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= fP21'17:i M:41t." ; !■ -• • 7 •-••••.„ -.....!'•••!!, • • .•••• ' - •• . , • •' • , • iti.;,..e DITAX al A • ' THE AJAX FILE: AN ANALYSIS OF INTERPOL'S FAILURE TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING A report by: The National Commission on Lr'w Enforcement and Social Justice (NCLE) Requests made to the U.S. Bureau (of Interpol) generally did not involve established international criminals or large crime syndicates. Most cases involved individuals with no prior criminal record who were arrested or being investigated for a wide variety of offenses... For example, most narcotics cases, the largest category of requests handled by the U.S. Bureau, involved young Americans or U.S. servicemen arrested overseas with small quanti- ties of drugs, such as marijuana. General Accounting Office Report "United States Participation In Interpol" December 27, 1976 page 13 For the past 20 years, the United States, as well as dozens other countries, has suffered through drug epidemics that seem to be controlled more by the fashion of the users than by any enforce- ment methods brought to bear. Narcotics, unlike the bulk of ordinary crimes, is usually an international problem. Except in cases of locally produced drugs such as LSD or marijuana, law enforcement must deal with the shipment of narcotics often from thousands of miles away before its appearance can prompt action. Whether it be opium from the "Golden Triangle" in Southeast Asia or Turkey or cocaine from Bolivia, law enforcement and local governments must often stand and wait, hoping that s7imilar concerns are shared a half a world away. Because the major drugs are imported into the United States, international cooperation is often the only means by which citizens can hcpe for any meaningful curtailment or enforcement. And because the final toll in American cities was too high, any means were sought in the desperate hope that this modern day plague could be resolved. It was not difficult for the officials of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to find themselves at the crossroads of information traveling around the world. Drugs quickly became the primary topic of conversation at Interpol's annual General Assembly meetings as the western governments expanded their drug enforcement budgets. Thus as 1976 ended, it came as a mild surprise to many that the General Accounting Office, the auditing arm of the Congress, could not find in the Interpol files any "established international criminals or large crime syndicates" and that "most narcotics cases" that Interpol handled "involved young Americans or U.S. servicemen arrested overseas with small quantities of drugs, such as marijuana." While the GAO team did not pursue this oddity, the possible explanation must start with only two possibilities: 1. Interpol has pursued major international narcotics figures and syndicates and the GAO simply did not see those files, or 2. The GAO report is correct - most narcotics cases handled by this private police group avoid major international crime figures. The first possibility would be hard pressed to maintain on two counts. First, the GAO team spent 10 months and traveled to an equal number of countries in this first-ever investigation of Interpol.(1)* At the Washington. D. C. office, they went through the Interpol files and closely studied every 50th case. Additionally, other reports were available to the investigative team. Finally, the media supports their findings: no stories on the arrest of any major figures or Interpol's role in any major "bust" can be found. This leaves the second, and most disturbing, explanation. But even here there are several possibilities, a. There have been no major narcotics investigations for Interpol to participate in; b. Interpol is an inefficient organization that law enforcement does not take seriously and thus does not share with them any major cases; c. Interpol has avoided the most serious narcotics offenders. Alternative "a" can be easily dismissed by even the most casual perusal of recent media. The notorious "French Con- nection", which was popularized by both book and media, occurred in Interpol's back yard yet there is not one shred of evidence that the organization played any role in it. Alternative "b" can actually be supported by the state- ments of various law enforcement officials and the media who have charged Interpol as being nothing but a "mail box" that is slow, cumbersome and ineffective.(2) Some have even described it as only a "travel agency", referring to the annual meetings at which nothing substantial is accomplished.(3) U.S. officials have expressed concern for Interpol's internal security and insisted that it would not transmit any highly sensitive material.