DOCSLIB.ORG

A Study Based on “Why Bother with Truth” by J. Beilby and D. K. Clark

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Study Based on “Why Bother with Truth” by J. Beilby and D. K. Clark A Study Based on \Why Bother with Truth" by J. Beilby and D. K. Clark Edwin Chong March 10, 2002 1 Why this study? Help to resolve personal confusion and conflict about truth and knowledge. • Provide a rational basis for our faith. • Help in understanding contemporary culture and thought. • Help in outreach and evangelism. • Improve understanding of philosophical premises of our own discipline (e.g., engineer- • ing). Help in integration of faith in our discipline. • Provide the foundations for further study on relevant topics; e.g., Christianity and • science, creation vs. evolution, \right for you but not for me." Disclaimer: I am not a philosopher. • These notes are merely a summary of the booklet by Beilby and Clark, with a few • points inserted. Exercise: Are these statements true, and how do you know? 1. If all Norwegians have blue eyes, and I am Norwegian, then I have blue eyes. 2. I exist. 3. The earth is round. 4. Jesus rose from the dead. 5. God loves me. 6. Black is beautiful. 7. The Aryan race is superior. 8. The sun rises in the east. 1 2 Introduction Socrates (470{399 B.C.): • { \The unexamined life is not worth living." { Pursued the truth about unchanging moral principles that lead to good life. Gorgias (Sophist): Nothing exists; or if it does, it can't be understood; or if it can, it • can't be expressed. Skeptical Question: Since we disagree about so many things, do we really know • what we think we know? Skepticism: the doctrine that all knowledge claims are suspect or unsupportable. • This study is a journey through history, examining key people and their philosophical • views on truth and knowledge (epistemology). Each is trying to find truth and overcome skepticism. Their views all have valid points to make, so we must tread very carefully! Introduce characters: Mary, Peter (father), and Paul (son). • Two main philosophical views: modern and postmodern. • No matter what you think of these views when we study them, in some way or other • they form the underpinnings of how each of us approaches life. 3 Modern Skepticism: No Knowledge Without Evi- dence Ren´eDescartes (1596{1650) Set very high standards for what counts as knowledge. • Either we achieve absolute certitude or we give in to skepticism. • Influenced by early developments in science and mathematics, especially geometry. • Descartes distrusted human senses. • Build knowledge based on reason alone: rationalism. • Rationalism: begin with absolutely certain starting point, carefully move to absolutely • certain conclusions. Thought experiment: What happens if I assume that a powerful demon is deceiving • me at every moment? Do I still have knowledge? Even in the worst case, \I'm being deceived. Thus, I'm thinking. Therefore, I exist!" • (Cogito ergo sum.) Descartes thought that he had overcome skepticism. • 2 Snags in Descartes's ideas: Following Descartes's method, Baruch Spinoza (1632{1677) and Gottfried Leibniz • (1646{1716) arrived at different conclusions about reality. Mathematicians discovered competing geometries (based on different starting assump- • tions). Kurt G¨odel(or Goedel) (1906{1978): His incompleteness theorems showed that ax- • iomatic systems that are sufficiently rich to describe interesting aspects of reality also contain \truths" that cannot be proved! Francis Bacon (1561{1626) Attempted to understand scientific method. • Relied on human senses (opposite to rationalism): empiricism. • Bacon thought he had overcome skepticism, because trusting the senses is obviously • reliable. David Hume (1711{1776) Argued that following empiricism rigorously leads to skepticism: To be absolutely • certain, we must limit our belief to what we can actually experience. Hume's famous discussion of causation: We cannot deduce what is cause and what is • effect; we can only experience isolated events. Isaac Newton (1642{1727) As rationalism and empiricism ground toward a negative result, science was enjoying • smashing success, thanks in large part to Newton. Alexander Pope: \Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night: God said, Let Newton • be! and all was light." Newton's approach was neither purely rational (like Descartes) nor purely empirical • (like Hume); it combined both. The Enlightenment (1700s) Golden age in modernism. • Intellectuals shared a central goal: happiness and liberty gained through social progress • guided by reason. This dream required shaking off the social influence of religious traditions and superstitions from the past (which often led to war). Science emerged as the primary form through which human reason would solve social • dilemmas and create a bright future. More recent implications By late 1800s, science dominated Western culture as the only authority of rationality: • scientism. 