Iran's Post-RevolutionForeignPolicy Introduction Conference Summary Contributors Sanctions onIran:OvercomingConceptualandPoliticalConstraints Iran’s NuclearPolicy Ethnic PoliticsinIran:Post2009PresidentialElections Iran’s RegionalPolicy–theRacetoMiddleEastHegemony Pictures fromtheConference Can theIranSanctionsSucceed? A NuclearIran–ToStrikeorNottoThatistheQuestion The IslamicRevolutioninIran:IntheThroesofFactionalRivalry „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ Description oftheCenter The publicationofthisbookletwasmadepossiblethrough thecooperationandgeneroussupport AmitaiGazit. EmilyB.Landau EphraimAsculai. ReuvenPedatzur. EphraimKam. DavidMenashri. BrendaShaffer. MeirJevedanfar. UziRabi. EphraimSneh . . . of FriedrichEbertStiftung,Israel.Wethankthefoundationfortheircontinuedpartnership ...... Table ofContents . Graphic design andprinting:Merav-Dascalu Publishing,Ltd. Translation toEnglish:SimonPompan,RuchieAvital Copy Editing:ElieFriedman,EstiOfer Scientific Editor:Dr.ReuvenPedatzur All rightsreserved©. November, 2010 85 75 68 59 29 13 76 48 39 22 5 2 4

1 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 2 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony Steering Committee International Management via issues global pressing address to international conferences,roundtablediscussions,andworkshops. order in together gather to leaders world and academics for opportunities organizes also Center The fields. respective their in expertise and experience the on based disputes regional in services mediation powerful offering people, business international prominent and academics distinguished experts, security leaders, community politicians, former of combination of political, security, academic and economic responses through the dispatching of teams driven initiatives based on practical experience and realistic goals. Its multi-faceted method provides a Center represents a much-needed approach to the problems of worldwide The conflict, beyond. offering and solution- region the in resolution conflict for suggestions and papers of position substantive establishment the in pivotal become has Dialogue Strategic for Center Abraham Daniel S. The members oftheBoardGovernors). the of listing full a statement for this of end the see (please globe the around nations from leaders community and business political, academic, includes Governors of Board The Minister. Health and The Jordan. of Talal Bin Hassan current of the Center is Dr. Ephraim Sneh, former Deputy Defense Minister, Transportation Minister, Prince Crown HRH and Gorbachev Mikhail Union Soviet the of President former of comprised is Center the of Management International The resolution. conflict institution in the Middle East, engaging in both academic pursuits and on-the-ground efforts toward a unique Center is of fields.The a variety leaders from scholars and group comprisedof action and think-tank a is College Academic Netanya at Dialogue Strategic for Center Abraham Daniel S. The Goals oftheCenter concerns waystotransformtheoreticalresearchintosolution-orientedpoliciesandactions. between expertsandpolicy-makers.Furthermore,theprincipalchallengefacingworldleaderstoday 1. How to transform theory into practical approaches in policy-making? 2. How to establish dialogue around the world that deal with theoretical approaches to conflict resolution tanks think face Several decisions. proper the at two arrive to order in academics, major and experts with dialogue problems: Given today's security concerns, leaders and national policy makers require more than ever a practical being ofvarioussocieties.Stabilizingtheseconflictsisthemostpressingchallengeourtime peace. world to threats as Dozens of armed conflicts well still prevail at as this time around the hopes world which pose a entail threat to the which well- changes global harbors century 21st The Former Chairsof Center Center forStrategicDialogue of Knesset,formerDirector oftheMossad International Activities&ConferenceDirector Director Ehud Barak,DefenseMinister andChairmanoftheLaborParty HE MikhailGorbachev,formerPresidentoftheUSSR Dr. EphraimSneh,Chair Netanya AcademicCollegeandVice-ChairoftheCenter l The S.DanielAbraham Brig.-Gen(ret)BaruchSpiegel,AdvisortotheDirectoryBoard Friedman, AssistanttotheDirector l TrevorSpiro,Co-Chair Intelligence and AtomicEnergy l DanMeridor,DeputyPrime Ministerandof l AmbassadorYitzhakMayer,SeniorAdvisor l Dr.DavidAltman,SeniorVicePresident, l l EstiOfer,Coordinator HRHPrinceHassanBinTalalofJordan l Dr.ReuvenPedatzur,Academic l DannyYatom,formerMember l AvivaPalter,Headof l Elie Science, UniversityofHaifa Louis Freeh, former FBI Director FBI former Freeh, Louis German Minister of State of Minister German Investments hul a, sai rdcls expert radicalism Islamic Bar, Shmuel Mansour Abu-Rashid, Chairman, Amman Center for Peace and Development Church in Austin, Texas Austin, in Church former General of the Southern Command Southern the of General former Rector, Netanya Academic College Academic Netanya Rector, Executive Director of the International Programs Center, The University of Oklahoma LLB, Yehuda Raveh & Co. & Raveh Yehuda LLB, e lr, omr rsdn o Suh Africa South of President former Klerk, De W. Frederick HE l former Israel Police Commissioner Police Israel former Pulman, LLB, Meadows, Collier, Reed, Cousins & Blau & Cousins Reed, Collier, Meadows, LLB, Pulman, College Center, Haifa Chair of the Board of Trustees, The Academic Arab College in Israel, Haifa Israel, in College Arab Academic The Trustees, of Board the of Chair masdr di Cr, ietr Itrainl rgas etr Uiest o Oklahoma of University Center, Programs International Director, Corr, Edwin Ambassador Yitzhak Teshuva, Delek Co. Delek Teshuva, Yitzhak Mr. Police Chief Police Law, School of Law, Netanya Academic College Academic Netanya Law, of School Law, eea o Ire' Dfne iity fre IF Commander IAF former Ministry, Defense Israel's of General Director- former Washington, to Ambassador Israeli former Adviser, Security National former Ivri, Kennedy, President, Church on the Rock International Rock the on Church President, Kennedy, Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew University, Jerusalem Ladner Institute Ladner Paul Ahlstrom, VSpring Capital VSpring Ahlstrom, Paul Mr. Board ofGovernorsthe S. DanielAbrahamCenter l Theodor Postol, MIT, USA MIT, Postol, Theodor Prof. for StrategicDialogue l l l ) Gabi Last, chairman of Delek Group Delek of chairman Last, Gabi (ret.) Cmdr. Prof. Sinai Deutsch, Senior Vice President, Dean of the Law School, Netanya Academic Elisha Yanai, President, Motorola President, Yanai, Elisha Mr . l Moshe Ortass, entrepreneur Ortass, Moshe Mr. l Tovah Feldshuh, award-winning Broadway actress Broadway award-winning Feldshuh, Tovah Mrs. l l James Woolsey, former Central Intelligence Agency Director Agency Intelligence Central former Woolsey, James Mr. Yossi Sadeh, advocate Sadeh, Yossi Mr. l Michael Feldman, GP Strategies, USA. Strategies, GP Feldman, Michael Mr. and Feldman Jerry Mr. l l Ya'akov Perry, former Head of General Security Service Security General of Head former Perry, Ya'akov Mr. l Larry King, journalist, CNN journalist, King, Larry Mr. Gabi Ben-Dor, Director, International Security Research Security International Director, Ben-Dor, Gabi Prof. l l Cameron Walker, Vice President, Bank of America of Bank President, Vice Walker, Cameron R. Mr. a Csi LB Csi n Co and Caspi LLB, Caspi, Ram Mr. l l ) Ya'akov Amidror, Vice President of the of President Vice Amidror, Ya'akov (ret.) Gen. Maj. Feinstein, Senior Lecturer of International of Lecturer Senior Feinstein, A. Barry Dr. l Shmuel Dankner, Dankner Investments Dankner Dankner, Shmuel Mr. l l Ambassador Dr Edward J Perkins, Chair and Chair Perkins, J Edward Dr Ambassador l l Gerald Mann, Riverbend Baptist Riverbend Mann, Gerald Dr. Pastor Nitza Nachmias, Department of Political of Department Nachmias, Nitza Dr. l Bernard Pinchuk, Vice President and President Vice Pinchuk, Bernard Prof. ) Arieh Amit, former Jerusalem former Amit, Arieh .) (ret Cmdr. l l l ent cmdbur former Schmidtbauer, Berndt Mr. Commissioner (ret) Assaf Hefetz, Assaf (ret) Commissioner Ymo Samya, Yomtov (ret.) Gen. Maj. l Giora Eliraz, The Harry S . Harry The Eliraz, Giora Dr. l Maj. Gen. .) (ret David l Yehuda Raveh, Yehuda Mr. l ai Kamal, Zaki Att. l l Charles D. Charles Mr. Dr. Lawrence l Gen. (ret.) l l Mr. Dr. l l

3 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 4 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony isls ol big rn l te lsr to closer the all attaining itsstrategicgoals. Iran bring would missiles these on warheads nuclear of installation The missiles. Their reach goes far, far beyond Israel. ballistic its of range the decrypt to than more no needs regime Iranian the of ambitions and pretensions the understand to trying Anyone rockets. Iranian of range will the under come Brussels also and Paris Within two, range. or year their another in Athens and Delhi, Moscow cover currently missiles ballistic Iran’s full dominationoftheIraqioilindustry. to control) Iran’s under purposes and intents all for is, Lebanon all, (after Mediterranean the finally have troops withdrawn, giving it full territorial American contiguity from the East . after Iraq Middle greater over control take to is goal urgent most Iran’s the over hegemony attain to striving is it range, immediate world. the In the in Muslims quarter a and billion a of leader the power, global a become will Iran regime, this of leaders the say term, long the In superpower. a become to - goal strategic Iran’s attaining to way the on goals secondary means, the all after are These states. many in activities subversive issue, Iranian nor nuclear terrorism, nor the neither was subject main The Hegemony. Regional hand: for Ambitions at Iran’s issue the of essence the true reflection a was conference the to given title The lecturers whoacceptedourinvitationtospeak. the of quality high the as well as itself subject the to Iran due both of interest considerable subject sparked the on held conference The Ephraim Sneh Introduction secular Iran-Whereto? yet conduct to able another conference in 2011, under the title be of will we that hope I a conference assist important success. to this much making so in doing us for and us with Israel experience considerable Stiftung its sharing for Ebert office Friedrich the again thank once to like would I opportunity, this At to make themquiteeffective. able be should year, this of the summer in early only completed was which Congress, American the in legislation and course their run yet not have Iran on sanctions economic The great seriousness. with prepared be must it but recourse, occur to allow to afford cannot Israel that reality a dwindle will investments foreign and from Israel away in will tilt dangerously the balance region years few a just within Egypt and Arabia Saudi of arming nuclear the to lead view of point different a regarding action military certainly and imposition sanctions, severe the of regarding and from doubts away expresses shies that one its and aspirations, regime Iranian the softer toward a approach presented Europe from guests The another one from different quite often views, of of variety some a presented who hosted experts finest the conference our noted, As . The military option as I see it is the last last the is it I as see option military The . Immigration to will Israel be Immigration halted . In my comments, I represented represented I comments, my In . A nuclear Iran will will Iran nuclear A . The strategic strategic The . This is is This A . regional geopolitical map at the advent of the of the features salient 21 the of one become East has Middle the in influence mounting Iran’s neet t scr fr tef advantageous itself Latin Africa, Asia, in countries with for agreements secure to interests and rivalries international of complexities the exploited has Iran astutely, States, Iranian Very well. the strategy served United have - Russia the and China between tensions and prices, oil rising 1991, in USSR the of fall the - Upheavals and instability in international politics east (Afghanistan). and (Iraq) west the to neighbors its fate befell that the against insurance providing as Asia, Central in influence exerting as well as arena, Gulf Persian the and East Middle the in sway holding views regime incumbent The change. regime a undergone have of and Americans hands the the at it experienced already have that countries two by flanked are they that fact the of view in especially Change’, ‘Regime as lightly what is known in Foggy Bottom parlance take not do leaders Iranian collapse. its about bring to seek which countries - allies States its and United the toward policy survivalist a adopting threatened, felt has Republic Islamic the inception, its Since objectives. paramount as leadership its of legitimacy the and security country’s the enhancing at aims strategy their the regional and international agenda. Above all, determining in voice dominant a them give will through economic, military, and political strength operate Republic under the assumption Islamic that the exertion the of power of leaders The regional power. a as history past its and the world, Shi’ite-Muslim in position central important location, population, geographical big size, large its from stems recognition international and hegemony regional for aspiration Iran’s Generally, century. Uzi Rabi The RacetoMiddleEast Iran’s RegionalPolicy- Hegemony st

h 21 the of start the at East Middle the in place taking transformations the reflected This Shi’ites. and relations Sunni as charged well as Arabs, and Persians between already the exacerbating aftermath, its in and War Lebanon Second the during apparent fully countries. became concerns Gulf These the and Jordan, Arabia, Saudi Egypt, include which regimes, Arab moderate distant, the more to concern grave of source nations a become has as well Arab as neighboring countries, of affairs domestic the in leadership role as ominous . Tehran’s intervention a in emergence Iran’s regard regimes Arab The forsaken thestruggleagainstIsrael. have that leaderships Arab the at out lashing while street, Arab the on support broad win to Teheran helped also policy This forefront. its at be and agenda Islamic an push to Iran helped network This collaborators. their as perceived Israel, the West, and the moderate Arab regimes n ehi (rbPrin tnin ta have that tensions (Arab/Persian) ethnic and dedicated to "resistance" ( "resistance" organizations to dedicated and countries of network a of against Israel, the Islamic Republic became the linchpin struggle uncompromising to commitment an a waging and hostility the this On of basis standing. regional of Iran’s means solidifying important an as served Israel vis-à- vis stance hostile implacably an Adopting increasing prominence. Iran’s reinforced that - 2006) (July-August War Lebanon Second the and 2003 Hussein’s April in regime Saddam of fall the centers, power Arab of decline the namely - decades recent in for striving leadership Iran’s coincided with East, regional developments Middle the In stage. significant most world the the on States United the of competitors are which China, and Russia with - significantly most - and America st h rlgos (Sunni/Shi’ite) religious The century. Muqawama ) against )

5 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 6 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony are Shi’ites. And while many Iraqi Shi’ites served for Arabia, example, most of the workers in the oil Saudi industry In roles. lower-caste instead filling states, Arab the of militaries the and systematic bureaucracies the in representation appropriate had of never Shi’ites because discrimination, institutional And them. toward attitudes basic in change no was there Sunnis, dominant the by accepted readily was support their although that found - cause Palestinian the or party Ba’ath the Nasserism, whether - nationalism Arab of manifestation various the of supporters Shi’ite fervent Even unchanged. remained - Arabs" class "second as to referred often - brethren Shi’ite their of mistrust Sunni and forgotten, be to strong too were centuries back going rifts Sectarian nation. Arab the of Shi’ites of members equal not were they Arabic, tongue be might mother although Thus, it. not against prejudiced was did and Shi’a the embrace nationalism Arab intact. Sunni leave dominance would ideologies prevailing and regimes secular in changes that lesson bitter the learn to were Shi’a the world, Arab the In to helpconsolidatethatinferiority. states of the Middle East and beyond has been nation the of role The ubiquitous. is inferiority Shi’ite but Arabia, Saudi and Lebanon, Iraq, in marked most been has reality This Shi’ites. of predominantly consisting ones, poorer classes the and upper and middle the between gaps socio-economic the bridge to effort has no been there leadership, political the of rhetoric pan-Arab and nationalist the Notwithstanding Shi’ites. of marginalization the the and dominance in states Sunni by characterized been nation have East Middle founding, their Since than tomattercoupd’étatsofthefaith. more closely linked to geopolitical developments were traditions Islamic great two the between tensions renewed these expected, be might as ' countries, accompanied their by efforts in to involvement promote the Iranian deepening about the concern growing a have latter The and states. Arab Iran between strain growing the of indicative is Crescent' 'Shi'ite a of advance the alarm with which the Arab nations have viewed The countries. Arab of expense the at Turkey) extent, great a to also, and (Iran players Arab non- of strengthening significant the been has which of feature prominent a dynamic, created new a have Hussein Saddam 2003 of April overthrow the since East Middle the swept Shiitization Nonetheless, communities. Sunni of ' regimes of the Persian Gulf and secular Arab secular and Gulf Persian the of regimes have taken to denouncing both the monarchical Iran by inspired militants Shi’ite conflict. Shi’ite Sunni- the sharpened and accelerated greatly regions. those in East Middle the in policy revolutionary Tehran’s interests ideological and economic vested Tehran’s to owing importance paramount of been have East Middle the and - either monarchic or republic - the Persian Gulf East is beyond the scope of this paper. For Iran revolution and its ideology on the entire Middle the of complete ramifications manifold the of A discussion Iran. modern-day of in history watershed the a was Revolution Islamic The Western Arabcountries. fostered relations with more moderate and pro- for Tehran however, time, same target the At aggression. a and enemy, an as regimes Arab radical by seen was Tehran result, a As region. the in elements radical against alliance defense western a of part integral an was Iran 1970s, and 1960s the In relationship. Arab-Iranian the 1970s, early became the predominant in shaping the character in of starting and importance, in grow to continue to were factors Regional in determining the Iran-Arab relationship waned. division West-East clear-cut the of importance Iran’s to close The dangers. imminent the highlighting very borders, revolution Arab the winds the of carried monarchy the of abolition in the Middle East during the course of the 20 nationalism modern of rise the to additional In not beanengineofsocialmobility. lesser ranks, thus ensuring that the army would in Saddam Hussein’s army, they did so mostly in Qassim’s Egypt. containing at aimed principally was Pact’, ‘Baghdad the of framework the within monarchy, Iraqi the and Iran between collaboration the 1950s, the In at thetime. rivalry Arab-Iranian the of hallmarks the of one was Union, Soviet the of aegis the under came Libya later and Syria Egypt, as such countries Arab while West, Iran’s the with itself Pact’. ally to choice ‘Baghdad the of part becoming the Soviet threat, Iran joined the western camp, about Concerned schism. Arab-Iranian the in itself manifested West and East between duel global the War, World Second the of aftermath between Arabs and Iranians. For example, in the another dimension to the ethno-religious friction century, regional and international politics added coup d’état coup and the and th

of one Said, Abdel-Moneim actions. subversive its continuing for Iran from at denunciations fierce directed media Cairo dissuade construction. Instead, the quasi-official Egyptian not did publication of publication solidarity and Palestinian suffering, as well as the Arab invoking by sentiment Egyptian to appeal to attempts But gunfire. of outbreak the to led occasion one on which crossing, Rafah the at media campaign against Egypt, organizing rallies aid from Iran. The Hamas leadership of conducted delivery a the obstructing and buildup military its compromising thereby affected, severely be would weaponry of smuggling the its for routes completed, were wall the of construction the if that understood organization The Hamas. than more none but world, Arab the in many astounded action This border. Egyptian-Gazan rna ncer su hs eoe h central the become has issue nuclear Iranian The ever. than foreboding more seems buildup nuclear Iran’s that backdrop this against is It a dangerousenemy. late. The fact too remains that Egypt little, regards Iran too as of case a been has it Mubarak, President with meet to Larijani, Ali their parliament, of mollify speaker the to sending anger, effort Egyptian some made have Iranians the Although Egypt". "Defending entitled article aies f rn a is eiin o ul a ‘ on wall build steel to decision its was Iran of wariness Cairo’s reflected that move Egyptian significant highly A intent. aggressive Iran’s Egyptian of leadership the to confirmation unassailable as served - regime Mubarak the of objectives toppling the far-reaching interrogations, detainee whose to according included, - Egypt cell Hezbollah in a of discovery 2009 April The to systematic Republic Hamas inGazaandHezbollahLebanon. Islamic the the by and given assistance Iraq, post-Saddam in influence mounting Iran’s concern with viewed have leaders Egyptian And countries. Eastern Middle "vulnerable" influence and attempts infiltrate to Iranian denounce scathingly electronic press and the print the about Both buildup. warnings Iranian stern issuing regularly camp. Egypt, the largest Arab country, has been and proxies Arab moderate the Iran’s to congenial more regimes between conflict the crucible of a become thus has East Middle The being "atheistic". as regard they that East Middle the in regimes al-Aharam ’s chief editors, published a lengthy Philadelphi Road Philadelphi fatwās against the construction, the against ,’ sealing off the off sealing ,’ Asharq Alawsat Asharq ne te headline Empire", Persian the of dream the revives "Iran the Under discourse. Arab of focus before it has gone nuclear," the Saudi warning Saudi the nuclear," gone has it before region the in meddles Iran how is this "If Iran. nuclear a about alarm the sound to intended part in least at are dangers, its stressing press Saudi the in Palestinian articles vitriolic the and the territories, and Lebanon in Iranian involvement of leadership Riyadh the by criticism because of the nuclear issue. Both the constant recent of aspect urgent more a assumed thus has rivalry years Arab-Iranian growing The to thethreat…Weneedimmediateresolution." closer are we because maybe term shorter the are a long-term solution, but we see the issue in Hillary Clinton State during her visit to of Riyadh that "sanctions Secretary told al-Faisal, Saud Minister Foreign Saudi countries, Gulf Persian the in feeling prevalent the encapsulates best perhaps that statement 2010 15, February a in nuclear Iran’s called program the "greatest threat to the region". And example, for Minister, Foreign Bahrain’s countries. the those of of out capitals coming started have statements Iran. As a consequence, increasingly outspoken nuclear a with dealing in devices own their to real and concretescenarioinwhichtheywillbeleft a foresee countries these security, their to commitment continued America’s Doubting - havenotmetthetestofreality. Iran has the right to have civilian nuclear energy and that example, for saying, by - diplomacy conciliation irenic for hopes Their Gulf. Persian making the geographic dominance, Iranian ensure to tool a as bomb" "Shi’ite the regard - Arab and Sunni both are Iran. The monarchic regimes in the Gulf - which - neighbors which will stand to Iran’s lose the most - from a nuclear countries Gulf Arab the and Arabia Saudi are apprehensive more Even East woulddeclinefurther. Middle the in countries Arab the of influence in their internal affairs. If this were to occur, the power, thereby encouraging further intervention regional a as status its solidify will Iran nuclear a countries, Arab most of standpoint the From state. nuclear a becomes Iran once region the in equation power the in change dramatic a is about concerned deeply are leaders Arab What to East. Middle intended the in dominance Iranian facilitate is rather but Israel, attacking at nuclear capability Iran is striving for is not aimed claimed in January 2006 that the Persian Gulf into a literal

7 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 8 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony president, exchanging friendly words Israeli with him." the of hand the in shook and dialogue York New interfaith an in participated king people there," Shariatmadari charged, "the Saudi Palestinian the the the of suffering the and against Strip "At Gaza aggression Islam. Israeli the with of do height to nothing having dictatorship absolutist an is it arguing Saudi Arabia, lambasted Shariatmadar leader Khamenei. spiritual Ali country’s the with aligned is Iraqi terrorattacks. the behind was Arabia Saudi that categorically of the conservative news agency of Saudis to create chaos there. Hassan Hanizadeh, editor the trying accused and Iraq in attacks terror in involvement also Iranians the Saudi dissident. And as if this were not enough, London-based a al-Massari, Mohammed was Shariatmadari, editor of the Saudi propaganda. Also prominent was Hossein Always monarchy. to the against vehemently attacks responded these press Saudi The who blamed Saudi Arabia for the situation. Yemen, conducting interviews with rebel leaders channel devoted many hours to the situation in television Alalam The Sana’a. in regime the and rebels Shi’ite the against war all-out an waging was filled with assertions that Saudi Arabia was were backed by Iran. In turn, the Iranian media rebels the claimed sources Not Saudi rebels. surprisingly, Shi’ite by forces security against offensive renewed a by broken was fire cease which also included the case of Yemen, when a 2009, August in opened Arabia Saudi and Iran between war propaganda the in front new A television channel, Arab-language Iranian-based, An Riyadh. at criticism blistering directing Iran, in campaign inaugurated was clerics ranking high by backed media anti-Saudi an Concurrently, once ithasthebomb." interference its of extent the image "just says, 4 2 1 with thebloodofmassacredYemeniShi’ites". stained "hands having and hypocrisy" of flag the "hoisting of Arabia Saudi accusing Shirazi Ayatollah with Iran, on blame cast also clergy 3 A recurring guest on guest recurring A 2009. Iran Alalam Mehr Alalam , (Iran),September 28,2009. , August 11, 2009; Jomhouri-e Eslami, August 26, , August15-20,2009; , September23,2009. Alalam , played a central role in the anti- 2 Alalam Abna Kayhan Daily Kayhan television network television (Iran)August14,2009. Mehr , claimed , which 3 The 4 1

Jazeera Thus, plot. Iranian an to Yemen in situation the attributed press Saudi the theme, this with operations intheArabianPeninsula: terrorist its for bridgehead a into Yemen turn of Emir Naif, should be looked into. looked be should Naif, Emir of abortive assassination of the Prince in Muhammad, involvement son Iran's that contended Aqili Al- Sulaiman Columnist region. the in interests an Iranian front dedicated to promoting Tehran's organization - although Sunni - was the nonetheless that charge the reiterated media Saudi the al-Qaeda, arch-enemy with Iran link to quick 6 5 Saudi foreignpolicy: with it contrasting countries, Eastern Middle in The columnist further outlined Iranian involvement daily Saudi the of editor-in-chief The 7 threaten theGulfcountries: Turki Al-Sudairi, wrote of Iran’s true intention to over Yemen…underIraniandirective. control seize to is objective main whose special forces (the of the Force Iranian Revolutionary Quds Guard), from officers through mainly place takes coordination are al-Houthi coordinated The with al-Qaeda in Yemen. Lebanon. This south in Hezbollah the after modeled mini-state own their establish to aspire They Iran. well from assistance logistical and as military as materiél, receive The rebels Movement')…. Shi'ite Yemen 'South (the Houthi (Shi'ite rebels) and the separatists al- al-Qaeda, between pact a is There rns elkon fot t smuggle to efforts well-known Iran's We (Saudi Arabia) are not competing with Al-Riyadh Al-Jazeera to SaudicitizenswhichthePrincehad declared. day House Open the of guest a as home his entered who bomber suicide a by attempt assassination an from spared was he 2009 September of end the At al-Qaeda. against forces security Saudi of combat the oversaw who Interior Muhammad bin Naif is the son of the Saudi Minister of the desire toinstillterror. its is nuclear go to Iran truth. prompts the What is this global all, After affects economies? that region the of geographic independence and stability the defend to desire the the of because not Is is it plan? that oppose why to poised and world against, nuclear acquire weapons to trying Iran is Who magazine claimed that Iran sought to sought Iran that claimed magazine , August22,2009. , (SaudiArabia),September3,2009 . 7 5 Consistent al-Riyadh 6 Al- , The new sanctions endeavor to prevent Tehran companies. energy and oil government-owned twenty than more and Guard Revolutionary the as well as four agencies operating on behalf of sanctions, evade the to company through shipping Iranian acted claims administration the which out, singled were companies' 'front Five programs. nuclear and missile Iran's in involved are that individuals and companies of assets on freeze a imposing 2010, in Iran on pressure up ratcheted administration The power. nuclear a to becoming to advance Iran’s down slow to the most it can accomplish through diplomacy is the that that conclusion the to appears come has administration It installations . nuclear its destroy to force military using or Iran nuclear a accepting either of choice the with confronted Obama administration has sought to avoid being the The ineffective. be to proven have allies its and contrast, States United the By by date to ends. taken measures those achieving in or sanctions impose diplomatic moves against it have been effective to attempts American India and other countries in its struggle against Russia, with years the over hatched had arms Iran nuclear its agreements of web The program . advancing development of purpose its served well governments Western within and in and objectives. At the same time, divisions between events standing its the promote to East of Middle the advantage full took Iran the regionintobloodyturmoil. hurl would pressures domestic and foreign off forecast, Iran's adventurism and efforts to ward grim Alhomayed's In bloodbath. regional a to lead would that provocations and stage to Hezbollah Hamas use to intends and - claimed he - Iraq over control gain to seeking is Iran West. the with negotiations its in maneuvering deceitful Tehran's by East Middle the to posed daily, Saudi the of editor-in-chief Alhomayed, Tariq self-destructive. is weapons to nuclear having that mention not aggressive, is not strategy and Saudi productive end. this to budget a nuclear state while sacrificing its annual become to strive Arabia Saudi does Nor [Qatar]…. Doha and Kuwait in meetings between the Arab countries in the summit strived for understanding and agreements who one the is Abdullah King Moreover, Palestine. and Lebanon Iraq, in ones the as such societies fractured to weapons saq Alawsat Asharq wre o te danger the of warned , countries are acutely aware of the threats Iran threats the of aware acutely are countries Gulf the but one), for hope actually may (some oppose necessarily not would countries Arab by Israel or the United States - is an option the strike against Iran's nuclear installations - either military A expectations. high have not did they but acceptable, find could Iran that international consensus an in result would 2010 April in proliferation nuclear on conference Washington the that hoped countries Arab The weakness. American reveal to served Iran’s and aggression of countries, Arab the conduct of was both a continuation of Iran's eyes policy the In action againstIranwasintheoffing. Iranian nuclear progress whenever international off showing of point a made escalated and rhetoric, his Ahmadinejad Mahmoud President Committee, Aladdin Boroujerdi. At the same time, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy cooperation with the member-nations," said the its reconsider will Republic Islamic the country, the "If United States to impose more sanctions on the adopted. even European Unionfollowsinthefootstepsof were they actions EU before the denounce to quick was Iran the intensify pressure." will we respond, not do they if but program, nuclear the about negotiation to from that - that the European nations are open message the takes Iran hope I "And explained. program," the UK Foreign Minister William Hague nuclear their of issue core the on negotiations serious start finally they so regime, Iranian the on pressure increasing at aimed all are "They members. Guard Revolutionary of assets froze shipping and visas, Iranian entry denied companies, airline and blacklisted sanctions The as in areas of trade, finance and transportation. investments in the gas and oil industries, as well The aim of the new package was to prevent further Tehran. to shipments cargo of oversight the missile and nuclear program, and heightened of senior officials from companies connected to assets of freezing the restrictions, travel sale, arms on ban a including Tehran, on sanctions of series a imposed which June, early of 1929 Resolution Council's Security the to follow-up a was action European This program. nuclear its the bid of to pressure Tehran to ministers change policy a and in curb sanctions foreign new approved Union European the 2010, July In as gasolineandjetfuel. from having access to petroleum distillates such

