Lessons Learned: Multinational Division Central-South
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Strzelecki, Polish Army
HE MISSION of the Polish Armed Forces in Iraq ISF and remain ready to support them with combat Tbegan in March 2003 with the first phase of power when needed.2 Operation Iraqi Freedom. Poland deployed the spe- On 9 June 2003, Poland sent the first group of sol- cial operations unit Grupa Reagowania Operacyjno diers to Iraq to help with the deployment of the main Mobilengo [Polish Special Forces] to Iraq; the body of Polish and other nations’ troops. The Polish logistic support ship Okret Rzeczyposplitej Military Contingent (PMC) (first rotation) deployed to Polskiej [Polish Republic Naval Ship] Rear Iraq with approximately 2,300 soldiers and took over Admiral Xawery Czernicki to the Persian Gulf; an area of responsibility (AOR) in the Central-South and a chemical decontamination platoon, on sector. The AOR covered one-fourth of the country, standby, to Jordan. Polish military assets used where 3 to 5 million inhabitants (90 percent of whom during the operation included 146 soldiers and 25 are Shia) live. The AOR also contained the Muslim military vehicles, not an impressive contribution, holy cities of Karbala and An-Najaf. The main task but much appreciated because of the quality of the was to carry out a stabilization mission. forces committed. The PMC’s operational activities have been im- The Global War on Terrorism justified sending pressive. After the transfer of authority from U.S. additional Polish troops to support the postwar forces on 3 September 2003, the MND CS has pro- coalition effort in Iraq. Poland, as “a lead nation,” vided security and stabilization, created conditions decided to structure a multinational division with 24 for building new governmental structures, conduct- contingents from 24 nations and conduct a stabiliza- ed thousands of patrols, set up approximately 15,000 tion mission, not an offensive one. In accordance permanent and movable checkpoints, organized with a memorandum of understanding signed by thousands of convoys, trained over 20,000 new ISF the Troops Contributing Nations, the Polish con- officers, cleared mines and destroyed approximately tingent—in fact, the entire Multinational Division 2 million pieces of munitions, and cleared thousands (MND)—would operate under the authority of the of square meters of roads. United States and the United Kingdom.1 With millions of U.S. dollars from the Commanders’ The end state for Multinational Division Central- Emergency Response Funds available, the Polish South (MND CS) was— Army could offer help to thousands of areawide proj- • For Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to take respon- ects, such as education, health services, and economic sibility for regional control. infrastructure improvement.3 During the first and • For anti-Iraqi forces to be rendered incapable second PMC rotations, more than 1,490 projects cost- of operating effectively through the destruction of ing more than $55 million were completed. The third sanctuaries and the lessening of popular support. rotation began about 200 projects costing more than • For local communities to predominantly accept $11.5 million. The projects included improvements in and support the situation. education, public safety, public health services, sew- • For MND CS forces in local bases to help the age and water systems, cultural heritage, transport,
32 November-December 2005 MILITARY REVIEW warfighting USArmy A Polish soldier operating with the Iraqi National Guard checks an AK-47 for booby traps, Hillah, Iraq, 23 August 2005. electrification, agriculture, irrigation systems, mu- (BCT), the Ukrainian-led 2d BCT, and the Polish nicipal services, finance and economy, food pro- BCT had no problems with internal communica- duction and distribution, and telecommunications. tions because they were allowed to use their national Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities and languages.5 humanitarian assistance are ongoing and vital to Media. The mission was complicated by the pres- the further improvement of Iraq. (See figure.) ence of Polish and visiting media representatives. The media had around-the-clock capabilities, satellite Current Status of Forces access, connectivity, global satellite phone systems, As of June 2005, about 1,600 Polish soldiers and advanced technology, and live-capable devices, all of 4,600 foreign troops from 15 nations were part of which were located on base in the AOR. The MND the Polish-led MND CS in Iraq.4 The Division itself CS headquarters accredited 5 to 15 Polish journalists went through many organizational changes, includ- to cover all activities. Journalists from other countries ing a change in the number of troops from contribut- temporarily accredited at the MND CS headquarters ing nations and changes in the AOR. or visiting the base to report on a specific topic on Experience. The experience the Polish soldiers short notice came from Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, gained; the skills they learned; the trust, confidence, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, the and good opinion they generated among the allies were invaluable, and future Polish forces will be Telecommunication 2 2 able to take the lessons learned to generate improve- Food production and distribution 3 ments and master the military arts. Over 16,000 sol- Finance and economy Municipal service 4 diers have participated in operations abroad, 11,000 Irrigation system 5 in Iraq alone. The soldiers’ experience confirms the Agriculture 5 need for professional, light, deployable units and Electrification 7 subunits ready to carry out a variety of missions. Transport 12 Language. Because English was the language of Cultural heritage protection 12 command, Polish soldiers conducted daily routine Sewage and water system 23 talks, business, and so forth in English. Although Public health service 41 48 soldiers’ language skills were not perfect, they could Public safety 48 understand the common language of command and Education perform their missions. Subordinate commands, Number of projects completed during the Polish such as the Spanish-led 3d Brigade Combat Team Army’s first and second rotations.
