in Zhanjiang, Benxi, and Tai’an.

Case 2: Wuhan, Hubei Province—Post Monitoring Data Online The highlight of Wuhan’s monitoring of enterprises’ daily pollution emissions is the pollution information disclosure system. Making use of the internet, this system provides the public with 24-hour online monitoring data and videos of sewage disposal and exhaust gas emissions in Wuhan since June 2008, while also providing historical data for reference. By selecting from major pollution sources and setting monitoring indicators and start and end times, the public can tell whether the enterprise’s discharge exceeds the standards for the speciﬁed period of time, clearly see the trends in discharge variation, and watch real-time surveillance videos of an enterprise’s pollution discharge. It is well known that the eastern, central, and western regions are not only geographic concepts but economic concepts in China. The disparity of PITI scores among these regions actually shows a certain degree of association between information transparency and economic development level. However, detailed analyses show no deﬁnite relation between environmental information transparency and regional economic development level. A comparison between Guangdong Province and Jiangsu Province, both in the developed coastal region and both export- oriented processing bases, shows the nine assessed cities in Jiangsu have an average per capita GDP of 39,846 RMB in 2007 and an average PITI score of 43.97 points, while the nine assessed cities in Guangdong have an average per capita GDP of 45,590 RMB and an average PITI score of 35.97.5

5 The nine cities assessed in Jiangsu were Changzhou, Nantong, Wuxi, Nanjing, Suzhou, Yangzhou, Yancheng, Xuzhou, and Lianyungang. The cities in Guangdong were Shenzhen, Fushan, Zhongshan, Guangzhou, Shantou, Zhuhai, Dongguan, Sha- oguan, and Zhenjiang. progress in environmental information transparency 65

Piti scores of 9 cities in Jiangsu Province Piti scores of 9 cities in Guangdong Province 70

0 012345 678910

Figure 3.1: Comparison of PITI (2008) scores between cities in Guang- dong Province and Jiangsu Province

IV. Certain Heavily Polluted Cities with Low Transparency Levels

It must be noted that in some areas with a high level of emission intensity, the PITI score is significantly low. Using the variable of pollution emission intensity per 10,000 RMB industrial output in 2007, we find that in certain cities with a high level of emission intensity in the eastern, central, and western regions (such as Shizuishan, Baoji, Xiangtan, Yibin, Luzhou, Benxi, Kaifeng, and Zaozhong) the environmental information transparency level is severely low.6 It is also worth noting that some heavily polluted cities score quite low for PITI. Taking the annual daily mean air pollution in 2005 as the variable, we find a rather low level of PITI in cities with a relatively high concentration level of sulfur dioxide and/or particulate matters (PM), such as Lanzhou, Zhuzhou, Datong, Linfen, Yangquan, Baotou, Yueyang, and Panzhihua.7

6 COD and sulfur dioxide emissions intensity per unit of industrial output in 2007 is quoted from the China Environment Statistical Yearbook 2007, China Environmental Science Press, December 2008. 7 Annual daily average of sulfur dioxide and PM10 in 2005 is quoted from the 2005 Environment Bulletin of relevant provinces and municipalities. 66 institute of public and environmental affairs

It is natural that some cities with high PITI scores do not have satisfactory environmental quality. There are many reasons for this. One important reason is that society has failed to attach sufﬁcient importance to environmental information disclosure and public participation has not been actively promoted, making it hard to convert information disclosure into real power for environmental protection. The purpose of developing PITI is to help the public make better use of open environmental information and participate in environmental decision-making and management.

V. Rocky Start for Information Disclosure upon Request

Measures on Open Environmental Information ( for Trial Implementation), for the first time, requires environmental protection bureaus to disclose information upon request. In order to assess the effects of such requirements, we applied to each of the 113 cities for its enterprise pollutant administrative punishments records and handling results of letters, calls, petitions, and complaints about environmental problems and enterprise pollution in September 2008. Twenty-seven cities provided their lists, complete or incomplete. However, more than eighty-six cities failed to offer their lists. They refused to provide the information, claiming the following reasons: it was “not suitable for disclosure”; the information involved “enterprise secrets”; they needed an “official authorization paper from a higher level of government”; or they were “protecting economic development.” Staff of some city governments even repeatedly hung up the phone when they heard we were applying for information disclosure. We were also surprised to find there was just no specific responsible bureau in some other cities to which we could apply for information disclosure.

Case 3: Hefei, Anhui Province—Model of Environmental Information Disclosure upon Request The total PITI score of Hefei is 66.6. Hefei scores particularly well with respect to enterprises’ records of regulatory violations and standards exceeded, handling results of letters, calls, petitions, and complaints about environmental problems and enterprise pollution, and disclosure upon request. Especially in terms of disclosure upon request, Hefei is one of the only two cities to have a perfect score (the other city being Qingdao). progress in environmental information transparency 67

IPE submitted an online application to the government information disclosure website of the Hefei Municipal Government on April 1, 2009. On April 14, the environmental protection bureau of Hefei faxed us two papers, Government Information Disclosure Application Accep- tance Notice (政府信息公开申请受理告知书) and Government Information Disclosure Notice (政府信息公开告知书), to keep us informed that our application information had been posted on the bulletin of “Latest News of All Departments under the Municipal Government,” which meant that the environmental information requested by the applicant had been made public. It is beyond doubt that assessment according to the PITI has reﬂected the gap existing in environmental information disclosure. The purpose of identifying gaps is to promote the solution of problems. One very important objective of this assessment project is to ﬁnd and share good pollution information transparency practices. Originated from actual practice, these good practices are highly operational. Therefore, it is absolutely feasible to popularize these practices.

VI. Four Municipalities Directly under the Central Government

A comparison of the rankings of the four municipalities directly under the central government, namely Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing, shows that Shanghai, Chongqing, and Beijing score fairly well while Tianjin’s ranking is rather low. A detailed analysis reveals that Shanghai performs outstandingly with respect to disclosure of records of violations and standards exceeded and leads in pollutant information transparency. Chongqing and Beijing have developed their own special features with respect to information disclosure of the handling results of letters, calls, petitions, and complaints about environmental problems and enterprise pollution. Meanwhile, the three municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing positively responded to the application for information disclosure. To improve its performance, Tianjin should learn from the three cities in environmental information disclosure. However, in terms of information disclosure, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Beijing are far from perfect. A detailed analysis shows none of the three cities performs satisfactorily in all aspects of information transparency. As a result, they are left behind by Ningbo, Hefei, Fuzhou, and Wuhan with better performances. For example, Shanghai deﬁnitely lags behind with respect to information disclosure of the handling 68 institute of public and environmental affairs results of letters, calls, petitions and complaints about environmental problems and enterprise pollution. For a city with a large population of 18 million, only seven pieces of information of this kind are available this year. The disclosure of records of regulatory violations and standards exceeded in Chongqing and Beijing is neither complete nor systematic. It is obvious that Shanghai, Chongqing, and Beijing could enjoy a rapid improvement if they can learn from each other.

VII. Innovative Models: Not a Privilege of Big Cities

Pollution information transparency innovative models are not a privilege belonging to big cities only. For example, Weihai, a medium-sized coastal city in Shandong Province, is the ﬁrst to publicize real-time regulatory information of heavy pollutant sources online. Changzhou in Jiangsu Province, through local media outlets, publicizes enterprises’ regulatory violations and exceeded standards records. Taizhou in Zhejiang Province provides one of the most comprehensive daily supervision information disclosures. Huzhou also in Zhejiang publicizes emission volumes, especially emissions of exceeded standards on a bulletin board. Shenyang and other cities in Liaoning Province have built their respective environmental protection bureau websites with a strong search service and therefore make their websites more user-friendly. Hefei directly posted the lists of the companies involved in exceeded standards and regulatory violations on their website in September 2008, providing related links to make this list available to more users.8

Case 4: Changzhou City, Jiangsu Province—Regularly Publicizing the List of Enterprises Involved in Exceeded Standards and Regulatory Violations through Media Outlets In 2008, the Changzhou Municipal Government used the column “Citizens’ Voices and Instigations” in the Changzhou Daily, a major local newspaper, to publicize the list of enterprises that had been investigated and received a penalty once a month. Disclosed informa-

8 Related information and detailed analysis will be issued in the ﬁnal research report in October 2009. progress in environmental information transparency 69 tion includes enterprises’ names, facts about the violations, pollutants exceeding the standards, and their concentration levels. Thanks to the column, the frequency of disclosure, and the wide circulation of the newspaper, enterprises violating environmental regulations were made public.

VIII. Potential for Better Information Disclosure

By ranking cities according to each of the eight indicators, we have found a “champion” for the best performance for each indicator. Put- ting the eight champions together, we can get an “All Star” team like the “All Star” basketball team, which scores as high as 89.5 points. This score is signiﬁcant because it is based on practices instead of assumptions. It shows that, under the current social and economic conditions in China, pollution information transparency is possible. If any individual city can learn widely from other cities’ strong points, it is possible for this city to achieve a high level of pollutant information transparency. More and more people have realized that information disclosure is of special signiﬁcance for perfecting China’s environmental management mechanisms and overcoming local protectionism, weak law enforcement, and low-cost for illegal actions. As NGOs in China, IPE and NRDC are allowed to evaluate the level of government environmental information disclosure. This fact proves that China has made some remarkable progress in public participation and environmental information transparency. With the PITI assessment project, we saw breakthroughs in terms of environmental information disclosure in 2008 and the great potential for improvement in different regions. Recently, we have started the 2009 PITI assessment campaign to assess the progress made by different cities. We are ready to strengthen communication and cooperation with people from all walks of life and particularly government bureaus at all levels in a joint effort to promote a higher level of environmental information transparency in China, thus boosting China’s sustainable development.

REGULATIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR PLANS: BREAKTHROUGHS AND LIMITATIONS

Wang Shekun

Regulations on Environmental Impact Assessment for Plans, the most important environmental legislation in China in 2009, is a great improvement over China’s Law on Environmental Impact Assessment in that it has clariﬁed the preparation, review, and follow-up assessment of environmental impact assessment (EIA) documents and the legal liabilities involved.1 However, due to conﬂicts in developmental interests and certain defects in the original Law on Environmental Impact Assessment, there still exist several limitations as to the extent, screening, technical organization, transparency, reviewing, and procedures in the new regulations.

I. Background for the Regulations on Environmental Impact Assessment for Plans

The Regulations on Environmental Impact Assessment for Plans (henceforth referred to as the Regulations) (规划环境影响评价条例) were issued by China’s State Council in August 2009 and put into effect on October 1, 2009. China’s Law on Environmental Impact Assessment (henceforth referred to as EIA Law) (环境影响评价法), has been in effect since Septem- ber 1, 2003. With a whole chapter devoted to basic principles for environmental impact assessment (EIA) for plans, the law signaled a gradual shift in China’s EIA from construction projects on the micro- level to strategic planning on the macro-level. Meanwhile, in 2004, the former State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA)

1 Translator’s note: There are different translated versions of the regulations under discussion. We adopt the one used by the official website of the China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection. These regulations cover two levels of EIAs: strategic EIAs and EIAs of projects and plans. 72 wang shekun issued the Technical Guidelines for EIA for Plans ( for Trial Implementation) (规划环境影响评价技术导则(试行)) to provide specific technical standards, as well as two ensuing regulations: Measures on the Reviewing of EIA Reports for Special Planning (专项规划环境影响评价报告书审查办法) and Measures on the Management of Expert Databases for EIA Reviewing (环境影响评价审查专家库管理办法). With a view toward specifying the scope of the EIAs for planning, Specific Scope for Plans to Prepare an Environmental Impact Report ( for Trial Implementation) (编制环境影响报告书的规划的具体范围(试行)) and Specific Scope for Plans to Prepare an Environmental Impact Chapter and Note ( for Trial Implementation) (编制环境影响篇章或说明的规划的具体范围(试行)) were also issued by the former SEPA, with the approval of the State Council. Nevertheless, the terms related to EIA for planning in the EIA Law were not effectively carried out. Apart from people’s insufficient recognition of their importance, the EIA’s partial failure may be attributed to ineffective policies and lack of clear-cut responsibilities for all parties involved.2 Therefore, the former SEPA has actively promoted the drafting of the Regulations on Environmental Impact Assessment for Plans since April 2006. In 2009, after three years, the Regulations finally went into effect.

II. Improvements on the EIA Law in the Regulations

The EIA Law only stipulates the principles of EIAs for plans in the nine clauses of its second chapter, whereas the Regulations have clariﬁed and extended the relevant terms in the EIA Law with a total of thirty- six clauses in six chapters, thus, greatly increasing the feasibility of the relevant guidelines in the law.

A. Improved Regulations on Document Preparation for EIAs for Plans The Regulations clearly stipulate that the body responsible for EIAs for plans is the plan-making organization, which is also held accountable for the quality of the EIA document. Meanwhile, the content of EIAs for plans has also been standardized. On the macro-level, it is required

2 Li Tianwei and Zhou Weifeng, “Analysis of the Management Problems in Envi- ronmental Impact Assessment for Plans,” Environmental Protection, No. 11 (2007). regulations on environmental impact assessment for plans 73 that EIAs for plans should cover: the overall potential effects resulting from the implementation of the plan in the ecological system of the relevant region, watershed, or marine area; the long-term impacts on the environment and public health; the relationship among economic, social, and environmental benefits; and the relationship between current and long-term benefits once the plan is implemented. On the micro-level, the analysis, prediction, and evaluation of the environmental impact in the EIA documents should specifically cover those in the environmental capacity of the resources, adverse environmental consequences, and the plan’s environmental compatibility with other plans. The proposed mitigation measures and solutions should include policies to prevent or mitigate the adverse environmental impacts and measures to be taken on management and technical levels. The con- cluding part of the document should include the environmental rationality and feasibility of the draft plan, the rationality and effectiveness of proposed counter measures and solutions for preventing or reducing adverse environmental impacts, and suggested modifications for the draft plan. Moreover, the Regulations also specify the channels and safeguard measures for consultations with the public. They stipulate that if public opinion is a clear departure from the conclusions of EIA, the plan- making organization shall make further scientific verification through conferences, public hearings, etc. The plan-makers should attach to the EIA report submitted for review and approval a statement on the adoption or rejection of public comments with sound reasons.

B. A Detailed Regulation on Document Reviewing for EIAs for Plans The Regulations clearly state that the competent authority for environmental protection is granted the right to convene a panel to review the environmental impact report (EIR) for the special plans that have been approved by the local governments. Rules for the composition of the reviewing panel and its working procedures have also been set in the Regulations. For instance, experts who have already participated in the drafting of the EIR are not eligible to be members of the reviewing panel; more than half of the reviewing panel shall be experts in the ﬁeld; and the reviewing report shall be agreed upon and signed by no less than three quarters of the reviewing members, with differing opinions of the members truthfully documented and reported. 74 wang shekun

The basic content of the reviewing report is also stipulated in the Regulations: authenticity of the original materials and data in the EIR, appropriateness of the assessment methodology, reliability of the analysis, prediction and evaluation of environmental impact, rationality and effectiveness of mitigation measures and solutions for preventing or minimizing adverse environmental impacts, rationality of the given reasons for the adoption or rejection of public comments, and scien- tiﬁc level of the EIA conclusions. Moreover, the Regulations make clear three types of review comments: 1) “approved”; 2) “the EIR is to be revised and re-assessed” for those EIRs that contain serious ﬂaws or omissions; and 3) “the EIR is rejected” for plans that the review panel recommends not to be authorized. Very importantly, the Regulations have elaborated on a safeguard mechanism, which demands the plan approval authority should take both the conclusions in the EIR and the reviewing comments on EIR into serious consideration. On the one hand, the plan approval authority—if it rejects either the EIR conclusions or the EIR reviewing comments—has to submit detailed written explanations, which will be archived for future reference. On the other hand, institutions, experts, and the public are entitled to review these written documents. By making the information publicly available, the Regulations ensure that the plan approval authority shall take the EIR conclusions and the EIR reviewing comments seriously.

C. An Additional Regulation on Follow-up Assessment The EIA Law has stipulated that follow-up assessment shall be organized by the plan-making organization, but no further details on its assessment content have been supplied. Additional provisions in this aspect have been speciﬁed in the Regulations: the follow-up assessment should include a comparative analysis and evaluation between the actual environmental impacts after the plan implementation and the predicted environmental impacts documented in the EIR; analysis and evaluation of the effectiveness of mitigation measures and solutions adopted in the process of the plan implementation aimed at preventing or mitigating adverse environmental impacts; public comments on the environmental impacts resulted from the plan implementation; and the conclusions of the follow-up assessment. regulations on environmental impact assessment for plans 75

D. An Extended Regulation on Legal Liabilities The EIA Law only stipulates the legal liabilities of the plan-making organizations and the plan approval authorities. This is certainly not sufﬁcient, because the legal subjects involved in the process of EIAs for plans are more than these two and every legal subject should bear corresponding legal responsibilities and liabilities. Under this guidance, the Regulations have designated certain legal liabilities to each of the parties involved, including the plan-making organizations, the plan approval authorities, technical agencies of EIAs for plans, and the agencies that bring together the review panel, reviewing experts, and departmental representatives of the review panel. In this way, the Regulations serve as a mechanism for the authorities involved to guarantee the effective implementation of EIAs for plans.

III. Limitations of the Regulations

The Regulations are an improvement on the EIA Law to a certain degree and provide an operational legal basis for EIAs for plans. However, after a careful reading of the Regulations, one may still have a sense of dissatisfaction concerning the law’s inadequacy. Many problems still exist, particularly in the regulations for document preparation and review.

A. Unclariﬁed Scoping The EIA Law has listed the plans that are required to conduct an EIA in Article Seven and Article Eight. The two Speciﬁc Scopes issued by the former SEPA in 2004 also follow the same methodology. Unfor- tunately, the Regulations have not broken new ground on this score since a listing can never be exhaustive, and the incomplete list has the potential risk that some plan-makers could evade legal responsibilities to conduct an EIA. For example, the terms of “guiding plans for special projects” in the EIA Law is confusing, and to explain it as “special planning for strategic development” in the Regulations is need- less repetition. This may provide some good excuses for plan-making or plan approval departments to seek an exemption from their EIA duties or a simpler EIA procedure for the plans they are in charge of. Eventually, this will lead to a failure in the effective implementation of the Regulations. 76 wang shekun

B. Irrational Screening Screening involves applying different assessment procedures according to the actual conditions of different plans. The general principle is that the more possible it is for a plan to produce serious environmental impacts, the more thorough its EIA should be. According to the Regulations, integrated planning involving land utilization or construction, as well as development and utilization of regions, watershed areas, and marine areas should include a chapter or note on environmental impacts in their plans, while special planning should submit a separate report on its environmental impacts. Since a chapter or note is less detailed and simpler than the report, it is clear that the legislators have assumed that the impact of integrated planning on the environment is smaller than that of the special planning, which might be incorrect and groundless. For example, to construct a development zone would make a great impact on the environment, but its plan-makers only need to write a brief assessment in one chapter or note to state its likely environmental impact.

C. Obscure Legal Nature of the EIA Technical Agencies According to the Regulations, the body legally responsible for an EIA is the plan-making organization. Yet, technical agencies are often sought to help prepare the EIA documents, as EIA involves complex environmental technology. How to define the qualifications for technical agencies, however, is left awkwardly unanswered in the Regulations. As a matter of fact, three approaches to solving the problem were discussed during the drafting of the Regulations: one is to specify the qualifications, another is to legalize the recommendation system, and the last is to leave it unregulated. The third approach seems to have been adopted in the Regulations, which means that the EIA technical agencies are to be standardized by the selection of the market. Yet, two prerequisites are indispensable to the effective functioning of this approach: one is the existence of a free market, and the other is the establishment of good professional ethics, which, it is sad to say, are both lacking in China. Originally the legislators did not intend a lais- sez-faire attitude toward Chinese EIA agencies, but the unresolved dis- agreements among departments has eventually led to today’s “ostrich policy” on this issue. regulations on environmental impact assessment for plans 77

D. Lack of a Disclosure Rule Although the rights and procedures for the public to participate in the EIAs for plans has been further strengthened in the Regulations, the disclosure rule of the EIA documents has still not been issued. How- ever, a sound environmental information disclosure system is a key to guaranteeing the scientific accuracy of environmental policies made by the government and the effectiveness of public participation. It is also needed to safeguard public environmental rights and interests. During the process of drafting the Regulations, it was once stipulated that the drafted EIR made by the plan-making organization should be voluntarily disclosed to the public, and the public should have the right to apply to review and photocopy the draft report. However, during the comment proceedings of the draft Regulations, the information disclosure and transparency rules gradually disappeared—a sad result of departmental conflicts and compromises by the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council.

E. Incomplete Coverage for EIR Reviewing According to the Regulations, only the EIRs of special planning shall be submitted for review, independent of the plan approval procedures, while other EI chapters or notes are not subject to independent review. This will lead to an ineffective and inadequate external oversight of the EIA of these plans, and many EIRs could become mere formalities. What’s worse, the plan approval authorities are always charged with the responsibility to improve economic development, so their conﬂict- ing roles may result in a negligence of obvious adverse environmental consequences for the sake of economic growth.

F. Irrational Differentiation of Reviewing Procedures The Regulations stipulate that different reviewing procedures shall be adopted according to the different levels of the plan approval authorities. The given reviewing procedure is mainly applicable to the EIRs of those plans submitted to the government for approval. As for other plans that are submitted to individual ministries for approval, the reviewing of their EIRs is not specified in the Regulations. It only mentions that their specific reviewing procedures and measures shall be jointly formulated by the competent authority of environmental 78 wang shekun protection of the State Council and related ministries and commissions of the State Council. Actually, the former SEPA issued Measures on the Review of EIA Reports for Special Planning (专项规划环境影响评价报告书审查办法) in 2003, which did not solve the problem either. The major difference in these two kinds of reviewing lies in the different locations of power to convene a reviewing panel for EIR. The power is granted to the environmental protection department alone if the plans are submitted to the government for approval; it is shared by the environmental protection department and the plan approval authority if the plans are submitted to individual ministries for approval. Nevertheless, the difference in plan approval authorities cannot and should not become the rationale for the differentiation of examining procedures. Looking back at the legislative processes of the EIA Law and the Regulations, it can be seen that this differentiation is purely a result of the conflicts of interest among different departments or sectors, because EIAs for plans are often seen by the plan approval authorities as a division of, and intrusion into, their original power by the environmental protection department.

IV. Prospects for the Legislation on EIA for Plans

Among the problems existing in the Regulations, some are inevitable due to the original defects in the EIA Law, while some are avoidable, yet remain unresolved due to conflicts in departmental interests. The struggle among departments has an adverse impact on the exercise of public power, which becomes divided into departmental powers, which seek and legitimate their own departmental interests only. Specifically speaking, in the field of environmental protection, “the long-term and overall interests valued by strategic environmental impact assessments (SEIA) are often in conflict with the short-term, local interests pursued by some departments or local governments, which leads to a luke- warm support of EIA from many departments and local governments. What’s worse, some even make efforts to find excuses to evade their responsibilities for EIA.”3

3 Zhang Ke, “A Three-year War in the EIAs for Plans,” First Financial Daily, November 25, 2009. regulations on environmental impact assessment for plans 79

Law is an art of balance. Legislation is a process of striking a balance among all interests concerned, a decision-making process involving both rationality and irrationality, and a game of compromise among interest groups by means of formal and informal policies.4 Compro- mise is not only necessary, but also a must in legislation. However, it should heed a bottomline. The above analysis has shown that the compromise of interests in EIAs for plans has already crossed the line, jeopardizing the certainty and feasibility of the law. There is no doubt that limitations of the EIA Law and the Regu- lations are caused by China’s social background to a certain degree. However, since more and more alarming environmental problems are resulting from poor decision-making on the macro-level, a strong system is necessary to regulate all the subjects involved in EIAs for plans.5 Therefore, the legislation should be further improved to create a favorable legal environment for EIAs for plans. In the long term, the Regulations serve only as an expedient to make up the deficiencies during the transitional period. Only when time is ripe for an amendment to the EIA Law can the limitations and problems of the EIA legislation be completely rooted out. In view of the uncertainty of the amendment and the long process it will take, and in face of the present urgent need for a clarified and operational law on EIAs for plans, it is important that those unspecified provisions in the Regulations be clarified and defined in the departmental rules so as to ensure the effective implementation of the existing laws. During all the work to improve legislation on EIAs for plans, either to establish supplementary rules and regulations or to amend the EIA Law and the Regulations, it is necessary for all parties involved to transcend departmental interests. China’s legislation on EIAs for plans should be amended and refined on the basis of a scientific and democratic legislative system.

4 Bu Xiaolin, Social Process in Legislation: An Analysis of and Reﬂection on the Grassland Law Case (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2007). 5 Hou Xiaoge and Luan Shengji, “Rational Paradigms of SEIA,” Studies in Science, No. 2, 2007.

CHINA’S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS

Yu Jie

This article reviews the foreign diplomatic pressures China faces as a developing country during negotiations on the post-2012 international climate change mechanism, China’s relevant voluntary actions and motives, and comments on them from around the world. It also discusses the cost of and path towards achieving the emissions reduction targets and the model for a corresponding international mechanism with transparent and open information. In the end, it presents a possible path toward reorientation in future negotiations and a future dialogue platform for the major economic powers and emitters including China. December 2009, the last month of the 21st century’s ﬁrst decade, witnessed the conclusion of the global climate negotiations after two weeks of tedious and dramatic meetings in Copenhagen. Under an extraordinary global spotlight, the feeble Copenhagen Accord was left unexpectedly stranded, leaving a negotiation result that is almost legally negligible.

I. Climate Negotiations: From Bali to Copenhagen

Expectations for a breakthrough in the world’s climate security policies at the Copenhagen climate talks have been high since 2005.1 The ﬁrst commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will come to an end in 2012. According to this ﬁrst global agreement aiming to protect the climate, major developed countries excluding the United States are supposed to reduce their emissions by 5.2% on average compared with their

1 Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in November 2004, revalidating this global agreement on greenhouse gas emissions reduction that had been stranded by the withdrawal of the United States. In the following year, the post-2012 global emissions reduction negotiation process was started up in accordance with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 82 yu jie levels in 1990. The total amount of emissions of these countries is just more than half of the global emissions, which have increased by 20% since 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol was enacted.2 China and other large developing countries’ responsibility for emissions reduction became the focus at the very beginning of this round of negotiations. From the coexistence of the Kyoto Protocol and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) mechanisms in Montreal, to the Article 9 Review in Nairobi and to the formal startup of talks on their coexistence in Bali, the focus of nearly every year was on developed countries’ trying to bypass the “common but differentiated responsibilities” between “developed countries” and “developing countries,” thereby setting legal procedures for developing countries to substantially participate in the world climate system after 2012. In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an organization consisting of more than 2300 scientists in climate- relevant fields, released the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). This report predicts that the global average temperature rise will likely reach 6.4 degrees Celsius at the end of the 21st century if no action is taken. It also clarifies the future status and responsibility of developing countries for global emissions. The report states that the carbon dioxide emissions caused by energy consumption will increase by 45% to 110% by 2030, of which 2/3 to 3/4 will come from developing countries. For this, scientists suggest that by 2020, developed countries should reduce their emissions by 25% to 45% compared with their levels in 1990 and that developing countries that are industrializing should also achieve significant emission reductions in the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. More- over, global emissions need to reach a peak in five to ten years and then decrease year by year. It is more possible to control the global temperature rise within two degrees Celsius by the end of the century if global emissions only decrease by 50% in 2050 compared with the level in 1990. This means that the global CO2 emissions per capita must be less than two tons by then, with the predicted population growth considered.3

2 They are Annex I countries that have ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol and are also known as Annex B countries. Non-Annex I countries generally refer to those listed as developing countries when the Kyoto Protocol was reached. They also include OECD countries like Korea, Singapore, and Mexico as well as some wealthy oil-producing countries. 3 Today, the CO2 emissions per capita are twenty-four tons in the United States, around ten in both the EU and Japan, and around ﬁve in China. china’s role in international climate change negotiations 83

The report shocked the world when it was first released and climate change has since captured the attention of the international community. The same year also witnessed the advent of the Bali Action Plan, which establishes demands for future U.S. participation, and under which developing countries agree to make contribution under certain conditions. Mentioned in the Bali Action Plan, “measurable, reportable, and verifiable” (MRV) has since become a new term in climate negotiations. The success of the Bali climate talks was once praised as a rare vic- tory in multilateral politics, because the world was in dire need of a new agreement to protect the increasingly endangered global climate. With the Bali Road Map, hopes for subsequent negotiations were pinned on the American presidential election at the end of 2008. The involvement of the United States was crucial for the European Union (EU), the other member countries of the Umbrella Group, and developing countries.4 People expected that during the first year after taking office, the new U.S. president would persuade the Senate and the House of Representatives to pass climate-relevant bills, and following a path of domestic legislation before international commitment, avoid the mistake of the former Clinton administration, which had failed to enact its commitment made to the international community. Therefore, the subsequent Poznan climate talks at the end of 2008 progressed very slowly, because the whole world was waiting. The years from Bali to Copenhagen were notable for the world. Several major global events happened directly or indirectly related to the climate. As the climate issue became a mainstream one, those events became inextricably linked. Between 2007 and 2008, China became the world’s largest emit- ter of greenhouse gases (GHGs). With a steadily increasing GDP, it approached the world’s second largest economy at the end of 2009. After the global financial crisis broke out, Western countries faced financially tight times. Therefore, bailing out the economy became more important on both the government’s agenda and the public’s. After Barack Obama took office, the House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act (the ACES Act) in May 2009, aiming to reduce the country’s emissions by 17% in 2020 from 2005

4 This is a coalition formed in the climate negotiation process, including the United States, Canada, Japan Australia, and New Zealand. 84 yu jie levels and achieve the goal through emissions trading.5 A similar bill was off the agenda in the Senate, however, because of the national health care bill, the most important one since Obama took office, was blocked. China received the world’s attention in the financial crisis because of its good financial status, and it was expected to play a more significant role in global governance. With the financial crisis and the stalled U.S. Senate climate legislation, governments began lowering expectations for the 2009 Assembly of States Parties, which was in contrast to the public opinion stimulated by science alerts. Rounds of bilateral and multilateral talks ended up with a compromise that countries should formulate a framework convention at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (commonly known as the Copenhagen Summit) and agree on a new, legally binding global accord in 2010. That was theoretically the last compromise, because it left merely two years for countries to ratify the accord.6 Right before the Copenhagen Summit, U.S. President Obama paid a visit to China, a move seen as the United States’ effort to coordinate its position with China. Although the text of the accord released after the Copenhagen Summit revealed that no substantial breakthrough was made, “the Group of Two” (G2) had become popular around the international community, even though China still ranked lower than 80th in terms of GDP per capita.

II. Analysis of China’s Goal

As the Copenhagen Summit drew near, changes were occurring in China’s climate agenda. In September 2009, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) attended the G8 Summit and a UN high-level meeting held in the United States. Mr. Hu said at the meetings that China will go further to include ﬁghting climate change in its economic and social development plan and continue to take powerful measures. First of all,

5 That is equivalent to a 4% emissions reduction in 2020 compared with the level in 1990. 6 The Kyoto Protocol will not become effective unless countries that represent more than half of the global emissions ratify it. Therefore, the withdrawal of the United States led to the ineffectiveness of the agreement until Russia ratified it seven years later. china’s role in international climate change negotiations 85 it will increase efforts to save energy and increase energy efficiency in a bid to significantly decrease the carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP in 2020 from 2005 levels. Second, it will aggressively develop renewable energy and nuclear power in a bid to increase by 15% the ratio of non-fossil fuel energy to primary energy consumption by 2020. Third, it will aggressively increase its forest carbon sequestration in a bid to expand the forest area by 40 million hectares and increase the forest reserve by 1.3 billion cubic meters in 2020 compared with 2005. Fourth, it will aggressively develop a green, low-carbon, and circular economy and research and promote climate-friendly technologies.7 The first of these four moves drew wide attention from the international community and was considered a positive signal from China that it would likely propose a quantitative emissions reduction target for 2020 before or during the Copenhagen Summit. Meanwhile, Chinese leaders were redoubling their efforts to prepare China’s negotiation proposal. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) spent a full day listening to reports about China’s energy use and emissions reduction prospects presented by experts from the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE), Tsinghua University, and the Energy Research Institute of the National Development and Reform Com- mission (NDRC). Furthermore, the book China’s Energy Outlook to 2050 (中国 2050 能源展望) was published in September. In November, Brazilian President Lula announced the Brazilian emissions reduction target for 2020, a 36.1% to 38.9% GHG emissions reduction in the BAU scenario. He clarified that it was a voluntary commitment made by a developing country. President Lula noted that China should also set a similar target. With restrictions from domestic legislation, U.S. President Obama announced a temporary emissions reduction target of 17% below 2005 levels by 2020. China was facing great pressure. After much deliberation, China announced its emissions reduction target in late November: to reduce the carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 40% to 45% using the carbon intensity standard of 2005 as the base year. China also asserted that this was a voluntary emissions reduction target of China as a developing country. In other words, it

7 From a speech made by President Hu Jintao at the opening ceremony of the UN Climate Change Summit, the official website of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, September 23, 2009, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009- 09/23/content_1423832.htm. 86 yu jie was not the result of negotiations and, hence, different in nature from the legally binding ones set by developed countries. The announced target aroused heated debates between domestic and foreign media, which held observably different views. The Chinese government, civil society, and enterprises generally believe that this is a laudable target but that it will take great efforts for China to achieve it. Their viewpoint is based on the fact that many small power, iron and steel, and chemical plants have been shut down to meet the energy efficiency target of reducing emissions by 20% in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, leading to hundreds of thousands of job losses. With the top-down target allotment system, neither local governments nor enterprises see much room for further emissions reduction. Moreover, power companies, which account for 33% of the total emissions in China, have employed the world’s most advanced technologies for their latest coal-fired power generating units. China is a world leader in terms of the growth rate of renewable energy. Further increasing energy efficiency will depend on natural gas power generation and nuclear energy, which in turn depends on the avail- ability of resources. Unlike the domestic attention to the probability of realization, most international comments are premised on many organizations’ previous prediction of China’s emissions reduction in the BAU scenario to conclude whether this new mid-term target belongs to significant emissions reduction in the BAU scenario. Consequently, there is a strong suspicion in the international community that China would taken similar actions even without climate change; hence, they should not be included in additional efforts. What is the BAU scenario? The focus of the debate is on whether it refers to the energy consumption trend before the target of Chi- na’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan is implemented or whether the target is directly included in the BAU scenario. According to the forecast of emissions and GDP released in May 2009 by the U.S. Energy Infor- mation Administration (EIA), the BAU scenario means that China’s energy efficiency will increase by 46% in 2020 over 2005 levels. The International Energy Agency (IEA) released a similar forecast of 40%, in November 2009. The difference primarily resulted from different predictions about China’s GDP in the coming decade. Their predictions about the energy scenario would be very close to each other if they had adopted the same hypothesis for the GDP growth rate. The china’s role in international climate change negotiations 87

BAU scenario generally refers to the trend right before the issuance of relevant policies and the one that they point to. Research shows that the 20% energy efﬁciency target in China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006 to 2010) is 24% if it is converted into carbon intensity. If China’s emissions reduction target for 2020 is a 40% to 45% decrease per GDP unit compared with 2005 (the maxi- mum is generally adopted if there is no other condition), China will need to achieve a carbon intensity target of 28% in the next decade after 2010. In other words, the target for the next decade is higher than that in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. Given that non-fossil fuel energy will account for 15% of China’s primary energy consumption by 2020, it will be more likely to surpass the target. Therefore, China has the potential to be more ambitious in emissions reduction. The interpretation of the BAU scenario is crucial for evaluation of

China’s emissions reduction target. If the CO2 emission levels after the energy efficiency policies of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan were published are taken as the BAU scenario, they can be regarded as being quite conservative. Otherwise, China’s contribution can be regarded as being considerable if the energy growth scenario before the Elev- enth Five-Year Plan is taken as the BAU scenario. The key point is whether the energy efficiency target proposed in the Eleventh Five- Year Plan is for reasons of climate, energy security, or air quality. When it comes to energy conservation, energy security may be the primary consideration for numerous developing countries (except Bra- zil, whose primary means of emissions reduction is reducing deforestation). Hence, it is difficult to work out pure predictions in the BAU scenario with energy security excluded. By setting 2005 as the base year, the Chinese government obviously regards the fact that the emissions increased faster than did the GDP before the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period as the BAU scenario. In fact, Premier Wen Jiabao said at the Copenhagen Summit that China would not only continue implementing its proposed emissions reduction target but also do more than that, even if no international accord had been reached. China has shown a clear position that it already takes energy conservation and emissions reduction, as well as a low-carbon economy, as its basic national policies, whether out of global interests or its own. China is orienting social development towards low-carbon technological innovation and commercialization, establishing a low-carbon society among other policy moves. 88 yu jie

III. How Can China Achieve the Target?

The confidence of the Chinese government comes from the success of local companies dedicated to developing low-carbon technologies in recent years. With the swift success of companies like Suntech Power and BYD Co. Ltd., the Chinese government has seen the hope of technological innovation and industrial upgrades brought on by a low-carbon economy. The increasing maturity of venture capital and private equity investment in China has signified the rise of those emerging industries. According to a survey among more than 600 private equity investment funds and relevant professionals in China, 69% of the respondents pay much attention to new energy and green industries, 49% to infrastructure construction, 45% to biotechnology, and 44% to retail.8 The future low-carbon economy will require large investments. If it achieves its carbon emissions reduction target in 2020—a 45% decrease per GDP unit compared with 2005—China will have to pay an annual 30 billion USD incremental cost in the next decade. That is, each Chinese household will have to pay 64 USD more annually, according to a study by a team led by Professor Zou Ji (邹骥) with Renmin University of China.9 Those investments will mostly depend on private and commercial organizations. Thus, clear policy signals are vital for investors to evaluate the return on investment and feasibility. In fact, the carbon price fell to 12.5 EUR from 14.5 EUR on the first Monday after the Copenhagen Summit ended, a clear signal that the negotiation result from the summit delivered a blow to the post- 2012 carbon market. With unclear international policies, both the legal status of emissions reduction policies of every country and their preparation of specific policies and measures became critical, so as not to slow down the pace of global energy transformation. Of all the developed countries and regions, only the EU meets that condition at present. In late 2008, the EU Parliament passed a resolution

8 Zhang Mo, Zou Lan, Meng Hua, and Xu Yue, “The Focus of Private Equity Next Year: Renewable Energies and Others,” Economic Information Daily, June 15, 2009. 9 Zou Ji, “The Interpretation of China’s Emissions Reduction Target and the Out- look for the Copenhagen Summit,” (speech from the website of Renmin University of China, December 8, 2009), http://envi.ruc.edu.cn/envicn/html/xinwenzhongxin/ jiaoxuedongtai/2009/1208/678.html. china’s role in international climate change negotiations 89 to reduce its emissions by 20% in 2020 from 1990 levels. Moreover, it has completed the legislative process for the policy package. In 2010, China framed the Twelfth Five-Year Plan as a phased objective for the realization of its emissions reduction target in 2020. The two leading factors for the energy conservation result of China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan are the application of clean technologies and the adjustment of its economic structure, according to the latest report from McKinsey.10 Besides the application of energy-saving technologies, clean-technology applications include the replacement of small, energy-inefficient facilities with large, energy-efficient ones, the improvement of management processes, and the substitution of renewable energy for thermal power. The structural adjustments include: increasing the proportion of energy conservation and emissions reduction tertiary industries in the GDP; decreasing the proportion of energy-intensive heavy industry in the secondary industry; and increasing the added value of products from heavy industries, making the output value grow faster than does the production volume and, hence, leading to a decrease in energy consumption per unit of output value. The report also found that 80% of the emissions reduction was realized by clean technologies in the few years before 2009 due to fast industrialization and that the structural adjustment has since been increasing due to the subsequent slowdown of the heavy industry growth caused by the global financial crisis. The possible energy efficiency target values in the Twelfth Five- Year Plan are 15%, 20%, and 25% respectively, according to forecasts in the same report. If the effect of GHG emissions reduction brought by alternative energy and carbon credit management are factored in, the three targets correspond to a 22%, 28%, and 35% carbon emissions reduction per unit of GDP respectively. Policies and measures in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan focus on: adjusting energy prices to provide energy conservation with cost-based dynamics by taxation and price raising; adjusting the industry mix through eliminating out-of-date production capacities and integrat- ing high-quality resources; and pushing mechanism innovation by identifying and removing institutional bottlenecks in the building and

10 Hua Qiangsen, You Maoting, and Zhang Haimeng, “The First Firm Step toward Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction: Analysis of the Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction Target in China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan,” the Chinese edition of McKinsey Quarterly, November 2009. 90 yu jie

transportation industries, which will have the fastest-increasing emissions in future urbanization. China will realize its long-term energy conservation and emissions reduction objectives step by step. MRV—measurable, reportable, and verifiable—was a topic that received more attention at the Copenhagen Summit than did China’s emissions reduction target for 2020. Among these words, “verifiable” was the focus. The U.S. delegates, in particular, took China’s consent to having the result of its emissions reduction efforts internationally verified as the precondition for providing financial assistance, short or long term, to the least developed and most climate-vulnerable countries. They insisted that China has a problem with tampering with statistics and that its local governments usually fail to carry out state policies to a satisfying extent. Therefore, international verification is necessary to make international emissions reduction actions more effective, transparent, and equitable. China takes a tough stance on international verification, because only mitigation projects that receive international financial and technical assistance are subject to international verification, according to the Bali Action Plan. As a result, mitigation actions funded and completed by China itself are within its sovereignty. International statistical methods for emissions may be referred to, but no international verification is allowed. China softened its stance after negotiations with a small number of parties on the last day of the summit. The Copenhagen Accord prescribes that: Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting, and verification, the result of which will be reported through their national communications every two years.11 Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the implementation of their actions through National Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions seeking international support will be recorded in a registry along with relevant technology, finance, and capacity building support. Those actions supported will be added to the list in Appendix II. These supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be subject

11 Author’s note: As a developing countries, China is on the list of Non-Annex I parties. china’s role in international climate change negotiations 91

to international measurement, reporting, and verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.12 China did not begin developing systems for energy statistics, auditing, and improving data collection until the start of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period. Energy conservation and emissions reduction entail basic tasks including: referring to international experience, unifying statistical standards, acquiring knowledge about relevant industries, and understanding China’s potential and measures for energy conservation. Though the Copenhagen Accord has an uncertain future, China will surely become open and transparent in terms of energy statistics. The next goal after the setback in Copenhagen was the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 16) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Mexico in 2010. Few people were optimistic about whether it would be likely to remove conflicts of interests between the United Nations’ member states and between interest groups and whether the United Nations’ inefficient procedures and slow processes would be improved before the conference in Mexico. Perhaps in the future, the big emitters and the major economic powers will go further to play leading roles in climate politics. More- over, they will play such roles at places more than the United Nations, as both the G8/G5 summit and the Major Economies Forum will also assume more significant roles. After all, the core of climate protection lies in the sincerity of every country. Mid-term targets are more important than long-term ones. Most of the developed countries brought out their mitigation targets for 2020 before the Copenhagen Summit was opened, but their actions as a whole remained insufficient compared with the 25% to 40% emissions reduction target proposed by the IPCC. Calculation by an independent research institute shows that mitigation promises made by all the countries before the Copenhagen Sum- mit was opened were far from satisfying the goal of controlling the global temperature rise within 2 degrees Celsius. On the contrary, they will be extremely likely to cause a global temperature rise of 3.5 degrees Celsius.13

12 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Copenhagen Accord,” December 18, 2009. 13 Author’s note: the independent research institute is Climate tracker and can be found at www.climatetracker.org. 92 yu jie

Climate negotiations have been described as the most difﬁcult multilateral talks in history, because problems concerning how humans deal with common resources (such as the prisoner’s dilemma, the tragedy of the commons, and the free rider problem) are all gathered together. Given the cost of emissions reduction and concerns about their competitiveness, it is very difﬁcult for every country to make any extraordinary promise. In China, the Copenhagen Summit gained public attention overnight about low-carbon living and the economy. Given the fact that there is no global government that deals with global problems, such bottom-up knowledge and consequent actions are perhaps the best hope for long-term emissions reduction in the future. PART II

LITIGATION

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AGAINST ILLEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF TWO HYDROPOWER STATIONS ON THE JINSHA RIVER

Xia Jun and Qie Jianrong

The construction of two hydropower projects launched by the stated- owned China Huaneng Corporation and China Huadian Corporation in the middle reaches of the Jinsha River was suspended by China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2009 for illegally conducting a river closure without an environmental impact assessment approval. China Chongqing Green Volunteer’s Union (CCGVU), a non-governmental environmental organization, applied for administrative review in the Ministry of Environ- mental Protection and National Development and Reform Commission, and later also lodged public interest civil proceedings in Wuhan’s Mari- time Court, requesting an end to the illegal construction of both projects and a recovery of the environmental damages. In recent years, illegal construction of hydropower stations has been rampant on the Jinsha River (金沙江)—in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River—posing a grave threat to the local environment, ﬁshery resources, natural landscape, and indigenous culture. In 2009, four years after several illegal hydropower projects were suspended by the former State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) imposed a ban on two more projects, causing great public concern. Environmental non- governmental organizations (NGOs) started seeking legal solutions by requesting administrative review and ﬁling public interest litigation, which marks a new stage for civil participation in environmental protection and indicates the growth of civil society.