3 By early 1900s, emergence of logical positivism: All knowledge should meet the stan- • dards of empirical science. Broad implications in many disciplines. Goal: prove every belief. Logic provides the means to be positive about beliefs. • Focus on language: specify criteria by which we can decide which words have meanings • and which don't. Verification Criterion of Meaning: for a word or sentence to be meaningful, it must • be verifiable by the five senses (empirically). Example: tree has \meaning" but God does not. Therefore \God loves me" doesn't • even get to be called false; it is just meaningless. Evidentialism: For a belief to be knowledge, it must be supported by evidence. • According to evidentialism, everyone has a rational and moral duty to believe only • those claims that are supported by sufficient evidence. Evidentialism, though not a new doctrine, was reinforced by the prominence of science. • Notice that only science produces knowledge that meets the requirements of eviden- • tialism and positivism. If a belief doesn't fit in with well-established scientific beliefs or isn't discovered through • normal scientific practices, then it isn't rational and doesn't count as genuine knowl- edge. Conclusion: Every person ought to be agnostic about religious claims. • Summary: Key ideas in modern skepticism Evidentialism: Every belief must be supported by adequate evidence (otherwise, we lack integrity, even morality!). Positivism: Only assertions that are verifiable by the senses are meaningful. Scientism: Science alone produces rational beliefs. Skeptical Question: Do we really know what we think we know|especially in religion| when our beliefs are not properly based on empirical evidence? Implication: Modern skeptics hold that religious beliefs never clear the very high crossbar that any knowledge must leap to be counted. Example: Peter (father): \Unless believers can give scientific evidence for their private, religious ideas, they really shouldn't believe in God." 4 4 Postmodern Skepticism: No Knowledge, Only Per- spectives If you think modernism is scary, wait till you see postmodernism. Modernism stresses • rationalism, absolutism, and positivism. Postmodernism sees these as wrong-headed! Immanuel Kant (1724{1804) Initially tried to follow Liebniz's rationalism. • After reading David Hume, Kant awoke from a \dogmatic slumber" to create a new • and different epistemology (to overcome skepticism). Kant's approach: both the senses and the mind contribute to human knowledge (recall • Newton's scientific approach; but Kant's is different). Recall Hume's discussion of causation: it's impossible to know that one event causes • another just be observing them. Kant's argument: By observing events, it is possible to know that one causes another, • because causation is a category that is innate to the mind. Categories are principles and concepts that are hard-wired into the mind. • Categories in the mind stand ready to receive and structure the facts of experience, and • experience fills the categories with content. Both elements work together to produce knowledge. Kant's synthesis brilliantly answered Hume's challenge, leading to a revolution in epis- • temology. Kant believed that he had answered skepticism. People generally assumed that the world shapes the contents of the mind, but Kant • said that the structure of the mind shapes our view of the world. This reversal was to have momentous implications! Snags in Kant's ideas: Kant's approach requires distinguishing between reality as it is (theoretical knowledge) • and reality as it appears to be (practical knowledge). Kant was satisfied with practical reason as a guide to living. But this distinction opened a door to deeper skepticism. Why was Kant satisfied with practical reason? Because he believed (naively) that all • human minds are structured in a similar way (i.e., have the same categories), and hence would arrive at the same knowledge, given the same empirical evidence. But what if different people have different categories? In the centuries since Kant, people came to believe that the categories of the human • mind can differ widely from time to time and place to place. Implications on knowledge of God: it is no more than knowledge of the human self, a • human invention based on religious needs and passions. 5 Implications in other disciplines: • { Psychology: God is a psychologically inspired father-image [Sigmund Freud (1856{ 1939)]. { Sociology: God is a concept created by the bourgeois class (financial elite) to hold down the proletariat class (poor and destitute) [Karl Marx (1818{1883)]. \Religion is the opiate of the people." The Postmodern view: The idea of universal mental categories is a vestige of modernity. • Our mental categories are particular and specific, grounded in history, tradition, cul- • ture, and language. Speakers of different native languages view the world through the lens of their own • language. English and Swahili aren't just distinct languages; they're radically different systems of thought. Linguistic turn: fundamental shift in how people look at the source or origin of the • categories or structures by which a person interprets the world. Renounce universal reason and celebrate a smorgasbord of particular forms of logic. • If knowledge means true beliefs about the way things really are, then we have no • knowledge at all! Not only can't we \know" God, we can't even \know" the physical world.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Demystifying the Saint
