Durossgasperi

DurossGasperi Social Justice Advocates South Africa email; [email protected] Advocates in South Africa, Oceania, Europe, North America UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders A/RES/53/144

31st December 2018

Attorney General Fraud Section, Criminal Division U.S. Department of Justice ATTN: Chief, FCPA Unit 950 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 20530

Email to [email protected]

Attention: Attorney General

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)

I. Communications of Complaint to Attorney General

1. DurossGasperi by way of submission of Communications of Complaint in respect to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the first instance, or any other Federal Legislation that the Attorney General, Department of Justice Sees fit to charge, investigate and indict.

2. Nature of the Offense All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period of years from 2003, when their relationship with the Jacob Zuma entered into participation of a criminal enterprise which participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, Crimes which fall within the Gambit of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA, as defined in FCPA federal legislation, and, in accordance with the provisions of the FCPA Statute, are individually responsible jointly or Severally for their own acts and for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy.

3. The common plan or conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes against FCPA, in that the defendants planned, prepared, initiated, and waged criminal campaigns, which were also in violation of international treaties, agreements.

4. In the development and course of the common plan or conspiracy it came to embrace the commission of Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the defendants determined upon and carried out, crimes against the very heart of banking systems, Swift systems, State Party and State owned enterprises amongst others, the plunder of public and private property, the indiscriminate destruction of businesses, and devastation not justified in any democracy. The common plan or conspiracy contemplated and came to embrace as typical and systematic means, and the defendants determined upon and committed.

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II. Major Parties of the violations against FCPA

1. Ajay Gupta, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 2. Atul Gupta, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 3. Rajesh Gupta, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 4. Jacob Zuma, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 5. HSBC Banking Corporation 6. Standard Chartered Bank 7. Duduzane Zuma, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 8. Oakbay Investments, South Africa 9. Bank of Baroda, South Africa 10. Bank of Baroda, India 11. Sanjiv Gupta, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 12. Sahara Computers 13. Transnet, South Africa 14. Nedbank, South Africa 15. ABSA Bank, South Africa 16. ABSA Bank Group, South Africa 17. Salim Essa, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 18. Westdawn Investments 19. Gloria Ngema Zuma, and or entities controlled by her directly or indirectly 20. Koornfontein Mine, South Africa 21. Tegeta Exporation and Resources, South Africa 22. Confident Concepts 23. Infinity Media 24. Islandsite Investments 180 25. Trillian Management Consulting 26. Optimum Coal Mine 27. Idwala Coal 28. Shiva Uranium 29. TNA Media 30. Centaur Mining 31. Trillian Financial Advisory 32. Eskom, South Africa 33. Charles King SA 34. Amir Zarooni, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 35. China South Rail, China 36. Regiments Asia 37. Eric Wood, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 38. PWC Price Waterhouse Coopers, South Africa 39. Gallenade Company 40. Success Stand Company 41. Shun Shi Company 42. Honorway Company 43. Bestway Company 44. PAI Company 45. AL Malaki Company 46. Vogen Company

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47. Daya Company 48. Flybright Company 49. National Westminster Bank 50. Wells Fargo 51. Habib Bank 52. Bank of China 53. China Citibank 54. Homix Company 55. Mercantile Bank 56. Ashok Narayan, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 57. Morningstar International Trade 58. Gallenade Company 59. Billon Lucky Company 60. MNT Trading 61. Shiv Gupta, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 62. Schabir Shaikh, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 63. Shamim Shaikh, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 64. ANC 65. Litha Nyhonyha, and or entities controlled by her directly or indirectly 66. Thebe Investment Holdings 67. Batho Batho Trust 68. Elgasolve Company 69. Magandheran Pillay, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 70. Phetolo Ramosebudi 71. Garry Pita 72. TSDBF Company 73. Stanley Shane 74. Regiments Advisory Company 75. Mosilo Mothepu 76. Trillian Financial Advisory 77. Albatime Company 78. Kuben Moodley 79. Mohammed Bobat 80. Trillian Asset Management 81. Garry Naidoo, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 82. Accurate Investments, Dubai 83. Brookfield Consultants, USA 84. World Windows Company, India 85. RR Energy Company, India 86. Bell Pottinger 87. Tim Bell, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 88. Ashish Gupta, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 89. Amol Gupta, and or entities controlled by him directly or indirectly 90. Bongi Ngema-Zuma, and or entities controlled by her directly or indirectly 91. Duduzile Zuma, and or entities controlled by her directly or indirectly 92. JlC Mining Services, South Africa 93. Verde Farm 94. Kamal Singhala Gupta, and or entities controlled by her directly or indirectly

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III. Minor Parties of the Violations against FCPA

1. Nksosazana Dlamini-Zuma 19. Brian Molefe 2. Nazeem Howa 20. Lynn Brown 3. Mcebisi Jonas 21. Mosebenzi Zwane 4. Thabo Mbeki 22. Malusi Gigaba 5. Kgalema Motlanthe 23. Iqbal Sharma 6. Tokyo Sexwale 24. SizweNtsalubaGobodo 7. Lazarus Zim 25. Nhlsnhla Nene 8. Ronnie Ntuli 26. Des Van Rooyen 9. Anoj Singh 27. SAP South Africa 10. KPMG South Africa 11. Mckinsey, South Africa 12. Xola Skosana 13. Vytije Mentor 14. Ace Maguschule 15. Keppy Maphatsoe 16. Thompson-SCF (Pty) Ltd, Mauritius 17. Thint (Pty) Ltd, Mauritius.

IV. Overview of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)

1. Nature of the Offense All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period of years from 2003, when their relationship with the Jacob Zuma entered into participation of a criminal enterprise which participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, Crimes which fall within the Gambit of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA, as defined in FCPA federal legislation, and, in accordance with the provisions of the FCPA Statute, are individually responsible jointly or Severally for their own acts and for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy.

2. In our encapsulated Submission we will prove beyond a reasonable doubt, a prima facia case, which will be based on High Court Records, Public Records that on the basis of the Merits, that the Attorney General of the United States should conduct an investigation in which upon review of all presented before him, proceed with an indictment of all those names, in the interests of justice as no one is above the law. When domestic laws fail, then International laws or the threads of international law should apply.

3. Corporate bribery is bad business. In our free market system, it is basic that the sale of products should take place on the basis of price, quality, and service.

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4. Corporate bribery is fundamentally destructive of this basic tenet. Corporate bribery of foreign officials takes place primarily to assist corporations in gaining business. Thus, foreign corporate bribery affects the very stability of overseas business.

5. Corruption is a global problem. In the three decades since Congress enacted the FCPA, the extent of corporate bribery has become clearer and its ramifications in a transnational economy starker.

6. Corruption impedes economic growth by diverting public resources from important priorities such as health, education, and infrastructure. It undermines democratic values and public accountability and weakens the rule of law.

7. It threatens stability and security by facilitating criminal activity within and across borders, such as the illegal trafficking of people, weapons, and drugs.

8. International corruption also undercuts good governance and impedes U.S. efforts to promote freedom and democracy, end poverty, and combat crime and terrorism across the globe.

9. Corruption is also bad for business. Corruption is anti-competitive, leading to distorted prices and disadvantaging honest businesses that do not pay bribes. It increases the cost of doing business globally and inflates the cost of government contracts in developing countries.

10. Bribery thus raises the risks of doing business, putting a company’s bottom line and reputation in jeopardy. Companies that pay bribes to win business ultimately undermine their own long-term interests and the best interests of their investors.

11. In 1998, the FCPA was amended to conform to the requirements of the Anti- Bribery Convention. These amendments expanded the FCPA’s scope to: (1) include payments made to secure “any improper advantage”; (2) reach certain foreign persons who commit an act in furtherance of a foreign bribe while in the United States; (3) cover public international organizations in the definition of “foreign official”; (4) add an alternative basis for jurisdiction based on nationality; and (5) apply criminal penalties to foreign nationals employed by or acting as agents of U.S. companies.20 The Anti-Bribery Convention came into force on February 15, 1999, with the United States as a founding party.

V. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq.

1. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. ("FCPA"), was enacted for the purpose of making it unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities to make payments to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business. Specifically, the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit the willful use of the mails or any means of instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of any offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of money or anything of value to any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to influence the foreign official in his or her official capacity,

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2. Induce the foreign official to do or omit to do an act in violation of his or her lawful duty, or to secure any improper advantage in order to assist in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.

3. The FCPA addresses the problem of international corruption in two ways: (1) the anti-bribery provisions, prohibit individuals and businesses from bribing foreign government officials in order to obtain or retain business and (2) the accounting provisions, impose certain record keeping and internal control requirements on issuers, and prohibit individuals and companies from knowingly falsifying an issuer’s books and records or circumventing or failing to implement an issuer’s system of internal controls.

4. Violations of the FCPA can lead to civil and criminal penalties, sanctions, and remedies, including fines, disgorgement, and/or imprisonment

VI. Territorial Jurisdiction—15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3

1. Territorial Jurisdiction—15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 The FCPA also applies to certain foreign nationals or entities that are not issuers or domestic concerns.Since 1998, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions have applied to foreign persons and foreign non-issuer entities that, either directly or through an agent, engage in any act in furtherance of a corrupt payment (or an offer, promise, or authorization to pay) while in the territory of the United States. Also, officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on behalf of such persons or entities may be subject to the FCPA’s anti-bribery prohibitions

2. The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions can apply to conduct both inside and outside the United States. Issuers and domestic concerns—as well as their officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders—may be prosecuted for using the U.S. mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of a corrupt payment to a foreign official. The Act defines “interstate commerce” as “trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State or between any State and any place or ship outside thereof ….” The term also includes the intrastate use of any interstate means of communication, or any other interstate instrumentality. Thus, placing a telephone call or sending an e-mail, text message, or fax from, to, or through the United States involves interstate commerce—as does sending a wire transfer from or to a U.S. bank or otherwise using the U.S. banking system, or traveling across state borders or internationally to or from the United States. Those who are not issuers or domestic concerns may be prosecuted under the FCPA if they directly, or through an agent, engage in any act in furtherance of a corrupt payment while in the territory of the United States.

3. Anti-bribery Provisions, whether they utilize the U.S. mails or a means or instrumentality of interstate commerce. Thus, for example, a foreign national who attends a meeting in the United States that furthers a foreign bribery scheme may be subject to prosecution, as may any co-conspirators, even if they did not themselves attend the meeting. A foreign national or company may also be liable under the FCPA if it aids and abets, conspires with, or acts as an agent of an issuer or domestic concern, regardless of whether the foreign national or company itself takes any action in the United States. In addition, under the “alternative jurisdiction” provision of the FCPA enacted in 1998, U.S. companies or persons may be subject to the anti- bribery provisions even if they act outside the United States.

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4. The 1998 amendments to the FCPA expanded the jurisdictional coverage of the Act by establishing an alternative basis for jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction based on the nationality principle.62 In particular, the 1998 amendments removed the requirement that there be a use of interstate commerce (e.g., wire, email, telephone call) for acts in furtherance of a corrupt payments.

VII. US v Kay (U.S Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit)

1. In 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the business purpose test in United States v. Kay and held that bribes paid to obtain favorable tax treatment— which reduced a company’s customs duties and sales taxes on imports—could constitute payments made to “obtain or retain” business within the meaning of the FCPA. The court explained that in enacting the FCPA, “Congress meant to prohibit a range of payments wider than only those that directly influence the acquisition or retention of government contracts or similar commercial or industrial arrangements.” The Kay court found that “[t]he congressional target was bribery paid to engender assistance in improving the business opportunities of the payor or his beneficiary, irrespective of whether that assistance be direct or indirect, and irrespective of whether it be related to administering the law, awarding, extending, or renewing a contract, or executing or preserving an agreement.” Accordingly, Kay

2. In short, while the FCPA does not cover every type of bribe paid around the world for every purpose, it does apply broadly to bribes paid to help obtain or retain business, which can include payments made to secure a wide variety of unfair business advantages

3. To violate the FCPA, an offer, promise, or authorization of a payment, or a payment, to a government official must be made “corruptly.” As Congress noted when adopting the FCPA, the word “corruptly” means an intent or desire to wrongfully influence the recipient:

4. The word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position; for example, wrongfully to direct business to the payor or his client, to obtain preferential legislation or regulations, or to induce a foreign official to fail to perform an official function.

5. Where corrupt intent is present, the FCPA prohibits paying, offering, or promising to pay money or anything of value (or authorizing the payment or offer). By focusing on intent, the FCPA does not require that a corrupt act succeed in its purpose. Nor must the foreign official actually solicit, accept, or receive the corrupt payment for the bribe payor to be liable. For example, in one case, a specialty chemical company promised Iraqi government officials approximately $850,000 in bribes for an upcoming contract. Although the company did not, in the end, make the payment (the scheme was thwarted by the U.S. government’s investigation), the company still violated the FCPA and was held accountable.

6. Also, as long as the offer, promise, authorization, or payment is made corruptly, the actor need not know the identity of the recipient; the attempt is sufficient. Thus, an executive who authorizes others to pay “whoever you need to” in a foreign government to obtain a contract has violated the FCPA—even if no bribe is ultimately offered or paid

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7. In order for an individual defendant to be criminally liable under the FCPA, he or she must act “willfully.” Proof of willfulness is not required to establish corporate criminal or civil liability, though proof of corrupt intent is. The term “willfully” is not defined in the FCPA, but it has generally been construed by courts to connote an act committed voluntarily and purposefully, and with a bad purpose, i.e., with “knowledge that [a defendant] was doing a ‘bad’ act under the general rules of law.” As the Supreme Court explained in Bryan v. United States, “[a]s a general matter, when used in the criminal context, a ‘willful’ act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’ In other words, in order to establish a ‘willful’ violation of a statute, ‘the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.’” Notably, as both the Second Circuit and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have found, the FCPA does not require the government to prove that a defendant was specifically aware of the FCPA or knew that his conduct violated the FCPA. To be guilty, a defendant must act with a bad purpose, i.e., know generally that his conduct is unlawful

8. In enacting the FCPA, Congress recognized that bribes can come in many shapes and sizes—a broad range of unfair benefits —and so the statute prohibits the corrupt “offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to” a foreign official. An improper benefit can take many forms. While cases often involve payments of cash (sometimes in the guise of “consulting fees” or “commissions” given through intermediaries), others have involved travel expenses and expensive gifts. Like the domestic bribery statute, the FCPA does not contain a minimum threshold amount for corrupt gifts or payments.