I. Two Jinsha River Hydropower Projects Suspended

A. Two Hydropower Projects Suspended for Illegal Construction without an EIA Approval On June 11, 2009, the MEP made a huge step in ordering the suspension of Longkaikou (龙开口) and Ludila (鲁地拉) hydropower 96 xia jun and qie jianrong

projects owned by the state-controlled China Huaneng Corporation (华能) and China Huadian Corporation (华电) on the middle reaches of the Jinsha River. Additionally, the MEP applied regional restricted approval for future projects by the two corporations. According to the MEP, the two corporations launched the projects without environmental impact assessment (EIA) approval and illegally conducted river closures in January 2009, causing severe ecological impacts on the Jinsha River. The two power developers were ordered to halt the construction of the main dam, take effective measures to ensure the safety of both upstream and downstream cofferdams during the flood season, conduct further studies on environmental impacts, and complete the assessment of environmental impacts. Tao Detian (陶德田), the MEP spokesperson, said that due to the wide influence of construction of hydropower stations, delayed or absent designs and management of environmental protection methods would bring unfavorable impacts to the local aquatic ecosystem and socioeconomic development both upstream and downstream. As a result, it was necessary to conduct environmental impact assessments and create environmental protection designs for hydropower construction based on legal procedures. Illegal construction of Ludila Hydro- power Station (by China Huadian Corporation) and Longkaikou Hydropower Station (by China Huaneng Corporation) has severely affected the environment. An environmental impact investigation into the hydropower cascade development plan on the Jinsha River indicated the necessity of further studies on the development methods and related environmental impacts of the planned Longtou Reservoir (龙头水库) and the Hutiaoxia (Tiger Leaping Gorge) (虎跳峡) river section in southwest China’s Yunnan Province. The investigation suggested the aquatic ecosystem and alternative ecological protection of nearby tributaries, as well as fish protection measures, be taken into comprehensive consideration. It also suggested that an integrated coordination and administration agency of the cascade stations be established for ecological protection. To ensure orderly and rational development of the Jinsha River basin, the MEP decided to temporarily stop approving EIA reports of hydropower projects in the middle reaches of the Jinsha River. The MEP also urged relevant authorities to further verify environmental impacts of projects both approved and to be approved and make improvements to the assessments and relevant measures based on the verification. Moreover, the MEP stopped approving the two corpora- public interest litigation against illegal construction 97 tions’ EIA documents for projects other than new energy development and pollution control. The MEP spokesperson said such punishment was to warn the two corporations to enhance environmental management and urge all relevant enterprises to strictly abide by environmental laws and regulations, adjust the industrial structure, and fulfill their social and environmental responsibilities.

B. MEP Supervising Team at the Sites of Suspended Projects On June 14, 2009, a supervising team headed by Mou Guangfeng (牟广丰), inspector from the EIA Department of the MEP, arrived at Lijiang in southwest China’s Yunnan Province to confirm the facts of illegal construction of the two hydropower stations. Both stations tried to defend themselves by presenting the same “objective” reason: with preparation work (water and power supply, road, and site leveling) completed, it would be advisable to start river closure in the dry season instead of waiting for the next best season to come. However, one of the supervisors, Wang Huimin (王辉民) refuted: unlike other types of construction, hydropower projects are closely related to ecological protection, and a relatively long time is needed to assess the ecological impacts and restoration measures. Mou Guangfeng pointed out that no excuses can justify the illegal construction of the two hydropower stations. In response to the argument of clean hydropower energy by both developers, Mou Guangfeng believed “comparison should not be easily made between the advantages of hydropower and the disadvan- tages of thermal power . . . Compared to thermal power, hydropower is free of smoke, dust, and sulfur dioxide pollutants, but its impacts on and damage to the ecosystem should not be ignored.” According to Mou, once the two hydropower stations are built, the river regime, water level, flow rate, and temperature of the Jinsha River would all be affected, the terrestrial organisms in the submerged region would be affected, and the environment of the settlement region would also be affected. All these problems need to be assessed in the EIA report with well prepared counter-measures. Coreius guichenoti is one example of a fish that is only seen in the Jinsha River. Inadequate fish passage facilities and artificial proliferation might cause the fish to decrease or even die out. Mou Guangfeng said at the dam sites that there was no timetable for the removal of the ban on the two state-owned power groups; it 98 xia jun and qie jianrong all depended on how quickly the wrongdoing could be amended. The ban would not be removed before the rectification was approved. Mou also warned the two companies to accept the punishments, and said that such practices as “construction without an approval” or “construction while waiting for approval” are against the law. The supervising team made specific rectification requirements: construction of the dams must be stopped and further assessments must be made to ensure orderly development of the Jinsha River basin. Meanwhile, the MEP supervision center in charge of the southwestern region and local authorities at all levels were required to send written reports to the ministry at least once every month on the conditions of the illegal projects. The supervising team warned that the construction should not restart before the rectification was done and administrative permission obtained. If requirements were not followed, the MEP would continue to limit approval and establish responsibility.

II. Persons Liable Unpunished and Ban Maintained

From June 11, 2009 to January 2010, construction of the two hydropower stations was been suspended by the MEP into the second year, and remained unclear when the construction would restart. The suspension was so long that it broke the record for suspension of illegal projects by the MEP or its predecessor, the State Environmental Pro- tection Administration. In fact, it was not the first time that Huaneng and Huadian were punished by the MEP for illegality on EIA issues. Apart from the long period, the MEP’s punishment was limited to suspension and “regional restriction.” As to the administrative accountability measures proposed by the media, the MEP and both power groups made no responses. Chang Jiwen (常纪文), an expert on environmental law with the Institute of Law under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believes these two stations are relevant to two illegal practices: illegal decision-making and negligence of local environmental supervision authorities. As for the law-violating corporations, Chang believes, according to the Provisional Regulation on Disciplining Dereliction of Duty in Environmental Protection Activities (环境保护违法违纪行为处分暂行规定), the corporation representatives designated by state administrative departments and their direct supervision agencies should receive a corresponding punishment. Therefore, there is sufficient legal basis for public interest litigation against illegal construction 99 seeking accountability of the leadership of the two companies. For the dereliction of duty of local environmental protection authorities, the basis for punishment lies in the eighth article of the regulation. Chang claims that persons guilty of dereliction could be punished based on administrative or criminal laws and regulations, such as in Article 397 of the Criminal Law (刑法). However, it’s disappointing that over six months passed from the suspension of construction work and the decision makers of both companies and their environmental supervisors had not been punished or held accountable for their actions. Considering restrictions of both objective and subjective factors, experts hold that certain defects do exist in the administrative penalty made by the MEP in June. It does not resolve all the problems of hydropower development on the Jinsha River. Furthermore, the decision by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the MEP to divide the approval process of a hydropower project into two steps—pre-construction and main construction—should be revised.1 Taking this into consideration, China Chongqing Green Volunteer’s Union (CCGVU), as an active organization in environmental protection, and with the legal aid of Beijing Zhongzi Law Office, applied for administrative review and lodged public interest civil proceedings against the illegal practice of the two hydropower projects. They were defending the authority of China’s Law of Environmental Impact Assessment (环境影响评价法) and supervising hydropower development on the Jinsha River as a non-governmental force.

III. Non-governmental Environmental Organization Filing for Administrative Review in the MEP

On July 14, 2009, CCGVU ﬁled for administrative review in the MEP arguing that the punishments were too lenient without quoting all related laws and regulations. They requested that the notice of punishments be repealed and adequate punishments be made: a full

1 Editor’s note: According to the relevant regulations, with approval from local government, pre-construction (water and power supply, road construction, and site leveling) and even the construction of a diversion tunnel, can be started. The “com- mencement” of hydropower projects refers to river closure and dam construction. “Construction before approval” has already become a common phenomenon. In fact, so far never has a hydropower project been terminated after all the pre-construction has been finished. 100 xia jun and qie jianrong cessation of hydropower development on the Jinsha River, the sever- est fine for the law-breaking enterprises, and an investigation into the administrative liabilities of responsible leadership in order to eradi- cate illegal practices against the Law of Environmental Impact Assessment. The administrative review was to stimulate public participation in the environmental protection campaign and encourage government to improve their work, defend the authority of laws and public interest, carry out the “scientific concept of development,” and achieve sustainable economic and social development. In addition, CCGVU was not satisfied with a document by the NDRC in 2007 approving pre-construction of Liyuan (梨园), Ahai (阿海), Longkaikou, and Ludila hydropower projects. The volunteers’ union requested a repeal of the document for thorough cessation of construction of the four hydropower projects before any approval was granted. Moreover, CCGVU called for a repeal of the official document issued by the predecessor of the MEP and the NDRC, which allowed preparatory work once the first EIA report was approved, to be started before the second EIA report was approved (HF[2005] No.13). From late July to early August, CCGVU had meetings with related departments of the MEP to gain a full understanding of the current environmental protection achievements by environmental supervision over hydropower projects on the Jinsha River. In light of the ministry’s sincerity in improving supervision and paying more attention to the environmental supervision by NGOs, the union decided to drop its administrative review application. That was the end of the first case of administrative review launched by an NGO for public interest in environment. However, on July 29, CCGVU received a decision from the NDRC that it would not accept the administrative review, arguing that the applicant was not related to the administrative act. Soon after this, CCGVU submitted an application to the State Council urging the NDRC to accept its administrative review application, and prepared to sue the NDRC for “nonfeasance on administrative review” if the application to the State Council received no results. CCGVU held that the current laws make more room for administrative lawsuits for environmental public interest administrative review. As Article 6 of Administrative Review Law (行政复议法) regulates, a citizen, legal person, or any other organization may file an application for administrative review in cases in which other specific administrative public interest litigation against illegal construction 101 acts of an administrative organ are considered to have infringed upon other lawful rights and interests, including administrative acts violating the legal rights of nonconventional civil rights. Hydropower projects on the Jinsha River and the NDRC’s approval of pre-construction inevitably violated the environmental rights of CCGVU members, particularly their right to appreciate nature. An environmental right is defined in Article 11 of the Law of Environmental Impact Assessment as a public interest legal right. The right to appreciate nature, though not expressly stated in China’s laws and regulations or within the range of personal or property rights, is a legal right protected by national laws and one of the rights on which civil environmental protection is based. Thus, it should be considered a legal right described in Article 6 of the Administrative Review Law. Therefore, CCGVU has the right to implement a supervisory right over relevant governmental decisions, including filing public interest administrative review applications according to the law.

IV. CCGVU Filing Public Interest Lawsuits in the Court

On August 20, 2009, CCGVU Chairman Wu Dengming (登明) submitted a case to the Wuhan Maritime Court, filing separate public interest litigation against Huadian Ludila Hydropower Development Ltd., Co. (affiliated with China Huadian Corporation) and Huaneng Longkaikou Hydropower Development Ltd., Co. (affiliated with China Huaneng Corporation) and requested:

1) Construction at Ludila and Longkaikou hydropower projects must be stopped. Before the overall plan and assessment of hydropower projects on the Jinsha River is completed by related national departments, the EIA report of both hydropower projects is approved by the MEP, and all project tests and procedures in accordance with the national regulations as well as other construction documents are completed, the defendants are forbidden to construct the main dam and the power plant. They are also forbidden to conduct any preparations affecting the environment, such as water and power supply, road construction, site leveling, construction of a diversion tunnel and cofferdam in order to avoid damages to the environment of the Yangtze River by illegal construction; 102 xia jun and qie jianrong

2) Emergency plans must be conducted during the suspension of construction. Under the supervision of the plaintiff, the third party (Changjiang Water Resources Commission), and the court, the defendants should take remedial and precautionary measures during the suspension of construction to ensure safety during flood seasons and overall geological safety, control water and soil erosion within a limited period, and restore vegetation damaged by construction, in order to eliminate the environmental damage and risks caused by construction of hydropower projects; 3) The environment must be restored. If defendants clearly refuse, and take no measures during a period designated by the court to restore ecology and control water and soil erosion, or measures the defendants have adopted do not fulfill the requirements stated in an assessment report on environmental improvements provided by a qualified organization, the court should charge the defendants a service fee in accordance with the assessment report, and entrust the responsibility of controlling water and soil erosion to the third party. The entrusting should be conducted under the supervision of the plaintiff, the third party, and the court; 4) Lawsuit fees must be paid by the defendants. All fees arising from this lawsuit and reasonable expenses by the plaintiff, including but not limited to a litigation fee, assessment fee, travel expense, and retaining fee, should be paid by the defendants.

As is stated in the case, according to regulations promulgated by the predecessor of the MEP and the NDRC, a hydropower project can be divided into two phases of construction: pre-construction and main construction. It is possible that before the EIA report of main construction is approved, developers can conduct pre-construction, such as water and power supply, road construction, site leveling, and construction of a diversion tunnel and cofferdam. However, the Law of Environmental Impact Assessment does not authorize any administrative departments to make exceptional regulations concerning EIA management of hydropower construction, nor does it give the hydropower industry any privilege to ignore laws. In fact, on-site activities such as water and power supply, road construction, and site leveling can signiﬁcantly change the ecological environment, and so they should be considered as an indivisible part of the main construction instead of mere preparatory work before the construction begins. public interest litigation against illegal construction 103

In addition, the enormous amount of investment in pre- construction and the adverse environmental impacts that follow are often used by hydropower developers to force relevant departments to approve and support the project. Illegal construction by the defendants has caused major damage to the ecology and environment, challenging the authority of the Law of Environmental Impact Assessment. CCGVU has long been connected with the Yangtze River. Since its inception in 1995, it has paid special attention to the environmental protection of the Yangtze River. The Union believed that by building cascade hydropower stations on the Jinsha River, the ecological environment would inevitably be changed, rare fish species and beautiful natural landscapes adversely impacted, and the storage capability of the Three Gorges Reservoir reduced. A large quantity of sand and dirt directly discharged into the river in the process of construction was sure to worsen water and soil erosion in the Yangtze River. All the negative impacts mentioned above could hamper public interest, including environmental civil rights and the interests of CCGVU members, and their appreciation of the natural landscape of the Yangtze River. As a regular participant in environmental protection of the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, in order to protect the public interest of its members, CCGVU believed that it was a qualified legal spokesperson to file a lawsuit for environmental public interest. CCGVU stated, only when the defendants stopped their construction can “black-hole projects” of this type be eradicated, and a legal and rational development of hydropower resources in the middle reaches of the Jinsha River come into reality. There is another reason why CCGVU filed the lawsuit in the Wuhan Maritime Court and not elsewhere. Large hydropower stations are believed to affect hydrological features of the whole river, impacting the river ecosystem of the middle reaches of the Yangtze River, reducing the storage capacity of the Three Gorges Reservoir, and potentially causing a negative influence on navigation along the Yangtze River. As a result, the lawsuit is within the jurisdiction of the Wuhan Maritime Court based in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. CCGVU expects this lawsuit to achieve positive results. The Union hopes that through the professionalism and independence of the maritime court, adverse environmental impacts caused by hydropower development on the Jinsha River can be alleviated, national laws implemented, and public interest protected, creating a successful and 104 xia jun and qie jianrong replicable example of protecting the ecosystem of the Yangtze River by means of the judicial process. So far, the Wuhan Maritime Court, still studying the application, has not decided whether or not this lawsuit will be accepted. Experts have observed two obstacles. One is the coordination between jurisdiction and executive power, and between civil actions and administrative resolution. The other is whether the lawsuit is within the jurisdiction of the Wuhan Maritime Court. However, once this lawsuit is accepted by the court, a breakthrough will be made in the history of environmental public interest litigation, the role of environmental NGOs as a plaintiff for public interest will be established, and an important step forward will be taken in exploring rules and mechanisms of environmental public interest litigation and promoting a law-based environmental protection mechanism in China.

V. Conclusion and Reﬂections

Total investment in the two hydropower projects is said to amount to over 20 billion RMB. The suspension of construction could cause a loss for the developers so gigantic, even officials from the Yunnan-based environmental protection office called it “an astronomical figure.” In fact, economic loss is just the computable part both stations have caused, while the negative impact on the ecological environment of the Jinsha River could never be calculated. Though the immense loss was caused by illegal construction by the two hydropower developers, supervision departments can barely remain innocent. According to the Law of Environmental Impact Assessment, any construction can only be launched after its EIA report is approved. Construction of hydropower projects can last as long as more than a decade. On appeal of construction companies, the predecessor of the MEP and NDRC adopted a two-step approach for authorizing a provincial environmental protection bureau to approve an EIA report on pre-construction before the MEP approved the second EIA report on main construction. By thus interpreting the Law of Environmental Impact Assessment, relevant supervision authorities objectively gave the green light to the illegal construction of hydropower projects. In addition, instead of the two hydropower stations, it was their parent companies (China Huaneng Corporation and China Huadian Corporation) that decided to start the construction of Longkaikou and public interest litigation against illegal construction 105

Ludila hydropower projects. But when it comes to liability, it is always their branch companies that get the blame as scapegoats, while the decision-makers behind the scenes remain at large. That is one of the most important reasons why illegal construction of hydropower projects can never be eradicated. We should be gratified to see CCGVU, an NGO, having the courage to submit an application for public interest administrative review to the MEP and the NDRC, and file a public interest lawsuit in court. Legal actions by the public for environmental protection play an active role in fighting against illegal hydropower development.

ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION: SEVEN EXPERIMENTAL CASE STUDIES

Lin Yanmei

This paper introduces regulations promulgated by environmental protection courts concerning environmental public interest litigation (EPIL), and analyzes the signiﬁcant breakthroughs and remaining challenges for experimental cases of environmental public interest litigation in terms of deﬁning the law, standardizing environmental public interest, and applying the precautionary principle as well as the polluter pays principle (PPP). It further discusses the current obstacles in the development of EPIL, explores strategies for initiating EPIL, and examines the direction of EPIL development in the future. Environmental public interest litigation (EPIL) has achieved remarkable progress within the last two years, after rounds of discussion and advocacy. In 2009, the All-China Environment Federation (ACEF), a civil society organization specializing in environmental protection, initiated two proceedings on environmental public interest: one concerning the shortcomings of administrative organs, the other aimed at polluting enterprises. Both lawsuits were accepted and heard by environmental protection tribunals. This paper analyzes seven environmental public interests cases tried in environmental protection tribunals throughout China and discusses the progress of and obstacles in the development of EPIL.1

I. Regulations on EPIL by Environmental Protection Tribunals

Between 2007 and 2009, environmental protection tribunals were established in the intermediate and primary people’s courts of Guiyang,

1 All cases mentioned in this paper, with the exception of those with given refer- ences, are cited from the Environmental Administration Specialization and Public Interest Litigation Project in the Environmental Studies Department of Wuhan Uni- versity and sponsored by the U.S. Lawyers Association, in cooperation with the Inves- tigation Results of Environmental Law Studies at Southeast Finance and Economics University. 108 lin yanmei

Wuxi, Kunming, and Yuxi. The courts publicly announced that they sought to establish an environmental public interest litigation system through piloting and experimentation. The country’s existing laws lack an explicit definition for the term EPIL, nor is there an established procedure for conducting such litigation. The environmental protection tribunals, via their constitutions and related rules and regulations, have implemented some regulations on EPIL. The Regulations on the Domain of Acceptable Cases of the Environmental Protection Tribunal of Qingzhen Municipal People’s Court and of the Environ- mental Protection Judicial Tribunal of the Intermediate People’s Court of Guiyang, Guizhou Province (关于贵阳市中级人民法院环境保护审判庭清镇市人民法院环境保护法庭案件受理范围的规定) provide that people’s procuratorates (state organizations for legal supervision) and environmental protection bureaus at all levels, as well as other relevant functional departments, may act as plaintiffs to initiate EPIL actions. Case types are restricted to disputes over environmental protection, administration, tort, damages, and compensation regarding Hongfeng Lake (红枫湖), Baihua Lake (白花湖), Aha Reservoir (阿哈水库), and the forest belt around the city. The Regulations on the Jurisdiction of Cases by Environmental Protection Judicial Tribunals (关于环境保护审判庭审理案件管辖的若干规定) released by the Intermediate People’s Court of Wuxi (无锡) stipulate that acceptable cases of environmental public interest litigation include public interest litigation against acts that may have an impact on ecological protection in conservation areas, on the environment of residential communities, on environmental protection in conservation waters of Taihu Lake (太湖), and on environmental protection in conservation areas of key tourist areas. Potential plaintiffs include procuratorial organs and environmental protection administrative departments at all levels, environmental protection organizations, and logistics segments in residential communities. The two above-mentioned regulations have only defined the qualifications of plaintiffs in terms of procedure, neglecting other procedural issues, and auxiliary systems. The Higher People’s Court in Yunnan Province has made further attempts in the establishment of EPIL procedures. The Minutes of the Forum on the Establishment of Environmental Protection Judicial Tribunals and the Adjudication on Environmental Protection Cases (环境保护审判庭建设及环境保护案件审判工作座谈会纪要) of May 13, 2009 articulates that people’s procuratorates and public interest social organizations focused on environmental protection, which are lawfully registered as seven experimental case studies 109 such, may qualify as proper EPIL plaintiffs.2 In addition to plaintiff qualifications, the minutes also regulate the burden of proof, adjudication process, bearing of judicial cost, and other related problems. However, these tentative regulations have only touched upon EPIL terminology as well as procedural rules without clearly defining the substantive connotation of EPIL. This may be why the volume of environmental protection cases remains very low. We are all familiar with the term EPIL, and yet cannot articulate its precise definition. Lack- ing foreseeable and clear litigation results, neither party will take rash actions. Although the definition of plaintiff qualifications is clear and relevant institutions are qualified as plaintiffs, their responsibilities are not clearly prescribed by law. Thus, plaintiffs are rarely motivated to initiate an EPIL.

II. Experimental Cases of Environmental Public Interest Litigation: Breakthroughs and Challenges

Table 7.1 lists seven influential environmental public interest cases for 2008 and 2009. This paper will analyze the significant breakthroughs and remaining challenges for these experimental EPIL cases in terms of defining competence in law and environmental public interest, and in applying the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle (PPP).

A. Definition of Plaintiff Qualifications Environmental protection tribunals have experienced three major breakthroughs in the definition of EPIL plaintiff qualifications. First, the court has made explicit regulations that administrative organs responsible for the protection of water resources and environmental protection are qualified as plaintiffs to initiate civil actions to pursue the civil liabilities from the polluting party. In sum, this reading allows administrative organs to fulfill their responsibilities. Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the newly-amended 2008 Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (水污染防治法) stipulates that local people’s governments

2 The meeting’s minutes is the document that guides the adjudication of the courts. 110 lin yanmei

Table 7.1: Experimental cases of environmental public interest litigation Case Acceptance Date Cases Court December 27, 2007 The Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Qingzhen Environmental Reservoir Bureau of Guiyang vs. Guizhou Protection Tribunal Tianfeng Chemical Inc.3 December 9, 2008 People’s Procuratorate of Haizhu District of Guangzhou Maritime Guangzhou vs. Chen Zhongming (Xinzhongxing Court Washing Factory)4 March 31, 2009 People’s Procuratorate of Panyu District of Guangzhou Maritime Guangzhou vs. Lu Pingzhang (Dongyongdongtai Court Leather Dyeing and Processing Mill of Panyu)5 April 27, 2009 Danzao Township Government vs. Tianyi Inc., Nanhai District People’s Su Guohua, Guo Youyong, and Jiang Jianfeng; Court of Foshan Nanhai People’s Procuratorate sent Suggestions in Support of Litigation to the Court.6 July 6, 2009 Zhu Zhengmao, All China Environmental Wuxi Environmental Federation vs. Jiangyin Container Ltd.7 Protection Tribunal July 28, 2009 All China Environmental Federation vs. Land and Qingzhen Environmental Resources Administrative Bureau of Qingzhen city 8 Protection Tribunal August 20, 2009 Chongqing Green Volunteers Union vs. Ludila Submitted to Wuhan Water and Electricity Ltd. and Huaneng Maritime Court, no reply Longkaihou Water and Electricity Ltd. of Yunnan Huadian Corporation9

3 “Case 4: The Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir Bureau of Guiyang vs. Guizhou Tianfeng Chemical Inc.,” Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir Bureau of Guiyang, May 8, 2009, http://lhyk.gygov.gov.cn/lhyk/74872343805034496/20090 508/187211.html. 4 “The First Public Interest Litigation in Guangdong: Procuratorate as Plain- tiff to Sue against Polluting Enterprise,” The People’s Procuratorate of Guang- dong Province, January 1, 2009, http://www.gd.jcy.gov.cn/xwys/dayagz/200901/ t20090106_122060.html. 5 Administrative Penalty Plus Civil Litigation: Environmental Public Interest Litiga- tion Complements Insufficient Law Enforcement—the Second Case of Public Interest Litigation in Guangdong,” ACEF, September 8, 2009, http://www.acef.com.cn/html/ hjflfw/hjfzjj/3739.html. 6 Zhao Jin, “Tons of Waste Oil from Zhongshan Discharged to Danzao, Serious Pollution Caused,” ND Daily, August 6, 2009, http://gcontent.nddaily.com/d/c6/ dc6a7e655d7e5840/Blog/aca/e76d02.html. 7 Plaintiff and Defendant in the First Environmental Public Interest Civil Litigation Filed by All China Environmental Federation Have Reached an Agreement through Mediation,” ACEF, September 23, 2009, http://www.acef.com.cn/html/hjflfw/ wqdt/3854.html. 8 “The First Public Interest Administrative Litigation Filed by All China Environ- mental Federation Has Been Accepted by Court,” ACEF, July 28, 2009, http://www .acef.com.cn/html/hjflfw/wqdt/3361.html. 9 SunTao and Wang Liping, “Water and Electric Companies as Defendants for Environmental Protection Litigation,” October 15, 2009, http://bbs.cecb2b.com/ redirect.php?fid=13&tid=173473&goto=nextoldset. seven experimental case studies 111 at or above the county level shall take precautions and measures to prevent and control water pollution and shall be responsible for the water quality within their relevant administrative jurisdictions. Article 85 stipulates that any interested parties harmed by water pollution shall have the right to request removal of such harm by and claim damages from the discharging party. People’s governments shall only exercise their administrative law execution power within their administrative jurisdiction to pursue administrative liability by the polluter. Environmental pollution has certain characteristics, especially when pollution is not restricted to administrative boundaries. Especially in the case of water pollution and air pollution, it is common for pollution to cross over administrative boundaries. Although Government A is responsible for the quality of water within its administrative jurisdiction, it will be faced with a challenging situation if the polluting source is not within its administrative jurisdiction or the polluter is a state-owned or province-owned enterprise. The Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir Bureau of Gui- yang vs. Guizhou Tianfeng Chemical Company (贵阳市两湖一库管理局诉贵州天峰化工有限公司) case is an example of cross-boundary pollution. Tianfeng Chemical Company is located in Pingba County of Anshun City (安顺市平坝县), beyond the administrative jurisdiction of Guiyang. Phosphogypsum residues from Tianfeng Chemical Company were discharged into the Yangchang River (羊昌河) and Hongfeng Lake without any treatment, causing serious pollution in Hongfeng Lake. According to the law, the administrative bureau of Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir shall take all measures necessary to protect the environment of Hongfeng Lake as the designated and commissioned unit responsible for the water quality of Hongfeng Lake. Although civil action is not prescribed in Article 4 of the Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, it is permitted as such action is neither prohibited by law. In this case, the environmental protection tribunal of Qingzhen (清镇) clarified this proposition, which is now regarded as the concrete interpretation and application of Article 4 of the Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution. It holds instrumental significance in all such trial cases. The second breakthrough came when the court confirmed that the procuratorate shall be the supervisory organ of law enforcement over administrative organs, so as to prevent the use of state property and resources for illegal actions. The procuratorate may also initiate civil action when state property and resources are infringed upon by illegal 112 lin yanmei actions. At the same time, the court confirms that procuratorates may directly file a civil action once their supervision suffers a setback or state property and resources suffer infringement via illegal action. The Procuratorates (Haizhu District (海珠区) Procuratorate and Panyu District (番禺区) Procuratorate) acted as plaintiffs in both cases of environmental public interest litigation tried by the Maritime Court in Guangzhou. In Danzao Township Government vs. Tianyi Company, Su Guohua, Guo Youyong, and Jiang Jianfeng, (丹灶镇政府诉天乙公司、苏国华、郭由永和江剑锋), the Nanhai People’s Procuratorate sent Procuratorial Suggestions (检察建议书) on EPIL to the Danzao Township Government, which supported the initiation of action for the case. When the Danzao Township Government filed the litigation, the Nanhai Procuratorate sent the court Suggestions in Support of Litigation (支持起诉意见书). Another breakthrough came when the court confirmed that nonprofit organizations are entitled to initiate EPIL as long as environmental protection is one of the functions of the organization and the litigation is for the protection of the ecological and living environment. All-China Environment Federation (ACEF) filed two cases to the environmental tribunals of Qingzhen City and Wuxi City in 2009. One case was filed for administrative omission against administrative organs (Land and Resources Administration Bureau of Qingzhen City), while the other dealt with pollution caused by polluting enterprises. The courts accepted both cases. The defendant did not cross-examine the qualifications of the plaintiff in the administrative procedure.10 Neither did the court certify the qualifications of ACEF as the plaintiff in the adjudication. In another civil case, an agreement was reached between the plaintiff and the defendant through mediation. The Civil Mediation Document (民事调解书) issued by the environmental tribunal of Wuxi City cer- tified the qualifications of ACEF as the plaintiff. The legal basis was founded on the functions of ACEF approved by the State Council at the time of its establishment. According to the approved functions, ACEF is responsible for the investigation, delegation of litigation, and delegation of complainants in mediation with local people’s govern-

10 Gao Jie, “Environmental Administrative Public Interest Litigation Makes Its Debut,” Green Law Website, September 9, 2009, http://www.greenlaw.org.cn/blog/ ?p=1436. seven experimental case studies 113 ments regarding environmental cases. Therefore, ACEF is entitled to file a civil action for safeguarding public interest in environmental protection. However, the qualifications of EPIL plaintiffs were insufficiently identified in 2009. In the two actions initiated by ACEF, the court did not provide any substantive legal basis for the identification of qualifications on behalf of the environmental protection organization in allowing it to serve as a plaintiff. To some extent, this means that there has been no universal recognition for environmental organizations acting as plaintiffs in an EPIL. The cases in which ACEF acts as a plaintiff are only individual cases. Article 6 of China’s Environmental Protection Law (环境保护法) stipulates: “All units and individuals shall have the obligation to protect the environment and shall have the right to report on or file charges against units or individuals that cause pollution or damage to the environment.” It is clear that Article 6 has granted the rights and obligations of units and individuals for supervision and prosecution. The court may further interpret this article: filing public interest charges is one of the ways to fulfill the rights and obligations mentioned in Arti- cle 6. Therefore, environmental protection organizations are entitled to file public interest charges against units and individuals that pollute the environment. Environmental protection organizations, as an organized venue for public participation and supervision, may file public interest charges against administrative organs when the latter omits administrative responsibility or abuses administrative power.

B. Application of Environmental Public Interest and the Precautionary Principle The Environmental Tribunal has declared that the purpose of EPIL is to prevent infringement of public interest with respect to environmental protection. However, stipulations from the Environmental Tribunal have not speciﬁed the deﬁnition of environmental public interest. To what extent, then, can environmental damages be remedied through litigation? The environmental laws of China explicitly stipulate that their foundation is based on the precautionary principle.11 However the

11 The precautionary principle mainly states that precautionary measures should be taken against environmental degradation or disruption. In case of accompanying possible damage of the environment; without accurate scientiﬁc basis, any possible environmental risk should also be approached with prudence. Wang Jin, Environmental 114 lin yanmei

application of this principle is by no means satisfactory when measured against the current status of civil litigations on environmental protection. The majority of cases of environmental civil litigation accepted by courts in China are for compensation for damages of environmental tort. The plaintiffs of such cases are environmental pollution victims, usually individuals. The polluting party is asked to compensate for the loss of property or deterioration of physical health caused by pollution. There is no doubt that the aim of this type of litigation is the protection of the environmental public interest, for civil remedies such as ceasing the infringing act or removing the impairment can benefit the environment itself. However such civil remedies are insufficient as the environment may have suffered irrecoverable damages. Experimental cases of EPIL have made important breakthroughs in the application of the precautionary principle. Such breakthroughs are reflected in court statements to the effect that once environmental quality deteriorates, and the environment has already been polluted and/or serious damage to the environment has already taken place, remedies can be sought through civil action, without the need to wait for the emergence of specific damages against physical health or personal property.

C. The Application of the Polluter Pays Principle The polluter pays principle was established after the enactment of the Environmental Protection Law in 1989. It states that polluters should take full responsibility for the consequences of pollution rather than the general public. However, current environmental civil cases in China are mainly ﬁled by individuals seeking compensation for environmental damage. In such cases, polluters are basically only accountable for the traditional damages they have caused, but not for the damages to the environment.12 The experimental cases in 2009 made signiﬁcant breakthroughs in the application of the polluter pays principle and the pursuit of civil liability from the polluters.

Law, Peking University Press, 2006. Table 4.3 in Fundamental principles of China Environmental Law, page 152. 12 Presently, there are a series of problems with regards to environmental civil litigation ﬁled by individuals, in which pollution victims often do not receive sufﬁcient compensation. seven experimental case studies 115

First, the court explicitly ruled that polluters should bear the expense of pollution treatment. In the case, Danzao Township Government vs. Tianyi Company, Su Guohua, Guo Youyong, and Jiang Jianfeng, Nanhai District People’s Court of Foshan City (佛山市) ruled that the defendants must cover the expense of 1.03 million RMB expended by Danzao Township Government for pollution treatment. Prior to this court ruling, defendants Su, Guo, and Jiang were sentenced to fixed-term imprisonments of one to three years, with fines of less than 100,000 RMB, for the “crime of causing a serious environmental pollution accident” on March 20, 2008. The procuratorate can not investigate the criminal responsibility of Tianyi Company due to a failure of evidence. But the company received a fine of 250,000 RMB from the Bureau of Environmental Protection of Guangdong Province. Thus, it follows that if not for the EPIL filed by the Danzao Town- ship Government, the penalties Tianyi Company received from the court and the Environmental Protection Bureau would have been much lighter. However, this is by no means to say that it was enough for the offender to bear the expenses of emergency clean-up efforts. The polluters were to be deprived of all illegal income, defined as the cost saved by illegal acts, and shall bear all expenses for environmental rehabilitation. In fact, in terms of the serious illegal acts such as that of Tianyi Company, punishment will never be enough unless the compensation outweighs the cost saved by illegal acts. Only in this manner can illegal acts be deterred. However, since the scope of compensation for EPIL is still under discussion and exploration, the court takes traditional accounting methods of compensation for reference with slight revisions in an effort to avoid controversy. Second, the court explicitly stipulated that illegal income gained from pollution shall be confiscated—the economic proceeds of illegal acts. In the case of the People’s Procuratorate of Haizhu District of Guangzhou vs. Chen Zhongming (海珠区检察院诉陈忠民), the Mar- itime Court of Guangzhou ascertained that the direct economic loss caused by pollution discharge from Xinzhongxing Washing Factory (新中兴洗水厂) totaled 117,289.20 RMB, which included the monitoring cost of 7,806 RMB, the supplement of water rates of 312 RMB, and the environmental economic loss of 109,171.20 RMB. At the same time, the defendant, Xinzhongxing Washing Factory, was required to restore the ecological environment of the river. It is estimated that the indirect damages caused and the fee for following up ecological restoration was high. The exact figure was to be precisely calculated. 116 lin yanmei

Finally, Chen Zhongming was penalized a fine of 117,289.20 RMB for losses caused by environmental pollution. The compensation was turned over to the Treasury. It is international practice to confiscate economic benefits of non- compliance. Specific formulas and rules have been developed in this regard. In the United States, for example, the Amount of Economic Benefits of Non-compliance = Deferred Cost + Avoided Cost. As has been verified through international practice, this is a convenient and effective method to investigate and ascertain environment civil responsibility of illegal polluters. Another rule of the polluter pays principle is that pollution fines shall be used to support pollution treatment. It is a pity that fines prescribed by the Maritime Court of Guangzhou were turned over to the Treasury, as it is difficult to determine what portion of the fines will be used for treating the polluted environment. While establishing the Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir Bureau, the Govern- ment of Guiyang City also approved the founding of the Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir Foundation, which aims to raise funds for treating the pollution in this area. As was proposed in the Meeting Minutes by the Higher People’s Court of Yunnan Province, the courts at various levels shall take the initiative to explore the management and usage mechanism for compensation in EPIL cases, and establish a system of environmental public interest funding through coordination with relevant departments. This is a positive development.

III. Obstacles and Prospects for Environmental Public Interest Litigation

Despite the major breakthroughs made by the experimental cases in 2009, it is worrisome that the case volume of environmental tribunals remains exceptionally low. There are only a few EPIL cases, which is disturbing when environmental pollution in China is strikingly serious. Why are there only a handful of plaintiffs initiating EPIL cases? It is necessary for us to conduct an in-depth analysis and propose strategies to promote further development of EPIL cases.

A. The Motivation of the Main Plaintiff A key factor accounting for scarcity of EPIL cases is that competent plaintiffs do not pursue litigation for reasons mentioned earlier. The second part of this paper mentioned that local governments should take seven experimental case studies 117 measures in order to assume environmental responsibility within their administrative jurisdiction. As the administrative organs delegated to supervise and manage various natural resources and the environment, such entities are entitled to pursue polluting parties and safeguard environmental public interests. Moreover, administrative organs are held to assume major responsibility. However, to date, China has not established legal responsibility for government environmental quality assessment. Nor has it established which administrative organ would hold such a duty, or under what circumstances. In fact, the issue of overlapping administrative functions is a significant obstacle in the field of pollution control, in that pollution affects all aspects of economic activities and almost all government departments hold the authority to control pollution. In such a situation where multiple government departments are involved in management with no specification regarding which branch is responsible for initiating environmental litigation, administrative organs have no motivation to perform additional legal functions. Moreover, it is even new for environmental protection administrative organs to enforce laws through civil litigation. For example, the Administrative Bureau for the Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir in Guiyang City is a public service unit affiliated with the municipal government of Guiyang. Delegated by the administrative supervisory organs of the district and the city, the Administrative Bureau for the Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir is responsible for the integrated implementation and enforcement of administrative laws concerning the protection of water resources and the environment. The Administrative Bureau for the Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir has set explicit targets for pollution treatment and water quality control and improvement. The Bureau exercises a strict performance assessment mechanism. It is motivated to solve the problem of cross-boundary pollution through litigation, so as to ensure the achievement of targets maintaining and improving water quality. In order to solve the problem of an administrative organ’s lack of motivation to file an EPIL, it is important to establish a government’s legal responsibility for environmental quality assessment. This can be done through legislation which reforms the environmental administrative regulation system, reducing the conflicts among functional departments of the government, and specifying the authorities and responsibilities of all concerned departments in environment protection when bringing civil actions for compensation for environmental 118 lin yanmei damages. Indeed, this is a long-term goal. As a short-term objective, we should encourage and urge more administrative departments delegated to protecting the environment and natural resources to pick- up their legal weapons, i.e., to file EPIL cases to investigate polluting enterprises which illegally discharge wastes. Procuratorial organs should play a more positive role in promoting EPIL. As legal supervisory organs in China, the procuratorial organs have the responsibility to supervise environment-related administrative institutions in addition to the execution of their required duties. They should directly file an EPIL to further investigate a potential offender for the sake of environmental public interest. However, currently, such a procuratorial function has not been institutionalized. This initiative is still in an exploratory stage. This makes procuratorial organs, similar to administrative organs, lack the proper motivation—due to a vagueness of responsibility. The solution sits with the Supreme Peo- ple’s Procuratorate. This entity should: (1) issue regulations specifying the responsibilities of procuratorial organs at all levels with regards to administrative organs; (2) file EPIL cases against illegal dischargers; and (3) directly litigate in cases of administrative omission. Procurato- rial organs at all levels may establish supervisory divisions on environmental protection and encourage administrative organs to file EPIL cases. Such measures will make procuratorial organs more effective in the pursuit of offenders. Environmental protection organizations (EPOs), an organized form of public participation and supervision, are the major impetus in promoting the development of EPIL. This is particularly the case in administrative litigation regarding environmental public interest, which can only be filed by EPOs. Quite a number of EPOs have realized that EPIL cases are powerful tools in protecting the environment and they keep a close eye on the development of EPIL cases. The problem that lies with EPOs is not a lack of motivation. The reason why they have not taken action can be explained by the following three aspects. First, there are few legal professionals in most EPOs, whether a governmental EPO or non-governmental EPO. They are not familiar with solving environmental problems through litigation. Moreover, the substantive issues regarding EPIL cases are still in a probationary phase. Therefore EPOs will need more time to fully understand the scope of an EPIL and to discover the best manner of incorporating EPIL cases within their overall strategy. Second, the judicial cost of EPIL cases cannot be neglected, especially the legal service charge by the lawyers and the assessment and evaluation fee seven experimental case studies 119 relating to environmental litigation. At present, besides a special fund for legal service granted to the All-China Environment Federation by the Ministry of Finance, there are no other special funds supporting legal actions of EPOs. Third is an issue of trust. EPOs belong to tertiary departments under development in China. Mutual trust has yet to be built between EPOs and legal departments, including courts and law firms. They need time to rub shoulders with each other to establish mutual understanding and trust. For tasks in the near future, EPOs should actively explore conducting experimental cases to push forward the development of EPIL cases, so as to protect environmental public interest. In order to encourage EPOs to act more strategically, the communication between EPOs and legal departments, lawyers, judges, and prosecutors should be enhanced. The court should hold the losing party accountable for the judicial cost, including case filing fees and lawyers fees, in EPIL cases filed by EPOs.

B. Assessment and Ascertainment of the Damage Compensation Liability for Environmental Pollution In addition to the impediments that lie in the plaintiff ’s own obstacles mentioned above, ascertaining the compensation liability for environmental pollution is another challenge in trying EPIL cases, according to judges. How shall the range of damages be identified? It is obviously inappropriate to merely consider personal and property losses. The current standards for deciding the range of damages to the environment involve technical standards in agriculture, fishery, and forestry. These standards mainly focus on the market value of resources, falling into the category of traditional damages. The List of Losses Caused by Environmental Pollution Accidents (环境污染事故损失明细表) enacted by the Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2008 merely considers the treatment fee for cleaning up contaminants. There is no ascertainable range of damages and assessment standard for damages caused by pollution per se. In terms of practical operation, currently no qualified judicial forensic institutions can issue legally binding forensic documents to identify the range of environmental damage and the causal relationship. It is thus extremely difficult to investigate and fix liability amounts against polluters. There is a long way to go before this problem is solved. However, the Ministry of Environmental Protec- tion has started drafting technical standards for assessing damages caused by pollution to the environment. Furthermore there is a plan to establish a relevant assessment and evaluation institution. This is a good start. 120 lin yanmei

Two feasible ways are available in the short term. First, as mentioned earlier, civil responsibility for polluting the environment can be investigated and fixed through confiscating the illegal proceeds of the polluter. The internationally recognized formula and standard can be referred to in this case. Second, it is necessary to prescribe in detail civil remedies besides compensation for losses, such as cessation of infringement, removal of obstacles, elimination of dangers, and restoration of original conditions. For most environmental issues, it is by no means an easy task to exercise civil remedies of cessation of infringement, removal of obstacles, and restoration of original conditions. Moreover, further examination regarding feasibility is needed. The plaintiff and the court need to cooperate with related environmental and natural scientists to work out some specific solutions.