9 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 10 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony n eebr 09 a eir Egyptian senior a 2009, December In outlets. media international and regional in entertained It was not the first time that such speculation was Iran. on attack Israeli possible a for preparation in secret Israel base would be built in Saudi Arabia in unloaded Saudi being Arabia. There was even speculation that a was equipment IDF that spreading started rumors that, to prior weeks Many objective. their to corridor air an fighters jet Israel's giving thereby Iran, on attack an of event the in territory its in overflight Israeli to the nuclear possibility that Riyadh would turn a Iran's blind eye around probing was Dagan that believed is It program. revolved have most likely would it but disclosed, not were took place, ever it if meeting, that from details say, to Needless officials. Saudi senior and Dagan Meir a director Mossad between about meeting secret speculation was there 2010, July In Arab world. the in leaders as Arabia Saudi like countries of pro-Iranian bloc, thereby bolstering the standing including Syria) would also undermine the cohesiveness of the (perhaps Palestinians the and Israel between process peace regional A East. Middle the in events of pace the determining from - proxies its and Iran namely, - elements perhaps primarily - the aim was to check radical diplomatic process with Israel. In addition- and the Palestinian Authority for a resumption of the to blessing its give to 2010 29, July on decided League Arab the when objective was only the peace not regional promoting example, For region. the in interests shared of constellations Arab countries the has the potential and of creating Iran new between tension mounting The advance . nuclear Iran’s by East Middle the on wrought change the of light in evolve to have The regional perspective of these states will also develop nuclearcapabilities. to resolved are they that occasions several on declared already have suit. countries those Indeed, following consider to Turkey and Egypt compelling many countries such as Saudi Arabia, either in the short or intermediate term, thereby premise is that Iran will become a nuclear power the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. Their working between caught feel countries Arab Moderate the GulfiftheyassistanAmericanoffensive. in objectives strategic other and oil installations attack to occasions several on made has a necessary counterweight to Iran's broadening Arab regimes that saw Turkey's rising power as moderate the by welcomed was region the in Turkey of significance growing The supremacy. its challenge to able be to seemed country no to be the dominant player in the Middle East, and appeared Iran 2007, Until forefront. the toward player, Turkey, has taken some meaningful non-Arab steps another power, hegemonic a regional as Iran of emergence the with Concurrent groupings seem to have emerged in the region. At the advent of the 21 the of advent the At East. Middle the in place taken have changes In the interim, some very interesting geopolitical Israel. to does it as Jordan and Egypt, Arabia, Saudi to problem a much as poses Iran action. military spearhead to capacity and will the having as it portraying by served actually are interests best region. Yet it remains uncertain whether Israel's a dangerous brew that threatens stability in the is destruction mass of weapons to and ideology open radical as of conjunction the Obviously, existence question. future country’s the portraying Israel, in anxiety public of level the frequent The use of threat. the term Iranian the about countries vocal more the of one was Israel process. armament nuclear its completed an Tehran before in upheaval result would Iran in dynamics political socio- the because dilemma, ultimate the face to have not would it that Israel in illusion or hope the either was there time some quite For come totermswithanuclearIran." cannot "we that saying Iran, in strike military American an of idea the endorse publicly far to as so went Otaiba, Al Yousef States, United The Iran. nuclear ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the a of prospects the about concern are expressing East publicly Middle course, the changing in countries Arab that proves Iran on sanctions the join would it that The announcement by the United Arab Emirates the MiddleEast. would eclipse Saudi standing as a key player in Iran nuclear A Iran. Shi'ite by threatened feels with Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf Emirates), which (together camp Sunni moderate the to belongs does Arabia it but Israel, with relations Saudi diplomatic have not time. some been for had on going program nuclear Iran's regarding intelligence Arabia Saudi and that Israel between likely cooperation it considered official 'existential threat' 'existential st century, new interest new century, raised f h poiet rb omnaos on commentators Arab elaborate prominent the of an One conducted objectives. Turkey's regarding discussion media Arab The dubbed him. newspaper one as East", Middle the of Sultan "new the and star a street. became instantly Erdoğan Arab the on mindset the of sign sure a Erdoğan, of ones by replaced and removed were Ahmadinejad and Nassrallah of portraits assessments suggested that Turkey was trying was Turkey that suggested assessments Other regimes. Arab moderate the destabilize and Syria could drive the region into conflict and Turkey Iran, of consisting axis tripartite a Such Egyptian leaders were trying to foster with Syria. expense of the one that the moderate Saudi and and the at emerging was (Iran-Turkey-Syria) 'triad' influence Iran's marginalizing it? reducing It seemed that a disconcerting in important an element it is or axis Iranian the of part Turkey Is question: interesting an on focused rdto of tradition best the In publics. Arab of reaction the was prominence to ascent Turkey's of proof Further renewed the opening oftheRafahcrossing. by replaced being, time the for was, matters security on stand strong its and and Syria. The flotilla events embarrassed Egypt, Iran from attack vitriolic and condemnation of brunt the borne and wall, security Egyptian the protest who to world the of activists corners all from peace came so-called of hundreds Israel tackling been months with for had Egypt blockade Gaza, on joint a purposes, and intents all for imposing, and Route 'Philadelphi pleased. Engaged in erecting a steel wall on the not were regimes Arab moderate the Certainly powerful media had mixed feelings Arab about a Turkey's moves. The firmament . into regional the in Turkey presence turn and interests Ankara's promote to conflict Israeli-Arab the of flames the fanning role, Iran's on taking was Turkey if as appeared It prominence. regional acquire to wish Turks the way the of example striking a was Strip, Gaza the of residents the to aid humanitarian bringing of aim purported with hundreds of passengers on board, with the The six-vessel "Gaza flotilla" sailing out of Turkey been heardfromTehranformanyyears. had what to similar very was Erdoğan, Recep Ankara, as conducted by Turkish Prime Minister in played being music the that countries these on dawned it long before However, influence. Jazeera s e st, bu Rha al-Rashed, Rahman Abdul site, web 's e o et ot vv l Roi! le vive mort, est Roi Le the , Al- indeed, is shown by the fact that Ahmadinejad that fact the by shown is indeed, This, Iran. by used those than other means Muslim by achieved with be can prestige resonance regional and publics both that drew proving flotilla Turkey, to The attention international and Israel. regional on pressure exerted such have not could Iran, so more the all your where and countries, money Arab the Presumably, is". mouth your "put implicit to the with challenge thunder Iran’s stolen have to seemed Erdoğan flotilla, the dispatching In Iranian regionalagendasince1979. issue having been Palestinian one of the main the items on the despite street, Iranian the on silence dead by to met was - Istanbul Paris) and from London did it indeed (as Tehran in rallies anti-American and anti-Israeli classic for had immense potential to serve as the occasion which - event this though, Surprisingly regime." "the barbarian murder perpetrated by the Zionist condemned quickly who leaders reaction Iranian angry from an triggered affair flotilla The antagonist. Israeli and savior Palestinian as itself portray to efforts newer its and greatness historic its of compounded aura an on relies Turkey East, In striving for a dominant position in the Middle prestige . has regional Iran’s Turkey of process, some appropriated the In influence. its of exertion the for objectives as Iran by targeted areas many on encroach to tried has it extent great a to and power, regional a of attributes the has Turkey words, other In exporter). gas or oil an not is it though even GDP, of terms in world the in 18th (ranking Republic Islamic the than robust more financially also is Turkey Iran. than ease at more is Turkey East, Middle Sunni mostly the In well. as States United the and the China Russia, Syria, and and states, Arab Iran moderate with dialog a having of possibility multifaceted the with a it provides conducts that diplomacy and - East the and Middle Eurasia, Balkans, the neighbors and - continents between bridge a as situated is chips, apparently more potent than Iran’s. Turkey Indeed, Turkey holds some important bargaining Rosa-elyosif card to advance its objectives." (Abdullah Kama, help the Palestinians, but to use the Palestinian media contended that "Turkey does not want to Egyptian quasi-official The initiative. diplomatic future any in broker regional a as serve to as to gather influence in the international arena so ). 11 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 12 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony the first decade of the 21 in game the of rules the that indisputable is it years. While seen many questions remain has unanswered, East significant geopolitical transformations in recent Middle the Unquestionably, the region,andpasscrowntoAnkara. defender of the Palestinian cause and leader of the as Iran Shi’ite dethrone to Turkey allowed on the nuclear issue. This was a ‘bear hug’ that Tehran, it embraced its rival by coming to its aid from portfolio Palestinian the snatched Turkey effectively tied Iran’s hands. At the same time as thus Turkey sanctions. further avoiding of hope more stringent international proposal, and in the a to alternative an as abroad, uranium Iran’s of joined some enrich further to proposal a in Brazil with having the and sanctions against of voted round fourth having for Turkey thank to forced was it discomfort, Iran’s to add To paling nexttotheTurkishinitiative. victory, Pyrrhic a become have could it that fact the to due possibly quickly, shelved was flotilla Gaza-bound a send to idea the However, Iran. on imposed recently sanctions international of round fourth the from attention diverted have might which the flotilla, own their with sending of idea toyed Guard revolutionary his and different fromthoseofthe20 eorpi data Demographic Tehran. near stations gas fifteen of torching the including measures, such household’s accompanied have that riots each the by seen as - for quotas consumption, pose a significant threat setting to stability necessity of consequent the and products, fuel its of third a about imports Iran that fact The policy. balanced a conduct to regime the further on pressure put will turn, in This, staples years. coming those in of price the in rise sharp a to natural gas, electricity, water and bread will lead gasoline, of purchase the for subsidies ending Iranian the or slashing of measures, austerity New economy. hallmarks the become have unemployment rates and clear signs of recession precipitous have years Growing Iran. in crisis economic the intensified two the last the in prices and oil in drop recession global The st century are markedly th . the IslamicRepublicfacesdauntingchallenges. hn nenl hne n rn il cu, but occur, clearly on the 31 will Iran in change internal when and if predict to hard is It concerns. social and rigged the 2009 overturn June elections, to to effort embrace economic an and sphere political the beyond expanding become, will protest the the greater the economic difficulties, the greater Still, decades. or years within either occur, will one another that inevitable not course of is centuries, it two undergone last the in has East revolutions various Iran Middle Although other astute populations. to uncommonly compared is politically public Iranian The so farhashadtheoppositeeffect. but society, Iranian advance to supposed was the revolutionary regime. After all, the revolution with citizens Iran’s of frustration growing the of wave discount to hard the is regime it Nonetheless, opposition. repressing incumbent in the successful that was appears it but hopes, these bolstered events subsequent the and elections 2009 June The path. different a new on Iran setting world, outside Such the to attentive tensions. more be would - thought is it so global - leadership and regional alleviate will priorities different new with leadership a of arrival the that and Iran in regime change for hopes Israel, including West, The of agents key rising discontent. the of young one the being generation with protest, growing contain to ability regime’s the to challenge another poses the recent elections. The growing public following distress crisis political unprecedented the of background the with place takes this of all And prices in city centers also adds to public unrest. housing rising amidst homes seeking couples in the economy and society. The plight of young for 2007-8), highlight serious structural problems 12%), of and a particularly high inflation rate (22.5% figure a claim authorities (the under or 30 people for 20% about of rate unemployment An unemployed each the year, of are further ranks signs the of crisis. join who people million one nearly the for opportunities employment create to inability government’s the with coupled 35, under is population the of third a that showing st anniversary of the revolution, Introduction نه شرقینه غربی جمهوری اسالمی. this directly in a letter which Khomeini penned Khomeini which letter a in directly this the as said even he this and disadvantage, biggest USSR's saw he fact, In God. in believes completely contradictory to Islamic belief, which as atheism Communism's viewed he foremost, USSR and the First contempt. much with communism and viewed also he time, same the At achieved thisgoalsuccessfully. He House. White the of out him force and him against vote they that so voter American the of front in weak look he Carter make corner, to wanted the around elections presidential US With Tehran. in embassy American the of takeover the behind reasons the of one is This strong. especially was Carter Jimmy president "corrupt" Shah. His animosity towards American the of supporter a and decades, for resources natural Iran's of "pillaging" called he what for responsible US the held also Khomeini Israel. Muslim the of people in the oppressor Middle East, and a staunch ally of the as seen Satan" was Great The "The as Islam. labeled of he whom enemy USA, the as USA USSR the the both and viewed he importantly, More USSR respectively. the and USA the by offered communism, and capitalism both to alternative viable a be would which Republic), Islamic (an Islam of version Ayatollah political a design to wanted Khomeini Ruhollah founder, and revolution's First the reasons. foremost, several to due was This beginning oftherevolution. the at policy foreign Iran's of linchpins the was (Capitalism) West the and (Communism), East the from independent staying of concept The Tehran's in Imam KhomeiniStreet. building Ministry Foreign to Iran's sign entrance the reads the Republic" to Yes Islamic East, the to No West, the to "No Meir Jevedanfar Iran's Post-Revolution Foreign Policy Torkmanchai prse) gis the against oppressed) adms ertra dsrs n rn ae him gave Iran on desires territorial Saddam's with uprising compiled threat, an a for Such Saddam. calling against as far as went even by Saddam's government for many years. persecuted Khomeini brutally been had who Iraqi Shiites many with well resonated oppressors) 4 3 2 1 sides, and subsequent treaties of Golestan of 1722, 1796, 1804, and 1826 between the two wars The Iran. on desires territorial had Russia fact that he, alongside many the Iranian to believed addition in that is This Afghanistan. as such responsible for oppression of Muslims in places an uprising amongst its own Shiite population Shiite own its amongst uprising an feared government Saudi the that so much So particular. in Shiites the amongst and East, in Middle especially attention, positive received Initially, Khomeini's model of the Islamic Republic a validfoundationofsuchbeliefs. of kilometers of its territory to Russia served as al fr h rs o the of rise the for calls The same was true with Iraqi Shiites. Khomeini's Saudi rulerscouldnotignore. the which threat a this made rich oil are which The fact that many Saudi Shiites reside in areas years. many for oppressing been had it whom o obce i 1988 in Gorbachev to bia" Ara- Saudi on revolution Islamic the of "Reflection http://www.cais-soascom/ CAIS/Iran/torkmanchai.htm Studies Oriental and African of School University, London (CAIS), Studies Iranian Ancient of Circle The Treaty" "Turkamanchai Iran/golestan.htm http://www.cais-soascom/CAIS/ Studies Oriental and African of School University, London (CAIS), ies Stud- Iranian Ancient of Circle The Treaty" "Golestan default.aspx http://www.irdcir/fa/content/4875/ Republic lamic Is- the of documentation the Mikhail for Center Gorbachev" to Khomeini Imam of letter of text "Entire www enghelab_islamic_p1.php Aftab News Aftab . aftab . 3 ir/articles/politics/world/c1c1195813833_ upon which Iran lost thousands lost Iran which upon (Tehran) November 23, 2007, http:// 2007, 23, November (Tehran) 1 e lo ed Russia held also He . Mostakbareen Mostazafeen (the (the 2 and 4 , 13 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 14 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 6 5 West Khomeini, was very combative. He saw both the like much approach, policy foreign Khamenei's forums. making decision policy foreign many in himself involved president then was who Khamenei Ali Minister, Foreign the was technocrat messianic a Velayati, Akbar Ali and matters, policy foreign Although Khomeini had the final say on important government, inJune1981. fell out with Khomeini over the role he of the clergy in after Iran fled Sadr Bani Hassan predecessor Abol Rajai's 1981. August of 31st on bomb massive a by assassinated was Rajai Ali Mohammad predecessor, his after presidency, Seyyed Ali Khamenei was elected to the post of (1981-1989): Combative Islam Khamenei Presidency in chargeofcarryingouttheirvision. replacement his Ali Khamenei to placed on the presidents later and he policy Leader, Supreme and As test. foreign validity the Khomeini's put effectiveness Iraq against war The invasion. his for backers and sponsors of short wasn't he that meant neighbors Arab other his scare to managed had Khomeini that fact The 1980. the pretext he was looking for to invade Iraq in 7 two sides. the between relations of absence to due parts, made aircraft, many of which did not have spare US operating was force air Iran's skies. the for This is especially true when it came to the battle equipment superiority, Iran had to do something. military overwhelming Iraq's of face the in that was argument Rafsanjani's costly. too being as viewed was policy a such Rafsanjani, as such regime, the of members moderate more some For them. of either with rapprochement in part no play should Iran that adamant was he and Te et s okn t cet hsiiy between hostility create Sunnis" and Shiites world's to looking is west "The showArticle3.cfm?article_id=18215&topicID=44 http://www .worldsecuritynetworkcom/ Network rity Secu- World 08/03/2010 Change" Regime want ple "Peo- Banisadr: Ex-President "Iran’s Farwick, Dieter ik Keddie, Nikki 15, 2010,http://shia-online.ir/article .asp?id=11421 August 1,2006, P. 258 Revolution 6 and the East as enemy of Islamic Republic 7 This meant that many of them were Yl Uiest Pes Udtd edition, Updated Press; University Yale , Modern Iran: Roots and Results of of Results and Roots Iran: Modern 5 Shia Online Shia , Tehran, May Tehran, , 9 was turned against the Tudeh party. Tudeh the against turned was regime the of wrath full the 1982, In long. last raise the ire of the Soviets. However this did not was initially hesitant because he did not want to for a while at least. It is believed that Khomeini party, Tudeh the of members to apply not did same The killed. or arrested, out, driven either MKM out and soon many of its members were broke out all over Tehran. Khomeini wanted the battles Bloody them. against turned he power, sharing of instead power, gaining After MKM. the with agreement his broke Khomeini after sour turned Things forces. Shah's the against the use to coalition, skills military their put Khomeini's Leader Supreme joining upon and 1970s, the in Lebanon in PLO the with trained was run by Masoud Rajavi. Many of his fighters organization the movement, Islamist - Marxist A (MKM). Movement Khalgh Mojahedeen the with out worked was arrangement same The power. of slice a receive would party the Shah, the against victory after whereupon Khomeini done as part of a power sharing agreement with in was This Shah. the against revolution 1979 the Khomeini backed initially Tudeh the party, by communist A Iran) . of masses of (party Iran of backed the party Khomeini, Tudeh the after for go to decided Khamenei worst when the for isolationists turn a took Things 8 the USSR could offer could USSR the which Tanks sophisticated most the and latest The other area was Tanks. Iraq was offered the warfare. electronic as such areas in inferiority from suffered flew which those And grounded. 10 ensure themalifetimeinparadise. mines would revolution the on for martyrs becoming and walking that taught were soldiers equipment, clearing mine latest the buying of Instead soldiers. of number of superiority its in up make could it equipment, military in lacked Iran what that was argument Their Khomeini. Initially, such factors did not move Khamenei and also sufferedfromlackofspareparts. which Sherman) the as (such Tanks British and Mathius Kuntzel, "Ahmadinejad's Demons" "Ahmadinejad's Kuntzel, Mathius html. pages/frontline/shows/saddam/interviews/aburish. ship" Interview with Interview ship" leader- and life his of Secrets "Saddam: Aburish, Said u Dsrmnto Koen fns nw scape- new goat" a With- finds Khomeini Hatred Discrimination "Iran: out Iyer, Pico Samghabadi, Raju de/contents/ahmadinejads-demons. Republic IE Magazine TIME , April 24 April , 2006, http://www.matthiaskuentzel PBS 8 , while Iran operated US operated Iran while , My 6 18, http://www . 1983, 16, May , http://www.pbsorg/wgbh/ 9 10 And with And The New New The ht a Ia' aiiy o s Hzolh to Hezbollah use to ability Iran's was that than important More Syria. with relationship its strengthen helped also the it Mediterranean, did the only Not interest. organization allow Iran to extend its helped reach near Iran's Hezbollah serve to term Khamenei's During know asHezbollah. now we which movement the create to figures religious more especially Shiites, local amongst support enough find to managed he Syria, to o an h spot f eaee Shiites, figure revolutionary Chamran, a Lebanese Mostafa of dispatched first support Khomeini the gain To the occupier. anger against them, because they saw them as their turned soon they However, Palestinians. the against liberator their as Forces Israeli Defense the welcomed Lebanon of population Israel's Shiite the by Initially 1982. in Lebanon of invasion followed was This price. the pay and retaliations military the suffer to had they whereupon Israel, attack to territory their using the of by Lebanon hospitality southern of population Shiite local the abuse to started and numbers, great in Lebanon to moved 1970 of September Black after who Palestinians the by followed was This compatriots. Maronite and many years from discrimination from their Sunni be missed opportunity. The Shiites had suffered the oppressed Shiite population offered a not to as well as there chaos ensuing The Lebanon. export the revolution to the region, starting with to ambition his of sight lose not did Khomeini war, fledged full a and chaos domestic ensuing the during that is impressive perhaps is What in formofweaponsonly. be to going was it if even assistance, Soviet of this, Iran lost the chance of receiving some kind hma fie, l Abr Mohtashamipour Akbar succeeded. Ali failed, Chamran where However, emulation). of (source Faghih willing to recognize Ayatollah Khomeini as Valiye not were They failed. and movement Amal the with tried He States. United the in University Berkeley from PhD his obtaining after Iran to 11 12 review.net/articles/619 . asar Online Hamshahri resistance" Lebanese of image in figure a "Chamran html#ixzz0u1WCCKON. time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,925941,00 l Mhai "s ebla te omne o sol- dier?" or commander the Hezbollah "Is Mohtadi, Ali www.hamshahrionlineir/News/?id=81748 . Tehran Review Tehran 12 h te Iain ambassador Iranian then The Tha, uut 6 20, http:// 2009, 26, August Tehran, , , August 12, 2009, http://tehran- 11 , who had moved back moved had who , those presented by Dawa were shunned upon. as such ideologies Religious popular. more far was after nationalism secular Arab War, Day just Six the time, that at Furthermore, heretics. as Shiites the viewed them of many as Shiites to power over hand to reluctant were Sunnis the then, back However Iraq". in state Islamic an create and political secularism, combat ethics, awareness, and values Islamic "promote to was organization the of aim the Nasr, Vali 1967. According to the eminent Shiite theologian Dawa party, which was originally established in against Saddam Hussein were carried out by the Shiites Iraqi by attacks militant of majority the It must be noted that before SCIRI was formed, regime. his against activities subversive in part taking by war the to prior Saddam antagonized also Shiites the that noted be must It War. Iran - continued bySaddamafterthestartofIraq Shiites against attacks as Iraq, flee forces. to had He Saddam's combating many been for had who years clergy Shiite Iraqi prominent was the son of Ayatollah Mohsen Hakim, Mohsen Ayatollah of son the who was Hakim, Al Baqir founded Mohammad by was 1982 in It (SCIRI). Iraq of Revolution the Islamic the was of Council revolution Supreme of the formations of reign the during revolution the exporting in success other Iran's Revolution ofIraq(SCIRI) Supreme CounciloftheIslamic by SaddamHussein. called for by Iran saved the regime from defeat repeatedly was destruction whose country a from weapons fate, of twist strange a In Iraq. against war the lose not did in Iran that ensuring instrumental were mediation) US (through Israel by supplied were which hostages. weapons The US of release the for exchange in weaponry, Western advanced receive to deal a out work to managed Iran operations, taking hostage Hezbollah's Through affair. Gate Iran the was Hezbollah from achievement biggest Iran's Perhaps actor. important an as West the in status its elevate to managed Iran activities, taking hostage its Through West. the pressure 13 14 "Who's who in Iraq: Sciri" Iraq: in who "Who's of International Affairs, Volume8,No.2,June,2004 . velopment and Future Prospects", Middle East Review De- Past Party: Da'wa Islamic "The Shanahan, Roger http://news.bbccouk/2/hi/middle_east/3769991 .stm BBC News BBC , June 17, 2004, 17, June , 13 a 14