9. Indeed, what might be considered a modest payment in the United States could be a larger and much more significant amount in a foreign country. Regardless of size, for a gift or other payment to violate the statute, the payor must have corrupt intent—that is, the intent to improperly influence the government official. The corrupt intent requirement protects companies that engage in the ordinary and legitimate promotion of their businesses while targeting conduct that seeks to improperly induce officials into misusing their positions. Thus, it is difficult to envision any scenario in which the provision of cups of coffee, taxi fare, or company promotional items of nominal value would ever evidence corrupt intent.

10. The most obvious form of corrupt payment is large amounts of cash. In some instances, companies have maintained cash funds specifically earmarked for use as bribes. One U.S. issuer headquartered in Germany disbursed corrupt payments from a corporate “cash desk” and used offshore bank accounts to bribe government officials to win contracts. In another instance, a four-company joint venture used its agent to pay $5 million in bribes to a Nigerian political party. The payments were made to the agent in suitcases of cash (typically in $1 million installments), and, in one instance, the trunk of a car when the cash did not fit into a suitcase.

VIII. Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of a Foreign Government Foreign Officials.

1. Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of a Foreign Government Foreign officials under the FCPA include officers or employees of a department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government.

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2. When a foreign government is organized in a fashion similar to the U.S. system, what constitutes a government department or agency is typically clear (e.g., a ministry of energy, national security agency, or transportation authority).

3. However, governments can be organized in very different ways. Many operate through state- owned and state-controlled entities, particularly in such areas as aerospace and defense manufacturing, banking and finance, healthcare and life sciences, energy and extractive industries, telecommunications, and transportation. By including officers or employees of agencies and instrumentalities within the definition of “foreign official,” the FCPA accounts for this variability. The term “instrumentality” is broad and can include state-owned or state- controlled entities.

4. Whether a particular entity constitutes an “instrumentality” under the FCPA requires a fact- specific analysis of an entity’s ownership, control, status, and function. A number of courts have approved final jury instructions providing a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered: •the foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity; •the foreign state’s degree of control over the entity (including whether key officers and directors of the entity are, or are appointed by, government officials); •the foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its employees; •the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; •the purpose of the entity’s activities; •the entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s law; •the exclusive or controlling power vested in the entity to administer its designated functions; • the level of financial support by the foreign state (including subsidies, special tax treatment, government- mandated fees, and loans); •the entity’s provision of services to the jurisdiction’s residents; •whether the governmental end or purpose sought to be achieved is expressed in the policies of the foreign government; and • the general perception that the entity is performing official or governmental functions.

5. However, there are circumstances in which an entity would qualify as an instrumentality absent 50% or greater foreign government ownership, which is reflected in the limited number of DOJ or SEC enforcement actions brought in such situation

6. For example, in addition to being convicted of funneling millions of dollars in bribes to two sitting presidents in two different countries, a French issuer’s three subsidiaries were convicted of paying bribes to employees of a Malaysian telecommunications company that was 43% owned by Malaysia’s Ministry of Finance. There, notwithstanding its minority ownership stake in the company, the Ministry held the status of a “special shareholder,” had veto power over all major expenditures, and controlled important operational decisions.In addition, most senior company officers were political appointees, including the Chairman and Director, the Chairman of the Board of the Tender Committee, and the Executive Director. Thus, despite the Malaysian government having a minority shareholder position, the company was an instrumentality of the Malaysian government as the government nevertheless had substantial control over the company.

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IX. Public International Organizations

1. Public International Organizations In 1998, the FCPA was amended to expand the definition of “foreign official” to include employees and representatives of public international organizations. A “public international organization” is any organization designated as such by Executive Order under the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288, or any other organization that the President so designates. Currently, public international organizations include entities such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Trade Organization, the OECD, the Organization of American States, and numerous others.

X. How are Payments to Third Parties Treated.

1. The FCPA expressly prohibits corrupt payments made through third parties or intermediaries. Specifically, it covers payments made to “any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly,” to a foreign official.

2. Many companies doing business in a foreign country retain a local individual or company to help them conduct business. Although these foreign agents may provide entirely legitimate advice regarding local customs and procedures and may help facilitate business transactions, companies should be aware of the risks involved in engaging third-party agents or intermediaries. The fact that a bribe is paid by a third party does not eliminate the potential for criminal or civil FCPA liability. Because Congress anticipated the use of third-party agents in bribery schemes—for example, to avoid actual knowledge of a bribe—it defined the term “knowing” in a way that prevents individuals and businesses from avoiding liability by putting “any person” between themselves and the foreign officials. Under the FCPA, a person’s state of mind is “knowing” with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result if the person: is aware that [he] is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially certain to occur; or •has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur. Thus, a person has the requisite knowledge when he is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist. As Congress made clear, it meant to impose liability not only on those with actual knowledge of wrongdoing, but also on those who purposefully avoid actual knowledge:

3. The so-called “head-in-the-sand” problem—variously described in the pertinent authorities as “conscious disregard,” “willful blindness” or “deliberate ignorance”—should be covered so that management officials could not take refuge from the Act’s prohibitions by their unwarranted obliviousness to any action (or inaction), language or other “signaling device” that should reasonably alert them of the “high probability” of an FCPA violation.

4. Common red flags associated with third parties include: •excessive commissions to third-party agents or consultants; •unreasonably large discounts to third-party distributors; •third-party “consulting agreements” that include only vaguely described services; •the third-party consultant is in a different line of business than that for which it has been engaged; •the third party is related to or closely associated with the foreign official;

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the third party became part of the transaction at the express request or insistence of the foreign official;

5. The third party is merely a shell company incorporated in an offshore jurisdiction; and the third-party requests payment to offshore bank accounts.

XI. United States v. Kozeny, et al.

1. In December 2011, the U S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a conscious avoidance instruction given during the 2009 trial of a businessman who was convicted of conspiring to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions by agreeing to make payments to Azeri officials in a scheme to encourage the privatization of the Azerbaijan Republic’s state oil company The court of appeals found that the instruction did not lack a factual predicate, citing evidence and testimony at trial demonstrating that the defendant knew corruption was pervasive in Azerbaijan; that he was aware of his business partner’s reputation for misconduct; that he had created two U S companies in order to shield himself and other investors from potential liability for payments made in violation of the FCPA; and that the defendant expressed concerns during a conference call about whether his business partner and company were bribing officials The court of appeals also rejected the defendant’s contention that the conscious avoidance charge had improperly permitted the jury to convict him based on negligence, explaining that ample evidence in the record showed that the defendant had “serious concerns” about the legality of his partner’s business practices “and worked to avoid learning exactly what [he] was doing,” and noting that the district court had specifically instructed the jury not to convict based on negligence

XII. Parent-Subsidiary Liability

1. There are two ways in which a parent company may be liable for bribes paid by its subsidiary. First, a parent may have participated sufficiently in the activity to be directly liable for the conduct—as, for example, when it directed its subsidiary’s misconduct or otherwise directly participated in the bribe scheme. Second, a parent may be liable for its subsidiary’s conduct under traditional agency principles.

2. The fundamental characteristic of agency is control. Accordingly, DOJ and SEC evaluate the parent’s control—including the parent’s knowledge and direction of the subsidiary’s actions, both generally and in the context of the specific transaction— when evaluating whether a subsidiary is an agent of the parent. Although the formal relationship between the parent and subsidiary is important in this analysis, so are the practical realities of how the parent and subsidiary actually interact.

3. If an agency relationship exists, a subsidiary’s actions and knowledge are imputed to its parent.179 Moreover, under traditional principles of respondent superior, a company is liable for the acts of its agents, including its employees, undertaken within the scope of their employment and intended, at least in part, to benefit the company.Thus, if an agency relationship exists between a parent and a subsidiary, the parent is liable for bribery committed by the subsidiary’s employees.

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XIII. Successor Liability Companies

1. As a general legal matter, when a company merges with or acquires another company, the successor company assumes the predecessor company’s liabilities. Successor liability is an integral component of corporate law and, among other things, prevents companies from avoiding liability by reorganizing.

XIV. Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy under federal law

1. Additional Principles of Criminal Liability for Anti-Bribery Violations: Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy Under federal law, individuals or companies that aid or abet a crime, including an FCPA violation, are as guilty as if they had directly committed the offense themselves.

2. The aiding and abetting statute provides that whoever “commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission,” or “willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States,” is punishable as a principal.

3. A foreign company or individual may be held liable for aiding and abetting an FCPA violation or for conspiring to violate the FCPA, even if the foreign company or individual did not take any act in furtherance of the corrupt payment while in the territory of the United States. In conspiracy cases, the United States generally has jurisdiction over all the conspirators where at least one conspirator is an issuer, domestic concern, or commits a reasonably foreseeable overt act within the United States.

XV. Statute of Limitations

1. Statute of Limitations in Criminal Cases the FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting provisions do not specify a statute of limitations for criminal actions. Accordingly, the general five-year limitations period set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 applies to substantive criminal violations of the Act. In cases involving FCPA conspiracies, the government may be able to reach conduct occurring before the five-year limitations period applicable to conspiracies under 18 U.S.C. § 371. For conspiracy offenses, the government generally need prove only that one act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred during the limitations period, thus enabling the government to prosecute bribes paid or accounting violations occurring more than five years prior to the filing of formal charges.

2. The government may seek a court order suspending the statute of limitations posed in a criminal case for up to three years in order to obtain evidence from foreign countries. Generally, the suspension period begins when the official request is made by the U.S. government to the foreign authority and ends on the date on which the foreign authority takes final action on the request.

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XVI. Covered by the Accounting Provisions

1. Books and Records Provision Bribes, both foreign and domestic, are often mischaracterized in companies’ books and records. Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)), commonly called the “books and records” provision, requires issuers to “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.” The “in reasonable detail” qualification was adopted by Congress “in light of the concern that such a standard, if unqualified, might connote a degree of exactitude and precision which is unrealistic.” The addition of this phrase was intended to make clear “that the issuer’s records should reflect transactions in conformity with accepted methods of recording economic events and effectively prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments of bribes.”

2. The term “reasonable detail” is defined in the statute as the level of detail that would “satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.” Thus, as Congress noted when it adopted this definition, “[t]he concept of reasonableness of necessity contemplates the weighing of a number of relevant factors, including the costs of compliance.” Although the standard is one of reasonable detail, it is never appropriate to mischaracterize transactions in a company’s books and records. Bribes are often concealed

3. In the past, “corporate bribery has been concealed by the falsification of corporate books and records” and the accounting provisions “remove this avenue of coverup ”under the guise of legitimate payments, such as commissions or consulting fees. Consistent with the FCPA’s approach to prohibiting payments of any value that are made with a corrupt purpose, there is no materiality threshold under the books and records provision.

4. Bribes Have Been Mischaracterized As: Commissions or Royalties, Consulting Fees, Sales and Marketing Expenses, Travel and entertainment Expenses, Rebates or Discounts, After Sales Service Fees, Miscellaneous Expenses, Free Goods, Intercompany Accounts, Supplier/Vendor Payments, “Customs Intervention” Payments.

XVII. The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952

1. Travel Act The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, prohibits travel in interstate or foreign commerce or using the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with the intent to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity or to promote, manage, establish, or carry on any unlawful activity. “Unlawful activity” includes violations of not only the FCPA, but also state commercial bribery laws. Thus, bribery between private commercial enterprises may, in some circumstances, be covered by the Travel Act. Said differently, if a company pays kickbacks to an employee of a private company who is not a foreign official, such privateto-private bribery could possibly be charged under the Travel Act.

2. Money Laundering Many FCPA cases also involve violations of anti money laundering statutes.For example, two Florida executives of a Miami-based telecommunications company were convicted of FCPA and money laundering conduct where they conducted financial transactions involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activities—violations of the FCPA, the criminal bribery laws of Haiti, and wire fraud— in order to conceal and disguise

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these proceeds. Notably, although foreign officials cannot be prosecuted for FCPA violations, three former Haitian officials involved in the same scheme were convicted of money laundering.

3. Mail and Wire Fraud The mail and wire fraud statutes may also apply. In 2006, for example, a wholly owned foreign subsidiary of a U.S. issuer pleaded guilty to both FCPA and wire fraud counts where the scheme included overbilling the subsidiary’s customers—both government and private—and using part of the overcharged money to pay kickbacks to the customers’ employees. The wire fraud charges alleged that the subsidiary had funds wired from its parent’s Oregon bank account to off-the-books bank accounts in South Korea that were controlled by the subsidiary. The funds, amounting to almost $2 million, were then paid to managers of state-owned and private steel production companies in China and South Korea as illegal commission payments and kickbacks that were disguised as refunds, commissions.

4. Certification and Reporting Violations Certain other licensing, certification, and reporting requirements imposed by the U.S. government can also be implicated in the foreign bribery context.

XVIII. FCPA enactment of certain amendments 1998

Since 1977, the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA have applied to all U.S. persons and certain foreign issuers of securities. With the enactment of certain amendments in 1998, the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA now also apply to foreign firms and persons who cause, directly or through agents, an act in furtherance of such a corrupt payment to take place within the territory of the United States.

The FCPA also requires companies whose securities are listed in the United States to meet its accounting provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m. These accounting provisions, which were designed to operate in tandem with the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, require corporations covered by the provisions to (a) make and keep books and records that accurately and fairly reflect the transactions of the corporation and (b) devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls.

XIX. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure

1. DurossGasperi hereby submits that our submission based on its merits complies with the FCAP compliance procedure:

a. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OPINION PROCEDURE 28 C.F.R. part 80 (current as of July 1, 1999) Sec. 80.1 Purpose. b. These procedures enable issuers and domestic concerns to obtain an opinion of the Attorney General as to whether certain specified, prospective--not hypothetical--conduct conforms with the Department's present enforcement policy regarding the antibribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 and 78dd-2. An opinion issued pursuant to these procedures is a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act opinion (hereinafter FCPA Opinion).