C. Environmental Public Interest Administrative Litigation At present, EPOs are the most likely plaintiffs to file environmental public interest administrative litigation, which is an important tool to ensure the implementation of the precautionary principle and the principle of public participation. There are three major types of environmental public interest administrative litigation: 1) access to relevant environmental information released by the government; 2) appeals against administrative licenses, such as administrative licenses of sewage discharge, construction planning, and environmental impact assessment; and 3) litigation against administrative omission. The environmental public interest administrative litigations filed by the All-China Environment Federation this year were a successful attempt. They forced the Land Resources Administration in Qingzhen City to take action. Filing environmental public interest administrative litigation can not only urge administrative organs to respond actively, but also balance the relationship between economic development and protection of environmental public interest. Against the background of attracting investment and promoting economic development, the licenses of sewage discharge and environmental impact assessment are usually regarded as superficial formalities. However, balance between economic development and protection of environmental public interest can be achieved if the court, as a judicial organ for fairness and justice, may try disputes arising from environmental development and utilization and sufficiently take into consideration environmental public interest. POLLUTION RELATED LAWSUITS ENCOUNTER MANY DIFFICULTIES

Zhang Jingjing

This article discusses three legal cases concerning infringement of rights through pollution, revealing the various challenges that such lawsuits encounter. These challenges include the courts being prevented by different interest groups from trying these cases; the reversal of burden of proof not being implemented; and environmental health standards that aim to protect human health not being established. Over the last few years, growing public awareness of both environmental protection and rights has led to a gradual increase in the number of legal cases related to pollution. However, these cases have all had difficulties progressing further. The three cases introduced in this article are all concerned with the right to life, health, and a healthy environment. The problems that have emerged during the trials include difficulties determining causality and reversing the burden of proof, and are of great significance to other lawsuits related to the infringement of rights by pollution.

I. Liu Desheng vs. Jishou City’s Bureau of Agricultural Machinery (刘德胜诉吉首市农机局) for Compensation for Cancer Caused by Benzene Pollution

A retiree from the Post Office Bureau of Jishou City, Hunan Province, Liu Desheng (刘德胜) had been a longtime resident of Jishou City’s Bureau of Agricultural Machinery (吉首市农机局) family residential compound before he passed away. This residential compound consists of two residential buildings with just over twenty households. Since 1982, the Bureau of Agricultural Machinery has inspected, performed maintenance on, and spray-painted agricultural machinery in the open space between the two buildings. These operations produced an enormous amount of pollution, angering the compound residents. Liu Desheng was diagnosed with malignant lymphoma in October 2000. By that time, nine people in the residential compound had been diagnosed with cancer and seven had died. Because the paint used to 122 zhang jingjing spray-paint the agricultural machinery contained the toxic substance benzene, Liu believed that the spray-painting operations were the cause of his disease. On July 3, 2002, Liu Desheng filed a lawsuit in the People’s Court of Jishou City against the Bureau of Agricultural Machinery of Jishou City, requiring that the defendant stop infringing upon his rights, eliminate the problem, and compensate him for damages. On September 11, 2002, the People’s Court of Jishou City handed down its civil judgment, ruling that the training, maintenance, annual inspection, and spray-painting of agricultural machinery carried out in the bureau’s residential compound by the defendant, the Bureau of Agricultural Machinery of Jishou City, had caused substantive pollution and damage to the plaintiff Liu Desheng and the surrounding environment in his neighborhood. Furthermore, the defendant should immediately stop operations in the residential compound. Despite the fact that the paint contained the toxic substance benzene, the court ruled that the cancer could be caused by multiple factors and thus denied the plaintiff ’s claim for compensation for medical treatment and mental damage. Unsatisfied by the ruling, Liu Desheng appealed to the Xiangxi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court. The Intermediate People’s Court made its ruling on December 20, 2002, rejecting the appeal and upholding the ruling of the People’s Court of Jishou City. After the second judgment, Liu petitioned the Hunan Provincial People’s Procuratorate, which lodged a protest to Hunan Provincial Higher People’s Court on December 9, 2003. The latter ordered that the Intermediate People’s Court in question retry the case. On August 17, 2004, the Intermediate People’s Court delivered its final judgment on the retrial, holding that the original ruling, being based on clear facts and evidence, the correct application of laws, and appropriate procedures, should be upheld. Still unsatisfied, Liu Desheng appealed to the Hunan Provincial People’s Procuratorate, which lodged a complaint to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate held that the rulings of the Xiangxi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court of Hunan Province were flawed in terms of both its criteria for clear facts and evidence as well as its application of laws and regulations. According to the Supreme People’s Procura- torate, Liu had brought forward the facts and evidence of pollution, affirmed by the Jishou Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau. pollution related lawsuits encounter many difficulties 123

Moreover, the ruling on Liu’s appeal had no legal basis in its opinion that “the principle of reverse burden of proof is not applicable despite the presence of damages.” Under the complaint filed by the Supreme People’s Procurator- ate, the Supreme People’s Court requested that the Hunan Provin- cial Higher People’s Court reconsider the case. Liu Desheng passed away in November 2006 before the court reconvened. His family took his place as the plaintiff and managed to enlist legal support from the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV ) at the China University of Political Science and Law before the court was in session. In court, the counsels from CLAPV provided comprehensive analysis on the application of laws concerning the two key disputed issues—whether or not pollution existed, and whether the defendant, the Bureau of Agricultural Machinery of Jishou City, should bear the consequences of its failure to fulfill the reverse burden of proof. The CLAPV counsels also submitted a large amount of scientific and technical epidemiological literature to demonstrate the toxic properties of benzene for the judges’ reference. However, despite the lawyers’ efforts, the Hunan Provincial Higher People’s Court reached a decision that was similar to the rulings in the first trial, the second trial, and the retrial. The Higher People’s Court held that: The spray-painting operation in the residential compound by the defendant has had a negative influence on Liu Desheng and the living environment of his neighborhood. Nonetheless, given that there is no definitive proof as to the cause of various types of cancer, it is groundless to apply the principle of reverse burden of proof in order to extrapolate a definite causal relationship between the defendant’s polluting behavior and Liu Desheng’s cancer due to the defendant’s failure to fulfill the reverse onus. Liu Desheng’s claim that his cancer was caused by the spray-painting operation cannot be supported. In October 2009, Liu Desheng’s wife and daughter filed a petition to the Supreme People’s Court requesting another retrial.

II. Ji Zhiqi vs. Cangzhou Chengyuan Cosmetic Company, Ltd. (纪执岐诉沧州成原化妆用品有限公司) for Compensation for Pollution Damages

Compared to Liu Desheng’s case, Ji Zhiqi’s case went more smoothly. Living in Qingxian County (青县城), Hebei Province, Ji Zhiqi resides in a suburban residential area—just a footpath away from Cangzhou 124 zhang jingjing

Chengyuan Cosmetics Company, Ltd.—which was established in 1997. The cosmetics company produces toilet brushes, burning a great deal of animal fur in the production process and emitting a lot of dust, black smoke, and odor over the residential area. Moreover, the adhesive they use contains benzene, which is a carcinogen. More than ten cancer victims, seven of whom suffer from lung cancer, live in the residential area. Mr. Ji began complaining to the local government and the polluting company in 2003, asking the company to address the pollution problem. His efforts were not successful, as the company continues to operate and discharge pollution. In 2003, Li Yujun (李玉俊), Ji’s wife, was diagnosed with lung cancer. In 2007, she had become extremely thin, constrained to lying in bed in the apartment they rented temporarily to keep her away from the polluted air. In 2008, she passed away. On November 26, 2007, with the help of CLAPV, Ji sued Cheng- yuan Cosmetics in the name of his wife, asking the People’s Court of Qingxian County to hold the company responsible for the pollution and for 560,000 RMB in compensation for his wife. This case went through a number of ups and downs, including the first trial, an appeal, and then a higher-level court remanding the case back to People’s Court of Qingxian County for a retrial. The retrial court’s verdict gave Ji hope. The verdict says: This court holds that in lawsuits for compensation for damages incurred by pollution, the perpetrator bears the burden to prove that it is legally exempted from liability or that there is no causality between its behavior and the damage. But the victim is not relieved of the burden of proof—the plaintiff should provide factual evidence to prove that the defendant has polluted the environment and caused damage. The plaintiff has proven that the defendant has discharged pollutant gas that contains benzene, which is a carcinogenic substance, and Li Yujun has died from it. There- fore, the plaintiff has fulfilled his burden of proof and the defendant has to prove its innocence. The defendant fails to prove its innocence and consequently it should compensate for the losses of the plaintiff. The defendant has proven that its discharge of pollution meets the standard, but this cannot exempt it from civil liability. Although benzene is not the only cause of cancer, it is undeniably a carcinogenic substance and cancer is still an incurable disease. Therefore, the defendant should provide compensation of 80,105.89 RMB, or 30% of 267,019.63 RMB, the amount proposed by the plaintiff. The death of Li Yujun has also inflicted upon the plaintiff mental injury, and the defendant is required to pay a pension of 3,000 RMB, which makes the compensation a total of 83,105.80 RMB. pollution related lawsuits encounter many difficulties 125

The defendant was not satisfied with the result and appealed to the higher court, which called for a second trial. The final decision of the second trial is pending. From these two cases, we can see the major difficulty facing pollution infringement lawsuits, namely, how to prove causality between pollution and damage caused by it (including damage to property rights and personal rights). First, we should make it clear that the causality that is yet to be proven in pollution infringement lawsuits is not de facto causality but rather legal causality. Thirty years ago when Japanese scholars summed up their experiences in lawsuits on diseases caused by the four public nuisances, they put forward the following opinion: Determining causality in public nuisance is extremely complicated. For instance, if we insist on strict scientific collateral evidence, then we will be dragged into scientific debates. Therefore, for matters that are not conclusive or clearly explained by modern science, it is difficult to decide which factors have caused damage to the plaintiff (or as it is called, the victim). The court is not a place for scientific debates where scientific truth is thoroughly explained, but rather a place where the plaintiff ’s and the defendant’s motions are compared according to proof within the duration of hearings to see which side is more convincing. Based on rationality, the court then considers whether there exists a causal relationship.”1 So, lawsuits seek legal causality and aim to ensure the undertaking of legal responsibilities and to stabilize conflicting social relations; the pursuit of proof does not equal the search for scientific truth. In the case of Liu Desheng, the judges mistakenly thought that evidence sufficient to prove absolute de facto causality between benzene and leukemia was needed in order for the polluter to be obliged to compensate for damages. Science has not determined the definite causes of cancer, but this does not mean that the polluter can easily avoid responsibilities. According to Chinese law, pollution is considered to have caused damage if the polluter cannot offer convincing evidence why it can be exempted from liability, or there is no causality between the pollution and damage, such as when the damage is caused by a third party. At this time, the judges are required by law to presume that there exists causality between the pollution and the disease. Given this legal

1 Yoshihiro Nomura, Introduction to Japanese Public Nuisance Disease, trans. Kang Shuhua, (Chinese Association of Environmental Management, Economics, and Law, 1982). 126 zhang jingjing causality, the polluter should bear civil liability. In the instance of Ji, the judges properly distinguished between de facto causality and legal causality, and gave a correct ruling that protected the interests of the victim. Why is the burden of proof on the polluting company (the defendant)? There are two reasons: one is the complexity and delayed nature of pollution infringement and the other is that the legislator wants to protect the interests of the weak. Lawsuits over pollution infringement require deep technical knowledge of natural science, and if the victim is required to explain the causality scientifically in detail that would completely block the way for civil trials to help victims. Moreover, if the company claims some material as business secrets, even national administrations, let alone common residents, cannot conduct an investigation and make sample tests without the full cooperation of the company. On the contrary, the company has exclusive and monopo- listic knowledge in many areas such as the mechanical equipment that produce and discharge pollutants. If the company cannot clear its factory of the accusation as the pollution source, a legal causality between pollution and damage can be determined. Even if something remains to be explained, so long as it does not conflict with modern science, the established legal causality should be regarded as valid. It is possible that Liu Desheng’s leukemia was not caused solely by benzene. It may be that other factors such as his personal physical or heredity contributed to his leukemia. However, the agricultural machinery company’s polluting actions were obvious, the way that the pollution harmed Liu Desheng’s physical health is clear, and his disease was explicit. These facts are enough to prove legal causality between the company’s pollution and the damage to Liu’s health. There may remain other obscure factors, but science has concluded that benzene can result in blood abnormalities, and the speculation that Liu’s leukemia was caused by benzene does not conflict with this scientific conclusion. Therefore, the judges should rule in favor of Liu’s family, awarding compensation.

III. Administrative Proceedings on Electromagnetic Radiation Pollution Filed by Residents of Baiwang Community, Beijing

When faced with pollution and potential pollution should we be prepared and act proactively or should we do nothing and wait? All those who cherish life would choose to do the former. The significance of an pollution related lawsuits encounter many difficulties 127 environmental impact assessment system is to be prepared and proactive. Nonetheless, without the participation and supervision of the public, an environmental impact assessment system is often reduced to nothing more than mere decoration. Soon after the Administrative License Law (行政许可法) took effect in July 2004, the residents of Baiwang Community, near the Summer Palace in Beijing, submitted an application in conjunction with twelve neighboring communities and organizations to the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Environmental Protection (BMBEP), requesting a hearing on the environmental impact assessment report of high-voltage power lines that cut across the community. BMBEP accepted the application by the thirteen interested parties including the residents of Baiwang Community and held a hearing on the afternoon of August 14, 2004. This was the first hearing held to collect public opinion in the history of China’s environmental protection administration. It was a milestone in the process of increasing transparency and democratization in environmental protection administration. Nevertheless, public opinion—especially public concerns about electromagnetic radiation—did not change BMBEP’s decision to approve the environmental assessment report on the high- voltage power lines. With this administrative decision, the base of the high-voltage lines would “legally” stand in a green area approximately fifty meters away from the community kindergarten, which was not acceptable to the residents in the community. As a result, in Septem- ber 2004, the residents filed an appeal for administrative reconsideration of BMBEP’s decision. They also began administrative litigation against Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform (BMCDR) for issuing planning permits without reviewing the relevant environmental assessment report. The administrative litigation filed by Baiwang Community residents against BMBEP has undergone four court sessions and substantive issues related to this case have been under discussion in court hearings. However, the court reached a decision that the community residents had no legal standing to sue. The decision was then upheld by a second court. Given the fact that this case concerned a high-voltage power line built within fifty meters of the nearest building in the community’s green area, the courts were in effect dodging a judgment that required legal analysis by simply playing the “lack-of-standing-to-sue” card. Lack of legal standing to sue has become the most useful shield for courts to avoid handling thorny social conflicts. In April 2005, Baiwang Community residents began another administrative litigation 128 zhang jingjing against BMEPB and requested that the latter rescind its administrative approval of the environmental assessment report concerning the high-voltage lines. The case almost disappeared given that the court was first convened at the end of 2005 and did not reach the second court until four years later in October 2009. The community residents were again disappointed, as the ruling was not in their favor. Accord- ing to the court, there was no solid conclusion as to the influence of electromagnetic radiation on the human body. Therefore, the court could not affirm that high-voltage lines caused pollution and the high- voltage lines were approved. The second administrative litigation that lasted for four years failed to stop the building of the high-voltage power lines project. In fact, the project had already been finished and put into operation by the time the administrative litigation was filed in 2005. According to the ruling, the judges believed that there was no solid conclusion as to the influence of electromagnetic radiation on the human body and that as a result their judgment had to be based on the environmental standards currently in effect in China. In fact, among the eight articles of technical regulations, evaluation criteria and guidelines formulated in Technical Specifications for Environmental Impact Assessment for Electromagnetic Radiation of Ultra High Voltage 500KV Power Transmission Project (500KV 超高压送变电工程电池辐射环境影响评价技术规范) and Management Guidelines for Environmental Protection from Radiation— Electromagnetic Environmental Impact Assessment Methods and Standards (辐射环境保护管理导则—电磁环境保护影响评价方法与标准), there are no environmental standards established to analyze the impacts on human health.2 In fact, human health based environmental standards have not yet been established within China’s current environmental standards system. With construction projects as its starting point, the current system focuses on the impact of a given construction project on the environment, including water and air, as well as its relationship with and impact on other construction projects. A people-oriented environmental standards system that analyzes the impact of construction projects on human health has yet to be established. Since the environmental impact report concerning the high voltage power line

2 The complete title is Environmental Impact Report on the Project of 220KV/110KV Elec- tric Transmission Lines in the Areas of Xishatun, Shangzhuang, and Liulangzhuang (Shangqing Section Towers #12–#36). pollution related lawsuits encounter many difficulties 129 project in question provided no analysis on possible damage to human health incurred by electromagnetic radiation, the judges could not refer to any such analysis in the report. Each and every year there are thousands of cases of social conflict triggered by pollution. The three cases presented here were the lucky few to have made their way into the court docket and concluded with judicial decisions. Thousands of similar cases have failed to even make it into the courtroom. Among those that did make it to the court, more often than not, they ended up with the plaintiffs (the pollution victims), losing the lawsuit. During the trials, local interest groups and local government officials impose great pressure and influence on the judges who are then not able to exercise their authority independently based on facts, evidence, and laws. According to relevant Chinese official statistics released in May 2007, cancer overtook cardiovascular diseases to become the number one killer in China for the first time. Environmental degradation is one of the major cancer-causing factors. The right to life and health is a basic human right, the protection of which is a basic requisite for the continuation of humankind as well as a safeguard for a nation’s prosperity. Seeking protection for life and health through laws and legal remedies is one of the channels by which pollution-caused health problems can be resolved. Fortunately, the Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (水污染防治法), Law on the Prevention and Control of Pol- lution by Solid Waste (水污染防治法), and the Tort Law (侵权责任法) provide a solid legal foundation to secure people’s right to health. The crux of the problem is that, during trials, courts are strongly influenced by different interests, and thus are not able to deliver a fair trial based on laws and regulations. As a result, it is hard for laws and regulations to protect the public, especially the victims of pollution, as far as the right to life and health is concerned.

THE CASE OF YANCHENG WATER POLLUTION: PROBLEMS IN JUDICATURE

Feng Jia

On February 20, 2009, tap water plants in Yancheng, Jiangsu Prov- ince were contaminated by toxic wastewater discharged by a local factory. The person responsible for the event was charged with the crime of administering poison, but whether or not this criminal charge is appropriate in this case is open to discussion. This paper argues that environmental legislation should serve as the most powerful weapon for addressing environmental problems, and that the loopholes in environmental legislation should be amended through legal means, otherwise a mistake may be made in interpreting the Criminal Law. Only when environmental legislation is perfected can we deal with environmental crimes effectively. On February 20, 2009, an accident in the city of Yancheng (盐城), Jiangsu Province shocked China. Tap water in Yancheng was severely contaminated, resulting in a water shut-down for 66 hours and 40 minutes affecting 200,000 residents and leading to a ﬁnancial loss up to 5.43 million RMB (about 796 thousand USD).1 The tap water was polluted by the Biaoxin Chemical Co., Ltd. (标新化工有限公司), because it discharged large quantities of waste water containing potassium ion into the river nearby—the main source of tap water for the local people. After the accident, the public and the media focused on how to convict the ones responsible for this event. On August 14, 2009, the People’s Court of Yancheng District sentenced Hu Wenbiao (胡文标), Chairman of Biaoxin Chemical Co., Ltd., to ten years of imprisonment for administering poison. With several other minor convictions, Hu will serve a total of eleven years in prison. This was the ﬁrst case in China in which someone who violated emission rules and caused serious environmental pollution was

1 Ding Guofeng, “The Judge Expounds on the Reason of the Conviction of Spread- ing Poison,” Legal Daily, August 25, 2009. 132 feng jia sentenced on the charge of spreading poison under the provision of Articles 114 and 115 of China’s Criminal Law (刑法). However, this case is not fully in accordance with the components of the crime of administering poison on the basis of the codes and principles of laws. Therefore, it reﬂects a tendency to misapply environmental legislation to meet the demands of environmental justice. Environmental legislation should be a powerful weapon for addressing environmental problems. Only by environmental legislation can environmental problems be resolved. Otherwise a mistake may be made in interpreting the criminal law.

I. A Crime of Spreading Poison or a Crime of Causing Serious Environmental Pollution

When the conviction was announced, it immediately attracted wide attention both from the public and the media. The decision was widely acclaimed, on the grounds that it not only punished the criminal behavior but also protected the environment and safeguarded people’s interests. Meanwhile, the verdict received many positive comments from netizens. For example, a netizen named “Xiao Dao” commented on his Sina Blog, “I would like to applaud the judges of Yancheng Court!”2 However, legal experts and scholars, along with many other netizens, believed that it was not appropriate to convict the accused of the crime of spreading poison with reference to existing regulations and law. Therefore, this case was “wrongly judged.” Among these voices was one from Wang Canfa (王灿发), professor of environmental law, who, on September 5, 2009, said in a talk show on the Phoenix TV News Channel that the case of Yancheng water pollution was wrongly judged. He believed that Hu Wenbiao should face the criminal charge of causing serious environmental pollution under the provision of Article 338 of the Criminal Law instead of being charged with the crime of spreading poison. Which criminal charge is more appropriate in this case is the main concern. In order to come to a better conclusion, we are obligated to

2 Xiao Dao, “The Nature of Yancheng Water Pollution Is Definitely Poisoning,” Sina Blog, October 23, 2009, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_53e18e730100esef .html. the case of yancheng water pollution 133 distinguish the crime of spreading poison from the crime of causing serious environmental pollution. Article 114 states: Whoever endangers public security by setting fires, breaching dikes, causing explosions, administering poison, or employing other dangerous means to sabotage factories, mines, oilfields, seaports, rivers, water sources, warehouses, dwellings, forests, farms, threshing grounds, ranches, important pipelines, public buildings, and other public and private property is to be sentenced to not less than three years but not more than ten years of fixed-term imprisonment in cases where serious consequences have not been caused. Article 115 states: Whoever sets fires, breaches dikes, causes explosions, and spreads poison, employs other dangerous means that lead to serious injuries or death, or causes major losses to public or private property is to be sentenced to not less than ten years of fixed-term imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death. From these two articles, one can see the “crime of spreading poison” is committed with a motivation of sabotaging and endangering private property and life. Here the motivation deserves special attention. In other words, when executing the act of poison-spreading, the criminal intentionally endangers public safety. Now, let’s look at Article 338 of the Criminal Law of China, which states: Whoever releases, dumps, or disposes of radioactive waste, waste containing pathogens of contagious diseases, and toxic materials or other dangerous waste into land, water, and the atmosphere in violation of state stipulations, leading to major environment pollution accidents— thus causing public or private property to suffer heavy losses, or severe consequences such as injury and death—shall be sentenced to a fixed- term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention, and may concurrently or exclusively be sentenced to a fine. If serious consequences have resulted, they shall be sentenced to a fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than seven years, and concurrently a fine. We notice that negligence is the key factor in the crime of causing serious environmental pollution, which, therefore, should be a negligence crime. However, because of this, many people, including the judge of Yancheng Court, held that Hu Wenbiao intentionally committed the crime when he discharged contaminated waste water and 134 feng jia was fully aware of its toxicity. Therefore, according them, Hu should not be charged with the crime of causing serious environmental pollution. The judge of this case said in an interview, “Hu Wenbiao and Ding Yuesheng (丁月生) knew perfectly well that the waste water was poisonous, but they still discharged a large quantity into the river. It endangered the public safety, and caused great losses to public and private property. Without a doubt, Hu’s behavior violated the law, and he should be charged with the crime of administering poison, instead of that of causing serious environmental pollution.”3 His con- tention was widely accepted by the public. There is no denying that Hu’s behavior was indeed intentional, but we must bear in mind that the key factor of negligence refers to the result instead of the act itself. That is, the conviction for the crime of causing serious environmental pollution does not refer to the circumstance that the accused discharged, dumped, or disposed of poisonous waste water out of negligence. Doing such things deliberately can also constitute the crime of causing serious environmental problems. The crucial point lies in the purpose of his action: was it to endanger public safety or to save production costs so as to increase profits? In most cases, enterprises discharge waste water illegally with the purpose of saving costs. Illegal dischargers do not intend to endanger the lives and property of others. Therefore, the crime of causing serious environmental problems is a crime of negligence, and “negligence” refers to the psychological state of the dischargers, not the result of their behavior. In this case, although Hu Wenbiao intentionally discharged poisonous waste water, people should consider this assumption. That is, did he intentionally endanger public safety? This paper argues that despite the fact that what Hu Wenbiao had indeed caused great losses and provoked a serious outcry, he was after profit. Going to great lengths to pursue profit is the root cause of his illegal act. Thus, the conviction of Hu’s crime as one of administering poison needs reconsideration.

3 Ding Guofeng, “The Judge Expounds on the Reason of the Conviction of Spread- ing Poison,” Legal Daily, August 25, 2009. the case of yancheng water pollution 135

II. Environmental Protection and Environmental Legislation: Can They Both be Achieved?

The real reason for the heated debate on this case lies in the different legal liabilities between the crime of causing serious environmental problems and that of administering poison, provided by China’s Crimi- nal Law. Administering poison is a felony, for which the offender could be sentence to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years if serious consequences have resulted. However, the crime of causing serious environmental problems is a less serious crime, for which the offender shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than seven years even if serious consequences have resulted. In the past, a number of serious environmental pollution accidents have taken place, but decisions were made about these cases without going through any judicial procedures, though many cases were already serious enough to be categorized as crimes. Even if several serious cases were brought into the court, the defendants were convicted as if they had committed a minor crime of causing serious environmental problems, resulting in light punishment. That is why in the eyes of environmentalists, the conviction of the Yancheng case was undoubtedly significant. However, this conviction was not in confor- mity with the basic codes of law. In other words, it was made at the expense of judicial justice. Though the result of this individual case is favorable to environmental protection and fits people’s basic notion of justice, it becomes a conviction of distorting the law. Then, what is the problem? Environmental protection is a just cause. In a society ruled by law, all acts must fall within the requirements of law. When we advocate environmental justice, we should also abide by the law. Moreover, only by legal means can environmental justice be truly achieved. Therefore, environmental protection must be realized and guaranteed by means of legislation. Legislation is the ultimate safeguard for environmental protection. But that does not mean that laws have no defects. In fact, there are many loopholes in laws. Problems that arise during law enforcement should be fixed by amending and improving laws. The crime of causing serious environmental problems is a good example. China’s current Criminal Law was adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on July 1, 1979 and amended by the Fifth Session 136 feng jia of the Eighth National People’s Congress on March 14, 1997. Back then, environmental problems had emerged, but they did not draw as much attention as today. Therefore, crimes related to environmental pollution were treated as relatively minor crimes, and punishments for them were not severe. But now, the Criminal Law cannot meet the needs of social development. Therefore, the current situation requires another amendment to the Criminal Law regarding, among others, the provisions for crimes causing serious environmental problems, so as to enhance the rigor and effectiveness of the law. From this perspective, the case of Yancheng water pollution had a positive effect on the development of China’s environmental legislation. Environmentalists and professionals of law had realized the loopholes in the Criminal Law before the event. Via various channels, they requested to increase the toughness of the penalty for the crime of causing serious environmental problems, but to no avail. In previous cases, courts and local governments were usually lenient to polluting enterprises, and against punishing illegal dischargers severely. But in this case, the court charged the offenders with the crime of administering poison, which sounded the alarm to legislators: there is something wrong with the provision concerning the crime of causing serious environmental problems. It should be amended promptly; otherwise, the provision will hinder the realization of environmental justice. Only by amending the law and fixing the loopholes can the Criminal Law adjust itself to the needs of environmental protection. Legislative problems can only be amended through means of legislation. Judicial procedures of individual cases can only provide experience for legislation, and ultimately problems in legislation can only be solved within the domain of legislation.

III. Effective Ways to Protect the Environment under the Rule of Law

The Yancheng water pollution case exposes the weakness of China’s Criminal Law in dealing with cases of environmental pollution. How- ever, good results for environmental protection cannot be fully achieved merely by amending the Criminal Law or heightening the legal liability for environmental pollution. Legal liability leads to compensation for what has been lost. So once legal liability is involved, damage has already been done. However, prevention is better than the cure. And the real purpose of practicing environmental rule of law is to prevent the case of yancheng water pollution 137 environmental pollution and environmental devastation through pre- ventive measures. Therefore, protecting the environment under the rule of law is more than the Criminal Law or criminal liability. It is established on the principle that prevention should come first. In other words, violation of environmental laws must be prevented by enforcing the law and strengthening monitoring of and tightening control over the environment. Thus, environmental law enforcement is the most important for environmental legislation. Environmental protection laws and regulations should be applied to the daily supervision of the production and management of enterprises to make sure that their discharge of pollutants does not overburden the ecosystem. However, the continuing violations of environmental laws indicate that enforcement of the laws in China is immensely problematic. The recurrent environmental pollution accidents are due to the ineffective enforcement of environmental protection. The Yancheng water pollution accident is a case in point. First, the system of environmental planning specified in environmental laws does not work properly. Many local governments focus only upon economic returns and revenues with little consideration for ecological conditions when making plans for socio-economic development. In the Yancheng water pollution case, the short distance between the Concentrated Development Zone of the Chemical Indus- try designated by the local government and the source of the city’s drinking water played a key role in causing the accident. Therefore, we can see the omission of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) for overall urban planning and the absence of public participation are the main causes. Second, the principle of “three synchronizations” (三同时) has not been implemented. This principle states that the design, construction, and production of the pollution control facilities should be synchro- nized with those of the main body of the project. Currently, routine supervision is actually carried out on a superficial level. Although a good many enterprises have obtained an environmental protection permit, they continue to discharge untreated pollutants illegally. Some even secretly dig ditches and bury underground drains to sur- reptitiously discharge pollutants. The Biaoxin Chemical Co., Ltd. in the Yancheng water pollution case is such an enterprise. But if the local environmental protection department had strengthened its daily 138 feng jia supervision to ensure the proper running of the pollution control facilities in the enterprise, the water pollution accident might have been avoided. Third, the role of public participation was not brought into play. The local administration did not pay due attention to public complaints about the pollutants discharged by the company until the water pollution accident happened. We should learn a lesson from the Yancheng water pollution case: that is, a severe penalty is not necessarily the only or best way to ensure environmental protection. The key is to enforce environmental laws and regulations. After all, “justice has long arms.” PART III

POLLUTION AND HEALTH

ALARMING ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH INCIDENTS OF 2009

Qie Jianrong

Frequent occurrences of environmental health incidents in 2009 alarmed the government and society. The Ministry of Environmental Protection has taken the prevention of heavy metal pollution as its priority in 2010.

I. Frequent Alarming Environmental and Health Incidents in 2009

There was much publicity in 2009 about health incidents caused by environmental pollution. Among the ﬁve worst cases, heavy metal pollution stood out.

A. Drinking Water Source for 200,000 People Polluted in Yancheng, Jiangsu Province “People Dashing to Supermarkets for Bottled Water Because Water Supply Cut This Morning in Yancheng (盐城), Jiangsu Province” was the eye-catching headline on the China Broadcast Network at 2 PM, February 20, 2009. An hour later, a news story revealed the truth: the source of the drinking water in this city was polluted by a chemical factory. At a press conference held the next day, a municipal government ofﬁcial announced that the pollution was caused by an illegal discharge of pollution upstream and that the polluter, Biaoxin Chemical Co., Ltd. (标新化工有限公司), had been shut down, with its corporate representative Hu Wenbiao (胡文标) held in custody. According to the media, the private chemical factory, employing less than 100 people, mainly produces raw materials for the chemical industry, such as potassium chloride, crystal aluminum chloride, and aquae hydrogenii dioxide. Surrounded by farm ﬁelds, the factory has been found many times discharging its sewage through hidden pipes into a river leading to the water source. 142 qie jianrong

By February 22, the water supply in Yancheng had been restored. According to the local health department, the quality of water was up to the national standard for drinking water, drawing an end to this three-day incident. Also on February 22, the police department announced an investigation into this major pollution case by the Biaoxin Chemical Co., Ltd. and the detention of Hu Wenbiao, the legal representative and Ding Yuesheng (丁月生), the factory manager and workshop director. On August 7, 2009, they were sentenced to ten and six years of imprisonment, respectively, by the district court for “placing dangerous substances into water.” This was the ﬁrst case ever in China in which suspects were convicted for this criminal charge. Cui Jianguo (崔建国), the then head of the local environmental supervision force in the protected zone of the water source, was also held responsible for the incident and was sentenced to a two-year prison term for his “failure to exercise environmental supervision” at the end of 2009.

B. A Mass Incident Triggered by Cadmium Pollution in Liuyang, Hunan Province On July 30, 2009, thousands of people in Zhentou Township (镇头镇), Liuyang City (浏阳市), Hunan Province took to the streets to protest against a local chemical company for environmental pollution. The protesters eventually withdrew after obtaining the local government’s promise to ﬁnd a solution. The city government soon announced that an investigation was under way.1 According to The Beijing News, the body of a villager, alleged to have died from cadmium pollution, had been taken to the government building the day before. Xinhua News Agency reported that by July 31 there were 509 cases (out of 2,888 valid tests) showing a high urine cadmium index. On August 1, the corporate representative for Xianghe Chemi- cal Plant (湘和化工厂), directly responsible for the pollution, was put under detention, while the general director of the Environmental Department of Liuyang and his deputy director in charge were dis-

1 Meng Zhou, “Cadmium Pollution in Liuyang: Why Did a Demonstration Take Place?” The Beijing News, August 3, 2009. alarming environment and health incidents of 2009 143 missed from ofﬁce. Others responsible for the incident were also under investigation. Changsha Xianghe Chemical Plant, a private shareholding chemical company, started operation in 2003, mainly producing zinc sulfate powder and granules. As proved by the government of Changsha, Hunan Province, cadmium pollution during the illegal production process was the main cause of the incident. The polluted area extends 500 to 1200 meters around the plant. The investigation attributed the incident to the negligence of the local environmental department and government ofﬁcials’ vested interests as share holders in this company. As The Procuratorial Daily reported on August 4, the company was closed down permanently. Five people were arrested and charged with “severe pollution to the environment,” including Luo Xiangping (骆湘平), the corporate representative, Huang Heping (黄和平), the factory manager, and Tang Wenlong (唐文龙), the chief technician. Meanwhile, the deputy mayor of Zhentou Town- ship and the head of the environmental department were under investigation for abusing power, taking bribes, and negligence.

C. Elevated Blood Lead Levels in Children in Fengxiang County, Shaanxi Province On August 7, 2009, eight medical workers from the Central Hospital of Xi’an, Shaanxi Province came to Madaokou Village (马道口村), Changqing Township (长青镇), Fengxiang County (凤翔县) to test the blood lead levels (BLL) in children under the age of fourteen. This was how the “elevated blood lead level children” of Fengxiang County became known to the public. The blood sampling of the 864 children in Madaokou Village and Sunjianantou Village (孙家南头村) was completed on August 10. Subsequently, the government of Fengxiang County announced the blood test results at a press conference on August 13, stating that 615 of the 731 children in the two villages had an elevated BLL, with 166 of them severely poisoned and in need of immediate hospitalization and treatment. Investigations into the source of the pollution proved that the Dongling Smelting Company (东岭冶炼有限公司) in Changqing Township, Fengxiang County was the major culprit. After the incident, 1,803 people from 425 households would have to move from the contaminated area within two years. The local government is responsible 144 qie jianrong for all the relocation costs, approximately 100 million RMB or the annual revenue of Fengxiang County.2 As reported on December 22, 2009, eleven ofﬁcials involved in the event in Fengxiang County and Baoji City (宝鸡市) were given disci- plinary punishment, though a detailed shortlist remained undisclosed.

D. Suspected Elevated BLL in 1354 People in Wugang, Hubei Province Soon after the incident of high BLL in children in Shaanxi Province was disclosed, a similar incident in Wugang (武冈), Hunan Province was reported. By August 18, 2009, 1354 of the 1958 children receiving blood tests, or 70% of the total, had been found with an elevated BLL. According to the Center for Occupational Disease Prevention and Treatment, Hunan Province, thirty-eight of the children had an elevated BLL (100–199ug/L), twenty-eight were lightly poisoned (200–249ug/L), seventeen moderately poisoned (250–449ug/L), and none severely poisoned. The moderately poisoned children were sent to a hospital in the city of Changsha. What stirred up this event was the result of an earlier blood test for a few children living near Wugang City Manga- nese Refinery (武冈市精炼锰加工厂).3 The Wugang Municipal Gov- ernment initiated a series of sampling and testing in the polluted area, and the findings indicated that the polluter was the refinery. The pollution triggered a mass incident when the Wenping County Government ignored the complaints of residents. Angered villagers from nearby towns began to block the road, beginning on July 30, which escalated to conflicts in which government vehicles were overturned.4 Under pressure, the municipal government closed down the smelting plant. Deng Qingguo (邓庆国) and Yi Jianhua (义建华) were put under detention as suspects, while Liu Zhongwu (刘忠武) was wanted by police. Additionally, two local officers from the environmental office were under investigation for negligence.

2 Qie Jianrong, “The Local Government Is Reaping What It Has Sown,” Legal Daily, October 23, 2009. 3 Li Jiapeng and Ding Wenjie, “Wugang, Hunan Provingce: 70% of 1958 Children with a Suspected Overly High Level of Blood Lead,” Economic Information Daily, August 20, 2009. 4 Jia Huajie, “Wugang Lead Pollution Indicating the Inefﬁciency of the Environ- mental Protection Department,” Time Weekly, September 3, 2009. alarming environment and health incidents of 2009 145

E. Elevated BLL Incident in Jiyuan, the “Lead City,” Henan Province With the disclosure of the elevated BLL incidents in Shaanxi Prov- ince and Hunan Province, nearly half of the smelting plants in Jiyuan (济源), Henan Province, known as the “lead city,” stopped operation by September 4, 2009. According to the 21st Century Business Herald, thirty-two lead plants have stopped production completely as of August 24, while the three biggest plants still in operation, namely Yuguangjinqian (豫光金铅), Jinli (金利), and Wanyang (万洋), have also closed their sintering machines. One month later, the city of Jiyuan completed the blood tests for children from ten villages of three affected counties. There were 1,008 children under age of fourteen that needed treatment. Thirty-two plants were closed.5 As the investigation revealed, the elevated BLL in children was directly caused by the absence of safety zones in the area. An authority admitted that the lead poisoning in Jiyuan was partially a result of the city’s development. When the plants were ﬁrst built, both the plants and the villages were rather small and separated from each other. Over the years, without a good sense of self-protection, villagers expanded across the 1,000 meter safety boundary from the plants. Currently, the municipal government plans to relocate the residents of the ten villages with full consideration of their situations. The cost of treatment for eliminating the lead will also be paid by the government. In fact, there are many similar incidents in which environmental pollution does severe harm to human health. Elevated BLL in children was also found in Dongchuan District (东川区) in Kunming, Yunnan Province; Shanghang (上杭), Fujian Province; and other places.

II. Environment and Health Incidents are the Result of Old Environmental Problems

Environment and health incidents exposed in 2009 are alarming and thought-provoking. Since the State Environmental Protection Admin- istration has been upgraded to the Ministry of Environmental Pro- tection, indicating an ever more stringent regulation at the national

5 Zhu Lin, “On the Rectification of the ‘Lead City,’” People’s Daily, October 16, 2009. 146 qie jianrong level, why are there still frequent outbreaks of environment and health incidents? Wang Canfa (王灿发), professor of environmental law at China University of Political Science and Law, observes that there is a hys- teretic feature in the emergence of the consequences of environmental pollution and damage, meaning the impact on human health will not be noticed until pollutants have piled up to a certain degree. This has been proven true. None of the recent environment and health incidents has been caused by a single incident of pollution discharge. Wang Canfa claims that the occurrence of recent environment and health incidents is closely related to the rapid development of the economy, the severe insufficiency in environmental inputs, and the weak enforcement of environmental laws over the past thirty years since the opening up and reform policies were adopted. During this period, China’s GDP has grown by 10% annually with the input in environmental protection accounting for less than 1% of GDP. It is only during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001–2006) that the environmental input in GDP rose to 1.4%. Experts estimate a minimum of 2% environmental input in GDP is necessary for maintaining a sound environment. Wang also attributes the frequent outbreaks of environment and health incidents to the fact that laws on environmental protection are not fully or effectively implemented and observed, though it is true that China’s environmental legislation has outpaced some developed countries.6 Meanwhile, the general conditions for environmental law enforcement are not favorable. The major problem with environmental law enforcement is the lack of pressure for and motivation of local governments. In Wang’s opinion, though the Environmental Protection Law (环境保护法) provides that a local government is responsible for the environment in the area under its control, responsibilities that the local government bears are not specified as to whether they are political, legal, or economic. Moreover, the assessment of environmental conditions and resource consumption are not included in the government performance evaluation, making the legal provisions concerning governments’ responsibilities in environmental protection invalid.

6 Zhu Lin, “Investigation on the Overhaul of ‘Lead City,’ ” People’s Daily, Octo- ber 16, 2009. alarming environment and health incidents of 2009 147

Sun Youhai (孙佑海), member of the National Environmental Advi- sory Committee and professor at China University of Political Science and Law, said that it is easy to ﬁnd the strong urge for increasing GDP and making immediate achievements among major local leaders, all leading to wrong decisions in terms of protecting the environment. In addition, China’s environmental administration system also con- strains law enforcement by environmental departments, mainly in the form of intervention by local authorities. Wang Canfa pointed ﬁngers to the corruption in environmental law enforcement which has seeped into personnel management, environmental evaluation, administrative punishment, and so on. Looking at these environment and health incidents for example, the monitoring statistics by environmental departments had indicated excessive pollutant discharge long before heavy-metal pollution incidents broke out. This is the result of corruption as much as inadequate supervision.

III. Environment and Health Incidents Will Remain Frequent in the Near Future

The frequent outbreaks of environment and health incidents in 2009 are by no means random. Some experts point out that after thirty years of rapid economic growth, the harmful effects of environmental pollution, especially the harm to human health, is becoming ever more prominent. It is highly possible that in the coming few years, environment and health incidents will continue to occur frequently. On the other hand, some experts claim that, in spite of a rapid increase in such environment and health incidents, the reported incidents in 2009 give us an encouraging sign of heightened public awareness of environmental pollution and its impact on human health, as “the victims can no longer tolerate this kind of environmental pollution, and they are ﬁghting against pollution in various ways.”7 The damage caused by environmental pollution can sometimes be immediately felt and can also remain unnoticeable for a long period of time as with some heavy-metal pollutants in which consequences may not reveal themselves until several years or even dozens of years

7 Wang Canfa, “Legal Reﬂections on the Outburst of Signiﬁcant Environmental Pollution Incidents,” Environmental Protection, 2009–9A. 148 qie jianrong later. Cases of this kind include itai-itai disease caused by cadmium pollution, Minamata disease caused by mercury pollution, and cancers caused by chemical substances.8 Over the thirty years of economic development, pollution has increased and accumulated far beyond what the environment can sustain. Diseases caused by pollution have come into a period of high incidence. On December 29, 2009, in response to frequent outbreaks of environment and health incidents, the National Environmental Emergency Response Group was established in Beijing. Obviously, the Ministry of Environmental Protection has foreseen environmental problems and their impact on human health. Experts compare the recent environmental pollution incidents that affect health in China to those in Japan in the early 1970s. After World War II, Japan also experienced a rapid economic growth and suffered from serious environment and health problems like the Minamata disease. If we refuse to face the environment and health incidents in 2009, we will have a harder time dealing with consequences of environmental pollution in the future.

IV. The Prevention and Control of Heavy-Metal Pollution Becomes a Priority of the Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2010

On January 8, 2010, a national conference was held by the Ministry of Environmental Protection to draft plans for pollution prevention and control, especially plans for coordinated work on heavy-metal pollution. The meeting concluded that old environmental problems are still unsolved while new problems keep emerging, especially heavy-metal pollution and its impact on human health, which was put on the top of the pollution prevention and control agenda for 2010. The ﬁrst move taken to tackle heavy-metal pollution was to draft a comprehensive prevention and control plan, together with an evaluation and supervision mechanism. According to published documents, the plan takes the prevention and control of pollution sources in key areas as its main task. Fol- lowing the principle of polluters pay, work will be done in a planned way, with a focus and in steps. The plan will specify the key areas

8 Wang, “Legal Reflections.” alarming environment and health incidents of 2009 149 of prevention and control, objectives, tasks, policies, and measures in order to solve the problem of heavy metal pollution and its threats to human health. The drafting of the overall plan is moving forward smoothly at the moment, according to the Ministry of Environmental Protection. The outline of the plan and the list of program requirements have been worked out. The newly established drafting group will go for investigation and research, identify key prevention and control areas, and examine and choose major programs. Judging from the history of environmental pollution in China, it is extremely difficult to check the outburst of environment and health incidents by taking one single measure. Serious reflections over the current environmental protection system are required for a thorough and long-term solution, rather than expediency for each single case.

ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IN RAPIDLY DEVELOPING NINGXIA, INNER MONGOLIA, AND SHAANXI

Yu Chen

Located in ecologically vulnerable deserts, the cities of Ordos and Wuhai in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; Yulin in Shaanxi Province; and Shizuishan in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region have become areas of fast economic growth. However, extensive urban construction, large-scale resource exploitation, and construction of enterprises that consume a large amount of energy and cause serious pollution, have brought severe environmental problems. This has resulted in intensified ecological degradation, desertification, pollution, water waste, and water shortage. Consequently, environmental protection and sustainable development in these regions have become pressing issues that call for immediate attention and solutions. In recent years, the economic growth rates of Ordos (鄂尔多斯) and Wuhai (乌海) in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; Yulin (榆林) in Shaanxi Province; and Shizuishan (石嘴山) in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, were all far above China’s average. The average annual GDP growth rate of Ordos was 27%, leading in both Inner Mongolia and China; hence, the term the “Ordos Phenome- non” has been coined. As for Yulin, its GDP grew at a rate of 24% in 2008 and ranked first in Shaanxi Province for seven consecutive years. Undoubtedly, the economic take-off at the junction area of Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and Shaanxi has attracted a great deal of attention. However, little has been mentioned of the ecological and environmental problems resulting from the economic growth stimulated by resource development in these severely arid desert areas. It is tremendously important for this economic “Golden Triangle” in North China, which is made up of the Ordos Plateau (鄂尔多斯高原), the Mu Us Desert (毛乌素沙漠), and the Alxa Desert (阿拉善沙漠), to consider how to promote sustainable economic and social development. The region has limited resources and must take its environmental capacity fully into account. 152 yu chen

I. The Impact of Resource Development on the Environment

A journey south from the city of Baotou (包头), across Ordos, Yulin, and then northwest to the counties of Jingbian (靖边) and Dingbian (定边) on the edge of Mu Us Desert, then up to Uxen Banner (乌审旗), Otog Banner (鄂托克旗), and Otog Front Banner (鄂托克前旗), and finally to the city of Wuhai, presents a desolate view of silent wilderness dotted with nothing but shrubs and needlegrass. Thundering down this road through the Gobi Desert are armies of heavyweight vehicles fully loaded with coal, petroleum, natural gas, and mechanical tools. The vast wilderness is turning into a huge energy base. Abun- dant resources such as fossil fuels and iron ore in the junction of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Shaanxi Province are being tapped and loaded onto the economic express of China. However, the large-scale resource development and exploitation have caused severe damage to the already vulnerable ecological environment of these areas under the influence of the arid steppe climate. On February 18, 2009, the Department of Land and Resources of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region announced that confirmed coal reserves in this region had reached 701.6 billion tons, which was more than twice that of the whole nation (326.1 billion tons), according to the 2008 China Statistical Yearbook.1 The city of Yulin in Shaanxi Province is incredibly rich in resources such as coal, oil, natural gas, and halite. The possible geological reserves of coal are 270 billion tons, of which 140 billion are proven. The reserves of oil and natural gas are also substantial, not to men- tion the projected 6 trillion tons of halite, which represent 26% of the national reserve. Furthermore, the mineral resources in Yulin account for 95% of those in the entire province of Shaanxi. However, the development of energy resources such as coal and oil in the cold and arid desert imposes a great demand on water. Strip mining, which is the major method adopted to extract coal in Ordos and Yulin because of the closeness of the ore to the land’s surface, has destroyed vegetation on a large scale. Consequently, the ecological system has suffered immensely.

1 Liu Jun, “Inner Mongolia Becomes Top Coal Province with a Storage of over 700 Million Tons,” Science and Technology Daily, February 19, 2009. environmental crisis in ningxia, inner mongolia, and shaanxi 153

The local residents and officials of Ordos have revealed that spring sandstorms appear in the city more often than in recent years in spite of the local government’s great efforts at planting sand-control vegetation. One of the causes of the growing desertification may lie in the fact that a large number of former ranches and farms were exploited when their owners moved to nearby towns and cities. They often received compensation from the government for land expropriation by coal-mining enterprises or the lands were left unattended and reserved for future industrial parks. The northern part of Shaanxi Province also faces environmental problems resulting from resource development. The daily discharge of wastewater from a coal mine in Yuyang District (榆阳区) of Yulin tops 1000 tons, turning the lake in the nearby desert into a dirty and black “dead sea.” Frequent oil leaks during exploitation have polluted the water resources in the counties of Jingbian, Hengshan (横山), and Dingbian in northern Yulin. When oil and gas companies mushroomed in Dingbian County, where there was no wastewater treatment plant, huge quantities of wastewater were discharged directly into surrounding farmlands. Pasturelands and farmlands at the junction of western Ordos, Alxa League in Inner Mongolia, and Shizuishan in Ningxia have also been transformed into mining areas. In particular, a large open coalfield located between Hainan District (海南区) in Wuhai and Otog Banner has posed environmental threats to the neighboring nature reserve. Such impacts on the environment caused by resource development are clear. But they do not end there. According to the Yellow River Water Rights Transfer Seminar held in Ordos in November 2008, the top ten seasonal rivers in Ordos—the ten channels for mountain torrents that run into the Yellow River via Kubiqi Desert (库布齐沙漠)—contribute 27 million tons of silt, mostly grit, into the Yellow River each year. Hence, Ordos has warned that immediate measures must be taken to prevent the ten rivers from carrying more sand into the Yellow River. Otherwise these sections of the Yellow River in Inner Mongolia will turn into rivers without foundations.

II. The Rise of Industries with High Energy Consumption and Emissions

The richness of energy and mineral resources in this region has unfortunately given rise to a large number of projects that involve high 154 yu chen energy consumption and heavy pollution as local governments are trying to extend the chain of industries. Baotou, Wuhai, and Ordos in Inner Mongolia are famous as the “Golden Triangle” of northern China. Baotou and Ordos rank high economically in Inner Mongolia, while Wuhai has continued to rise in recent years. As proven by data released by The 2007 Blue Book on China Urban Competitiveness, Wuhai has fought its way into the top 10 of 200 cities above the prefecture level in terms of growth competitiveness. What is fueling the economic growth in this region? The answers are resource exploitation and industries with high energy consumption and emissions. Construction of the “Golden Triangle” industrial parks started in late 1990s. Wuhai, Ordos, and Alxa League have taken advantage of their abundant coal, electric power, and mineral resources to attract investment by formulating favorable policies. They rushed into setting up industrial parks, which were occupied by high energy consumption and heavily polluting enterprises on the narrow stretch of riverbanks that run a few dozen kilometers along the Yellow River. For example, industrial parks were built in an area of 99 square kilometers around Wuhai’s Wuda District (乌达区) and Hainan District, Wusitai Town (乌斯太镇) of the Alxa Left Banner of Alxa League (阿拉善盟阿左旗), and the Otog Banner of Ordos. All of these development zones and industrial parks, including the Gongwusu Development Zone (公乌素镇开发区), the Wuda Industrial Park (乌达工业园区), the Wus- itai Industrial Park (乌斯太工业园区), the Alxa Left Banner Industrial Park (阿拉善左旗工业园区), and the Qipanjing Industrial Park (棋盘井工业园区) were packed into the convergence of southwest Inner Mongolia and Ningxia. Hence, a noon sky can look like smeared dusk when over a thousand factories bellow smoke at the same time. The Wusitai Industrial Park was designated in 1996 as a “model park” in the east-west cooperation between township and village enterprises in Inner Mongolia, and then upgraded in 2002 to an autonomous region level development zone with a planned area of 16 square kilometers. The Park houses factories that are mainly involved in salt chemical engineering, dye chemical engineering, metallurgy, construction materials, and coal reprocessing. So far, about a hundred enterprises have moved into this industrial park. Although executively under the supervision of Alxa League, the park is, geographically speaking, just across the road from the Wuda Industrial Park in Wuhai. How- ever, general visibility is less than 10 meters on the road between the two parks when they start work in the morning. environmental crisis in ningxia, inner mongolia, and shaanxi 155

The Qipanjing Industrial Park, as another example, is part of the Mengxi Economic Development Zone (蒙西经济开发区) in Ordos. A single high-energy park covers an area of 60 square kilometers. A document provided by the Management Committee of this park shows that by 2007, the yield capacity of high-energy products was 1 million tons per year, crude coal was 12 million tons, machine coke was 6 million tons, and cement was 2 million tons. In all, the park boasted a GDP of 10 billion RMB. Yet this vista of economic prosperity is dark- ened by the smog over the mountaintop, which is co-produced by the park and its counterpart, the Xilaifeng Industrial Park (西来峰) of the Hainan District in Wuhai, on the other side of the mountain. In spite of stricter national environmental policies, these industrial parks incline towards dramatic expansion instead of shrinking. Further down the Yellow River, about 30 kilometers to the east of the city of Yinchuan (银川) in Ningxia, a new park called Ningdong Chemical Industrial Park (宁东化工园区) is, for instance, under construction. According to Ningxia’s official statistics, the Ningdong Energy and Heavy Chemical Base (宁东能源重化工基地) is designed to extend over an area of about 2,855 square kilometers, of which the heavy chemical area will cover 13.57 square kilometers. It is planned that by 2020, the yield capacity of coal in the Ningdong Base will reach 0.11 billion tons, indirect coal liquefaction 10 million tons, coal-based dim- ethyl ether 2 million tons, methanol 1.7 million tons, and the installed capacity of electricity above 20 million kilowatts. In May 2007, the Yellow River Conservancy Commission of the Ministry of Water Resources pointed out that the supply and distribution of water from the Yellow River was plunged into a crisis because of the coal-water heavy chemical industries and high water consumption industries, which crowd along the middle section of the river, covering a length of 800 kilometers from Ningxia to Hohhot (呼和浩特), Inner Mongolia. Over 400 billion RMB was invested in these industries. Ordos is expected to implement the four fundamental development strategies of “big coal mines, big coal power plants, a great chemical industry, and great energy capacity.” It is hoped that by 2010, industrial bases will produce 200 million tons of coal, 15 million kilowatts of electricity, 10 million tons of coal chemical products and 10 million tons of natural gas. By that time, the annual water consumption in this area will reach 2.59 billion cubic meters, causing a water shortage of up to 0.87 billion cubic meters. Although China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection and the provincial environmental protection departments of both Inner Mongolia 156 yu chen and Ningxia have made multiple efforts to control and restrain the high energy consuming industries, they simply resume operations shortly after each of the campaigns to combat pollution has concluded. This situation has not changed much because the competition for economic growth among regions is at the root of the environmental problem and cannot be resolved with a quick fix. No decision can be easily made as to how to make rational use of resources and avoid predatory exploitation. The only way out for resource-based cities is to promote cooperation between regions and share complementary advantages to achieve mutual benefits. To continue expanding high energy consuming industries in Ningxia, Shaanxi, and Inner Mongolia is no better than killing a goose for its eggs. Resource development in energy- and resource-based regions should not be conducted at the cost of the already vulnerable environment.

III. New Cities in Deserts: Challenges for the Environment

Cities on the Ordos Plateau, the Mu Us Desert, and the Gobi of Ningxia rest their glory and dreams on the enormous economic benefits brought by rich resources. In recent years, such cities as Yinch- uan, Shizuishan, Wuhai, Yulin, and Ordos have proposed to develop new districts. Even counties and towns in the depths of deserts have brought up plans to expand around new urban centers. This upsurge of urban construction in the desert poses a great challenge to the local environment. A rising concern is whether it is appropriate to build more cities in the cold and arid deserts, considering the factors of local population, water supply, and growing desertification. Undoubtedly, Ordos has taken the lead in the wave of urban development. Take its almost finished new district of Kangbashi (康巴什新区) as an example. Located in south central Ordos, 25 kilometers from the old city of Dongsheng (东胜), this new district covers a planned area of 155 square kilometers, including a construction area of 32 square kilometers. According to a private statement made by the authorities of Inner Mongolia: “It will be China’s Dubai.” The future city of Ordos, composed of the Kangbashi New District, the Dongsheng District, and Altanshireet County, will sprawl over a thousand square kilometers with a population of more than one million. What a miracle in the desert! environmental crisis in ningxia, inner mongolia, and shaanxi 157

Every visitor to the Kangbashi New District will be impressed by its magnificence. Its heart is constituted by the 1 kilometer office buildings of the Municipal Committee, the Municipal Government, the Munici- pal People’s Congress, and the Genghis Khan Square, which features five giant groups of sculptures. This new square, stretching over 1.6 kilometers from north to south, dwarfs most municipal squares in China. By 2010, this new district will house a population of 100,000, according to the local government. One hundred thirty kilometers away from its south is the city of Yulin in Shaanxi Province, which approved a plan for the Yulin New District in December 2008. The new district is designed to cover an area of 58.1 square kilometers with a population capacity of 0.42 million, while the old city proper of Yulin has only a population of 0.3 million. If the plan is carried out, the new district and the old city proper will grow into a city of one million residents. A new Yulin will stand side by side with Ordos as the two closest cities in the desert of China. Nevertheless, the pioneers of urban expansion are the cities of Yinchuan and Shizuishan of Ningxia Province. Now, the two old districts of Yinchuan, which used to scatter over 10 kilometers along the east and west of the Baotou-Lanzhou Railway, have been packed with new buildings. Moreover, the fever of urban expansion has spread to small counties and sparsely populated villages that dot the Mu Us Desert, the Alxa Desert, and the Ordos Plateau. Counties at the southern edge of the Mu Us Desert, such as Fugu, Shenmu, Jingbian, and Dingbian, have at least doubled their areas. Currently, every county is turning into a construction site, busy building numerous roads and residential areas. At the same time, some other places in the depth of the Mu Us desert, such as Uxen Banner, Otog Banner, Otog Front Banner, and Hanggin Banner (杭锦旗), are also gearing up for expansion. Poorly populated as they are, by no more than a dozen or a hundred thousand people, these banners boast urban structures that will not pale beside those found in some prefecture-level cities in populous regions of central and eastern China. Inevitably, the large-scale city construction in deserts will put huge pressures on the local environment, while endless big projects exacerbate the burden on, first and foremost, water supply. After studying the history of hydrology in Inner Mongolia, Professor An Jiesheng (安介生) of the Center for Historical Geography Studies at Fudan University points out that water from rivers, lakes, and wells is the 158 yu chen lifeline of the herdsmen on the Mongolian Plateau. Hastened exploitation and abuse of water resources will, he warns, only end up in a nightmare of water depletion and disappearance from the plateau as well as other regions.

IV. Excessive Consumption of Water

Water supply is a huge challenge facing the new cities in the desert. Excessive exploitation of water goes on daily in the economic development zones of Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and Shaanxi, where the “water cities” and “waterscapes” that the administrators have decided to build are violating the natural rules. The construction of a gigantic artificial waterfall was started in the Kangbashi New District of Ordos in Inner Mongolia on May 20, 2009. According to the local media, this waterfall—receiving an investment of 0.15 billion RMB—uses water from the Wulanmulun River (乌兰木伦河), the main water supply in Ordos. Twenty-eight meters in height and 600 meters in length with a total scenic area of 43,000 square meters, the waterfall is claimed by local authorities to be the largest landscape waterfall in Asia and one of the world’s largest. The Ordos government regards it as a river management project, but the authorities of Yulin respond that this project exploits too much of the water resource of the Hongjiannao Lake (红碱淖湖) on the border between Inner Mongolia and Shaanxi, causing a sharp decrease in the lake’s area. The abuse of water resources began with the large-scale construction of new districts in Ordos. The Kangbashi New District is driven by a raging thirst. In 2004, a private enterprise, Huitong Water Company (汇通水务公司), was incorporated to build the Kaokaoshina Reser- voir (考考什纳水库) in order to get water from the eastern section of the Wulanmulun River. By 2007, to meet the soaring water demand for the plants recently transplanted to new roads, squares, and residential areas, Huitong Water Company pumped water from the reservoir day and night through seventeen high-lift submersible pumps. Conse- quently, pumps for the farmlands nearby were unable to work, which led to crop failures for successive years. In the autumn of 2007, over 400 local famers came into conflict with the water company. They blocked the pump trucks and protested on the municipal square. Finally, the conflict ended with compensation being paid by the government. environmental crisis in ningxia, inner mongolia, and shaanxi 159

Water shortages have always been the biggest headache for the junction area of Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and Shaanxi. Situated in the North Temperate Zone, Ordos is dominated by a semi-arid continental climate with an average annual precipitation of 348.3 millimeters, but an average annual amount of evaporation of 2506.3 millimeters. It is suffering severely from the overexploitation of underground water and consequential droughts. Early in November 2007, the State For- estry Administration released a document on wildlife conservation, showing that the shrinking area and ascending salinity and alkali of the natural lakes within Ordos were endangering the aquatic plants and animals there. Fish have disappeared, for instance, from the lakes of Hongjiannao, Qigainao (柒盖淖), and Pojianghai (泊江海). In the meantime, excessive water exploitation has also occurred in the cities of Ningxia. Several hundred kilometers away from Ordos, Yinchuan, the capital of Ningxia, is rushing to turn itself into “a lake city north of the Great Wall.” Meanwhile, Shizuishan, a city to the north of Yinchuan, has diverted water from the Yellow River to fill Xinghai Lake, an artificial lake named after the mayor and the secretary of the CPC municipal committee. “Yinchuan, a lake city north of the Great Wall, a city of fresh charm” was an advertisement that appeared on CCTV in 2005. Actually, the Yinchuan Plain is another seriously arid region in China. Yinchuan lies in the northwest of China with an annual precipitation of 200 millimeters, but an annual amount of evaporation of 1500 to 1800 millimeters which is nearly ten times the precipitation level. However, the city dreamed of rebuilding itself into a fantastic lake city with a blueprint approved by the Municipal People’s Congress eight years ago. According to the plan, a water view would be constructed out of the city’s flood prevention and drainage system, the Big and Small Xihu Lakes (大小西湖), and the Seventy-two Connected Lakes (七十二连湖). In addition, this plan was included in the Report on the Work of the Government (政府工作报告) as one of the urban construction projects of Yinchuan. Covering a huge area, the project aimed to create a new “ecosphere” by surrounding the city with lakes which stretch across Yinchuan to Shizuishan and Qingtongxia (青铜峡). Six years ago, Shizuishan proposed to build a garden city in the desert and initiated another great “water campaign.” It planned to create within five years a wetland of about 43 square kilometers with a perennial lake area of 20 square kilometers in the Dawukou Dis- trict (大武口区) where the municipal government is located. The lake, which was named Xinghai (星海湖), will be the largest artificial lake 160 yu chen in China, five times larger than the West Lake in Hangzhou, when it is completed. Each year, the Yellow River Conservancy Commission distributes 4 billion cubic meters of water to Ningxia, while the irrigated areas of the province draw 7 to 9 billion cubic meters of water from the Yellow River. But 60% of that amount has to be drained back to the river after irrigation so as to provide the water supply allocated by the Commission. Originally, the water flowing back to the Yellow River filled up the lakes in Yinchuan through six drainage channels. However, a significant part of this is now robbed by Xinghai Lake, which, according to the data released by Shizuishan, has a perennial water storage capacity of 23 million cubic meters and an annual amount of evaporation of about 34 million cubic meters. The projects of building lake cities and water cities are almost finished, already causing extensive damage. Several years ago, the local government of Ningxia forced farmers to reduce the rice fields by 0.3 million mu (approximately 20,000 hectares), and is continuing to do so. To make things worse, the discontinuity of flow to the Yellow River has deprived wheat fields in the North China Plain of the desperately needed water supply in times of droughts. The rapidity of urban development has compelled Ordos to embark on a wild hunt for water resources. In 2006, Ordos planned to build twenty-three reservoirs and launched water supply projects to extract underground water in the Mengxi Industrial Park, the Qipanjing Industrial Park, and the Kangbashi New District. Ordos admitted that, according to the analysis of the observed data of the underground water level in its irrigation area from 2005 to 2008, the underground water level had dropped considerably with an annual decrease of 0.15 to 0.25 meters and the overall storage continued to descend. Environmental experts believe that Ordos needs protection. The Ordos Desert Steppe is on the list of nineteen key protected regions in China’s eight ecologically vulnerable areas, as stated by the National Plan of Protection for Ecologically Vulnerable Areas (全国生态脆弱区保护规划纲要) issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection in September 2008. The Decision of the State Council on Strengthening Envi- ronmental Protection (国务院关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定) pointed out explicitly that development should be limited in ecologically vulnerable areas. Strategies should be implemented by the Ministry to improve the ecological environment of the nineteen key protected regions. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan on Environmental Protection environmental crisis in ningxia, inner mongolia, and shaanxi 161 of Ordos (鄂尔多斯市“十一五”环境保护规划), released in November 2008, warned that the natural water quality in Ordos was seriously degraded and the surface water of the urban area exceeded its quota in the Santaiji Reservoir (三台基水库), the Huoshatu Waterhead (活沙兔水源地), and the Wulanmulun River. However, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia are left with no remaining quota of water. Water waste has become a life-and-death issue for urban development in the junction area of Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and Shaanxi. Excessive exploitation of water from the upper reaches of the Yellow River, increasing depletion of underground water, and fierce competition for water among regions, will disturb the balance of the ecosystem, and leave one after another dead cities buried in sand. This is a tragedy that no one would like to witness.

HIDDEN ENVIRONMENTAL TROUBLES OF RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA’S WESTERN REGIONS

Yang Yong

In 2009, the Chinese government launched a series of policies to stimulate economic development, and the momentum for investments in large-scale development of the western regions increased. Hydropower development on rivers and mineral resource development vigorously moved forward. This trend, together with simpliﬁcation of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) approval process and supervision, has led to further threats to the environment in western regions. Xichang (西昌), a mid-sized city in southwest China, is known as the “Moon City” and “Aerospace City” of China. It is famous for its sunshine. However, a different picture of the city can be seen if one visits it now—chimneys belch smoke everywhere. In the last two years, a lead-zinc smelter with an annual productivity of 100 thousand tons was built in the Anning Valley (安宁河谷), only a little over ten kilometers away from the city. Nearby, the Panzhihua Iron and Steel’s Xichang Comprehensive Utilization of Vanadium and Titanium Proj- ect (攀钢西昌钒钛综合利用项目) was under construction next to the Huanglian Stone Forest in Huanglianguan Township (黄联), located on the lower part of the same valley. The project, with an total investment of 17 billion RMB, is estimated to produce 160 thousand tons of vanadium slag, 18.3 thousand tons of vanadium iron, 300 thousand tons of titanium ore concentrate, 160 thousand tons of high titanium slag, 100 thousand tons of titanium dioxide, 4 million tons of iron, 3.6 million tons of steel, and 3.5 million tons of hot rolled plates annually.1 In Anning Valley, tens of mines, smelters, and concentration plants are being built—that is why a thick layer of polluted air hangs over the valley. Ironically, several years ago the government of Sichuan Province invested a large sum of money to develop the Panzhihua- Xichang area as a national tourist project named “Tour of Sunshine

1 Data is from the official statistics of key projects in Liangshan Prefecture. 164 yang yong in Winter.” In the near future, a world-class hydraulic development cluster will be constructed in this area. This is only one example of the kinds of resource-intensive development being seen in China’s West. In 2009, China was enthusiastic about investing in large-scale development of the western regions. Wenchuan (汶川) post-earthquake reconstruction, hydropower development on rivers, and mineral resource development were making fast progress. Such trends have led to even further threats to the natural environment in the western regions due to the following factors: construction of a series of large and controversial projects, simplification of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) approval processes, lack of precise scientific planning and feasibility assessment, and ineffective supervision.

I. Resource-oriented Industry Plans to Move to Western Regions

Due to the unique natural environment and resource advantages, a resource-oriented industry cluster is growing in China’s western regions. It covers the following:

1. Oil, natural gas, and other energy resource industry zones in and around the Tarim Basin (塔里木盆地) in Xinjiang. This includes the exploration and development of ferrous and non-ferrous metals on the northern side of the Kunlun Mountains (昆仑山), oil and gas in the Tarim River Basin, and coal in the middle section of the Tianshan Mountains (天山山脉). 2. The non-ferrous metals, coal, and salt chemical industrial zones in the Altai Region (阿尔泰) of southern Xinjiang Province. This includes the exploitation and development of non-ferrous metals in the eastern section of the Tianshan Mountains and Altai Moun- tains, and the development of coal and potash chemical processing in the Kumutake Desert in Hami Region (哈密库姆塔克沙漠). 3. The pre-salt oil, non-ferrous metals, and iron industrial zones in the Qaidam Basin (柴达木盆地). This includes oil, the iron industry in western Qaidam Basin, the ten-million-ton iron and steel smelting and potash chemical processing industry in the middle of the Basin, the mining of jade and gold in the middle section of Kunlun Mountains, and the mining of coal in the Datonghe River Valley (大通河流域). hidden environmental troubles 165

4. The non-ferrous metal, iron, and oil exploitation and development project in the Hexi Corridor (河西) on the north side of the Qilian Mountains (祁连山脉). This includes mineral exploitation and development in the headwater region of inland glaciers on the north side of the Qilian Mountains, the smelting industry in Hexi Corridor, the petrochemical cluster, and the development of non-ferrous metals such as gold and silver. 5. Energy resources like oil, gas, coal, and coal-bed gas industrial zones in the middle section of the Yellow River. This includes the oil industry in Gansu Province’s Qinyang (庆阳), Shanxi Prov- ince’s Yan’an (延安) and Yanchang (延长), and the development of coal-bed gas and coal in central Shanxi Province. 6. The non-ferrous metals industry zone in the middle section of the Qinling Mountains (秦岭山脉). This includes the exploitation and development of copper, gold, silver, lead, and zinc mines in the Baoji (宝鸡) section of the Qinling Mountains, and gold mining in Longnan (陇南) in Gansu Province. 7. The gas, phosphate chemical, and construction materials industrial zones in the Sichuan Basin. This includes the development and construction of the natural gas chemical industry in central Sichuan Province, the post-earthquake construction of the phosphate chemical industry, and the construction materials industry in the Longmenshan (龙门山) region. 8. The metal and coal industrial zones in western Panzhihua- Liupanshui region. This includes the development of vanadium titano-magnetite in the western Panzhihua (攀西) region and the coal mining industry in Liupanshui (六盘水) and in Qujinfuyuan County (曲靖富源) in eastern Yunnan Province. 9. The mines in the Three Parallel Rivers Protected Areas of Yun- nan (三江并流) in southwest China. This includes the mining and development of the metal industry in eastern Tibet and western Sichuan Province, the non-ferrous metal and iron industry in northwest and southwest regions of Yunnan Province, and the mining industry near the Dadu (大渡河), Yalong (雅砻江), and Jinsha Rivers (金沙江). 10. The non-ferrous metals industry of Hongshui River (红水河) in Guangxi Province. 11. The metal, oil, and gas industrial zones in Qinghai-Tibet Pla- teau. This includes the mines in Gangdise Mountains (冈底斯) 166 yang yong

and Yajiang River (雅江), mines in the Lake Palgon (班公错) and Nujiang River (怒江) areas, and oil and gas mines in Qiangtang (羌塘) in northern Tibet. 12. Hydropower plant clusters on rivers in the west.

In summary, there is an industrial chain based on a series of industries with high energy consumption, high emissions, and high pollution and driven by the development of mining and hydropower.

II. The Basic Features of Resource Development in Western Regions

At the beginning of the large-scale development of the western regions, governments on all levels attached great importance to ecological construction and environmental protection. However, as development proceeded and large amounts of investment became involved, people gradually paid less attention to eco-industries and tourism, and focused on the development of resource-oriented industries. The reasons are as follows: ﬁrst, local governments can increase revenues in a short period of time by selling and renting resources and land; and second, some people can gain proﬁts in the process of implementing these projects. That is why it has become popular to appropriate the lands, the mines, and the water, to aggregate resources, and to engage in speculation. Activities like resource packaging, auctions, and transferring at a high price are also common in this region. The following are features of the current large-scale development of the western regions:

A. Resource Development Extends to Ecologically Vulnerable Areas The western regions of China, in particular the Qinghai-Tibet Pla- teau and the Hengduan Mountains (横断山), are extremely important ecological areas for China and for Asia. They are where monsoons originate, rivers start, and the continental westerly winds pass, and they are important for ensuring national security and protecting the environment. However, at present, excessive large-scale projects of resource development have done great harm to these environmentally vulnerable areas. Take the Qilian Mountains as an example. Many continental rivers in the Hexi Corridor originate from the glaciers on the north side of hidden environmental troubles 167 the Qilian Mountains. These rivers are the source of life for urban economic development in this area. However, in 2009, during my research, I found numerous mines had been set up below the glaciers in the back country lands of the Qilian Mountains with concentrated plants scattered in the headwater areas and protected areas, undoubtedly posing a threat to the already scarce water resources. It was also found that mining and exploration activities were carried out in the Geladandong Mountains (各拉丹冬山)—the headwater of the Yangtze River, in the Kunlun Mountains and Hengduan Moun- tains. Even famous tourist cities, protected areas, and the World Heri- tage Sites, such as the old city of Lijiang (丽江) in Yunnan Province and the Dujiangyan Irrigation System (都江堰) in Sichuan Province, were about to be enclosed by cement factories that cause heavy pollution. The Chengdu-Mianyang Economic Zone, also known as the “Land of Abundance,” failed to seize post-earthquake reconstruction opportuni- ties. They continued to build a series of industrial clusters producing chemicals and construction materials, and continued to exploit mineral resources in the Longmen Mountains (龙门山), whose geological environment is vulnerable. As a result, air pollution is becoming more severe and geological hazards have further increased.

B. Resource Development Lacks Scientific Evidence China’s scientific research, in terms of geology, environment, and ecology in western regions, is lagging due to a long-term lack of investment. China has not made significant breakthroughs in the fields of ore-forming regularity, resource reserves, plate tectonics, or engineering-induced seismic activities in key areas. A detailed map of these areas on the subject of geology and hydrology has not been completed, and a comprehensive geological exploration has never been made. Under these circumstances, resource development lacks strong support from scientific surveys in terms of planning, rational distribution, and industrial structure. This has led to geological, ecological, and investment risks in many large-scale projects. In recent years, local governments have granted a large number of exploration and mining licenses before completing a comprehensive systematized mineral resource prospecting and exploration of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. In particular, no geological work has been done concerning resources such as salt lake minerals, non-metallic minerals, and rare minerals. Consequently, there is little information 168 yang yong about their distribution. Up to now, the amount of resource reserves explored has not met the design requirements, and technical and economic indicators are variable. Under such conditions, investment and development projects are inappropriate and irrational. In the Tibetan Autonomous Region, geological exploration has been carried out in limited mining areas: 1% of the discovered mines have made geological explorations, only 15% of the mining areas have carried out geological exploration, and only 10% of the geological resource reserves have been evaluated by government departments. By 2005, there were only 132 proven reserves of mineral deposits. Most mining companies are small-sized and scattered around, while most geological explorations are basic The majority of mines do not meet development requirements because they lack precise information about the reserves, so it is impossible to create a standard design. Hence, mining in this region is not based on scientific planning. With no dominant large-sized mining companies, it is common practice for small-sized companies to mine minerals without plans, to waste resources, and to cause damage to the environment including rivers and the natural landscape. Meanwhile, the local government has failed to make efforts to protect the environment. Companies are eager to make a fortune overnight, and therefore they sign illegal contracts and transfers and mine minerals beyond the officially approved areas under the guise of exploration, which leads to serious environmental destruction. For example, although the government of the Tibet Autonomous Region has called for a halt, the mining of gold placer deposits has gone ahead for several years—causing damage to the environment, such as river-course blocking, soil erosion, and grassland degradation. These companies do not have facilities to treat wastewater, thus, they discharge it directly into the river. Wastewater with heavy metal sedi- ments contaminates the river, posing a threat to the drinking water of downstream areas, while the sediment blocks the streams on the grasslands leading to serious grassland degradation. Hydropower development in the Hengduan Mountains of southwest China also poses a threat to local environment and geological conditions. Most of the hydropower stations are built on dangerous sections of the following rivers:

1. Minjiang River The dam and the reservoir of the Zipingpu (紫坪铺) hydropower station were built on the central fracture of the Longmen Mountains and hidden environmental troubles 169 on the bend of the Minjiang River (岷江). On this rift zone were built hundreds of hydropower stations on the upper reaches of the Minjiang River and its tributaries, Tuojiang River (沱江), Fujiang River (涪江), and the upper reaches of the Jialing River (嘉陵江) and its tributaries. That is why they were seriously damaged in the Wenchuan earthquake and 60% of the small- and medium-sized stations were hardly able to recover from the disaster. The Zipingpu hydropower station had only run for two years before the earthquake. More attention should be paid to the relationship between hydropower stations and earthquakes.

2. Dadu River The Pubugou (瀑布沟) hydropower station was built on the juncture of the Daofu-Kangding (道孚—康定) Rift Zone in the northwest direction and the south end of Longmen Mountains Rift Zone in the northeast direction. The Dadu River bends to the east at the city of Shimian (石棉) and forms a 50 kilometer gully, where the dam and reservoir of the Pubugou hydropower station were built. The dam is 186 meters high and the reservoir has a storage capacity of 5.39 billion cubic meters. The station began to store water at the end of 2009. At present, the water level has reached 790 meters and cascade hydropower stations are under construction. Caution should be taken against the consequences of the construction of dams and the operation of the reservoirs in this dangerous area, where geological activities have remained dormant for decades.

3. Yalong River Both Grade I and Grade II super-large hydropower stations at Jinping (锦屏) are under construction at the big bend at the foot of Jinping Mountain. The dam to be built on the upper reaches is 305 meters high (the world’s highest dam) and the reservoir has a storage capacity of 7.76 billion cubic meters. Downstream of the dam is a diversion-type power plant, making use of the large ﬂow of energy in the bend. It is built on the Muli Arch (木里弧形) Fault Belt and Daochen-Jianchuan (稻城—剑川) Rift Zone from south to north, which is a very complex geological area as well as a microplate suture zone. The seismic geological research has not made breakthroughs and seismic activity has been dormant for a long time, while several strong earthquakes struck neighboring areas in the past hundred years. Therefore, there should be caution concerning the interrelation between power stations and seismic activity. 170 yang yong

4. Jinsha River The development of thirteen cascade hydroelectric stations has been planned in the middle and lower reaches of the Jinsha River, mainly down from Shigu (石鼓) on the Xiaojiang (小江) Fault Zone, Anning Fault Zone, and Lvyejiang (绿叶江) Fault Zone, which are earthquake-prone areas running from north to south. Hydropower stations like Xiangjiaba (向家坝), Xiluodu (溪洛渡), and parts of the reservoir and cascade hydroelectric stations at the Tiger Leaping Gorge, namely Liyuan (梨园), Ahai (阿海), Jinanqiao (金安桥), Longkaikou (龙开口), Ludila (鲁地拉), Guanyinyan (观音岩), are all under construction. Baihetan (白鹤滩) and Wudongde (乌东德) have already been designed. The above-mentioned hydropower stations, linking up one after another on the middle and lower reaches of the Jinsha River, are characterized by high dams and large reservoirs. The one reservoir and eight cascade hydroelectric stations at the Tiger Leaping Gorge are located along the up-side down “N” bend of the Jinsha River. The ﬁrst of the eight stations is located along the “First Bend” of the Jinsha River, namely the Shigu part of the Jinsha River, which is in the Yulongshan (玉龙山) and Chenghai-Binchuan (程海—宾川) Fault Zones. It can provide hydropower stations in the lower reaches with 11 million kilowatts of electricity by balancing the storage with the help of the broad valley located in the Jinsha River suture zone. But such a layout and the design scale are also high risk.

5. Lancang River and Nujiang River The Lancang River (澜沧江) Fault Zone and the Nujiang River Fault Zone are located in the suture zone of plates and are earthquake- prone areas. The Lancang and Nujiang Rivers, which ﬂow into the South China Sea and the Andaman Bay, are the lifeline of the South- east Asian Peninsula. Within the borders of China, thirteen cascade hydropower stations with a reservoir storage capacity of 51.526 cubic meters on the Lancang River have been planned. On the Nujiang River, thirteen cascade hydropower stations, part of which is located on the Tibetan section, have been planned with a total installation capacity of 21.32 million kilowatts.

C. Resource Development Boosts High-tech, High-capital, and High-value Industries The construction of hydropower stations in the western regions has progressed at an unprecedented pace. Countless power stations are hidden environmental troubles 171 being built on the rivers in a disorderly and an uncontrolled manner. Multiple problems exist in the development of river projects: river basin planning is incomplete; the structure of investors is complicated with most of them being large business groups; the distribution of hydropower stations are over-concentrated; dams are too high and reservoirs too large; procedures for obtaining permission to build power stations are incomplete; construction often begins before an EIS report has been made or reviewed; results of the EIA reports are ambiguous; there are complex problems concerning ecology, migration, international environment, and finance issues; there are conflicts with different vested interests; there is no mechanism for regulating rivers and reservoirs; predictions about the electricity market are unclear; the investment budget does not consider the ecological and the social costs; assessment and research on earthquakes and other geological disasters are not conducted fully; sharp conflicts evolve between the allocation and regulation of rivers’ functions; frequent disastrous floods break out; water pollution is worsened by dams; and there is a loss of indigenous cultures. The strategic goal of “West-to-East Power Transmission” is to transmit power from hydroelectric projects in the west where water resources are abundant to the east where water resources are scarce in order to replace the electricity generated by coal-fired power plants and, thus, improve the environment. However, China’s electric power construction has deviated from this strategy as the east continues to develop coal-fired power stations and actively pursue alternative energy resources, such as nuclear power and solar energy. In north China’s Shaanxi Province, Shanxi Province, and Inner Mongolia, coal-fired power projects are still in rapid development. In the northwest of China, wind power plants are developing rapidly. With new policies encouraging the development of new energy sources, the construction of alternative energy will surely witness an upsurge. Through energy conservation and emissions reduction, we expect to save installed electricity capacity. In this way, the east will rely less on the project of “West-to-East Power Transmission,” which means that the electricity generated by the hydropower stations along the rivers in southwest China will be consumed locally. Under such circumstances, the construction of the large coal-fired power stations will not slow down. It turns out that some hydropower stations are out of operation because of the overdevelopment of hydropower in the southwest and the inadequate development of power networks. At the same time, this has led to the unprecedented expansion of industries with high energy 172 yang yong consumption, high pollution, and high emissions, called “three high” industries, in the southwest which have brought negative impacts on the local environment and urban-rural environment. In some areas a disturbing mode of co-development of hydropower and “three high” industries has emerged. In other words, wherever there are hydropower stations, there will be “three high” industries consuming the electric power. All these have worsened the already vulnerable environment. If the current situation continues, the efforts for energy conservation and emissions reduction made by the east regions will be counteracted by the rough mode of development in the west.

D. Worsening Conflict between Humans and Land, Uneven Profit Distribution, and Increasingly Unstable Factors in Resource Development The western areas are characterized by dense populations living on inhospitable lands, underdeveloped economies, limited environmental capacity, complex weather conditions and hydrological conditions, poor waste treatment facilities, and non-standard discharge of the “three wastes” (三废). What is more, these areas are inhabited by many ethnic groups who are pious believers in different religions. How to relocate residents is a complex social issue concerning cultural values. In western regions, available land resources are limited, resulting in a severe conflict between humans over land. Mining, factory construction, and reservoirs of hydropower stations are all distributed in the narrow human settlements and the arable lands in the valley terrace and intermountain basin. These land resources are vital for the livelihoods of indigenous peoples. The construction projects of hydropower stations compel these people to move to remote mountain areas or agricultural and pastoral areas, adding pressures to the environment and society there. The contradictions among land, employment, society, and political power may intensify social conflicts. In the process of resource development, local people face problems of scarce land, deteriorated living environments, unemployment, home- lessness, marginalization, infectious disease, hunger and cold, inconve- nient public utilities, dissolving of social cultures, and a weak ability to counter disasters. A 100 kilometer pollution belt has formed on the Yellow River along the borders between Ningxia Province and Inner Mongolia. Many villages have disappeared among the free-flowing hidden environmental troubles 173 waste water and heavily polluted air caused by factories. Along the severely polluted main stream of the Yellow River are the Baotou- Erdos (包头、鄂尔多斯), Jin-Shan Valley (晋陕峡谷), and Hejin- Hancheng (河津、韩城) industrially polluted belts and the tributaries of the Yellow River. For example, the Weihe River (渭河) and Fenhe River (汾河) are losing the functions of a river system. The local governments and developers tend to draw a promising blueprint before the construction of projects, exaggerating the benefits that they will bring to the local people. However, all too often they give the local people little but disappointment.

III. Development of West China Should be Carried out Legally and the Sources of Pollution Should be Curbed

Judging the economic development of the western regions in 2009, it is obvious that heavy chemical industries and the extensive mode of growth take the upper hand, which will demand more energy. Severe pollution has led to an ascending conflict between economic development and the environment. If we do not adjust the economic structure and the mode of development, it will be difficult for the energy resources and the fragile environment to sustain. According to the current economic structure, growth, and consumption patterns, the demand for fossil fuel energy will increase and the emission of CO2 and other pollutants will barely decrease in the years to come. The present mode of development can hardly tackle the pressure to reduce emissions but instead imposes a huge cost on investment and environment. If we fail to deal with these problems, the state policy on sustainable development cannot be successfully carried out. Fast-developing China faces an arduous task of emissions reduction. One way to change the development mode is to develop a green economy that is characterized by lower energy consumption, lower pollution, and lower emissions. Through these measures, we can finally achieve our goal of energy conservation and emissions reduction. To make China stronger and more prosperous, we have to employ new technologies, set new standards, and make new regulations, optimize industrial structures, develop alternative energy, put backward industries out of operation, control the “three high” industries, change the crude extensive mode of development, promote a low-carbon economy 174 yang yong and lifestyle, establish a circular economy, and build a sustainable development mechanism that leads to harmony between humans and nature. For a period of time, many regions in the southwest believed that abundant hydroelectric resources would make them rich and that mining and hydropower should develop side by side. In such a situation, some local governments put short-term economic profits as their top priority, but gave little consideration to the benefits of the people, environment, or society. During our investigation, a frequently heard remark by the local officials was that “in order to increase the fiscal revenue of the government, the only way for us is to sell available resources and land as soon as possible.” As long as investors are brought in and projects are launched, governments will get a huge sum of money; however, development and ecological protection should benefit the people. The aim of entrepreneurs, on the other hand, is to make profits from their investment. Therefore, they will invest their money wherever it is profitable, reduce costs to a minimum, shorten the profit cycle, and withdraw as soon as they have made a profit. To improve the situation in the western regions, the following suggestions are made:

1. Government officials must realize the urgency and necessity to change the current development mode. They must realize that the government is the supervisor of resources and environment, not the operator. To achieve an optimal distribution of resources, they must have the courage to acknowledge their errors in policy making and take remedial measures. 2. According to the goal of social development and the medium- and long-term objectives of energy conservation and emissions reduction by 2020, the western regions should properly employ their financial resources to resolve key issues such as optimizing the distribution of resources, proper layouts of industries, and the adjustment of industrial structures. 3. Plans should be made for the development and protection of rivers. The EIA for resources development and regional economic growth should be strengthened. The exploration and exploitation of mineral resources and hydropower should be carried out according to the law. Regulations concerning scientific plans of the rivers and EIAs should be tighter. Environmental risks should be minimized hidden environmental troubles 175 by stopping blind development and imposing restrictions on the “three high” industries. We should optimize the strategy of western development to achieve our goal of harmony among humans and between humans and nature.

NEW POLLUTION IN RURAL AREAS: THE “HOME APPLIANCES TO THE COUNTRYSIDE” PROGRAM

Cai Yongfei

In response to the powerful impact of the international ﬁnancial crisis, China adopted a variety of economic stimulus programs. The “Home Appliances to the Countryside” scheme encouraged farmers to buy government-subsidized home appliances to help electrical appliance manufacturers expand into the rural market and to relieve them of overproduction. At the same time, the program enabled more of the rural population to enjoy the fruits of China’s modernization. How- ever, the program’s impact on the rural environment received little attention. During the process of modernizing and building the new countryside, it is important to recognize and address environmental pollution in rural areas brought on by bringing “Home Appliances to the Countryside.”