    DEMYSTIFYING THE SAINT: JAY L. GARFIELDʼS RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION OF NĀGĀRJUNAʼS MĀDHYAMAKA AS THE EPITOME OF CONTEMPORARY CROSS-CULTURAL PHILOSOPHY TIINA ROSENQVIST Tampereen yliopisto Yhteiskunta- ja kulttuuritieteiden yksikkö Filosofian pro gradu -tutkielma Tammikuu 2011 ABSTRACT Cross-cultural philosophy approaches philosophical problems by setting into dialogue systems and perspectives from across cultures. I use the term more specifically to refer to the current stage in the history of comparative philosophy marked by the ethos of scholarly self-reflection and the production of rational reconstructions of foreign philosophies. These reconstructions lend a new kind of relevance to cross-cultural perspectives in mainstream philosophical discourses. I view Jay L. Garfieldʼs work as an example of this. I examine Garfieldʼs approach in the context of Nāgārjuna scholarship and cross-cultural hermeneutics. By situating it historically and discussing its background and implications, I wish to highlight its distinctive features. Even though Garfield has worked with Buddhist philosophy, I believe he has a lot to offer to the meta-level discussion of cross-cultural philosophy in general. I argue that the clarity of Garfieldʼs vision of the nature and function of cross-cultural philosophy can help alleviate the identity crisis that has plagued the enterprise: Garfield brings it closer to (mainstream) philosophy and helps it stand apart from Indology, Buddhology, area studies philosophy (etc). I side with Garfield in arguing that cross- cultural philosophy not only brings us better understanding of other philosophical traditions, but may enhance our self-understanding as well. I furthermore hold that his employment of Western conceptual frameworks (post-Wittgensteinian language philosophy, skepticism) and theoretical tools (paraconsistent logic, Wittgensteinian epistemology) together with the influence of Buddhist interpretative lineages creates a coherent, cogent, holistic and analytically precise reading of Nāgārjunaʼs Mādhyamaka philosophy.
    [Show full text]
  • Reading Questions for Phil 251.501, Spring 2012 (Daniel)
    Reading Questions for Phil 251.501, Spring 2012 (Daniel) Class One: What is Philosophy? (Jan. 17) • How is philosophy different from mythology? • How is philosophy different from religion? • How is philosophy different from science? • What does it mean to say that the “love of wisdom” is concerned with the justification of opinions? • Why is giving reasons for your beliefs important regarding the main areas of philosophy (e.g., metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and logic)? Class Two: Philosophical Tools (Jan. 19) • What is “logical consistency”? Give some examples. • What is the difference between logical possibility and causal possibility? • What is the difference between lexical and real definitions? • What is the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions? • What are thought experiments? • In philosophy, what is an argument? • What is the difference between a deductive vs. and inductive argument? Class Three: Knowledge and Skepticism (Jan. 24) • What distinguishes propositional knowledge, “knowing how,” and “knowledge by acquaintance”? • How does Clifford’s insistence on having evidence highlight the moral significance of distinguishing belief and knowledge? • What are the three necessary conditions for knowledge? Give an example of a Gettier- case exception—that is, a case of meeting these conditions that is still not knowledge. • How are skepticism, empiricism, and rationalism different? • What is the difference between global and local skepticism? • What is Descartes’ method of doubt, and why does he adopt it? • For Descartes, why can’t we trust knowledge based on sense experience? • For Descartes, how are doubts raised by dreaming more profound than doubts about sensations? • How are the thought experiments of the evil demon, the brain in the vat, or the matrix even more profound than doubts about sense experience or dreaming? • How are skepticism, solipsism, and fallibilism possible responses to Descartes’ doubts? Class Four: Huemer on Skepticism (Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • Forthcoming In: Episteme Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism
    Forthcoming in: Episteme Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism Cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-Defeat Thomas Grundmann, University of Cologne penultimate version Abstract. Global meta-philosophical skepticism (i.e. completely unrestricted skepticism about philosophy) based upon disagreement faces the problem of self-defeat since it undercuts its motivating conciliatory principle. However, the skeptic may easily escape this threat by adopting a more modest kind of skepticism, that will be called “extensive meta-philosophical skepticism”, i.e., the view that most of our philosophical beliefs are unjustified, except our beliefs in epistemically fundamental principles. As I will argue in this paper, this kind of skepticism is well-motivated, does not undercut the conciliatory principle, but still poses a radical challenge to philosophy as a cognitive discipline. Moreover, I will argue that non-global skepticism that is still extensive undermines itself as well. The deeper reason for this is that this more modest kind of skepticism can only be motivated by the assumption that disagreement with philosophical peers is abundant and that we can identify peers only by relying on track-record arguments. But then one can argue for extensive meta-philosophical skepticism only if one presupposes that those philosophical beliefs that form the basis of track-record evaluations are justified. Here, the threat of self-defeat looms again. I will proceed by first defending the premises of this new anti- skeptical argument against standard objections from the literature. Second, I will show in more detail where the epistemic inconsistency arises in the argument for extensive meta-philosophical skepticism. I conclude with an assessment of the scope and the limits of my argument.