15 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 16 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 16 15 Kuwait behalf Iran's on acting in members, Dawa to targets attributed were commercial and against 1983 military in Attacks states. Gulf Persian the in supporters his and Saddam undermine to efforts Iran's in instrumental were Dawa of This organization, which included many members at it regime. the put with odds system people the of Governance party's Dawa the revolution, Iranian the After critics inIraq. Islamic the sway to manage not did still This scholars). of (Governance Ulama Al Wilayat to contrast direct in is This system. political the in leadership and participation public meaning people), the of (Governance Umma Al Wilayat of idea the on relied founder Sadr Al Baqir Mohammad Dawa's that fact the despite is This hs otne utl i death, his until continued This on hand". friends Iran's one count can "I them told he residence, Jamaran his at ambassadors Iran's Khomeini wasawareofthis.Inameetingwith And deteriorated. community international the of rest the and West the with relations policy As the war against Iraq continued, Iran's foreign were setup,calledtheBadrbrigade. So much so that entire brigades of Iraqi soldiers forces. Iranian joined and army Iraqi the from increased as more Iraqi Shiites soldiers defected evd CR' utmt ga o atn a an umbrella groupforallIraqiShiitegroups. as acting of goal ultimate This SCIRI's SCIRI. served of creation the to led eventually which accepted Clergy, by Governance Iran of version Iran's in stayed who those Iraq, to returning be wouldn’t they that realized Dawa party the of members and by went time As did notstopitsmembersfromfleeingtoIran. a spiritual and ideological partner. However, this difficult for the Iranian government to view it as it made Iran) for case the is (which clergy the of rule the than rather rule, people's on relying 17 bellion", Re- for Potential The Iraq: of South the in Dwellers Urban & Ideologues Tribes, "Clerics, Jabar, A Faleh http://www.antiwarcom/ Ash- glantz/?articleid=5002. Service, the Press From Inter Rises es", Party "Shia Glantz, Aaron 1997, p.117 Magnus Ranstorp, Magnus Steven Simon),AdelphiPapers354, IISS2003. of the Western Hostage Crisis Hostage Western the of Iraq at the Crossroads the at Iraq 17 Meanwhile, SCIRI's membership SCIRI's Meanwhile, . Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics Politics The Lebanon: in Hizb'allah 15 Initially, its system of system its Initially, Toby Dodge & Dodge Toby (eds. , Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave , 16 main reasons (amongst others) why Khomeini why others) (amongst reasons main with this organization. In fact, this is one of the (IRGC). Rafsanjani had a very rocky relationship Corp Guards Revolutionary Islamic the of role the was contention of bones biggest their of One foundations). (charitable control Bonyads and the of economy, the privatize to plans Rafsanjani's included These issues. many over clashed they presidency, Rafsanjani's of years which almost imploded in later years. During the 19 n Peiet asnai a i cmo, in what was and common, still is in had Rafsanjani President and Khamenei Ali Leader Supreme that goals few their similar regional that ambitions were one of the fact the note to important more far is It was true. opposite the fact, In ambitions. regional its on This however, did not mean that it had given up which thecountryhadsuffered. and stability future, it needed to repair own the massive damages its of sake the for people, choice. With millions of displaced and other little had unemployed It country. the of reconstruction the was time that at regime the of priority The economic damage. of billion $500 - $300 somewhere suffered had and injured, million a than more soldiers, 500,000 lost just had which a country over presided He Iraq. against war bloody death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the end of the Rafsanjani started his presidency soon after the Islam (1989-1997): Constructive Rafsanjani Presidency alliance inIraqandLebanon. regional successful and strong very a of seeds the sowing was it 1989, 1980- between west, the in weaker became Iran While region. the in occurred regarding trend Iran's opposite ambitions exact to increase the its However, influence presidency. Khamenei's of end the with coincided which 18 in, pi 7 21, http://www.alarabiyanet/arti- cles/2010/07/04/113009.html 2010, 7, April sian), Dfeecs vr zd nvriy ee re- were University ruling" Khamenei's after Azad solved over "Differences htm. www.globalsecurityorg/military/world/war/iran-iraq. "Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)", War "Iran-Iraq 18 19 a very rocky relationship, Global Security Global l Arabiya Al , http:// , (Per- and 2009presidentialelections. 2005 the in IRGC the from support solid such received Ahmadinejad why reasons the of one is and him, against resentment much created 21 20 the to detrimental as West conservative's ideological animosity towards the the saw He country. the of reconstruction the for necessity a as it saw Rafsanjani West. the There was also the issue of rapprochement with VAVAK. as known agency, main intelligence Iran's of charge in was which Security, and Information of Ministry the responsibilities its of many over Council handed he Security Instead, (SNSC). National Supreme the from branch intelligence IRGC's the of head the of took Rafsanjani seat the away took he presidency, as of post the soon as Supreme fact of In post Leader. the for him chose not did Shiites. especially Muslims, of millions to policies Israel anti- its justify to for looking was it reason the land, Israel provided Hezbollah and Tehran with south validity to such thinking. By occupying Lebanese of occupation more added also unabated continued Israel's Lebanon that fact The new to due Tehran. in out worked were which calculations primarily was kidnapped This longer Americans. no and target exclusively to Israel started organization Shiite the that militant accident no by is It Israel. towards US, the from away focus its turned Hezbollah on impact profound why fact in was This ambitions. regional Iran's a had realization This by aforeignarmy. what was a full invasion of against its itself sovereign territory defending for criticized was Iran US, the to contrast exact in diplomatically, while years, eight in him beat not could and Saddam fought Iran assist. to happy very was and on Saddam's decimated mighty army in Kuwait, while the world cheered forces Its world. the in the United States as a new unchallenged power saw Rafsanjani disagreed, Khamenei as much As Kuwait. invaded successfully had America while collapsed, just had USSR dangerous. the then, as Back it saw also He regime. the of s?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6btiOq7DxNY. http://www.bloombergcom/apps/new 2009, 28, June Power While Backing Ahmadinejad" Bloomberg News, Amass Guards Revolutionary "Iran Forouhar, Kambiz tional, London,2006,pp.201-208 . and the Quest for Security", Praeger Security Interna- (Intelligence Approaches National Intelligence: and Security Global of Handbook "PSI Javedanfar, Meir maslehat 21 (interests) 20 This by the IRGC the by trained and absorbed were brigade Badr the of members former the health of many Meanwhile care. subsidized government received they They Iran. were housed, their to children were educated, and fled had who Shiites Iraqi the nurturing on focused it Instead time. to its decided bide regime Iranian the Iraq, to came it when Kuwait; in defeat massive as well as from UN sanctions, the UN imposed no fly zones, weakened increasingly becoming Saddam With 22 to only reactors, nuclear its for Argentina from xxx reactor) (or Uranium enriched of supply the for agreement an secured just had Iran Israel. with angry be to reason another had Iranians the Porter, Gareth reporter investigative US the of to According 1992 . February in killing Mousavi Sheikh the for revenge attack in be first to thought The is 1994. in building Argentina) Argentine - Mutual Association (Asociación Mutual Israelita Israel the against in city which attack same the massive 1992, another in by followed Aires was Buenos in embassy Israeli the against attacks the also were There Mykonos restaurantinBerlin. the at figures opposition Iranian Kurdish four of assassination the in Shiites Lebanese using 17th of September 1992, when Iran was caught demonstrated to the was international community kill on This used abroad. and opposition the down of it members track infrastructure, to members military Hezbollah and social its at and Hezbollah's in heavily investing Israel While enemies. at strike to Hezbollah use to decided government Iranian the Therefore anti-Israeli groups oftheirtime. other more than religious much and were focused members Its Israel. fight to willing was that force disciplined a as and as members dedicated its to Khamenei's Velayat saw Faghih system, It offensive. the to on decided go Iran Hezbollah, to came it When allies andoperativesofIran. is revolution in Iraq, they would be sent back as the there day one if best, at And of Tehran. in regime defenders become would Iraqis these new Iran, in revolution no is there if worst, 23 in Iran" in "50 percent of Badr brigade were former Iraqi POWs gel national/germany/0,1518,522584,00.html "Germany Releases 'Mykonos' Assassins" 'Mykonos' Releases "Germany www.jahannewscom/prtb9sbarhbf8piuur .html , November 12, 2007, http://www.spiegelde/inter- 2007, 12, November , Jahan News Jahan 22 The thinking in Iran was that at that was Iran in thinking The . , Tehran, January, 1, 2009 http:// 2009 1, January, Tehran, , 23 - Spie Der 17 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 18 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony to hover around the $10-$15 per barrel. prices oil caused events These it. followed and preceded which recession global the and crisis, economic Asian the - event global important The answer to this question is related to a very Khamenei's with line thinking? in and conservative more much was who Nouri, Nategh Akbar Ali competitor his of favor the in cheatings allow elections in the first place? And why did he not for run to Khatami allow Khamenei did why So Larijani, who isnowthespeakerofMajles. Ali with him replaced and Guidance, he fired him from the post of Ministry of Islamic 1993 in that so much so - pro-democracy too and pro-Western too as him saw and Khatami 24 revolution. the of path the from deviated had who someone as Khatami saw IRGC the in those especially supporters, Khamenei's of Many rocky. always was two the between relationship the fact, In for. stood Khamenei what to contrasted This speech andbetterrelationswiththeWest. of freedom democracy, rights, human as such The Republic. reforms which he Islamic was calling the for were of for issues reform the was The underlying principal of Khatami's presidency (1997-2005): ReformistIslam Khatami Presidency Iran's foreign policy. in period constructive a as deemed is especially Europe . This is why Rafsanjani's term order to improve Iran's relations with the West, while at the same time, making concrete steps in goals, regional Iran's fulfill to Hezbollah use to achievement by Rafsanjani was that he managed What was interesting and considered as a major Israel's as viewed Iranians invisible hand. the what and States, United the by torpedoed deal the find 25 cuty hc ers oe hn 0 o its of 80% than more earns which country a for And revolution. the of start the since with dealt had Republic Islamic the price lowest the Ilm es sros ifrne bten Iran's between leaders" differences serious News: "Islam Global_Economy/GE26Dj02.html oil", $50 Times, May 26, with 2005, http://www.atimescom/atimes/ problems real "The Liu, Henry pe.rianru/articles/20090819/122758154.html Rianovosty 24 vn asnai i nt like not did Rafsanjani Even Rsi) My 0 21, http:// 2010, 30, May (Russia), 25 This is Asia lrgt plgzn fr h CAs oe n the 1953 Mousadeqcoup. in role CIA's the for apologizing Albright also the case of US Secretary of State Madeline was There hosts. his to respect paid he guest, had country been labeled as "The Great Satan", yet as a wrestler's The a was occasion. This momentous head. his above it lifted also he arms, his in it held only not he respect, of sign a As hold. to Khomeini of picture a given was medal gold the won and part counter Iranian his beat who wrestler American The revolution. the of start the since team sports American an by visit first the was This 2001. in Iran visited which delegation First wrestling American administration. the was new the try with to luck their decided Americans the Even capitals. European in listeners and supporters many had civilizations of dialogue His Paris. and Madrid Rome, as such capitals, European numerous to president Iranian smiling the by trips numerous This is why during Khatami's presidency, we saw the sake ofitsowneconomy. for West, the to closer get to but choice his own pockets. line Rafsanjani to enterprises state the of many all used had it economic top to and still rehabilitated, severe were not areas damaged under war The pressure. was Khamenei This weakened the hands of the Conservatives. that couldnotbeignored. process a was it oil, of sale the from income 26 Iran's removed States United Iran's The policy. for Iraq boost massive a as served Afghanistan, Iraq, which of invasion of the by followed invasion was which American the boosted further by was This two. the between relations closer as well as economy, a Iran's in favored Union, reformist Iran. European This led to significant investments the especially First and foremost, the international community, a numberofimportantfactors: period for Iran's foreign policy. This was due to successful most the with coincided presidency with Washington. Despite that, the period of his Khatami fences mend gestures such use to unable was opposition, Khamenei's of Because 27 News "Does Mr Rafsanjani agree with corruption?" with agree Rafsanjani Mr "Does org/publication/12806/timeline.html http://www.cfr 2007, 9, March Relations, Foreign on Lionel Behhner,"Timeline:U.S-IranContacts"Council com/news/1843/. , Tehran, May 20, 2009, http://www.ansarnews 2009, 20, May Tehran, , 26 The Islamic Republic had no 27 Ansar Ansar 28 market. construction booming Iraq's in ones Iraqi replaced soon bricks made Iranian made products started flooding the Iraqi market. sprang up soon after the fall of Saddam. Iranian hotels operated Iranian Karbala. and Najaf as such cities Shiite in property up buying started started it politics, taking over the Iraqi economy as well. Iranians Iraqi over take to started only not Iran Tehran. with cooperated people intelligence and politicians bureaucrats, of file and Rank few. a just were Sistani, Ayatollah as Iraq with its Shiite allies. Nouri Al Maliki, as well flood by to Iran allowed Saddam forces coalition Western of overthrow was The it time. refugees, payback Iraqi after in investing Furthermore, of years enemy. regional biggest o uh o ht haiea' supporters elections the after Ahmadinejad's him threatened even that so much So day. this to reformist a is still ardent is He an reformist. fact in was Akbar Lebanon in Ali Hezbollah true. was started who man Iranian opposite the Mohtashamipour, Hezbollah. the with fact, relations In Iran's did office hinder presidential not oriented the in Western sat that reformists fact The with Hezbollah. relations Iran's to happened same The become anIraniansatellite to started Iraq - all to apparent were results 30 29 Palestinian Intifadah". the for "assistance the for committee of post important the from removed was he on, later However unlike the conservatives such conservatives the unlike However bomb. nuclear a want regime, this to even opposed Iranians, those of majority the fact, In bomb. nuclear a wanted Khamenei like just Khatami, program. nuclear Iran's was least not but Last to needed it vacuum improve itspositionthere. the Iran gave boom, construction massive a by followed withdrawal, Israel's witnessed Lebanon that fact The reign. economic and military leverage during Khatami's Iran's strengthening on impact massive his for those who do remember him, they eulogize him all to However him. help not did Hezbollah up Gina Chon, "Iran's Cheap Goods Stifle Iraq Economy" fa News ruling" Larijani's Aftab by removed is "Mohtashamipour default.aspx http://www.irdcir/fa/content/8014/ 2009, Republic Islamic October, the of documentation for Mohtashamipour" Center with conversation "Unexpected com/article/SB123732669334561799.html Journal Street Wall vdcgny9y.ak9374prra .html Mrh 21, http://www.aftabnewsir/ 2010, March, , , March 18, 2009, http://online.wsj 30 The fact that he had set 28 29 The , and , very loweconomicandpoliticalcost. four given years to was continue with the nuclear program, at a Khamenei that meant them, weaken to offer swap nuclear Obama the with that the US had to wait till 2009 until it came up would have been much easier, in 2005. The fact Iran in conservatives the weakening of job the accepted, America Had interest. Iran's in was his argument that rapprochement with the West and leverage his Khatami cost This agree. not did States United the However, this. for ready Union, represented by European Germany, Britain and The France was aircraft. commercial for economic incentives, which included spare parts What reformists. Khamenei asked for the return was for a package for of achievement major ovne hmni o ge t a temporary suspension a to agree to Khamenei to convince managed Khatami that fact The Rowhani. to listened Khamenei Europeans. the courting worth was it that Khamenei convince Khatami Rowhani, who was Hassan another was reformist also (SNSC) Supreme helped Council the Security of National charge in man the that fact The times. 16 than less no Tehran to traveled Secretary Foreign British then the door. Straw, Jack their on knocking Union European the had they negotiations, protracted Through its. from concessions extract to and closer, Union leveraging tool. They used policy it foreign important to an into bring it turned the them European preceded who reformists the Ahmadinejad, as 31 in or change polish, to tried always They men". "yes no were they but him, to listen ultimately from his presidents. Rafsanjani and Khatami did resistance of kind some faced always he 1989, the in republic Islamic the assumed of ship the of he captaincy Since another. or way one in insubordinate, been had who soldiers had always had election, Ahmadinejad's until who, commander the was Khamenei policy. foreign Iranian into 1979 of revolution Islamic the of had entered politics: to implement the principals he since do not could he what do to decided Ahmadinejad finally Khamenei which in Mahmoud period a in ushered of presidency The Islam (2005-Present): Principalist Ahmadinejad’s Presidency Ia fr o ncer resumption", nuclear on firm "Iran uy 7 20 http://news .bbccouk/2/hi/middle_ 2005 east/4720649.stm . 27, July 31 f rnu ercmn ws a was enrichment Uranium of B News BBC , 19 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 20 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 32 its strengthen to able Moqtada Iraq, in Maliki Al Nouri with relations Iran was only Not Arabia andEgypt. Saudi as such powers regional than other of those efficient and democratic more much as Arabs, especially Shiites saw its political system legitimacy, as limited as it may have been. Many legitimacy. of question During Ahmadinejad's first term, the regime had the also was There last factorskeepingittogether. the of one glue, US - anti the dissolve would It regime. the destroy could States United the with Rapprochement existence. very the regime's against threat a as considered be would approaching Tehran's Imam Khomeini airport One for a state visit Force Air US of sound However, the program. nuclear Iran's to threat a as viewed be would installations nuclear Iran's over planes war American or Israeli of sound the exact opposite. Or to put it another way, the their domestic and foreign policies. They despise justify to it need in They Oxygen. like is this Iran, conservatives To change. regime and war of threat wanted: always he what Khamenei gave Bush importantly, More Afghanistan. and Iraq of invasion his to due world Islamic the with standing terrible a had who community, international the in man unpopular an was He wanted. always had Khamenei that present the of number a to reasons. First and foremost, due President Bush was was This between significantly. improved term standing regional Iran's first 2005-2009, Ahmadinejad's During Regional Ambitions 2005 in office presidential the into placed was Ahmadinejad Mahmoud when stopped This ideas. his away cast cases some is inaccordancetoKhamenei'swishes. foreign policy, what Ahmadinejad sees and says foreign policy. Therefore, when it comes to Iran's Ahmadinejad himself has very little say on Iran's is thesonthatKhameneialwayswanted. In fact, one could even go as far saying that he the was He for. looking always was Khamenei who soldier results. election fixing through 33 Comment "Iran official alleges election fraud", com/2009/06/stealing-iranian-election.html un oe "taig h Iain Election" Iranian the "Stealing Cole, Juan iran.claim/indexhtml http://www.cnncom/2005/WORLD/meast/06/25/ Jn 1, 09 http://www .juancole . 2009, 13, June , 32 CNN and in 2009 in and , June 25, 2005, Informed Informed 33

the region. in failure Iran's to testimony is world Islamic the in figure new a as emerge to managed has Erdogan that fact very The Turkey. of form the to emergence of new competitors in the region, led in which isolation, ensuing the also was There allies. for available being aid economic damage Iran's economic standing, meaning less sanctions as position, Iran's worsened actually sanctions to led which policies nuclear Iran's least, not but Last Satan'. 'Great the as States United the portray to efforts Iran's undermined Iran's interests. His peaceful overtures seriously against odds at stood world Islamic the with Iranian government and his efforts to the improve relations to outreach His 2008. in election Obama's was second The region. the in and serious damage to the regime's credibility, in Iran in 2009 and the ensuing demonstrations caused and First then. foremost, Ahmadinejad's since controversial reelection region the in standing regional Iran's weakened factors two However Al Sadr, after his initial hostility, initial his after Sadr, Al 34 viewed the be will always and are Iranians limited. be predecessors, will impact its that find its will regime current like much However, of version Islam inordertospreaditsinfluence. its use to trying is it that fact the is regime current the with difference only The of thousands back years. stretching rulers of Iran's many did as ambitions, regional had The Shah rulers. clerical current Iran's not to regional exclusive are ambitions has such Iran However, of ambitions. Republic Islamic The Conclusion 35 Afghanistan, time, Iran started cooperating with Al Qaeda in same the At cabinet. Lebanon's in years many for looking was it which vote veto the achieve to camp to managed it American where point the to it strengthen pro- the the and Sunnis in of the weakness the losses use to managed war, military 2006 heavy despite Iran, Hezbollah's time, same the At ally. an as in Media Meir Jevedanfar, "Sadr Rages Against Iran" Against Rages "Sadr Jevedanfar, Meir o Cgln "ern cue o amn Taleban explosives", and weapons with arming of accused "Tehran Coghlan, Tom blog/sadr-rages-against-iran/. 18, 2009. Mrh 1 20, http://pajamasmedia.com/ 2008, 31, March , 35 againstNATOforces. London Times London 34 was brought was Pajamas Pajamas , March , eed o saiiy n lgtmc a home. at legitimacy and stability on depends policy foreign Iran's of success the Ultimately, regional control couldbackfire. exert to trying in exercise overt any as allies, as choose they who in prudent be to influence. Therefore, Iran's policy planners have their spread to challenge they a it Thus find always East. will Middle the in minority a as and abroad. of the Turkish government's legitimacy at home flags is not due to Turkish money - it is because Iranian of instead Turkish waving comfortable more is Hamas days, these its that fact The allies. amongst even hurt, be could standing its more the continue, leadership Iran's senior of levels at differences current the longer The 21 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 22 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony ioiis ae o be atv i te post- the the in active that been reasons not have main minorities the of one Second, emergence ofamajorstruggle inIran. the of event the in role tipping a play may they regime change in Iran at this juncture. However, for movement the in head sphere a be not will the demonstrations and activities and most likely in role meaningful a played not have minorities First, in the post-2009 election period the ethnic article makesanumberofmainpoints. The period. election presidential post-2009 the in Iran in developments political in minorities ethnic Iran’s of role the examines article This influenced theirsensesharedidentity. in subsequently minorities and abroad co-ethnics ethnic and Iran the of many representatives between interconnectivity and ties the increased has years recent in information and media to access expanded Moreover, identity. mutual continued guarantee necessary not do identity relations are dynamic and historical ties first the during year after of the Islamic Revolution. In addition, and Two, War World dynasty, during Qajar the of period last the include Examples autonomy. or independence advance to attempted have minorities ethnic the Iran, juncture each in eroded significantly has power central at when that shows Iran of history modern the However, identity. Shi’i common a generations of mutual statehood and sharing of in minorities identify strongly with Iran after many minorities ethnic ethnic the of most that of claiming politics, Iran’s role the underplay Most mainstream publications in Iranian studies and Pakistan). Afghanistan (Azerbaijan, Turkey, states Turkmenistan, Iraq, bordering in with ties co-ethnics share groups minority the of most and areas, border the in concentrations in live Turkmen, Arab and Baluch. The ethnic minorities Persian minorities, including Azerbaijanis, Kurds, non- of comprised is population Iran’s Approximately of half country. multi-ethnic a is Iran Brenda Shaffer 2009 PresidentialElections Ethnic PoliticsinIran:Post major policychallengefortherulingregime. have increased in 2009-2010 and has become a and that provinces are comprised primarily of ethnic the minorities, in institutions state post-election the against of representatives attacks the violent intensity in of and frequency role the demonstrations, prominent played not have a minorities the while Third, to theethnicminorities. not support granting language and cultural rights while camp, this does Iran, in democracy for support articulating of most that reform is the movement with cooperation of lack their in toward ethnic minorities. Moreover, a key factor policies the on impact any having as struggle this see not do they that is dissent elections ags mnrt, ubrn egt ilo, and million, eight numbering minority, largest of Azerbaijan provinces) . Republic Iranian Kurds are the next West the and Azerbaijan, East on (Ardebil, Azerbaijan border northwestern that Iran’s provinces in clustered is minority Iran’s total population . Most of Iran’s Azerbaijani over twenty million — approximately one third of number They Turkey. in very spoken that language to similar Turkic a speak who Shi’a are minority, ethnic largest Iran’s Azerbaijanis, The ethnic different groups areestimates. of size the on data all Thus, in Iran and expect to receive uninhibited answers. surveys conduct researchers independent can nor surveys, in identity or language primary tend to inflate abroad, their figures. Iran living does not advocates include especially minorities, ethnic the of activists while minorities, ethnic regime tends on to underreport the numbers of the the statistics politicized: quite are published makeup ethnic Iran's the of Most polity. multi-ethnic a is Iran Persians, as inhabitants the and Persia as to referred commonly While Minorities Background onIran’sEthnic 1 Arabs, Europe. and Canada, States, United the in organization political Diaspora active very a by supported are Kurds Iranian the addition, In activities and identity trends of the Kurds in Iran. Developments Iraq. among the and Kurds in the Turkey neighboring states affect border that they live primarily in the northwestern provinces n elt, rn a not has Iran reality, In media. broadcast and print for and education for minorities ethnic to rights language grants Iran of Republic Islamic the of Constitution the Formally, cultures. languages and minority the against discriminates systematically Republic Islamic the lines, along ethnic Muslims theory among in differentiate not that does ideology Islamic its Despite with itsneighbors. relations bilateral Tehran’s affects significantly and regime the for challenge security a creates states neighboring in majorities co-ethnic from border the across directly situated minorities ties. The presence of family relatively large groups of and ethnic co-ethnic by facilitated often is which develop states, neighboring to with trade languages direct native their using by economically themselves elevate to last attempted the In decade, ethnic disadvantages. minorities in Iran's provinces economic have challenges with identity their compounds borders Iran’s near concentrated Being assimilated. as nearly not are Ethnic and provinces underdeveloped culture. Iran's in majority Persian the are however, minorities, dominant the into assimilated highly are ethnic whom of Iran's many of groups, metropolis all of multi-ethnic presence large a a with is Tehran foreign and policy. policies development economic groups, non-Shi’i the and regime Iran the between relations in relations, issues center-periphery policy including main number a with overlaps Iran in politics ethnic of question The because theyarealsoSunniMuslims. and Baluch endure double differentiation in Iran Turkmen, Kurds, the of Many Afghanistan. and Pakistan both border which Sistan-Baluchistan the of province and southeastern in located are Baluch Turkmenistan, to adjacent is which inhabiting the northeastern province of Khorasan Turkmen the Iraq, neighbors which Khuzestan of province southwestern the in minority concentrated Arab the with members, million two approximately count each Baluch and Turkmen, Arabs. Ahwazi as to referred often are Arabs Iranian The 1

3 Rights." the International Covenant on Civil and Political in or Minorities on Declaration the in out set norms the meet not does Iran in minorities of treatment the that doubt no be can "there that of the UN Commission on Human Rights stated Representative Special the Copithorne, Maurice Iran, on report his In Iran. of Republic Islamic co-ethnics in Persian, the own official language their of with the business conduct to speakers obligated minority-language dominate, teachers and government officials are ethnic where provinces Iran's Throughout limited. very been have publications and press language Persian in their own languages in schools, and the non- study or teach to minorities ethnic its allowed 2 4 separatist agenda are also active. a have and primary as identity Azerbaijani their see who Azerbaijanis contrast, In Azerbaijan. desire but rights, of Republic the with union nor self-rule neither cultural and strive language Azerbaijanis for Some Movement. Green oppositionist Iran’s of leader Mousavi, Hossein Iran's Khamenei, Supreme leader, is of Azerbaijani origin ‘Ali as is Mir Ayatollah instance, For many identify strongly as Muslims and Iranians. ruling clerical elite are ethnically Azerbaijani and the of third one Approximately culture. family element is confined to the realm of folklore and collective identity is Iranian, and the Azerbaijani can identify large numbers for whom their primary the largest ethnic minority, the Azerbaijanis, one among instance, For minorities. ethnic Iran’s of and relationship with the regime among member There is great variation in the level of identification religious and circles areheldbyethnicminorities. military, system, political the in regime and a number of the pinnacles of power are allowed access to rights, positions of power in or the culture based ethnic promote to do minorities, ethnic the individual members of the ethnic minorities that to rights cultural and Michael Fischer, 100525F97/$File/G0210126.pdf?OpenElement> . Iran, see Brenda Shaffer, Brenda see Iran, in Azerbaijanis among trends identity on more For 78. Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Islamic the in rights human of situation the on Report ridocda/huridoca