I. The “Home Appliances to the Countryside” Program: An Important Measure to Address the Economic Downturn and Stimulate Domestic Demand

As a government policy, the “Home Appliances to the Countryside” (家电下乡) program was formulated well before it became a hot topic in 2008, when China was hit by the global financial crisis. In August 1999, an article by economist Lin Yifu (林毅夫) suggested a new countryside campaign that included massive upgrades in the electrical infrastructure—including an upgrade of rural power grids and a reduction in electricity charges—to prepare for the “Home Appli- ance to the Countryside” scheme. This suggestion was written into the Tenth Five-Year Plan, making the program an important policy goal. The implementation of the Tenth Five-Year Plan and the Eleventh Five-Year Plan laid a solid foundation. In November 2007, the Minis- try of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce issued the Notice on Car- rying out Pilot Projects of the Home Appliances to the Countryside Scheme (关于开展家电下乡试点工作的通知) which designated Shandong, Henan, and Sichuan as pilot provinces. Farmers in these three provinces were 178 cai yongfei able to buy color TV sets, refrigerators (including deep freezers), and mobile phones at a 13% discount subsidized directly by the state. The “Home Appliances to the Countryside” project became an important measure in the Chinese government’s economic stimulus plan after the country was hit by the global financial crisis. At the Executive Meeting of the State Council held on November 19, 2008, the State Council decided that it would expand from fourteen provinces to twenty-two provinces and last for four years. Home appliances such as TV sets, refrigerators, washing machines, and mobile phones were included. Motorcycles, computers, water heaters, air conditioners, microwave ovens, and induction cookers were later added to the subsidized home appliance list. Moreover, each family in rural China could buy two things in the same category instead of one thing as originally stipulated. According to an official with the Ministry of Commerce, China’s budget for the program in 2009 was as much as 20 billion RMB (3 billion USD). At the Executive Meeting of the State Council on May 19, 2009, it was decided that the government would encourage farmers to replace their old automobiles and home appliances with new ones by granting subsidies. The Central Economic Work Confer- ence held on December 6, 2009 pointed out that more effort should be made to carry out the program and implement the old-for-new policy. The “Home Appliances to the Countryside” scheme was expected to reach its climax in 2010. According to statistics by the Ministry of Commerce, 27.88 million subsidized home appliances were sold from January to October in 2009 with a turnover of 50.82 billion RMB (7.44 billion USD). As of October 13, 2009, 1.08 million old home appliances had been recycled and 768 thousand home appliances were sold with a turnover of 3.03 billion RMB (444 million USD). According to the Operating Regulations of the Home Appliances to the Coun- tryside Scheme (家电下乡操作细则) issued by the Ministry of Finance and another ten central government departments in April 2009, the program is an important measure to address the current international financial crisis, benefit farmers, stimulate industrial production, and boost domestic demand.

II. “Household Appliances to the Countryside” and New Rural Pollution

Although the “Home Appliances to the Countryside” program has promoted economic and social development in rural areas, it has also new pollution in rural areas 179 caused new pollution. Home appliances inevitably cause pollution such as radiation, static electricity, noise, and hazardous gas. Use of home appliances is normally safe within the appliance’s lifespan. The main large-scale impacts on rural villages brought by the “Home Appliances to the Countryside” scheme include water pollution caused by lack of supporting infrastructure, solid waste pollution caused by disposed old household appliances, and chemical contamination caused by disassembling of the appliances.

A. Pollution Caused by a Lack of Supporting Infrastructure for Home Appliance Use Unlike TV sets, refrigerators, air conditioners, computers, and microwave ovens, home appliances that use water such as washing machines and water heaters require water-supply lines and sewers. However, it is very common for many rural areas in China to not be equipped with drainage and sewage treatment systems. According to a February 19, 2009 report in China Construction News, over 25 million tons of domestic sewage is directly discharged every year in rural China due to a lack of drainage lines and sewage systems. This pollutes rivers and ponds, affects farmers’ environments, and seriously threatens public health. According to a survey by Pro- fessor Hu Jing (胡靖), who studies problems concerning agriculture, the countryside, farmers, and urbanization, due to a lack of reliable and well-designed sewage pipes, farmers directly release a large quantity of non-decomposable domestic sewage into the environment. This comes from their use of inorganic chemical products such as washing powder, soap, shampoo, and liquid detergent. The sewage, which con- stitutes one of the largest pollution sources, is discharged into ditches and ponds around farmers’ houses, polluting the living environment. When the sewage is released, it pollutes the water, making it hard for water creatures to survive. The sewage also pollutes underground water and wells.1 I had ﬁrst-hand experience with water pollution caused by domestic sewage when our research team was studying environmental pollution in the countryside of Shaanxi Province in August 2009. The end-of-pipe treatment applied in urban areas to build centralized

1 Hu Jing, “Revival of Rural Areas—Restructuring the Village Fiscal and Rural Collective Economy,” Green Leaves, No. 8, 2009. 180 cai yongfei sewage treatment plants and pipe networks was not suitable for the rural areas where villages are scattered. Even without considering the difﬁculty of covering a vast area with pipe lines—even if it could be done by stretching the pipe lines along main roads—the high cost of installing pipes and long-distance sewage pump stations makes the results out of proportion to the high cost. Hence, in rural China, sewage cannot be treated on a large scale. Moreover, the massive transfer of pollution from urban to rural areas, and the absence of law on this matter, contributes to the worsening of the rural environment, urging us to ﬁnd new and more practical solutions to rural pollution. Accord- ing to statistics from the Ministry of Commerce, under the “Home Appliances to the Countryside” scheme, 2,665,636 washing machines and 297,335 water heaters were sold between January and September 2009. With more water-related products being sold in rural areas, pollution caused by a lack of supporting infrastructure will become more severe.

B. Solid Waste Pollution and Chemical Pollution from Discarded Home Appliances While the “Home Appliances to the Countryside” scheme helps to improve farmers’ living standards, it also accelerates the pace at which old household appliances are being discarded. According to General Rules for the Lifespan and Recycling of Household and Similar Electrical Appli- ances (家用和类似用途电器安全使用年限和再生利用通则) issued by the Standardization Administration of China (SAC) in 2007, the lifespan of household appliances is normally not long.

Table 13.1: Lifespan of home appliances Item Lifespan Item Lifespan Color TV set 8–10 Fan 10 Black-white TV set 10–12 Gas stove 8 Electric water heater 8 Washing machine 8 Air-conditioner 8–10 Hair dryer 4 Iron 9 Microwave oven 10 Electrical clock 8 Electric shaver 4 Electric blanket 8 Vacuum cleaner 8 Rice cooker 10 VCR 7 Refrigerator 12–16 PC 6 new pollution in rural areas 181

As household electrical appliances flood into rural areas, pollution and risks from old appliances will increase greatly. To resolve this problem, on June 28, 2009, the Ministry of Finance and other departments issued circulars, emphasizing that in order to stimulate consumption, improve the efficiency of resource and energy use, reduce environmental pollution, and promote energy conservation and emissions reduction, relevant departments in Beijing and another eight provinces and municipalities should implement New Measures for Replacement of Electrical Household Appliances (家电以旧换新实施办法). Here are three points about the policy that deserve our attention. First, the main purpose of replacing old appliances with new ones was to boost domestic demand. Second, the number of pilot places was quite limited and the so-called appliances only covered TV sets, refrigerators, washing machines, air-conditioners, and computers. Third, the measures stipulated that household electrical appliances that were subsidized and sold under the “Home Appliances to the Countryside” scheme were not included in the measures. Therefore, the number of used appliances in rural areas cannot be reduced. In fact, even if both subsidies were given to the same purchase, it would only protract the time when a large number of old home appliances would be disposed of. Hidden dangers and pollution still exist. In fact, before the program came into effect, household electrical appliance waste had already contaminated rural areas. On March 5, 2009, a press conference concerning Regulations for Management of Recy- cling and Disposal of Electric and Electronic Product Waste (国务院法制办、环境保护部负责人就〈废弃电器电子产品回收处理管理条例〉答记者问) was held by the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council and the Ministry of Environmental Protection.2 It was reported at the conference that currently in China, if electric and electrical product waste, such as cars, motorbikes, and other vehicles could be reused, they would flow into rural areas. Even those that had to be disassembled would end up in the countryside. At present, most household electrical appliance waste is sent to rural areas to be disassembled in numerous private manual workshops. A

2 Legislative Affairs Office, “Regulations for Management of Recycling and Disposal of Electric and Electronic Product Waste,’’ (Press conference, March 5, 2009), Cen- tral People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/zwhd/2009- 03/05/content_1251495.htm. 182 cai yongfei story in the April 17, 2009 issue of the China Environment News reported that a little town called Guiyu of Shantou City (汕头市贵屿镇) in South China’s Guangdong province was known as the world’s largest base for disassembling electric and electrical product waste. Over 80% of all the families in the twenty-one villages in the town were engaged in disassembling electrical appliances. This place that takes apart 1.5 million tons of electrical waste each year has attracted tens of thousands of migrant workers. The extraction of precious metals is conducted through such primitive methods as open burning and infusion in strong acid, causing a huge amount of waste gas, waste water, and industrial residue. Severe pollution in the atmosphere, soil, and water has threatened people’s health. In Guiyu, 88% of the migrant population has skin diseases and diseases of the nervous, respiratory, and digestive systems. Children there carry much more lead in their bodies, and the volume of dioxins and organic pollutants in human bodies is much higher than that of other places. Cases like Guiyu’s abound. In order to control pollutants from household electrical appliance waste, on February 29, 2009, the State Council promulgated Regula- tions for Management of Recycling and Disposal of Electric and Electronic Product Waste, which was passed in the 23rd standing conference on August 20, 2008. However, the document did not come into effect until Janu- ary 1, 2011. There was a preparation period for implementation, during which the flood of household electrical appliances would peak. Consequently, recycling of electric waste should become the first priority in implementing the regulation.

III. Pollution Control after Household Electrical Appliances Go to Rural China

At present, rural pollution mainly comes from production and daily life. In terms of production, pollution is caused by industrialization. This includes industrial waste transferred from urban areas and rural industrial pollution such as the use of fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural plastic ﬁlms during agricultural production. Actions that harm ecosystems, such as quarry mining, excavation, and damage to the ﬁelds to obtain soil, are also related to industrialization. Although livestock production and straw burning began in small-peasant societies, they cause pollution, as they are associated with industrialized production. For instance, if livestock and poultry were not raised on an new pollution in rural areas 183 industrialized scale, massive pollution would not ensue. Were industrial fuels not used so widely, straw burning would be reduced. Rural domestic pollution primarily comes from domestic sewage and household garbage, which are caused by the introduction of industrial products. With the popularization of household electrical appliances, ways of living that are suitable for industrial production have been introduced to rural China, giving rise to pollution caused by people’s new ways of living. If means of modern production were the major source of pollution before the introduction of appliances to villages, the “Home Appliances to the Countryside” scheme marked the coming of a time when rural pollution was caused by modern ways of living and production. In a traditional Chinese village, agricultural production and farmers’ lives are in a virtuous circle. Unlike rural China’s economic mode where agricultural production, consumption, and recycling form a constant cycle, economic activities in cites and industries form a one- way system that includes production, consumption, and waste disposal. This makes central emissions and processing of life and production waste a necessity. 3 As we are building a new socialist countryside, we need to study how to improve rural infrastructure and establish a modern waste recycling system after the introduction of modern living.

A. Popularize Knowledge that is Consistent with Modern Ways of Living While government agencies are introducing household electrical appliances to rural areas, knowledge and science should also reach the villages. Farmers need to know how to properly use the appliances and how to safeguard their rights as consumers. Stricter requirements should be imposed upon appliance production and after-sale services. Farmers’ complaints about appliance manufacturers should be handled responsively and carefully so that no more appliance makers dare to produce shoddy products. Moreover, the government needs to revise certain rules and regulations with regard to environmental pollution caused by electric waste and put them into effect as soon as possible.

3 Qiu Baoxing, “Planning and Construction of Towns and Villages in the Age of Ecological Civilization,” http://www.cin.gov.cn/ldjh/jsbﬂd/200903/t20090316_ 187287.htm. 184 cai yongfei

B. Upgrade Sewer and Toilet Facilities As farmers’ purchasing power in home appliances increases, sewers and toilets need to be improved. Local agencies should take measures based on local conditions and adopt appropriate techniques and methods to help farmers build a modern infrastructure. It is suggested that the relevant departments provide farmers with subsidies and services to facilitate the implementation of the “Home Appliances to the Countryside” scheme.

C. Promote Construction of Rural Residences and Communities In conclusion, planning and reconstruction of rural communities and residences constitute a vital part of building a new socialist countryside. Planning for small towns and areas of dense rural population should be subject to a higher standard. Construction of sewer networks, sewage treatment systems, and garbage recycling systems should be included in the agenda. For rural families that live separately from the communities, sewage treatment solutions need to be practical enough to keep the environment and the ecosystem from being hurt by their use of home appliances. PART IV

CONSUMPTION

2009: A WASTE CRISIS AT A CROSSROADS

Yang Changjiang

China experienced a waste crisis in 2009. The construction of waste incineration power plants triggered many mass incidents. The government strongly supported incineration power plants, regardless of opposing opinions by experts. It is time to reach a consensus on the environmental consequences and social harm brought by incineration power plants. With the garbage crisis at a crossroads, it would be disastrous if we choose the wrong direction. The year 2009 witnessed a waste crisis in China, triggering heated debates from Chinese society and bringing about an unprecedented impact on the country. With intensiﬁed waste problems that were unavoidable for the entire country, the year marked a watershed. It is predictable that environment and health issues accumulated within the last thirty years of rapid economic development and will occur in a more intensiﬁed manner over the next ten or twenty years. The current waste crisis, now at a crossroads, poses a threat to social development. Professor Nie Yongfeng (聂永丰), at the Department of Environmental Science and Engineering at Tsinghua University has claimed that “a golden time for waste power generation is coming.”1 The number of waste power plants has increased rapidly in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and other cities. Heated debates on waste incineration are going on. Professor Liu Yangsheng (刘阳生) of Peking University predicted that “if the government does not increase efforts in garbage disposal, China will face a health crisis in the next ten years.”2 The crux for the waste crisis is that the consequences will be disastrous if the wrong direction is chosen.

1 Zhang Qian, “Waste Incineration Power Generation: a Golden Time Is Coming,” Solidwaste.com, April 26, 2009, http://news.solidwaste.com.cn/k/2009-4/200942623 12397836.shtml. 2 Wang Qi, “Garbage Is Growing with Economic Growth,” Global Times, October 13, 2009. 188 yang changjiang

I. Environmental Warnings

Garbage problems have existed for thirty years and now they are reaching a crisis. On February 15, 2009, the Xiaping (下坪) landfill in Shenzhen collapsed. This triggered a series of mass incidents, including Tianjingwa (天井洼) in Nanjing on May 14, Asuwei (阿苏卫) in Beijing on September 4, Pingwang (平望) in Nanjing on October 21, and Panyu (番禺) in Guangdong on November 23. At 4 p.m., February 15, 2009, a pipe overflow occurred in the third waste hole of Xiaping solid waste landfill on the Qingshui River (清水河) of Shenzhen, Guandong Province. Mud spurted from underground pipes and covered the entire road with thick black sludge, giving out an unbearable odor. In the outflow, according to witnesses, streams of water and mud gushed up seven to eight meters high. Sludge and sewage flowed down the slope of the landfill and spread over the roads in the sewage treatment plant, covering a construction site.3 This huge amount of sludge and waste flowed into the Buji River (布吉河) and continued to pollute the downstream Shenzhen River (深圳河), and further to Hong Kong’s Mai Po (米埔) and Inner Deep Bay (后海湾) areas.4 In the government’s promotion of constructing waste incineration power plants, there were several deceptions. Furthermore, the plants were operated in non-standard ways. It is no wonder these plants were confronted with fierce opposition from the public. Disputes arising from waste incineration are turning into a social issue. In Nanjing, the Jiangsu Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau stated that the appraisal for Tianjingwa’s waste incineration power plant was open for public opinions until May 15, 2009, and all could give their opinions directly to the bureau. On the afternoon of May 14, 2009, hundreds of residents living in Jiangbei Apartment Complex gathered in front of the bureau, demanding a dialogue with the leaders in the hopes that the waste incineration plant construction project would be reassessed. More than ten police cars and several municipal

3 Xiao Qiong, “The Xiangping Collapse, Maybe Only A Warning,” Solidwaste.com, February 27, 2009 http://news.solidwaste.com.cn/k/2009-2/2009227902255041 .shtml. 4 “Shenzhen’s Garbage Landfill Plant Collapse May Cause Eco Disaster,” Solidwaste .com, February 23, 2009, http://www.epi88.com/master/news_view.asp?newsid= 7784. 2009: a waste crisis at a crossroads 189 government cars stood outside the gate. At 3 p.m., about eighty homeowners demanded a dialogue. Then several tough-looking men emerged, hustling and even hitting the homeowners, causing some to bleed on the face. The homeowners could do nothing more to protest but put up banners on the roadside and sing the national anthem in grief and indignation.5 On the morning of September 4, 2009, the Beijing Environmental Sanitation Exhibition was held in the Agricultural Exhibition Center. Dozens of homeowners from Changping District (昌平区) came to the center to protest against the construction of the Asuwei incineration plant, stating that if the plant was built, pollutants, particularly dioxin (a powerful carcinogen from garbage incineration), would harm their health and cause cancer.6 Police went to the area to maintain order and evacuated the protestors under the pretext of illegal assembly and social disturbance. More than twenty people were arrested and five were administratively detained.7 People in Jiangsu Province, typically known as mild and gentle, showed their tough side on October 21 and 22, 2009. On these two days, over 20,000 people from Pingwang Town, Wujiang City (江市平望镇) gathered by State Road 318 to protest against the near- completion of the Wujiang waste incineration plant. They surrounded the plant and were confronted with 3,000 policemen for two days. On October 22, 2009, the Wujiang government, fearing social instability, announced the discontinuance of the construction of Wujiang incineration plant by the Wujiang Oasis Environmental Thermal Power Company (江绿洲环保热电有限公司), thus ending the protest.8 In Panyu District, Guangzhou, the construction of a waste incineration plant met opposition from most local residents, while some officials hoped to build more. On November 23, 2009, hundreds of residents rallied outside the office of the newly established Guangzhou Municipal Administrative Commission. Some were wearing masks and

5 Yi Ying, “When Will the Nightmare of Tianjingwa End?” July 19, 2009, www .tianjingwa.com. 6 Geng Xiaoyong, Zhang Ning, “Over Ten Owners Protest Against the Asuwei Garbage Plant Construction,” Beijing News, September 14, 2009. 7 “A Matter Of Life And Death For China’s Urban Environment: Report on Waste Incineration Policies And Public Opinions,” EIA Fans Net, January 18, 2009, http:// www.eiafans.com/viewthread.php?tid=57712. 8 Hu Nianfei, “Public Stops the 300 million RMB Waste Incineration Power Plant In Wujiang,” South Daily, November 18, 2009. 190 yang changjiang t-shirts with words showing their protest. All were holding ﬂags and slogans with black characters on white paper. They numbered over one thousand. Shouting slogans and singing the national anthem, they “took a walk” to the city hall nearby. The protest, lasting for several days, surprised the whole country. It came to an end on December 20, 2009, when the party secretary of Panyu District told the public: “If the majority of residents oppose the project, it will not go ahead. Don’t worry. The project has stopped.”9 According to a China Daily survey, 92% of people believe that waste incineration will harm human health, and 97% are against incinerator construction. The past decade saw an increasing number of petitions concerning environmental problems.10 The termination of Pingwang and Panyu waste incineration plants shows that projects, if they affect public health, ought not to proceed against public will or they will create social problems.

II. Disputes on Waste Incineration Projects in Beijing

On March 8, 2009, Chen Yong (陈永), director of the Beijing Munici- pal Administrative Commission (BMAC), explained: “Beijing’s daily garbage is 18,400 tons, but our disposal capacity is only 10,400. In fact 17,400 tons are disposed. That means all landfills in Beijing are overloaded. In four years we will simply have no space for burying garbage. So we must set up more incineration plants.”11 In Beijing, 90% of garbage was disposed of at landfills, 8% composted, and only 2% incinerated. Chen Yong thinks the ideal proportions should be 30%, 30%, and 40% respectively.12 Chen Ling (陈玲), assistant director of BMAC, said firmly: “New facilities for garbage disposal will not pollute the environment, nor will incineration plants do harm to our health. We will shift from landfills to waste incineration in a comprehensive manner. This will be possible if we speed up the construction of incineration plants and

9 Liu Gang, Zhou Hualei, “Guangshou: Taking a Walk in the Name of Environ- mental Protection,” China Newsweek, November 26, 2009. 10 “Environment Tests China’s Social Stability,” Reference News, November 25, 2009. 11 “A Waste Crisis Presses upon Beijing” interview with Chen Yong, Director of Beijing Municipal Administrative Commission on Radio Beijing, March 8, 2009. 12 Ibid. 2009: a waste crisis at a crossroads 191 build necessary facilities for food waste disposal.” She also pointed out that waste incineration is common in other countries and has become the major method of dealing with daily garbage disposal in developed countries. “Don’t worry. We will meet both national and international standards, and control the discharge of dioxin within limits.”13 Heated discussions were aroused by the news headline: “Over- loaded Garbage Disposal Facilities: A Waste Crisis Challenges Bei- jing.” Guan Kuoshan (关阔山), a delegate to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and chief of Group 3 of the Environmental Sanitation Service Centre of Chongwen District (崇文区), Beijing, said that waste incineration is commonly adopted by developed countries. Despite the higher investment, waste incineration has five advantages. First is the efficient volume reduction of 80% to 90% after incineration. In this way, a garbage treatment plant, which is designed to last for ten years, will last eighty or ninety years. Second, it disinfects thoroughly. Third, power generated from incineration can be used for heating and electricity. Fourth, there will be less pollution. Fifth, disposal of waste will be more effective. Guan suggested that Beijing municipal government should make rules and regulations to shift garbage disposal from landfills to incineration. However, the public is skeptical about what these government departments have advocated. They are not convinced that waste incineration will not pollute the environment or do harm to people’s health. At a press conference held by the NPC and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on March 11, 2009, a journalist raised questions to the Ministry of Environmental Protec- tion (MEP): “Should the Liulitun (六里屯) waste incineration plant be built? Is it going to be built? Will it pollute the environment as people have worried? And more broadly, should incineration technologies be used and widely promoted in China?”14 Zhu Xingxiang (祝兴祥), director of the Pollution Control Department of the MEP, answered: “First, whether the Liulitun incineration plant will be built or not needs further assessment. Second, we have to listen to public

13 Sun Xiaojie, “Beijing’s New Garbage Disposal Facilities Won’t Pollute the Envi- ronment—Q&A from Chen Ling,” Beijing Daily, March 9, 2009. 14 Chang Lu, Yang Jinzhi, “The Ministry of Environmental Protection: The Liulitun Waste Incineration Power Plant Will Not Be Constructed Without Public Approval,” Xinhuanet.com, March 11, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2009-03/ 12/content_10995144.htm. 192 yang changjiang opinion. Third, the construction will not start without approval from the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau.” Wu Xiao- qing (晓青), assistant director of the MEP, added: “The environmental departments should pay close attention to public participation and protect citizens’ rights.” The proposed shift from landfills to waste incineration by Beijing government departments in charge was questioned by the public. Zhao Zhangyuan (赵章元), researcher at the Chinese Research Acad- emy of Environmental Sciences, believed that waste incineration was essentially pollution transfer; the pollutants circulating in the atmosphere will harm the human body eventually.15 Shi Guangyu (石广玉), researcher with the Institute of Atmospheric Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, said that there are too many organic compounds in our garbage, such as those from plastics. So, emission of harm-free gas from burning is hard to avoid. What is more, there is a grey haze hanging in the atmosphere 500 to 600 meters above Beijing, known as a “brown cloud.” It has attracted world-wide attention and deserves further research to determine how harmful it is to humans. Despite public doubts, the Beijing Municipal Committee and the Beijing Municipal Government released the official Opinions on Compre- hensive Treatment of Domestic Waste (关于全面推进生活垃圾处理工作的意见) on April 28, 2009, proposing to gradually increase incineration of domestic garbage. That means by 2012, 20% of garbage will be burned, 30% bio-chemically treated, and 50% buried. By 2015, the proportions will change to 40%, 30%, and 30% respectively. Even- tually, there will be zero landfills in the city. It was announced by relevant departments that by 2012, three waste incineration plants, namely Asuwei, Jingnan (京南), and Dongcun (董村), will be set up, and by 2015, Liulitun, Beitiantang (北天堂), Nangong (南宫), and Liangjiawu (梁家务) would be built. Therefore, by 2015, there will be all together nine waste incineration plants in operation in Beijing, with a daily disposal capability of 8,200 tons.16 “Waste incineration plants will create serious problems due to the terrain and meteorological restrictions in Beijing,” said Tang Dayou

15 Zhang Qiaoling, “Will Garbage Incineration Cause New Environmental Prob- lems?” Science Times, March 16, 2009. 16 Wang Dongliang, “Beijing: To Build Nine Waste Incineration Power Plants by 2015,” Beijing Daily, September 7, 2009. 2009: a waste crisis at a crossroads 193

(汤大友), associate research fellow at the Beijing Research Institute of Environmental Protection. Furthermore, Tang claimed: The mountain areas in the northwest of Beijing, accounting for 62% of Beijing’s total area, form our ecological conservation zone, where no contamination should be allowed. The remaining 38% are plains in the southeast. Although the plains consist of thousands of square kilometers, there is no more space for garbage landﬁlls. In terms of meteorology, there is a northwest wind in the morning and a southeast wind in the afternoon. So pollutants will not be blown away from the city. Therefore, the waste incineration plants to be built in Beijing will pose a potential danger.17 Tang recommended a macro strategy; that is, taking north China’s Jing-Jin-Tang (京津唐) area (including Beijing, Tianjin, Tangshan, Qinhuangdao, and Langfang) and northwest China as a whole in solving the issue of garbage disposal in Beijing.

III. Truth Coming Out of the Debates

The year saw widespread public debates over the construction of waste incineration power plants across the country. On the one hand, governments and some experts were in favor of such projects; on the other, it was strongly opposed by other experts and the public. As the Chinese saying goes, “the truth will come out of the debates.” Yet, at this stage, the truth about waste incineration seems to be blurred. On March 15, 2009, the Seventh Seminar on Solid Waste was held by the Department of Environmental Science and Engineering at Tsinghua Univesity in Beijing. At the seminar, someone spoke out: “We have to choose between the interests of individuals and that of the masses. An effective implementation of such choice will be in vain without authoritative legal restrictions.”18 In a report drafted by Xu Haiyun (徐海云), chief engineer at the China Urban Construction Design and Research Institute, Xu suggested “promoting the development of daily garbage incineration regardless of all obstacles; we

17 “Du Pengfei, “Tang Dayou: Environmental Protection in Urban Areas,” November 24, 2009, http://www.dangjiancn.com/article.do?method=shownews&id=74382. 18 Li Jianjun, “The Seventh Solid Waste High-level Salon: Garbage Management in Beijing,” Solidwaste.com, March 16, 2009, http://news.solidwaste.com.cn/k/2009- 3/20093161058283592.shtml. 194 yang changjiang should relocate the residents rather than the garbage plants.” Other aggressive statements have included: “The public should be ignored; they’re an obstruction to progress; and, what is covered by the media is only sensational and for the sake of novelty.”19 Zhao Zhangyuan, researcher at the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sci- ences, commented that the Tsinghua voice sent out the wrong signal, the effect of which might turn out to be just the opposite. On March 17, 2009, Chen Wenkai (陈文恺), professor at Nan- jing University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, and Xu Zhenqu (徐振渠), Deputy Director of Sustainable Development, Resource, and Environment Commission under the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, had a heated discussion at the hearing on the construction of the Jiangbei (江北) waste incineration plant in Nanjing. Xu Zhenqu, a strong supporter of waste incineration, said: “Concerns over dioxin are not necessary at all.” In terms of dioxin, he believed Jiangbei’s emissions would be able to meet EU standards. “Dioxin emissions in the Shanghai Jiangqiao (江桥) waste incineration plant are 0.038ng-TEQ/Nm3 and are 0.056 ng-TEQ/Nm3 in the Likeng (李坑) waste incineration plant in Guangzhou.” He said, “We should be on alert for public panic over dioxin caused by exaggerated or one-sided media reports.”20 Waste incineration, once labeled as energy-saving and environmentally friendly, enjoys green lights from academia, related industries, and the market. At the Third Seminar on Municipal Waste Incinera- tion Technologies and Facilities held on April 24, 2009, Nie Yongfeng claimed: “2008 to 2015 is a golden time for waste incineration”; Li Songtao (李松涛), chairman of the board of directors of Shenzhen Energy Group Co Ltd. expressed the same view that “waste incineration will provide valuable resources and solve the garbage crisis at the same time.”21 Entrusted by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the China International Engineering Consulting Corporation (CIECC) completed Suggestions on the Garbage

19 Meng Dengke and Zhao Yihai, “Expert? Lobbyist? Or Merchant? Advocate for Garbage Incineration: For Whom You Take the Responsibility?” Southern Weekly, December 3, 2009. 20 Yu Honghai, Liu Yiguang, “Why Garbage Incineration Power Generation Plant Became a Thorny Rose?” China Energy News, May 11, 2009. 21 Zhang Qian, “Garbage Incineration Power Generation: a Golden Time Is Around the Corner,” Solidwaste.com, April 26, 2009, http://news.solidwaste.com.cn/ k/2009-4/20094262312397836.shtml. 2009: a waste crisis at a crossroads 195

Management Industry (Draft) (推动垃圾焚烧处理产业健康发展的建议 (讨论稿)). The draft concluded that with the development of China’s economy and the rising rate of non-hazardous garbage treatment technologies, the waste incineration industry would have a bright future. This report was to be submitted for approval by the State Council. Waste incineration technology was likely to be included in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan in China as one of the prioritized projects of the environmental industry.22 Feng Yongfeng (冯永锋), an environmental journalist, believes that burning garbage is actually transferring pollutants into the atmosphere, which only results in more environmental disasters. He adds that it is favored by the government because it can quickly get a large amount of garbage out of sight.23 Some experts have commented that “waste incineration, under the cover of environmental protection and power efficiency, is only a benefit-seeking tool by interest groups.”24 Lv Zhengxiong (吕正雄), senior environmental engineer and an expert in environmental chemistry, who has done research on solid waste for nearly forty years, commented: “Waste incineration has no future and it’s not suitable to be promoted in China.”25 Despite the concerns of many experts as well as citizens over toxic pollutants such as dioxin, and despite the fact that Roland Weber, a German expert on persistent organic pollutants (POPs), warned that China should not fall into the same trap as Japan did in garbage disposal, there is still a rising voice protesting that “waste incineration has been demonized.” In an interview in 2007, Zheng Minghui (郑明辉), researcher at the Center for Eco-Environmental Science Research under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, compared dioxin to a chemical time bomb. However, on October 30, 2009 in an open discussion by the Panyu Garbage Incineration Plant in Guangzhou, he modified his view, saying: “Dioxin is like a tiger that can be controlled.” His dramatic change of stance earned him the title of “scholar bereft of

22 Tan Hong’an, “Garbage Incineration Power Generation: to be Released from Plight,” China Business, December 5, 2009. 23 Feng Yongfen, “Garbage Disposal: Classiﬁcation Rather than Incineration,” China Comment, April 29, 2009. 24 Wang Yamin, “Uncover Garbage Incineration,” August 29, 2009, http://special .nengyuan.net/200909/02-5847.html. 25 Sang Xueqi, “Garbage Incineration Not Suitable in China,” China Consumer Jour- nal, October 28, 2009. 196 yang changjiang moral and academic righteousness.”26 “Claiming waste incineration is without pollution and under control,” according to Zhao Zhangyuan, is actually “an advertisement by waste incinerator businessmen.” On November 5, 2009, a news headline, “Waste Incineration Power Plant Construction Enjoys Ardent Support from the People,” appeared in the Panyu Daily. It was reported that, after visiting the site of the waste incineration power plant, NPC delegates said the plant to be built was in line with economic and social development in Panyu, and is a people’s project.27 In the New Express Daily on the same day, it was reported that an opinion poll released on October 4 on the construction of a waste incineration plant in Panyu showed 97.1% of the respondents and 100% of citizens living within two kilometers of the site were against the project. Therefore, great importance should be attached to public opinion so as to avoid any mass protests.28 These reports show diametrically opposing opinions of the government and the public. 2009 witnessed many disputes on waste incineration, pushing us to reﬂect. Perhaps we should re-read Silent Spring, written over half a century ago, in which Rachel Carson says: “We stand now where two roads diverge. But they are not equally fair. The road we have long been traveling is deceptively easy, a smooth superhighway on which we progress with great speed, but at its end lies disaster.”

26 Liu Gang and Zhou Hualei, “Guangshou: Take a Walk in the Name of Envi- ronmental Protection,” China Newsweek, November 26, 2009. 27 Ding Shanhai, “Garbage Incineration Power Plant Underway Enjoys Ardent Support of the People,” Panyu Daily, November 5, 2009. 28 Xie Sijia, Deng Honghui, Xu Gang, and Shi Yumei, “Survey Found 97% of Panyu Citizens Against Garbage Incineration Project,” New Express Daily, November 5, 2009. PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION

Zheng Yisheng and Zhang Boju

This article analyzes the challenges China faces in promoting sustainable consumption and the achievements it made in 2009. It aims to clear up the current misconceptions about consumerism and give suggestions on further promotion of sustainability in China.

I. The Concept of Sustainable Consumption and the Existing Policies

There was a significant increase in interest in climate change and low- carbon development in China in the year 2009, not only by the Chi- nese government but also by enterprises and the public. “Sustainable consumption,” which is not a new concept, has regained attention in China. It would be no exaggeration to call 2009 a turning point for promoting sustainable consumption. Sustainable consumption is defined by the United Nations as “the use of goods and services that respond to basic needs and bring a better quality of life, while minimizing the use of natural resources, toxic materials, and emissions of waste and pollutants over the life cycle, so as not to jeopardize the needs of future generations.”1 The idea of sustainable consumption has been embodied in Chi- na’s policies. The 2005 Resolution on Implementing the Scientific Concept of Development and Strengthening Environmental Protection (关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定) by the State Council stated that “in the consumption link, the government should vigorously advocate an environmentally-friendly consumption pattern and implement environmental labeling, environmental verification, and a government green purchasing system.” In June 2007, the National Action Plan on Climate Change (中国应对气候变化国家方案) drawn up and distributed by the National

1 UNEP, “Element for Policies for Sustainable Consumption,” Nairobi Sympo- sium: Sustainable Production and Consumption Patterns, 1994. 198 zheng yisheng and zhang boju

Development and Reform Commission specified the goal of “enhancing society’s awareness of energy efficiency, accelerating the construction of a resource-conserving society, and slowing down greenhouse gas emissions.”2 In 2007, the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China set the goal of building a well-off society, which includes building an ecologically-conscious culture and formulating a new consumption pattern. The Proposal of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee for Formulating the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划的建议) states that the government should promote consciousness of economizing, encourage the production and use of fuel-efficient automobiles and products conducive to energy and water conservation, develop energy- and space-saving construction, and form a resource-efficient consumption pattern. In 2009, Wu Xiaoqing (晓青), Vice Minister of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), stated at the Forum on Envi- ronmental Labeling and Green Economic Development: “What we should do now is make consumers realize that, apart from rejecting goods with low quality and a high price, we should also reject energy- intensive and pollution-prone products. In so doing, we can satisfy our demands without jeopardizing the needs of future generations and turn sustainable consumption into the driving force for green economic development.”3 This reflects MEP’s goals for sustainable consumption: 1) to encourage enterprises to develop low-carbon products and technologies based on public consumption choices; and 2) through production and consumption, involve the entire society in environmental protection.

II. Severe Challenges to Sustainable Consumption

Early in 2009, it was believed that the global ﬁnancial crisis would raise public consciousness of sustainability and promote sustainable consumer behavior. However, this did not turn out to be the case.

2 The State Council, “Notice on the Issuance of China’s National Climate Change Program,” The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, Notice No. 17, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-06/08/content_641704.htm. 3 Wu Weizheng, “Wu Xiaoqing: Sustainable Consumption Is Not against Con- sumption,” People’s Daily, November 5, 2009. promoting sustainable consumption 199

There still existed some ingrained mistaken ideas in society. Inconsis- tency in consumer behaviors was far more severe than predicted.

A. Serious Unsustainable Consumption Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) pointed out in a government work report that one objective for the Chinese government is “to advocate an economic, environmental, and civilized production mode and consumption pattern in society as a whole and endeavor to build a resource-conserving and environmentally-friendly society.” The reality is in stark contrast to this goal, though. High levels of energy consumption, disposal, and waste are not uncommon in China. On December 19, 2009, “The Bird’s Nest Snow Season Carnival” opened. The National Stadium was converted into a ski field through artificial snowmaking, consuming 25,000 tons of water.4 Meanwhile, similar snowmaking projects were launched at Beijing’s Chaoyang Park and other places. The number of ski resorts in operation in the suburbs of Beijing was fifteen. Except for the Bird’s Nest and a few ski fields that utilized reclaimed water, most of the ski fields pumped groundwater for snowmaking, which resulted in a decline in the area’s water table and an intensification of the water shortage.5 On Decem- ber 21, only two days after the opening of the Bird’s Nest ski field, Bei- jing’s Municipal Development and Reform Commission announced a price increase for residential water use for the purpose of water conservation and water efficiency.6 There is confusion over the municipal government’s policy on water use. Given the water shortage in Beijing, the municipal government resorted to such means as price leverage in the hope of promoting water conservation. In this case, why did it allow parks and ski fields to utilize the precious water resources for snowmaking? Did it take into consideration the shortage of water resources and fairness in water distribution before it gave the green light to the highly water-intensive

4 Yu Hao, “The Most Water-intensive Artiﬁcial Ski Field,” China Enterprise Newspa- per, December 28, 2009. 5 Zhao Fangying, Zhou Lianxiong, Zhao Guojun, and Sun Baoping: “Soil Erosion and Its Countermeasures on Ski Field Project Construction with Longfeng Mountain Ski Field in Mentougou District as an Example,” Soil and Water Conservation Research, No. 3, 2006. 6 Rao Pei, “Water Price Raised by Three Jiao Per Ton,” Legal Evening News, Decem- ber 22, 2009. 200 zheng yisheng and zhang boju entertainment projects? Should water use by the entertainment business be given such priority in city water use planning? It is important to note that the construction of ski resorts in Beijing has resulted in mountain vegetation degradation, soil erosion, and ecological destruction, which is not in line with the goal of building a harmonious society.7 Such discrepancies between policies and practice are not exceptional. The Seventeenth CPC National Congress clearly stated: “It is essential to advocate the practice of hard work and frugality, handle all affairs in an economical manner, and oppose extravagance and waste.” However, waste related to government conduct is very serious. Some examples of waste in China are as follows:

1. Waste for Banquets and Official Vehicles at Public Expenses The Energy Research Institute of the National Development and Reform Commission has revealed that the overall purchase of official vehicles was 50 billion RMB in 2004, 70 billion RMB in 2006, 150 billion RMB in 2007, and 200 billion RMB in 2008 (excluding vehicles purchased by public hospitals, schools, state-owned enterprises, armed forces, and those purchased beyond government quotas). The official vehicle acquisition expense grows by 20% every year.8 A proposal by the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) shows that the transportation cost per 10 thousand kilometers by a private car is 8,215.40 RMB, while that of an official car is up to tens of thousands of RMB. The efficiency of an average taxi is five times that of an official car at a cost only 13.5% of the latter.

2. Ostentatious “City Image Projects” Some cities have dazzling night lights downtown despite a shortage of electricity in the summer. Local governments approve of the construction of extravagant buildings. Some government buildings exceed national standards several times over with a per capita ﬂoor space of 40 square meters.

7 Zhao, “Soil Erosion and Its Countermeasures.” 8 Li Xinxin, “The Expense of Ofﬁcial Vehicles of Government Agencies and Insti- tutions Exceeds Hundreds of Billions,” Outlook, January 4, 2010. promoting sustainable consumption 201

3. Excessive Waste in Construction Often, buildings under normal use and service are dismantled for purposes other than safety. At Zhejiang University, for example, the main teaching building on its lakeside campus, also known as “the tallest building by the West Lake,” had an expected lifetime of 100 years. However, it was demolished recently, although it had been in use for only thirteen years. The average lifespan of construction in China is between thirty and forty years, a far cry from eighty years in Europe and forty-four years in the U.S. The floorage of demolished buildings is about 44% of the new building floorage annually. Energy experts believe that such waste deserves public attention. If the average lifespan of urban housing increased from thirty to fifty years, the energy saved through cutting down on steel and cement would equal that produced by 600 million tons of standard coal.

4. Ineffective Control of Plastic Pollution A nationwide campaign against the use of plastic bags has been in practice for two years. But it has fallen short of its goal. A new source of plastic pollution—disinfected tableware wrapped up in a plastic package—has become popular in restaurants across China. This kind of plastic package produces new waste. According to statistics from the Qingdao Solid Waste Disposal Limited Liability Company (青岛市固体废弃物处置有限责任公司), tableware packaging and other plastic litter produced by restaurants accounts for 30% of the total amount of plastic garbage.9

5. Conspicuous Consumption In addition to extensive and wasteful consumption patterns, conspicuous consumption also prevails and receives lavish praise in the mainstream media. The acquisition of Hummer by a Chinese company is a case in point. In October 2009, Sichuan Tengzhong Heavy Industrial Machinery Company (四川腾中重工) concluded the ﬁnal agreement with Gen- eral Motors to purchase Hummer. Contrary to the trend of energy conservation, this acquisition of a high emission vehicle brand was applauded by the mainstream media. It was believed by some people

9 Wang Yuan, “Tableware Packaging, the New Pollutants,” Peninsula City News, October 21, 2008. 202 zheng yisheng and zhang boju that high fuel consumption vehicles like Hummer would find eager buyers in China. What lies behind the “Hummer Phenomenon” is conspicuous consumption. It is reported that the sales of sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) reached 562,450 in the first ten months of 2009, an increase of 160,000 vehicles or 41% over the same period of the previous year.10 It is an undisputable fact that SUVs sell better than cars in China. By contrast, the market for SUVs is shrinking in Europe and the U.S. What’s more, in some countries, their sale is restrained by laws. That gas guzzlers are in short supply in China should prompt reflec- tion on our culture of consumption. Profit-driven auto vendors and advertising agencies turn transportation vehicles into symbols of status and wealth, regardless of their counter-effects on energy conservation. Apparently, the government fails to exercise effective supervision, although a series of policies such as fuel taxes have been enforced. Priority is given to the need for expanding domestic demand and stimulating the economy. Given that, it comes as no surprise that gas guzzlers are popular in China.

B. Misunderstandings of Sustainable Consumption Few Chinese would deny the fact that China has an immense population base and a fragile ecological environment or that China is confronted with severe challenges of food and energy security. However, why have we not discontinued our behaviors that exacerbate environmental degradation? One of the important reasons lies in our misunderstanding of sustainable consumption. Some people disagree with the concept of sustainable consumption for China because they believe it is unfair to the Chinese people: having just entered the intermediate period of industrialization, the Chinese people have a consumption level much lower than those in developed countries. Hence, some believe, it is unfair to require China to limit consumption. Further analysis is needed to explain such a view. Some scholars on consumerism point out: “Within the current world economic framework, developed countries dominate global economic development. If they do not act as a role model in transforming the mode of consumption, it’s very hard for developing countries to

10 Shang Min, “Increasing Popularity of China’s SUV,” Daily News, December 15, 2009. promoting sustainable consumption 203 solve environmental problems by themselves, because they bear even more social pressure (such as poverty).”11 Indeed, developed countries should be held partly responsible for this consumption pattern in developing countries. Since multinational companies have taken the lion’s share of local markets, they help shape people’s consumption behavior. Given this, the task China faces is complex and formidable. What the government should do is not to simply suppress consumption, but to improve the living standards in underdeveloped areas. This, however, does not justify our dodging of consumption problems. Currently, three major forces in China drive unsustainable consumption: 1) the government’s pursuit of ostentation and extravagance and the short-term growth of GDP; 2) the new rich, and especially the young new rich, who pursue the ‘American Dream’ characterized by high energy consumption; and 3) enterprises’ drive for proﬁts by desperately cultivating consumerism which is suitable for national conditions. If we do not combat and overcome these three forces, our resources will by no means sustain our economic development and the country will be placed in danger. The second misunderstanding is that sustainable consumption will hinder the expansion of domestic demand. However, the two are compatible with each other. Currently, China is facing a critical turning point. On the one hand, Chinese society is undergoing the transition from subsistence living to a relatively comfortable living. Rapid urbanization is underway. On the other hand, the Chinese economy is also undergoing an adjustment from an export-oriented economy to a domestically-oriented one. The combination of the expansion of domestic demand and sustainable consumption can bring about new options and produce new needs. Domestic demands cannot be expanded indiscriminately. For example, the demand for recreational activities with high fuel consumption should be restrained instead of encouraged. We should take into consideration China’s national conditions in our modernization process. Sustainability should be ingrained in production as well as in lifestyle (including city layout and transportation regulations). The expansion of domestic demand does not mean a surrender to consumerism, and increasing the diversity of consumption does not mean high energy consumption and high carbon emissions.

11 Zhang Rongnan and Liu Feng, “Consumerism and Consumer Ethics,” Ideological Front, No. 2, 2006. 204 zheng yisheng and zhang boju

III. Promotion of Sustainable Consumption

The consumptive behaviors and living modes of the public have an indispensible inﬂuence upon the promotion of sustainable consumption. While many treat sustainable consumption with “lots of talk, but little action,” non-governmental organizations (NGOs) increase and enrich their activities considerably. To these NGOs, the public should be active participants, advocates, and supervisors, rather than passive receivers in a low-carbon society. In 2009, in order to promote public sustainable consumption, NGOs carried out a series of activities to an unprecedented extent. Among these activities the following three were the most typical.