Page 15 c. Sec. 80.2 Submission requirements. A request for an FCPA Opinion must be submitted in writing. An original and five copies of the request should be addressed to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, Attention: FCPA Opinion Group. The mailing address is 10th & Constitution Avenue, NW, Bond Building, Washington, DC 20530. d. Sec. 80.3 Transaction. The entire transaction which is the subject of the request must be an actual--not a hypothetical--transaction but need not involve only prospective conduct. However, a request will not be considered unless that portion of the transaction for which an opinion is sought involves only prospective conduct. An executed contract is not a prerequisite and, in most--if not all--instances, an opinion request should be made prior to the requestor's commitment to proceed with a transaction. e. Sec. 80.4 Issuer or domestic concern. The request must be submitted by an issuer or domestic concern within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 and 78dd-2, respectively, that is also a party to the transaction which is the subject of the request. f. Sec. 80.5 Affected parties. An FCPA Opinion shall have no application to any party which does not join in the request for the opinion. g. Sec. 80.6 General requirements. Each request shall be specific and must be accompanied by all relevant and material information bearing on the conduct for which an FCPA Opinion is requested and on the circumstances of the prospective conduct, including background information, complete copies of all operative documents, and detailed statements of all collateral or oral understandings, if any. The requesting issuer or domestic concern is under an affirmative obligation to make full and true disclosure with respect to the conduct for which an opinion is requested. Each request on behalf of a requesting issuer or corporate domestic concern must be signed by an appropriate senior officer with operational responsibility for the conduct that is the subject of the request and who has been designated by the requestor's chief executive officer to sign the opinion request. In appropriate cases, the Department of Justice may require the chief executive officer of each requesting issuer or corporate domestic concern to sign the request. All requests of other domestic concerns must also be signed. The person signing the request must certify that it contains a true, correct and complete disclosure with respect to the proposed conduct and the circumstances of the conduct. h. Sec. 80.7 Additional information. If an issuer's or domestic concern's submission does not contain all of the information required by Sec. 80.6, the Department of Justice may request whatever additional information or documents it deems necessary to review the matter. The Department must do so within 30 days of receipt of the opinion request, or, in the case of an incomplete response to a previous request for additional information, within 30 days of receipt of such response. Each issuer or domestic concern requesting an FCPA Opinion must promptly provide the information requested. A request will not be deemed complete until the Department of Justice receives such additional information. Such additional information, if furnished orally, shall be promptly confirmed in writing, signed by

Page 16 the same person or officer who signed the initial request and certified by this person or officer to be a true, correct and complete disclosure of the requested information. In connection with any request for an FCPA Opinion, the Department of Justice may conduct whatever independent investigation it believes appropriate. i. Sec. 80.8 Attorney General opinion. The Attorney General or his designee shall, within 30 days after receiving a request that complies with the foregoing procedure, respond to the request by issuing an opinion that states whether the prospective conduct, would, for purposes of the Department of Justice's present enforcement policy, violate 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 and 78dd-2. The Department of Justice may also take such other positions or action as it considers appropriate. Should the Department request additional information, the Department's response shall be made within 30 days Sec. 80.9 No oral opinion. No oral clearance, release or other statement purporting to limit the enforcement discretion of the Department of Justice may be given. The requesting issuer or domestic concern may rely only upon a written FCPA Opinion letter signed by the Attorney General or his designee. j. Sec. 80.10 Rebuttable presumption. In any action brought under the applicable provisions of 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 and 78dd-2, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that a requestor's conduct, which is specified in a request, and for which the Attorney General has issued an opinion that such conduct is in conformity with the Department's present enforcement policy, is in compliance with those provisions of the FCPA. Such a presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. In considering the presumption, a court, in accordance with the statute, shall weigh all relevant factors, including but not limited to whether information submitted to the Attorney General was accurate and complete and whether the activity was within the scope of the conduct specified in any request received by the Attorney General. k. Sec. 80.11 Effect of FCPA Opinion. Except as specified in Sec. 80.10, an FCPA Opinion will not bind or obligate any agency other than the Department of Justice. It will not affect the requesting issuer's or domestic concern's obligations to any other agency, or under any statutory or regulatory provision other than those specifically cited in the particular FCPA Opinion. l. Sec. 80.12 Accounting requirements. Neither the submission of a request for an FCPA Opinion, its pendency, nor the issuance of an FCPA Opinion, shall in any way alter the responsibility of an issuer to comply with the accounting requirements of 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2) and (3). m. Sec. 80.13 Scope of FCPA Opinion. An FCPA Opinion will state only the Attorney General's opinion as to whether the prospective conduct would violate the Department's present enforcement policy under 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 and 78dd-2. If the conduct for which an FCPA Opinion is requested is subject to approval by any other agency, such FCPA Opinion shall in no way be taken to indicate the Department of Justice's views on the legal or factual issues that may be raised before that agency, or in an appeal from the agency's decision.

Page 17. o. Sec. 80.14 Disclosure. (a) Any document or other material which is provided to, received by, or prepared in the Department of Justice or any other department or agency of the United States in connection with a request by an issuer or domestic concern under the foregoing procedure shall be exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552 and shall not, except with the consent of the issuer or domestic concern, be made publicly available, regardless of whether the Attorney General responds to such a request or the issuer or domestic concern withdraws such request before receiving a response. (b) Nothing contained in paragraph (a) of this section shall limit the Department of Justice's right to issue, at its discretion, a release describing the identity of the requesting issuer or domestic concern, the identity of the foreign country in which the proposed conduct is to take place, the general nature and circumstances of the proposed conduct, and the action taken by the Department of Justice in response to the FCPA Opinion request. Such release shall not disclose either the identity of any foreign sales agents or other types of identifying information. The Department of Justice shall index such releases and place them in a file available to the public upon request. (c) A requestor may request that the release not disclose proprietary p. Sec. 80.16 Additional requests. Additional requests for FCPA Opinions may be filed with the Attorney General under the foregoing procedure regarding other prospective conduct that is beyond the scope of conduct specified in previous requests.

XX. SWIFT’S International governance

1. We need to take the case of the Guptas collectively and or individually along with all other actors listed above in participation of a criminal network which spans across the globe and touches at the very heart of the financial system.

3. At the very heart of the complex banking system lays SWIFT Headquartered in Belgium, SWIFT’s international governance and oversight reinforces the neutral, global character of its cooperative structure. SWIFT shareholders elect a Board composed of 25 independent Directors which governs the Company and oversees management. SWIFT’s oversight objectives centre on the security, operational reliability, business continuity, risk identification and resilience of the SWIFT infrastructure.

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4. Central banks have the explicit objective of fostering financial stability and promoting the soundness of payment and settlement systems. SWIFT is neither a payment nor a settlement system and is therefore not regulated as such by central banks or bank supervisors, it is subject to central bank oversight as a critical service provider. A large and growing number of systemically important payment systems have become dependent on SWIFT, which has thereby acquired a systemic character.

5. As a result, the central banks of the G-10 countries agreed that SWIFT should be subject to cooperative oversight by central banks. SWIFT has been subject to oversight since 1998.The arrangement was last reviewed in 2012 when the SWIFT Oversight Forum was set up. Information sharing on SWIFT oversight activities was thereby expanded to a larger group of central banks.

6. NBB as lead overseer, the NBB conducts the oversight of SWIFT together with the G-10 central banks: Bank of Canada, Deutsche Bundesbank, European Central Bank, Banque de France, Banca d’Italia, Bank of Japan, De Nederlandsche Bank, Sveriges Riksbank, Swiss National Bank, Bank of England and the Federal Reserve System (USA), represented by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

7. In the SWIFT Oversight Forum, these central banks are joined by other central banks from major economies: Reserve Bank of Australia, People’s Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Reserve Bank of India, Bank of Korea, Bank of Russia, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Monetary Authority of Singapore, South African Reserve Bank and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. The SWIFT Oversight Forum provides a forum for the G-10 central banks to share information on SWIFT oversight activities with a wider group of central banks.

8. All SWIFT customers were required to assess and attest their compliance status against each of the applicable mandatory security controls by the end of 2017. Their self-attestations are collected in a registry that will be used as of 2018 to improve transparency of a SWIFT customer’s compliance status vis‑à‑vis its counterparties. SWIFT customers will be encouraged to take this compliance information into account during their counterparty due diligence reviews. Greater transparency in the SWIFT user community on compliance with security controls is thus a key design feature

9. The SWIFT Oversight Forum included Potential issues that need to be monitored might include a limited number of submitted customer attestations and / or low levels of compliance with the controls.

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11. SWIFT’s customers are located in more than 200 countries and territories: there are 11 336 live customers of which 2 382 are shareholding members. SWIFT is owned and controlled by its members. It has an ongoing dialogue with its customers through national member groups, user groups and dedicated working groups. These discussions relate, for example, to SWIFT’s activities such as proposals for new or revised standards, providing industry comments on proposed corporate or business service changes, and comments on timeframes for new technology or service implementation systemic importance.

XXI. Banking Integrity within the Conspirators Criminal Conspiracy.

2. DurossGasperi will show within our encapsulated Submission that the Banking Integrity of Major banks have been breached, each of these Bankers, have played an integral part in the criminal conspiracy of all the defendants, with divers and other persons in facilitation of such criminal enterprise.

3. The integrity of South Africa’s banking sector has been tested and continues to be tested, we are present are filing with the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority over conduct of ABSA, Barclays PLC UK which ABSA has been dealing with bad actors, bad state actors, corrupt clients under a clandestine subterfuge.

4. Maria Ramos the head of the banking group ABSA

5. Testimony by the Banks in the week of September 2018, reveals an evisceration and a step away from the ANC’s identify as a party of the rule of law.

6. At the Zondo Commission of enquiry , evidence given under oath by former Rand Merchant Bank CEO Johan Burger that he had been asked or summonsed to a meeting by the official Enoch Godongwana, by text message begs the question: how seriously does the party take its history and role as a steward of society?, which was a member of the ANC Government messaging Burger to set up a meeting to inquire why the bank had been one of four which revoked bank accounts of the Gupta family and related entities.

7. At the Zondo Commission of Enquiry several banking executives under oath stated, the ANC’s decision to step in was a step-change in banking regulation and a highly risky one.

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8. The party summonsed banking executives to Luthuli House while former Mineral Resources minister Mosebenzi Zwane used an inter-ministerial committee purportedly created by Cabinet to pressurize the banks too.

9. “In my 32 years in banking, I’ve not had a third party questioning client/banker relationships,” Burger stated under oath. Burger was the only one of the four big bank CEOs who did not attend either the meeting with the ANC or another meeting with Zwane’s inter-ministerial committee to also probe why the banks had closed the accounts.

10. This means the banks were subjected to two levels of pressure by the ANC on behalf of a single family shown to be close to former president Jacob Zuma. At a Business Leadership SA meeting in 2016, then ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe met ABSA CEO Maria Ramos and asked her to a meeting to discuss the bank account closures. A day later, she attended the meeting at Luthuli House, where she warned Mantashe that “it will be a very short meeting” if anything related to client confidentiality was to be discussed.

11. Ramos the head of ABSA Bank Group is a former ANC official, she was the Treasury’s first Director General.

12. Given the close ties with ANC , ABSA has been involved in skirting the financial intelligence laws and to the establishment of the Financial Intelligence Centre.

13. These laws prevent international crime and money laundering and provide the kind of X-ray vision that ultimately ensured that the Gupta family’s various efforts to launder and corrupt were exposed.

14. “Non-compliance (with global banking regulations) can lead to the revocation of a (banking) licence and personal criminal liability… there was evidence of large unexplained transfers of funds between Oakbay and related parties at other banks,” Yasmin Masithela, ABSA’s head of strategy, told the Zondo Commission of Inquiry.

XXII. INTERNET

1. The Internet being the worldwide web for the Republic of South Africa is held under Af- IX.Which is IFX Region designated to South Africa, as such all internet exchange traffic within The primary purpose of an IXP is to allow networks to interconnect directly, via the exchange, rather than through one or more third-party networks.

2. The terms Internet and World Wide Web are often used without much distinction. However, the two are not the same. The Internet is a global system of interconnected computer networks In contrast, the World Wide Web is a global collection of documents and other resources linked by hyperlinks and URLs.

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3. A computer network facilitates interpersonal communications allowing users to communicate efficiently and easily via various means: email, instant messaging,online chat , telephone, video telephone calls, and video conferencing. A network allows sharing of network and computing resources. Users may access and use resources provided by devices on the network, such as printing a document on a shared network printer or use of a shared storage device. A network allows sharing of files, data, and other types of information giving authorized users the ability to access information stored on other computers on the network.

4. The transmission media (often referred to in the literature as the physical media) used to link devices to form a computer network include electrical cable, optical fiber and radio waves. Are defined at layers 1 and 2 — the physical layer and the data link layer.

5. A 2012 decision of a case (US v Kieffer) decided in the Tenth Circuit, which covers the districts of Colorado, Utah Kansas, Wyoming, New Mexico, as well as Eastern, Western and Northern Oklahoma became a critical declaration in the legal question probing the use of the Internet as a means of transmitting deceitful data which meets the defined criteria and establishes an interstate wire for the purpose of a fraud.

6. UAE-IX is a carrier- and data center-neutral internet exchange point (IXP), situated in Dubai (UAE). It interconnects global networks, network operators and content providers in the GCC region.UAE-IX is the biggest Internet Exchange in Middle East and North Africa region in term of number of participating networks and volume of traffic.

XXIII. AML Anti-money laundering

1. A number of vulnerabilities to money laundering across the sector that make up the money remittance and currency exchange sector were identified. The analysis of the case studies and other materials enabled the project team to compile numerous examples of indicators of potential money laundering activities related to transactions, customer profile and behaviour as well as specific indicators for bureaux de change and money remittance providers that may help the industry to identify and describe suspicious behaviours and protect themselves against money launderers and other criminals.

2. Clearly, laundering through money remittance and currency exchange providers poses a number of regulatory and enforcement challenges. At the same time, it was observed that there is low detection of money laundering in comparison to the size of the industry as a whole. The money laundering and terrorist financing threat in the sector not only results from direct penetration of criminals into operations of money remittance or currency exchange providers. The absence or lax implementation of AML/CFT standards and adequate related policies provide opportunities which are being exploited by money launderers and other Criminals. Money is the prime reason for engaging in almost any type of criminal activity. Money-laundering is the method by which criminals disguise the illegal origins of their wealth and protect their asset bases, so as to avoid the suspicion of law enforcement agencies and prevent leaving a trail of incriminating evidence.