23 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 24 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony utm ad hs apitet hv often spurred protests. have appointments these and or custom, language local the in versed not are who governors non-native by ruled frequently are provinces Iran's elected, not and government central the by provinces the to appointed are governors Since provinces. ethnic-majority governors to non-native of appointment issues the minorities is contending ethnic Iran’s and additional Tehran between the of One province. that in majority the constitute still Azerbaijanis name Azerbaijan in its the title, despite the fact carry that ethnic not does Ardebil of province new The provinces. two into 1993 in divided was which Azerbaijan East as such provinces, ethnic-majority of power the weaken to order in units, smaller into provinces of number a up in any specific province. Tehran has also broken population majority a attaining from minorities Iran's of ethnic prevent borders to times of number a provinces the redrawn has Tehran provinces. receivers, especially in Iran's Kurdish-populated satellite the eliminate to efforts the intensified Tehran 2006, of summer the During receivers. satellite confiscate to campaigns of number a promulgated has regime the phenomenon, this counteract to order In citizens. Iran's of many of environment cultural the and entertainment the divided and identity ethnic particular their Iran's among ethnic minorities. For use some, it has and also reinforced knowledge language ties with co-ethnics abroad and reinforce native cement helped have broadcasts These Europe. many from broadcasts and Kurdish-language view Kurds television, Turkish watch to tend For example, Iran's Azerbaijanis overwhelmingly broadcasts from abroad in their native languages. transmission. satellite Iran's ethnic minorities tend to watch television via basis regular a on abroad from broadcast programming television have to access citizen’s trends Iranian by identity influenced been 1990s, early the Since government opportunities, policies andthegeneralsituationinIran. by affected and dynamic are trends Iran’s identity However, not borders. policies, Tehran’s change to seek and citizens Iranian as themselves view rights ethnic groups seeking expansion of their cultural - Iden Azerbaijani of Challenge the and Iran the and tity , Cambridge,MA ., MITPress,2002 respect. with Iran in groups ethnic all treating of policy Kurdish languages declaring Mousavi’s promised and Turkmen the in editorials published Word) 5 of Violence Demonstrations, butMoreActs Elections: LessPublic Post 2009Presidential oratories. their end to ordered been have and Kurdish, especially languages, own their in Iranian parliament the addressed have caucuses based ethnic- the of members instances, of number a In Tehran. including regions, of variety groups a from ethnic of members of comprised are caucuses These Azerbaijan. of Republic the as such majority, the are co-ethnics their where and on foreign policy issues affecting the states provinces where their co-ethnics form a and majority, Iranian the to relating functioning policies impacting vocal, are caucuses ethnic-based unofficial parliament, Iranian the In parliament. a number of the states’ institutions, especially of the activities in found be can politics Ethnic 2009 elections, Mousavi’s by cultural and vote rights of the ethnic language minorities. On the eve their of the expand to court committing and the minorities to elections, ethnic appeal to 2005 attempted also and candidates elections ethnic presidential 1997 the the for of campaign the vote During minorities. the court to attempted candidates campaign, election 2009 the During rna scey lbr raiain, women, organizations, labor society: Iranian in sectors of range wide a encompassed and times in the year following the faulted elections Iran. Thedemonstrationsreignited anumber of public against the policies of the ruling regime in mass open, for demonstrations by catalyst large segments a of as the Iranian served Iran in elections presidential 2009 June contested The political salient issue. a become has it thus, rights; of expansion desire minorities ethnic the that promises indicates that Iran’s politicians assess campaign these made candidates that fact The Iran. in activists minority of ethnic the to concern issue central a languages, minority status the the of improve to change any for called Press TV(Tehran), May28,2009. 5 t h sm tm, osv hs not has Mousavi time, same the At Kalameh Sebz Kalameh (Green tnc ioiis epcal Krs hv been have Kurds, especially minorities, the ethnic of number In large 2010 . a crackdown, in post-elections intensified have to seems attacks violent of trend The areas. populated in emerged 2006, especially in the Baluch, attacks Kurdish and Arab violent especially ethnic-based of regime, round This Guards. the Revolutionary the towards of and institutions representatives against minorities ethnic of presidential primarily comprised provinces the in conducted been 2009 has activity violent the significant elections, political following open in decline protests, the to contrast In ethnic Iran’s towards minorities. policies new form to movement opposition the among willingness a 6 conduct terrorist activities. the to them encourages of end the in that handling minorities heavy and demands ethnic legitimate the dismissing of policies the regime’s condemned forces Zahedan, opposition in reportedly bombing suicide twin 2010 July the movements to response in political time, same the At ethnic Iran. in the and forces opposition main the between cooperation little is there Consequently, minorities. ethnic the to not support extending minority and supporting cultural rights while emergence reformists, of democracy veteran in Iran, apparently the does of nucleus main the addition, In minorities . ethnic similar to those of the ruling regime toward the as Mousavi, Hossein Mir as such Green Movement, the in figures main the view of policies organizations the political ethnic main The movements. political ethnic the of goals the of most support not do movement protest the in the to post-election minorities protests if is ethnic that the central the actors for mobilization A main factor contributing to the lack of political East Azerbaijanprovince. the of capital the Tabriz, as such cites, majority regime activity was quite prominent in the ethnic the student demonstrations in 1999, when anti- as such periods with contrasts This majorities. demonstrations post-election were centered in cities which have clear Persian the Republic, contention with the ruling regime in the Islamic public in of periods other to activity comparison In Iran. post-election the in insubstantial more. The ethnic minorities and were conspicuously disenfranchised economically reformists, "Resurgence of ‘crushed’ extremists in Iran", in extremists ‘crushed’ of "Resurgence tional , July15,2010. 6 This perhaps signals - Na The usi, h tid hie mm n te attack the and imam Shiite third the Revolutionary Hussein, Imam of Islamic birthday the also and the Corps Guards of Day national Iranian the on place took attacks The Guards. the dead, were 15 members of Iran’s Revolutionary Among injured. 300 than more and dead in the city of Zahedan. This attack left 27 people bombings on July 15, 2010 at the Jameh mosque suicide twin the were 2009-2010 of period the in attacks dramatic most the Among province. of five high ranking Revolutionary Guards in the the organization took responsibility for the killing 2009 October in instance, For members. Guard The Jundallah has targeted its attacks at Revolution mosque intheprovince,killing25people. Shiite a in attack bombing suicide a conducted Jundallah elections, the of 2009-2010 eve the the On period. in province the in bombings suicide major of number a conducted has and activities its to bombing suicide introduced it escalated its activities in December 2008, when Jundallah The Zahedan. in office campaign head Ahmadinejad’s President attacked Jundallah the instance, on the eve of For the attacks. elections terror killings in major 15 May approximately and 2009, and kidnappings of taken scores has for Jundallah credit 2003, in emergence its (God’s Jundallah Soldiers), operates in the Baluch province. Since group, extremist outlawed maintain effective control in the region. A major of number large attacks in this province a and the regime does not undergone have Guards In recent years, Iranian soldiers and Revolutionary insurgency hasragedsince2004. Baluchistan, Pakistan, neighboring in province in members populated Baluch the In states. two these both group co-ethnic to ties sharing Afghanistan, and Pakistan on borders province of The Iran. in unemployment of rates highest the one possesses and underdeveloped, impoverished and most Iran’s of one is province Sistan-Baluchistan Sistan-Baluchistan The Iran. in minority the the Baluch of population the of in center the province, insurgency an battling been has Iran decade, a to close For Baluch presidential electionsinIran. and violent activity in Iran during the post- 2009 protests an based ethnic main the of is examination following The sentences. prison harsh received have languages ethnic the in publish to attempting journalists addition, In executed. 25 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 26 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony targets. have Kurdish against attacks coordinated militaries conducted their that publically disclosed in thwarting it. Turkish and Iranian officials have publically admitted to together the insurgency and have their cooperation officials Turkish and 8 7 Iraq. in Kurds on attacks cross-border to these on complaints authorities Iranian of the number a registered have government provincial semi-autonomous Erbil in Iraq. The Iraqi government in Baghdad and the villages Kurdish of attacks of scores conducted unintentionally have forces Iranian rebels, the combat to attempting in 2007, September Since the ChiefProsecutorofprovince. killed rebels 2010, April In province. Kurdistan Iranian the of officials ranking high of number a 2009 September in assassinate to succeeded rebels Kurdish the period, post-election the In period. with this throughout confrontations groups armed on Kurdish reported has press Iranian The 2010. in intensified evidently has Kurdish and 2007 in began insurgency the The insurgency. period, post-election provinces have been a center of an anti-regime the In Kurds 2010. February in capture his following 2010 June in place took which Rigi, Abdolmalek Jundallah, of leader the of execution the followed attack striking This attacks. the for pay" would "US the that stated and Washington by supported is Jundallah the to pursue terrorists. Iranian officials claimed that consider entering neighboring Pakistan in order will they that threatened have officials Iranian mosque, Zahedan the in bombing suicide 2010 this on Guards symbolic day of their Revolutionary unit. In response to the the July targeted 9 rns auh h ognzto cmad or Baluch identificationwithitsgoals. commands organization the Baluch Iran’s it is not clear how much popular support among active, despite losing its leader. At the same time, signified that the organization is still vibrant and bombing close to a month after Rigi’s execution villages," For instance, "Iraq condemns Iranian shelling of Kurd ctionid=351020101>. 14 27 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 28 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony onre, rmrl te ntd igo, the Kingdom, United the primarily countries, minorities bydepictingthemastoolsofforeign ethnic for Iranian by rights demands cultural and the language delegitimize to attempted has and influences outside blamed has Tehran challenges, ethnic-based the all to response In role ofthedirectionstruggle. minorities ethnic would join the struggle the and could fulfill a tipping among organizations opposition the of number a develop, to were regime ruling the to challenge major a if that radicalization. subsequent their and activists their widening thus minorities, ethnic the of members more of the long-run this policy can lead to the alienation in However, Arabs. the and Azerbaijanis the as such movements, the of number a decapitating off, paid have to seems policy severe this run, short the In activists. the on down clamping harsh from aside organizations, minority ethnic the to interest of issues the address to little doing is regime The Israel. and States, United 1 * turning point in the history of present-day Iran, The Islamic Revolution is thus not only a critical world. entire the indeed and general in world Islamic the East, Middle the for - borders its beyond far reaching ramifications and Iranian society for revolution consequences Islamic profound had The has in East. Middle Republic new Islamic and a singular monarchy a Iranian establishing 2,500-year-old eradicating thereby the decades, three over for to the Pahlavi regime that had ruled the country The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran put an end ovrey wie the revolution in while Iran was led by the clergy Conversely, ( ideology. new their to loyalty command and broaden regime their to of support sought they that power after seizing only was It support. grassroots lacking groups small by staged typically were - century twentieth the of middle the since place taking this in region and generally in occurring the Third World - chiefly coups the Previously, an East. of model this new insurrectionary movement in the modern Middle Khomeini, a represents Ruhollah revolution Ayatollah by Led East attheturnoftwentiethcentury. but one of the pivotal events shaping the Middle glorious legacyofearlyIslam. the to return a of short nothing was revolution the by embodied ideology "new" The power. of a was prerequisite, rather than a result, enjoyed of their seizure they support grassroots the David Menashri* n rna plc sne h rvlto se David see: Menashri, revolution the since policy Iranian On in gatheringmaterialforthispaper. nian Studies (CIS) at Tel Aviv University, for their help Danielle Digli, research students at the Center for Ira- Ms. and Friedman Brandon Mr. thank to like would I Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion and and Religion Iran: in Politics Post-Revolutionary velopments since Khomeini's death"; David Menashri, de- of "Analysis Meier and Holmes 1990; York, New Power in Iran:IntheThroesof , London,Prank Cass, 2001. The IslamicRevolution Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution, Revolution, and War of Decade A Iran: Factional Rivalry Ulama ), 1

h ’seby f xet’ ee ed regularly. held were Experts’ of ’Assembly the Parliament, as well as to local governments and Iranian the Majlis, the to elections elections the years, in albeit 2009, whose results remain controversial. Over those in reelected was who candidate, radical most the iconic Ahmadinejad, the - Mahmoud Khatami by replaced was - reform of symbol when 2005, in place took change significant Another 2001. in term the Nateq Nouri. Khatami was elected for a second defeating Akbar Ali élite, governing the elections, of representative the presidential in elected 1997 was - of movement candidate reform the the - Khatami Mohammad as occurred change unusual highly a president, as terms consecutive two served Rafsanjani After President. named was Rafsanjani and Leader, as Supreme the designated becoming successor, Khomeini's was Khamenei maintained. in nonetheless was death country the in Khomeini's stability 1989, of trauma the Despite 1989 . through 1981 from continuously served all Rafsanjani) of Hashemi (Akbar Speaker Parliament the the and Mousavi) Minister (Mir-Hossein Prime the Khamenei), the (Ali Khomeini), President (Ayatollah Leader" "Supreme The robustness. remarkable demonstrate did two first the years of the revolution, the regime's institutions of shocks initial the Following formula forsocietaladvancement. ( to prove that its slogan - "Islam is the Solution" the time being . The revolution, however, has yet the rule of the clerics seemed stable, at least for challenges, daunting those Despite ills. political and economic social, pervasive remedy would by establishing an exemplary Islamic society that the ideology revolutionary the fulfilling consolidating and regime, and stabilizing primary objectives: two on focused government Islamic the rule, its of decades three first the During Al-Islam huwa al-hal huwa Al-Islam ) - constitutes an effective 29 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 30 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony ofotto bten poig camps . opposing between violent open, an confrontation into turned elections 2009 The Ahmadinejad . of election the with so, more even and, president as Khatami of election the with heights new reached They years. recent The in pronounced more loyalists . becoming revolution, the ardent of and inception very the at emerged controversies staunch most Khomeini's among even evident was be applied should that policies the about dissension Substantial change. of depth and pace scope, the about disagreements however, were, There found itselfconfronted. practical solutions to the problems with which it of search in doctrine its adapt to government transition the from opposition to power compelled the Islamic movements, ideological other many with case the been has as that, apparent became it however, enough, Soon born. was revolution the which from unrest the of heart the ills that afflicted Iran, and which were at the to solutions had it that prove and doctrine its implement to upon called was regime new the triumph, revolution’s the With society. plaguing revolutionary doctrine and solving the problems the implementing than easier proved clergy the of authority the establishing and power Seizing what prevailedduringtheShah'sregime. than Iran day present in freedom greater no is there and unchanged, remained have hardships yet to occur: the social inequities and economic the Iranian people to embrace prompted the which revolution areas has key two the in change and be and a require would which emulate, should societies Muslim the were other that life Islamic ideal the of principles embodiment revolutionary their that an Islamic-founded state. They wanted to show up set on problems society's solve to way the was ideals revolutionary the realizing them, For seizing power was not the goal in and of itself. not a mere designation for their movement, and of the "New Iran", the "Islamic Revolution" was proving it can remedy social ills. For the leaders people. In this way, they validate their ideology, the purpose of improving society and the life of for rather but another, with regime one replace Yet revolutions do not transpire solely in order to regime itself hasremainedsecure. the establishment, governmental the within changes significant the Notwithstanding operandi in terms of values and values of terms in Islamic hry n yas ae, significant a later, years one Thirty . in all spheres of existence of spheres all in revolution modus modus foreign influence in the country and the decline the and country the in influence foreign "cultural with aggression" by the displeasure West, resentment of growing services, social provision of better standing, financial improved freedom, political for hope reasons: of variety a for message revolutionary the to responded confined solely to the "religious" sphere. People be cannot revolution the animating factors the distinction a other, the on structure, societal and economics, draws who politics, and hand, one the on religion, between observer an standpoint of the from But comprehensive. and since all-encompassing religious indeed was philosophy their deemed be Islamist can the movements theory, broad this to According life, which is also governed by religious tradition. reflect those principles. The same is true of daily Islam; and by the social dictated order and is its cultural policy values economic the faith; from derived is regime the of conduct The economic policies. or social and religion science; and no distinction between draws religion and politics; religion that religion total a is Christianity) unlike but Judaism, (like Islam Fundamentally, movements intheregion). Islamist other about raised be also may that and the objectives of its proponents (a question roots its of terms in Islamic truly is revolution the which to extent the is discussion for point lhuh h rvlto i kon s the as known ( Revolution" is "Islamic revolution the Although the RevolutionaryPolicy Idealism versusPragmatismin the frameworkofrevolution. within groups various the of strength relative and outlook evolution, the review to made be is the 2009 presidential elections, an attempt will various discussion of point focal the the Although factions. of and strength camp relative the revolutionary examine the in different the approaches analyze to out sets paper This and state;betweenIslamtheWest. was a need to strike a balance between religion there Equally, country. the running in efficiency revolution and the demands for pragmatism and the to fidelity between sought was balance a while squall, turbulent a in pitch to continued Throughout this period, the Iranian ship of state eulc ( Republic" eie, ( "Islamic the Regime", as known is Iran in regime the ohr-e Eslāmi Jomhuri-ye uua- Eslāmi Hukumat-i nhlb Eslāmi Enghelābe , go starting good a ), o "Islamic or ) , and ), ( of degree certain ideological pluralism. The greatest a Islamic jurists has Islam of world The exegesis overridestheothers. Abdolkarim Prof. intellectuals, illustrious Iran's of one is views these for advocate outspoken An regime. conservative the of leaders the by dictated interpretation the of defiance popular by underscored currently being is conflict Their state. and religion of question the on example descent) is at loggerheads with Khamenei - for Iranian (of al-Sistani Ali Ayatollah in today, figure Iraq Shi'ite eminent last most the passing Even his year. until 1989 from of expression freedom denied his was be who and to successor) designated initially had Khomeini (whom Montazeri Hossein-Ali Ayatollah was another policy revolutionary the Later, of opponent prominent 1986. in death his until arrest opposed to Khomeini and was was day, kept the under of Iran house in cleric senior most the Shariatmadari, Kazem Ayatollah revolution, the of start the at example, For interpretation. their of expression dominant the one being name as philosophy to hard be would many It generations. over transformations undergone have tenets faith’s the and knowledge, of wealth a offers Islam Christianity, and Judaism like fact, much In Islam. Shi'ite of least at - philosophy Islamic of representative as ideas Khomeini's see to inclined were people Iran, in revolution the of wake the In tradition? Islamic to faithful movement revolutionary the of teachings the were degree what to is: question second The citizens. Iran's facing problems the resolve to ability its in rather but ideal, Islamic an of realization its key to the regime's stability over time lies not in this as a premise, it can also be argued that the With regime. Islamic an to rise gave it is, that results: its in as motivations its in much so not "Islamic" was revolution 1979 the that argued be therefore can It meanings. specific own his it giving while understand, and to relate easily lgn naslts h mvmn’ main movement’s message: 'Islam is the Solution' ( the encapsulates slogan revolutionary The ills. society's all to remedy a offered Islam" to "return The children. their for promised a better future, if not for them, at least that answer an - afflictions society's to answer existing order, the citizens the of to Iran opposition in saw Rising in values. religious Islam of an al-hal maraji Islam This is a message that any Muslim can Muslim any that message a is This ). ) in Iran were often in disagreement in disagreement in often were Iran in ) In terms of religious doctrine, no one no doctrine, religious of terms In . Al-Islam huwa huwa Al-Islam eovs rud h dge o pragmatism therefore, of degree Iran, the in around revolves controversy major The necessity, thelatterwillprevail. invariably, Almost when there reality. is a collision between ideology and changing meet to adapted be must theory and always implemented, be cannot constructs ideal its power, in when doctrine; theoretical a to adhere strictly of the government. While in opposition, one can conduct of the revolutionaries after taking control history revolution prior to seizing power and the actual throughout reveals the great gaps between the power. ideas revolutions of the to clergy Reviewing the brought that the with ideology keeping in is regime Islamic the of policy the extent what to is question third The Islamic world oftheday. the in pervasive concepts underlying the revolutionized teachings its teachings, its in Islamic was revolution the as extent an great revolutionary views or pre- his Khomeini's own of many previous of writings trace no is There platform and the doctrine of the Islamic regime. making them the mainstays of his revolutionary thought, religious of center the to views marginal Shi'a elevating in succeeded actually has by Khomeini himself before the 1970's. Khomeini expressed philosophy the with odds at even is revolution. Moreover, the revolutionary ideology 2 e no be can there that contends he Moreover, Islam. of interpretation superseding and single no is there that argued repeatedly has who Soroush, r n h nw h't philosophy. Shi'ite new the in or 3 leaders of the Iranian the the of leaders among views the indeed or generations, recent in philosophy mainstream reflect not did also it but Islam" "Shi’ite or "Islam" represent only did the ideology of the 1979 revolution not single a valid interpretation of "Islam", it is clear that not of negations general these Beyond Islamic the regime. of premise basic a contradicting al-Asrar opr hs iw epesd n i book his in expressed views his Compare pp.99-106 1940's and his book International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Studies, Eastern Middle of Journal International oiia Thought], Political Khomeini's in [Shi'ism Khomein" shel ha-politit ato be-tor- 'Ha-Shi'a Lazraus-Yafeh, Hava p.532; (1980), Nikki Keddie "Iran: Change in Islam, Islam is Change", Jurisprudent] writtencirca1970. official [Unveiling the Secrets] written in the early the in written Secrets] the [Unveiling nepeain f sa, thus Islam, of interpretation aMza Ha-Hadash Ha-Mizrah Velayat-e Faqih Velayat-e Ulama on the eve of the of eve the on [The Rule of the 3 hs t as to Thus, 30, Vol. , Kashf Kashf II 2

31 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 32 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony the Islamic concept of unity of with the reconciled be president country’s the as that only a Shi'ite of Iranian stipulation descent could serve constitutional Iran’s else, could all, How after policy. its formulating in interests particular Iran's account into take to had and ideologically regime could not ignore national considerations, - was speaking - nationalism foreign to the spirit of Islam, the of new the notion although example, For dogma. interests overcame collided, two the whenever fact, In revolutionary ideal. the supplanted gradually has interest national death of Khomeini in June 1989. the Accordingly, the since reinforced gradually been has trend This start. the from policy revolutionary of been part has and spheres, many in evident was adjustments in dogma. Such doctrinal distancing of forced reality harsh result rather, preference; doctrinal the necessarily not was trend reality. This with compromise to had they - often and - quickly Very only. slogans revolutionary by society Iranian plagued that problems the power, it became clear that they could not solve vision of an ideal regime. But once they rose to they could conceive a theoretical and - had to adapt doctrine to reality. In opposition, revolutionary movements that move from opposition to power the Islamic regime - implemented, much like other ideological be could its doctrine which in revolutionary ways practical for search its In institutions. government and society civil between as well generation and the children of the revolution, as is It founding the between struggle outlooks. personal a also different with groups power two between struggle a conservatives is This radical other. the on and hand, one the on reformists, or pragmatists debate: internal with this connection in other each against pitted are groups main Two doctrine. from departure introduced, and the persons who may authorize be should it which at pace the required, is that issue of government authority in an Islamic state, the Addressing dogma. before interests putting for basis doctrinal the supplied also Khomeini a fundamental pillar-bebridged? is nationalism Arab which for - Syria ruled and Iran's close ties with secular and Ba'athist- How could the gap between pan-Islamic thought on calling the Gulf the ' insistence Khomeini's and Islamic ideal supra-national the between contradiction the could Persian Gulf' be resolved? umma ? How that the Supreme Leader ( held constitution 1979 the and Khomeini both rnil of principle the of disavowal unapologetic an was legacy most erudite and pious cleric ( cleric pious and erudite most 4 ( Islam's fundamental edicts if the state's interest of one of fulfillment the suspend or mosque a demolish to right the has government the that override would revolutionary ideology. interest He national further that stated 1989 in ruled he 5 to determinetherevolutionarypath. and extremists. Both blocs have fought strongly radicals the side other the on and moderates, the barricades are the pragmatists, reformers or of side one many On subgroups. are and groups other there yet course, revolution’s the chart to years recent in vying been have that rivalry and personal enmity. There are two blocs not only conceptual differences but also political reflected opinions varying The change. of pace the and reform, of areas pragmatism, of extent the revolutionary camp regarding the acceptable Nonetheless, there were substantial disputes in become - regime rulers? Islamic the to all anathema were who - Shah the even and Mubarak Hosni Hussein, Saddam couldn't why power, to of mockery a doctrine. If that were the criterion made for ascension terms presidential two by arguing that he was highly experienced after over ideology. Justifying Khamenei’s nomination supreme reigned pragmatism that proof further provided credentials, scholarly necessary the of the Supreme Leader, though he clearly lacked successor the as Khamenei of designation The him. succeed to jurist a as standing sufficient a had disciples loyal his of none and dogma this none of Khomeini's theologians could adhere to ea- Keshvar Selah-e diverse movements ineachoneofthem. and subgroups are there and cohesive, or mogenous ho- is camps these of none Furthermore, Sadegh Khalkhali). and Mohtashami, Ali-Akbar Karubi, Mehdi Ayatollah Speaker Majlis former Mousavi, Hossein Mir- Minister Prime former today's (e.g pragmatists are leading upheaval initial the of radicals leading the of his Some Soroush). and Montazeri (e.g teachings to challenge greatest the posed subsequently revolution the of start the at followers staunchest Khomeini's of Some years. the over transformation and are changes undergone associations have and categorical, Factional not misplaced . be would camps two the describe accurately to attempt Any Kiyan (Tehran),January7,1988. eaa- Faqih Velayat-e s requires. so ) Rahbare hs although Thus, . A'lam va-Asdaq A'lam 4 ) must be the Khomeini's 5 ), - aredrivingdownthewrongway." in a one-way street, you - the people in power red linesthatnoonehaseverdefined,but student went on, "is not that youth cross some the problem," "The deal?" real the is decide one which to gets who And are? there Islam of but perhaps you should tell us how many types Islam, real the to faithful stay we that ask "You wrote: student the Islam, of bounds proper the 6 with Iraq contrary to his pledge to pursue "war, cease-fire the accepted not had Khomeini if all, his teachings. What would have happened, after alive he would probably have changed some of still were Khomeini if like maintained, they manner, In earlier. years 1,400 set had they path same very the followed have would they that in govern to contemporary times, there could be no certainty were Islam seventh- of the leaders if century that argued they Moreover, right to define the correct interpretation of Islam. of people could monopolistically appropriate the Kadivar, individuals These opposed the notion Shabastari. that Mohsen a Mojtahed small group Mohammad Soroush, and others, among included, bearers standard Their advocates. and who supporters revolution’s the among initially were groups critical other several and by students intellectuals, also joined Islamic were the regime by taken path the voiced about who doubts loyalists former and clerics The student. Responding to an editorial by Iranian an by paper insightful an in addressed interestingly is duality This revolution". the of "children as known generation the and guard old the between establishment as well the as society, civic between and struggle a is It change. of spirit new the and principles 1979 view suggests that this is a conflict between the to take toward the outside world. attitude A more in-depth appropriate the and versus globalization, isolationism interest, versus ideology state, and religion as such matters on debate philosophical a teachings. in engaged are sides Khomeini's two The to champion adherence conservatives utmost non- the the world, with Muslim rapprochement and social change openness, economic freedom, political of principle the celebrate reformists the While philosophy and the application of practical policy. his of interpretation the over dispute a in ways as followers of Khomeini's teachings, they parted Although the adherents of these camps all started Islam Jama’a wih ald n ot nt o overstep to not youth on called which , , May19,1988 6 Hojjat ul- Hojjat and hope for a better life in 1997. in 1979, Khatami became the symbol of change Khomeini with case the was As independence. and identity its maintain to able was Iran that provided desirable, also not but was unavoidable only influence foreign that thought and affairs, domestic with connection in openness inclination of an favor in spoke Khatami pragmatism. toward suggested also governance" saving it. His emphasis on also "interest" and "proper but republic Islamic the serving only not wanted to get it back on the right track, he thereby Rather, revolution. the disavow not did he Clearly, reform. and openness of advocate an as he was regarded as the leader of Viewed liberalism and liberal. outstanding a someone standing apart from the indeed establishment, the was Khatami become representative of had this trend. By Iranian standards, Khatami the warforeternity? continued have we Would victory"? until war 7 bloodshed of the revolution had been for the for been had revolution the of bloodshed the all whether wondered He person". one of hands the in concentrated sage religious the of rule "absolute the finally and sage", religious the of rule "absolute the then sage", religious added, had gradually turned into "the rule of the he republic, Islamic an of ideal The materialize. to failed had - justice and freedom sovereignty, Islamic Republic - as guaranteeing the people's student the leaders in1999,lamentedthatthevisionof of one leadership. Tabarzadi, conservative Heshmatollah the dead- of the policies and end Iran revolutionary Campuses of reality the students. of criticism scathing of hotbed nation’s a ground became fertile the found among philosophy new This reformist circleshadontheIranianstreet. influence the of indication an also were They change. for yearning a expressed respectively, 2000, and 1991 in Majlis the and governments local for elections the and 2001, and 1997 in elections presidential the in reformists the of Donya-e 'Shahr' ta Shahr-e 'Donya Shahr-e ta 'Shahr' Donya-e Khizesh Mashroote, Mashroote, Khizesh Tehran; Paya; Tehran; See his books and collection of articles: Ny 1997; Ney, e Nashr- Tehran, World], the of City the to City the of al-Jadid, 1988; [Studies onReligion,Islamand the Time],Beirut,Dar Hope and Challenge: The Iranian President Speaks, Speaks, President Iranian The Challenge: and Hope ran, Sima-e Javan, 1995 (first published in 1993); in published (first 1995 Javan, Sima-e ran, hamton, StateUniversity ofNewYorkPress,1997. Bim-e Mouj Bim-e oal't i-i wlIlm wal-'Asr wal-Islam fil-Din Motalla'at [The Rise of Constitutionalism] of Rise [The [Fear of the Wave], Teh- Wave], the of [Fear [From the World the [From 7 The victories Zamineha-ye Zamineha-ye Bing- Az Az

33 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 34 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony hs ves ad n pn eine f the of defiance open principle of in and views, these f h dsr o suet ad nelcul to intellectuals and students of desire newspapers the various of in expression the Thus short-lived. was 1997 in election Khatami’s of wake the in politics Iranian characterized that euphoria the establishment, conservative unbending an of face the In change. real about bring however, support garnered by the reformist camp did not, These rumblings of discontent and the electoral prison). to sentenced were Ganji and Kadivar (Both fascist. is Iran in regime the that argued clerical [rule]". is problem main "Iran’s that 1999 in published article an in writing further, even went Kadivar the leadership’santi-Israeltirades. of wisdom the about queries even occasionally rule", support of relations with the United States, and "clerical the of criticism taboo: deemed were hitherto that topics addressing criticism, not insignificant. They have featured unreserved newspapers supporting reform remained hundred open one is that fact the - prosecuted being editors and writers the of many with - 2000 in liberal beginning hundred period five-year a one over newspapers regime roughly down the shut although did And limited constrained. however expression, and degree of certain freedom a of of indicative as perceived be could slogans such standards, regional By Interpretation of Religion and State and Religion of Interpretation 8 clergy". the of tribunal special the [or] Guard, Revolutionary flagellation, sword, the of edge the with it impose "to but choice no with government the left it, accept willingly a "monocracy" which, because no society would characterized the conservative leadership, led to had which man, one of rule absolute the that concluded He authority. greater even assume and then Shah, seeing someone the else seize power on and revenge taking of purpose sole 9 leadership ( "Khemenei, shame on you! ( in 1999 decried the lack of freedom by chanting: Rah-e Halli bara-ye Sakhtar-e Ayandeh-e Iran", Ayandeh-e Sakhtar-e bara-ye Halli Rah-e Ruzegar-e Now Ruzegar-e Islam Jahan-e book: David Menashri, David book: US), the in published Association, Teacher the of periodical (a pp. 144-146 31-33. 1, Spring 1999; Internet edition; see also my also see edition; Internet 1999; Spring No.1, 8 Vol. Velayat-e Faqih Velayat-e raha kon raha