1) The Wuhan Women’s Federation introduced the ‘green consumption file project’ (绿色消费档案) to 10,000 households. The first household green consumption file covers content like the purchase and use of energy-saving and environmentally-friendly household electronic appliances, monthly energy consumption, recycling of garbage and second-hand goods, and living a green lifestyle. Through building the household green consumption file in a planned way, this activity aims to guide participating families in leading a “two-oriented” lifestyle (“两型”生活). A “two-oriented” lifestyle is a lifestyle that is oriented towards resource conservation and environmental protection. In addition to the household green consumption file project, the Wuhan Women’s Federation also established ten community energy-saving counseling stations in Wuhan, opened 100 barter markets, employed 1,000 “two-oriented” volunteers, and selected 10,000 “two-oriented” model households. 2) The Pilot Project of Cool China Public Low-Carbon Activities (酷中国全民低碳行动试点项目) was launched in April 2009. Orga- nized by the Environmental Defense Fund, the “Old Communities, New Green” (老社区, 新绿色) program, the Center for Environ- mental Education, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection, this project promoted low-carbon living in eleven pilot cities out of nine provinces: Guangdong, Jiangsu, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chong- qing, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Xiamen City, and Shenyang City.12 This

12 Translator’s note: The “Old Community, New Green” program is an environmental protection social activity that aims to help improve old communities’ public environment. promoting sustainable consumption 205

project also conducted a survey among 330 selected households, and finished The 2009 Survey Report of Household Carbon Emissions in China’s 11 Cities (2009 年中国11 城市家庭碳排放调查报告) by analyzing their carbon emissions with carbon calculators. Mean- while, a series of publicity activities were carried out to promote sustainable consumption and low-carbon living. Through a year of implementation, this project aimed to compile a set of books, The Toolkit for Community Low-Carbon Education and Activities (社区低碳教育与行动工具包), which would contain project experiences in the eleven cities as well as publicity and educational materials collected during the project. The project would distribute these books among green communities throughout the country in order to enlarge the scope of publicity and education and encourage more people to join low-carbon living. 3) In the summer of 2009, the Chinese environmental group Friends of Nature launched a themed activity called “Low Carbon Families” (低碳家庭). The core of this activity was to select 100 pilot families throughout China, keep a record of and analyze household power consumption with professional measuring tools, and then invite experts to design for each family a specific energy-consumption improvement plan. The 100 families involved in this project updated their household power consumption data through an online website and communicated with each other, sharing their improvements. The long-term goal of this project was, through building on the experience of those pilot families, to introduce different detection indices and improvement plans based on different features of each family, effectively spread pilot families’ actions via traditional media and the internet, attract more families to be involved in this project, promote energy-efficient domestic electrical appliances, and advocate environmentally-friendly consumption and low-carbon living.

Households are the fundamental units of a society, and also an important force in the public’s participation of sustainable consumption. For this reason, NGOs prefer working with urban families and carrying out projects at the level of family and community. The effects of these projects remain to be seen in the coming years. At the same time, because sustainable consumption has not yet become part of mainstream culture, NGOs alone cannot bring about the transformation, which requires joint efforts by different parties in society. 206 zheng yisheng and zhang boju

IV. Missions of China’s Environmental NGOs

Low-carbon living is an area where people talk much and do little, and where few disputes occur on principles but many problems appear in practice. In recent years, the Chinese government has come to realize that consumptive behaviors and people’s lifestyle are in various degrees related to energy conservation, emissions reduction, and climate change. However, it lacks specific policies on comprehensive promotion of sustainable consumption and low-carbon living. According to the experiences of other countries, environmental NGOs can play a significant role in the popularization of the concept of sustainable consumption and can exert tremendous influence upon its development in the future. Seventeen years ago, Agenda 21 put forward and called for sustainable consumption for the first time. In expounding on the transformation of civilization, Ervin Laszlo held that we must find a mode of human activities for over 6 million people in this destroyed environment. A new moral principal that is to live in a way that allows others to live as well should substitute for existing ethics. In Macroshift, Laszlo pointed out that in order to achieve the goal of better allocating the world’s resources, we have to reform our economic system; but if there is no change in the values and orientation of the public, there will be no reform.13 As Gandhi said, our world can meet human needs, but cannot satisfy human greed. He urged people to live in a simple way to allow others to live as well. Because this idea holds significance for the future, its advocates must withstand pressure from immediate material interests. This is where NGOs will play an essential and indispensable role. There are two specific goals for advocates to achieve: the first is to prompt the central and local governments to make and implement economic and social policies concerning sustainable consumption; the second is to explore and spread China’s new sustainable lifestyle through practice.

13 Ervin Laszlo, Macroshift (Beijing: China CITIC Press, 2001). EXTRAVAGANT WATER CONSUMPTION IN BEIJING’S NEW BATHHOUSES

Hu Kanping

Recent years have witnessed the rapid development of Beijing’s bathing industry. Numerous bathing facilities, including spas, bath centers, and hot spring clubs, are scattered around the urban districts and suburban counties of Beijing. The bath area of this industry may easily cover up to tens or even hundreds of thousands of square meters. Meanwhile, water conservation in the bathing industry is slow to progress, and the bathing industry lags behind in the campaign to build a water-saving city. In 2006, Beijing introduced the Water Resource Protection and Utiliza- tion Plan (水资源保护及利用规划) for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period. The plan aims to enhance water conservation awareness throughout society, popularize water-saving techniques and measures, reach the water conservation level of moderately developed countries, optimize the distribution of water resources, signiﬁcantly improve the modernization of water resource management, and perfect the policies and regulations on water resource management so as to usher in a benign cycle of water resource protection and utilization and establish a water-saving city by 2010.1 The most important reason for setting these objectives is that Bei- jing is a city with serious water shortages and severely limited water resources. It is no exaggeration to call Beijing a thirsty city. While the internationally recognized per capita water shortage warning line is 1,000 cubic meters, the per capita available water resources in Beijing, calculated based on population in 2005, are only 248 cubic meters— less than one-eighth that of the national level and about one-thirtieth of the global level. In other words, if each citizen in the world has a thermos ﬂask of water, every Chinese would only have a cup, and every Beijing resident would have just a sip.

1 Beijing Municipal People’s Government “Beijing Municipal People’s Government on Issuing the Water Conservation and Utilization Plan during the Eleventh Five- Year Plan,” Beijing Municipal People’s Government Documents, No. 24. August 9, 2006. 208 hu kanping

Moreover, successive years of droughts have worsened water scarcity in Beijing. Over the past decade, the average annual precipitation in Beijing was only 450 millimeters. This was only 77% of the usual average precipitation in Beijing (585 millimeters) and lower than the average annual precipitation in other major cities in China. With rapid urbanization, population growth, and city function expansion, Beijing’s demand for water resources has been increasing rapidly, which has ampliﬁed the water shortage problem. With limited sources for diverting water from other areas, Beijing has no option but to solve the crisis through conservation and sustainable utilization of water resources. Beijing’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan has highlighted the need for “stricter management of water consumption in special businesses such as ski resorts, golf courses, bath houses, and car washes. The total amount of water consumption of special industries must be controlled under the water permit system, while the special water price standard must be enforced for these industries.” To some extent, the effectiveness of water conservation in Beijing’s special industries will be of signiﬁcance to the entire country. The year 2009 was an essential indicator as to whether Beijing could achieve its objectives by the end of the Eleventh Five-Year period. In 2009, Beijing residents’ per capita water consumption continued to fall, agricultural use of water decreased substantially, and the reuse of industrial water increased. However, it is worth noting that only limited progress in water conservation has been made in various special industries, especially the bathing industry. There is still much room for improvement in water conservation.

I. Rapid Development of the Bathing Industry Regardless of Water Scarcity

Surprisingly, special industries with high water consumption have been springing up in Beijing over the last decade of drought. Among these is the bathing business. Among the special industries listed in Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the bathing business is one of the most relevant to people’s daily life. Beijing’s bathing industry has a long history, but it is only in recent years that this business has experienced an explosive development. Thousands of bathing places such as spas, bathing centers, and hot spring clubs scatter around urban districts and suburban counties. Beijing’s bathing areas cover up to tens of or even hundreds of thousands of square meters. extravagant water consumption 209

In 2009, Shunjing Hot Spring (顺景温泉) in Beijing was recognized by the Guinness Book of World Records as the world’s largest indoor hot spring. The hot spring is located in the Shunjing Villa area near the northeastern corner of the Fourth Ring Road in Chaoyang District (朝阳区). It is reported that the spring is about 3,500 meters deep with a total area of 130,000 square meters and an average daily water yield of 4,000 cubic meters. In the hot spring resort, there are 96 pools in different shapes and a large-sized drift channel of 1,300 meters, able to serve 5,000 people at the same time.2 Hot Spring Leisure City, Longmai Hot Spring Village, Tianlongyuan Hot Spring Resort, and Oriental Hawaii used to lead the bathing business in Beijing, but Shunjing has put them all to shame. However, an insider reveals that another hot spring in the western part of Beijing is expected to break Shunjing’s record in 2010. With the emergence of super-large bath houses, the total number of bathing centers in Beijing is also increasing. At the end of 1989, there were only thirty-nine bathing pools in Beijing. It has been reported that the figure has now reached over 3,000, according to the Special Business Management Office of the Beijing Municipal Public Secu- rity Bureau. However, when a journalist tried to confirm the figure in an investigation of water consumption, the Beijing Administration for Industry and Commerce was unable to provide an accurate figure, claiming that the number of bathing centers in Beijing—including some hotels that provided bathing services—was increasing too quickly.3 Because of this, people say there are even more bath houses than restaurants in Beijing.

II. Why So Much Interest in the Bathing Industry?

Before the mid-1980s, people usually spent a few cents on a bath in the bathhouses of their companies or public baths. Later, with improved living conditions, people began to take a bath at home. However, in the last decade, more and more people choose to have baths and mas- sages at luxurious bathing centers as a leisure activity. According to an

2 Dai Lili, “The World’s Largest Indoor Hot Spring Settles in Chaoyang District,” Beijing Evening News, December 2, 2009. 3 Yang Xueting, “With Bathing Water Rising to 30 Yuan Per Ton, Which Bath Center Will be First Off the Game after the Implication of Progressive Water Prices,” Beijing Modern Business Daily, February 10, 2006. 210 hu kanping insider in the business, large-sized bathing centers and business hotels have been extremely prosperous because more and more people get together at these places. The insider attributes the popularity of bathing centers to their service combination of dining, leisure, fitness, entertainment, and bathing. Besides bathing, these centers usually have subsidiary facilities such as stages, restaurants, beauty salons, fitness rooms, and chess rooms. These bathing centers provide several kinds of featured services provided by facilities of various functions. Impressive benefits come on the heels of great popularity. Most of these centers are running well now because their main body of clients comes from membership, thus remaining relatively stable. Therefore, more investors have been attracted by this emerging market. Some of the building of expensive bath centers costs several hundred million RMB, and they are becoming more high-end, on a larger scale, and with more luxurious facilities. In the last two years, brand chains have developed in Beijing’s bathing industry. Quanjingcheng Group (权金城集团) is the first and largest chain business in the bathing industry in Beijing with over twenty outlets. To stimulate economic development and consumption, local governments are generally supportive of the development of the bathing industry. In the summer of 2009, the Changping District (昌平区) government launched a campaign of “experiencing a healthy and leisurely lifestyle in Changping,” giving away 100 thousand spa coupons worth 15 million RMB to citizens in Beijing and neighboring provinces and cities. Seventeen enterprises participated in this campaign, including Jiuhua Spa Resort, Fengshan Hot Spring Resort, Hot Spring Leisure City, Tianlongyuan Hot Spring Resort, and Longmai Hot Spring Vil- lage. As it turned out, some hot spring centers boasted a consumer volume of over 10,000 in a single day. The total volume of water (including groundwater), if calculated, must be alarming. However, neither the government, nor the enterprises, nor the media mentioned water consumption in their reports of the activity, although such a calculation would have been easy.

III. An Invisible Price to be Paid

China’s First Spa Industry Forum held in 2008 warned that China’s rich hot spring resources were being excessively exploited in an unor- extravagant water consumption 211 ganized way and on a large-scale. They also warned that relevant laws and regulations, as well as an industry association, were urgently needed to regulate and improve China’s spa industry.4 Because of the absence of relevant laws and regulations for hot water collection, market access thresholds, and scientific use, waste and overexploitation exist in hot spring development in some areas. In Beijing, as a result of the hunger for instant profits and the lack of environmental protection and crisis awareness, many tourist spa projects have been randomly exploiting hot spring resources, which have caused latent geological dangers. In general, a hot spring is geothermally heated groundwater springing out from the Earth’s crust through long cracks in the underground rocks under the pressure difference of still water. Many spa centers in Beijing extract hot water from deep wells drilled two or three kilometers into the ground. Strictly speaking, they are not hot springs. According to the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Land and Resources and Bureau of Geology, Mineral Exploration, and Development, Bei- jing’s exploitation of groundwater exceeds the standard volume by 100 million cubic meters. By the end of 2003, “five land subsidence zones had developed in the Beijing Plain, posing a direct threat to urban construction planning and residence safety.”5 For example, an accident occurred on the afternoon of March 1, 2005, when a tap water pipeline under the side road to the east of the Sanyuandong Bridge (三元东桥) in Chaoyang District burst open under the pressure of land subsidence resulting from overexploitation of groundwater. Within ten minutes, the road was flooded.

IV. “Blind Zone” in the Campaign to Build a Water-saving City

The daily per capita water consumption in Beijing is around 110 liters, while in bathing centers the average water consumption is 300 to 500 liters per person/time, with an even higher ﬁgure at spa centers. In

4 Ding Wenjie, “Experts Warn of Overexploitation of Hot Spring Resources in China,” Xinhua.net, July 23, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-07/23/ content_8757205.htm. 5 Hong Yanjie and Duan Jinping, “Beijing: Water Overexploitation of 1,000 Mil- lion Cubic Meters; Five Land Subsidence Zones Formed,” Beijing Evening News, April 22, 2005. 212 hu kanping other words, one bath at a bathing center consumes more water than that needed by a family for three days. The population of Beijing is 17 million. If every Beijing resident takes one bath at a bathing center every month, using 400 liters of water each time, the annual consumption of bathing water at bathing centers will reach 81.6 million tons. Obviously, such a “trend” is too large of a burden for Beijing, a city with extreme water scarcity. Given that industrial development and mass consumption cannot be restricted, water conservation seems to be the only solution to reduce water consumption in the bathing industry. Water conservation must become a social obligation for any bathing business and a conscious behavior of consumers. However, the reality is that neither consumers nor business operators take water-saving seriously. On the contrary, people do not feel pressure from the water shortage. The phenomena of excessive use and waste of water are common. An informal survey was conducted by the author to investigate consumer attitudes toward bathing trends and water conservation. When asked about the amount of water they used, respondents usually con- fessed they paid little attention to it. Some consumers even believed that since they paid for their bath, they could keep water running during the bath. They turned deaf ears to the author’s suggestion of turning off the tap when applying soap. A remark by one senior citizen was typical: “Why would I pay to bathe here if I want to save water?” Bathing center operators have their own difficulties in promoting water conservation. A manager said to the author: “The customers are here to relax and to do what they like. Even though water conservation is beneficial to us managers, I will not risk telling my customers to save water, because they may get annoyed and never come here again.” On another occasion, the manager of a bathing center told the author that that bathing centers were targeted at middle to high end customers. Each ticket costs 168 RMB, covering services such as swimming, bathing, three buffet meals, and watching performances. The manager said customers tended to think that it would be worth the money only if they consume more water and eat more food. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for business operators to promote water conservation. However, bathing centers can actually contribute to the enhancement of consumers’ water conservation awareness. It should be easy to put up water-saving signs in the bathing area. To the author’s disappointment, no sign of this kind was found in half of the bathing centers extravagant water consumption 213 investigated. An efficient and feasible way is to adopt new types of water-saving appliances such as proximity sensor nozzles and pedal switching systems. To my surprise, such appliances can hardly be seen in bathing centers in Beijing. A manager offered an explanation by saying: “We fear that the customers may think we are too stingy if they find their use of water is limited.”

V. Water Price Adjustment: A Solution?

Facing water shortages, the Beijing Municipal Government started implementing a new water pricing plan for non-household users on December 20, 2009. The water price for bathing centers was raised from 61.50 RMB/m3 (about 9.01 USD/m3) up to 81.68 RMB/m3 (about 11.97 USD/m3). At the same time, household water prices went up to 4.00 RMB/m3 (about 0.59 USD/m³) from 3.70 RMB/m3 (about 0.54 USD/m3). The price adjustment scheme encouraged those who support the construction of a water-saving Beijing. However, how this price adjustment scheme will affect the bathing industry remains unknown. An expert in the industry has pointed out that, raising water prices can hardly constrain the expansion of high water-consuming projects. As the author has found, since water prices were raised, some clients at bathing centers use more rather than less water. At a bath center near the Mingguang Bridge (明光桥) in Chaoyang District, an old lady who had just ﬁnished bathing said to the author: “After water prices went up, my neighbors used less water at home, but spend more time here.” The author has the following recommendations to make. First, the Beijing Government should learn from the city of Changchun and make regulations for the bathing industry as soon as possible. Chang- chun enacted its Provisional Regulation for the Bathing Industry (洗浴业管理暂行办法) as early as 2001. In 2005, the Beijing People’s Congress announced that it would begin to draft a similar regulation, but no such regulation has been enacted. Second, bathing centers should be encouraged to use water-saving techniques and devices. Many university bathhouses in Beijing, Tianjin, and Nanjing are already using computerized water management systems and equipment. When one has to pay for what he/she actually uses, much water can be saved. Third, Beijing residents can be introduced to the water conservation 214 hu kanping initiative called “60 Second Sports Power Shower” by the organizers of the 2008 Australian Open Tennis Championships. All players were called upon to ﬁnish bathing within 60 seconds, whether after training or a match. “It is simple, but meaningful,” said the person in charge of the organization of the event. RESTRICTED USE OF PLASTIC SHOPPING BAGS: THE WAY OUT

Mao Da

In 2009, one year after China instituted its ban on free plastic bags, problems arose in the enforcement of the Plastic Bag Restriction Policy.1 Charging for the use of plastic shopping bags gradually dimin- ished, posing a threat to prior successes. Moreover, the prohibition on ultra-thin plastic bags was a near failure because it was not being carried out. These problems resulted primarily from a gap between policy goals and implementation. The Chinese government neither took adequate follow-up actions nor supplied sufﬁcient administrative resources. To solve these problems, the Chinese government, retail outlets, and environmental protection organizations should modify the policy in order to discourage the use of plastic bags and reduce “white pollution.” A year after China issued its ban on free plastic bags in 2008, different parties began actively to improve the policy and increase its positive effects. For instance, some deputies of the National People’s Congress (NPC) proposed motions related to plastic bags; the government scrutinized the enforcement of the policy; Chinese media and public non-proﬁt organizations held forums; and scholars also played their part in investigations and provided feedback and advice for the government. Some enforcement problems arose in this process. It is necessary to analyze and evaluate the policy for the sake of further improvement and better effects.

1 The restriction policy is short for the State Council Notice on the Restriction of the Production, Sale, and Usage of Plastic Shopping Bags (国务院办公厅关于限制生产销售使用塑料购买物袋的通知), introduced on December 31, 2007 by the State Council of the PRC. 216 mao da

I. Partial Success in Charged Use of Plastic Shopping Bags

A. Discouraging the Use of Plastic Bags by Charging for Their Use In August 2009, China’s National Development and Reform Commit- tee announced that since the ban took effect on June 1, 2008, the use of plastic bags nationwide had dropped by two-thirds and the overall plastic consumption had been reduced by 270 thousand tons. This saved 2.4 to 3 million tons of crude oil and 7.6 to 9.6 million tons of CO2 emissions annually.2 A common explanation for the short-term success of this public environmental policy from Chinese government ofﬁcials and experts was an “economic lever,” namely, the visible charge on plastic shopping bags reduced demand for them. Yet, there are other more important contributing factors. First, in terms of psychological effects, people might think that they were overcharged when purchasing plastic shopping bags. In fact, as stressed by many government ofﬁcials, this practice aimed to make the public aware of costs spent on producing plastic bags. As most retailers sold plastic shopping bags at the manufacturing price or a bit higher, the costs of a plastic bag before and after the imposed charge did not vary much. As a result, for the foreseeable future, consumers— especially those with high incomes—will use less plastic shopping bags to save money. This is mainly out of psychological concerns because plastic bags are cheap. Second, after it came into effect, the Plastic Bag Restriction Policy sent out an inspirational signal. In addition to the psychological effects of the “economic lever,” the signal aimed to educate the public about the effects of plastic bags on the environment and to raise their awareness for environmental protection. Over and above the media’s promotion at the preliminary stage, the imposed charge on plastic bags in supermarkets, farmers’ markets, and other retail outlets simultaneously reminded consumers of their obligation to protect the environment. Third, by creating public information, the policy made it possible for retailers to take united action. The rule of “labeled price and sepa-

2 “Immediate Success of Restriction Policy on Plastic Bags,” National Development and Reform Committee, August 26, 2009, http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwfb/t20090826_ 297992.htm. restricted use of plastic shopping bags: the way out 217 rate charging” (明码标价, 分开记收) was carried out more smoothly in supermarkets and chain stores due to their different operational characteristics than in farmers’ markets, independent stores, and by peddlers. According to some social researchers, these characteristics included intensive management and operation, ﬁxed prices, and pre- packaged commodities. In fact, these characteristics existed before the enforcement of the Plastic Bag Restriction Policy. Therefore, a question emerges: Why didn’t supermarkets and chain stores charge for plastic bags before? In fact, few businesses did so except for a number of international corporations like IKEA. This was clearly a case of the “prisoner’s dilemma.” Retailers were fully aware that double charging, regardless of being labeled or hidden, would bring risks to themselves as some consumers were not conscious of environmental protection, nor understood the beneﬁt that comes from the price paid. Therefore, to avoid placing themselves in a disadvantaged position, no retailer wanted to take the initiative. Things are different now with the introduction of the restriction on plastic bags, which sent out a public message to all consumers and retailers regarding the principle of “labeled price and separate charge.” Starting from June 1, 2008, a united action was taken to discourage the use of plastic bags in China. This message enabled all eligible retailers to carry out the policy without worries. Obviously, the policy was an economical act, which cost the Chinese government nothing except to release public information. All eligible retailers jointly took action with the cooperation of the public. This successful experience deserves commendation.

B. Reduced Effect of Charged Use Temporary success cannot wipe out consumers’ worries about the future policy of plastic bag use or guarantee long-term effects. To date the regulation for charging for the use of plastic bags has been losing ground. First, the execution rate in supermarkets and other retail outlets is dropping. According to a survey conducted by civilian researchers in six Chinese cities, less than 90% of retailers followed the policy, as many medium- and/or small-scale supermarkets no longer comply. In Harbin and Lanzhou, the percentage dropped to less than 80%. Reports repeatedly discovered retailers that refused to carry out the policy. 218 mao da

Second, more and more consumers became used to paying for plastic bags at shopping points and the demand for plastic shopping bags actually increased. Media in different cities made similar observations. In early 2009, a newspaper in Hebei Province reported that consumption of plastic shopping bags was “on the rebound” in a big supermarket which had implemented the regulation effectively. While some senior citizens brought their own shopping bags, most young and middle-aged adults purchased plastic bags. The use of plastic bags in supermarkets increased rapidly. Some supermarkets sold 1,000 to 2,000 bags daily.3 Similar reports could be found in other cities, such as Chongqing, Wuxi, and Fuzhou. In some areas, plastic bag consumption reached almost half the amount of the pre-restriction time, with an increase rate much higher than 10% to 20% as estimated in July 2008.4 There were at least three factors contributing to this rebound phenomenon: 1) People became indifferent to environmental protection when they were not constantly reminded; 2) Cheap plastic bags posed little burden on family expenses. Consumers gradually changed their prior negative feelings against the paid use of plastic bags; and 3) A growing number of consumers have understood the significance of making hidden charges visible, and thus feel no loss in practice. The fact that the policy is becoming less effective does not indicate that the policy itself is problematic. Intrinsically, the policy has limited functions. It is essential to fix the policy soon in order to enhance prior successes. If there is no further incentive to inspire retailers and consumers to carry out the policy, its effects will fade away. To date the State Administrative Department for Industries and Commerce has taken measures to urge retailers to implement the policy. How- ever, these measures are mostly promotional and short of supervision by the media and the public. It takes time to know how effective the policy will be. The policy is weak in consumer inspiration. Retailers decide on whether or not to remind consumers about environmental protection. The government has not done systematic work to facilitate policy implementation. Some government officials conducted a few interviews

3 Zhang Hui and Wang Yixin, “Sales of Plastic Bags in Supermarkets Still High,” Yanzhao Daily, February 12, 2009. 4 Xu Yuan, “Difﬁcult Journey Ahead for Restriction Policy,” Chongqing Business, April 4, 2009. restricted use of plastic shopping bags: the way out 219 at the early stage. Many questions and doubts about the policy remain unanswered. In 2009, some activities were launched to discuss and promote the policy. However, most communicative and promotional activities were organized by civilian welfare organizations. In this case, it is necessary for the government to do more promotional work to gain public support for the policy.

II. Restriction on Ultra-Thin Plastic Bags

A. Restriction Policy on Ultra-Thin Plastic Bags One measure for the restricted use of plastic bags was to forbid the manufacturing, sale, and consumption of ﬂimsy plastic bags thinner than 0.0025 millimeters. Unfortunately, this measure was effective for only a short period after the policy took effect. As reported, ultra- thin plastic bags reappeared in some provinces as early as August of 2008 when the Olympic Games were underway. In September, even in Shanghai, where people enjoyed a relatively high living standard and a strictly regulated market, the qualiﬁcation rate of plastic bags randomly sampled was only 56.5%.5 In 2009, there were more reports on the increasing use of ultra-thin plastic bags. Most farmers’ markets still provided ultra-thin plastic bags. Controlling measures over the use of plastic bags were ineffective. Ultimately the restriction on ultra-thin plastic bags turned out to be useless. At times, people even misper- ceived the policy as equivalent to the Plastic Bag Restriction Policy. In the predicament with the ultra-thin plastic bag restriction, both the media and the public proposed to enhance policy implementation. The Chinese government also took some actions. Li Jing (李静), Vice Director of the Environment and Natural Resources Protection Division of the National Development and Reform Com- mission (NDRC) stated that in 2008, the General Administration of Industry and Commerce made a formal request to carry out the Plas- tic Bag Restriction Policy. Beginning in March 2009, over 600 thousand executors from Administration of Industry and Commerce were

5 “Sample Result of Quality Supervision on Plastic Bags in Shanghai in the Second Season of 2008,” Shanghai People’s Government.net, September 10, 2008, http://www .shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2319/node12344/userobject26ai16001 .html. 220 mao da mobilized; 250 thousand retailers and 2.3 million stores were under investigation; 260 million bags were disqualified and over 2 thousand illegal cases were checked, resulting in an accumulated penalty of 2.04 million RMB.6 After June 1, the NDRC, the Ministry of Commerce, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, and the Bureau of State General Administration of Industry and Commerce randomly examined the policy implementation. In July, the Bureau of State General Administration of Industry and Commerce issued an urgent notice on the restricted use of plastic bags in farmers’ markets with an emphasis on retailers’ responsibility, promoting the application of a supermarket system to other retail outlets, and providing qualified and pre-packaging plastic bags for raw foods. The author of this article verified the notice by asking for transparent official information from the Beijing Administration Bureau of Industry and Commerce. On November 9, 2009, feedback from the bureau indicated that in March, 5,650 executors were mobilized, 4,010 retailers and 23,412 store owners were checked, and 153,713 bags were found to be disqualified. Government departments concerned consider it inappropriate to blame the government for having not done anything to deal with the inefficiency of the Ultra-Thin Plastic Bags Restriction Policy. Ultra- thin plastic bags remain rampant nationwide. Follow-up investigations in the six cities by civilian researchers in the summer of 2009 showed that ultra-thin plastic bags were still popular in farmers’ markets, independent shops, and peddlers’ stalls. Only a small number of strictly- registered farmers’ markets have stopped using plastic bags.

B. Why the Restriction Policy on Ultra-thin Plastic Bags Became Inefﬁcient At this point, we cannot help asking why the policy became inefﬁcient. To answer this question, it is necessary to compare policy goals with outcomes in evaluation. Failure to carry out the ultra-thin plastic bag policy derives from unrealistic objectives. The restriction means zero tolerance for ultra-thin plastic bags. Nevertheless, this strict require- ment is hardly accepted by farmers’ markets and consumers in the

6 “Forum in May: The Limitation of Plastic Bags in the Supermarkets Took Effect, Supervision on Agricultural Product Markets Is Not Enough,” Souhu.com, May 25, 2009, http://green.sohu.com/20090525/n264163664_2.shtml. restricted use of plastic shopping bags: the way out 221 short term, and goes beyond the capability of public management in enforcement. Some grassroots government officials complained that the production of ultra-thin plastic bags has low requirements for technology and investment, and therefore abounds in many places. It is hard to put an end to the manufacture, sale, and distribution of such bags.7 In fact, it is unlikely to completely stop the production and use of the plastic bags. The key approach lies in whether related offices provide enough administrative resources. Many administrators detected unlawful business behaviors but did not abide by rules in punishment. Their common excuse is that “peddlers have a hard life.” After all, if an administrator cannot understand the significance of the policy, how can we expect the policy to be effective? Undoubtedly, failure to carry out an issued policy is a big problem that influences the construction of a legal system. Many people become indifferent to this failure, which is the biggest obstacle in building a society regulated by law and protecting the environment. The author of this article believes that failure in policy enforcement derives from the policy itself. We should not equate “ideal” to the actual policy. We can only pursue an attainable aim. Otherwise, we have to revise it. Or else, inefficient policies will reduce people’s enthusiasm and make the tangible goals impossible.

C. Increasing Investment and Avoiding a Sweeping Approach In comparison to supermarkets and retail stores, farmers’ markets, private grocery stores, and peddlers are the most criticized for being unable to follow the restrictions. In the case of ultra-thin plastic bags, government goals do not ﬁt in with reality as most retailers are incapable of labeling plastic bag prices publicly and charging customers separately. In addition, vegetable markets and other farmers’ markets usually do not provide pre-packaged produce and, thus, depend more on plastic bags. If no alternatives are found, plastic bags are hard to get rid of.

7 Xie Chaohong, “Rampant Free Plastic Bags: One Year after the Restricted Use Policy Took Effect,” Hunan Business Daily,” May 27, 2009. 222 mao da

III. How to Improve the Plastic Bag Restriction Policy

The discussions above indicate two key problems. The policy expects retailers to record the purchase of plastic bags, to encourage recycling, and to avoid burying and burning plastic bags. However, the media did not give adequate attention to these expectations, nor did government departments take effective actions to implement the policy. Therefore, we should improve the policy starting from the key issues of policy-making and implementation, as well as public participation. Finally, this article will discuss potential measures used to improve the policy from the perspectives of three major parties concerned.

A. Government Departments At present, the biggest problem in the enforcement of the policy is that no specific departments or offices have been designated to take care of policy implementation. The policy was launched by the General Office of the State Council. According to the media and interactions between the government and the public, the Environmental and Natu- ral Resources Protection Division of the NDRC is the central body for policy-making and execution. Therefore, this department and its officials should continue to lead the movement for restricted use of plastic shopping bags to promote the development of the policy. No matter which department takes charge, all executive offices involved should publicize their contact information for the convenience of reporting and advising. A critical function of such a department is to set up a mechanism facilitating interaction between the government and the public and enlisting all parties involved to design and execute policies. Technical problems can be resolved only with the help of an interactive mechanism between the government and the public. It has been hard to carry out the Restriction Policy on Ultra-thin Plastic Bags. Thus, proper adjustments and amendments as well as clear progressive goals should be added to the original policy objectives. As for the paid use of plastic bags, more attention should go to shopping malls with brand-name stores as they have the capability to execute the policy more smoothly. For farmers’ markets, independent shops, and peddlers, waivers may be considered with encouraging measures taken to reduce the use of plastic bags. The central Chinese government can launch some guiding rules for policy execution and share successful experiences with multi-level government offices and retail outlets in diverse fields. restricted use of plastic shopping bags: the way out 223

Moreover, “white pollution” exists not only because of the use of plastic bags, but also because of the careless dumping and disposal of such bags. Hence, the government should pay more attention to garbage disposal over and beyond discouraging the use of plastic bags. To put it differently, we need to surpass the level of reducing the use of plastic bags in order to control “white pollution.”

B. Retailers Retail outlets, especially large-scale supermarkets and shopping malls, should seize every opportunity, especially at the check-out desk, to transmit the message of environmental protection and discourage plastic bag consumption.

C. Environmental NGOs No matter how hard the government, retailers, and environmental NGOs work, the main motivation to improve the restriction policy and to reduce the use of plastic bags and pollution must come from the public. Environmental NGOs can conduct more studies to help the government understand policy enforcement, and provide suggestions. Environmental NGOs are good at promotion. By cooperating with retail outlets, designing better promotional plans, encouraging the use of alternatives to plastic bags, and avoiding abstract doctrines in dealing with the predicament, they can successfully discourage the consumption of plastic bags.

PART V

ECOLOGICAL PROTECTION

ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS AT NATURE RESERVES: AN ANALYSIS OF TOURISM DEVELOPMENT AT JILIN’S CHANGBAI MOUNTAIN

Shen Xiaohui

During the past few years, the Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve has gone through an organizational transformation from a nature reserve to a “conservation and development zone.” The focus has shifted from protecting nature to developing tourism and stimulating the economy of Jilin Province. Currently there are large-scale investments, development operations, and construction projects taking place in the nature reserve. The administrative takeover of these projects has lead to an increased focus on economic development despite the ecological destruction brought on by government policies. The ecological qualities of the nature reserve have changed substantially. This article looks at the case of the newly established Changbai Mountain Con- servation and Development Zone Administrative Committee, raises important questions as to where the future of Chinese nature reserves lies in the current tide of economic development, and offers policy suggestions for strengthening the construction of nature reserves. The Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve (长白山自然保护区) is one of China’s earliest, largest, and most inﬂuential nature reserves. It was one of the nature reserves where the Chinese Academy of Sci- ences established the earliest forest ecosystem research stations and one of China’s earliest Man and Biosphere Nature Reserves. It served as an important role model for the construction of China’s nature reserves. Great conservation importance is attached to the Changbai Moun- tain Nature Reserve. Changbai Mountain has the greatest biological diversity among all zones of the same latitude on Earth. It is home to 2,806 species of wild plants and 1,578 species of wild animals. Changbai Mountain is also a classical example of a forest ecosystem on mountains in the Temperate Zone of Eurasia. It has a distinct vertical distribution of mountainous vegetation, including all major vegetation species, growing in areas from the middle Temperate Zone to the Frigid Zone. Being the source of the Songhua River (松花江), 228 shen xiaohui

Tumen River (图门江), and Yalv River (鸭绿江), Changbai Mountain has brought substantial ecological and social beneﬁts to conservation of water and soil, improvement of the climate, puriﬁcation of the air, and safeguarding of industrial and agricultural production as well as life of the local inhabitants.

I. The Organizational Transformation of Changbai Mountain from Nature Reserve to Conservation and Development Zone

Beginning in the 1980s, the prefectures and cities related to Changbai Mountain have been battling over control and power over the tourist resources at Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve, each trying to incorporate the nature reserve into its own economic development plan. Every time the provincial party committee and government of Jilin Province changed sessions, the new officials offered schemes for sharing profits proposed by different stakeholders. The previous provincial party committees and government officials of Jilin Province placed great emphasis on the Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve and maintained a cautious attitude towards tourism development. The Provincial People’s Congress of Jilin even formulated Regulations for the Administration of Changbai Mountain National Nature Reserve in Jilin Province (吉林长白山国家级自然保护区管理条例). However, the situation changed after June 2005, when Jilin’s provincial government passed the decision to establish the Changbai Moun- tain Conservation and Development Zone Administrative Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee) (长白山保护开发区管理委员会), which began operating in January 2006. The mode of administration is called the “9+1” method, which involves nine cities and prefectures plus the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee. The Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee manages: three county-level tourism economic zones—Chixi (池西), Chibei (池北), and Chinan (池南); eleven internal institutions; ten public institutions; and one corporation called the Changbai Mountain Tourism Devel- opment Corporation (长白山旅游开发集团公司). The Commission is authorized by the provincial government to manage the region by “following the development zone model” (按开发区模式进行管理). The original Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve Administrative organizational transformations at nature reserves 229

Bureau has been dissolved and its duties distributed among different departments of the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee. What was the main purpose of establishing the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee, for protection or development? According to Jilin Government Document No. 19 (2005) and Jilin Government Document No. 30 (2006), there were three objectives for establishing the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee: first, to strengthen the efforts to protect the Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve; second, to accelerate the development of the tourism industry in Jilin Province; and third, to establish a unified core for the planning, protection, development, and management of Changbai Mountain. In a working conference on August 16, 2005, the then vice-governor of Jilin Province made it clear that the establishment of the Changbai Mountain Adminis- trative Committee was based on three “urgent needs”: “the urgent need to stimulate the economic development of both the province and local regions, to create a better brand and build an integrated image for Changbai Mountain, and to get rid of the defects and contradictions in the current management system and search for a management method truly suitable for the development of Changbai Mountain.” In his speech, the vice-governor also mentioned that in order to speed up the development of Jilin Province, “the tourism industry must be prioritized, and one of the key tourism resources is Changbai Moun- tain.” Changbai Mountain is a “three-dimensional treasure bowl” with abundant resources “to be harnessed for the purpose of strengthening its competitive edge.” In a word, the objective for establishing the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee was to stimulate the economy of Jilin Prov- ince through the tourism industry. This position clearly gave priority to economic development. The administrative power of the government is a double-edged sword. If used for nature conservation, it is more efficient than the original, publically funded administrative institution. However, if more focus is put on economic development, more serious ecological damage ensues. One of the direct consequences of the shift toward administrative control of nature reserves is that land usage in nature reserves can be changed easily as long as the new plan is formulated and approved by local governments. In this way, the “obstacles” of laws and regulations can be overcome and “lawful development and utilization” can be 230 shen xiaohui carried out. Considering the enthusiastic pursuit of high GDP performance by local government officials, turning the nature reserve into a “conservation and development zone” and turning the publically funded administrative institution into a government institution that tries to balance nature conservation with economic development, and even attaches more importance to the latter, certainly has greater det- riment than benefit.

II. Big Investment or Big Failure?

After the establishment of the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee, in the years between 2006 and 2008, there was extensive investment, development, and construction, under the leadership of Shi Guoxiang (石国祥), former director of the Changbai Mountain Admin- istrative Committee and current secretary of the Party Administra- tive Committee. The major economic development projects included:

A. Government Projects: Construction of Government Office Buildings, Hotels, and Restaurants There was much construction after the establishment of the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee. It was declared that “the infrastructure of Changbai Mountain will be developed into top-ranking infrastructure both in Jilin Province and in China” within three to five years. As expected, within three years the Changbai Mountain Admin- istrative Committee organized sixty-two major projects, including construction of office buildings, administrative buildings, the Changbai Mountain Academy of Sciences, the Changbai Mountain Museum, the Days Hotel Landscape Resort, the architectural complexes at the gates of the West Slope and the South Slope, and the transit center at the West Slope. An Exhibition Center, hospitals, and stations are under construction. The nature reserve has been made in to a huge construction site. About 1.2 billion RMB of the total investment of 1.68 billion RMB has come from national bonds and loans, resulting in an annual interest of 70 million RMB and amounting to two-fifths of the annual income brought in by tourism. organizational transformations at nature reserves 231

B. Investment Projects and the Rise of a Tourist Destination Comparable to Yalong Bay Resort in Sanya, Hainan Province Investing government finances into the construction of infrastructure at an early stage and then attracting investment from the outside to boost economic development will surely lead to economic development of ecological reserves such as Changbai Mountain. It is not difficult to see this change using the investment project plans released by the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee. The Committee raised 200 million RMB by selling the land where the original Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve Administrative Bureau used to stand to the Hong Kong Magnolia Group (香港紫玉集团) to build holiday resorts; Changbai Mountain International Resort Hotel brought in investments of 100 million RMB; the tourism development project in Yuanchi (园池), 120 million RMB; the Holi- day Hotel of Changbai Mountain Forest, 50 million RMB; the golf course in the Changbai Mountain Forest, 250 million RMB; the Shen- hua Sports and Recreation Center, 400 million RMB; the Wolong International Business Center, 1.3 billion RMB; and finally, the Hep- ing Yingzi International Holiday Resort, which covers an area of 10 square kilometers, brought in investments of 20 billion RMB. According to the comprehensive plans made by the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee, the town of Erdao (二道镇) in Chibei District will be built into “a great work of ecological art” called Baihe Town (白溪小镇); the Forest Bureau of the Songjiang River (松江河) in Chixi District will be moved out of the Baixi Forest Farm, which will become the site for the town Baixi (白溪小镇)—an international, European style tourist town; Chinan District will become the site for the town Manjiang (漫江小镇), with hot springs, shopping malls, and new highways, railroad tracks, and airports connecting it to all major cities. According to the promotional materials, “A tourist attraction comparable to Yalong Bay in Hainan Province is rising in Northeastern China.”

C. Road Construction and Upgrades The Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee has launched a road construction project to facilitate tourism development, including seven major projects: a highway around Changbai Mountain; a highway between Chibei and Songjiang River; a highway between the West 232 shen xiaohui

Gate and Chinan; a highway between Chibei and Yuanchi; a highway from Chixi to Wolong (卧龙) and then to the West Gate; a highway from Chinan to Wangtian’e (望天鹅) and then to Shiwudaogou (十五道沟); and overall “upgrades of the existing road surface that has hardened.” At present, about 350 kilometers of road have been built in the Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve, which include 1,999 km of secondary road with a cement surface and 30 kilometers of newly built highway. The other roads consist of 75 kilometers of third-rate gravel roads and 40 kilometers of dirt roads. In nature reserves, dirt roads and gravel roads are considered eco-roads, while hard-surface and high- grade roads are not conducive to the protection of wild animals. After participating in a research study of the road ecology at the Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve, the author found four major problems:

1. The surge in both road mileage and road networks has led to fragmentation of animal habitats. The four main roads that cut across the preserve have divided the Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve into five large parts and a number of small parts, which has greatly reduced the connectivity between the animal habits. This has resulted in genetic isolation between large wild animal groups and has caused excessive inbreeding. 2. The expansion of roads has led to a growth in traffic flow. The upgrading of roads has increased traffic speeds, which has resulted in a large number of amphibians being crushed, seriously restricting the number of amphibian species in the preserve. This has affected both the balance and the stability of the ecosystem. 3. The convenient road transportation has facilitated people’s access to the nature reserve to engage in various activities. Currently, the Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve has 113 criss-crossing entrance roads. At present, there is virtually no area at the Changbai Moun- tain Nature Reserve untouched by humans.

Two central district highways have completely cut off the organic connection between the forests in the nature reserve and forests belonging to other forestry bureaus. Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve has become ecologically isolated. organizational transformations at nature reserves 233

D. Environmentally Unfriendly “Green Projects” The Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee claimed that in the past three years it carried out ﬁfty-six ecological conservation projects, with a total investment of 1.9 billion RMB (others says the funds concerned with the conservation efforts only reach 710 million RMB). Conservation on this scale is unprecedented. But upon careful analysis, how much of this large amount of money has been employed toward effective protection, how much has been wasted, and how much has produced a negative effect? These are questions that no one can speak to clearly. The following are three examples of environmentally unfriendly “green projects.” These projects not only lacked the involvement of ecologists and biologists, but also went ahead without an environmental impact assessment.

1. Plank Roadways in Scenic Spots Plank roadways were built above the ground in order to protect the vegetation, but due to the shade cast by the roadway coupled with construction induced damage, the original vegetation has mostly died. Building plank roadways in the hot spring area is not only detrimental to the landscape, but can also severely endanger a national second- grade protected plant—the hot spring adder’s tongue. Building plank roadways in the “underground forest” has caused the division of the last two remaining groups of red deer, thus decreasing the wealth of their gene pool. On the northern slope of Changbai Mountain, the excessive number of wood plank roadways is an unnecessary waste of timber.