    [Show full text]
  • Summary %E History of Skepticism
    Summary %e History of Skepticism. In Search of Consistency e book is devoted to the reconstruction of the history of the idea of philosophical skepticism from ancient to present time. It is also an attempt to present the recent state of research in the 'eld of both history of philosophical skepticism (recent interpretations) and epistemology of skepticism (recent discussions and opinions). e thesis of the book is that the basic problem for the skeptical position throughout history is the problem of inconsistency (self-refutation). Since antiquity skeptics were forced to answer to this charge, they invented many ways to avoid it. But the result was either not e0ective or too costly. Sextus Empiricus took his own words as the description of his feelings without any assertion. However, his skepticism is not a thesis at all and it cannot be accepted as true. Hume weakened the assertion for all beliefs and for his skeptical thesis. Such view in contemporary vocabulary is fallibilism rather than skepticism. In contemporary philosophy the skeptical thesis No one ever knows anything about anything or No one is ever justi(ed in believing anything is treated as a clear paradox. e main result of the book is the thesis that skeptical inconsistency is a pragmatic inconsistency. It is not a logical inconsistency, because there is no clear contradiction here. Pragmatic inconsistency is also a contradiction between two propositions, but only one of them is overtly stated; the second is tacitly presupposed in the act of assertion of the skeptical thesis. When skeptics assert No one ever knows anything about anything they presuppose that they have some reasonable ground for such assertion.
    [Show full text]
  • Reading Questions for Phil 251.200, Fall 2012 (Daniel)
    Reading Questions for Phil 251.200, Fall 2012 (Daniel) Class One: What is Philosophy? (Aug. 28) How is philosophy different from mythology? How is philosophy different from religion? How is philosophy different from science? What does it mean to say that the “love of wisdom” is concerned with the justification of opinions? Why is giving reasons for your beliefs important regarding the main areas of philosophy (e.g., metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and logic)? Class Two: The Activity of Philosophy and The Life of Reason [two readings] (Aug. 30) How is the appeal to reason different from an appeal to authority, emotion, and self- interest? What are the criteria for determining whether your reasons for doing or believing something are justified (i.e., “good” reasons)? According to Socrates, “the unexamined life is not worth living”: why?—especially since it is obvious that human beings are not essentially or inherently rational. How can reason be used to resolve conflicts in feelings and among different people? Why is appealing to reason preferable to relying on authority or allowing people to believe whatever they want about the world? Class Three: Knowledge and Skepticism (Sept. 4) What distinguishes propositional knowledge, “knowing how,” and “knowledge by acquaintance”? How does Clifford’s insistence on having evidence highlight the moral significance of distinguishing belief and knowledge? What are the three necessary conditions for knowledge? Give an example of a Gettier- case exception—that is, a case of
    [Show full text]
  • HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU Monografie Fundacji Na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej
    HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU monografie fundacji na rzecz nauki polskiej rada wydawnicza prof. Tomasz Kizwalter, prof. Janusz Sławiński, prof. Antoni Ziemba, prof. Marek Ziółkowski, prof. Szymon Wróbel fundacja na rzecz nauki polskiej Renata Ziemińska HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU W POSZUKIWANIU SPÓJNOŚCI toruń 2013 Wydanie książki subwencjonowane przez Fundację na rzecz Nauki Polskiej w ramach programu Monografie FNP Redaktor tomu Anna Mądry Korekty Ewelina Gajewska Projekt okładki i obwoluty Barbara Kaczmarek Printed in Poland © Copyright by Renata Ziemińska and Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika Toruń 2013 ISBN 978-83-231-2949-3 WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU MIKOŁAJA KOPERNIKA Redakcja: ul. Gagarina 5, 87-100 Toruń tel. +48 56 611 42 95, fax +48 56 611 47 05 e-mail: [email protected] Dystrybucja: ul. Reja 25, 87-100 Toruń tel./fax: +48 56 611 42 38, e-mail: [email protected] www.wydawnictwoumk.pl Wydanie pierwsze Druk i oprawa: Abedik Sp. z o.o. ul. Glinki 84, 85-861 Bydgoszcz Spis treści wstęp ......................................................................................................... 9 część i. pojęcie i rodzaje sceptycyzmu rozdział 1. genealogia terminu „sceptycyzm” ........................... 15 rozdział 2. ewolucja pojęcia sceptycyzmu .................................. 21 Starożytny sceptycyzm jako zawieszenie sądów pretendujących do prawdy .......................................................................................... 21 Średniowieczny sceptycyzm jako uznanie słabości ludzkich sądów wobec Bożej wszechmocy
    [Show full text]