9 , February 14, 1999; "Nagofteh-haye Enqelab: "Nagofteh-haye 1999; 14, February , In his defiantly-titled book, 205 (February-March 1999), pp. 1999), (February-March 205 No. , )." Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran in Politics Post-Revolutionary , protesting students haya kon haya , Akbar Ganji 8 Reflecting ) let go of Mehregan Fascist Fascist ,

diinly they Additionally, bodies). extra-governmental (the Revolutionary Guard, the military, as well as enjoy they massive backing from important, the security establishment Equally spilt. be rightly can policies its and regime the to opposed are who those of blood the same, the and one are that the fate of Islam and the Islamic revolution they represent eyes, divine own truth, their and In since Islam. they true believe the policy represents their that assert they First, advantage. important several sources of power enjoy that have so far used to good conservatives The who hadtakentothestreets. effectively squelched the protests of the youths forces security the of from threats legitimacy and violence the of proclamations religious 10 ae t flil i Ilmc n ntoa duty, national "tomorrow might be too late". and Islamic his fulfill to taken were action immediate unless that him warned which the President had handled the riots, they with leniency and complacency supposed the Decrying danger. against imminent an called they what action take President the that terms uncertain no in demanded Guard Revolutionary Simultaneously, 24 senior commanders from the to us stamp outtheweeds." compels religion "our that proclaiming heretics the and those who oppose the regime or its policy, of heads the off cut to used be must sword" "jagged the that preached He it. against up rise that those against mandatory of use its deems also it but asserted, he use violence, the recommend Islam. Islam does about only Not nothing understands violence anyone that advocate not does Islam proclaimed that contended who - Ahmadinejad of Mesbah Yazdi - considered the spiritual mentor Taghi Mohammad Ayatollah the sermon, Friday a during 1999, 23, July On and policy. power their dictate of reins the to on grip rulers tight a keep conservative the the of hardened determination only freedom and reform see 11 12 f oiia opponents. political of tongues the off cut and behead to ready were Guard, Yahya Rahim-Safavi, added that his forces In like vein, the former head of the Revolutionary with restraint - their patience was wearing thin. turbulence and that - while they dangerous were still to acting end an putting of capability the had they that him reminded they enough, clear Kayhan Islami Jumhuriy-e Nashat , July24,1999; (Tehran),May28, June1,1998. , July19,1999. Iran Daily Iran 10 12 h cmiain of combination The 11 , July24,1999. If this were not ht a tkn lc sne h sat f the of start the immediate revolution. The since place taken had that anything severity in surpassed far which Iran, presidential 2009 throughout June riots mass in culminating elections, the during climax a reached camps two the between struggle The Elections New ClimaxafterPresidential Domestic StruggleReaches aftermath ofthe2009presidentialelections. the Shah in 1979. This was starkly evident in the opponents from doing to them what they did to They mean to stay at the helm and prevent their the cost of violently suppressing the opposition. at even rule, their preserve to determined are is acoalition comprising diverseforces. Speaker of the Majlis. Each of these movements former President Khatami, and Karubi, with the former together Mousavi, Minister Prime former and candidate presidential the by led is other the while Guard, Revolutionary the by backed Leader, Supreme the and President the by led is struggle the in side One Ahmadinejad. and the elections, Khatami presidents, two last Iran’s of outlooks comparing the by illustrated to dramatically prior are forged were which camps, ideological opposing the of views The the localarenaandIslamicworldatlarge. in figure central a becoming of goal his served also but - beyond and Iran in both - standing president- making standpoint, the inflammatory statements not only enhanced his personal his by From elect. championed conservative the ideology to momentum further lent hand and the Revolutionary Guard on the other one the on Leader Supreme the Ahmadinejad from received support among The conservatives. confidence the greater instilling factors United additional were the Afghanistan and Iraq in States by experienced being difficulties the and revenues oil increasing Furthermore, confidence, new by which in turn significantly bolstered its strength. invigorated was camp conservative emboldened already the 2005, in president as Ahmadinejad of election the Upon with theoutcomeofrevolution. movement ran much deeper, going back to disappointment the of roots the However, vote?" my is "Where was slogan main demonstrators’ The fraud. electoral of claims the was unrest cause célèbre cause for the for all politicalactivityandparties suppressing totally by resistance underground to them driving without force political effective an as Greens") ("The rivals their eliminate to is adherents of principles or 13 h cnevtvs ( conservatives The world their views, seeabove). (For pragmatism. thoroughgoing more a about bringing of objective the share by characterized disappointment with post-revolution reality, and are reformers The change. (either regime across-the-board explicitly) seeking or implicitly certain to in institutions reform views, for revolutionary of desire a spectrum from ranging wide as camp a reformist elections encompasses the Movement", the "Green since the known Generally the West and see themselves as the authentic the as themselves see and West the of dominance the on predicated order world a oppose figures These Jannati. Ahmad Ayatollah and Yazdi Mesbah Taghi Mohammad Ayatollah coterie and supported by such clerical figures as most the powerful one is today, comprised - of radicals" Ahmadinejad’s -"the group third The global the economy. in Iran integrating privatization of means a economic as supports group This Ghalibaf. Mohammad-Bagher Tehran of mayor former the and Razi Mohsen of Guard Revolutionary head former others, among includes, The second group, "the pragmatic conservatives", that the that argued Farhi, Daud Dr. Teheran, of University the from lecturer a - Larijani with associated is in an interview with the magazine violent suppression of the "Greens". For example, the with displeasure voiced also they Recently, confrontation with the West insofar avoid as possible. to wanting utterances, provocative and gestures theatrical Ahmadinejad’s to opposed are They sage. religious the by rule of principle Supreme Leader Khemenei and the fundamental the to faithful personally are They Velayati. Ali advisor Affairs International the Leader’s Supreme and Haddad-Adel, of Ali Gholam Speaker Majlis "traditional former the Larijani, the Ali Speaker Majlis - the by of represented three is the - conservatives" of first The promote to their sharedideas. how on split are yet regime, the support which of all factions, three into divided Khabar , August15,2010 . Usulgarayan’s most difficult challenge difficult most Usulgarayan principalists 13 . Khabar literally, , ), are now - which 35 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 36 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony n at t a rmnset of reminiscent ( it" do can we and possible "It’s was it Ahmadinejad’s 2005 elections campaign slogan: fact In appealing. the "oppressed people" ( people" "oppressed the of situation the and bridged, significantly been not have gaps social the Even sin. a is regime was a crime; today, speaking against the Islamic democrat. Back then, speaking against the Shah no was himself who Shah, the of days the to Iranians do not enjoy triumphed, greater freedom revolution compared the after decades Three were also the underlying tenets of the objectives revolution. These freedom. and bread freedom, and welfare goals: two for struggles ongoing in embroiled been have people Iranian the so, or years 120 last the For objectives. primary its realize to failure revolution’s the public at indignation cumulative from arises factor first The tone vis-à-vistheMuslimworld. embark on a dialog with Iran, and his conciliatory to Obama’s decision his presidency, the to rise meteoric awakening, public’s the of support Washington’s of consisting - effect" "Obama its expectations. The second may be termed the revolution’s failure, after thirty-one years, to the at meet disgruntlement public was one protest. first The of outburst the of heart the at were factors fundamental two had elections, conservatives the stolen the that belief their from stemming reformists the of anger the Beyond the in followed election’s wake. regime Islamic the of early days the since Iran in seen demonstrations violent most and each largest The at ruthlessly. out other lashed - conservatives the reformists and the - camps two these election campaign, bitter a in other each against Pitted as "Neoconservatives". known occasionally are they that reason this for is It Khomeini. Ayatollah of followers His elections slogan - slogan elections His change. about bring and bottom the from rise His to possible is him. it that hope in after ushered election themselves model to sought who countries, numerous in leaders potential inspired nation powerful most world's presidency the of the to ascent meteoric Obama’s thirty-one yearsafteritsvictory. revolution the were much higher compared to the stark reality from expectations the Surely, had Khomeini pledged to improve - has not been ameliorated. standing whose strata social Yes We Can We Yes mustazafin Mishavad va- Mishavad ) - the very the - ) - sounded - rm the from Newspapers elections. Iran’s in effect" "Obama the international and local press touched on the 14 osraie publication conservative president. Mousavi’s that American the of that by inspired was campaign intimating technology, edge cutting- movement’s Green the and campaign colorful the on remarked all Ahmadinejad) with ntd tts nevnd n rns domestic Iran’s in intervened States United was faced with a serious dilemma. In 1953, the once the mass riots broke out the administration Iran, in change internal facilitating of means as administration deliberately sought to give Iranian youths hope American the not or Whether the youthsinIran,whichapparentlyitdid. to appeal might that carrot" "poisoned a was dialog the that concerned were They carrots. them, Obama’s policy was not one of sticks and correctly perilous, assessing the inherent threat of a dialogue. For be to it radicals, thought however, The reformists. Iran’s by welcomed approach since the revolution, and it was greatly long-standing the to compared change marked people, but also vis-à-vis the regime. This was a Iranian the vis-à-vis approach new a only not the among nations place (gratefulness rightful to Iran’s its legacy) expressed take to Iran for call his and regime), Islamic the recognizing of sign a being as construed was (which Iran" of 2009), his direct appeal to the "Islamic Republic people on the occasion of the New Year (March conciliatory Iranian the to address His circles. reformist the heartened Islam and his Iran towards demeanor however, Unquestionably, voters. Iranian on power to rise Obama’s of and assess, there is no way of to proving the emotional impact hard obviously is Inspiration backing. a struggle, believing they would enjoy American militants of the Iranian opposition to embark on the energized This priority. his them made and Obama raised the issue of human and civil rights elected. The second had to do with the fact that with dialog a Iran and his initial statements right after have getting to initiative his was one first The particular. in movement reform the to and general, in people Iranian the to attractive Two elements in Obama’s policy were particularly to speakersofthelanguage. which means "he is with us", has natural appeal Mitavanim Javan , July5,2009; 14 In the aftermath of the riots, both riots, the of aftermath the In ). In fact, his name in Farsi in name his fact, In e Yr Times York New New York Times York New Javan o h Iranian the to , June20,2009. (associated U-Ba-Ma , Ma-Nist so much as a knife - was a was - knife a as much so of war on God or anyone taking up arms - even rn u t te rsue f h Zoit and Zionist the neoconservative lobbyonCapitolHill. of pressure the to due toward Iran policy conciliatory Obama his abandoning accused manager, of Hashemi, Samara campaign Mojtaba Ahmadinejad’s affairs. domestic their in interference American gross be to perceived they what at grumbling from conservatives the stop not did policy cautious 15 the ( called earth on Allah he of enemies the message, demonstrators the home Driving demonstrators. the against means Shari’a any employ to contradict permissible it making and thus law]," [religious law are [state] demonstrations against "unauthorized that said Khatami Muhammad al-Islam were Hujjat Tehran, in they sermon and Friday a At it. eradicate election, to determined the after a that magnitude erupted imagined the of never movement resistance had conservatives The complained: Others government]?" [the them with or demonstrators us with you are that "Obama, asked: reason good for was It sealed. been already had movement Green the and human rights. By then, however, the fate of he expressed direct support of political freedom that days agonizing ten after only was it and Obama Initially, chose not to address the movement. events in Iran directly, reform the help fact in would intervention such that certainty of policy dialog and non-intervention. Nor was there any president-elect’s the have contradicted would intervention American An times. those during with grappling was the House White question the was - extent what to so, if and - involved be to not or be To triumph. to revolution the helped having as perceived thus was and affairs, domestic Iran’s in involved get subsided to not chose not Carter President has 1979, In since. rage Iranian and affairs, demonstrators, while at the same time assuring the against resolve its show to wanted it hand its opponents and supporters alike. On the one wanted to simultaneously convey a message to regime The out. violently carried brutally and vigorously act to against the demonstrators, and indeed this justification was religious with and similar statements supplied the government 16 o sa’ ms svr punishment. severe most Islam’s to Mohareb BBC World Monitoring Service, Service, Monitoring World BBC TV Press u ee this even But us"]. with not is ["He ), decreeing that anyone found guilty found anyone that decreeing ), , June30,2009. June 26,2009. Mohareb 15 16 , subject , These U-Ba- French revolution the calls for calls the revolution French the (During freedom. and bread - other the pillar social-economic on political the and the hand, one the pillars: on pillar two on Iran in value stood revolutions past, intrinsic the In ideal. the that of great however support, mass develop to freedom of ideal the on only focused movement a for hard is it Furthermore, amendments, or liberalizing some electoral social policies. some adopting policy, economic of the aspects some modifying is, that - change partial effecting of support in millions mobilize Shah to hard is It slogans. similar no has movement "The current The Solution" . the commanding: is "Islam Go", uncomplicated, Must and was compelling message contrast, In Khomenei’s masses. the rousing message of catchy capable and comprehensible easily and clear a lacked opposition the disorganized, varied opponents. Moreover, in addition government’s to being the all unite lacked could that ideology It failings. alternative shared a own and leadership charismatic its the had forces, by security opposition the suppressed of ruthlessness were the dissidents the While succeeded, atleastfortheshortrun. undoubtedly they this In power. relinquish to not determined were they - itself Islam of fate the indeed and - republic Islamic the of future the and rule own their of identity complete the in Believing victors. yesterday’s on tables the turning from opponents their prevent to sought lesson from their uprising against the Shah and their learned indeed had They situation. the on control and that the regime maintained a firm grip of out spiraled not had things that followers its Ahmadinejad, but also at the Supreme Leader Supreme the at also but Ahmadinejad, at only not directed rage the is regime the for ominous Equally conditions. proper erupt the to under waiting active, remains volcano however, the surface, the the Below by forces . repression security iron-fisted of face the in subsided have months subsequent in up flared occasionally that resistance of outbreaks The power. on grip their consolidated further have In the year since the elections, the conservatives money?" oil my is "Where was asked also have should they what vote?" my is "Where question the to addition In goals. social-economic tangible call for freedom should have been coupled with the millions, mobilize To together.) bound were representation political and taxation revolution, American the in similarly, hand; in hand went liberté et égalité et liberté

37 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 38 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony the Revolutionary Guard and the on security forces, primarily rely to seems regime current the on the premises of ideology, ethics and religion, power sought Having Iran. throughout many of Iranian regime has been diminished in the eyes the of legitimacy the finally, And blow. serious a dealt was - achievement historic revolution’s Khemenei" graffiti were sprayed on the walls. the on sprayed were graffiti Khemenei" 17 the on procession a during video YouTube A camp. conservatives’ the in squarely him positioned results election the of endorsement immediate his for and Ahmadinejad support unwavering Khemenei’s himself. 18 os, the Worse, today. of principle revolutionary bigger and deeper much looks sides the between gap the revolutionary movement, the of part as themselves saw still that factions between feud" "family a be to the point that said be could camps two the between struggle until if Furthermore, Leader". "Supreme exalted the the of instead in arena political player regular a becoming and status his devaluating consequently group, one with clashing camps, Khemenei chose to openly side the above stood always who Khomeini Unlike compromised. was prestige Khomeini’s Khemenei’s shoes, fill to unable generally being and charisma, and qualities leadership both Lacking o h dictator". the to "Death chanting and Khemenei of photos up ripping demonstrators shows 2009) December New York Times York New International Herald Tribune Herald International 17 , December28,2009. n ulc lcs "et to "Death places, public In Velayat-e Faqih Velayat-e , August18,2009. Day of Ashura of Day - the - (27 18

an hleg o te sai rgm three regime Islamic decades afteritsformation. the of challenge main the is This Iran. of people the all for freedom - namely the promise for a better life and greater rebellion fueled originally that expectations the met has regime revolutionary the which to degree the on rather but Islam, a true to realizing return in sages religious the of success the on depend not will position its scales, the to weight full its adds public the when and If change. public sudden a foresee to ability the any early-warning signs. Historians do not have They are never predictable, nor do they send off suddenly. up spring always movements Popular regime. Islamic incumbent the to serve warning a as should year last the of experience the and past the from the memories Accordingly, Shi’a. of mainstay the was this respects many in fact, In regime. usurping a against struggle the to indifferent never also were Shi’ites The change. for call to streets the to took Iranians The activity. grassroots anti-establishment of tradition impressive an have people Iranian the East, Middle the in nation other any than More occur. will upheaval another when and if political say to hard with is It world. experienced final the say to yet has - struggles - public Iranian over The struggle decided. been the not has Iran that revolutionary seems it but round, this in hand upper the had conservatives The important political ramificationsinthefuture. have undoubtedly will which of all 1 desire toattainenergyindependence . are building an entire nuclear fuel cycle out of a gas reserves are not unlimited. To that end, they natural and oil Iran’s because energy generate only to build nuclear power reactors in order to seek they that claim They needs. peaceful at and that its nuclear program is aimed exclusively weaponry, nuclear developing in interest or to intention no have they that claim Iranians The arms. nuclear acquire to striving is it that hint or statement any to regard in caution extreme the Iranian leadership has consistently agenda, exercised the on been has issue the that years them in the future. For the approximately twenty course have said nothing about any plans to use that they intend to develop nuclear arms, and of deny Iranians The clear: is gap information this weapons, should it obtain them. The reason for or the use that Iran plans to make of its nuclear it, guide that considerations the programs, the policy. No hard data are available on the aims of is known about Iran’s current and future nuclear has been revealed about it, hardly anything at all Iranian nuclear program the and the on information that focused attention intense the Despite other aspectsoftheprogramatsametime. conceal to continues it although parties, other by exposure their prevent to order in program nuclear its of aspects certain reveal to will, its against forced, was too, Iran, (IAEA). Agency Energy Atomic International the of inspectors by and community intelligence Western years the by recent in revealed been have program international nuclear Iran’s of components Numerous the arena. in many among concern of source constant a representing governments, perceived as a serious threat in the eyes of many acquire nuclear arms in the foreseeable future is will Iran that possibility in The years. coming attention the of focus the remain to continue will and decades, two past the for geopolitics major issue in the Middle East and international conduct regarding its nuclearization, has been a The Iranian threat, at the center of which is Iran’s Ephraim Kam ar Energy: Programs and plans," and Programs Energy: ar Nucle- Iran’s for Organization "The example for See view with Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to ABC on ABC to Rafsanjani Hashemi Akbar Ali with view inter- NES-FBIS; 93-067 1993 9, April 1993; 3, March Iran’s NuclearPolicy Ettela'at 1

(Teheran), do so. It is only in recent years that to this debate to capability planning the have not was did it it them, acquire if even that believed or claim that it had no interest in nuclear weapons, to even capable of doing so. Many accepted was Iran’s it intended whether and weapons indeed nuclear acquire Iran whether debated hotly experts and community intelligence the Moreover, up until a few years ago, governments, nuclear program. its of development the resume regime the did the after learned, been had Iraq with war the of lessons 1987, in Only devil. the from came the halt revolution, program to because of his view orders the that nuclear power gave after Khomeini 1979, Ayatollah in but program, nuclear a advance to taken were steps modest some Shah, the of rule the During claim. this to Islamic revolution, there was indeed some truth need them. During the early years following the not does it because plans arms nuclear no develop to has it has that Iran maintained case. persistently the always self-evident, not was be this to but appears today question this to answer The weapons. nuclear attain to striving indeed is Iran whether is context this in explored be to needs that question first The Program The GoalsofIran’sNuclear and thepossibilityoferrors. on will contain a number based of question marks, doubts is that assessments, and consequently, its conclusions component major a data and hard on based is that component small entails that this analysis will contain a relatively This program. nuclear Iran’s of context leadership the in its facing considerations relevant the of examination an on and nuclearization, of context the in behavior its on doctrine, defense Iran’s understand to effort an on based be will policy its of analysis this policy, nuclear Iran’s about information direct any of absence the In Kamel Harazi, Kamel Minister Foreign Iranian by remarks 1993; 24, May February 5,2002, FBIS-NES-2002-0205. Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani in Shamkhani Ali Minister Defense Haaretz , October 7, 1997; remarks by remarks 1997; 7, October , Asharq Al-Awsat Asharq , 39 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 40 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony has not stated this categorically. this stated not has it if even weapons, nuclear attain to striving is Iran that possibility the regarding suspicions the matter of the Iranian bomb, has now raised on approach political cautious a take to tended always has which IAEA, the Even explicitly. this Iran. The government of Russia has even stated indicative of the fact that they no longer believe sanctions on Iran by the UN Security Council is of imposition the supported times four have - positions Iran’s accepted past the in which - China and Russia of governments the that fact of nuclearization, path and the on that a upon fairly doubt short embarked timetable. indeed The for has room Iran any leaving longer no program, nuclear Iran’s regarding accumulated has that information of amount vast the is this for reason The out. died part most the for has 2 - or a limited offensive against its nuclear sites. against it - just as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan campaign military broad-ranged a out carry to taken the view that the United States has plans has Iran years, ten past the For States. United a far more serious one - the threat posed by the However, theIraqithreathasbeenreplacedby it has disappeared off the map as a military actor. forces, coalition U.S-led the by occupation of strategic weaponry . Furthermore, since Iraq’s arsenal its losing War, Gulf First the of result a as weakened significantly was Iraq However, missiles. ballistic of stockpile a and biological weapons and chemical possessed already it that and weaponry, nuclear acquire to efforts making again once was Iraq that Iranians the drawing to a close, after it had become clear to launched in 1987 just as the Iran-Iraq war was was program nuclear Iran’s Iraq. with war its in suffered it defeat and trauma terrible the of background the on especially deterrence, and needs a strategic weapon for reasons of defense to acquire nuclear weapons is that in its view, it The original suggested. and fundamental be reason may for Iran’s reasons efforts main Three Why does Iran want to acquire nuclear weapons? doing so. to way its on stage advanced an at already is it that and capability weapons nuclear up build to striving fact in is Iran that is policy nuclear Iranian the of investigation the for departure n 13 (08 i te sai Rpbi o Iran, of Republic GOV/2010/28, May 31,2010. Islamic the in (2008) 1835 and (2008) 1803 (2007), Council 1747 (2006), Security 1737 of resolutions provisions relevant and ment Agree- Safeguards NPT the of Implementation IAEA, 2 The point of point The rallying thenationaroundit. prestige, internal it giving by regime the bolster convinced that acquiring nuclear weapons would to topple it. The regime’s leaders are apparently try and regime the undermine might elements internal a in external and itself internal that fear of state constant finds to and home at standing related its to is sensitive is regime reason Islamic The considerations. third The prevalent assumptions-Israel,too. the on based - and India Pakistan, Russia, as that possess nuclear weapons capabilities, such countries by surrounded already is Iran when element in building Iran’s hegemony, in particular central a become would prestige, attendant the that the acquisition of nuclear weapons, with all hegemony. The regime’s apparent expectation is to the strategic ones behind the desire to attain regime added an Islamic-religious consideration impact current The area. the to in processes principal the able superpower regional a as up Iran build to sought also Shah the of regime The ambition. new a not is This East. Middle regional attain entire the and Gulf Persian the over hegemony to aspiration its is weapons The second reason for Iran’s interest in nuclear attacking itisbyacquiringnuclearweapons. from superpower a deter to way only the that believes apparently Iran threat, this of light In h wrig supin s ht hn Iran will when it device, nuclear a manufacture to that decides is assumption working The break throughtonucleararms? the manufacture to the eyes, its in time, right the is what - weapon decides Iran if And it. a few months away from actually manufacturing to create a nuclear device and to halt at the brink, bomb, or to make do with building the capability nuclear a develop actually to whether question: yet possess nuclear weapons, it faces a twofold not does Iran which in situation, current the In the halt to efforts process fail. the if weapons nuclear stockpiling in succeed indeed may Iran when not does yet possess but nuclear arms; and so, the future period, do to ability its up building is and weapons nuclear acquire to striving is Iran which during period, current the time: of periods two on touches policy nuclear Iran’s Nuclear Policy The CurrentStageofIran’s enrichment ofuraniumtoahighgrade. the for designated be may and needs, civilian for intended not clearly is which Qom, of city the near uranium small of enrichment the relatively for facility a of construction secret The 2009-2010: in uncovered were steps Iranian following the addition, two In grade. high a to enriched for if bombs, sufficient amount an in grade low a to enriched uranium amassed has Already Iran today, bombs. of number a manufacture to it for sufficient amount an in - material fissile i.e - grade high a to enriched uranium produce to it enable will that grade low a to enriched seeks to manufacture plutonium a large amount Iran of uranium efforts, these also of focus the At but production. uranium, of the involving enrichment mainly - capabilities nuclear of 3 l of its first bomb. direction the in ahead speed full rushing not is intelligence community point to the fact that Iran But the indications in the hands of the Western a numberofyears. a up building sufficiently large stockpile of weapons, will in take succeeded has it until start its from which process, gradual a be will Iran of nuclearization the that is means this What capability. second-strike maintain to also but mishap, technical a encounters or its fails case attack in bombs additional of number a of an is uncommon scenario. that It and would require - a attack stockpile to but choice no has it unless bombs, two or one only has it when attack nuclear a mount not does state A arms. nuclear not the employing actually considers Iran if are i.e bombs needs, operational two for effective or sufficiently one bomb, first its possesses it moment the from country nuclear a as viewed be launch will Iran Although varied capabilities. with least, very the at devices ten to eight of stockpile a up build to seek will but bombs, two or one just with do make not

for NationalSecurity Studies,Dec.15,2009 Amos Yadlin, at the annual conference of the Institute Lecture of Chief of IDF Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. percent sofar. 20 of grade a to uranium of kilograms 20 enriched had it that announced Iran 2010, timetable July In material. fissile the of production the for shortens which but grade, military a considered not is which percent, 20 of grade a to uranium of enrichment The 3 Instead, it is building a variety l l 4 these fundamentalconsiderations: to added be may factors further of number A 5 until itactuallypossessedanuclearbomb. it, on even if attack that deterrence would not be of immediate, possibility any of face the in deterrence strategic partial achieve particular in and arms nuclear of acquisition the from result that advantages the of - all not albeit - from some benefit to able be would Iran scenario, its internationalcommitments.Moreover,inthis all meeting is it that insist to continue would withdrawing and Treaty from Nonproliferation Nuclear refrain the from also would Iran scenario, this of framework the in that possible is It minimum. a to bomb, a of development its required to pay in the international arena, due to them, thereby keeping the price that it would be developing of intention no has it that and arms without lying - that it does not possess nuclear technically and - claim to continue to able be of would advantage Iran that is state threshold a The remaining bomb? the manufacture - or will it decide to go all the way and actually itself weapon the build not will meantime, the for but weapons nuclear build to capability the develop to decided has that state a i.e - state nuclear policy: Will it prefer to remain a fundamental threshold Iran’s to related is one main The considerations. of number a on dependent be not, when it will be made. Such a decision could has it if and made, been already has decision the nuclear barrier - and it is not yet clear if that the is through break to when and if policy decision political nuclear current Iran’s in important most stage the that follows it this From

o mr o ti sbet se Eham a and bomb," Iranian the Kam for timetable Ephraim "A Asculai, Ephraim see: subject, this on more For Ibid. Strategic Assessment Strategic advanced missiledevelopment. the products of their missile program and its display prominently and openly they deny, the Iranians take great pains to conceal and aspects military whose program, nuclear its Unlike precision. and range their improving is and weapons, nuclear for system delivery development of ballistic missiles as a possible Furthermore, Iran is concurrently advancing its of additionalfacilitiestoenrichuranium. number a build to future near the in plans it that announced also Iran time, same the At , Vol.12,Issue4,January2010 5 4 41 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 42 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony Future ofIran The NuclearPolicy andthe l l l weapons, raises two important questions: What will decide at some stage to Iran manufacture which nuclear to according scenario, second The a firstbomb. for material fissile of amount sufficient a has it that assessments, on based moment, the from case assumption, i.e that Iran has gone nuclear a manufacture nuclear bomb, it will have will to work from a strict- Iran when exactly know indeed will it that advance in assume Israel cannot and question critical nuclear. a is fully this Because becoming to state threshold regarding a being from move especially might Iran when stage and the program, nuclear Iranian the of can state the regarding obtained intelligence be timely and precise this in scenario, that assurance no is There countries. relevant other and Israel for problem difficult a create will scenario this capability, nuclear of threshold the at stop to decides Iran if Even will itstimetablebe? what and adopt to decide Iran will policy What that step would be based on a political decision: do so within that time frame. The key to it taking it doesn’t necessarily follow that to Iran will indeed knowhow technical manufacture a the first nuclear bomb by 2010-2011, has Iran community that intelligence is Western the among From all this, it appears that even if the consensus

nenly fr xml sol a severe a should internal crisisdevelop? it example strengthen for urgently could internally, bomb that the conclude acquiring regime the Will the purposeofimmediatedeterrence? for arms nuclear build to it requiring Israel, for about to be attacked by the United States - or was it that quickly conclude to were more it if example, bomb the build and timetable its that up step to about Iran require might come circumstances the Will Iran wasmanufacturingnucleararms? that apparent became it after it, on imposed sanctions, which may be assumed would be for manufacturing the bomb, including further it from exacted be price lowest the would In other words, when, in Iran’s assessment, Iran were to decide to start to manufacture? terms to break through the nuclear barrier, if What would be the optimal timing in political probability - will be that Iran has succeeded in succeeded has Iran that be will - probability high or certainty of level a on - West the and Israel in assessment the However, case. the is possesses a bomb, and may even deny that this nuclear ambiguity, i.e it does not announce of policy that a adopts it Iran that is option first The to openlyconductanucleartest. or weapons, such possesses it that announce signals that it has acquired nuclear weapons, to clear out send to alternately, or arms; nuclear has it that admit to not i.e ambiguity, of policy be able to choose one of two paths: to adopt a will it barrier, nuclear the through breaks Iran which in scenario a In bridge. the reached has it when only so do will it that and decided, yet and it is entirely possible that Iran itself has not be, might policy future its what to as indication already been noted that Iran has not given any has It be weapons . nuclear will to acquired has policy it after insufficient future is Iran’s what basis determine factual the Today, acquired them. has it before than likely less even is weapons nuclear its dismantle and back clock the turn to nuclear weapons, the possibility of convincing it acquired has Iran after that assumed be may it event, any In 1998. in conducted they tests nuclear the following Pakistan and India with that they will be eased over time - as happened the that sanctions hope will not be excessively the prohibitive and in price the pay to willing be will Iran that these and it deter not will sanctions that consideration into taken be must it But chooses. it paths two the of whichever ones, serious very perhaps sanctions, of form the in price heavy a pay to forced be will Iran that assume to reasonable is It bomb. a attain to necessary work the of most done have will it then by that is hope the exposed, is it if out; nuclear found be not will a it that hope of the in - device construction the and fissile of material production the including - undeclared facilities in activity nuclear to secret try conduct could it Alternately, of weapons. acquisition nuclear the to ahead quickly it move enabling to IAEA, the of supervision the end and Treaty Nonproliferation Nuclear the from withdraw can It ways. two of one in so do to able be will it weapons, nuclear manufacture to If Iran decides not to stop at the threshold and it makeofthesearms? its to regard possession of nuclear arms? And what use in will adopt Iran will policy public l l l l of number a Iran give advantages: would policy This is manufacturingnucleararms. no irrefutable evidence exists to prove that Iran various among that claiming position, its support accept that countries find to try will Iran case, a such in that assumed be may It does. it that admitting from refrained has it because a absence of conclusive proof that this is so, and having of suspected bomb, itssituationwillbeeasier,inviewofthe be may Iran while situation, a such In weapon. nuclear a building eur Ire ad te cutis o accept to countries will other arms and Israel nuclear require possesses it that Iran of part the on declaration a hand, other the On weapons . nuclear possesses indeed Iran that doubt for room no leave would test A options: two the between difference certain a is There test. nuclear declared a conduct even perhaps announce may and weapon will nuclear a Iran possesses it is, that that - policy nuclear The second option is for Iran to pursue a declared