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3. Because they deal with other people's money, financial institutions rely on a reputation for probity and integrity. A financial institution found to have assisted in laundering money will be shunned by legitimate enterprises. An international financial centre that is used for money-laundering can become an ideal financial haven. Developing countries that attract "dirty money" as a short-term engine of growth can find it difficult, as a consequence, to attract the kind of solid long-term foreign direct investment that is based on stable conditions and good governance, and that can help them sustain development and promote long-term growth. Money-laundering can erode a nation's economy by changing the demand for cash, making interest and exchange rates more volatile, and by causing high inflation in countries where criminals are doing business.

4. Most disturbing of all, money-laundering fuels corruption and organized crime. Corrupt public officials need to be able to launder bribes, kick-backs, public funds and, on occasion, even development loans from international financial institutions. Organized criminal groups need to be able to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking and commodity smuggling. Terrorist groups use money-laundering channels to get cash to buy arms. The social consequences of allowing these groups to launder money can be disastrous. Taking the proceeds of crimes from corrupt public officials, traffickers and organized crime groups is one of the best ways to stop criminals in their tracks.

5. Money is the prime reason for engaging in almost any type of criminal activity. Money-laundering is the method by which criminals disguise the illegal origins of their wealth and protect their asset bases, so as to avoid the suspicion of law enforcement agencies and prevent leaving a trail of incriminating evidence.

6. Given that all those involved in the Criminal Conspiracy, have escaped Domestic Justice, there needs to be an international response to the majority of these defendants names in order to curb money-laundering on the one hand, attacking the economic power of criminal organizations and individuals in order to weaken them by preventing their benefiting from, or making use of, illicit proceeds and, on the other hand, at forestalling the nefarious effects of the criminal economy and of terrorism on the legal economy.

7. Money-laundering is the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. For instance, a drug trafficker might buy a restaurant to disguise drug profits with the legitimate profits of the restaurant. In this way, the drug profits are "laundered" through the restaurant to make the income look as if it was earned

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8. lawfully. Money-laundering is crucial to organized crime operations because offenders would be discovered easily if they could not "merge" their illegal cash into, for instance, a legal business, bank, or real estate. (Soudijn, 2014; Malm and Bichler, 2013)

XXIV. International Organized Crime Convention

1. The crucial need to conceal organized crime activity was addressed by articles 6 and 7 of the Organized Crime Convention. Article 6 requires State parties to criminalize money- laundering, while article 7 refers to measures to combat money-laundering.

2. Article 6(1) of the Convention requires that each State party criminalize money-laundering. Criminalization not only allows national authorities to organize the detection, prosecution and repression of the offence, but also provides the legal basis for international cooperation among police, judicial and administrative authorities, including mutual legal assistance and extradition.

3. The Organized Crime Convention seeks to establish uniformity for the intolerance for money- laundering, which serves to conceal organized crime activity. In article 7, requirements for comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory schemes for banks and non-bank financial institutions are set forth, as is strong guidance for cooperation and the exchange of information at the national and international levels to investigate suspected money- laundering activity.

4. The money-laundering cycle can be broken down into three distinct stages; however, it is important to remember that money-laundering is a single process. The stages of money- laundering include: Placement (i.e. moving the funds from direct association with the crime) Layering (i.e. disguising the trail to foil pursuit) Integration (i.e. making the money available to the criminal, once again, with its occupational and geographic origins hidden from view)

5. The placement stage represents the initial entry of the proceeds of crime into the financial system. Generally, this stage serves two objectives: it relieves the criminal of holding large amounts of cash obtained illegally; and it inserts the money into the legitimate financial system. During this stage, money launderers are most vulnerable to being caught, because placing large amounts of cash into the legitimate financial system may raise suspicions.

6. The layering stage comes after the placement stage and it is sometimes referred to as "structuring." This is the most complex money-laundering stage and often entails moving the illicit funds internationally. The primary purpose of the placement stage is to separate the illicit money from its source. This is done through a sophisticated process involving layering financial transactions, whose final goal is to conceal the audit trail and break the link with the original criminal activity.

7. The final stage of the money-laundering process is termed "integration." During this stage the money is returned to the perpetrators from what seems to be a legitimate source.

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8. The criminal proceeds, that were initially placed as cash and layered through a number of financial transactions, are now fully integrated into the financial system and can be used for any legitimate purpose.

9. Anti-money laundering laws generally require the recipients of funds to exercise the reasonable care expected in a financial transaction. There have been many significant cases involving banks moving money internationally without exercising proper due diligence in knowing their customers or the source of the funds.

10. Corrupt Public Officials and money-laundering, in a review by FATF shows and validates the merits of our submission, that the Attorney General, DOJ needs to cherry pick which defendants are open to an investigation by the full weight of the Office in which has been appointed.

11.

Corrupt public officials and money-laundering A review of cases by the FATF found that corrupt public officials used money-laundering methods very similar to those used by organized crime. The corrupt public officials disguised their ownership through corporate vehicles and trust companies and used gatekeepers and nominees to launder proceeds through the domestic and foreign financial institutions. They used their power, like organized crime figures in some jurisdictions, to acquire state assets, control law enforcement, and capture banks. (FATF 2011; FATF, 2015) According to the FATF, common indicators of "red flags" of potential money-laundering activity include: Frequent high-dollar cash transactions. Use of large amounts of cash when checks would be expected and would be more convenient. Many wire transfers to or from known bank secrecy havens around the world. Immediate check or debit card withdrawals of large and frequent sums received by wire transfer. An account holder who pays undue attention to secrecy regarding personal or business identity. Lack of general knowledge about the customer's stated business.

12. These are the kinds of indicators that financial institutions and businesses dealing in cash transactions are expected to act on when unusual financial transactions occur. Besides the above

13. The relationship between money laundering and foreign corruption was highlighted in the U.S. National Money Laundering Strategy for 2000, which called for numerous actions to be taken in this area. Most significantly, the Department's of Treasury and State, and the federal bank regulators issued guidance to help U.S. financial institutions avoid transactions that may involve the proceeds of foreign official corruption. The importance of such guidance was reinforced by the publication last year of a report by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission.

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14. The report detailed how 19 banks that operate in Switzerland handled almost $1 billion in funds relating to corruption by the former ruler of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha. The report criticized several of the banks for weaknesses in their account-opening procedures or monitoring and reporting mechanisms. The report noted that "[t]he Abacha case is a clear example of the international dimensions of the issue of the deposit of corruption proceeds in the financial system."

XXV. Gupta’s, Zuma’s collectively or individually.

3. Given the vastness of what has been uncovered in the course of our findings, we believe that this is just the tip of the iceberg, given the resources and the access that the DOJ has, the DOJ, will be able to gain more clarity of the depth of what has occurred, follow the fingerprints of the illicit ill-gotten gains, much more than has been achieved within these encapsulated filings.

4. DurossGasperi in our Submission to the DOJ in from Paragraph 5 have simply condensed the amount of information to concise facts which have been obtained from public information, news dissemination, third parties etc. in order to provide the Attorney General, DOJ with a prima facia case to cherry pick and open and investigation.

5. Two sets of top leadership of ANC Government tried to persuade banks not to close down the Guptas Accounts, which is a matter of public record at the Zondo State Capture Commission of enquiry.

6. November 2017— Pressure from Lord Peter Hain, a UK politician who has campaigned vigorously for justice in South Africa, has sparked public disclosures by global graft enabler HSBC bank that it allowed Gupta funds to wash through its system.

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a. The bank has reluctantly disclosed that it was forced to shut Gupta bank accounts. But HSBC concedes, too, that money launderers are sophisticated and that it is still looking at whether it has other Gupta-linked accounts in its system.

b. Lord Hain got the ball rolling in the UK by asking UK and European authorities to investigate why Europe-headquartered banks were facilitating the moneylaundering of South African taxpayers’ funds “on an industrial scale”.

c. He provided a list of individuals suspected of moneylaundering, including presidential hopeful Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

d. The HSBC revelations are a signal that pressure on international corporates involved in corruption is starting to knock the Gupta clique at the heart of the state capture scandal that has enveloped South Africa.

e. HSBC has revealed that it closed accounts linked to South Africa’s Gupta family corruption investigation, admitting for the first time concerns about its potential ties to the snowballing scandal, the Guardian reports.

f. The bank said it had also flagged up its worries to the financial crime expert who has overseen its money-laundering controls since it was fined a record $1.9bn in 2012 for processing cash for Mexican drug lords and terrorists,” it says.

g. The Guardian reports that HSBC admitted on Friday that it was forced to close bank accounts held by “front companies” associated with the Guptas.

h. “The bank has previously declined to comment on its involvement, but revealed its concerns after details of transactions linked to the Guptas emerged.

i. “The bank said: HSBC has been reviewing its exposure to the Guptas for some time, and has closed a number of accounts for associated front companies wherever we have found them.

j. The Guardian understands that HSBC closed the accounts in 2014, the same year that Standard Chartered said it had shut down accounts linked to the Guptas. “It also notified Michael Cherkasky, who monitors the bank’s anti-money laundering controls as a condition of its 2012 settlement with the US Department of Justice and the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).”

k. The Gupta family used HSBC Holdings PLC bank accounts in Dubai to transfer millions of dollars through companies that have been linked to suspected kickbacks for the sale of Chinese locomotives, according to documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

l. “The documents show money moving among three United Arab Emirates-based firms in January and February 2013 through HSBC accounts while one of the firms was receiving payments from a Chinese rail company with a contract to sell locomotives to a South African state-owned enterprise. One of the documents, a spreadsheet of bank transactions, shows that the transfers among U.A.E.-based firms were made in dollars and cleared by HSBC in New York,” reports the leading media outlet.

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m. The documents have buttressed longstanding suspicions among many South Africans that the powerful business clan leveraged its connection to President Jacob Zuma and other government officials to amass great personal wealth, says The Wall Street Journal.

n. “They also underscore the risks for banks of processing potentially illicit money flows. HSBC said it is determined to keep criminals out of the financial system. It said it “has been reviewing its exposure to the Guptas for some time, and has closed a number of accounts for associated front companies wherever we have found them.”

7. Two brothers, a mountain of suitcases, five assistants and one wife flew from Lanseria Airport to Dubai amid state capture hostility Just hours after an emotional meeting with his executives on Thursday, where he told them he was resigning from his business empire, Ajay Gupta left for Dubai with his brother Atul on their luxurious private jet.

a. At 11pm that night, and with a mountain of luggage loaded on to the business jet ZS-OAK, the brothers, together with one of their wives and five of their assistants, left Lanseria Airport – likely for good.

b. An eyewitness at the airport said they had enough luggage for 20 people. Their flight was destined to land at Al Maktoum International Airport about 37km southwest of Dubai.

c. On Friday, Ajay and Atul Gupta resigned all their directorships. So did their business associate, President Jacob Zuma’s son Duduzane Zuma.

d. Nazeem Howa, spokesperson for the Gupta family’s business interests and the CEO of Oakbay Investments and its media businesses, told City Press yesterday that even the children had been at the receiving end of hostility.

e. This after the 2013 scandal a Gupta wedding sparked when guests were allowed to land a chartered jet at Air Force Base Waterkloof.

f. The final decision to leave was taken by family patriarch Ajay. He had mulled over the decision since Easter, when the “state capture” fight was at its toughest, and when the ANC decided to formally investigate the family’s activities.

g. But the last straw was the banks. They caused Ajay Gupta to call his senior executives to a meeting at their Midrand offices on Thursday morning. He told them his family was leaving for the sake of their staff.

8. This followed Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas’ bombshell announcement that the Guptas had offered him the job of finance minister while Nhlanhla Nene was still in office.

9. Because of his interest in politics, Howa said Ajay Gupta befriended three South African presidents: Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe and Zuma.

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a. Ajay Gupta considered himself closest to Mbeki, who had included him in his advisory council and appointed him to the International Marketing Council.

b. “The idea of The New Age [a newspaper that supports the government] had been born in discussions in Mbeki’s advisory council of which people including [Naspers chairman] Koos Bekker, [lawyer] Christine Qunta and several of today’s corporate and political leaders were also a part,” said Howa. These monthly informal sessions formed the basis of Ajay’s extensive network of friends.

c. Other friends of the family told City Press that the Guptas did not only court the politically influential such as Duduzane Zuma.

d. They were also involved with other businessmen, including ANC luminary Tokyo Sexwale, former Anglo American executive Lazarus Zim, and Comair director Ronnie Ntuli.

10. The Gupta’s involvement with the Bank of Baroda, Johannesburg Branch shows how the murky world in which these criminal conspirators tentacles reached , through the patronage of Zuma’s but also by extension of other state actors which have already been named in our encapsulated filings.

a. In the Indian times it was reported is that the Guptas peddled R4.5bn through the branch between 2007-2017 and that this amount “was so large that it dominated the transactions of the entire Bank of Baroda branch in Johannesburg”.

b. What’s further shocking are revelations that top staff in the Johannesburg Bank of Baroda branch regularly turned a blind eye to money laundering and that Nedbank underpinned their systems. In the meantime, the Bank of Baroda plans to shut down completely in South Africa by the end of March rather than own up to its contribution to state looting.

c. India’s state-owned Bank of Baroda — one of the country’s largest — played a crucial role in the financial machinations of South Africa’s politically influential Gupta family, allowing them to move hundreds of millions of dollars originating in alleged dirty deals into offshore accounts.

d. The bank’s Indian head office denies any wrongdoing in the affair. But interviews and documents obtained by reporters prove otherwise. The documents show that the bank’s South African branch issued unapproved loan guarantees, quashed internal compliance efforts, and prevented regulators from learning about suspicious transactions in a way that benefited the Guptas’ network.

e. The Gupta brothers — Atul, Ajay, and Rajesh, who immigrated to the country from India in the 1990s — are accused of using their money and influence to pursue a project of “state capture,” in collaboration with former President Jacob Zuma, to enrich themselves at the expense of taxpayers.

