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EPISTEMOLOGY Two Kinds of Truth NECESSARY TRUTHS

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EPISTEMOLOGY Two Kinds of Truth NECESSARY TRUTHS EPISTEMOLOGY Theory of knowledge and Truth 1 EPISTEMOLOGY: The theory of knowledge (1) What does it mean for a set of beliefs to be true? What kinds of truth are there? (2) How will we know when our beliefs are true? What are the criteria for having knowledge? 2 Two Kinds of Truth Traditionally, there are two kinds of truth (1) NECESSARY (2) EMPIRICAL (or Contingent) 3 NECESSARY TRUTHS A statement expressing a necessary truth cannot possibly be false. Examples: All triangles have three sides. All bachelors are unmarried. No one who believes that God exists is an atheist. 4 Necessary Truths The truth of a necessary truth does not depend on what the facts are like; necessary truths are always true no matter what. Examples: Can you ever find a bachelor who is married? Can you ever find a triangle that does not have 3 sides? Is it possible to find an atheist who believes in God? 5 Necessary Falsehoods We can say similar things about necessary falsehoods. Impossible to be true Their falsity does not depend on what the facts are like; necessary falsehoods are always false no matter what 6 Necessary Truths and the A Priori (ā prē or ē) A Priori = prior to experience or independent of any experience of facts or states of affairs in the world. Necessary truths are often said to be true a priori, true independent of any particular facts. 7 Necessary Truths and A Priori Truths It is also said that their poof (or justification) does not depend on any particular facts of the world. 8 Necessary Truths and Analytic Truths Necessary truths are sometimes called analytic truths Analytic truths are necessarily true because (1) The predicate is contained in the concept of the subject. (2) Denying the truth of the statement leads to a contradiction. (3) Contradictions are impossible and go against reason. 9 Analytic Truths “All sisters are female” is an analytic truth because the predicate “female” is contained in the subject “sister.” Why? A sister is defined as being a female sibling. So “All sisters are female” says the same thing as “All female siblings are female.” The predicate is contained in the subject. It is easy to see that it would be a contradiction to say that not all female siblings are female. So “All sisters are female” is necessarily true and couldn’t possibly be false. 10 Analytic Truths Example: Fathers are males. The concept “male” is in the concept of “father” (male parent). 11 Analytic Truths Example: All electrons are subatomic particles. An electron is by definition a certain type of subatomic particle. So the concept of a subatomic particle is contained in the concept of an electron. 12 Empirical (or Contingent) Truths Empirical = having to do with experience Contingent = depending on experience A statement expressing an empirical truth is true in virtue of the facts. An empirical statement is empirical because its truth value (whether it is true or false) depends on what the world is like. 13 Empirical (or Contingent) Truths They can be known to be true only after actually looking at (or knowing about) the facts of the world. It is possible for an empirical truth to be false because of the facts. We can say similar things about empirical falsehoods. 14 Empirical (or Contingent) Truths Empirical Statement: Microorganisms live on Mars. Empirical truth: Over 5 billion people live on Earth. Empirical falsehood: Germany won WWII. 15 Empirical Truths and A Posteriori Truths A posteriori = with experience or depending on experience of the facts Empirical truths are sometimes called “a posteriori” because empirical truths depend on the facts. 16 Test: A Priori and A Posteriori: Are these statements true or false? I can know a priori that all bachelors are unmarried. It is impossible to know a priori whether New York has more inhabitants than Mexico City. I can know a priori that there is life on other planets. All of mathematics is based on a priori reasoning. 17 Test: A Priori and A Posteriori: Are these statements true or false? Nobody can know through a priori reasoning that the Empire State building is the tallest building in the world. I can know a priori that is someone is shot to death, then somebody must have been a shooter. I can know a priori that a cube must have 12 edges. I can know a priori that all swans are white. 