but everyonewillbelievethatitdoes. will not admit that it possesses it nuclear arms, i.e in: is Israel that situation Iran the to gets closer the gradually, attained be will advantages such weapons, does such really possess it whether to as doubt some remain always will there because ambiguity, arms will be more modest if it pursues a policy of nuclear of acquisition the from gain to hopes Iran that regional advantages internal and the of some that true is it While be mitigated. responsibility for causing that damage the would Iran’s and to Treaty Nonproliferation damage Nuclear The nuclear either. in interest a encouraging no has in Iran which join race, arms to countries Eastern Middle other among constraints the reduce could bomb the of existence the Denying pressure. less with and easily more stockpile nuclear larger increasingly an up build Iran help will bomb its of existence very the Concealing without delay. readily has already available nuclear weapons Iran that it can activate that assume to have would countries those because state, in a scenario in which it remains a threshold United States or Israel would be higher than The credibilityofitsdeterrencevis-à-visthe 1998. in tests nuclear declared their conducted they until weapons nuclear acquired had they time the from years for waited Pakistan and India one of ambiguity . It was for these reasons that to policy declared a from back way no is there hand, other the On policy. declared a to over it with asufficientadvantage, it canalwaysmove provides longer no ambiguity of policy the that convinced becomes Iran If flexibility. some allows It advantage: another yet has ambiguity knows it of policy a of if choice The advance. in is it what especially minimum, a to pay to have will it that price international the keeping advantages, internal and regional the of most milking while deterrence, of level reasonable a provide it with optimal results: It would achieve of ambiguity, at least at the first stage. This could a greater likelihood that Iran will opt for a policy is there considerations, two these among From other. the on attacked, being of fear its of light in deterrence credible and immediate needs it will much how and it hand, one the price on pay, to have the of assessment its and Iran on exerted be to pressure international the of main two weighs it weight the another: one against considerations will after Iran decision by made be The nuclearization? of or declared ambiguity of policy a choose Iran Will something thatIranisnotinterestedin. - judgment in mistake or misunderstanding a danger of a nuclear confrontation as a result of game and the red lines, which will minimize the the of rules the including regarding - Russia or countries, Turkey European with for - example parties other with dialogue enable will It advantage: another yet has policy this And achievements. internal and regional both with military option against Iran and will provide Iran a of possibility the to end an put conclusively will deterrence, credible create will policy this advantages, the for As track. nuclear the take to countries Eastern Middle other convince to serious sanctions and another is that it is likely more and further to lead certainly most will it that is disadvantage One disadvantages. and advantages both has policy nuclear declared a lies and subterfuge. As far as Iran is concerned, bearing in mind that Iran has a history of using while - deterrence immediate of purpose the for example, for - lying be may Iran that doubt temporary least a at for room leave of amount certain will but credible, as declaration that 43 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 44 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony l l three mainfactors: on based is hypothesis This country. other any use of nuclear arms - neither against Israel nor is it actions, reasonable to its assume that it will not initiate the in lie that opportunities the against dangers the disadvantages, the against advantages the weighs it if rationally, Iran behaves if that claimed be can It conclusive. nor simple neither is question this to answer The that optionintoaccountinitsconsiderations. take and arms nuclear with it attacking Iran of the only is country that will have to weigh the danger it because concerned, critical is Israel especially where is question This weapon? threat, or will it view them as an offensive strike real under come interests important most its if be used in the worst-case scenario, for example, weapons? Will nuclear it leave its them on use the shelf Iran only to will How explored: be to At this point, the most important question needs

in whichthereisnootheralternative. to be saved for an extreme and dire situation designation: fundamental and original their harm would Israel against weapons nuclear far as Iran is concerned, initiating the use of that one not is requires nuclear weapons to neutralize it. As it Iran, to threat military limited a represents Israel While price. any at weapons nuclear of use the justify would a supreme interest, one whose achievement in Iran’s eyes, the destruction of Israel is not for its development of nuclear weapons, and State of Israel, that is not its main motivation expressly declared its desire to eradicate the case the of an extreme in military crisis. net While it safety has strategic this a as views weaponry it words, other In deterrence. and defense of first purposes for foremost weapons and nuclear developing is judge, to Iran possible is it that extent the To t ih ee udrie n tpl the topple and undermine even might serious it cause infrastructures; country’s and the to devastation Iranians of kill would millions cities other on and it on nuclear strike a Teheran, in living people million 14 With it. on Israel by strike nuclear harsh a involving response a to lead necessarily account that a nuclear strike on Israel would into take to need of would it assumption, this basis the On capability . second-strike has apparently it that and arms, nuclear of stockpile large a has Israel that - does else everyone that extent the to - believes Iran l l l this conclusionshouldbenoted: to reservations important three arms, nuclear with Israel attack to unlikely is Iran analysis, rational a on based that conclude we if Even

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The probability of Iran Iran of probability The . Iran will will Iran . ula assac otie h cnet f a of context the outside assistance nuclear with allies its provide also could Iran However, into taken be consideration. should Israel involving crisis military severe a of case in umbrella" "nuclear a Syria promise might Iran that possibility the scenario, serious more a In ally. its to caused being harm deter the intensifying further to from Israel thereby and response its of nature the to regard in uncertainty to of state order a create in - weapons nuclear includes this that -implying disposal its at means all using them help to willing be would it that allies its to signal could Iran Nevertheless, one. nuclear a not especially and Israel, with confrontation would also prefer not to Iran get involved in a direct future the in that assume to reasonable is it But weapons. nuclear acquired has it after would refrain from responding in the future too, Iran that guarantee no is past the in response a of absence the However, allies. its protect to involvement real any from refrained Iran War, Hezbollah was attacked in the Second Lebanon when and War, Lebanon First the in Israel by attacked was Syria when past, the In low. be probability of an Iranian nuclear response the would - Hezbollah or ally Syria particular in an - Iran on of attack an involving scenario a In wake ofanAmericanattackonit. a launch in even States United the against strike nuclear would Iran that unlikely highly is it it to respond with a nuclear strike. In any event, the stability and survival of the regime, requiring and material infrastructural damage, and/or pose a danger to considerable as well as Iran in the attack were to cause the loss of many lives if arise would strike a such of probability The out. ruled completely be cannot Israel on strike nuclear Iranian an of possibility nuclear the capability, second-strike retained Iran and out, carried be to were If strike a such facilities. nevertheless, nuclear known the outside sites secret in weapons nuclear its conceal to able be would Iran because sites, nuclear on attack an in success has one-hundred-percent assure to Iran after because difficult very be would it arms, nuclear acquired also and then, by possess nuclear would Iran the that capability to deterrence due both - weapons nuclear on acquired has Iran after low very be would Iran strike a such of probability the However, this strike. a such weighing in participate to willing or countries option other no are There facilities. nuclear Iran’s on particularly strike, a 45 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 46 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony At present, there is no single no is there present, At certainty . a hardly change should occur, on Iran’s nuclear policy is The impact of internal change, if and when such when itdoes. capability nuclear possess already will Iran if and occur will change this when determine to change regime will follow. It resolve, is clear that with it is impossible unrest the navigate and camp the organize and rally can that leadership charismatic produce to manages change seeks leadership itself, is profound; regime when the the within camp and that regime, the and people the the of proportion large however, a between rift internal stability; maintaining force, using thereby camp reformist the suppress to managed has regime the far, So it. replace to wants and government the of enough had has public Iranian the of part large a that indicative is 2009 June in erupted that unrest internal The a possibility is of a regime there change is not when insignificant. and The Iran. in regime the of nature the in change if change will policy An important question is whether Iran’s nuclear confrontation withIsrael. a into it draw could that importantly, more and device that would strengthen it relative to Syria, nuclear a acquire to Lebanon, in backyard, own its in active organization an allow to reluctant be would Syria that unlikely not is It Iran. was source the that obvious be would arms it because nuclear possessed organization, terror a as defined been has which Hezbollah, discovered that were it if a an position in uncomfortable itself deploy find would could Iran weapon; nuclear organization the whether doubtful is It it: to weapons nuclear over hand to not reasons other are there Hezbollah concerned, Where is control. its of out them let to than rather weapons nuclear its of control that Iran would prefer to do so itself and retain vis Israel, or to deter Israel, it may be assumed vis-à- Hezbollah or Syria up back to necessary becomes it If slim. appears to Hezbollah or Syria weapons nuclear transfer might Iran that would possibility the hand, other the On out. help leak not this that hope the in technology nuclear transferring by assist to try might Iran and program nuclear its advancing in help years for recent in asking been has Syria either. ignored be to not is program nuclear its with with it. The possibility that Iran might help Syria affiliated organizations or or states to weapons technology nuclear transfer could Iran that suggested been has It confrontation. military between Israel and either the Syrians or or Syrians the either Iran would not Palestinians, become part of and the Israel between halt and disrupt to process the can it whatever do and will Palestinians, the and Syria Israel and between or Israel peace between any whether to immediate process, opposed nor vehemently direct is Iran neither be would certainly influence of type This policy? nuclear Iran’s impact Authority, Palestinian the and/or Syria and Israel between negotiations peace the in the of progress especially conflict, nature Israeli-Arab the in changes would Finally, would bequitedifferent. of threat Iranian the of nature entire the kind, this regime a under and involved, dangers the moderate Iranian regime would markedly reduce nuclear arms by that time, their possession by a acquire to were Iran if even case, any In thing. nuclear program - although this is far from a sure greater chance a of have leading to could a develop, suspension of to the it were kind, this of the improving relations between the two countries. to A dialogue eye an with administration would agree to regime engage significantly with the American Iranian moderate more a that chance greater far a is there time, same the At A 6 weapons. nuclear of development the to relates support its whether unclear is it and program, nuclear not distinguish between the civilian and military does public the although - right Iran’s is it that continuation of the program because it believes the supports movements, and currents various the majority of the Iranian public, including all its testimonies, numerous to According president. further was it advanced when Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was minister; prime was Mousavi Mir-Hossein when launched was It program: were partners camp to reformist the advancement the of of the nuclear heads the All program. nuclear the of development continued the opposed is to that Iran in party or camp major

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Gary Samore, President Obama’s top advisor on by voiced was estimate This weapons. nuclear of development the complete to Iran for longer or year a take would it that suggesting views, further expressed officials American Recently so. do to choose they should them build to years more two need would they but bombs, nuclear has enough low-enriched uranium to make two probably most Iran that 2010 27, June on said Panetta Leon director CIA weapons. nuclear its of development the complete to two or year a about require would Tehran that estimate the intelligence community in recent American months has also embraced the uranium, enriching 23 21 Up: How Fast Is This Clock Ticking?" Round- "Monday Gould, J. 2010; 19, August Times, York New Imminent," Not Is Threat Iran That rael Mark Mazzetti and David E. Sanger, "U.S Assures Is- php?cat=79&incat=&read=4255 193, 20 July 2010. http://www.inssorgil/heb/research the Race" [Iran likrat sof merotz] sof likrat [Iran Race" the of End The "Iran: Landau Emily and Asculai Ephraim Ha'aretz overheated.html> fied/2010/08/16/talk-about-iran-attack-seems-very- YNET Israel yekholettkifa be-iran], [le- Iran" Striking of Capable "Israel Yaalon: Moshe January 31,2009. 24 On the eve of the last elections in Israel , 7June2008. 25 . ynet . co . il/articles/0,7340,L-3552786,00 Walla , May10,2010. 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The there However, an could beaccomplishedinthecaseofIran. for program nuclear extended period, and believe the same objective Iraqi the Baghdad stopped near reactor the of destruction the 1981 June the that note They reactor. Osirak Iraq’s on to attack similar is advocate military a strike of proponents the that model The strikes againstobjectivesinIran. out carrying been much hyped and publicized exercises simulating has IDF the Additionally, 28 29 Street Journal Street rns e ncer sites," nuclear key Iran's 504574418813806271306.html> com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052970204518 ha-medameh tkifa be-iran], tkifa ha-medameh targil arkha [Israel Iran" in strike simulating ercises Orr Heler and Reuters: "Report: Israel carries out ex- rna Nuclearization," Iranian Ephraim Inbar, " The Imperative to Use Force Against military/ops/iran-strikes.htm> GlobalSecurity.org. Cordesman, "The Iran Attack Plan," Attack Iran "The Cordesman, H. Anthony 15, December 12, No. ; 25, ber , September 25, 2009. com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052970204518 H. Cordesman,"The IranAttackPlan". Anthony repercussions-of-an-israeli-attack-on-iran>; oga Dvs "sal il o htvr t Takes," it Whatever Do Will "Israel Davis, Douglas 7-33. pp. 2007, Spring 4, issue 31, volume Security, national Inter- Facilities," Nuclear Iranian Destroy to pabilities Raas and Long, "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Ca- ru/2010/08/05/14688111.html> Iain i Dfne o ac fr S Attack," US for Match No Defence Air "Iranian Voice of Russia of Voice Update Defense Release Press Jane’s Spectator Pand SIrei tak n Iran," on Attack US-Israeli "Planned Chossudovsky, Michel com/public/jid/index.shtml>; ; html>; ; t efrs o eeo ncer epn, he weapons," concluded. nuclear renounce develop to or efforts capitulate its either to Iran force cannot strike Israeli "An be. would delay that Eiland added, the "$64,000 course, question" remains how Of long program." nuclear of Tehran's delay or obstruction is achieve can Israel what most, At rehabilitation. beyond capacity military capability to destroy the Iranian nuclear he said, "Unfortunately Israel does not have the Aviv, Tel in 2008 December in conference INSS an Addressing significantly. it delay or program contends nuclear Iran's Council, destroy to unable is Security Israel that National the of head former Eiland, Giora (res.) 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Anthony and Toukan Abdullah cf: attack of plan possible Israel's of analysis an For 300pmu.htm> YNET opment Facilities opment Dudi Cohen, "Former general: Israel can't defeat Iran," istrikeiran.pdf> omnt o Ia t cmltl collapse, completely to Iran on community sanctions the and cause the could pressure Iran of on attack the Israeli international An causing anadditionaloilpricespike. thereby countries, oil Gulf the sabotage in installations could commandos Iranian the invadingIranians. with deal to forces large allocate to States United the compel could This government. collaborating with the insurgents battling the and unrest fomenting Iraq, into incursions out carry could forces Guard Revolutionary causing adrasticoilpricehike. of oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, thereby The Iranians might hinder maritime movement through itsairspace. cooperated Riyadh fly to aircraft its allowing by Jerusalem with that assume would Tehran since Arabia, Saudi in and countries Iran that Gulf the in not targets on attacks launch would than likely more also is It e Next?" Be taliate if Israel Strikes Nuclear Facilities," Nuclear Strikes Israel if taliate Re- to Threatens Tehran "Iran: Recknagel, Charles ticle/israel-attacks-3907> Fox News Fox Ha’aretz est American against forces. operate to it help and Afghanistan in Taliban the with cooperation Persian Gulf. The Iranians could also step up the in targets American attack likely would Iranians the strike, Israeli the to assistance even or in acquiescence as perceive would they what for States United the punish To and Jewishtargets. embassies) (e.g Israeli attack to world the around cells terror use could Iranians The of whichhavea40-kilometerrange. Aviv. Hamas has thousands Tel of rockets, some striking of capable are which of rockets, some 50,000 than more has Hezbollah heartland. Israel's into rockets of thousands hl Rtlae ih isls f e r Attacked," are We if Missiles with Retaliate Shall uoe ai Liberty Radio Europe os h Ire Wnt tie rn ntm Soon," Anytime Iran Strike Won't Rea- Israel Why 5 sons Than "More Miller, Judith be-next/3599/>; theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/will-iran- . chive/2010/08/the-difficulty-of-launching-a-success- ; 42. ; Paul Rogers, Paul prised/61578/>; ing updated," ing be- Iran against plans military U.S " Starr, Barbara Michael Crowley,"TheBombSquad ." Insight , Vo.197,5August2010 CNN theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/08/indyk- from acquiringnuclearweapons. Iran prevent to determined is President 'The there: leaders the to President the from message a delivered and Gulf the to traveled Gates Defense] of [Secretary when That's so. do to began he January In table. the on back force put to time was it that and failed had engagement that conclusion the reached he however, that approach. 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is f h pa, nldn optimum including plan, the timelines. of aims ultimate and intermediate The Introduction: l l l l l as time goes by, and that there is little chance little is there that and by, goes time as done, been have will country offending the by damage additional that is made be must assumptions that the of be One always counter-productive. almost will sanctions applying in must Procrastination manner. sanctions timely a the in applied be that doubt no is There no regimechangehastakenplace. if place, first the in achieved been have would than higher much be could so doing for price the community international the of wishes to accedes country the if end, on the In anything own. their achieve rarely they community, joint position and intentions of the international weak actions have the benefit Although of situation. announcing new the the to actions its and also buy time for the country to adjust its plans both the government and the population. These international demands and firm the resilience of the to acquiescing to resistance the stiffen to tend They future. the in against actions severe countries more "immunize" actions Weak the actionistaken. which against country the to visible and table the reason why the is "or else" option must be on This the position. its from retreat possible to firm its stance, and to close the door on any a as but so action, in, extreme take also cave could country could country A predictable. absolutely not is actions all of result end The achieve achangeofpoliciesinthefuture. new government, could make it more difficult to assured the change of the political stance of the the regime, where this change has not the previously of change change A leadership. its of mode necessarily behavioral not will regime a of codes underlying the alter A not will that change arena. nuclear the in including precedents, historical has This regime. the of change the aims, is political failed, have to achieve seems else everything when to ways the of One

Backup andalternate/contingencyplans. the aboveactivities. Incentives, as an alternative and as an aid to etc. actions covert actions, diplomatic Sanctions, area: each tackling of means and ways The should betackled. that vulnerability of areas the of Definition the problem. Details of the overall strategy of dealing with 10 the program the i.e barn, the escaped usually has horse the since country target the in activities proscribed of development the hinder do to will little entities such on sanctions Imposing stronger than the actions of much government usually officials. is interest commercial The them. circumvent to way a found have entities and countries exist, NPT. restrictions commercial the When of obligations the of contradiction s eupet y ay onre t those to developing countries nuclear capabilities. many by equipment use dual- prohibited The of sales the are arena nuclear actions. the in these events non-compliance with common most dealing in have way Countries ways. a its change to regime the convince to attempt the in fail usually will and entities that are involved in specific groups activities specific targeting and Dealing avoided. with deal 7-9 Criteria And thisisnottheonlycase. pay for arriving at a nuclear weapons free Libya. to had community international the price the is This standing. good in member a as community international the it to returned clean, immediately come has has it once contrary, the On misdeeds. its for way any in punished not was it out, caught been has it After NPT. the under obligations international its to contrary project, development weapons nuclear a on embarked Libya affair is a case in point. In this case, Libya the discussed, generally not Although problem. moral serious thing a poses easy it Moreover, an accept. not to is This side. other the of demands the of some to giving-in be to seem least at to principles, basic against not if and, tangible serious, be must so doing for regime not reward enough, itself. In the case that removing the sanctions is very harsh, removing them could be a reward in are sanctions the If aims. political the achieve and declarations to by, goes by time as harder, it make that deeds backed also are which They against well-entrenched. usually country are taken are the actions of policies The even ifithassufferedaserioussetback. stage, later a at efforts the its resume enabling to country there, remain will potential the its achievements, at almost any cost. Moreover, technical milestone. A country will try to cling to a achieved has country a once "rollback" a for Arms America's Enemies", Trade Nuclear Secret the How Peril: "Peddling bright, Al- David see, trade illicit of review extensive an For the incentives for the ruling cin ta sol be should that actions Free Press Free 10 This is in direct , 2010. 63 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 64 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony l l that determineitsbehavioralpatterns: characteristics following the at arrive we Iran, If we go to these basic hypotheses concerning 4. 3. 2. 1. having amilitarynuclearcapabilityare: boost in the early 2000’s. The main reasons for result of the Iran-Iraq war, and given a serious a as revived was it Shah, the of rule the during Although the Iranian nuclear project had its roots The SituationinIran Part B:TheIranSanctions very little,sincetheycanbebypassed. achieve will sanctions applied ineffective. Half-heartedly usually are loopholes large that leave Sanctions well-applied. be to have they effective be to order in that is all to common that combine one or more categories. The thing and sanctions sectors those course, of are There activities. specific against sanctions and travel isolation, sanctions and against the population diplomatic military, Economic, categories: several into roughly divided be can Sanctions The ApplicationofSanctions for thesakeofcommercialinterests. that chose to disregards the international norms, countries in supplies, the for sources alternate serious effect on it. Moreover, there usually are a have to prohibitions the for advanced far has l l

custo o te rsie f aig the having most powerfulweapon. of prestige the of Acquisition factor ofIran’scitizenship. nuclear project seems to be the main uniting Ensuring the stability of the regime, since the power. world-class a be hegemony, to considered being regional and for ambitions Iran’s Iran’s threatperception. ula waos il ep establish The ruleofthe presentregimeisnotstable . help will hegemony intheregion. weapons Nuclear in thisambition. this firm role strong a to plays pride a National situation. wants as and power, itself regional sees Iran Notwithstanding, Iran’s threatperceptionisreal. l 11 2006. December in resolution sanctions first the adopt to Council Security the for year a than more took It 2005. late in so did finally It Council. Security the to The IAEA took its time in transferring the matter The UNSanctionsResolutions ut fw ots ae, n ac 20, and 2007, areas: significant two in first the from differed March in later, months adopted few a was just resolution sanctions next The of thepersonnelinvolvedinproject. few a and entities Iranian the of some routes, Iranian nuclear program, its suppliers and supply the was resolutions sanctions ensuing the and 13 12 rns ula porm a be described been extensively in the literature. has program nuclear Iran’s resolutions. this basis for the ensuing Security Council sanctions stopped later safeguards’ cooperation. These two matters IAEA but were the formal the Protocol, by Additional abide to agreed also had Iran enrichment. resumed and word its on back went uranium then it program, its enrichment suspend to occasions, separate two on agreed, had Iran Although commerce. illicit profitable very the on eye blind a turned by many governments, some of whom, however, employed are transfers the on rules strict and although this was and is prohibited by the NPT, the sources, external from materials and equipment program, this for needed it technologies nuclear the acquire to managed of Iran devices. explosive cores two produce and HEU to it enrich further to taken, were decision the if it, enable would that (LEU) uranium enriched low Iran mid-2010 had already accumulated a sufficient quantity of by and two, the of advanced more the is route first The (Pu). plutonium and (HEU), uranium enriched High device: explosive nuclear a of core the for needed materials the materials, fissile of production towards routes it can be said that Iran proceeds on two parallel

on o h Iain Bomb", Iranian the to down "Count- Asculai, Ephraim and Kam Ephraim e.g, See, http://www http://www ies, February,2010. Volume 12, No. 4, Institute for National Security Stud- unsc_res1747-2007.pdf unsc_res1737-2006.pdf and theaccomplishmentofitnationalaims. regime the of survival the firm to wants it if Iran must have a nuclear weapons capability . . iaea iaea . . org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/ org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/ 12 h mi tre o this of target main The 11 In short, however, taei Assessment Strategic 13 ,

more than10%. is unemployment of rate the and considerable subsidies its high, relatively is inflation of rate vulnerable since its imports are considerable, its and its hegemonic ambitions. Iran’s economy is pride of sense national Iranian the add could 16 15 refining 14 sufficient a have not does it since considerably, on oil distillates (gasoline) imports, extent on oil exports. In addition, Iran depends, large a to depends economy Iran’s since vulnerable one, most the perhaps is issue oil The vulnerability. political and, capabilities; military program; nuclear the stability; internal particular; in issue oil the and general in situation economic Iran’s vulnerable: Iran find that areas following the defines study One vulnerabilities? apparent Iran’s are What successful a been strategy. not has this case, this in utilize opportunities, as they arise. Unfortunately, to tries and ear" by it "plays administration the the US administration gives one the feeling that by timetables declared of failure recurrent the that fact the impression, false a just this be could Although project. nuclear Iran’s of issue the with dealing for strategy overall apparent that mention could one outset, the Iran four the At criteria. defined above the evaluation be will sanctions the for basis The Evaluating theSanctionsResolutions purposes." Islamic the developmental and humanitarian of for except Iran, Government of Republic the to loans, concessional and assistance, financial grants, for commitments new into and enter to "not called manner, compulsory, not advisory, an in sales to Iran of certain military equipment, albeit It targeted, in addition to the nuclear arena, the Iran’s nuclearprogramme…" mutual on of nature peaceful exclusively the in confidence based international of establishment the Iran and respect and with relations of cooperation development the for allow would which agreement comprehensive term long- a for "… offer the repeating community, to enter into negotiations with the international addition was the call for the government of Iran sumer_prices).html . http://www.indexmundicom/iran/inflation_rate_(con - http://www.jcpaorg/text/iranian-vulnerabilities .pdf of left, course, muchtotheimagination ofallconcerned. purposes developmental to reference The 16 15 o hs ise one issues these To 14 n important An there is no is there f uy 2010. July of beginning the at distillates oil of issue the on sanctions further enacting by them augmented by themselves, not the most efficient ones, and imposed. The US recognized that the UN sanctions were, were transactions financial Iranian on restrictions general no Yet, program. nuclear Iran’s financing with affiliation their of because (1929) some financial institutions were targeted, h itrainl economy. international the over stranglehold a have will Iran oil, Iranian without exist to ability the achieves world the Unless economy. world on effects detrimental that preventing or limiting oil exports could have few years. It must be also mentioned, however, its own statements, will close the gaps within a up additional refining capacity and, according to said that, Iran is investing a big effort in putting Having ones. new of development the for and fields, old the of maintenance the for needed existing oil wells, of the age lack old of the sufficient of investment because suffers industry oil The prices. subsidized and low very at public asn sfeig n dsponmn i the population. in disappointment and suffering causing went and came support opportunity this but unrest, the and encourage to west the by used been have could This unrest. major of quelling have been rigged, which culminated in the brutal to acknowledged generally were that elections general the following 2009, June in head a to came and regime, the of change a advocating those of repression the from apparent is This unrest could bring about the change of civil that is fears main leadership the Iran’s of One regime. very effective. to return to talks, it is doubtful that these will be rn a nt nldd n h S sanctions SC the in resolutions. included not was Iran against sanctions oil-related of use direct The Iran, and to a lesser extent on the outside world. halting inside effect considerable a have could exports, without Iran, to imports distillates oil capacity. 21 20 19 18 17 July. U ihes acin oe Ia ncer programme nuclear Iran over (http://www sanctions tightens EU http://www.opencongressorg/bill/111-h2194/show . sc_resolutions.shtml http://www http://www .eiadoegov/cabs/ Iran/Oil.html See: production. oil crude global the of 5% approximately produces Iran http://www.eiadoegov/cabs/Iran/Oilhtml 21 Although Iran, almost immediately, agreed 17 These oil distillates are sold to the to sold are distillates oil These 19 . bbc In the most recent SC resolution SC recent most the In 20 . iaea h E floe sie ae in later suite followed EU The . co . uk/news/world-europe-10758328) . org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/ 18 rvnin of Prevention .