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f. The scandal led to Zuma’s resignation under pressure from his ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), on February 14.

g. Earlier on the same day, police raided the Guptas’ Johannesburg mansion; an arrest warrant for Ajay has been issued. The three brothers, as well as the former president’s son, Duduzane, are on the run and believed to be in Dubai.

h. Duduzane Zuma is accused of being a key player and beneficiary in the Guptas’ financial dealings. His father appointed many of the key officials that made the family’s schemes possible.

i. At the core of these was the South African branch of the Bank of Baroda. The documents obtained by reporters show the bank played host to hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of suspicious transactions.

j. One of the larger deals that appears in the transactions is the Guptas’ irregular acquisition and allegedly illicit sale to themselves of a major South African coal mine.

k. The revelations in the documents follow the bank’s announcement in mid-February that it was shuttering its South African operations.

l. Reporters have also learned that the head of Bank of Baroda’s South African branch, Sanjiv Gupta, may face disciplinary action over the bank’s business in the country. (He is not known to be related to the Gupta brothers.)

m. A senior Indian government official, who asked to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the matter, confirmed to reporters that the bank has asked the Central Vigilance Commission, the country’s top anti-corruption body, to initiate penalty proceedings against Sanjiv Gupta, which could result in his dismissal.

11. The three Gupta brothers have for years been major players in South African business. After immigrating from India, they ran a computer hardware company called Sahara Computers, named after their hometown of Saharanpur.

12. But their business really started to grow after they developed a relationship with Jacob Zuma, who was then Deputy President, in 2003. Both parties benefitted from an arrangement in which the Guptas allegedly provided Zuma’s family with financial support while he provided access to lucrative state tenders and appointed friendly officials. Since then, the Guptas have moved into the mining and media industries, eventually building an empire that made the family one of South Africa’s richest.

13. Their rise has not been without controversy. the Gupta empire earned millions on the back of Transnet, the country’s main transportation infrastructure firm. The Guptas’ alleged large- scale raiding of South Africa’s public purse has for years been a public preoccupation in the country, particularly after the details were made public in the 2016 release of a critical report, “State of Capture,” by former public protector Thuli Madonsela.

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14. Over the years, the Gupta family has run afoul of several South African banks, including Standard Bank, Nedbank, and ABSA, which all shut down their businesses’ accounts, citing reputational risks. In recent years, the Bank of Baroda’s South African branches, which the Guptas have used since 2005, took on a crucial role as the family’s preferred financial institution.

15. Years of transaction records obtained, as well as internal documents and audits, shed new light on how exactly the Gupta family made use of the bank for nearly a decade.

16. The documents show a wealth of suspicious transactions among several of the Gupta’s real firms, as well as a series of shell companies controlled by the family. A key Gupta associate who appears in many of the transactions is Salim Essa, a director and shareholder in some of the companies, who is seen as the financial architect of many of the deals. The transactions include a number of back-to-back loans and other transfers that have no apparent legal or business purpose but which appeared to be used to disguise the origin of the money. Especially large amounts moved in and out of Sahara, the firm at the apex of the Gupta empire.

17. Close to 4.5 billion rand (about US$ 532 million, based on an average exchange rate over 10 years) was transferred among just a handful of the companies between 2007 and 2017. As a whole, the amount of cash flowing through the Gupta accounts was so large that it dominated the transactions of the entire Bank of Baroda branch in Johannesburg.

18. In some cases, the significant benefit to the Guptas and their allies was clear. The Baroda account of Atul Gupta, for instance, shows that he received 57.3 million rand ($4.8 million) from Westdawn, one of the shell companies, in a single transaction on March 26, 2015 (while reporting taxable income of just 1 million rand ($80,000) two years prior).

19. Some of the money enriched former President Zuma’s son Duduzane, who held shares in a number of the companies that received large transfers.

20. Gupta-controlled Westdawn provided Gloria Ngema Zuma, one of the former president’s wives, with a 160,000 rand ($12,300) monthly salary for a position she held at one of their firms.

21. But many of the transactions were more complicated. Their purpose may have been to disguise the origin of money as it entered the Gupta empire — much of it obtained through friendly state companies and cozy contracts — and to blend it together to the point that it could no longer be tracked. At least some of the funds that flowed through the bank ended up in accounts controlled by the Guptas as far away as the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and even the United States.

22. Many of the transactions lacked adequate documentation about the purpose of the transfers, as is required in South African banking regulations. Other times, information was included, but didn’t make sense. For example, on June 14, 2016, the Gupta-controlled Koornfontein Mine wired 100 million rand ($6.5 million) to a Gupta-controlled mining company called Tegeta for “[environmental] rehabilitation,” meaning the repair of damage caused by mining activity.

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23. But Tegeta does not itself offer such services, which are typically handled by outside contractors, raising the question of the real purpose behind this transaction.

24. Transfers stating “intercompany loan” as a reason from evidence obtained:

25. Transactions flagged as “intercompany loans” involving companies owned or controlled by the Guptas. One particular technique shows up frequently in the transactions: Inter-company loans with no “apparent legal or commercial purpose.” For instance, on Jan. 18, 2017, transactional paperwork shows that Trillian Management Consulting, at the time majority- owned by Gupta associate Salim Essa, loaned 160 million rand ($11.8 million) from its Baroda account to another Gupta company, Centaur Mining. The actual loaned funds passed through another similarly titled company, Trillian Financial Advisory. However, while the transactions describe a loan, no loan documentation could be found and there was no explanation for why the funds for the loan were provided by another company.

26. Internal documents also show that some of the funds originated with two state-owned companies: Eskom, an electricity utility, and Transnet, a railroad company.

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27. Eskom alone paid 466 million rand ($36.3 million) to Trillian for “management and financial services” at a time that the company had few employees and could not have performed the work. Internal Baroda documents noted that bank employees filed alerts about several irregularities about the payments, including the fact that some were made on the same day as invoices were received (giving Eskom no time to assess the quality of the work) and the fact that, for some reason, some of the payments were made to accounts held by other companies.

28. Despite all of the suspicious transactions, Baroda kept doing business with the two dozen shell companies controlled by the Gupta inner circle. The bank’s employees dutifully filed suspicious activity reports (SARs), which banks are legally required to file with regulators whenever they see suspicious or potentially suspicious activity. On some days, they filed as many as half a dozen SARs related to the Guptas’ transactions. However, Bank of Baroda managers often stepped in and voided the reports, marking the transactions as “genuine.” As a result, most of the SARs never reached the South African Financial Intelligence Centre, the state body in charge of reviewing and acting on them.

29. In 2016, the Baroda transactions spiked dramatically even as other South African and foreign banks closed out their own Gupta accounts amid negative headlines about the family. Tens of millions of dollars moved through the Guptas’ Baroda accounts during that year.

30. Because the Bank of Baroda is a foreign bank, it needs a local sponsor bank to work in South Africa. That bank was Nedbank. All transactions the Indian bank made used Nedbank’s infrastructure. But this relationship made it possible for the two banks to shift responsibility for the Guptas’ transactions to each other.

31. For example, Nedbank could perform due diligence on the foreign bank branch itself — but did not have access to money moved between Baroda accounts. It was up to Baroda to check these clients and oversee those transactions. On the other hand, there was other information Baroda could not see, such as the origin of transactions made to Baroda accounts from external banks. Partly as a result, neither bank took responsibility for ensuring that the transactions were legitimate.

32. It remains unclear whether the Bank of Baroda ever reported any suspicious activities to South Africa’s Finance Intelligence Centre. But one thing is apparent: Nedbank kept Baroda on as a client despite evidence that suspicious activities were taking place. Like other South African banks, Nedbank closed down their own Gupta family-related accounts, but shutting down Baroda, a bank the Indian government owns, would have been politically costly.

33. This helped keep the Guptas in the money-moving business even as authorities circled in. The Bank of Baroda continued to allow the Guptas’ activities until January this year, when a South African court ordered it to share information about the accounts of more than 20 Gupta-linked companies. This was prompted by a Public Access to Information Request filed by the Helen Suzman Foundation, a local NGO.

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34. The Bank of Baroda transactions related to Tegeta, the mining company, offers an instructive example of the questionable origin of some of the money that circulated within the Gupta accounts.

35. On April 13, 2016, Tegeta, a joint venture of the Guptas and Mabengela, a company owned by the former president’s son Duduzane, received three deposits totalling 823 million rand ($65 million). The money arrived in Tegeta’s account via several different Gupta-controlled accounts at the Bank of Baroda.

36. On the same day, Baroda bank employees filed four SARs against the Gupta’s Sahara account. Four more alerts were filed the next day when new transactions came in. But sometime between April 13 and May 2016, Baroda officials nullified the alerts, pronouncing the transfers acceptable, which ensured that the Financial Intelligence Center did not discover them.

37. Much of the money flowing into Tegeta’s Baroda account was South African taxpayer money that came from state-owned entities. From January 2016 through February 2017, Eskom, the state electricity provider, deposited over 1.8 billion rand ($143 million) into various Gupta accounts at Baroda.

38. Eskom was like a bankomat machine for the Guptas — and there is evidence of high-level political involvement. Eskom executives like Anoj Singh and Brian Molefe had been handpicked by senior Gupta allies, like Public Enterprises Minister Lynn Brown, who themselves had been appointed by the president.

39. Tegeta was a major Eskom subcontractor. In one 2016 deal, it was given a massive 564 million rand ($48 million) contract to supply Arnot, a large power plant, with six months of coal. Eskom had been purchasing coal for an average price of $19.40 per ton, but Tegeta received more than double that amount. It was the most expensive supply contract on Eskom’s books. Money from this contract was among the millions that flowed into the Gupta’s Baroda accounts.

40. Another deal involving Tegeta stands out: the company’s purchase of the Optimum Coal Mine in April 2016.

41. Previously owned by Glencore, a multinational commodity trading and mining company, Optimum Coal was a major supplier of coal to Eskom, the country’s electric utility. But there was a hitch: Eskom claimed that the Glencore coal was of a low quality and demanded 2 billion rand ($170 million) in penalties.

42. Glencore said that, due to the fine, it was no longer profitable to supply Eskom and decided to sell the Optimum Coal company. With a huge penalty on its books that Eskom refused to waive, interested buyers were few.

43. Then, in December 2015, Tegeta announced that it would buy Optimum Coal for 2.1 billion rand ($160 million). South Africa’s Mines Minister — a known Gupta ally named Mosebenzi Zwane (who had been appointed by President Zuma) — travelled to Switzerland to meet with Glencore and the Guptas. Shortly afterwards, the penalty was waived.

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44. On December 18, 2015, Sanjiv Gupta, the Bank of Baroda’s South African head, issued a letter of assurance from the bank on behalf of the Guptas for the full payment. India’s Central Vigilance Commission is now examining whether it was in his powers to do so, according to a

45. But there was one more snag. On April 11, 2016, the Guptas informed Glencore that they were 600 million rand ($48 million) short of the sale price. South African banks had declined to lend to Tegeta, by then already perceived as a Gupta-Zuma scheme. Yet by 9 p.m. that night, in a wholly unusual move, Eskom agreed to “prepay” the Gupta companies 659 million rand ($52 million) for future work so that the purchase could be completed. The deal was, at best, an interest-free loan for the Guptas and Zuma. At worst, it was another plundering of public assets.

46. Bank of Baroda records show the Guptas using a series of transactions to pay a total of 1.8 billion rand ($144 million) for the mine. There is no record of what happened to the remaining amount.

47. Essentially, Tegeta had paid for much of Optimum Coal using taxpayer money from Eskom — which had waived a fee that, according to the mine’s previous owner, had rendered the venture unprofitable.

48. By 2017, the Gupta’s deals had come under scrutiny, particularly the allegedly illegal payments made by state-owned entities like Eskom.

49. In August 2017, the Guptas announced that Tegeta had been sold for 2.97 billion rand ($225 million) to a Swiss company called Charles King SA. This was an unusual buyer for a mining company, having been formed in February 2011 as a clothing distributor with 50,000 Swiss francs ($53,500) in capital and managed by a financial services firm with a nominee director. An Emirati named Amir Zarooni, an alleged Gupta proxy, became the company’s sole administrator in August 2017, at which time the company’s registered activity changed simply to “trading.”

50. If the deal in fact went ahead as described, the Guptas would have effectively paid the $225 million for Tegeta to a foreign proxy — placing the money in Switzerland, a foreign tax haven, where it is beyond the reach of South African law enforcement. T 51. There was another financial windfall. When they purchased the Optimum Coal company from Glencore, the Guptas received 1.7 billion rand ($136 million) in “rehabilitation funds,” where are meant to be set aside to mitigate environmental damage and used after the mine had closed. But, in violation of South African law, the Guptas took out loans against this money, moving the funds to their accounts at the Bank of Baroda, which allowed them to borrow nearly the same amount against the fund in early 2016.

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52. The loan was allegedly approved by Minister of Mines Mosebenzi Zwane, yet another Zuma appointee . It took until November 2016 for the Bank of Baroda to void the loan. It is not known what the Guptas used the money for.

53. Days after former President Zuma resigned, Optimum Coal filed for a business rescue – a term describing a financially distressed company that is seeking external support to survive. Seven other Gupta-related businesses did too.

54. The South African authorities say they are seeking to recover as much as 50 billion rand ($4.07 billion) lost through the Guptas’ deals.

55. In the meantime, the country is struggling. The government has announced plans to slash the national budget by tens of billions of rand, as well as raising taxes, including the VAT and fuel levy. Meanwhile, Eskom is so financially strapped that it has sought steep increases in electricity tariffs for South African consumers.

56. If you look closely at the details of a 2014 contract to bring Chinese-manufactured locomotives to South Africa, you can tell that something more than transportation was going on.

57. On the surface, the contract referred to a big, seemingly conventional deal in which China South Rail, a state-owned Chinese manufacturer, would deliver locomotives to South Africa’s state-owned transport infrastructure firm, Transnet.

58. China South Rail’s contract for 359 locomotives was worth a whopping US$1.5 billion. But this was no straight deal.

59. Behind the contract were associates of South Africa’s wealthy and politically connected Gupta family, which has been implicated in an ambitious financial raid on Transnet.The Guptas have close ties to South African President Jacob Zuma, whose son, Duduzane Zuma, is on their payroll, and they are well known for giving perks to other public officials and receiving favors in return.

60. The contract shows China South Rail promising to pay $321 million as an advisory fee to Salim Essa, an alleged front man and proxy for the Gupta family. For that fee -- which represented an astounding 21 percent of the total contract -- the Chinese identified Tequesta, Essa’s Hong-Kong-registered advisory firm, as providing it with “Black Economic Empowerment” assistance. (All foreign investment in South Africa needs this designation, intended to correct the economic imbalances of the apartheid regime that ended in 1994.)

61. The fee was to be paid under an unusual arrangement spelled out in the contract that required Transnet to cover the cost. In short, the fee appears to be structured like a kickback to the Gupta empire that is funded by South African taxpayers.