(4) Thus this alternative does bear some consideration. Alternative -c", however, is the most disturbing possibility. As a private organization, Interpol has never had to open its international files to any investigative body. The GAO's study was a landmark and then only the U.S. files cc ere seen. Unfortunately, while alternative "b" may be true, alterna- tive ec", that Interpol has avoided major narcotics offenses, is being supported by growing evidence. This evidence is based upon two important points: 1. Interpol is and has been a French-dominated organization, and *(1), (2), etc., indicates footnote. See back of report. _2_ 2. French intelligence services and officials have been involved in narcotics trafficking for over two decades. THE FRENCH INTERPOL (5) Until 1946, France's role in this international cooperative had been much like any other country's - France was a member and paid its annual membership dues. But in 1946, the rela- tionship changed. France was no longer just a participant, but had suddenly become the primary sponsor and supporter. Created in 1924, Interpol was another attempt at some form of "European community", this time with regard to crime. With their borders in such close proximity, the police chiefs of a number of European nations met to work out the' concept of a central para-nationa] body that would assist in combating the post-World War I crimes that plagued the continent. In the wake of "internationalism" stirred up by the new League of Nations. Interpol was created. The moving force came from Austria and there the organization took its first roots. The constitu:.ion required that the as- sociation (then known as the "International Criminal Police Commission" - the name would he changed after the war to sound "more permanent") would be headed by the leader of the host coun- try's police. By 1935. new support came from an eager Germany. Swastikas began to appear at the annual meetings, and a Nazi General was elected vice president. Three years later, the Austrians voted to join with Germany, and Interpol went with them. While there is only one recorded protest (and that stemmed from the more basic issue of Germany controlling Austria), no one in Interpol complained. After all, one must remember that in 1938, the German police system was considered by most as the most efficient and effective in the world. Interpol had found an intense supporter and Interpol officials reciprocated. By 1941, Interpol was housed in Berlin. The Austrian Secretary General moved to the German capital and worked on a new book detailing the activity of his organization with the two successive Gestapo chiefs - Reinhard Heydrich and Ernst Kalten- brunner. The group was given new facilities and continued to operate throughout the war. (6) The collapse of Germany 1945 momentarily terminated Interpol's activities. The group's president was hung for war crimes at Nuremburg and the Secretary General returned in disgrace to Austria, too "tainted" to continue any public role in Interpol's development. But just before the war ended, a final drama was played out that might explain (in light of later events) France's recog- nition that Interpol could have a value far beyond anything imagined, even by the Germane. -3- The story is told in Harry Soderman's book Policeman's Lot. (7) Soderman had been with the organization since its creation in 1924. While he fails to mention that he collaborated with the Nazis throughout the war, the Swedish policeman was privy to extensive information about Interpol's officials, activities and— files. Brought from Austria, the Interpol files were developed extensively by the Nazi police. According to famed Nazi hunter, Simon Wiesenthal, the files were used to find Europe's top forgers for the counterfeiting of foreign currencies, passports, but as well as sheer blackmail to force many to spy for the Third Reich. (8) By the end of the war, the files would certainly be of inter- est to any government for what they would have contained. Ap- parently seeing their value, Gestapo Colonel Carlos Zindel packed up as many files as he could and fled Berlin, according to Soderman. Whether by design er accident (Soderman's account and events of the period make this difficult), Zindel and the files ended up in French hands at Stuttgart where the Nazi took cya- nide, leaving the French with one of the final legacies of the Nazi police. (9) Within months after the end of the war, Soderman and Florent Louwage, a Belgian who had also collaborated with the Nazi Interpol throughout the war, met to discuss revitalizing the organization. Louwage obtained his government's agreement to issue invitations and the 1946 meeting of the "new" Interpol was set. (10) With the election of new officers, the only other matter of business to seriously consider was where the organization would be situated. The delegate from Great Britain reported that by "common consent" Paris was chosen as the seat for the "new" Interpol. (11) War-torn with political conflicts and financial instability provoking conflicts in the streets. France's move to offer per- sonnel and funds to reestablish an organization that had not operated outside Nazi influence for 9 years and certainly of questionable immediate value was not questioned by a cadre of officials who had for years before been working with the Nazis.