65 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 66 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony dacd s t ol lk te t be. to them like would it well as as advanced not probably are capabilities military Iran’s vulnerable . quite bravado, its all for itself, feels Iran Thus, future. the in power military its also aware that Iraq has the potential to regain is it and compass, the of points all almost from forces US by present, at surrounded, is it since acute, quite probably is perception threat Iran’s if somewhathinderedbythesanctions. probably continue to operate and advance, even will and advanced, well very is program nuclear Iran’s suppliers case, any In routes. transshipment networks, and purchasing clandestine present to get all it needs from suppliers, through Iran at manages probably and past, the Moreover, in managed project. nuclear its of routes both for materiel and equipment the of most purchased already has Iran that assessed be plutonium route is under construction, but it can The production. of rate and equipment basic layout, very a at albeit operational, is program enrichment its stages, where stage the at now construction is and and planning basic the passed long has Iran ago. years few a was it than vulnerable less much is it However, area. this in activities the mainly target sanctions SC the and vulnerable, indeed, is, area nuclear The 23 22 military force. military sizeable a with better, much is offensive land a very impressive. The ability of Iran to withstand and their ability to launch a naval offensive is not offensive capacity is limited, the their capabilities, air missile their force of exception outdated the strong statements and implied (or real) threats. real) (or implied and statements strong of the support SC sanctions, Iran immediately reacted with in 2010, June in voted, China and not tally with Iran’s position. Thus, when Russia strong reaction to any and slight or action that does immediate in demonstrated as case, in this deceiving and be deeds may Appearances its misdeeds. to reactions international of notice little air take to appears an and superiority, of carries it relations international its In reaction, paramount. is international regime the of survival of the since notice little it takes this in and unrest civil of indication any to strongly very reacts regime repressive Iran’s against stand-offweapons. power withstanding little have they and attack, the irregulars. This includes the Army, the Revolutionary Guards and pdf forasummaryofIran’smilitary capabilities. http://www.inssorgil/upload/(FILE)1275907735 . See 23 This cannot be said for an air an for said be cannot This 22 With l l l the l for assumptions development ofastrategyareasfollows: fundamental The Defining aStrategy which itisdevised. against activities the of timelines the into account take must plan The strategy. overall the of aims the achieving in success that assure could measures strong include must plan The vulnerabilities. detailed above the all account into take should plan The Iran. with dealing for devised be should plan resultant a and strategy Taking all the above into consideration an overall their leaderinregionalandworldaffairs. be to wish Iran’s to succumbed not have most neighbors, the Gulf States are wary of Iran, and it when hand holds a real threat over them . At present, Iran’s other the on or neighbors its peaceful with a relations good in has it when done only manner be can This regional the hegemon. of role the assume to wants It Iran wants to present itself as a regional power. to beorappearisolated. want not does it since scene, international the in friends seeking actively is political Iran savoir-faire. than rather vulnerability shows This

reformists back . the brings change regime a if even option, nuclear military the up give not will regime political theocratic the threat, military severe a and with sanctions coupled applied, are isolation and pressures fierce Unless contain. to forecast, and will be almost impossible to will be severe, its form and ensue details very could difficult capability nuclear military a gain Iran should that instability regional The materials. fissile it military-grade produce give to option would the which cycle, fuel nuclear a The theocratic regime of Iran must not have Materials Cut-offTreaty. Fissile proposed a oppose not and to Treaty commit Ban Test Comprehensive the ratify must Iran employed. irreversibly ratified and be must Protocol Additional IAEA The dismantled. verifiably be must facilities weapons. reprocessing and nuclear enrichment all Specifically: produce the to of bereft possibility be must Iran Undertaking: l l work onseveralareasinparallel: must plan the time, of shortage the of Because Principles foraPlan l l l l l

ilmtc n patcl slto o Iran, including cuttingofftradewithGulfstates. of isolation practical and Diplomatic of Iran,includingtheoilindustry. Severe sanctions hitting mainly the economy the SecurityCouncil. will have to be taken outside the purview of action preventive main the it, sees west the Iranian that severity the same the with view project nuclear to appear not do they since and west, the of those to orthogonal are interests Chinese and Russian Because Iranian nuclearcapabilitywillprobablyfail. these to assumptions is agreement secured, any plan to avoid its an Unless in field. player this important most the is USA The by thesafeguards’AdditionalProtocol(AP). Iran, following its irradiation. Iran must abide from removed be to have will and abroad, from supplied be to have will fuel nuclear their the program, power nuclear civil a for quest in persist demands, international to acquiescence the following Iranians, the If and whensuchachangewouldtakeplace. ambitions. However, it is difficult to predict if nuclear military abandoning for potential the A change to a secular democratic regime has chances foraroll-backarenegligible. the and target, their Iranians achieving to the close are since short running is Time a successfuloutcome. a plan formed along its lines stands a chance of from becoming a nuclear state, and carrying out Iran preventing of aim stance, ultimate the strategic on based agreed an of like- allies its minded and US the by acceptance, an Only will bemostdifficulttomanageinthefuture. inaction present the of results The capability. far as it wants on the route to a military nuclear as go to Iran for way the paves table the on is option military a that state and out come not does US the that fact The fact. of statement a than more weapon neutralizing a as came this that possible is it project, nuclear the affecting Although Iran has stated that the sanctions are the most effective weapon negating in the sanctions arsenal. thereby future, near very the in distillates petroleum on self-reliance achieving be may Iran effect . full take to late too come President actions and the Congress ensuing EU sanctions may US have addition, latest the In of approval aim. Obama’s this achieve to attempt the in ineffective proven have will own ambitions. The four rounds of sanctions on their chance that Iran will abandon its military nuclear In today’s (July 2010) situation there is very little A LookintotheFuture l l l

launching capabilities. and developing missile and facilities nuclear against action military for preparation Overt regime. regime change in Iran a to a about secular bringing democratic at aimed activities Covert with Iran. talks secret parallel and II track Mediatory, 67 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 68 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony track record of success, but rather because the because rather but success, of record track proven a have they because not widespread is sanctions of use The behavior. state influence to ability their discounts that someone be will there sanctions, of effectiveness potential the of supporter every For record. mixed a best at has sanctions of use the international Empirically, relations. in understood well not is ways as a means of compelling states to change their and effectiveness their widespread sanctions, of use quite prevalent the despite yet, And contemplating theactualuseofforce. before step final the as regarded often are and toolbox, non-military the in stick strongest the nexus are they force: the military and diplomacy between at stand sanctions sense, this In with international problems to the military arena. dealing for strategies diplomatic of realm broad the from line the crossing considered be would force military to sanctions from move A such cases. in dissatisfaction its express Security to UN Council the of tool favored the become have sanctions rules; the breaks that state a to respond forcefully to strategy used commonly more much the are sanctions force) option, last a military as of threat clear the even often states normally relate to a resort to military force (and Because force. military of - execution actual the to opposed as - threat the is option action: punitive of interim An force. military or sanctions economic sets broad two to down boil basically They limited. quite its are - behavior express normative and compliance into to back state the disposal its dissatisfaction - to punish and/or try to compel at tools the obligations, international with non-compliance with blatant or behavior, faces break of standards aggressive international community state's individual international an the When Introduction Emily B.Landau Overcoming Conceptualand Political Constraints Sanctions onIran: curb Iran's military nuclear ambitions since 2006, how understand to effort overall the into to figured have sanctions is purpose article present the the mind, of in questions these With effect. desired the about bring to weak too perhaps were they whether contrary, the on or ground, its hold to resolve regime's the effect hardening the of having harsh, because too was were it sanctions whether why: clear always not it's offender, the of behavior or approach the in change any about bring don't sanctions when that is factor complicating final A state. broader misbehaving the vis-à-vis efforts policy-making for implications negative quite have can turn in This processes. and goals different to referring time same the at while "sanctions" for support common their expressing be might policymakers This and experts about. different that means come to change expects it how or sanctions, of use its the through offender the impact what on have specified to seeking is community international not often is It implementation. successful operational their for clear definitions of cases many in absence the is measures these of effectiveness the of that complicates efforts to gain better problem understanding additional An role. to supportive a best at relegated sanctions with induced, change any can for reason that "true" the interim as the cited be in play into came that state behavior, there are invariably other factors influence did sanctions that made be can case to takeeffect.Eveninthoseinstanceswherea the to due significant span of difficult time that is required for them rendered of are usefulness sanctions the of assessments Empirical displeasure, shortofgoingtowar. express to measure default the are They offer. to better nothing has community international passed by the Security Council in 2006. The four resolutions with beginning years, several past the over Iran that against place in sanctions put been have financial US Council and Security UN resolutions of series a to primarily refers This sanctions . of prong" "nuclear the is - here interest of focus our - category second bilateral US-Iranian relations and regional dynamics. The in developments with accordance in over the years with varying degrees of intensity, the of updated been have sanctions time These revolution. the at crisis hostage-taking the to response in 1979 in back US the by place in category put main initially were first that two sanctions The comprises sanctions. to of reference Iran categories to makes regard with generally debate sanctions The 1) SanctionsagainstIran'snuclearprogram over thepasthalfdecade. Iran on debate sanctions the of framework the in forth put be to continue and been have that agendas cross-cutting sometimes and different The first order of business is to understand the to theSanctionsDebate Introducing ConceptualClarity at theforefrontofanalysis. placed be should that context political the is it on the economic dimension of these measures, strategies. So while there is a tendency to focus are assigned in carefully thought-out diplomatic they role the as well as politics, international of dynamics on hinges critically success their tool, economic an primarily are sanctions while that is analysis the underlying theme major A more effectivedowntheline. prove might what and proliferator, determined overall this confronting for strategy an political/diplomatic into integrated have conceptually sanctions been degree what to and how of vis Iran. This will be followed by an assessment into political, play regarding decisions of on sanctions vis-à- array the come have that factors strategic and economic, out tease an to include attempt will section next the approaches, these measures. After mapping out the different to and from expected be realistically can what suggest discussed, and raised expectations being are different that the clarify to order in itself, debate sanctions the of analysis critical a be will step first The future. the in effectively with an eye to how things might be done more and can should be thinking about sanctions beyond they and issue, nuclear the on Iran with negotiate to ability the have actors These Iran. vis-à-vis unfolding is that process the lead to themselves upon it taken have that EU the and US the like actors international strong of job the is This realm. nuclear the in course future - proliferator's other any or - Iran's influence as otherwise or negotiate to equipped not is such organization international This ambitions. nuclear Iran's confronting for process broader a with decision sanctions a on up following for But at the UN level there is no viable mechanism to ensurecontinuedtreatycompliance. ability the as far as precedent dangerous a be indeed punish the offender. Otherwise, it would will it that demonstrate and through follow to the international community has a responsibility or that treaty, or else there will be consequences", when states are told: "you must comply with this for not upholding international commitments. So of its commitment own free will - its that there are of consequences according to an international treaty that it breach joined a country contemplating other any to and - Iran to a message send to is sanctions these of purpose the is Iran cheating on its that NPT obligations. In other words, indications to response direct a constitute they because straight-forward fairly be should implementation their fact, in debate; political broad of matter a be really sanctions not should Council Security UN the theory, In conception. security Israel's for implications region, particular with this in stability and security to threat the heightens which East, Middle the in states other towards directed rhetoric threatening and Iran's harsh its but with commitments, NPT only its regard of breach not this concern in deep taken reflects been has that action International implications. regional severe with ambitions - a global (non-proliferation) concern, based sanctions specifically target Iran's nuclear in the nature of US-Iranian relations, the nuclear- While the first category of sanctions is grounded the in nuclear realm. defiance ongoing its and obligations, NPT (nuclear non proliferation treaty) safeguards declarations of Iran's lack of compliance with its Agency) Energy Atomic (International IAEA to response community's international the are - 2010 June and 2008, March 2007, March 2006, December in decided - sanctions UN of rounds 69 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 70 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony But by July 2010, just after the US added its own different, more severe one would be attempted. In program . other nuclear words, after the failure of the first route, a Iran's stopping of goal same the reaching for routes parallel basically as sanctions and diplomacy portrayed He 2009. of outreach diplomatic his shunned had Iran after the ambitions, in nuclear Iran's stage curb to next attempt the as them of spoke he sanctions, harsher promote to decided had he that clarified first Obama when 2010, January in Initially, mid-2010. in upon agreed finally and same set of sanctions that were on the agenda, the to roles different two assigned months, six of space the in Obama, president Interestingly, further elaboration. without realm, nuclear the in course change to Iran induce will sanctions that expectation and statements in superficial this vein, reflecting issue the naïve hope often officials European and American program. nuclear Iran's of nature the sanctions will somehow have a direct impact on expressed (but least realistic) expectation is that commonly most The behavior about. Iran's come actually in will changes how to given is thought additional little normally cases these and in punishment, as role their per to often referred most are sanctions debate, this Within the goalstheyarepursuing. but decision-makers need to be very clear about often debate, sanctions conflated the in over glossed are they because discussed being are that emphases and approaches different quite the clarify to important is It experts. informed by out carried are that discussions journal media and in also reflected is mix confusing This reference to different aspects of Iran's behavior. with and times different at actors international Different expectations are expressed by different process of confronting Iran's nuclear ambitions. broader the in sanctions of role expected the to regard with confusion of bit a quite is there Iran, on debate sanctions the to now Turning 2) Whataretheexpectationsfromsanctions? sanctions would playarole. which within realm, nuclear the in behavior Iran's changing the fundamentally of goal pursuing for strategy overall an to devising energy and time necessary the devote to "NPT enforcers", these states must be prepared of role the assuming about serious are they If non-compliance. for punishment as role their 1 their of basis the on statements, evaluated sanctions of with focus the been has that - se US-Iranian the per issue is nuclear the than rather - relationship it instances other still In new regimecomestopowerinIran. sanctions through sought a when day the hastening to geared be should is that the experts, pressure these for regime; current the in change inducing of chance no to little is there that view the reflecting are analysts more and more elections, 2009 June the following Iran in protests public of repression bloody the Since as awaytoplayfortime). West the (rather than using these negotiations with tactically - negotiations toward attitude serious more a adopt to it induces rather but course, change directly to it cause not necessarily does that pressure is regime current the to regard with debated option Another regime. the around rally to regime, them cause the conversely, or, to opposition their enhance will population the for hardship economic whether of contention with regard to the latter option is come indirectly, via the population. A major point on the regime and its growing isolation, or it will pressure of result direct a as come will change either debated: variants two are There regime. current the in induced be can change how on focus Some experts . of level debate the at the conducted within primarily discussed, being finds the greatest divergence in the approaches one that regard this in is It behavior. changed which by economic and mechanisms political pressure possible can the translate into to turns focus realm, nuclear the in behavior its alter to Iran cause actually might sanctions how about When more serious attempts are made to think negotiations. failed to alternative an as than rather strategy, sanctions were presented account, as a link in a revised broader diplomatic this to According negotiations. of round - serious more hopefully and - new a to precursor that the be was would they expectation his now sanctions: to role new a attributing was Obama June, early in Council Security the by upon decided finally were that measures the to sanctions unilateral tions: Sanctions and Strikes" For articles in this vein see Jonathan Paris, "Iran Op- of International Security Affairs Security International of Change'", 'Regime for Case The "Iran: Rubin, Michael 2010; 17, tolenghi, "Setting the Sanctions Agenda" Sanctions the "Setting tolenghi, Commentary , April, 2010; and Emanuele Ot- Atlantic Council Atlantic , no.18,Spring,2010 . 1 The Journal Journal The , February 2 know do we what task, easy no is strength of degree sufficient manner. a is significant what determining a While in state offending the pressuring of chance a have to enough strong secure agreement on measures that are deemed successful implementation of sanctions is to first the for precondition essential and obvious The 1) UNSanctions:themissingpoliticalwill confronting Iran. for process political broader a into sanctions and the second is the importance of integrating international political will to decide on sanctions, of question the is first The measures. these of political different two dimensions that can influence examining the successful use by debate sanctions the in context political of on importance focusing the highlight will section This Embedded inPoliticalContext The LogicofSanctions: they canrealisticallyhaveonthisstate. and - more importantly Iran, - what kind of influence on have to like would they influence of this they need to be very clear about what kind for confronting Iran's nuclear ambitions, and for very thinking be policy overall an devise to how about seriously must actors These realm. nuclear the in heart of change a have to Iran cause directly somehow will they that assume superficially to or punishment, as merely them that decide upon sanctions cannot afford to treat different policy implications. International actors and very have sanctions to approaches regard with emphases different these Obviously, [than imposingsanctions]…" do. Changing relations with Iran is much harder to how know we something are they because so, become easily can themselves they in unfortunately but end an become to supposed 2010, Limbert noted that "sanctions were never July in resignation his of eve the On context. this in Iran against imposed UN sanctions US and mid-2010 John the to expert related recently Iran ambitions. Limbert Department nuclear State Iran's Former confronting relations than US-Iran repairing on more focused seemed that Iran toward initiative diplomatic a with 2009 early Indeed, in out started relationship. himself Obama this influence to ability com abr Sai, Hsae o Events", to "Hostage Slavin, Barbara , 27July2010. 2 Foreignpolicy. and Iran - giving a concession to one, and then has dictated frequent swings between the West policy Russian particular, in years 3-4 past the Over rivals. strategic remain two the improve, relations bilateral when even because US the feels a need to maintain a certain distance from onboard a US-led drive to sanction Iran. Russia jumping as perceived being by served not are important strategic interests vis-à-vis the US that up this lucrative market. Beyond that, Russia has maintaining give to loath is Russia Iran; with ties economic is interest overriding the Russia, For states? these driving were interests What all theresultingpoliticalimplications. policeman, but rather a group of 15 states, with global objective an not is Council Security the breach of its international Iran's obligations, in practice to response automatic almost an have been should rather but calculations, these to hostage held been have not should sanctions Council Security UN theory in While capability. nuclear military a toward advance incremental Iran's despite application, sanctions of favor in interests their than stronger proved sanctions comprehensive and severe of imposition the stopping of goal resisting in states of interests the Indeed, Iran. the to unconnected were that sanctions interests state by dictated that were decisions was framework, that outside as well as Council, Security UN the of context the within both over and over emerged What on Iran. sanctions stricter for support with well sit not strategic and economic interests that simply did political, of array an by driven were sanctions reality, however, these two states' objections to In (China). pressure without pursued be should diplomacy that believed they because or 2010), down the military route (Russia up until summer were not wholly convinced that Iran was going they because either - warranted was Iran on pressure harsher think not did they that rather sanctions would be weaker sufficient to that elicit the thought desired effect, they but that not China for favoring less stringent traditional measures were the and Russia were by cited reasons the And holdouts. China and Russia and (although not consistently to the same degree), sanctions stronger favored France normally Britain and US, The permanent resolutions. five the for all members of support the garner to order in down watered purposely were 2006 since Council Security UN the sanctions by upon decided of rounds four the that is sure for 71 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 72 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony required - periodic reports in the media than still further going relate even companies some with - sanctions of implementation greater toward steadily moving been has Europe that seems it overall while And them. enhance to actually their economic ties with Iran, but in some led cases place, curtailing their resist to only not countries European take to in would rush China immediately and Russia Iran, with deals out of backed they if that assessment the with together Iran, with trade continued in interest economic the too here But 2010. before well of the Security Council and in concert with the US, framework the outside economically Iran European desired, states couldhavedonemuchmoretopressure so they had that, is the truth sanctions, the UN-based for stricter China of and absence Russia blame to Europe and US the for convenient certainly is it While resistant behavior. was China that was taking it the sanctions, lead of in round sanctions- fourth the to up leading dynamic the in and changed, has tendency that Council resolution. Over the past year, however, Security a blocking state only the be as perceived to like not would it as sanctions, on lead Russia's follow would China that was wisdom common the 2009, Until globally. and regionally both itself assert to wants it and state, nuclear particularly feel a becoming Iran of scenario the by threatened not international does broader China the community. and East, Middle the Iran, vis-à-vis interests political/strategic and economic of mix a by driven is too China Russia inamoreprominentmanner. interim period other interests come into play for the in imminent, is acquisition weapons nuclear nuclear power, as long as military it doesn't believe that a become Iran neighboring seeing in interest no has surely Russia though even So, will. maintain at used be to and pressure of levers effective sides, both from concessions exact to able is It maneuvering. strategic and political for room much Russia allows approach noncommittal The movement. forth and back this by served best actually is interest Russia's that reality uncomfortable the accepting resists more securely on board its sanctions agenda, it While the West agonizes other. over the how reassure to get to Russia move a making quickly 3 see Yoram Evron, "Iran, China and the Israeli Stick", Israeli the and China "Iran, Evron, Yoram see For an interesting assessment of China's calculations, INSS Insight INSS , no.150,December22, 2009. 3 acin dynamic. sanctions June 2010 ushered in a new and unprecedented Iran. business with ties problematic out carry to continues institution financial European that or this how 4 5 ht ee novd n h poieain of proliferation the in involved were that companies 40 over down shut immediately it it that UAE would the comply with the June 2010 UN sanctions; by announcement the development was recent unprecedented Another before. come has that anything than stronger are they and sector, this target did UN resolution the of heels the on on came decisions that EU sanctions then and US, separate the energy Iran's However, investments. foreign including sector, targeting measures any to omit was China and Russia to concession The upon. decided previously measures with compliance states' of problems with dealing for provisions included also resolution The banking. Iranian on restrictions increased and planes, and ships on cargo suspicious inspecting for framework a up set it addition, In weapons. nuclear carry could that missiles ballistic to related all activities banned and sales, weapons conventional on embargos and included sanctions, personal institutional previous The expanded rounds. resolution previous the than further went administration had hoped for, the new sanctions While not the "biting" sanctions that the Obama passed. was sanctions UN of round fourth the non- 9th June many on possible), as as members permanent (and Council members Security permanent the five of all of support the gain to haggling of months 6 after and 2008, March in resolution sanctions UN previous the 6 front companiesoftheRevolutionaryGuards. with dealing were Iran with trade in involved companies Austrian the of some that suspicion the including 2009, in percent 6 increased Iran to exports Austrian Iran, with trade decrease to trying were states European other all 2009. While of course the over Iran in business of record its to due highlighted was particular in ar Effort", David Crawford, and "Small Bank in Germany Fritsch Tied to Iran Nucle- Peter see example recent a For Yossi Melman, "The Austrian Gate to Iran", to Gate Austrian "The Melman, Yossi July 28,2010. Sanctions", Iran of List Lengthening "The Bruno, Greg see summary one For April 29,2010. Wall Street Journal Street Wall 4 h ngtv rl o Austria of role negative The 6 oe hn yas after years 2 than More Council on Foreign Relations Foreign on Council , July18,2010. Haaretz 5 , , or "biting" sanctions), but as raised earlier, the earlier, raised as but sanctions), "biting" or (coming "crippling" termed be could what near nowhere effect real any to have terms to expected economic be in weak too been have recently very until sanctions the is that only problem not the worked", not have sanctions far "so that made is argument the when Still, heat. indications the feel to beginning is regime are Iranian the that there Indeed further. utilized then be can that impact economic significant more a seeing of chance 2010 a there June-July is decisions the since Only purpose. that for conducive most be might steps economic what and realm, nuclear the in policy changed into translates level domestic the at economic pressure all, at if how, economic ask to their effectiveness: over debate a conduct even to enough comprehensive or strong not were As discussed, the first three rounds of sanctions 2) Sanctions:partofapoliticalprocess hamper effortstoconfrontIraneffectively. to continue will it framework, multilateral this if the US continues to insist on the centrality of are still not on board in a significant manner, and China and Russia However, sanctions. non-UN of terms in further much go to determination Iran's European surprising a with and activities continuing concern greater reflects months recent in introduced sanctions of set new The balance ofpoweramongthesestates. the and economics international of reflection a a very real sense, the sanctions debate became - with unity of purpose compliance and with determination. global In wider - ensuring including implementation their regarding constraints by compounded place, first the in them upon agree to will political of lack the was sanctions of use such, effective the As to constraint bear. primary to the bring to sought they interests that nuclear strategic and political, confronting economic, of range full to the with comparison in proliferation accorded actors international strong the of some lower that the priority and politics, international of story a primarily was story sanctions the of prong" "nuclear the 2010, of summer until up sum, In into Iran. in order to circumvent sanctions and get goods Dubai of use long-term the to due significant especially is compliance UAE resolutions. UN by banned materials dangerous and dual-use hs ae w vr dfeet goals, different very two are These change. regime about bring help to is desire true their seek to influence the present regime or whether must make a clear decision about whether they Within this context, whoever leads negotiations and skilledopponent. determined a doubt no is which Iran, vis-à-vis eye to carving out a clever negotiations strategy established, it must be capitalized upon, with an been has momentum sanctions new a If goal. that serves best that strategy a into integrated be must Iran vis-à-vis taken step every Iran, with deal negotiated a reach to is goal ultimate the If issue. Iranian the on thinking strategic for principle guiding the as be messages established to firmly needs shifting logic this the Obama, from to coming contrast in references. But, later his in Obama by implied as that should precede - not follow - negotiations, Iran pressuring of means essential as viewed better are execution) actual or alternative threat (the force than viewed rather military and sanctions view, this In approaches. be complementary, fact, should as In strategies flawed. different seriously the is logic this But Iran toreverseitsnuclearambitions. getting namely, goal: same the of pursuit the in chosen be can that route severe increasingly and parallel, independent, an is strategy each that is implication the - 2010 early in sanctions - and as reflected in Obama's initial portrayal of sanctions to to diplomacy military force. from According be to this to view thought generally is of one as move the Iran: to sanctions approaches escalating three to relate to been tendency has overwhelming the far so However, not becomeanuclearstate. does Iran that ensuring for strategy overall an of framework the in states strong by used are of test they which by manner the the is Iran on sanctions ultimately, Indeed, sanctions. of effectiveness potential central the is understanding for context Political se. per sanctions strategy for dealing with Iran that goes beyond overall an into integrated be must they effect, late stage is in the game. rather For sanctions this to have answer an at especially no; short - certainly almost The program? its simply will reverse it that point the to Iran bring will they that expectations to up live sanctions Can are expectedtoinduce. question is what exactly is the "effect" that they 73 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 74 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony gaining multilateralsupport. of constraints political the to due needed, was what of short well fell still round, previous the round of UN sanctions that, while going beyond fourth the with only left been have would we positions, independent strong adopting states unilaterally, by the US and the EU. Without these effective measures were the ones decided upon most the that demonstrated clearly has round latest the sanctions, of case the in Even asset. Iran, multilateralism is more of a liability than an focused negotiations conducting with of a determined purpose party the like for multilateralism, of idea the with enamored is Obama as much not As Iran. is with negotiating for format proper this the sanctions, UN of discussions states of for group relevant the is P5 the While over thefueldeal. group that negotiated with Iran in October 2009 role in the EU-3 framework. It is this multilateral with the addition of Germany due to its historic five permanent members of the the Security Council, P5+1: the is purpose this for evolved has that states of group the Iran, with negotiating for framework multilateral a on insistence his and 2006, in especially sinceObamabecamepresident,with began Council Security the sanctions of the once members permanent But five the involving process Iran. with deal to plate the to up stepped US the and EU-3 the (2003-2006) stage initial the In process. lead this will who is question essential next The 3) Whowilllead? be set. must priorities and different are dynamics the Again, such. as issue nuclear the is business of order first its whether or relations US-Iranian on primarily focused is it whether decide must follow through more effectively. Similarly, the US decision must be made on this a issue in order to and strategies, overall different require that eot o oc mas aig hs political this taking means process veryseriously. force to resort without goal this achieve To capability. nuclear themselves to stop Iran from acquiring upon a military it taken have that shoulders powers strong the the of on lies responsibility heavy A the of goals international actorsthatemploythem. the and sanctions, to agree to will political necessary the of question the to and addressed. Particular account attention was devoted into taken be must that process this of dimensions political while important process, highlighting broader the within sanctions of role the some about confusion up conceptual the clear of to attempted has paper This to ability seriously hamperprospectsforsuccess. the have will arise that constraints political must the Otherwise, and such. as with way, dealt be the of step every evident is process overall the of nature political The play. to role a have sanctions which within process Confronting Iran's nuclear ambitions is a political Conclusion discussions, ratherthanallowingIrantodoso. of content and pace the determines that party the be to - process bargaining a in hand upper the gain to order in strength projecting as such and learn begin implementing quickly basic to negotiations The strategies, have deal. will hard administration a forward driving with do to everything and confidence-building, with do to little very has actually that dynamic tough a be bargaining will Iran with negotiations focused Effective strategies. with "engagement" "diplomacy" as and such platitudes replacing but multilateralism, over leadership choosing only not means This leadership. accept US to assuming decision a require would for this but role, candidate leading the suitable surely most is US the the Iran, with negotiations For a lecturer in lecturer a research senior a associate is Menashri David Prof. Haifa University. at at program Abroad Study the program at and University, Studies Security the at Dr. Landau lectures on the for National Control Regional Security Program Arms at the INSS (Institute the of director and fellow as serves Landau Emily Dr. instructor attheNationalSecurityCollege. and department intelligence the of in positions senior same the university. at program studies security the in Security Studies), Tel-Aviv University and the of Director Col. (ret.) East. economic and political of analysis the in specializes which Company), (The Middle East Economic and Political Analysis He established and who analyst, Iranian-Israeli an is Jevedanfar Meir security andsafety. he dealt primarily with nuclear and environmental Energy Commission) for over forty served and Studies) fellow Dr. Ephraim Ascolai serves as a senior research pcaie i Ia ad h Mdl East. Middle the and Iran in specializes at the INSS (Institute for National Security Dr. Ephraim Kam serves as the Deputy at the Center for Iranian Studies, is Studies, Iranian for Center the at Previously, he served in a number of number a in served he Previously, Security Studies), Tel-Aviv University. the Department of Middle Eastern Middle of Department the NS Isiue o National for (Institute INSS currently manages MEEPAS the IDF’s research division research IDF’s the at the IAEC (Israel Atomic (Israel IAEC the at processes in the Middle the in processes topic of arms control Contributors a senior research senior a years, where as a senior a as Tel-Aviv lectures and e pbiain i te ok nry Politics Energy (University ofPennsylvaniaPress,2009). book the is publications her University. Harvard at program Studies head the recently as served also Sheffer Dr. (APSA). Association Science Political American the of Section Policy Head the as served She Haifa. Science Political of School Sheffer Brenda Dr. Aviv University. Center the at fellow Cooperation. Regional and Diplomacy for Institute University and University Tel-Aviv at History of Department Prof. "Security Strip"radioshowonArmyRadio. on host a and newspaper "Haaretz" the for of Dr. Pedatzur is Department a commentator on the at Communications lecturer senior a as University Tel-Aviv at Science Political of lecturer senior a and College, serves Academic Netanya at Dialogue Strategic for Center Abraham Daniel S. the of the is Pedatzur Reuven Dr. Melbourne, Australia. professor visiting a as Studies Iranian Tel-Aviv at Modern for and Chair Parviz Nazarian the of incumbent the is and University, Tel-Aviv at History African and evs s h Ha o the of Head the as serves Rabi Uzi This year he is serving is he year This University. ai s sno research senior a is Rabi Prof. ide atr ad African and Eastern Middle at Netanya Academic College. Academic Netanya at is a senior lecturer at the at lecturer senior a is of research in the Caspian the in research of for Iranian Studies at Tel- at Studies Iranian for t oah University, Monash at at the University of University the at t h Department the at Academic Director Academic of the Foreign the of security issues Head of the of Head Among Pouran and the 75 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 76 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony the conference,said: organizing in Dialogue Strategic for Center the with collaborated which office, Israel Stiftung, Ebert Friedrich the of Director Hexel, Ralf Dr. pose afar-flungthreat. aspirations that missiles and global rockets long-range develops such with country a only view, his In domination. world subsequent and hegemony regional achieve to aspiration the is opined, he today, strategy Iranian guides What selection. random a not was title conference’s Center for Strategic Dialogue, explained that the Dr. Ephraim Sneh, Chair of the S. Daniel Abraham again oncethecurrentconflictsareresolved. case the be would that that hope expressing observed, he years, 2,800 for Iran in welcome constrains such dreams. The Jewish people were Politik Real that however, adding, past, national glorious a restore to longing atavistic an from stem wars many that noted further Arad Prof. revived . was empire the reinstating of dream the power, to radicals the and Khomeini of rise Asia to India the With years. 900 lasting and Africa, to Minor from sprawling ever, empires Cyrus the Great, Iran became one of the largest should of conquests history the Following examined. be illustrious also its hegemony, for of that in addition to addressing Iran’s aspirations President the remarks, College, Academic Netanya opening his In its ramifications, andpossibleresponses. hegemony, on regional for conference aspirations a Iran’s hosted College Abraham Academic Netanya Daniel the at S. Dialogue Strategic the for Center 2010, June 14 On nentoa cmuiy s whole. Security the by a approved sanctions The as community international the by threat a as seen are leadership radical and program nuclear In Iran’s fact, policy . foreign Israel’s principal facing the issue is Iran "Unquestionably, Regional Hegemony- Iran’s Aspirationsfor Conference Summary , said Arad, Zvi Prof. Foreign Policy First Panel-Iran’sRegional l l discourse withthefollowingconcerns: Arab preoccupied has and issue Iranian Sunni the Shi’a, between and Persian, and Arabs religion. In light of the historic tension between and culture through influence exerting Iraq, to why Tehran infiltrated some three million Shi’ites way for territorial contiguity in the west, which is the paved 2003 April in Hussein Saddam of fall The power. to Ahmadinejad Mahmoud of rise Shi’ite population . This policy intensified with the a have that countries those to attention great affairs of Arab countries. Iran has been devoting of this regime is its intrusive involvement in the the Middle East. One of the important hallmarks at Israel has vituperation helped Iran to advance its heaping strategy in particular, In regime. that policy was a diametrically opposed to that of the Shah’s adopting world, the and Israel has waged an uncompromising struggle against regime The 1979. since world the at "potshots" taking been has Iran that stressed University, of Department Aviv Tel at the History African and Eastern of Middle Head Rabi, Uzi Prof. so astoavoidaresortforce. effective for diplomatic actions to recommendations be taken by Israel’s leaders raise would conference the that hope expressed also He