18 Empirical Truths and Synthetic Truths Empirical truths are sometimes called synthetic truths because the predicate of the statement is not contained in the subject but is connected to it through experience. Example: My car has more than 1 gallon of gas in it. Example: The door to this room is shut. 19 Test: Analytic or Synthetic Claims? All pencils and pens are writing utensils. Electrons are the smallest physical particles in the universe. More than 20 million people died of AIDS last year. There are more heterosexual humans than homosexual humans. Earthquakes are natural disasters. 20 Test: Analytic or Synthetic Claims? Dogs and cows are both animals. Texas is larger than Oklahoma. The average lawyer makes more than $70,000 a year. All solid spheres have one surface. 21 Test: Necessary or Empirical Claim? If one multiplies any natural number by 2, the resulting number is even. The income of the average worker in the US is higher than the income of the average worker in Europe. Every state must have some form of government. Every event has a cause. If any nation should ever use nuclear weapons again, then millions of people will die. 22 Test: Necessary or Empirical Claim? Every recession in the economy is eventually followed by an economic recovery. If a person freely performs an action, then the person can be held responsible for the action. Sugar is sweet. All human beings have the same fundamental rights. All cats are animals. 23 Test: Necessary or Empirical Claim? The moon moves around the earth. All US presidents are male. The US withdrew from Vietnam in 1975. If Frank has more than 2 sisters, then he has at least three siblings. There are infinitely many prime numbers. In order to graduate from Northwestern University, one has to take at least 3 English classes. 24 Necessary and Empirical Truths Necessary Truths Analytic A priori Empirical (or contingent) Truths Synthetic A posteriori 25 Knowledge: Three Kinds (1) Knowing how (2) Knowledge by acquaintance (3) Knowing that In philosophy, we are almost always concerned with (3), the knowing-that kind of knowledge. 26 Knowing How (1) Knowing how (competence knowledge, skill knowledge): This has to do with knowing how to do something. For example, I know how to ride a bike. 27 Knowledge by Acquaintance (2) Knowledge by acquaintance: This is knowledge that one has when one knows something or someone directly. For example, I know my friend Jack by having been in direct contact with him. 28 Knowing That (3) Knowing that (propositional knowledge, descriptive knowledge): This is knowledge that something is the case. For example, I know that the earth has one moon. In philosophy, we are almost always concerned with (3), the knowing-that kind of knowledge. 29 Test: Knowledge: (1) how, (2) by acquaintance, or (3) propositional? I know exactly how you feel about her death. “2+2=4,” I know that for a fact. I used to know Peter very well but in recent times we have grown apart. I’m not afraid to cheat on my exams because I know how to cheat without getting caught. 30 Test: Knowledge: (1) how, (2) by acquaintance, or (3) propositional? If only I knew more about the Vietnam war. My father used to be the smartest man. Now, he has Alzheimer’s, and he doesn’t know anything anymore. You might know something that is in your accounting book, but this doesn’t mean that you know anything about how to run an accounting firm. 31 Knowledge: Does Believing Strongly Give Us Knowledge? • Can believing strongly that something is true, make it true? 32 Knowledge • Simply believing strongly that something is true in no way establishes that it is true. Strong belief is not the key to having knowledge. Do you agree? 33 Knowledge: Does Having a True Belief Give One Knowledge? Suppose you have a true belief. Do you have knowledge? Do you know that this belief is true? 34 Knowledge: True Belief Is Not Enough for Knowledge Suppose Mike is on the quiz show Who Wants To Be a Millionaire? He is asked the name of the Greek city- state that defeated the Persians in the battle of Marathon. Mike doesn’t know ancient Greek history or the battle of Marathon. But he believes that “Athens” is the answer and selects it. It turns out that “Athens” is the correct answer. But does Mike know that it is the correct answer? No, he is merely guessing. 35 Knowledge: What is needed for it? • When a belief is appropriately linked to truth, then the belief counts as knowledge. But what exactly is this link, and what is knowledge? Can you think of some beliefs that you have that count as examples of knowledge? 36 Knowledge: Classical Definition Someone S knows that P if and only if: (1) S believes that P is true (2) P is true (3) S is justified in believing that P is true We have to add justification. One has to have reasons or evidence of some kind to establish that the belief is 37 Can you KNOW any of the following? (Can you justify any?) I know that I have two hands.
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