MILITARY REVIEW November-December 2005 33 United Kingdom, and the United States. Thirty Iraqi number of field hospitals, including a combat-stress journalists as well as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabeea clinic. (Iraq has proved the importance of having medi- stringers were also present.6 Ground rules gave an cal support and medical-evacuation assets.) Operating equal chance to all media representatives to cover units should be light, armored, and deployable and MND CS operations. there should be more professional subunits. Having modern communications systems and a night-vision The Future Focus capacity is key to operational success. After 2005, when UN resolutions expire and Although MND CS was not to conduct offensive a new Iraqi Parliament and Government assume operations, its troops took preemptive measures to power, reexamining the mission will be vital to maintain law and order in the AOR. Such actions meeting Polish and alliance goals. Poland will con- included organizing ambushes; detaining suspected sult the United States and countries that contributed persons; searching homes, cars, and other proper- forces for the Polish-led division, as well as the Iraqi ties; and conducting a wide spectrum of night Government, to determine the purpose and character patrols, which sometimes resulted in engagements of future Polish contributions. After the October with the enemy. 2005 elections in Poland, newly appointed Minister Soldier preparedness, the will to fight, professional- of Defense Radek Sikorski visited Iraq and took part ism, and combat skills were important, but participat- in official talks with the Iraqi president and the min- ing in such exchanges was a traumatic experience for ister of defense. They asked the Polish Government some soldiers and caused temporary mental problems. to maintain its forces in Iraq and change its mission Those not able to overcome the experience or who did from conducting training and stabilization to con- not improve with medical treatment in the AOR were ducting advisory activities and training. A decision sent home for further treatment. about the Polish force’s strength and mission will The force attempted to follow doctrinal proce- not be made until the end of 2005. dures, but some procedures became irrelevant and The main problems with MND CS involved did not apply in an environment of such dynamic achieving a well-tailored force structure and person- change. In a multinational organization like MND nel professionalism. Structuring the MND CS ac- CS, setting standing operating procedures is impos- cording to NATO standards is not enough. Personnel sible because of participating countries’ conflicting should also have support from higher headquarters, national regulations. For example, some countries clear objectives, sufficient professional knowledge are NATO members, others are not; a few belong to and experience, and efficient equipment to use. the Partnership for Peace Program; others are not ac- Operational lessons learned suggest a need for tive in NATO or in the European Union; many have improved human intelligence, better trained military had little experience in UN missions. Therefore, the police, more flexible logistics, advance development of MND CS’s success, measured in real operational CIMIC and psychological warfare units, and a greater achievements, is truly significant.MR
NOTES
1. UN Security Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003 and the 2003 Memorandum of 5. In May 2004, the Spanish Government withdrew the 3d BCT (approximately Understanding of Warsaw give the United States and the United Kingdom of Great 1,600 soldiers). Soon after, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua Britain and Northern Ireland authority in Iraq. followed. 2. See Multinational Division Central-South (MND CS) Public Information Office 6. Unfortunately, the media often did not report the truth, as when on 4 February Website, on-line at
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Strzelecki, Polish Army, is a senior expert for military cooperation at the Analysis Branch of the Command, Control, and Communications Directorate. He received a B.A. from the Stefan Czarnicki Armor Officers Military College, an M.A. from the Adam Mickiwicz University of Pozhan, and is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Language School, the Canadian Forces School of Management, and the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. In 2004, he joined Operation Iraqi Freedom as Chief of the Public Information Office and Spokesperson for the Commanding General, Multinational Division Central-South.
34 November-December 2005 MILITARY REVIEW