2. “Comprehensive Management” of River Segments Torrents are the original natural characteristic of rivers in Changbai Mountain. However, the Changbai Mountain Administrative Com- mittee has used bulldozers from the top of the Erdaobai River (二道白河), ﬂattening and transforming it or building in “water steps,” thus changing the torrents into slow streams. This has destroyed the river landscape and river ecology in the nature reserve.

3. The Xiaotianchi Lake Replenishment Project The Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee adopted two other ill-advised measures. For one, they pumped spring water from the Erdaobai River, which is rich in hydrogen sulﬁde, into the Xiaotianchi 234 shen xiaohui

Lake (小天池), thus changing the physical properties and chemical composition of the water. This has moved a national second-grade protected animal, the Siberian salamander, to the brink of extinction. Secondly, they dug a ditch to divert water from the upper reaches of Xiaonichi (小泥池) into Xiaotianchi, which has led to weed growth in the Xiaonichi marshes, thereby causing an ecological crisis for the only high-altitude peat marsh with research accessibility in northeast China.

E. Senseless Repetitious Tourism Development Plans In order to make the nature reserve “one of the top world-class tourist spots,” the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee planned forty-nine scenic spots. Many scenic spots extend deep into core areas and buffer zones where tourism is strictly forbidden by laws and regulations. The short-term and mid-term tourism development plans were quite ambitious. From 2010 to 2012, the committee aimed to become a leader in northeast tourism. From 2013 to 2015, they plan to be known as “the vacation paradise of the north,” and people would be able to say “in the south there is Yalong Bay, in the north there is Changbai Mountain.” From 2016 to 2020, the committee wants to declare itself “the Alps of the East.” Besides achieving these objectives, the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee has also planned to build eleven five-star hotels, fifteen to twenty spa resorts, five ski resorts, and three golf clubs. In order to build up a brand name image that can boast, “In the south there is Yalong Bay, in the north there is Changbai Mountain,” the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee has invested more than 70 million RMB in advertisement and promotion. But the problem is that Changbai Mountain and the Yalong Bay cannot be compared. Yalong Bay is a coastal tourist and leisure resort, while Changbai Mountain is a state-level forest and wildlife protection zone. As for “making Changbai Mountain the Alps of the east,” the challenges are even greater and the current tourism development plans from Changbai Mountain are not only completely different from those of the Alps, but it could even be said that they are self-defeating. Tour- ism development in the Alps was not accomplished overnight, but required over a hundred years of development. The Alps do not rely on a large amount of investment from the government and external funds. Instead, there are fascinating tourist towns that are developed organizational transformations at nature reserves 235 freely by community residents. This has not only brought wealth to the common people but also retained the town’s historical heritage and traditional cultures, including architecture, customs, festivals, food, clothing and craftsmanship. The development model of excessive logging, demolition, and construction, as well as the relocation of so many native people can never achieve the same effect. Tourism in the Alps is eco-tourism in its original sense, with simple infrastructure, moderate scale, and minimum impact on the environment and landscape. Many roads in the area are well concealed or just use gravel, forfeiting luxury and extravagance. The tourists mainly drive cars or walk to travel, promoting a higher awareness and appreciation of nature. This is completely different from the tourism model of rushing passengers through rapid “conveyor belts” from one scenic spot to another. A tourist journey that only has target spots and no in-between experiences is a low-grade tourism style that is fundamentally disconnected from eco-tourism. In fact, we do not have to learn from the Alps that are so far away. Just by comparing with our neighbor, Mt. Fuji, the ills underlying the development of Changbai Mountain become obvious. We built roads to the top of the mountain, while the roads on Mt. Fuji only reach Wuhemu, halfway up the mountain and 2,400 meters above sea level. This has left more than 1700 meters without any cable cars or “sky elevators.” Be they rich or poor, all tourists have to climb the mountain by themselves. Where does the difference lie? Some people in China hold a value system that prefers enjoying mountains and nature from a consumerist mindset and spending more money, as opposed to showing respect to the mountains and nature. For the nature reserves, “What do we want to do?” and “What will we do?” is less important; instead, we must ask more questions like “What should we not do?” and “What can we not do?”

III. How Will the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee Keep its Promise of “Protection First”

In 2009, the new party leader of the Changbai Mountain Administra- tive Committee, Xu Han (徐晗), took office. In view of the increasingly prominent conflict between ecological protection and construction in the rapid development of Changbai Mountain, Xu Han said that the protection of the original ecosystem in Changbai Mountain should 236 shen xiaohui be seen as the primary task and a basic prerequisite for the development of the mountain. He further added that despite temptations of large profits, the task of protection must not be ignored, and even the smallest ecological system should not be destroyed. As a government official, such statements indicate a high level of awareness. However, the implementation of the “Protection First” promise depends mostly on whether every project incorporates proper attitudes and standards, and whether the concrete measures adopted are appropriate or not.

A. Is the Purpose of Establishing Nature Reserves to Protect First and Develop Later? A few years ago, the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee invited “well-known experts of development strategy at home and abroad” and “tailor-made the future development direction for Chang- bai Mountain.” These experts proposed an “advanced concept” which is “protect ﬁrst and develop later.” Is this concept right or wrong? The following questions should be asked in order to fully answer this question.

1. In Accordance with Relevant Laws and Regulations, is “Development” Allowed in Nature Reserves? In all laws and regulations concerned with nature reserves, we read words like “reasonable use,” but no word like “development.” For example, the People’s Congress of Jilin Province promulgated the “Jilin Changbai Mountain National Nature Reserve Regulations,” which stipulate that “in nature preserves, scientific research is conducted to explore the rational use of natural resources.” “Exploring the rational use of natural resources” is a scientific experiment that belongs to the category of scientific research, while “development” belongs to the economic category. There is an obvious difference between the two. Nature reserves only allow non-destructive “reasonable use” in the experimental area. Development is strictly prohibited.

2. Is the Protection and Management of Nature Reserves in the Early Period Designed for Later Economic Development? “Protect ﬁrst and develop later” is essentially “protection for development.” “Protection ﬁrst” is the means, “develop later” is the purpose. Protection is to serve development. This matter concerns the purpose of the establishment of nature reserves. Nature conservation is organizational transformations at nature reserves 237 for mankind’s future development (development not only of the economy, but also of social progress and enhancement of human spiritual morality), not for short-term economic development. Conservation is a long-term strategy, not an interim step. Nature preserves are the common wealth shared by the country and its people. They are not assets that belong to a few interest groups. Therefore, in nature preserves, conservation is always the priority. It is not a means, but the primary goal. Any other use should be subordinated to conservation, because it is the main principle.

3. Is the Notion “Conservation for Conservation’s Sake” Right or Wrong? With highly-developed intelligence and moral sense, human beings are gradually recognizing that as part of the links of a large biological chain, all living creatures on this planet have a right to live, deserving our respect and care. Furthermore, as stewards of the earth, humankind is responsible for the safety of all species because the protection of nature for human interests is closely related to and consistent with safeguarding the interests of the entire life community on Earth.

B. On Keeping the Promise to “Protect First”

1. There is a great discrepancy between the objectives of the Chang- bai Mountain Administrative Committee and those of the Chang- bai Mountain Nature Reserve. If the administrative functions of the reserve are distributed to the administrative committee, a new conﬂict of disharmony between preservation and tourism arises. Therefore, to clearly separate the conservation area from the economic development area, the conservation administrative bureau should be subordinate to the administrative committee. 2. The Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee should bear in mind that the area under their charge covers the whole “greater Changbai Mountain.” The precinct includes at least four counties, Fusong (抚松), Antu (安图), Helong (和龙), and Changbai. These can serve both as a stimulus for the administrative committee to transform the travel-oriented economy to a multilevel model of a green economy with a peripheral conservation belt for the Chang- bai Mountain Nature Reserve. 3. The functioning area of the reserve needs to be adjusted. It should be expanded so as to remedy the defect of a core area of broad-leaf 238 shen xiaohui

Korean pine forest, which is smaller than normal due to misdeeds by officials in the early arrangement period. In order to secure the integrity of the Wangtian’e Volcano, the Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve should include Laoling (老岭) and Shiwudaogong (十五道沟). 4. All the “high level” and “high starting point” plans proposed by the administrative committee should be based on ecological principles and place ecological protection as the first priority. When basing plans on the development of other scenic spots and economic development districts, the new area will still be below the level of the original. Therefore, it is preferable for experts of other fields, under the leadership of ecological experts, to revise every plan and make ecology a new and enduring standard. 5. Dirt and sand-gravel roads are the ecological roads most suitable to nature reserves, and therefore, they should be preserved as much as possible. Wooden plank roadways, hard surface roads, and highways should be modified according to ecological principles, so as not to interfere with the movement and migration of the wildlife. 6. China’s Forest Law (森林法) strongly prohibits felling trees in order to build villas. However, there are many cases where the law is not followed. Therefore, organizations, such as the forestry department, the public security department, department of supervision, law-enforcement, and the inspection corps of land resources, are asked to unite to look into the issue. Punishment should be meted out not only to the project manager, who is often not the primary decision maker. The results of an investigation and the handling of a case should be made public in a timely fashion. 7. In the summer of 2007, the Changbai Mountain Administrative Council invited Ma Jineng (马继能), director of the ASEAN Cen- tre for Biodiversity, to evaluate Changbai Mountain as a potential world natural heritage site. Ma suggested that as mountains on the border of both China and North Korea, Changbai Mountain should be proposed as a candidate property for the world natural heritage site by the two countries. Ma said the materials and papers on the Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve are not enough to be convincing and lack scientific value. While Ma’s suggestion to apply with North Korea is remembered, his criticism of the scientific materials is often forgotten. The reserve should promote background investigations and carry environmental monitoring and biological conservation research. Furthermore, research staff should be encouraged organizational transformations at nature reserves 239

to tell the truth, for only when the staff feels comfortable to express their own opinions can they offer convincing evidence for the government to make a decision.

IV. Where are China’s Nature Reserves Heading?

The purpose of planning and establishing nature reserves is to maintain the only remaining land that has not been polluted by humankind, the only remaining wilderness that humans have not set upon, the only haven for wildlife, the only remaining gene pool for the wild species, a spiritual home for human beings, and a hope for future development. Nature reserves are the primary battleground of protection for biodiversity and the vital artery of ecological security. By the end of 2007, there were 2,531 nature reserves in China, covering an area of 157,880,000 hectares, among which 303, about 93,656,000 hectares, met national standards. The statistics above show the achievements made by China in establishing nature reserves. In spite of this we should also recognize predicaments and crises confronting some major nature reserves in terms of tourism development, the mining of mineral resources, and hydropower development.

A. Current Major Problems and Resulting Circumstances in Nature Reserves in China

1. The tendency for administration-oriented control to cause over- prioritization of the economy. One manifestation is when an entire administrative system is replaced with a new overall plan so that the reserve can circumvent legal “obstacles” and policies, gradually transforming into an economic development zone. Another manifestation is when the function of the nature reserve is changed, the nature reserve plan is changed to pave the way for economic development and to promote local GDP growth. 2. Ecological deterioration mainly caused by the government. Seven years of planting wind-breaking trees, six years of Korean pine seed production, and the current tourism development in the Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve were all directed by the government and categorized as government behavior. Compared with the individual 240 shen xiaohui

behavior of illegal felling and hunting in the reserve, the consequences of government actions were far more destructive. How- ever, even now the law can only regulate the behavior of ordinary citizens and fails to regulate the government. Government mistakes have not been investigated, and ofﬁcials have not been punished in cases of illegal administration. 3. External funds are used in development, while local inhabitants are marginalized. One of the major principles of the international Man and Biosphere Program is that the existence of a nature reserve should be conducive to the economic development of the local community so as to bring more inhabitants into the natural preservation program. However, if the tourism resources are mainly controlled by government backed tourism companies and proﬁts gained from tourism are primarily earned by the tourism companies and outside investors, the inclusion ideal is impossible to realize. The government monopoly and a tourism development based on external investments will slow down and have a negative effect on the economic development and the living standard of the local inhabitants. Large-scale construction tends to ruin the cultural and traditional heritage site of the nation, meanwhile destroying the uniqueness and integrity of the natural scenery and ecology.

B. Strengthening Macro-level Control of Nature Reserves China’s nature reserves are now at a crossroads. Some nature reserves that have been neglected are now in the full swing of economic development. A focus on nature and ecology is being replaced by a focus on the economy, industrialization, commercialization, and an increase in artiﬁcial substitutions, which is an extremely dangerous tendency. Therefore, some suggestions are listed below:

1. A powerful and efﬁcient law regarding nature reserves (or natural heritage sites) should come into force as soon as possible. Due to lack of enforcement, the two regulatory policies on nature reserves in China—Regulations on Nature Reserves (中华人民共和国自然保护区条例) and Methods for Managing Forest and Wildlife Reserves (森林和野生动物类型自然保护区管理办法)—are becoming increasingly incapable of meeting modern day requirements. With increased energy behind economic development and lack of power for nature preservation, the current situation is in urgent need of a law with organizational transformations at nature reserves 241

the highest legal authority and force to regulate the behaviors of the government and companies and to prohibit all development activities that are against the agreed upon functions of the reserve. 2. National nature reserves should adopt a strengthened national administrative system. Nowadays the territorial jurisdiction adopted by nature reserves tends to cater to the aims of local economic development, whereas the most preferable structure of a reserve is one with self-governed personnel and financial systems so that all reserves can be planned and operated under the same regulations. Since national-grade nature reserves play an important role in environmental preservation, a national-grade administrative system should be adopted. 3. Local officials’ political performance should be assessed according to the ecological index of the nature reserve. For the sake of the ecological security of the nation and the sustainable development of the social economy, in essential ecological areas such as Changbai Mountain the major criterion for judging the achievement of an official should no longer be based on GDP but instead on the results of ecological preservation, recovery, and improvement efforts. The central government should grant preferential treatment to ecological zones in areas such as policy, taxes, investment regulations, and so on. 4. The administration-oriented management system of certain nature reserves cannot be adopted everywhere. Kanas Nature Reserve (哈纳斯自然保护区) and Narat Nature Reserve (那拉提自然保护区) in Xinjiang were put under the respective supervision of the provincial government and the provincial tourism administration. During a series of revisions of subdivisions and an increase in authority of the local government, the main purpose and central characteristics of Jinggangshan Nature Reserve (江西井冈山自然保护区) in Jiangxi Province underwent serious changes. Similar cases have taken place in various forms in other provinces, regions, and cities. However, the administration-oriented management system of certain nature reserves cannot be adopted everywhere. If other places imitate the model without a second thought and turn a nature reserve into a “reservation and development area,” the nature reserves in China will face catastrophe. In spite of this, the author believes we should give government institutions such as the Changbai Mountain Administrative Committee another chance. We hope that under the leadership of the current administrative 242 shen xiaohui

panel they can ﬁnd a way to properly balance preservation and development. 5. The state should strengthen supervision of nature reserves across China. It is suggested that an investigation group should make a comprehensive assessment of the current situation and the predicted future trends of national-grade nature reserves so as to promote “a working mechanism with the government as the director, the society as the supervisor, and the public as the participants” in China’s nature reserves and lead them onto a track of healthy development. The members of the group should consist of government ofﬁcials, experts, scholars, and environmental protection NGOs, and be under the leadership of related departments, committees, and institutions directly under the State Council.1

1 From a speech made by Vice-premier Zeng Penyan at the 50th anniversary of the China Nature Reserve. CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS: INCORPORATING GOVERNMENT-LED AND COMMUNITY-BASED INITIATIVES

Li Shengzhi, He Xin, Feng Jie, and Mao Chending

Conservation agreements are an emerging method of motivating social sectors for the protection of public property. They can be widely utilized by government sectors as a policy instrument. Through a mutual agreement between the conservation authority and the conservation implementer concerning obligations, rights, and assessment methods, the implementer receives compensation and development opportuni- ties based upon performance of conservation duties. This model has been practiced in western parts of China (Qinghai, Sichuan, etc.) and has been effective in promoting community participation and conservation outcomes. It has also proven to be a viable experimental approach to compensation using the payment for ecological services (PES) mechanism.

I. General Overview of Conservation Agreements

A conservation agreement is an emerging method which utilizes social sectors to protect public property. It is also a new type of policy instrument, the purpose of which is to balance the protection of natural resources and economic development. It is an institutional and con- tractual relationship established on the basis of mutual agreement by government sectors and professional protection institutions, including non-governmental organizations such as research institutes, private companies, and communities. Under a conservation agreement, government sectors and other investors reach a consensus on protection of the natural environment and a means for providing stable compensation for the conservation implementers and communities. Thus, a conservation agreement can be viewed as a type of ecological compensation provided by a third party for the owners of the natural resources (generally the local government and communities) for the purpose of environmental protection. 244 li shengzhi, he xin, feng jie, and mao chending

Some ecologists hold that a conservation agreement is a protection model using direct compensation. It surpasses other popular international protection projects in terms of the efficiency of capital utilization and excellence in coping with sophisticated ownership relationships and organizational patterns. Conservation agreements are regarded by many environmentalists as supplemental to the protection modes of nature reserves and national parks. It is relatively cheaper to protect the resources of habitats and wildlife through direct compensation because of poor economic conditions in these areas. For instance, in Costa Rica, a middle-income country, local residents get thirty-five dollars annually for the protection of the forest per hectare. Given the fact that many residents are willing to sign the protection contract, thirty-five dollars per hectare per year is sufficient to cover the protection cost. In Kenya, the World Wide Fund for Nature offers an annual compensation of four dollars per acre through leaseholds to protect migration channels of wild animals. Conservation agreements have great developmental potentials because they can strengthen the protection of vast areas of biodiversity. Another reason is that they reduce the financial and managerial burden on the government. So far, they have been extensively applied in the protection of global land and oceanic ecosystems from the tropical rainforests of the Amazon to rare fish and coral species of the South Pacific Ocean.

II. The Implementation of Conservation Agreements in China

As the standard protection system of the country, nature reserves have been implemented in China for decades. Despite their remarkable success, some problems have surfaced. For instance, the system has a rigid protection mechanism, dependent upon the financial investment of the state without much participation from social sectors. This can result in a shortage of financial investments. While some significant areas are not covered in nature reserves, many established protection areas lack efficiency in conservation. Moreover, the concepts of protection and managerial levels are not adapted to national conditions. There also exist legal delays, an absence of ownership, and chaotic resource management. Traditional rights and the desire for environmental protection of the community are often without channels. Therefore, the priority at present is how to establish a long-term comprehensive protection mechanism. conservation agreements 245

Researchers on the protection of biodiversity have introduced from abroad the concept of a conservation agreement and its application methods according to the country s present condition of natural resources and ownership characteristics. Some environmental protection organizations, such as Conservation International, Beijing Shan Shui Conservation Center, and the Global Environmental Institute, have launched pilot programs in provinces and regions in western China, including Sichuan, Qinghai, Yunnan, and Tibet. In China, conservation agreements have two meanings. The first is the enrichment of protection ownership and the second is the establishment of a motivational system. The enrichment of protection ownership means endowing the implementers with land and subsidiary resource protection rights, which are similar to operational rights, and then establishing the protection as rights and obligations through contracts. The implementers refer to the social sectors (local communities, non-governmental organizations, and even enterprises) which have no property and management rights, but are willing to make capital, human, and time investments in the protection. Meanwhile, the establishment of a motivational system means establishing the responsibilities and rights of both sides through a contract, provide corresponding compensation according to results, and supporting the implementers development needs. This active motivational system is established to ensure the continuity of protection. In terms of protection ownership, the state is the owner of the natural resources in China, while government sectors such as the State For- estry Administrative Bureau exert management power. Environmental protection, in this sense, is solely dependent upon government investment. This cannot assure long-term protection in many areas, especially in western China. Residents there have long relied upon their local natural resources to develop and establish management systems of their own. However, the strong dependence upon natural resources of the local residents and community members has also brought threats to the protection of biodiversity. In the process of industrialization and urbanization brought about by unprecedented economic development, however, damage to the local environment caused by powerful outside economic developers is far stronger than that caused by the local residents style of living. Deep valleys and high mountains featuring great biodiversity are under threat due to the establishment of roads, reservoirs, dams, mining, ill-managed tourism development, and the excessive collection and trade of wildlife spurred by consumers and medicine companies from the outside. Under this development trend, 246 li shengzhi, he xin, feng jie, and mao chending biodiversity protection and the management of sustainable resources has become marginalized. At the same time, remote rural areas with high biodiversity are also marginalized and experience development problems. Due to decentralization of household management in the western areas of China, and the migration of the young from local communities to urban areas, the effect of community organization, which traditionally plays a large part in environmental protection, is decreasing, even disappearing. The communities at present are usually weak and ineffective in resisting outside developers and illegal activities, such as illegal mine exploration, hunting, and collection of wildlife. Conservation agreements in other countries mainly employ economic compensation as an incentive. In China, the motivation and compensation patterns for implementers have been enriched. Com- munity members are the most active implementers of environmental protection because they benefit most from it. Therefore, the community has the will and the ability to carry out their promise of environmental protection. Through a contract, the conservation agreement endows implementers with the right of management of their local natural resources. This has become a significant incentive for local communities in accordance with the actual conditions of the country. Since 2006, the Forestry Bureaus of Qinghai and Sichuan, Conser- vation International China Program, and Beijing Shan Shui Conserva- tion Center have made joint efforts to launch seventeen conservation agreement projects in the western provinces of China. These projects are mainly carried out at Qinghai Lake (青海湖), the Sanjiangyuan region (三江源区) of Qinghai, Min Mountain (岷山) in Sichuan, the Qionglai Mountains (邛崃山) in Sichuan, and the Ganzi Temperate Forests (甘孜) of Gansu. Over one million dollars have been collected for projects protecting 730,000 hectares of land and drainage areas. Parts of these programs were integrated into the disaster relief work of the Wenchuan earthquake, which affected 70% of panda habitats. With the coordination of the Forestry Bureau of Sichuan Province, the Conservation Agreement Program was carried out together with the earthquake relief work in Zhongba Village (中坝村 of Pengzhou City (彭州) near Baishuihe Nature Reserve (白水河自然保护区), Mashan Village (马山村) of Li County (理县) near Miyaluo Nature Reserve (米亚罗保护区) in Sichuan Province, and Liziba Village (李子坝村) of Wen County (文县) near Baishuijiang Nature Reserve (白水江自 conservation agreements 247

然保护区) in Gansu Province. Apart from providing disaster stricken communities with basic necessities, the program encouraged the communities to engage in the monitoring of the natural resources and supervision of secondary disasters in these areas.

A Case Study of the Conservation Agreement Program of Cuochi Located in the hinterland of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, Sanji- angyuan National Nature Reserve has nurtured the largest number of rivers on the Eurasian continent. It is the source of the Yangtze River, Yellow River, and Lancang River (澜沧江), and at the same time the home to many rare wild animals like Tibetan antelope, wild yaks, Tibetan donkeys, and snow leopards. The reserve covers an area of 152,300 square kilometers, and Cuochi Village (措池村) is situated at the source of the Yangtze River which is 4,600 meters above sea level. During the feasibility survey of the Conservation Agreement Pro- gram, the local residents claimed that what they wanted most was the right to protect the region rather than money. They did not want to witness killing wild animals and the destruction of habitats by people from the outside. Supported by Conservation International (CI), the Administrative Bureau of Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve signed a conservation agreement with Cuochi Village in September 2006, authorizing the latter to monitor and patrol the village with an area of 2,440 square kilometers. The Cuochi patrol group, called the Wild Yak Water Association, stopped invasions by poachers four times in two years. After grasping the patterns of migration and activity of wild animals, the villagers voluntarily marked out ﬁve wild animal protection communities, thirteen water source protection sites, three wild animal migration routes, three areas temporarily prohibiting grazing during the animals reproduc- tive and migratory seasons, and three areas permanently prohibiting grazing. Furthermore, the villagers launched six programs to monitor climate change in Cuochi. The success of the Cuochi Program has recently won the recognition of the Administrative Bureau of the Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve. The experience of the program will be widely promoted in the Sanjiangyuan area. 248 li shengzhi, he xin, feng jie, and mao chending

III. The Role of the Conservation Agreement Program in the Implementation of Conservation in China

A. Encouraging Communities to Become the Implementers of Conservation As an important criterion for constructing a “harmonious society,” the central government has proposed improvement of self-management skills and self-development skills of rural communities. This is also of vital importance for setting up a virtuous long term protection mechanism for biodiversity in the western regions of China. It is hoped that by conservation agreement programs, communities in the western regions can engage in conservation and grow to be an important element in the conservation service of the government.

B. Exploring Various Ways of Motivation and Compensation Conservation agreements provide implementers with the right to protect and regulate local natural resources. The western region of China which boasts rich biodiversity is the homeland of minority ethnic groups, whose community construction is comparatively underdeveloped despite the traditional cultures they possess. So, in constructing a model that combines inspiration and compensation, besides economic compensation, the needs of the community should be taken into consideration and should include capacity building, traditional cultural activities, and public goods such as education, medical treatment, and health. In this way, the community can effectively exercise their rights and actively engage in conservation.

C. Involving Social Sectors in Conservation to Make up for Insufficient Funds Ecological investment in China is critically low. Recently the country has increased its investments and a total of 600 million RMB (250 million RMB from the central budget and 350 million RMB from local finances) has been put into the implementation of the “Project of Wild- life Conservation and Nature Reserve Construction” and the construction of the “Special Fund for the Capacity Building of National Nature Reserves.” But the increase in investment lags far behind the speed of the construction of nature reserves. Each national nature reserve only receives 1 million RMB out of the 250 million RMB central budget, which means that the daily administrative fund per person is limited conservation agreements 249 to less than 10,000 RMB per year. As a result, the salary of the staff is low, which makes it impossible to launch daily patrols and conduct scientific research activities. One reason for the lack of ecological funding is the limitations in types of investment modes, the over-dependence on national finances, and the inadequacy of social sector involvement. The impetus for the conservation agreement program mainly comes from social sectors, including enterprises, individuals, and NGOs. Therefore, conservation agreement mechanisms that attract financial investment into ecological conservation could make up for the insufficiency of national finances in ecological conservation.

D. Complement to the Traditional Conservation Model The traditional model for almost all countries in the world to protect biodiversity is to establish a nature reserve or a national park, which can effectively prevent the loss of biodiversity. However, conservation and exploitation have often been in conﬂict. The model that excludes the engagement of the local communities in conservation projects is gradually losing inﬂuence. The conservation agreement program, as a model that incorporates conservation and development, involves the participation of communities, and ensures the sustainable utilization of resources to the largest extent, is an effective complement to the traditional approach.

E. Advancing the Application and Exploration of Conservation Agreements Currently, the application of conservation agreements faces limitations. Firstly, the program poses high requirements for implementers and administrators, such as requirements for a high organizing capacity, a good conservation tradition in the community, and outstanding management competence of the local conservation department. Secondly, according to the agreement, the right of protection is bestowed to the party that plans the conservation. The deﬁnition is legally ambiguous, which makes the protection rights blurry. Thirdly, much technological support is needed in the process of operation, such as the methods and criteria to measure conservation achievements, to specify the standard of compensation, and to launch monitoring and assessment. As one of the organizations promoting conservation agreement projects in China, Beijing Shan Shui Conservation Center will work together with its partners to develop an “operation manual” for 250 li shengzhi, he xin, feng jie, and mao chending conservation agreements, drawing on existing experience of carrying out conservation projects. The organization also seeks to work with interested parties across China to carry out legal studies for models of conservation agreement programs, with a view to establishing legislation and creating legal safeguards for the promotion of conservation agreements. BIODIVERSITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Lv Zhi

This paper discusses the negative impacts of climate change on biodiversity in China. Ecosystem protection is a fundamental measure for human beings to eliminate these negative effects and adapt to climate change. Adapting to climate change should be a priority for China. The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, the mountainous region in southwestern China and water ecosystems such as rivers, lakes, and wetlands in northwestern and southwestern China should be turned into priority protection zones in adaptation to the climate change.

I. Global Warming: Temperature Rise should be Limited to Less Than 2 °C

The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference aroused a heated discussion about climate change at the end of 2009. The conference failed to produce a legally binding intergovernmental pact. However, the conference attracted widespread attention to climate change and arrived at a consensus that more action should be taken. It is an inarguable fact that the world is warming up. The main cause is greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel energy consumed by human industrial activities. According to the fourth assessment report by the United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007, the earth’s surface temperature rose by 0.74 °C on average in the past hundred years, 1906 to 2005, with an increase of 0.65 °C from 1956 to 2005. Among the twelve warmest years, eleven years were in the period from 1995 to 2006. Sea level rose by about 0.17 meters in the twentieth century with an increase of 1.8 millimeters per year between 1961 and 2003 and 3.1 millimeters per year between 1993 and 2003. Snow accumulation in many parts of the world is reducing, especially in spring and summer seasons. Snow accumulation in the northern hemisphere has been reducing month by month over the past four decades (except in November and December), especially in the 1980s. 252 lv zhi

Right now the consequences of global warming are impossible to predict, because its complexity and uncertainty are far beyond our understanding. Climate change has exerted its effects globally: deser- tiﬁcation is worsening, the precipitation pattern is changing, sea level is rising, and the frequency of severe weather is increasing. All of these will have great impact on the living environment and the ecosystem for human beings and other life forms. According to the fourth assessment report of the IPCC, if the temperature rises by 2 °C to 3 °C in the future (compared with the temperature before the Industrial Revo- lution), the structure and function of 25% to 40% of present ecosystems will be changed dramatically. Thus, a rise of 2 °C is the tipping point for the global ecosystem. An average rise of 2 °C may mean the loss of homeland for those who live on small islands in the Paciﬁc Ocean, while a temperature rise of 3 °C (or more) may mean an “end of the world” disaster for some African countries. Thus, state heads attending the G8 Summit in Italy on July 8, 2008 issued a declaration which set a long-term goal on controlling global warming. That is, by 2050 green-house gas emissions should be reduced by at least 50% (at least 80% for developed countries) compared with that of 1990. The purpose is to guarantee that global temperature rise should be strictly limited to no more than 2 °C compared with the Pre-Industrial Revolution period. However, the fact that the Copenhagen Conference did not deliver an agreement informs us that it will be hard to control the temperature rise to less than 2 °C, as not all countries are equally willing to make commitments. Facing a changed environment, we must get ready to adapt to climate change and try to reduce or even eliminate the negative effects brought by it.

II. Effects of Climate Change on China

In the past one hundred years, climate in China changed at the same pace as the global climate change. China is one of the countries that suffer a lot from the consequences of climate change. On the whole, there have been several negative climate-related changes in China, such as an increase in severe weather, decrease in the stability of agricultural production, an obvious withdrawal of glaciers, a decrease in biodiversity, and serious problems with water resources. In the past ﬁfty years, the total amount of precipitation did not change much, but the precipitation pattern changed a lot. In the west, precipitation biodiversity in the context of climate change 253 increased by 15% to 50%. The southeast was frequently hit by ﬂoods, while the northeast suffered from droughts. Precipitation in southern China increased by about 5% to 10% while precipitation in northern and northeastern China decreased by about 10% to 30%. In addition, the operation of key projects faces more risks. The more developed coastal areas are confronted with threats of rising sea levels. In general, human health, living conditions, and transportation have all been affected by climate change.

III. Biodiversity Enabling Humans to Adapt to Climate Change

Biodiversity is the degree of variation in species, ecosystems, and genes. It is a fundamental component of a healthy ecosystem. The ecosystem can slow down and adapt to climate change. Ecosystems provide services to humans, including producing crops, oxygen, medicine, and material resources. Additionally, ecosystems provide cultural and spiritual enjoyment. All of these guarantee the survival of human beings. A complete, healthy, and diversified ecosystem can better stand and survive climate change. Therefore, by preserving a sound ecosystem, human beings can lessen the negative effects of climate change and attempt to adapt to it. In addition, all forest, grassland, and wetland ecosystems can absorb carbon dioxide. Expanding forest coverage to absorb more carbon dioxide is an effective way to reduce carbon dioxide and rebuild a carbon balance. In fact, 20% to 30% of the total global carbon discharge is caused by destruction of forests and the reduction of vegetation. That is why protection of biodiversity and ecosystems is so vital in the context of climate change. Climate change affects biodiversity to different extents. Most of its effects on biodiversity are negative. For example, the extinction of species and the loss of ecosystems are irreversible. Human activities can worsen the negative effects which will threaten human survival in turn. Research on the fragility of China’s ecosystems under climate change in the twenty-first century conducted by Wu Shaohong (绍洪) and others from the Chinese Academy of Sciences points out that future climate change in China will affect ecosystems negatively, and it will become worse as time goes by. Not only will the areas with vulnerable ecosystems be seriously affected, those areas with good ecosystems will also suffer. Severe weather will exert serious effects on the ecosystems, with the greatest damage to exposed bushes and wild steppes. Broad- leaf deciduous forests, grasslands with forests, and evergreen coniferous 254 lv zhi forests will also be affected. Not all the effects brought by climate change are negative. For example, the warming of climate may be beneficial to cold areas. But in the mid- and long-term climate change affects the ecosystems more in a negative way. Scholars in China have observed phenomena that may have something to do with climate change: some species have been found in regions more north than they used to be. For example, the fork-tailed sunbird has moved north from the Oriental Realm to the Palaearc- tic Realm. The Japanese white-eye bird used to live in places south of Shandong Province. But in recent years, they can also be seen in Beijing and even Yichun City (伊春都) in northeastern China. The grey crane used to spend the winter in southern China. Now they are present in the Yellow River Delta and the Wafangdian (瓦房店) area of Liaoning Province. The tropical and subtropical ghost ant (Tapinoma melanocephalum) now frequents the city of Kunming. The cricket frog (Rana limnocharis) has spread to the north while the dark- spotted frog (Rana nigromaculata) can be found in western Yunnan Province. Severe weather conditions have an even greater impact. For example, the loss of habitat due to continuous drought may directly lead to the extinction or partial extinction of some species located in certain geographical niches. In 1981, two species of ray-finned fish, Anabarilius macrolepis and Cyprinus yilongensis, died out because their only habitat, Yilong Lake (异龙湖) in Yunnan Province, dried up for twenty consecutive days. The sharp reduction of the Jankowski’s Bunting was a more complicated process. Originally, when the cuckoo bird, Cuculus canorus, made nests, they chose the oriental great-reed warbler living in wetlands as the host. But because of the drought in the north over the past decade, many reed wetlands have degenerated into shrub steppes. Thus, the number of oriental great-reed warblers decreased. The Cuculus canorus has had to occupy the nests of the Jankowski’s Bunting. This change lead to the dramatic decrease of the Jankowski’s Bunting. In the source region of the three rivers, Jinsha (金沙江), Lancang (澜沧江), and Nujiang (怒江), herdsmen found that the milking time of yaks has become shorter due to climate change. This has directly affected the survival rate of baby yaks as well as the livelihood of the herdsmen. Nevertheless, these scattered observations are not sufficient to reveal the impacts brought by climate change on our ecological security. The fourth assessment report of the IPCC did not include systematic data from China. The stark absence of long-term, systematic, in-depth field biodiversity in the context of climate change 255 studies of species and ecosystems, and research on the relationship between ecosystem function, climate, and other environmental factors as well as human activities, is a major bottleneck for China in making effective climatic adaptation plans. It is clear that China’s biodiversity is now facing a severe crisis that will be worsened by climate change. According to conservative estimates in China’s Biodiversity: A National Study (中国生物多样性国情研究报告) in 1996, China’s biodiversity was worth more than 4.2 trillion USD per year. But the overall biodiversity of China continues to dete- riorate like other countries in the world. In the past one to two hundred years, more than ten species of mammal have gone extinct, and over twenty species of animals are on the verge of extinction. In the past fifty years, population growth, overexploitation, abuse of natural resources and habitats, pollution, invasion of alien species, and other factors have been working together to worsen China’s ecosystems. In recent years, China has made great efforts in the conservation of biodiversity. China has established more than 2,500 nature reserves, occupying more than 15% of the total land area. China has implemented large-scale ecological protection and restoration projects, such as the protection of natural forests and returning farmland to forests. These projects are unprecedented in Chinese history, and can even be seen as a milestone throughout the world. They have produced positive effects for ecosystem protection. However, the degradation of natural ecosystems has not been reversed. Take the protection of giant pandas for example. This project consumes the most resources compared to others in China. There are more than 300 wild giant pandas in Pingwu County (平武县) in southwestern Sichuan, China’s largest base for giant pandas. In the past fifty years, four preserves were established which played a key role in the project. However, outside of these areas, giant panda habitats continued to decrease over the last twenty years. The main threats came from deforestation in the 1990’s and current road construction, hydroelectric power, other infrastructure construction projects, and tourism. According to assessments in the China Species Red List (中国物种红色名录), the ratios of China’s threatened species (including the critically endangered, endangered, and vulnerable) are: invertebrates 34.74%, vertebrates 35.69%, gymnosperms 69.91%, and angiosperms 86.68%. This exceeds the world average. Furthermore, ecosystem degradation, particularly the degradation of grasslands and wetlands, is severe. 256 lv zhi

Another main difﬁculty in formulating adaptation plans is that, for a long time in China the conservation and management of biodiversity was short of research and monitoring, and crude management methods were adopted. Despite the lack of data on species and ecosystems, as well as various inﬂuencing factors, several basic judgments on priority areas of climate change adaptation can be made. Such estimates are made based on analyses of future climate change in China, on the correla- tion of climate change impacts and the vulnerability of China’s ecological system, and on the characteristics of China’s biological diversity and ecosystem services. (Of course, the determination of priority areas should be supported by more accurate and comprehensive analyses.)

1. Overall, areas that will be seriously affected by climate change— northern and western China—overlap highly with areas that have fragile ecosystems. 2. The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is the highest priority area, because of: the impact of melting glaciers on water resources and grassland ecosystems; the unique nature of its biological diversity; the local herdsmen lifestyle; its major role as a water source to big Asian rivers in the survival and livelihood of billions of people downstream. 3. China’s Southwest Mountains are the world’s most biologically diverse temperate region. Their high-altitude area has an extreme risk of species extinction due to its vertical distribution of species in the high mountains and narrow canyons. 4. The rivers, lakes, wetlands, and other freshwater ecosystems in the upper reaches of rivers in north-western and south-western China have high ecological value. Thus, they are highly affected by climate change, especially by melting glaciers. Isolated by large mountains and canyons, species evolve fast with high vulnerability, therefore the area should also be prioritized in a climate change adaptation policy.

IV. Suggested Priority Actions and Policies to Adapt to Climate Change

Climate change is an issue that all people and all countries have to face and adapt to. It is urgent to establish a complete ecosystem protection based adaptation system for the sustainable development of China. biodiversity in the context of climate change 257

Regarding adaptation to climate change, we suggest the following priority actions and policies:

A. Understand Climate Change and Development Climate change is ultimately a development issue. In terms of adaptation to climate change and reducing the negative impacts of climate change, to reduce and eliminate the existing threats to biological diversity is the key. Goals to be achieved in the priority areas are: 1) Allow no biological species extinctions and 2) The value of the most important and valuable ecosystem functions should not decline.

B. Develop Quantifiable Goals and Targets and Complete Further Studies To improve the present crude mode of nature conservation and resources management, China needs to develop quantifiable goals and targets, and strengthen field studies, long-term monitoring, and investment in basic research and personnel training. In addition to observ- ing and studying the impacts of climate on species, ecosystems, and ecosystem service functions, it is also necessary to research the interaction among various factors such as climate (especially severe weather conditions), water, biodiversity, ecosystems, and human activities to provide grounds for decision-making and management.

C. Set Priority Actions Priority actions speciﬁcally include the following:

1. In terms of regional planning, the priority areas should be excluded from development and exploitation. According to the characteristics of each region, eco-friendly and explicit development goals should be set up, an ecologically-friendly industrial structure should be formed, development plans should be made, and the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects should be controlled. The Environmental Impact Assessment for Plans (规划环境影响评价条例) should be fully implemented, and unfavorable factors to adaptation should be eliminated. 2. The goal of “zero-extinction” for endangered species, ﬂagship species, and ecosystem indicator species should be established. The background and the status of species and ecosystems should be 258 lv zhi

comprehensively surveyed. Species protection plans should be made and implemented with joint investments from the state and civil society based on the full understanding of the status of species. 3. The establishment of an ecological compensation mechanism in climate adaptation priority areas deserves serious consideration. The national ecological compensation policy should prioritize the interests of the residents living in climate adaptation priority areas, in line with the objectives and plans of major functional zones. Apart from government transfer payments, the policy should provide incentives to paid ecosystem services under a market-oriented mechanism, in particular paid forest carbon sequestration (which can be used in combination with the emission reduction) and the use of paid water resources. This will enable the protectors and the local residents to benefit from ecosystem services. 4. The effectiveness of protected areas should be enhanced. The spa- tial connection between the protected areas should be strengthened while the distributional changes of species should be forecasted. The scope of protected areas should be adjusted, setting aside enough space for the movement of species. The central government should directly finance protected areas to guarantee their effectiveness. 5. Villagers should be encouraged to directly participate in, and even lead the protection work, while following their traditional culture. The government can sign agreements with villagers by using an eco-compensation mechanism, making explicit the protection inputs and outputs, as well as eco-efficiency goals. Community protection agreements have been implemented in the three river sources area and proved to be a cost-effective and sustainable conservation measure. 6. The plateau grassland ecosystem is one of the most climate change affected ecosystems. There is an urgent need to change the current crude mode of grassland management, to quantify management objectives, to combine modern science and traditional knowledge, and to improve resource management. 7. The population carrying capacity in climate vulnerable areas should be assessed, and the total number of people should be controlled, so as to avoid the effects of climate change and the vicious circle of population explosion, resource exploitation, and environmental destruction. 8. To strengthen research and monitoring, it is necessary to establish a system of dynamic monitoring, analysis and forecasting, and biodiversity in the context of climate change 259 decision support. Monitoring subjects include: ecosystems sensitive to changes, sensitive and key species, species causing important changes in the economy (bee industry, fisheries, pests, human epidemics, and so on), important ecosystem functions, impacts on species and ecosystems by climate and severe weather conditions as well as human activities, and the evaluation and changes of ecosystem functions.

CRAFTING A SUCCESSFUL VISION FOR WILD GIANT PANDA PROTECTION

Wang Hao, Sun Shan, Chen Ai, and Lv Zhi

China has made considerable progress protecting giant pandas over the past three decades. However, in giant panda habitats, the existing protection strategies are not sufﬁcient to ensure the survival and safety of wild giant pandas in the long run. Besides forest logging operations, the major challenges that have destroyed or fragmented wild giant panda habitats outside the reserves in the past decade are hydropower development, construction of transportation infrastructure, and increased tourism. These challenges unfortunately lead to further isolation and disappearances of the giant panda population. Considering the long-term survival of the wild giant pandas, it is essential that they have their own complete habitats. Therefore, China needs to implement more active methods to protect this endangered species. The giant panda is probably one of the most cared about wild species in the world. Though living only in China, it is a symbol of wildlife protection for the entire world. Both the World Wildlife Fund and the China Wildlife Conservation Association have taken its image as their logos. As a popular topic of the news, giant pandas have strong support from people in favor of protecting them. This article is dedicated to discussing the future of the giant panda and to crafting a successful vision for wild giant panda protection. The Peking University Center for Nature and Society (PUCNS) has described a vision for the bright future of wild giant pandas: “Twenty corridors will be built to connect the twenty-three separate giant panda habitats. About 1,700 square kilometers of key habitat will be restored. As a result, giant pandas’ living space will be expanded, and the protection of the area will be enhanced. By 2020, the number of wild giant pandas in China is likely to reach 2,800.” 262 wang hao, sun shan, chen ai, and lv zhi

I. Giant Panda Protection has Proven Effective

The protection of giant pandas has always been highly emphasized in China and has made great achievements. Since 1980, the Chinese government, research institutes, and protection organizations at home and abroad have cooperated in the research and protection of giant pandas. By 2008, three national surveys had been conducted about the animal. Sixty-three reserves had been established, with a total area of 32,000 square kilometers, covering most giant panda habitats. The third survey published in 2006 shows that the existing giant panda habitats and potential habitats cover a total area of 19,000 square kilometers, where at least 1,596 wild giant pandas live. Research on giant pandas has also been fruitful. Covering many aspects from molecular biology to behavior and ecology, Chinese and foreign researchers have studied giant pandas both in captivity and in the wild. This has made giant pandas one of the most thoroughly studied species in the world. Each year, several or even dozens of doctoral or master’s students choose the giant panda as their research subject. Achievements have also been made on giant pandas in captive breed- ing, with dozens of pandas born each year. This has put off people’s doubts about the reproduction of captive giant pandas. Instead, people have started to worry about limited space in the cages. The protection of giant pandas has been successful, but greater efforts should be made to ensure the long-term survival of giant pandas. The success of the wild giant panda protection is subject to connected and complete habitats.