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62. Banking records obtained show a total of $75 million paid out by China South Rail after the contract was signed and $39.8 million in the three months prior to that. No access to all records to track the full $321 million in payments.

63. The documents show that the money went first to Gupta-associated companies and then on to a series of small shell companies where much it disappeared. But some is traceable to payments on everything from coffee to luxury cars. Bankers often failed to flag a suspicious scheme, accepting large payments from the Chinese rail firm and then paying out a series of smaller payments to an array of shell companies controlled by the Guptas.

64. After all this, South African taxpayers suffered the indignity that the first two locomotives that arrived in the country in early 2017 turned out to be defective.

65. According to the contract, Tequesta, the Gupta-connected firm run by Essa, got an advance of ($60 million), which represented 3.9 percent of the contract before it was even signed. The rest was to be paid from money Transnet sent to China South Rail, which would then pay a portion of it on to Tequesta, or any other entity of Tequesta’s choice.

66. As the contract put it, “Each time the company [China South Rail] receives a payment from the client [Transnet] as a percentage of the total contract value, same proportion of the advisory fee will be paid to Tequesta.”

67. If Transnet stopped paying or reduced payments, the contract stipulated, Tequesta would get zero or reduced fees.

68. The banking data reveals that a total of $114.6 million was paid out by China South Rail in some 42 transactions. About $49 million was sent to Tequesta’s HSBC account between June and October 2015. The remaining $65 million went into the HSBC account of a Hong Kong company called Regiments Asia, also throughout 2015.

69. In response to reporters’ inquiries, HSCB representatives wrote that "HSBC simply has no desire to do any Gupta-related business. To the best of our knowledge, HSBC previously exited, is in the process of exiting, or never had a banking relationship with Tequesta, Regiments, ... [and persons such as] Mr. Salim Essa ... or other members of the Gupta family, and other Gupta-related entities we have become aware of through the media or otherwise."

70. Regiments Asia (of which Essa is a cofounder) and Tequesta are partners that share many of the same principals. The two firms were established on the same day, June 20, 2014, they share the same Hong Kong address.

71. According to whistleblower information provided, another alleged cofounder of Regiments Asia, Eric Wood, was at the time a shareholder in Regiments, Transnet’s South African financial partner.

72. Moving assets in this way, through confidential contracts and multiple shell companies, along with the use of well-placed allies in the government, is a Gupta specialty.

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73. The emails and documents show Wood and the Guptas colluding with Transnet insiders to ensure that its rail supplier contracts went to companies of their choosing. China South Rail was one of those chosen.

74. One of their insider allies was Iqbal Sharma, another Gupta associate and Essa’s business partner, who was appointed to several senior Transnet positions. He was named to the company’s board in late 2010 by then-Minister of Public Enterprise Malusi Gigaba, who has held a number of senior positions by appointment of President Zuma. By 2013 he had become chairman of Transnet’s Board Acquisition and Disposal Committee alongside Anoj Singh, then the company’s chief financial officer and since exposed as another Gupta associate, according to a report by South Africa’s former Public Protector.

75. Singh was also key to the Guptas’ efforts to influence Transnet. In fact, Transnet’s tender for the locomotives came out in July 2012, the same month he was appointed. In his crucial position, Sharma was in close contact with the Guptas and Wood as Transnet moved forward on the locomotive tender. As the Guptas’ insider within the company, he was instrumental in steering the state firm’s decisions in a way that made the scheme possible. The emails also show that Woods and the Guptas had access to a confidential internal Transnet document that spelled out the procurement criteria for the tender.

In the fall of 2014, media reports were beginning to point to the Guptas’ influence on state entities, including Transnet. In response, the company hired PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to carry out an investigation.

76. That November, according to documents, PwC had identified multiple Gupta-linked companies in which Sharma “might have” a conflict of interest because of his involvement in companies that benefited from deals with Transnet.

77. Sharma’s own company, VRLS, also linked to Essa, was financially integrated into the Guptas’ corporate empire.Meanwhile, Tequesta itself gave the company a multi-million-dollar loan, according to Tequesta’s September 2014 balance sheet.

78. Yet the Guptas’ influence continued. The following year, in a memo Transnet retained Regiments to raise $800 million it needed to pay for the locomotives.

79. Transnet ultimately wanted to buy a total of 1,064 locomotives; the Chinese-owned firm’s ultimate allocation would soon increase from 359 to over 500.

80. Early in 2017, the first two of the locomotives were delivered and found to be unusable. While acknowledging “glitches,” Transnet said that those two locomotives were simply prototypes. It is not known when delivery of the remaining locomotives is to take place.

81. China South Rail sent the locomotive deal “fee” to Regiments Asia and Tequesta in chunks ranging from $100,000 to several million dollars. The bank data shows that, whenever Regiments Asia received a credit to its account, it was always from China South Rail -- suggesting that the firm had been established precisely for this deal. Tequesta records show a similar pattern, with 90 percent of its money coming from China South Rail.

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82. But the money didn’t stay with the two shell firms for long. The millions then went through more than three dozen shell companies around the world, mostly using HSBC accounts in Hong Kong and other locations, but also employing other banks in London, Johannesburg, Dubai, and the US.

83. Regiments Asia paid more than $100 million from its account to shell companies that appeared to have no substantive business activity, employees, or even physical offices. These companies, bearing names such as Gallenade, Success Stand, Shun Shi, Honorway, Bestway, PAI, Al Malaki, Vogen, Daya and Flybright, received money, sometimes almost daily, from late 2014 through February 2017, with the bulk arriving in 2015. Tequesta paid out over $60 million to the same shell companies.

84. Gupta family members received some of these funds directly in transactions flagged as problematic by big banks’ compliance departments.

In all, data shows that more than 20 banks sent or received money from Regiments Asia, Tequesta, or the shell companies. Led by HSBC, these banks also included National Westminster in the United Kingdom, Wells Fargo in the US, India’s state-owned Bank of Baroda, Habib Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, and a dozen Chinese banks like Bank of China and China Citibank. Often, the transfers were listed as “commissions.”

85. Flows from one key conduit in South Africa, a shell company called Homix, were so vast that the account was shut down by its bank, Mercantile Bank, after just 11 days. During that time, the company -- which was allegedly run by Essa’s legal advisor Ashok Narayan – sent $8.4 million to Morningstar International, a Gupta-controlled firm in Hong Kong.

86. Big banks like the Bank of Baroda and HSBC allowed the payments to carry on from 2014 until 2017. Mercantile, however, noticed suspicious activity within four working days of the account being opened. Its bankers reported this to the South African Reserve Bank, which requested that Mercantile block the account, which it did.

87. Like the other shell companies in the scheme, Homix appeared to have no substantive business activity or employees. But each remittance it sent to Morningstar had an instant consequence. For instance, on May 27, 2015, at precisely the time that Homix sent two payments to Morningstar International Trade, that company moved similar amounts to Gallenade and Billion Lucky. On the next day, the same pattern was repeated.

88. After Mercantile shut down the Homix account, and perhaps unknown to the bank, other nominees stepped in to serve as new conduits for Morningstar.

89. Some of the Morningstar funds ended up in the US with a company called MNT Trading, which received transfers from Morningstar’s Hong Kong account in its account at Wells Fargo.

Between Tequesta and Regiments, more than $160 million was moved through international banks led by HSBC and Bank of Baroda.

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90. A host of transactions by the Guptas, such as buying luxury cars, groceries, or even coffee and bagels at Pret-a-Manger in London, were also flagged as suspicious by the compliance departments of several big banks.

91. But the flagging appeared to make no difference, and the transfers continued.

92. South Africa’s Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises has investigated the influence of the Guptas on the country’s state-owned entities, including Transnet. But there has been little scrutiny of institutions such as the Bank of Baroda, HSBC, and other banks that helped them, keeping transaction fees for themselves. In fact, transactions considered “risky” -- such as the large flows described here – brought the banks higher fees.

93. In partnership with Nedbank, one of South Africa’s largest banks, companies controlled by or connected to the wealthy and politically-connected Gupta family via its lieutenants extracted more than 1 billion rand (US$ 67.2 million) from Transnet, a state-owned company charged with constructing rail, port, and other transportation infrastructure to serve South African citizens.

94. The operation, which took place during late 2015 and early 2016, was one of the most intricate schemes in a long story of private influence over the running of the South African state.

95. Private companies employing government-connected insiders manipulated Transnet’s operations to get it to carry out complex financial operations solely to generate consulting fees for the companies.

96. While other South African banks called the financial schemes "tainted" and "toxic" and declined to get involved, Nedbank signed on as the Guptas’ financial partner in trades involving loans that netted the Gupta-linked firms millions of dollars per transaction.

97. Eventually, crafty asset managers apparently decided to cut even the complicit Nedbank out of a portion of the deals, leaving more fees for themselves. This phase of the scheme involved defrauding Transnet’s pension fund, on which 51,000 pensioners rely.

98. Astoundingly, Transnet's auditor, SizweNtsalubaGobodo (SNG), also counted the company on the receiving end of the millions as its client, even as its audit of the suspect transactions failed to uncover anything unproper.

99. Fortune smiled on the family again in 2003 when Jacob Zuma, then a deputy president, became embroiled in an infamous arms deal scandal that revealed his relationship with two prominent brothers, Schabir and Shamim (Chippy) Shaikh.

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With the Shaikhs facing legal prosecution, Zuma needed a new set of wealthy supporters, and appears to have chosen the Guptas. Within a decade, Zuma’s son Duduzane had become tightly bound with the family business empire.

The Guptas and their associates were able to win lucrative government contracts, obtain bank loans on highly favorable terms, and use their political connections to dismiss and appoint senior public officials.

As it turns out, the Guptas were also able to use their connections to direct millions of dollars from Transnet, a major state firm, into their pockets.

100. Ironically, the Guptas’ Transnet gambit was made possible by a company that declined to sell them shares. This was Regiments, a firm that, for years, had been closely connected to the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and, allegedly, its systems of patronage.

101. A boutique equities and securities investment firm, Regiments is run and co-owned by Litha Nyhonyha, one of the first licensed black accountants to gain prominence after the end of apartheid. Nyhonyha soon became a key ANC business ally, helping run critical entities, such as Thebe Investment Holdings, that were designed to assist the party in funding such needs as elections and events through institutions like the Batho Batho Trust.

102. Draft contracts obtained by OCCRP show that Elgasolve, a company run by Gupta’s key associate Salim Essa, offered to purchase 50 percent of Regiments Capital for 200 million rand ($14 million), promising that it would earn massive profits thanks to their involvement.

According to a High Court filling, Nyhonyha declined Elgasolve’s offer. But Regiments’ two other directors, traders Magandheran (Niven) Pillay and Eric Wood, appeared to be tempted. Pillay conceded that he met with the Guptas at their home with Wood, where it was explained that, if the other went through, he would become the company’s head. Ultimately, though, he would decline the offer.

103. By early 2016, Wood created a number of companies under an umbrella group called Trillian along with Gupta associate Salim Essa. Between them, Wood and Essa owned 85 percent of the new firm.

104. Internal documents obtained show that Trillian informally took over some of Regiments’ contracts and then formally acquired a division of the company, including 50 employees – and, notably, its trade in securities.

105. According to an affidavit, the intent was to run Trillian only until 2019 - - a period that corresponds to President Zuma’s current term in office.

106. A document trail indicates that before Trillian was even properly formed, Wood -- known as a prominent trader -- had been using Regiments’ securities desk to earn millions in collusion with the Guptas at the expense of Transnet.

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107. As one of the country’s top three borrowers, Transnet, a state-owned freight transport company, proved an easy target for loan manipulation.

108. In 2015, Brian Molefe, the Transnet group chief executive and a known Gupta ally, appointed a man named Phetolo Ramosebudi -- whose brother was one of the Regiments traders who moved over to Trillian -- to lead Transnet’s treasury department. Among other tasks, he was responsible for driving the company’s funding strategy.

109. In what would become a key element of the scheme, on Dec. 3, 2015, Ramosebudi sent a memo to Transnet’s acting chief financial officer, Garry Pita, calling for unusual changes in the company’s securities trading policy. The memo is in the possession of OCCRP.

a. The memo made three key recommendations: First, in a new approach, Regiments would handle Transnet’s large loans and interest rate risk management, rather than Transnet handling it in-house, as had been the normal practice. b. Second, loans arranged by Regiments would use fixed interest rates, rather than the lower, market-based floating rates that had usually been arranged by the specialized, and highly skilled, Transnet team of treasury unit. c. Finally, the memo called for Regiments’ consulting fees for executing the loans, which proved exorbitant, to be folded into the interest rates -- essentially hiding them from scrutiny.

110. On the very next day after Ramosebudi sent his memo, Regiments carried out the first of a series of transactions on Transnet’s behalf using the new policies. as the counterparty. It involved borrowing 4.5 billion rand ($314 million) to buy a set of locomotives from China.

111. Then, in a transaction arranged on behalf of Regiments, as instructed by Eric Wood, Nedbank stepped in as a counterparty to do an interest rate swap on the loan from the floating rates to higher fixed rates.

112. An interest rate swap is a contractual agreement between two parties to exchange, over an agreed period, two streams of interest payments. It is usually done when a company with a variable interest rate wants a more predictable loan payment and swaps its floating rate for a fixed rate with a counterparty -- usually a bank or investment firm -- that’s willing to take the risk, or vice versa. Such rate swaps are not regulated by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).

113. But in these deals, Transnet ended up paying consistently higher rates than they would have had they not made the swap -- and then paid large fees to Regiments on top of that for arranging the deal.

114. “No invoice is created,” quotes the affidavit of a whistleblower, referring to the fees folded into the interest rates.

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115. Because Transnet’s outsourcing of these arrangements under such terms was unprecedented, Nedbank was the only bank willing to go along. According to the same affidavit, other banks approached with the same offer found it “strange” that an external consultant would perform transactions on financial instruments that Transnet’s internal team would have done directly in the past, describing it as “tainted and toxic.”

116. Obtained copies of the transactions which show the difference between the floating rate Transnet’s loans should have had and the fixed rate Regiments arranged. The fixed rate (11.15 percent) was 2 percent higher than the floating rate (9.1 percent), and the consulting fees specified in Ramosebudi’s memo added still more, yielding a final interest rate of 11.83 percent, a margin of 2.6 percent.