  • A Non-Contextual Rule for Epistemic Contextualism.1
    SKÉPSIS, ISSN 1981-4194, ANO VIII, Nº 15, 2017, p. 52-61. A Non-contextual Rule for Epistemic Contextualism.1 Gustavo Almeida de Azevedo (Universidade Estadual de Campinas) E-mail: [email protected] Abstract: Our idea here is to offer a version of epistemic contextualism that can respond to skeptical doubts. More precisely, we believe we can combine the theories of DeRose (1992) and Feldman (1988, 2004) in order to invert the burden of proof for the skeptical side. That is, what we call rule of reasonableness requires that the skeptic has to provide reasons why we should take their doubt into account, what I am calling here 'relevant alternative'. Thus, we claim that two clauses need to be reached, in order to such doubt be taken into account, namely, (i) S has evidence to believe R; and (ii) given the contextual standards of justification to which S is submitted, it is required that the possibility of R occurs remains excluded. Key words: Contextualism; Evidence; Skeptical Doubt. 1 - Introduction The following lines over this paper intend to discuss the possibility of an epistemic contextualism based on a non-contextual rule. Such strategy is not a new one and it was developed, for example, by Blome-Tillman (2014). However, I disagree with his development. In order to state the foundations for this disagreement and consequently state my proposal, I should have to establish the framework problem I am considering here, namely, the general skeptic argument (SA), which any epistemologist must dare to. SA, since Descartes (1641) at least, can be represented by the below formulation: If one subject S knows P, then S knows that R is not the case (sKp → sK~r) because R implies not-P.
    [Show full text]
  • Sextus Was No Eudaimonist
    Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy 7-14-2008 Sextus was no Eudaimonist Joseph B. Bullock Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Bullock, Joseph B., "Sextus was no Eudaimonist." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2008. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/40 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SEXTUS WAS NO EUDAIMONIST by JOSEPH B. BULLOCK Under the Direction of Dr. Tim O’Keefe ABSTRACT Ancient Greek philosophical schools are said to share a common structure in their ethical theories which is characterized by a eudaimonistic teleology based in an understanding of human nature. At first glance, the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus as described in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism seems to fit into this model insofar as he describes the end of the skeptic as ataraxia, a common account of the expression of human happiness. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of Sextus’s philosophy for several reasons. “The end of skepticism” cannot be eudaimonistic or teleological in the way that other ancient ethical theories are typically understood; moreover, ataraxia is not an end derived from a theory about human nature. For these reasons, the skeptical way of life is radically different than the ethical theories proposed by other schools. I argue that this difference is a result of the character of the skeptical enterprise which involves the implicit rejection of norms in both the epistemological and the ethical spheres.
    [Show full text]
  • Bridging the Secular-Religious Divide with Assistance from the Buddha
    861 WILSON SWLR PROOF - PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/1/2016 6:40 PM BRIDGING THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DIVIDE WITH ASSISTANCE FROM THE BUDDHA James G. Wilson* I. INTRODUCTION The Seventh ClassCrit Conference contemplated emerging coalitions that could effectively combat unjust structural inequalities. To determine the appropriate size, nature, and durability of any humane electoral/cultural coalition, one must first estimate the severity of our species’ current problems. The next step is to build a conceptual framework that might create and maintain an adequate alliance. Tragically, most prior political ideologies have been primarily animated by our instinct to optimize power, not just over each other but also the rest of Nature. As a result, our legal and philosophical systems laid the intellectual foundation for humanity’s deepest structural inequality, one that is exponentially accelerating: mankind’s temporary dominance of the biosphere, a relationship that may not outlast this millennium. To employ the enduringly useful political terminology of the ancient Greeks, humans are the “few” and all other beings and landscapes constitute the “many.”1 The most troubling prophecy is that nine billion people will soon seek some form of satisfaction on this diminutive planet. Strain is evident everywhere: filthy sewage ruining the sacred waters of India, drought in California and Australia, melting and collapsing ice caps at both poles and Greenland, annihilation of rain forests, acidic oceans, dwindling fish populations, earthquakes caused by fracking, and so forth. We recklessly abuse the four elements: voraciously burning limited fossil fuels and producing innumerable chemicals that toxify the earth, air, sky, and water.