II. Future Survival of Giant Pandas Calls for Complete Habitats

In 1998, Peking University Center for Nature and Society, formerly known as the Giant Panda Protection and Research Center of Peking University, started a systematic study on the status of wild giant pandas in China. With the support of China’s State Forestry Administration (the former Ministry of Forestry), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Conservation International (CI), and Shan Shui Conservation Center, PUCNS worked with forestry departments of provinces like Sichuan, Gansu, and Shaanxi, as well as dozens of reserves and research institutes, to collect information about the wild giant panda population and habitats. By probing into giant panda habitats covering tens of vision for wild giant panda protection 263 thousands of square kilometers, PUCNS has gained data over some dozen years, and has produced analytical results. From 2008 to 2009, supported by CI’s “Kung Fu Panda” project, PUCNS evaluated the survival of wild giant pandas. With the survey results and data collected, PUCNS estimated the status of giant pandas, as well as its future survival over the next few decades. The result of the assessment can be summed up in one sentence: the long-term survival of the wild giant pandas in China requires complete habitats, or else their survival will be extremely unlikely.

A. Existing Problems in Giant Panda Protection: Case Study in Pingwu County In the last twenty years, the progress Pingwu County (平武县) has made in forestry and wildlife conservation reﬂects the overall development of China. In Pingwu, the giant panda habitat has undergone two phases: degradation due to destruction, and then restoration as a result of conservation. Pingwu County, a county in Mianyang (绵阳市), Sichuan, is endowed with almost one-sixth of wild giant pandas in China, and 42% of giant panda habitats of the country. The four nature reserves, Wanglang (王朗), Xuebaoding (雪宝顶), Xiaohegou (小河沟), and Yujiashan (余家山), have a combined area of 786 square kilometers, accounting for 13% of the county’s total area, and covering nearly 40% of the giant panda habitat. Pingwu got its fame not only because it has the largest number of wild giant pandas in China and because it has one of the ﬁrst nature protection zones in China (Wanglang National Nature Reserve), but also because of the new eco-protection methods being tested there over the years. A large number of internationally renowned conservation organizations have carried out activities. They have applied advanced protection measures adjusted to local conditions and have put cutting-edge protection concepts into practice. However, despite the strong protection force working in Pingwu, under the impact of the rapid development of China’s overall economy throughout the years the county’s giant panda habitat has been degraded. From 1988 to 2008, Pingwu’s giant panda habitat was split from two connected pieces into six smaller ones, which are fragmented and disconnected. The habitat area decreased by about 1% annually, with a total reduction of nearly 20% in twenty years. Moreover, the quality of the remaining habitat declined. 264 wang hao, sun shan, chen ai, and lv zhi

The real reason is, from 1988 to 1998, Pingwu County paid far more attention to economic development than the protection of nature. Like other counties with giant panda populations, highways mushroomed. Trees were cut along roads, splitting the original undivided habitats. Our research shows that within two kilometers from the highway, the closer the habitat is from the road, the more seriously it suffers from degradation. There is also a lack of effective management of the use of animal and plant resources in the forest. Illegal poaching and herb- digging are very common, and they occur from time to time even in the core area of the protection zone where no entry is allowed. According to our research, three kilometers away from the residential area, the closer the habitat is from the residents, the more serious the degradation is. Since 1996, along with conservation organizations, Peking Univer- sity, several other research institutes, and nature reserves in Pingwu County started a ﬁeld project for giant panda protection, trying to reverse giant panda habitat degradation. A growing number of staff working in the protection zone as well as local residents realized the importance of nature protection, and soon mastered various conservation measures. In that way, the awareness and capability of nature conservation was strengthened. A state forest logging ban issued in 1998, along with the Natural Forest Protection Project and Grain for Green Project, has played a very positive role in the protection of giant pandas. Commercial logging ceased almost overnight, after severely damaging the giant panda habitat for over ten years. The forest began to recover slowly. On both sides of the abandoned roads crossing the forest, the once severely- destroyed habitat was rapidly restored. However, the protection force has not yet gained an upper hand. Between 1998 and 2008, economic development remained a top priority on Pingwu’s county agenda. Jiuzhaigou’s (九寨沟) Huanglong Travel Route and the development of hydropower projects were the major challenges. Tourism development brought more tourists, whose demands drove local residents to hunt wild animals, gather wild plants, and collect traditional Chinese herbs. Hydropower development occupied an ever increasing proportion of the county’s economy. Accord- ing to incomplete statistics, the number of hydropower stations in Pingwu soared from six to twenty-six. Quarrying and other activities within ﬁve kilometers from the hydropower stations seriously affected the habits of giant pandas. vision for wild giant panda protection 265

Nonetheless, there is some good news here too: between 1998 and 2008, in spite of the overall degradation of habitats, some conservation zones and surrounding areas where protection was implemented apparently recovered. This shows that the actions taken were effective for the protection of giant panda habitat. If we continue to strengthen support for the protection zone and expand the community-based conservation operations, Pingwu’s giant panda habitat would be better protected while its habitat degradation will be contained in a larger context. In other areas where wild giant pandas live, there have been many similar stories as those in Pingwu.

B. Habitats for Giant Pandas are being Rapidly Divided and Destroyed For the time being, wild giant pandas live in twenty-three separated habitats. With expansion of human population and residential area, the habitats of giant pandas and other species have been rapidly separated and reduced. The best habitats for pandas have already been occupied by mankind, with a vast population and rapid economic development. Pandas have been driven to deep mountain valleys which are not suitable for residence by humans. If it were not for such poor transportation conditions—Sichuan has been famous for its zigzagging and bumpy roads—the pandas might have gone extinct like the South China tiger. However, with the rapid development of engineering and technology, nature is struggling to keep the habitat for pandas and other vulnerable species alive in the wild. This struggle is reﬂected in several surveys. According to China’s third giant panda survey which was completed in 2001, as well as a survey of isolated panda populations and corridors in between these populations conducted in 2009, we believe that China’s wild pandas currently live in the twenty-three relatively isolated habitats. Of these twenty-three habitats, four larger populations with larger habitats and a lower risk of extinction live in the Qinling Mountains (秦岭山), Min- shan Mountains (岷山), Qionglai Mountains (邛崃山), and on Liang- shan Mountain (凉山); six moderate populations face a medium risk of extinction; and thirteen small populations have less than ten pandas each. These populations, fragmented by roads, settlements, and farmland, are scattered around larger ones and have more chances of extinction. This process from large population to small population and then to extinction, is described by scholars as an accelerating “extinction 266 wang hao, sun shan, chen ai, and lv zhi vortex.” The impact of random events with small probability, almost negligible in large populations, can be accumulated to produce a vicious circle for a small population. For example, if an adult female giant panda dies in an accident, it will not harm a large population greatly; but if it occurs in Jiuzhaigou Valley, where some habitats like the Heihe Rural Area or the Immortal Pool have only about ten pandas, this might imply more than one-fourth of the female pandas in the populations would be gone. That accident alone may lead to the extinction of the entire population. Computer simulation of 1,000 virtual panda populations shows that if each of the populations consists of thirty pandas, in 200 years forty-one of the 1,000 will die out; in the same period the extinction would grow to 412 if each of the population consists of ten pandas. To sum up, if the population size decreases from thirty to ten, the risk of extinction increases ten times. Of the twenty-three isolated panda populations, thirteen groups have less than ten pandas while the other four groups have less than thirty. These populations are exposed to the threat of an “extinction vortex” if we do not take effective measures to protect them with top priority. If we continue this rapid and rampant economic development in their habitats and corridors, large populations will be further split, medium-sized populations will become smaller, and the smaller populations in critical conditions may disappear forever. This could happen in the near future, possibly in only ten years. The disappearance of small populations does not only result in loss of individuals, but also loss of unique genetic characteristics carried by these individuals. Brown giant pandas, carrying very special DNA, are only found in the Qinling Mountains with several individuals. Once the population goes extinct, the brown giant panda genome will disappear forever. Such unique DNA is also found in other small populations. Thus, maintaining a higher degree of genetic diversity could be vital to strengthening the evolution of the species against unknown environmental changes in the future. Such “failure to protect” is obviously far from acceptable. Successful protection depends on complete habitats. To build corridors between habitats, connecting the isolated smaller ones with larger ones, enables individuals from smaller populations to interact with those from the larger populations, thus, their genome can carry on. The total area of the habitats can increase by restoring the corridors as well as the vision for wild giant panda protection 267 expansion of existing habitats. That could accommodate more pandas and can induce their reproduction. To ensure the completeness of the habitats and reduce or eliminate the harmful effect of separation on the panda populations, we need to effectively manage the roads and human activities along the roads. Therefore, we need to build more tunnels to lessen the area occupied by roads, pursuing a win-win situation for both the economy and the environment. We need to consider environmental assessment when planning the panda habitats, including the long-term demand of panda corridors. As estimated, if we could build or restore twenty panda corridors, it would be possible to link the existing twenty-three isolated habitats together. If we can restore some 1,700 square kilometers of key panda habitats by 2020, enhance the protection of panda reserves and communities, improve the quality of panda habitats, and effectively control disturbance, we believe the number of China’s wild giant pandas is likely to increase to 2,800, which signiﬁes an interim success for panda protection in the wild.

III. Suggestions on the Protection of Giant Pandas

First, the government should continue to increase investment in wild giant panda conservation, especially in existing panda reserves and in community protection support. In 2008, China’s total GDP reached 30 trillion RMB. In the three provinces where giant panda exists, Sichuan’s GDP reached 1.25 trillion RMB, Gansu 317.6 billion RMB, and Shaanxi 85.1 billion RMB. As estimated, nationwide funds used in the protection of wild giant pandas in 2008 account for less than 120 million RMB. In 3.2 million square kilometers of panda reserves, each mu (approximately 0.066 hectares) of reserve only got 2.5 RMB, even less than the national standard on compensation of public forests, which was 5 RMB per mu. The allocation of funds is also uneven. Some reserves are even short of routine patrol expenses. We should significantly increase investments in panda reserves. Second, management of reserves has defects and unclear effectiveness. Even in some key reserves with relatively adequate funding, there are still contradictions between reserve management and economic development. The effectiveness of panda conservation should be 268 wang hao, sun shan, chen ai, and lv zhi re-evaluated in a stricter way. This is particularly important as national funding increases. Third, our surveys show that in the corridors between the reserves, which have been the toughest area for habitat protection over the years, also live many giant pandas. There are a considerable number of giant pandas living in forest areas supervised by local communities. As we exert more effort to protect the giant pandas and increase their populations, their distribution area will correspondingly expand. More- over, in newly-increased giant panda habitats, community-supervised forest areas will account for a growing proportion. With the launching of forest tenure reform, it would be increasingly difficult to take these forest areas into the existing reserve system if we want to establish new reserves. However, the protection of giant pandas throughout the nation must rely on communities to work in an effective way. A national and local ecological compensation mechanism for counties with giant pandas, along with other poverty alleviation and education measures, should focus on communities who make efforts to protect giant pandas and the ecology. Only if the local people benefit from panda conservation, can this endangered animal be truly protected. In conclusion, we believe that the protection of giant pandas in China has been effective and has made remarkable progress. How- ever, the success of the protection of wild giant pandas is subject to more efforts. The living conditions of the wild giant panda are far from optimistic at the present stage. In most giant panda distribution areas, economic development still has higher priority than nature conservation. Continuing the path of the current development model will lead to further isolation and loss of giant panda populations. As such need to reverse this trend is imminent, we recommend the state to set specific goals and implement more robust protection initiatives. The mountains of southwest China boast some of the world’s richest biological diversity, including the golden monkey, takin, snow leopard, green, rainbow tail pheasant, and giant salamander. All of these species, including thousands of invertebrates, thousands of plants, and a greater number of insects, will benefit from the protection of giant pandas. Other than these species, the ecosystem, mainly large areas of forests, will also benefit from panda protection. These forests have a variety of important ecological functions like cleansing the water, regulating floods, purifying the air, and absorbing a fixed amount of carbon dioxide which could mitigate global climate change. The absence of these vision for wild giant panda protection 269 ecological functions, even estimated conservatively, will cause annual economic losses of tens of billions of RMB in the Yangtze River Val- ley, one of the most important economic zones in China. Therefore the conservation actions we propose would be a win-win solution. By doing so, we can help the endangered wild fauna and flora to survive, enable the precious forest areas in southwest China to better cope with the threat of climate change, restore forests to create market value such as carbon sinks, reduce the losses caused by ecological dysfunction, and benefit the local people. Thus, the meaning of the panda protection would be far beyond the species itself. The success of wild giant panda conservation would be an indicator of the sustainability of economic development in the region.

PART VI

APPENDIX

ANNUAL INDEXES: ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES IN CHINA

The developing trends of China’s major environmental problems during the mid-term of the nation’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan period (2006–2010) are presented below with tables and figures. Comparisons are made with data from 2005—the year selected in the Planning Objec- tives of Environmental Protection for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan Period (“十一五” 环境保护规划目标) as the benchmark—and with the objectives for the five years. The data selected and compared reflect the major environmental problems of 2009: the emission and treatment of air pollutants, discharge and treatment of water pollutants, energy consumption, and water quality and ecology of rivers and lakes. With the changing trends of environmental problems during the mid-term of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, both the effects of governmental efforts and the possibility of reaching the objectives for the five years can, to some extent, be observed. Some indexes were removed due to not being updated for two years.

I. Air Quality

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 Emission of industrial

(Million tons) (Million 3 waste gas 2 1 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Year 274 appendix

14 12 10 8

6 Domestic Soot

(Million tons) (Million 4 Industrial Soot 2 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Year

Figure A.1: Emission of industrial waste gas in China, 2004–2008

Table A.1: Emission of industrial waste gas in China, 2004–2008

Year Target 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Emission (2006–2010) (mill. tons) Industrial Dust 9.048 9.112 9.00 8.084 6.990 5.849 Industrial Soot 8.865 9.489 – 8.645 7.708 6.707 Domestic Soot 2.085 2.336 – 2.243 2.155 2.309 Total Emission 10.95 11.825 11.00 10.888 9.863 9.016

15 Target (2006–2010)

Million tons 10 Domestic 5 Industrial

0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Target Year

Figure A.2: Emission of SO2, 2004–2008 annual indexes: environmental changes in china 275

Table A.2: Emission of SO2, 2004–2008

Year Target Target 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Emission (2001–2005) (2006–2010) (mill. tons) Industrial 18.914 21.684 – 22.348 21.4 19.913 – Domestic 3.635 3.809 – 3.54 3.281 3.299 – Total 22.549 25.493 18.00 25.888 24.681 23.212 22.95

SO2 emission in 2008 totaled 23.21 million tons, down 5.95% from a year earlier. Soot emission was 9.02 million tons, and industrial dust was 5.85 million tons, down 8.59% and 16.3% respectively. The former State Environmental Protection Administration and the National Development and Reform Commission jointly compiled the National Eleventh Five-Year Plan of Acid Rain and Sulfur Dioxide Pollution Control (国家酸雨和二氧化硫污染防治“十一五”规划) in January

2008, aimed at dramatically cutting SO2 emissions, curbing the rising trend of ammonia nitrogen discharge, reducing the intensity of sulfur deposition and the area of severe acid deposition area, easing regional ﬁne particles pollution, and lowering the thickness of sulfur dioxide in the air of urban areas by the year 2010. Major tasks included: allocating a quota for sulfur dioxide emission control, launching a sulfur dioxide treatment program focused on desulfurization of coal- ﬁred power plants, accelerating industrial restructuring, strictly limit- ing sulfur content in fuels, controlling ammonia nitrogen discharge, and strengthening capacity building in environmental supervision and administration. 276 appendix

II. Water Quality

A. Wastewater

70 60 50 40

30 Domestic Billion tons 20 Industrial 10 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Year

Figure A.3: Wastewater discharge in China, 2004–2008

Table A.3: Wastewater discharge in China, 2004–2008 Year Discharge 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (bill. tons) Industrial Wastewater 22.11 24.31 24.02 24.65 24.19 Municipal Wastewater 26.13 28.14 29.66 31.02 33.01 Total Discharge 48.24 52.45 53.68 55.67 57.2

100 % Industrial 80 % wastewater discharge up to 60 % standard

40 % Recycled industrial wastewater 20 % Treated municipal wastewater 0 % 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Figure A.4: Wastewater treatment in China, 2004–2007 annual indexes: environmental changes in china 277

Table A.4: Wastewater treatment in China, 2004–2007

Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 Percentage Industrial Wastewater up to Standard 90.7% 91.2% 92.10% 91.7% Recycled Industrial Wastewater 74.2% 75.1% 80.60% 82.0% Treated Municipal Wastewater 45.6% 52% 57% 49.1%

1.6 1.4 1.2 1 Municipal Ammonia 0.8 Nitrogen 0.6 Million tons Industrial Ammonia 0.4 Nitrogen 0.2 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Year

Figure A.5: Ammonia nitrogen discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2008

Table A.5: Ammonia nitrogen discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2008 Year Discharge 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (mill. tons) Industrial Ammonia Nitrogen 0.422 0.525 0.425 0.34 0.297 Municipal Ammonia Nitrogen 0.908 0.973 0.988 0.983 0.973 Total Ammonia Nitrogen 1.33 1.498 1.413 1.323 1.27 278 appendix

16 14 12 10 Total COD in Wastewater 8 (Target: 2006–2010) 6 Municipal COD Million tons 4 2 Industrial COD 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Target Year

Figure A.6: COD discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2008

Table A.6: COD discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2008 and target for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010)

Year Target Discharge 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (mill. tons) (2006–2010) Industrial COD 5.097 5.548 5.423 5.111 4.576 - Municipal COD 8.295 8.594 8.859 8.708 8.631 - Total COD in 13.392 14.142 14.282 13.818 13.207 12.73 Wastewater

COD discharge in wastewater in 2008 totaled 13.21 million tons, down 4.42% from 2007, while the year 2006 saw an increase of 5.6% from the year before. This indicates that the situation was improving in 2007. The decrease was first seen in November 2007 when COD discharge of the first three quarters was down 0.08% from the previous year, after China stepped up wastewater treatment and industrial pollution source control in the first half of the year.

B. Water Systems Water quality of the seven major water systems—Yangtze River (长江), Yellow River (黄河), Pearl River (珠江), Songhua River (松花江), Huaihe River (淮河), Haihe River (海河), and Liaohe River (辽河)—was mostly unchanged compared with the previous year. Water in the Pearl annual indexes: environmental changes in china 279

120.00% 100.00% 80.00% Worse than Level V 60.00% Level V Level IV 40.00% Level I, II, III 20.00% 0.00%

er er

Pearl Riv Haihe Riv Yellow River Huaihe River Liaohe River Yangtze River Songhua River

Figure A.7: Water quality of China’s 7 major water systems, 2008

Table A.7: Water quality of China’s 7 major water systems, 2008

Water System Yangtze Yellow Pearl Songhua Huaihe Haihe Liaohe Water Quality River River River River River River River Level I, II, III 85.60% 68.20% 84.90% 33.3% 38.4% 28.6% 35.1% Level IV 6.70% 4.50% 9.10% 45.2% 33.7% 14.3% 13.5% Level V 1.90% 6.80% 3.00% 7.2% 5.8% 6.3% 18.9% Worse than 5.80% 20.50% 3.00% 14.3% 22.1% 50.8% 32.5% Level V

River and the Yangtze River was good quality, while the Songhua River was lightly polluted. The Yellow River and Huaihe River were moderately polluted, and the Liaohe River and Haihe River were severely contaminated.

C. Lakes In 2008, among the twenty-eight lakes and reservoirs with close governmental monitoring, four had Level II water quality, accounting for 14.3% of the lakes; two had Level III water quality, accounting for 7.1% of the lakes; six had Level IV water quality, accounting for 21.4% of the lakes; ﬁve had Level V water quality, accounting for 17.9% of the lakes; and eleven had water quality worse than Level V, accounting for 39.3% of the lakes. Major pollutants were total nitrogen and total 280 appendix

120% 100% 80%

60% Worse than Level V 40% Level IV, V 20% Level I, II, III 0% 2005 2006 2007 2008 Year

Figure A.8: Water quality of lakes (reservoirs) with close governmental monitoring, 2005–2008

Table A.8: Water quality of lakes (reservoirs) with close governmental monitoring, 2005–2008 Worse than Water System Level I, II, III Level IV, V Year Level V 2005 28% 29% 43% 2006 29% 23% 48% 2007 49.9% 26.5% 23.6% 2008 21.4% 39.3% 39.3% phosphorus. Among the twenty-six lakes and reservoirs with eutrophication monitoring, one (3.8%) was severely eutrophic, five were (19.2%) moderately eutrophic, and six were (23.0%) lightly eutrophic. Water quality of Taihu Lake (太湖), one of China’s biggest lakes, was worse than Level V in general. The lake was in a state of moderate eutrophication, with the major pollutant being total nitrogen. Rivers flowing in and out of Taihu Lake were, in general, moderately polluted. No significant change was seen in water quality compared with the previous year. The major pollutants were ammonia nitrogen, BOD5, and oil. Water quality of Dianchi Lake (滇池) was worse than Level V. The northern part of the lake, also called Caohu Lake or Inner Sea, was in a severe condition of eutrophication, while the southern part, or the Outer Sea, was moderately eutrophic. Major pollutants included ammonia nitrogen, total phosphorus, and total nitrogen. Rivers around Dianchi Lake were generally severely polluted. Among the annual indexes: environmental changes in china 281

Table A.9: Water quality of China’s 9 biggest lakes, 2005–2008

Eutrophication Eutrophication Lake Index State 2008 2007 2006 2005 Major Pollutant Taihu 60 Moderate < < < < TN, TP Level Level Level Level V V V V Dianchi 72 Moderate < < < < TP, TN, Level Level Level Level Ammonia V V V V Nitrogen Chaohu 62 Light Level Level Level < TP, TN, Oil V V V Level V Erhai 39 Moderate Level Level Level Level - II III III III Dongting 46.6 Moderate Level Level Level Level TP, TN V IV V V Hongze 55.8 Light < < < < TN, TP Level Level Level Level V V V V Nansi 50.8 Light Level Level < Level Oil, TP, TN IV V Level V V Poyang 49.4 Moderate Level Level Level Level Oil, TP, TN IV IV V IV Jingbo 40.1 Light Level Level Level Level Permanganate IV IV IV IV

eight national groundwater quality monitoring cross-sections, 37.5% were Level I, II, or III, and 72.5% were worse than Level V. This was a little better than the previous year, and major pollutants were ammonia nitrogen, BOD5, and oil. Water quality in Chaohu Lake (巢湖) was Level V, remaining almost unchanged compared with the previous year. The western half of the lake was moderately eutrophic, while the other half lightly eutrophic. Major pollutants included total phosphorus, total nitrogen, and oil.

D. Coastal Areas Water quality of the nation’s offshore areas in general was lightly polluted, slightly worse than the previous year. Most offshore areas were clean, and water quality of distant sea areas remained good. 282 appendix

120 % 100 % Worse than 80 % Level IV 60 % Level IV Level III 40 % Level II 20 % Level I 0 % Bohai Yellow East China South China Nationwide Sea Sea Sea Sea Water Areas

Figure A.9: Coastal water quality, 2007

Table A.10: Coastal water quality, 2007 Sea Area East China South Bohai Sea Yellow Sea Nationwide Water Quality Sea China Sea Level I 24.5% 35.2% 2.1% 44.9% 26.0% Level II 38.8% 50% 26.3% 38.8% 36.8% Level III 14.3% 9.3% 15.8% 8.2% 11.8% Level IV 10.2% 1.8% 14.7% 1.0% 7.1% Worse than 12.2% 3.7% 41.1% 7.1% 18.3% Level IV

Offshore areas of Level I and II account for 70.4%, up 7.6% from the previous year; Level III was 11.3%, barely changed from the previous year; and Level IV or worse was 18.3%, down 7.1%. Among the four biggest sea areas, the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea had good water quality. The Bohai Sea was normal, and the East China Sea had bad water quality.

III. Solid Waste

In 2008, production of industrial solid waste nationwide was up 8.3% from the previous year, while the amount of discharge was down 34.7%. About 1.24 billion tons of industrial solid waste was reused, up 11.87% from the previous year. Production and discharge of solid waste was further restricted by the State Council Notice on the Compre- hensive Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction (国务院 annual indexes: environmental changes in china 283

2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 Generation 1000 Intergrated Reuse 800 Million tons 600 Disposal 400 200 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Year

Figure A.10: China’s industrial waste generation and disposal, 2004–2008

Table A.11: China’s industrial waste generation and disposal, 2004–2008 Year Amount 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (mill. tons) Generation 1200 1340 1515 1757 1901 Integrated Reuse 677.95 770 926 1104 1235 Disposal 17.92 16.54 13.02 11.97 7.82

关于印发节能减排综合性工作方案的通知), as well as the revised Energy Conservation Law (中华人民共和国节约能源法(修订版)), both of which went into effect in 2007.

IV. Urban Environment

Air quality nationwide in 2008 was generally ﬁne and better than the previous year, although pollution remained severe in certain cities. Distribution of acid rain nationwide barely changed, while pollution remained severe. 284 appendix

120.00%

100.00%

80.00% Worse than Level III

60.00% Level III

40.00% Better than Level II

20.00%

0.00% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Year

Figure A.11: Air quality in urban areas, 2004–2008

Table A.12: Air quality in urban areas, 2004–2008

Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Index Better than Level II 38.6% 60.3% 62.4% 60.5% 71.6% Level III 41.2% 29.1% 28.5% 36.1% 26.9% Worse than Level III 20.2% 10.6% 9.1% 3.4% 1.5% TERMINOLOGICAL GLOSSARY

Brown clouds (棕色云团): A cloud-shaped mixture of pollutants consisting primarily of ﬁne particles, including carbon and organic particles, sulfates, nitrates, ammonium salts, sand, and dust in the troposphere.

Carbon lock-in (碳锁定): A “carbon lock-in” is a phenomenon which appears when a country constructs infrastructure for high carbon consumption with a life span of 50 to 100 years. Due to the inertia of industrial activities and economic scale, technology, policies, and the structure of systems will gradually lean towards a system based on fossil fuel. China is now involved in a rapid industrialization and urbanization process, and a large amount of infrastructure and equipment will be put to use within twenty years. Without advanced technology and equipment, as soon as this infrastructure is constructed, its whole life span will be locked into a mire of high energy consumption, high pollution, and high emissions.

Cascade development (梯级开发): Strategy of building several smaller hydropower dams as opposed to one very large dam.

Circular economy (循环经济): The China Daily describes the circular economy as a model for economic growth which aims at environmental protection, pollution prevention, and sustainable development. Under this model, resources are used with higher efficiency and reused and recycled when possible, so that pollution is minimized and waste is reduced as much as possible. It also involves the transformation of industrial organization and allocation, urban infrastructure, environmental protection, technological paradigms, and social welfare distribution. An important part in China’s effort toward sustainable development, circular economy was officially raised as a target for future growth in 2004. The State Council issued a file about promoting it in July 2005, making it a key guideline in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan and to achieve the specific goals in energy conservation and pollution reduction before 2020. 286 terminological glossary

Environmental mass incident (环境污染导致的群体性事件): The definition of “mass incidents” (群体性事件) is somewhat ambiguous and varies by province, but environmental mass incidents in general are cases where groups of people converge to express their disapproval of a variety of environmentally related issues. The most common causes for environmental mass incidents are water pollution from speciﬁc factories or industrial complexes, appropriation of land and displacement of people for industrial and water projects (i.e., dams), and air pollution caused by speciﬁc factories and power plants.

Low-carbon economy (低碳经济) (LCE): A low-carbon economy is characterized by a certain level of carbon productivity (economic output per unit of carbon emission) aimed at high economic growth with low-carbon emissions. Low-carbon development is the transition towards LCE and it will be achieved through technological breakthroughs and institutional regulation. The results of low-carbon development are more efﬁcient energy use, an optimized energy structure, and more rational consumer behavior. In December 2006, for the ﬁrst time, the Chinese government put forth the idea of developing a LCE in the National Assessment Report on Climate Change (气候变化国家评估报告).

Road ecology (道路生态学): This sub-discipline of ecology aims at understanding the relationships between roads and the natural environment. Research on the ecology of roads began in the 1960s, but didn’t start in China until much later.

Three high industries (“三高”产业): These are industries with high energy consumption, high pollution, and high emissions.

Three rivers and three lakes (三河三湖): This refers to Huaihe River, Haihe River, Liaohe River, Lake Taihu, Lake Dianchi, and Lake Chaohu.

Three wastes (三废): This refers to waste water, exhaust gas, and industrial slag.

White pollution (白色污染): Pollution caused by plastic rubbish. This rubbish affects the appearance of cities and landscapes, while also creating long-term environmental problems. INDEX

2008 Law on Prevention and Control of China Chongqing Green Volunteer’s Water Pollution 109 Union 95, 99 Agenda 21 206 China Council for International Aha Reservoir 108, 111, 116–117 Cooperation on Environment and air quality 87, 203 Development 35, 37 All-China Environment Federation China Wildlife Conservation Association (ACEF) 25, 107, 112, 119–120 261 Altai Mountains 164 China’s West 14, 164 alternative energy 11, 52–54, 56, 89, Chongqing 23, 61, 64, 67–68, 95, 99, 171, 173 204, 218 An Jiesheng 157 circular economy 10, 17, 43, 49–51, Anshun City 111 85, 174, 285 civil society 7, 21, 27, 86, 95, 107, 258 Baihua Lake/s 108, 111, 116–117 clean development mechanism (CDM) Bali Action Plan 83, 90 49 Baoji City 144 climate change 2–3, 7–8, 10, 21–22, BAU 82, 85–87 27, 48, 50, 81–84, 85 n. 7, 86, 91, Beijing 10, 18, 21–22, 24–25, 61, 197, 198 n. 2, 206, 247, 251–258, 67–68, 79 n. 4, 99, 127, 142, 148, 268–269, 286 181, 187–193, 199–200, 206 n. 13, CO2 216 207–213, 220, 245–246, 249, 254 coal 10–12, 14–15, 22, 34–35, 39, 48, Biaoxin Chemical Co., Ltd 131, 137, 51, 152–155, 164–165, 171, 201 141–142 COD 12, 35, 65 n. 6, 132, 135, 278 biodiversity 24, 238–239, 244–246, conservation 2, 9–12, 17, 21–22, 25, 248–249, 251–253, 255–257 34–35, 37, 39, 43, 47–55, 57, 87, BLL 143–145 89–91, 108, 159, 171–174, 181, 193, blood lead levels 143 198–199, 201–202, 204, 206–208, Brazil 85, 87 212–213, 227–230, 233, 236–238, brown cloud 192, 285 243–250, 255–258, 261–265, 267–269, 285 carbon dioxide 39, 44, 48–49, 82, 85, Conservation International (CI) 253, 268 245–247, 262 carbon lock-in 39, 285 Copenhagen Accord 81, 90–91 CCGVU 95, 99–101, 103, 105 Copenhagen Climate Change Center 22, 24–25, 39, 44, 98, 123, Conference 251 144, 156–157, 189, 195, 204, Copenhagen Conference 252 207–213, 230–231, 245–246, 249, Copenhagen Summit 48, 84–85, 261–262 87–88, 90–92 Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Criminal Law 99, 131–133, 135–137 Victims 25, 123 Cui Jianguo 142 Chang Jiwen 98 Changbai Mountain 227–239, 241 Dadu River 169 Changchun 213 Danzao 112, 115 Changsha 60, 143–144 Deng Qingguo 144 Chen Ling 190, 191 n. 13 desertiﬁcation 2, 10, 151, 153, 156, Chen Wenkai 194 252 Chen Yong 190 development pattern 34, 41, 44, 48–49 Chengdu 60, 167, 187 Ding Yuesheng 134, 142 288 INDEX ecological protection 35, 43, 96–97, Fu Tao 36 108, 174, 235, 238, 255 Fuzhou 61, 67, 218 economic crisis 40, 48 economic stimulus plan 43, 178 Gansu 165, 246–247, 262, 267 EIA Law 71–72, 74–75, 78–79 Gansu Province’s 165, 247 Eleventh Five-Year Plan 15, 43, garbage 13–14, 18–20, 26, 34–35, 86–87, 89, 91, 177, 207–208, 273, 183–184, 187–195, 201, 204, 223 285 GDP 12, 32–33, 39, 44, 49, 64, emissions reduction 9–11, 17, 21, 83–89, 146–147, 151, 155, 203, 230, 34–35, 43, 47, 50–51, 59, 81–82, 84 239, 241, 267 n. 5, 85–92, 171–174, 181, 206 GHG 48, 53, 83, 85, 89 energy conservation 9–12, 17, 21, 34, global ﬁnancial crisis 31, 42, 47, 83, 35, 37, 39, 43, 47, 50–55, 87, 89–91, 89, 177–178, 198 171–174, 181, 201–202, 206, 285 Gobi 156 energy conservation and emissions Gobi Desert 152 reduction 9–11, 21, 34, 43, 47, green construction 43–44 50–51, 87, 89–91, 171–174, 181 green credit 41–42 energy consumption 10–12, 17, 31, green economy 44–45, 173, 237 39–41, 44, 50, 52, 55, 82, 85–87, 89, green energy 48, 51 154, 166, 173, 199, 203–205, 273, green growth 43–45 285–286 green investment 43 Environmental Defense Fund 204 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 22, Environmental Impact Assessment 48, 81 n. 1, 198, 251 (EIA) 19, 71–79, 86, 96–98, greenhouse gases (GHGs) 83 100–102, 104, 137, 163–164, 171, Guan Kuoshan 191 174 Guangdong 19, 25, 34, 64, 15, 182, environmental information disclosure 188, 204 22–23, 59, 61, 63–64, 66–67, 69, Guangxi Province 165 77 Guangzhou 18–19, 34, 60, 64 n. 5, environmental investment 35–36 112, 115–116, 187, 189, 194–195 environmental protection 2, 7, 9–10, Guiyang 107, 111, 116–117 12, 16–18, 20–21, 23, 31, 35–38, Guiyu 182 40–45, 47, 49–50, 53, 60, 66–68, 71, 73, 78, 95–96, 98–101, 103–105, Hanjiang River 25, 36 107–109, 111–115, 117–119, Harbin 34, 60, 217 121–122, 127–128, 135–138, 141, Hebei 123, 218 145–146, 147 n. 7, 148–149, 151, Henan 145, 177 155, 160, 166, 181, 191–193, 195, Hengduan Mountains 166–168 198, 204, 211, 215–218, 223, Hexi Corridor 165–166 242–246, 275, 285 high energy consumption and high Environmental Protection Law 113–114, pollution 39–40 146 High Energy Consumption, High Pollution environmental public interest 100, 31, 39, 41, 285–286 103, 107, 109, 113–114, 116–120 Hohhot 155 Environmental Public Interest Litigation Home Appliances to the Countryside (EPIL) 104, 107–109, 112–119 177–181, 183–184 EU 18, 82 n. 3, 83, 88, 194 Hongfeng Lake 108, 111, 116–117 Europe 201–202 Hu Jing 179 European Union 83 Hu Jintao 7, 84, 85 n. 7 Hu Wenbiao 131–134, 141–142 Feng Yongfeng 195 Huang Heping 143 Fengxiang County 143–144 Hubei Province 19, 36 Forest Law 238 human health 23, 121, 128–129, Friends of Nature 1, 21, 205 145–149, 190, 253 INDEX 289 hydropower 23–25, 52, 57, 95–105, low-carbon economy 44, 47–49, 163–164, 166, 168–172, 174, 239, 87–88, 173, 286 261, 264, 285 Low-Carbon Living 92, 204–206 Low-Carbon Transportation 56 image project 36 Ludila 23, 25, 95–96, 100–101, 105, in Inner Mongolia 153–154, 171 157–158 Luo Xiangping 143 infrastructure 3, 34–35, 39–40, 51, 53, Lv Zhengxiong 195 88, 177, 179–180, 183–184, 230–231, Lvliang 41 235, 255, 257, 261, 285 Inner Mongolia 41, 151, 153–159, Ma Jineng 238 161, 171–172 Madaokou Village 143 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region mass incident 20, 144, 187–188, 286 151–152 mass protests 196 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate MEP 23, 38, 40, 43, 45, 49, 95–102, Change (IPCC) 82, 251 104–105, 128, 191–192, 198 Methods for Managing Forest and Wildlife Ji Zhiqi 123 Reserves 240 Jiangsu 64, 204 Ministry of Environmental Protection Jiangsu Province 18–19, 64, 68, 131, 23, 38, 40, 42, 43 n. 11, 49, 79 n. 1, 141, 188–189 95, 119, 141, 145, 148–149, 155, Jilin Province 227–230, 236 181, 191, 198, 204 Jinsha (金沙江) 95, 165, 254 Minjiang River 169 Jinsha River 23, 95–101, 103–104, 170 Mou Guangfeng 97 Jishou City 121–123 Mt. Fuji 235 Jiyuan 145 Nanjing 19, 64 n. 5, 188, 194, 213 Kunming 61, 108, 145, 254 Nanzhang County 36 Kyoto Protocol 81–82, 84 n. 6 National Development and Reform Commission 23, 35 n. 2, 49, 85, 95, Lancang (澜沧江) 170, 247, 254 99, 194, 200, 219, 275 Lancang River 170 nature conservation 229–230, 236, Lanzhou 65, 217 257, 264, 268 Law of Environmental Impact Assessment nature reserve/s 153, 227–244, 99–104 246–249, 255, 263–264 Law on Prevention and Control of Water NDRC 23, 49, 85, 99–102, 104–105, Pollution 109, 111, 129 194, 219–220, 222 LCE 47–50, 286 Nie Yongfeng 187, 194 Li Jing 219 Ningxia 151–161, 172, 204 Li Songtao 194 Ningxia Hui Autonomous Li Yujun 124 Region 151–152 Liaoning Province 68, 254 Ningxia Province and Inner Lijiang 97, 167 Mongolia 172 Lin Yifu 177 North Korea 238 Liu Desheng 121–123, 125–126 NPC motions and CPPCC Liu Shijin 39 proposals 48 Liu Yangsheng 187 nuclear energy 86 Liu Zhongwu 144 nuclear power 85, 171 Liuyang City 142 Nujiang (怒江) 166, 254 Longkaikou 23, 25, 95–96, 100–101, Nujiang River 21, 170 104, 170 low-carbon building 54 Ordos 151–161 low-carbon development 44, 48, 286 Otog Banner 152–154, 157 290 INDEX

Pan Yue 42 Shandong 68, 177, 254 Panda/s 246, 255, 261–269 Shanghai 19, 61, 67–68, 187, 204, Panzhihua 65, 163, 165 219 Peking University Center for Nature Shanghang 145 and Society 261–262 Shanxi 41 Pingwu County 255, 263–264 Shanxi Province 41, 165, 171 Plastic Bag Restriction Policy Shenyang City 204 215–217, 219 Shenzhen 19, 64 n. 5, 188, 194 pollution 1–3, 7, 9–10, 12–17, 19–20, Shi Guangyu 192 22–25, 27, 31, 34, 36–37, 39–41, Shi Guoxiang 230 56, 59, 61, 64–69, 97, 111–117, Shizuishan 151, 153, 156–157, 119, 121–126, 128–129, 131–138, 159–160 141–149, 151, 154, 156, 166, 167, Sichuan 40, 177, 245–246, 255, 171–173, 177, 179–181–183, 191, 262–263, 265, 267 192, 196, 198, 201, 215, 223, 255, Sichuan Province 19, 25, 34, 163, 165, 275, 278, 283, 285–286 167, 246 public health 3, 16, 24, 73, 179, 190 Sichuan Tengzhong Heavy Industrial public interest 25, 95, 99, 100–101, Machinery Company 201 103–109, 112–120 social welfare 33, 35, 40, 285 public interest litigation 95, 101, 104, State Council 31, 39, 44, 72, 78, 100, 107–108, 112 112, 160, 178, 181–182, 195, 197, 242, 285 Qilian Mountains 165–167 stimulus 31, 33–36, 38, 177, 237 Qingxian County 123–124 stimulus package 21, 31, 35, 53 Qingzhen 108, 111 stimulus plan 31, 33, 43–44, 178 Qingzhen City 112, 120 sulfur dioxide 12, 39, 65, 97, 275 Qinling Mountains 165, 265–266 Sun Youhai 147 Qinyang 165 Sustainable Consumption 57, 197–198, quality of water 111, 142 202–206 sustainable development 1, 7–8, 16, reforestation 35 27–28, 48, 57, 69, 151, 173–174, Regulations 11, 17, 42–43, 52, 55, 57, 241, 256, 285 59, 61, 69, 71–79, 97, 99, 101–102, 107–109, 118, 122, 128–129, 132, Taihu Lake 13–14, 108, 280, 286 137–138, 173–174, 178, 181–183, Tang Dayou 192 191, 203, 207, 211, 213, 228–229, Tang Wenlong 143 234, 236, 240–241 Tao Detian 96 Regulations on Environmental Impact Tarim Basin 164 Assessment for Plans 71–72 Technical Guidelines for EIA for Plans ( for Regulations on Nature Reserves 240 Trial Implementation) 72 renewable energy 11–12, 52–53, 57, Tenth Five-Year Plan 146, 177 85–86, 89 the Inner Mongolia Autonomous resource development 151–153, 156, Region 151–152 163–164, 166–167, 172 Three Gorges Reservoir 14, 103 road ecology 232, 286 three synchronizations 137 Roland Weber 195 Tianjin 10, 67, 193, 204, 213 Tianshan Mountains 164 sewage 13–14, 22, 34, 36, 64, 120, Tibet 3, 165–168, 245 141, 179–180, 183–184, 188 Tibetan Autonomous Region 168 Shaanxi 41, 151–152, 156, 158–159, Twelfth Five-Year Plan 44, 89, 195 161, 204, 262, 267 Shaanxi Province 143–145, 151–153, U.S. 83–86, 90, 107, 201–202 157, 171, 179 United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental Shan Shui Conservation xiii–xiv, 22, Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 245–246, 249, 262 251 INDEX 291

United Nations Framework Convention on Wuhai 151–156 Climate Change (UNFCCC) 81 n. 1, Wuhan 19, 25, 61, 64, 67, 204 82, 91 Wuhan Women’s Federation 204 United States xvi, 48, 81–84, 116 Wujiang City 189 Wuxi 64 n. 5, 108, 218 Wang Canfa 132, 146–147 Wuxi City 112 Wang Huimin 97 Wang Jinnan 43–44 Xiamen City 26, 204 waste xvii–xviii, 15, 18, 35, 55–57, Xichang 163 118, 131, 133–134, 151, 161, 168, Xinjiang 3, 164, 241 172–173, 179, 181–183, 187–188, Xu Haiyun 193 191, 195, 197, 199–201, 211–212, Xu Han 235 233, 282, 285–286 Xu Zhenqu 194 waste crisis 187, 191 waste incineration 2, 18–20, 187–188, Yalong Bay 231, 234 190–196 Yalong River 169 waste incineration power plants Yan’an 165 187–188, 193 Yanchang 165 waste power plants 187 Yancheng 60 n. 2, 64 n. 5, 131–132, water insecurity 34 135–138, 142 water pollution 12–14, 34, 37, 111, Yangchang River 111 132, 136–138, 171, 179, 286 Yangtze River 21, 95, 101, 103–104, water quality 25, 36, 111, 117, 161, 167, 247, 278–279 273, 278–282 Year xvii, 2, 11–13, 15, 31–33, 35, 39, water resources 24, 109, 117, 153, 42, 47, 57, 59, 68, 81 n. 1, 82–83, 158, 160, 167, 171, 199, 207–209, 85, 87, 98, 120, 129, 153, 155, 160, 252, 256, 258 179, 182, 187, 193, 197, 200, 202, water scarcity 208, 212 205, 208, 215, 244, 249, 251, 255, water supply 35–37, 141–142, 262, 273, 278, 280–281 156–158, 160, 179 Yellow River 25, 153–155, 159–161, Wen Jiabao 9, 31, 85, 87, 199 165, 172–173, 247, 254, 278–279 Wenchuan 34, 164, 169, 246 Yi Jianhua 144 West China 173 Yichun 254 western China 2, 35–36, 245, 256 Yilong Lake 254 Western Regions 14, 64–65, 163–164, Yinchuan 155–157, 159–160 166–167, 170, 172–174, 248 Yulin 151–153, 156–158 West-to-East Power Transmission Yunnan Province 24, 96–97, 108, 116, 171 145, 165, 167, 254 wildlife conservation 159, 263 Yuxi 108 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 24, 261–262 Zhao Zhangyuan xi, 192, 194, 196 Wu Dengming 101 Zheng Minghui 195 Wu Shaohong 253 Zhu Xingxiang 191 Wu Xiaoqing 44, 192, 198 Zipingpu 168–169 Wugang 144 Zou Ji 88