117. Thanks to the extra fees, Regiments earned 161.8 million rand ($11.29 million). Nedbank earned another 28.2 million rand ($1.96 million dollars), presumably its cut of the fees. In early March, the operation was repeated again, earning Regiments 335 million rand ($21.9 million) and Nedbank 46.15 million rand ($3.02 million).

118. A few weeks later, according to internal documents obtained, Transnet’s Treasury unit held a meeting with Pillay and Ramosebudi. The dealers complained that they had been excluded from the process and that the costs of executing the swap were miles from the market -- the second higher than the first. At the meeting, Pillay explained that his role had been limited to making a phone call to a Nedbank trader. He said that he had done this on instruction by Wood as a favor to him.

119. By that month, Trillian acquired Regiments’ financial advisory division, affording Wood greater control.

120. Rather than continuing to use Nedbank, Wood then apparently decided to use Transnet’s pension fund -- a separate legal entity known as TSDBF -- as the counterparty. This meant, in practice, that Trillian wouldn’t have to pay a cut of their fees to a counterparty (previously Nedbank).

121. Fortunately for Wood and Trillian, a key ally was in place. About a year earlier, South Africa’s Minister of Public Enterprises, Lynne Brown, who had appointed many of the Gupta family’s friends to key roles and who was associated with them via her partner -- brought Stanley Shane, himself a Gupta ally and Trillian principal, into the Transnet board. Shane would also take on the role of chairman of the TSDBF board of trustees.

122. This put him in a position to lobby heavily for Regiments to win a TSDBF tender for asset manager. Affidavits and other documents in OCCRP’s possession show that, though a range of highly rated asset managers applied for the role, Shane ensured that Regiments would have insider information and get the contract. At the same time, he acted on behalf of Trillian in examining Transnet deals.

123. "Stanley Shane ... helped establish Trillian, which he then helped get work for while being a board member of Transnet," said Mosilo Mothepu, a former CEO of Trillian Financial Advisory, the unit that acquired Regiments Advisory, where she previously worked.

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124. Speaking to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises on October 31, she described how uncomfortable Trillian's own directors were that Shane, Essa and Wood made decisions which directors, like herself, would be accountable for.

125. Over the next few months, two interest swap operations using the TSDBF fund were carried out, earning Regiments 284.6 million rand ($19.1 million) on the first swap and 148.4 million rand ($9.9 million) on the second. These speculative swaps cost Transnet’s pension fund consulting fees. There is no defensible reason for a pension fund to take part in large interest rate swaps – and, in fact, the volume of derivatives TSDBF came to hold because of its participation violated laws meant to protect the pensioners from excessive risk.

126. TSDBF had contracted with Regiments, not Trillian, to manage its assets – so when the fund discovered that Regiments had transferred its consulting fees to Trillian (even though Trillian had arranged the deals), it sued Trillian and others involved, demanding repayment of 230 million rand ($16.3 million)

127. Notably, this money had been deposited into Trillian’s account at the Bank of Baroda, which government reports show is a linchpin of the Guptas’ financial empire.

128. According to the Sunday Times, citing the TSDBF court filing, the same account was also used by Albatime, a shell company the Public Protector report says was part of the Guptas’ massive money laundering machine. The company is run by Kuben Moodley, then an adviser to Minister of Mineral Resources Mosebenzi Zwane.

129. The use of this bank account by both Albatime and Trillian underscores Trillian’s close connection to the Gupta family. From December 2015 - the date of the first interest rate swap - until April 14, 2016, shortly after the last swap, Albatime received 42 million rand (nearly $3 million) from Regiments via this account. The Public Protector report confirmed that Albatime contributed to the purchase of a coal mine for the Guptas.

130. Regiments’ transfers to Trillian soon became the subject of a dispute among the alleged conspirators of the fleecing of Transnet.

131. Even as the interest rate swaps were playing out from December 2015 through April 2016, the Trillian principals’ influence over South Africa’s state-owned companies continued to grow.

132. According to whistleblower affidavits, by October 2015, Wood (then still with Regiments), had received advance knowledge of President Zuma’s plans to fire Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene. (Meanwhile, the deputy finance minister, Mcebisi Jonas had publicly revealed that the Guptas had offered him 600 million rand (then around $ 44 million) to take over Nene’s position.)

133. “[Wood] emailed me a document that essentially outlined initiatives that the new finance minister was going to approve - about 12 of them- and the potential fees that Regiments - at the time, was going to earn,” said Mothepu, the former CEO of Trillian Advisory, to parliament of the day that Wood told her Nene would be fired.

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134. “Six weeks later in December 2015, I confirmed to Eric that he was right,” he continued. “He then mentioned a colleague at Regiments, Mohammed Bobat, an advisor to the new Minister, and his role was to essentially channel all the work from state-owned companies or national treasury to [the company that would become] Trillian.”

135. On Dec. 9, 2015, several days after the first interest rate swap, the president announced he would fire Nene and hire Des Van Rooyen as his replacement -- with Mohammed Bobat, a Regiments principal -- as advisor. Their alleged role, according to leaked emails, would be to channel government tenders from the national treasury and various state-owned entities like Transnet to the newly-formed Trillian.

136. But the appointment of Van Rooyen, an ANC parliamentary backbencher, caused a financial panic. Days later, he was replaced by Pravin Gordhan, known to be a corruption fighter. But affidavits obtained indicate that in March 2016, when Trillian was established, Trillian’s CFO confirmed that “they” (meaning the Guptas) would soon have Gordhan replaced. By March 2017, the following year, he was.

137. In the meantime, the architects of the Transnet scheme began to fall out with each other.

138. Even as Regiments was pocketing millions from Transnet, it began to squabble with Trillian over who would get the lion’s share of the money and the deals.

139. According to Mothepu, Regiments gave 50 cents of every rand earned from its public sector contracts to Salim Essa and Kuben Moodley -- showing that the Gupta associate and the Albatime head were both benefitting from Regiments’ success.

140. But by late April 2016, Transnet’s board voted to transfer its Regiments contracts to Trillian officially. As Trillian absorbed Regiments’ business under Wood’s direction, Regiments principals Pillay and Nyhonyha fired back, filing a court case that accused Wood of diverting their business opportunities.

141. Meanwhile, Wood is quoted in a prominent report on state capture as saying that nothing improper had happened, as Trillian had been subcontracted by Regiments to carry out the Transnet work.

142. This was backed by Brown, the Minister of Public Enterprises, who stated Trillian Asset Management was introduced to Transnet as a subcontractor to Regiments and as part of the latter’s supplier development obligations to Transnet.”

143. Nyhonyha has denied these claims, according to his High Court filing, in which he

144. WhatsApp messages show that Pillay at least was well aware that, without the knowledge of Ramesbudi, Wood was engaging in interest rate swaps during this period.

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145. During the October 31 parliamentary cross-examination of Mothepu, questions were posed, asking how Regiments was able to obtain the type of consultancy contracts that only state- owned companies like Transnet would know about and which Trillian later hijacked.

146. Mothepu responded that work was channeled through the business development partners, Salim Essa and Kubentheran Moodley. When asked how the staff of these state- owned entities felt when internal capacity and expertise was put aside in favor of external consultants, she said that internal staff felt resistant but such decisions were taken by the executive - men like Anoj Singh, Brian Molefe, Garry Pita and Phetolo Ramosebudi.

147. As a state firm, Transnet is subject to annual audits to ensure that it is using taxpayer funds wisely and legally.

148. However, the firm’s long-time auditor, SizweNtsalubaGobodo (SNG), which conducted the audit for the financial year in question, failed to uncover any irregularities related to the interest rate swaps -- such as the 612 million rand in additional consultancy fees costs earned by Regiments.

149. Though Transnet’s 2016 annual financial statements show 511 million rand in losses on interest rate swaps, as compared to none in the previous year, SNG’s audit did not address

150. SNG said it was not within the normal audit scope to look at mandates between counterparties and suppliers. However, the first two swaps (with Nedbank) violated section 8.3 of Transnet’s public procurement manual, which declares that external consultants, like Regiments, may not be approached for specialist services that fall into the competency of the treasury unit.

151. SNG appears to have had its own conflict of interest. It is the auditor not only of Transnet, but also of Regiments, and, from April 2016 until September 2017, of Oakbay, the most prominent firm within the Guptas’ business empire.

152. In the summer of 2017, Stanley Shane resigned from the board of Transnet. Shortly thereafter, in July, the fixed interest rate charged to Transnet dropped by a significant margin.

153. State-owned companies - the low hanging fruits - were Regiments and later Trillian’s main clients. "We were essentially being given stuff on a silver platter that other companies did not have," Mothepu told parliament.

154. The UK headquarters of a global bank told its Hong Kong and Dubai subsidiaries to ignore suspicions that transactions involving the Gupta family were illicit.

155. This was divulged in the upper house of the British parliament, the House of Lords, by South African-born and educated former anti-apartheid activist Peter Hain on Wednesday.

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Hain had written in September to UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (finance minister) Philip Hammond asking him to urge law- enforcement agencies to track about R7-billion thought to have been laundered through the Guptas' international networks, and to ensure that it was returned to the South African Treasury.

156. Hain told the Lords that he was in possession of transaction printouts that showed transfers of funds by the Guptas over the past few years, from their South African accounts to accounts in Dubai and Hong Kong, that appeared to be illicit. The printouts, which identify the banks, have been sent to Hammond.

157. Hain said the records showed all the account numbers. "Many of the transactions are legitimate, but many certainly are not," he said. Hain said the illicit transactions were flagged internally by the bank as suspicious. "But I am informed that they were told from the UK headquarters to ignore it. That is an iniquitous breach of FCA [Financial Conduct Authority] practice, which I trust ministers would never countenance, and is an incitement to money laundering, which has self- evidently occurred in this case, and also been sanctioned by a British bank, as part of the flagrant robbery of South African taxpayers of many millions," he said.

158. Hain said each originating transaction started with one bank account and was then split into a number of accounts to conceal the origin. "Undoubtedly hard questions will need to be asked of the facilitating banks because they have aided and abetted the Gupta money-laundering activities," he said.

159. The transactions date between 2013 and 2016 and total more than R1.1-billion. The most active of the Gupta entities are Oakbay Investments, which is based in South Africa, Accurate Investments, based in Dubai, Brookfield Consultants, based in the US, and the Indian-based World Windows and RR Energy.

160. The size of the transactions varies, with some of the largest being R320-million, R230-million for the purchase of two aircraft from the US - allegedly bought with the proceeds of crime - R128-million, and R15.5-million which passed through the Bank of Baroda.

161. Gupta’s family's strong ties to former South African president Jacob Zuma, both personally and through its company Oakbay Investments, have been the subject of extensive international scrutiny and caused much political controversy.

162. The ties have led to widespread claims of corruption, undue influence and of state capture – a term which is used to allege that the government undertakes activities and decisions, decides some high level appointments, and determines control of some state enterprises, for the Gupta family's direct or indirect benefit, or in agreement with the family.

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163. In 2015 the Guptas' influence on the presidency was described by anti-corruption campaigner and former trades unionist Zwelinzima Vavi as being a "shadow government". Multiple MPs and ministers have stated that they were offered government positions by, or on behalf of, the Gupta family, in return for beneficial commercial decisions once appointed.

164. In 2017 it was discovered that British PR company Bell Pottinger, acting on behalf of Gupta-owned Oakbay Investments, had deliberately manipulated and inflamed racial tensions, stirred up racial hatred, and made accusations of "white monopoly capital", using a large number of fake Twitter and other accounts online, as part of a campaign portraying Oakbay and those connected to it as victims, apparently intended to deflect corruption claims. Bell Pottinger subsequently collapsed in the wake of the scandal.

165. Gupta nephews Ashish and Amol, who are US Citizens, resident in Texas, received payments r from a Gupta-linked company in the United Arab Emirates.

166. On 16 February 2018, two days after Zuma had stepped down as president of South Africa, Ajay Gupta was declared a fugitive from justice by South African authorities after failing to turn himself over to the authorities.[

167. The Guptas and then vice-president Zuma first met at a function hosted by the Guptas at Sahara Estate in 2003. Since then the family have been involved in a number of events involving Zuma and his family. The family is known to have been a supporter of Zuma during his power struggle for leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) with then president Thabo Mbeki in 2005.

168. The family is known to have employed Zuma's wife Bongi Ngema-Zuma. One of Zuma's sons, Duduzane Zuma was a director in a number of Gupta owned firms and one of his daughters, Duduzile Zuma, was made a director of the Gupta owned Sahara computers in 2008. She has since resigned from that position. Duduzane Zuma has also since resigned from all positions held at Gupta owned businesses. Zuma's close relationship with the family is a source of tension within Zuma's own party the ANC.

169. The Guptas' influence on the presidency has been described by the former General Secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions Zwelinzima Vavi as a "shadow government."Donwald Pressly of the South African business publication Biznews has stated that comments made by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa about the state capture of public enterprises by people with political connections was referring to the close relationship between Zuma and the Gupta family.

170. As part of the company’s annual results announcement in September 2016, Oakbay Investments stated that government contracts accounted for 9% of the company’s sales.

171. Oakbay also stated that its largest mining company, JIC Mining Services, has never had a government contract, while Sahara, the second biggest contributor, has had no government contacts following a deliberate decision taken by the board in 2008.

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172. A reflection of the close relationship between the Gupta family and Jacob Zuma, particularly by both Zuma and the family's detractors, is the term "Zupta" to refer to this relationship. The portmanteau, a combination of "Z" from "Zuma" and the "upta" from "Gupta", was first coined by the Economic Freedom Fighters at the 2016 South African presidential state of the nation address when they disrupted the event by repeatedly chanting "Zupta must fall" to express their dissatisfaction with this relationship.

173. On 30 April 2013, an Airbus A330-200 chartered aircraft run by Jet Airways carrying 217 guests[49] from India was cleared to land at the South African Air Force base at Waterkloof for the wedding ceremony of Vega Gupta to Aakash Jahajgarhia at Sun City, North West. This event caused a significant controversy that led to the African National Congress (ANC) and other political parties as well as the South African National Defence Union to denounce this use of the air force base. The ANC issued a statement calling for "those responsible for giving the family permission to come into the country without going through the normal channels be 'brought to book'".[9][50]

174. In the aftermath of the event, India's High Commissioner Virendra Gupta (not related to the Gupta family) said publicly that the Indian High Commission was given permission to land the plane at Waterkloof Air Force Base.He explained that the Commission communicated through its defence adviser with the chief of defence for foreign relations in the SA National Defence Force (SANDF).