serious andreadytoact." is community international the that and alone news not is it good that showing Israel, are for 9.62010 on Council h psil eegne f Shi’ite the tearing of potential the a with Syria, and of emergence Crescent, stretching through Iraq to Lebanon possible The and "Iranianize"theregion . East Middle the to Shi’a export to attempts The Arab regimes are concerned by Tehran’s l 2. 1. in theregion: He then listed the countries with vested interests from controllingit. and gain Iraq to stands as Iran unstable, long are Afghanistan so permission, Iran’s by accessible only is area the that fact the Given Middle East to the Hindu-Kush mountain range. foreign policy is to create a buffer zone from the Iran’s of strategy the that explained Metz Prof. perspective isdifferent. his Consequently, energy. nuclear and in industry background considerable has he scientist, social a being to addition in that noted in Berlin University Free the at Sciences Social and Prof. Lutz Metz from the Department of Political new King". the live long dead, is King "The that feeling the street", where the atmosphere appears to reflect Israel’s chief detractor as has influenced the "Arab emergence Turkey’s Meanwhile, breaker". "tie- a need might Tehran rate, present the At eclipsed Israel. at also directed rhetoric venomous in Tehran has Ankara history. rich a has also and Iran than stronger is it Economically, cachet. Iran’s of some appropriated has Turkey Dr. Turkey, leadership, Erdogan’s under that in observed Rabi developments on Remarking

apprehension. great caused has East, Middle the of fabric t copihn sottr gas n Iraq in goals short-term accomplishing at cooperation covert aimed Iran, and States some United the between now is there past, the to contrast In - States United The countries two foster positiverelations. these interest, shared a is its out phase this because States And region. the in involvement United the see to like would Iran and Russia Both weapons. turn, helps to expand the market for Russian in which, capabilities, military their increase to region the in countries other encourage aspirations nuclear Iran’s East . in Middle the States United the for to counterweight market as thriving a serves also is Russia weapons. Russian-made Iran - Russia responsible forprovokingIsrael. are - backing Iran’s with - Hezbollah and against Israel. Claims were made that Hamas time that there was no unified Arab position the wars in Lebanon and Gaza were the first - Empire Persian the revives Iran nuclear A otoes rin, n ee some even and reigns, Controversy Iranian regime. the weakened experienced have 2009 unrest June since and upheavals the that the Analysis (MEEPAS), said in and his opening remarks Political analyst and Economic East Middle Iran of director an Javedanfar, Meir a smallfractionofitsforeignpolicy. only constitutes Israel that reveals interests of In conclusion, Prof. Metz opined that Iran’s map 6. 5. 4. 3. and otherseconomicaidenergy. Mauritania Mali, Sudan, as such countries including program, the nuclear UN sanctions, its Iran to offers African opposition of the face in support secure to bid a In - Africa economic cooperationwithTehran. and trade through effect their negating same time the at while sanctions, the of favor in votes it hand its one the On in policy. Iranian game double a plays Like China Council. Russia, Security UN the of member is China land. permanent a is it because Iran to important by oil import can it which from country only the is it because Iran to importance attaches billion China annually. three dollars estimated an to dramatically risen has become countries two the between trade has The Iran market. export important 2008, most China’s Since - China Nicaragua. and Bolivia e.g countries, American agriculture. South and cooperation tourism Similar typesofcooperationexistwithother signed in countries agreements two the also has dispatched military consultants. It Recently poor. the for projects housing built and Venezuela in platforms production oil up set has Iran vehicle. ‘non-imperialistic’ a joint projects. For example, they manufacture Venezuela - Iran and Venezuela share many extending aidtothepoorercountries. and products, energy them selling countries, those in investing by support their garnered UN sanctions on Iran. Tehran has successfully program. This explains their opposition to the nuclear its to opposition blunting by support primary political interest, while Iran looks for their as now- development economic see Soviet Union The former the - of nations independent states breakaway Soviet support ofterroristorganizations. their conflict over Tehran’s nuclear policy and affect does naturally This Afghanistan. and 77 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 78 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony l l l l These include: and constraints the tensions thataffectSaudipolicyvis-à-visIran. Ilan presented Bar at University, Studies Political the of in student Department doctoral a Raviv, Michal Ms. the regime. of continuation the guarantee will that policy insurance an not is bomb atomic An downfall. weight of its internal failures will bring about its the Union, Soviet the like that, convinced is He capability. nuclear acquires it if even collapse and will rifts regime the internal believes he Given management, bad long. very likely would last Iran not in regime current the that Mr. Javedanfar concluded his talk by suggesting primacy. Iran’s reinforce would Hezbollah strengthening and bomb nuclear a Acquiring the growing. is between two rivalry and one, temporary a is alliance Iran-Turkey The Turkey. to hegemony regional its losing of concern Iran’s display reinforces of kind This streets. the on seen are flags Iranian than rather Turkish Strip, Gaza the to aid financial Tehran’s despite that observed Touching on relations with Turkey, Mr. Javedanfar foreign policyofsuchparamountimportance. its own soldiers, an additional of factor that makes its loyalty the doubting troops, foreign relies on regime Iranian the that conclusion the never shoot at their fellow would citizens. Iranians This supports since Lebanese or Palestinian either were demonstrators at fire to orders out testified who that members of the al-Quds force who carried Guard Revolutionary the from defectors two with Guardian the in interview an cited Javedanfar Mr . the vulnerability. of regime’s sign a unmistakable distanced an - have themselves followers president’s the of rm h Sui perspective, Saudi the From peace. for strives and conflict Arab-Israeli the of resolution the it favors it why is help That interests. own its will protect that stability regional been for has striving Arabia Saudi foundation, its Since

Concerns aboutitsownsurvival The rivalrybetweenPersiansandArabs The rivalrybetweenSunniandShi’ites Muslim the of world leader and places holiest Islam’s of guardian as role Arabia’s Saudi l l l l l l l program anditsimplications: nuclear Iran’s to opposed to are Saudis the as why reasons following the cited Raviv Ms. any destroys program chance forpeace. nuclear Iranian the cooperated. countries all not because War Cold the during be must failed sanctions such that explained He formed. coalition stable a sanctions, the of College, said that in order to ensure the efficacy and Senior Vice President of Netanya Academic Dialogue Strategic for Center Abraham Daniel chairman, In the opening remarks of the second panel, the and theirEfficacy Second Panel-TheSanctions l l l l l as follows: Ms. Raviv continued to outline the Saudi options,

destabilize theregime would trigger criticism in the Arab world and however, this, support; American Requesting at theGulfstatesandSaudiArabia Fear that Iran will direct its nuclear weapons Fear ofanuclearaccident Shi’ites the with confrontation defense exacerbated of Fear its increase to spending reluctance A Fear ofgrowingAmericanmilitarypresence the region of destabilization and race arms an of Fear nrdcin f ula waos no the Middle East into weapons nuclear of introduction off ward to efforts diplomatic in Engaging Eastern andGulfcountries Middle with alliance strategic a Establishing an attack Allying itself with Iran as a means of averting Pakistani missilesinthecountry deploying or Russia from missiles acquiring of option the explored already have Saudis the capabilities; nuclear own its Developing Arab andwesterncountries Establishing a strategic alliance consisting of Dr. David Altman, Vice-Chair of the S. Yet effective. more be could fuel refined of imports on restrictions imposing that suggest would gasoline its of 40% some imports Iran that fact the and prices gasoline in rise 40% a after out broke that riots the is However, futile. them banning obtain therefore capability, to nuclear needed the know-how of and most materials acquired already has Iran that explained he Iran, on sanctions the to Turning 7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. sanctions: of effectiveness the ensure to necessary are Dr. Ascolai then outlined the principles he believes of payment reparations. the and terrorists of extradition the for demands to capitulated although ultimately Libya disproportionate, and serious were tragedy Lockerbie the of wake the in Libya on imposed sanctions the that Dr. maintains opinion. Ascolai public world on a impact had negative people Iraqi the on effect their about concern and harsh, extremely considered were it from developing weapons of mass destruction were employed against Iraq in order to prevent that sanctions The States. United the on attack Japanese the prompted Manchuria of conquest its following Japan on imposed States United historians believe that the severe sanctions the Many Nations. of League the of member a not of cooperation from the United States, which was following its attack on 1930s Ethiopia failed the due to in lack Italy on imposed sanctions The instances where such penalties were attempted. past reviewed (INSS), Studies Security National for Institute the at Associate Research Senior Iran, on sanctions current In an attempt to assess the effectiveness of the conveys weakness. reasons political for sanctions the Diluting be should avoided sincetheycanbeeasilyovercome. sanctions Narrowly-focused its policy. changes it if compensation and incentives offered be should country sanctioned The Timing ofthesanctionsisimportant. should harm humanitarian nonetheless beavoided. success, of chances improve sanctions severe Although vulnerable points. Sanctions should be applied to the country’s should neverstandalone. and strategy a of part be to have Sanctions Dr. Ephraim Ascolai, Ephraim Dr. 1. the followingthreeconclusions: states. Having analyzed 73 sanctioning case studies, they arrived at the for possible as costs considerable country’s political and economic little as and vulnerability, target the coalition, sanctioning the within unity of extent success: great a for conditions main three to points their report, they claim that the relevant literature In work . sanctions which under circumstances he had prepared with a colleague concerning the Institute in Research Frankfurt, Peace Germany, reviewed the a from report Kubbig Bernd Prof. yields productivenegotiations. pressure only because concluded, she linked, inextricably are diplomacy and Sanctions action. military possible and sanctions from separate community international made another mistake by viewing diplomacy as the opinion, her In transactions withIran. revenue losses that would result from cancelling economic Chinese interests and European and concern about Russian in accommodate diluted to were order and enough strong not are Dr. Landau contends that the existing sanctions this optionfromthetable. administration has erred by effectively removing Obama The threat. military credible a including applied, be to need pressure of means other its violates that treaty. If sanctions country are to be effective, however, a punish military to of action short option only world’s the are measures such sanctions, the of effectiveness the assess to hard is it although that argued the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), at Associate Research Senior Landau, Emily Dr. little ornoimpactonIran. the aspects he all alluded to, the sanctions would incorporating have plan comprehensive no was there as long as that opined Ascolai Dr. a have significant effect. could said, he This, Libya. with done been had what to similar manner a in Iran of isolation possible the exploring proposed He also issue. this address not new do in that resulted sanctions has Russia and China with relations its complicate to reluctance American from thestart . doomed were Iran against taken measures the why is This are. sanctions the effective less the objective, the important more The 79 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 80 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 4. 3. 2. 1. vulnerabilities: heel. He and his colleague identified four Iranian Achilles’ country’s that on sanction focus to is condition second The strength. sanctions’ the undermining thereby met, not is condition this homogenous case, a Iran’s In objective. clear having a with coalition is success their for the describe why they failed in Iran’s case. to The first condition proceeded conditions for the success of the sanctions and Kubbig Prof. 3. 2. onr’ itrainl rdt akn has ranking credit international country’s to The debt. foreign and due corruption, spreading wide- flight, power capital increased purchasing an inflation, of loss the including problems economic and Financial blunt a remain to instrument forsometimetocome. likely is - ban import international an of form the in - weapon oil the level, high a on remains price oil the as long As vulnerability. high mutually their to due weapon, oil the use will side either that its however, skeptical, of are Experts gold". "black export the halt could Tehran hand, to import Iranian oil any more. On the other not decide would states member the which a closed international sanctioning alliance, in to applies this hand, one sanctioning the On potential. great a conveys Iranian immediately exports the Iran’s of of monoculture The demise regime. the about bring would exports those later Curtailing unviable. or be sooner will economy Iranian the exports gas or comes oil Without budget export. oil from government’s the of Half riots. to lead could gasoline of shortage because This is the regime’s most daunting challenge, distillates. oil of 40% approximately import to The condition of the oil refineries forces Iran are agoodsubstitute. Russia and China although infrastructure, its materials Tehran needs in order the to modernize supply not do exporters fact European that the by encouraged is He production. increase or maintain either to heavily invest Ageing oil infrastructure that forces Tehran to the account into regime ofthetargetcountry. take should Sanctions ineffective. are hence and motives the address not do they Iran, of case the In side. other the of Sanctions should also address the motivation xlie ta gvn wny er o secrecy of years twenty given that explained (INSS), Studies National Security for Institute the of Director Deputy Nuclearization Options inDealing withIran’s Third Panel-theStrategic sanctions. to due capacity, weapons nuclear towards step up its nuclear enrichment, which could be a first not many indicators for Iran’s readiness to give are there currently that concluded Kubbig Prof. the commoditiesitimportstoIran. of 85% exports actually nothing, manufactures which Dubai, and period, sanctions the during percent four by increased have Iran to exports Even Israel continues to deal with Iran. German the distributionofglobalresourcesisoccurring. show that a fight over spheres of influence and "Asia-option" the in interest growing on Tehran's community international the of focus The policy. embargo European the of consequence its relationship with China, India, deepen and Russia - as a to starts Iran if arise could order, energy new the of center the at serving Iran with market, new gas and oil the the of to developments due costs political Furthermore, among theleadingpowers. differences policy foreign to as well, as Beijing and Moscow of interests economic to ascribed be can alliance sanctioning the of unity limited the Indeed, restrictions. entry to reduced were field respective the in scientists and personnel military Iranian for ban entry envisaged initially the and minimum; a to kept were frozen, were assets foreign whose fields, rocket-related and the number of Iranians employed in the nuclear materials; and technologies listed explicitly on the Western members turned into a specific ban by proposed initially ban export comprehensive example, in the December 2006 UN sanctions, For China. the and Russia by diluted severely been to the most recent round of UN sanctions, have 2006 from sanctions, of rounds all Kubbig, Prof. to to According unwillingness form. original their in them accept the community’s to due international ineffective sanctions rendered been the have vulnerabilities, these Despite rate, whichisdefactoatover50%. structural problem is the high unemployment considerable another while worsened, also r Eham Kam, Ephraim Dr. mosbe rslig ehp fo diplomatic from perhaps resulting impossible, not is Israel on attack nuclear a that observed Kam Dr. considerations, these Notwithstanding 3. 2. 1. reasons: of number a for weapons nuclear use not will Iran that contends also He flexibility. diplomatic more with it provide will it since ambiguity of policy a adopt will Iran that estimates Kam Dr. Tehran. with accommodation some seek to compelled be would countries European and acute more other things, the threat to Israel would be made Among power. major a as standing its solidify court would time same the at but punishment, capacity international nuclear achieved it has that acknowledging the Publicly and States. Israel United to threat a sanctions, posing still minimize while and limit to damage it diplomatic enable would option second The diplomatic strategies: going two public or of maintaining ambiguity. one choose to have will it threshold, nuclear the cross to decides Iran If will ratherseekasecond-strikecapability. but bombs, two or one for settle not will it that Iran’s development of ballistic missiles suggests 3. 2. 1. motivating theIranianprogram: as sees he that factors three discussed Dr. Kam weapons. atomic developing of brink the on is Iran noted that experts among consensus he the Nonetheless, information. specific than rather inferences and analysis on based weaponry nuclear their development, his observations were necessarily about Iranians by to actagainstIran. and the United States might provoke America The long-standing close ties between Israel on Iran. fatalities of millions and devastation inflict Israel has a second-strike capability that will the raisond’êtreofacquiringthiscapability. Using nuclear weapons will reduce deterrence, will bolsteritsstandingathome. capability such believes regime Iranian The regional power. nuclear going a becoming of ambitions their further would that believe Iranians The strong enemysuchastheUnitedStates. a deter would that weapon a needed they After the war with Iraq, the Iranians realized 7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. the challenge: with cope to take could Israel actions various the presented Pedatzur Reuven Dr. Dialogue, Strategic for Center Abraham Daniel S. the of will acquire nuclear weapons, the Iran Academic Director that assumption the under Working strike againstoneofIran’sallies. Israeli an to response in or misunderstanding unpalatable choices facingIsrael. Dr. Pedatzur’s opinion, this is the best of the In war. Cold the during superpowers the by own annihilation. This was the policy adopted would deter the Iranians since they risk their capability second-strike Israel’s intent. clear a of manifestation a of favor of in ambiguity policy the relinquishing mean since would Israel it for departure a mean would policy deterrence nuclear open an Adopting intolerable damagetoIsrael. One inflict to take would it defense. all is missile nuclear foolproof provide cannot it because however, policy, complete a be cannot It policy . Israel’s of element an fact in is defense active that suggests system anti-missile Arrow the of development The for Israel. such cost staggering a at any come would endeavor and feasible, not entire is wrong the population to the shelter be Providing approach. would defense Passive affairs, thisisunrealistic. of would state current the given but desirable, be agreements disarmament Ideally, be guaranteed. not cannot fulfillment is whose promise American an on rest defense would policy a Such American advisable. on Relying the of consequences ofitsactions. clear made be side other the that important is It undesirable. are areas gray realm, this In mistake. a opinion, Pedatzur’s Dr. in is, ambiguity of policy the Continuing diplomatic of collapse pressure onIran. the to lead Additionally, will fail. it to doomed is an operation such reasons, intelligence and tactical logistical, for But weapons. such has acquired Iran before possible only is program or significantly delay Iran’s nuclear weapons destroy to strike military A - action Military 81 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 82 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony nihet srnteig h isetos of inspections the strengthening enrichment, uranium on compromises program, nuclear the which must include the following steps: delaying war, or sanctions to alternative promising very a be can elements, different of consist should which concept", "smart This security. national Iran’s guarantee and relations their improve to key to a solution is for Tehran and Washington the believes He wane. will program nuclear its pursue to motivation peace Iran’s Syria, a with accord signs and initiative peace accepts Arab Israel the if that maintains Kubbig Prof. off anattack. Iranian ward to for desire the is opinion, his in reason armament, The war. Gulf the during cooperation Iran’s despite undiminished was them toward hostility against American that and them, weapons chemical of use Hussein’s to the effect that the West had ignored Saddam he presented claims made by Iranian colleagues point, his make To isolation. of sense its from stems weapons nuclear develop to motivation Institute in Research Frankfurt, Germany Peace argued the that Iran’s from Kubbig Bernd Prof. a just not and regional one. power, global a become to weaponry Iran’s seeks Tehran that that suggest plans development concluded Rubin Dr. the and United States. Russia a China, in with Iran category similar putting thereby (ICBMs), Missile Ballistic Intercontinental into retrofitted be can launchers satellite send Their and space. to orbit astronauts in satellites communication have to is a objective their that launching stating satellite, in succeeded even They space. into missiles launch to capability also its improved has Iran efforts, these with Concurrent targeting of capability Europe. a mean more would to or This kilometers believed 2,000 reach approximately current be the ever-increasing with an range, with missiles produced have technology in ballistic investments Iran’s capable Shihab3. nuclear- the is these of recent most The years. eight every missile new a developing is Tehran to obsolescence, forces technological of state a ground into fall and air its develop. allowing to While chooses it assets the on based Defense intentions strategic Iran’s Rubincon examined Consulting, of director Rubin, Uzi Dr. . cec ad h Dprmn o Ain Studies Asian of Department the and Science Political of School the from Shaffer Brenda Dr. Iran turnsnuclear. question remains whether this will occur before political and economic goals, it will succeed. The its accomplish can revolution the If legitimacy. of loss a caused which regime, the destabilized Prof. Menashri contends that the events of divided 2009 and weak a (4) opposition. and force; use to willingness their (3) Guard; Revolutionary the (2) God; (1) sources: four from stems strength radicals’ The power. of levers the on grip their retained radicals the because anything change to unable was Khatami moderate, Considered account dailyneeds. into take that solutions embrace to inclined are strict and demonstrate a greater degree of openness and pragmatism bent pragmatic a of Those adherence. religious the between on focus Iran tension in disputes internal The religiously appropriate. is what dictate cannot therefore regime Iranian the that and Islam, of no interpretation valid is one there that proclaimed have few a And revolution’s Khomeini. opposed openly clerics senior the most over Iran’s of One values. Islamic with disputes consistency are There and freedomisobviouslynon-existent. alleviated, been not have society in Inequities materialize. not did welfare things these bread, freedom; and and freedom provide to was which - however, one, power second The seize accomplished . was to was one first The objectives. two had revolution the view, his In Menashri believespreoccupiesIranians. Prof . that issue an is This accomplished. been had revolution the of objectives the whether for Center examined University, Aviv Tel at Studies Iranian the at associate research senior panel, the of start the At Struggles inIranianSociety Fourth Panel-InternalPower and engagement. nuclear its all containment combines it this of Instead plants. at abolishing aim and not Iran does isolating concept This Tehran. and Washington between diplomacy direct offering and incentives, economic plants, nuclear Iran’s Prof. David Menashri, David Prof. power tobe reckoned with. international an become then and East Middle the in standing its consolidate to wants Iran Israeli last him, to According unstoppable. is nuclearization the Lubrani , ambassador to serve in Iran, claimed that Iran’s Uri Ambassador join itandwillbecomehardtocontrol. a rebellion. However, if one breaks out, they will of their rights. She does not think they will spark isolationist and independent, but become to seek seeking not recognition are minorities the that In her concluding remarks, Dr. Shaffer explained with ethnictensions. the Iranian regime is having a hard time coping that their suggest events from other and bodies These families. the withhold to as far so went regime the who riots, Fearing people executed. were of funerals the ban to Iranians the prompted minority Kurdish the of fear The government’s officialwebsite. Iranian the of Talkbacks the in even reflected was in that sympathy of extent arrested an enjoyed 2010, was who leader, Its violence. to resorted past the in has minority Baluchi the Although the smallest ethnic group in the country, have relativesinneighboringcountries. and border the to close live minorities Ethnic fluid because half of all Iranians are not Persian. She further believes that the political situation is terrorist deter the to organizations operatinginitsmidst. even unable or is countries It neighboring provinces. the all in difficulties facing problems, political serious by Dr. Shaffer opines that Iran is also beleaguered north ofthecountry. the in death" to "freezing are people and all, to electric infrastructure is poor and not accessible the ubiquitous, is gas of Shortage gas. and oil has Iran that huge gas reserves, it nonetheless has to import fact the Despite rising. keeps either consumption constant, production remains oil or While decreases gas. and oil by generated are revenues country’s the of 50% prices and the government’s budget. In addition, that keeps growing due to the gap between oil economic has problems. It Iran suffers Shaffer, from 20% Dr. inflation to and According a deficit that itisaglobalpower. the Iranian regime in an effort to refute notions of hardships the on focused University Haifa at leaders. its impact can that apparatus only the is this be should sanctions applied to Iran’s that oil exports and asserted imports because also He deterrence, butratherIsraeli inferiority. mutual no be will there this, of view In bigger. seventy-fold is ten-fold area its and Israel’s than larger is population Iran’s Iran. and Israel between symmetry no is there superpowers, two the between situation the Unlike States. existed between the Soviet Union and the United not be comparable to the ‘balance of terror’ that an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would Dr. Sneh believes that the conditions created by too hightostopIran’snuclearprogram. intolerable. Therefore, no price can be considered In Dr. Sneh’s opinion, such a situation would be 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. cited He it. several reasonsforthis: against weapons nuclear never uses Iran if even existence Israel’s imperils the conference, concluded stating that Iran’s nuclear armament Dialogue, Strategic for Center Dr. Ephraim Sneh, Chair of the S. Daniel Abraham the Farsi language. in station Israel of Voice the down shut to pressure budgetary mentioned repeated and he constant example, of way By rebellion. Israel was not doing enough to encourage that that regret expressed Lubrani Mr. conclusion, his In regime. incumbent a the replace will who front domestic the revolution on will take place, yet it is hard that to predict believes He Sunni Muslims. has enabled it to gain significant support among valuable time. Meddling in the Palestinian affairs buy to able been has On it front, international domestic. the and international - fronts two on fighting is Iran that explained Lubrani Mr. rba n Eyt o eeo ter own their develop nuclear weapons. to Egypt Saudi and drive Arabia will armament nuclear Iran’s of anuclearpower. backing the with activity their increase and The terrorist organizations will rear their head Israel’s for economic growthwilldryup. needed investments Foreign Israel. It will prompt a debilitating "brain-drain" from Israel. to immigration stop will threat Iranian The 83 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 84 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony ol b aoto b te ntd tts of States United the by adoption be this would avert to way only The militarily. react to Dr. Sneh voiced concern that Israel would have banking systems. its on boycott a impose and industry oil Iran’s in investments prevent to legislation effective with otherpanelists Senior Researcher of Iranian Studies, History, African and the of Department Head of Middle Eastern Rabi, Uzi Dr. Dialogue, Strategic Netanya AcademicCollege Center Chair, Abraham for Daniel Sneh, S. Ephraim Dr.

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 Office Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Israel Netanya AcademicCollege  Zvi Arad, President, Arad, Zvi Prof. Ralf Hexel, Director, Hexel, Ralf Dr. 85 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 86 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony Ambassador toIran Ambassador Uri Lubrani, former ainl euiy Studies for (INSS) Security Institute National Deputy Directory, Kam, Ephraim Dr. 

 olg, ipaig Iran’s missile rangecapabilities displaying College, Academic Netanya Dialogue, Abraham Center for Strategic Daniel S. Director, Academic  (INSS) Studies Security National for Institute Fellow, Research  ml Lna, Senior Landau, Emily Dr. evn Pedatzur, Reuven Dr. Academic College Netanya Dialogue, Strategic S. Daniel Abraham Center for Vice-Chair, Altman, David Dr. University ofHaifa and Science Department of Asian Studies, Political School of Shaffer, Brenda Dr.   (MEEPAS) Company Analysis Political the and Economic of East Middle Director Analyst,   Free UniversityBerlin Sciences, Social & Political of Prof. Lutz Mez, Department er aeafr Iran Javedanfar, Meir 87 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony 88 Iran's Ambitions for Regional Hegemony Dr for National Security Security panelists other with (INSS), National Studies for Institute Fellow, Research University Tel-Aviv of Programs, Dean for Special Studies, Center Iranian the of Head Prof . Ephraim Ascolai, Senior Senior Ascolai, Ephraim . David Menashri, Menashri, David   Institute, Frankfurt International, Research Peace Research Ballistic Defense Missile Director, Project   Herzog Mike .) (ret Gen. Brig. en Kubbig, Bernd Prof.