    [Show full text]
  • Epistemology.Pdf
    Epistemology An overview Contents 1 Main article 1 1.1 Epistemology ............................................. 1 1.1.1 Background and meaning ................................... 1 1.1.2 Knowledge .......................................... 1 1.1.3 Acquiring knowledge ..................................... 5 1.1.4 Skepticism .......................................... 7 1.1.5 See also ............................................ 7 1.1.6 References .......................................... 8 1.1.7 Works cited .......................................... 9 1.1.8 External links ......................................... 10 2 Knowledge 11 2.1 Knowledge ............................................... 11 2.1.1 Theories of knowledge .................................... 11 2.1.2 Communicating knowledge ................................. 12 2.1.3 Situated knowledge ...................................... 13 2.1.4 Partial knowledge ...................................... 13 2.1.5 Scientific knowledge ..................................... 13 2.1.6 Religious meaning of knowledge ............................... 14 2.1.7 See also ............................................ 15 2.1.8 References .......................................... 15 2.1.9 External links ......................................... 16 2.2 Belief ................................................. 16 2.2.1 Knowledge and epistemology ................................. 17 2.2.2 As a psychological phenomenon ............................... 17 2.2.3 Epistemological belief compared to religious belief
    [Show full text]
  • Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Second Edition
    Chapter Five Can Skepticism Be Refuted? A standard form of skepticism rests on the premise that the choice between our ordinary beliefs and skeptical hypotheses is evidentially underdetermined. To make a case against this premise, Jonathan Vogel invokes inference-to-the-best-explanation and considers what he calls the “isomorphic hypothesis,” which matches the cause and effect relationships of the real world hypothesis, according to which things are by and large what we take them to be. The isomorphic hypothesis’s explanatory power seems to be no less than that of the real world hypothesis. On what grounds, then, can we prefer the latter over the former? Vogel argues that the isomorphic skeptical hypothesis does not deepen our understanding of our perceptual experiences. The isomorphic hypothesis is more complex than the real world hypothesis because it replaces genuine shapes with pseudo-shapes and genuine locations with pseudo- locations. This increased complexity is not offset by a commensurate increase in explanatory scope and depth. Hence, Vogel suggests, we may prefer the real world hypothesis over the skeptical isomorphic hypothesis and thus reject the evidential underdetermination premise on which skepticism relies. In his response essay, Richard Fumerton explores the challenge of refuting skepti- cism within the traditional framework of inferential internalism, according to which knowing propositions about the external world requires (a) that we have evidence E making such propositions probable and (b) that we know E makes such propositions probable. For inferential internalists to avoid skepticism, they must meet two serious challenges. First, to avoid an infinite regress, they must show that we can have direct knowledge of what makes what probable.
    [Show full text]
  • 7. Inferential Abilities and Common Epistemic Goods Abrol Fairweather
    7. Inferential Abilities And Common Epistemic Goods Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor While the situationist challenge has been prominent in philosophical literature in ethics for over a decade, only recently has it been extended to virtue epistemology1. Alfano argues that virtue epistemology is shown to be empirically inadequate in light of a wide range of results in social psychology, essentially succumbing to the same argument as virtue ethics. We argue that this meeting of the twain between virtue epistemology and social psychology in no way signals the end of virtue epistemology, but is rather a boon to naturalized virtue epistemology. We use Gird Gigerenzer’s models for bounded rationality (2011) to present a persuasive line of defense for virtue epistemology, and consider prospects for a naturalized virtue epistemology that is supported by current research in psychology. Keywords: inference, reliabilism, bounded rationality, naturalized virtue epistemology, situationism 1. From Moral to Epistemic Situationism A wide range of psychological research on trait attribution and rationality has chipped away at what appeared to be a solid empirical footing for virtue ethics, thereby challenging the adequacy of virtue ethics on the very point that appeared to be a primary strength2. Philosophers such as Gilbert Harman (2000) have been led to question the very existence of character traits, and others like John Doris (2003) have denied their robustness and explanatory value. Character trait attributions enjoin predictive and explanatory commitments that simply fail too often to meet norms of epistemic success that require the manifestation of epistemic virtues. Doris(2002) argues that traditional forms of virtue ethics cannot be empirically adequate and normatively adequate at the same time.
    [Show full text]