175. The landing was cleared by Bruce Koloane who was chief of state protocol at the department of international relations who insisted that the flight was a “sensitive” official visit. Koloane was demoted after an investigation concluded that he used Zuma's name to illegally authorise the landing. President Zuma was scheduled to attend the wedding but cancelled after the incident became public.

176. In 2017, it was revealed that the wedding was paid for by funds, laundered through Dubai, and granted to a Gupta-linked company by the Free State Province government, purportedly as part of the Vrede Dairy Project.

177. In January 2018, the Asset Forfeiture Unit of the National Prosecuting Authority seized R220 million that Free State Department of Agriculture under Mosebenzi Zwane had paid to the Gupta family as part of this project, calling it a "scheme designed to defraud and steal monies from the department" The Hawks unit of South Africa's Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) raided the offices of Ace Magashule, the Premier of the Free State, in connection with the project.

178.In 2016, a series of allegations of the Guptas' influence over appointments to the South African Cabinet came to the fore. Former ANC MP Vytjie Mentor claimed that in 2010 the Guptas had offered her the position of Minister of Public Enterprises, provided that she arranged for South African Airways to drop their India route, allowing a Gupta linked company (Jet Airways) to take on the route.She said she declined the offer, which occurred at the Guptas' Saxonwold residence, while President Zuma was in another room. This came a few days before a cabinet reshuffle in which minister Barbara Hogan was dismissed by Zuma. The Gupta family denied that the meeting took place and denied offering Vytijie a ministerial position.President Zuma claimed that he had no recollection of Vytjie Mentor.

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179. Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas confirmed media reports that he had been offered the ministerial position by the Guptas shortly before the disastrous dismissal of Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015, but had rejected the offer out of hand as "it makes a mockery of our hard-earned democracy‚ the trust of our people and no one apart from the President of the Republic appoints ministers". The Gupta family denied offering Jonas the job of Finance Minister.

180. The Sunday Times has reported that the Minister of Mineral Resources, Mosebenzi Zwane, and then Minister of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, David van Rooyen (who was controversially appointed by President Zuma as Minister of Finance in December 2015) met with members of the Gupta family in Dubai. Van Rooyen allegedly met with them only a few days after his unsuccessful appointment to be Minister of Finance on the 20 December 2015. Minister Zwane assisted in the sale of a large coal mine to a Gupta owned company.

181. Former bodyguards of the Gupta family have stated that they often saw important government officials, such as Hlaudi Motsoeneng the COO of the state broadcaster the SABC, and large amounts of money in cash moving out of the Gupta's Saxonwold estate. The bodyguards also stated that Ajay Gupta would visit President Zuma up to three times a week until 2015 at the presidential guest house in Pretoria. A spokesperson for president Zuma denies that the visits ever happened.

182. Ranjeni Munusamy of the Daily Maverick has stated the "Gupta family has effectively usurped the function of the ANC deployment committee" thereby undermining the party's ability to independently and legitimately select senior ministers and executives in government and state owned companies.

183. The Gupta's alleged influence was the subject of an investigation into "state capture" by outgoing Public Protector Thuli Madonsela. President Zuma and Minister Des van Rooyen applied for an interdict to prevent the publication of the report on 14 October 2016, Madonsela's last day in office.Van Rooyen's application was dismissed, and the President withdrew his application, leading to the release of the report on 2 November. The report recommends the establishment of a judicial commission of enquiry into the issues identified.

184. The report recommends that a full probe of Mr. Zuma's dealings with the Guptas should be conducted by a commission of inquiry, with the findings published within 180 days. Zuma and Des van Rooyen have since denied any wrongdoing.

185. On 25 November 2016, Zuma announced that the Presidency would be reviewing the contents of the state capture report.He said it "was done in a funny way" with "no fairness at all" and argued he was not given enough time to respond to the public protector.

186. In late May 2017 a number of emails were leaked to the public from the Guptas and their associates implicating them in efforts to appoint government ministers and heads of government owned companies in addition to coordinating activities with political figures associated with President Zuma for their own personal gain.

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187. Most notable were efforts to appoint Gupta friendly executives for Transnet, Eskom, the appointment of Mosebenzi Zwane as minister of mineral resources.

188. In January 2018, Ramaphosa announced that there would indeed be a Commission of Inquiry into State Capture[73], and this would be chaired by Deputy Chief Justice of South Africa Raymond Zondo. Hearings began on 20th August, 2018, and are expected to last for two years.

189. Oakbay Resources & Energy is a mining and processing company run by the Gupta family.[75] It supplies minerals and mineral products, such as gold, uranium, platinum, coal and diamonds and also conducts trackless/mechanised mining, track bound mining, breast mining, down-dip mining and open-pit gold operation. Oakbay Resources & Energy began trading on the JSE on 28 November 2014.

190. In 2010 the Gupta owned firm Imperial Crown Trading (ICT), along with Duduzane Zuma who was a part owner in ICT, were involved in a dispute with ArcelorMittal and Anglo American plc over the rightful ownership of Kumba Iron Ore, which owns Sishen mine, one of Africa's largest iron mines. The Department of Mineral Resources granted the ICT 21.4% ownership in the mine when ArcelorMittal did not renew their mining licence in time. The case was taken to the Constitutional Court where, in 2013, it was ruled that the Gupta/Zuma consortium could not claim rightful ownership.

191. HSBC - estimated £5.57 billion Back in 2012, HSBC forfeited £1.2 billion for having inadequate money laundering controls. This followed a report published by the US Senate which alleged, amongst other things, that HSBC had: supplied banking services and American dollars to some banks in Saudi Arabia in spite of their connections to terrorist financing dodged restrictions created to prevent transactions involving Iran, North Korea and other countries subject to international sanctions HSBC US didn’t treat its Mexican counterpart as high risk even though it has a problem with drug trafficking and money laundering. Control issues like these allowed the laundering of an estimated £5.57 billion over at least seven years. HSBC was able to enter a five-year deferred prosecution agreement or DPA, which is essentially like being on probation. If the US government had pressed charges against HSBC, it could have lost its US dollar licence.

192. 15th December 2018, Jacob Zuma in the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) Case no: 21405/18 & Case no: 29984/18 Jacob Zuma is currently before the Republic of South Africa for corruption related charges in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court in Pietermaritzburg, Jacob Zuma leader of South Africa for nearly 10 years, is facing trial for 16 charges of fraud, money laundering, corruption and racketeering linked to 783 payments were paid to him.

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193. Jacob Zuma in his personal capacity in the criminal prosecution instituted against him on 20 June 2005, 28 December 2007 and 16 March 2018, and in ancillary or related civil proceedings (the impugned decisions).

194. Criminal charges against Jacob Zuma include a charge of racketeering, corruption, money laundering and 12 charges of fraud. The ‘Stalingrad defence’ strategy, which Mr Zuma adopted, has cost the state, and hence the taxpayer, thus far a total amount of between R16 788 781.14 and R32 million. a.The term ‘Stalingrad defence’, Wallis JA explained in Moyo v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and others (387/2017); Sonti v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and others (386/2017); [2018] ZASCA 100 (20 June 2018) para 169, ‘. . . has become a term of art in the armoury of criminal defence lawyers. By allowing criminal trials to be postponed pending approaches to the civil courts, justice is delayed and the speedy trials for which the Constitution provides do not take place. I need hardly add this is of particular benefit to those who are well-resourced and able to secure the services of the best lawyers.’

195. Jacob Zuma served in the national leadership of South Africa’s ruling political party, the African National Congress, as its Provincial Chairperson in KwaZulu-Natal and its National Chairperson from December 1994 until December 1997, its Deputy President from December 1997 until December 2007, and its President until December 2017. Jacob Zuma was employed as the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Economic Affairs and Tourism in KwaZulu-Natal from October 1995 until June 1999, then as the Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa until 14 June 2005, and as President of the Republic of South Africa from 9 May 2009 until 14 February 2018, when he resigned.

196.‘An encrypted note’ was found during the investigation by the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) that allegedly implicated Jacob Zuma in corrupt activities relating to the government’s 1999 strategic arms acquisition program that became known as the arms deal, when he held the office of MEC: Economic Affairs and Tourism in KwaZulu-Natal.

197. On 23 August 2003, the then NDPP, Mr Bulelani Ngcuka, announced his decision that Mr Schabir Shaik would be indicted on charges of corruption in respect of various undue benefits he had afforded or arranged for Mr Zuma since late 1995, but that Mr Zuma would not be indicted simultaneously. Mr Ngcuka announced this decision at a press conference in the presence of the then Minister, Dr Penuel Maduna. In the press release, he inter alia said: a. ‘After careful consideration in which we looked at the evidence and the facts dispassionately, we have concluded that, whilst there is a prima facie case of corruption against the Deputy President, our prospects of success are not strong enough. That means that we are not sure if we have a winnable case.’

198. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) charged Mr Shaik and several companies he controlled with one count of corruption for making 238 payments for Mr Zuma’s benefit between October 1995 and September 2002, totaling R1, 340, 078, with the aim of inducing Mr Zuma to use his political influence to benefit Mr Shaik’s business interests or of rewarding him for having done so; one count of fraud for misrepresenting companies’ accounting records to disguise such benefits afforded to Mr Zuma; and another count of corruption, for attempting to procure a R500 000 annual bribe for Mr Zuma from a French-owned arms manufacturer, Thompson-SCF (Pty) Ltd (later renamed Thint (Pty) Ltd (Thint), with the aim of inducing Mr Zuma to use his influence

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to protect its interests in any public investigation into the government’s 1999 arms acquisition program.

199. On 14 June 2005, a week after Mr Shaik had been sentenced, the then President Thabo Mbeki dismissed Mr Zuma as the Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa.

200. The NDPP brought an application to the High Court, Durban for the issuing of a letter of request to the Mauritian authorities in terms of s 2(2) of the International Co-Operation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996, for the delivery of original documents seized during a search and seizure of the Thompson/Thales offices in Mauritius during 2001. Mr Zuma instructed Hulley to oppose the application and three counsel (led by Adv Kemp SC) were briefed in the matter. On 7 April 2007, Levinsohn DJP rejected Mr Zuma’s grounds of opposition and issued the request:

201. The current applications are part of the continuing litigation saga that has endured over many years and involved numerous court cases. It is doubtful that a decision in this case would be the end of the continuing contestations concerning the prosecution of Mr Zuma. Minutes into the argument before us counsel for both Mr Zuma and the NPA conceded that the decision to discontinue the prosecution was flawed. Counsel on behalf of Mr Zuma, having made the concession, with the full realization that the consequence would be that the prosecution of his client would revive, gave notice that Mr Zuma had every intention in the future to continue to use such processes as are available to him to resist prosecution.

202. On 16 March 2018, the then NDPP, Adv Shaun Abrahams, announced his decision to reinstate the 16 criminal charges (racketeering, corruption, money laundering and fraud) that had been brought against Mr Zuma in 2009 and that his representations had been unsuccessful.

203. The state has thus funded Mr Zuma’s Stalingrad defence strategy from before he had been indicted for the first time on 20 June 2005 - in order to respond to the NDPP’s questions, to obtain access to the ‘encrypted note’ and to represent his interests at the Shaik trial - until the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal on 13 October 2017, upholding the setting aside of the acting NDPP’s decision to discontinue the prosecution of Mr Zuma. .(Zuma and another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and others 2006 (1) SACR 468 (D); [2006] 2 All SA 91 (D); Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] 1 All SA 229 (SCA); National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma and another [2008] 1 All SA 197 (SCA) Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and others; Zuma and another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and others 2009 (1) SA 1 ( CC));

204. Letter of request issued to access information held by the Mauritian authorities (National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma and others ((13569/2006) 2 April 2007 (DC&LD) unreported; Zuma and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] 1 All SA 234 (SCA) and Thint Holdings (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd and another v National Director of Public Prosecutions; Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 (1) SA 141 CC));his indictment in terms of s 179 of the Constitution (Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 ALLSA 54 (N); 2009 (1) BCLR 62 (N); and National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA));

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204. the disclosure of the transcripts of the conversations recorded in the spy tapes (Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and others 2016 (2) SACR 1 (GP); [2016] 3 All SA 78 (GP); 2016 (8) BCLR 1077 (GP); Zuma v Democratic Alliance and others [2014] 4 All SA 35

205. In essence the DA seeks to set aside the decision by the accounting officer in the Presidency and/or the State Attorney to provide state funding to the former President, Mr JG Zuma, for his legal defence in the criminal prosecution brought against him in relation to certain conduct pertaining to the negotiation of the contract for the procurement of strategic defense equipment, otherwise known as the ‘arms deal case’.

206.The State Attorney also consulted a number of individuals previously in the employ of the Department of Justice and Correctional Services and the Presidency as well as current employees in 2. As a result, we have provided the documents that we were able to find. Some of these are unsigned or in draft form but we were unable to locate the final version of those documents.’

207. Allegations or charges of corruption and fraud against a public office bearer, in the words of former President Thabo Mbeki, raise ‘questions of conduct that would be inconsistent with expectations that attend to those who hold public office’. And, as was said by President Ramaphosa, it is a ‘fundamental principle that public money should not be used to cover the legal expenses of individuals on strictly personal matters’.

209. The resistance of our courts to acknowledge that acts of corruption and fraud allegedly committed by a government official are sufficiently closely linked to the powers and duties of such official’s public office and thus allegedly committed by the official when acting within the course and scope of his or her employment, is further demonstrated by judgments, such as the unreported judgment of the Western Cape division of the High Court, Government v Minister of Police (Govender and others v National Minister of Police and another (21976/2015) 18 February 2016, para 56), and Acting Premier, Western Cape v Regional Magistrate, Bellville, and others 2006 (2) SA 79 (CPD).

210. In Acting Premier, Western Cape it was held that government officials charged with offences of corruption and fraud are not charged with offences allegedly committed on behalf of the provincial government, but they are charged in their personal capacities

211. Similarly, the charges of corruption, fraud, racketeering, money laundering and tax evasion against Mr Zuma have nothing to do with any of the official functions he was required to perform as MEC or Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa. The specific conduct on which the prosecution rely - that Mr Zuma allegedly received 783 payments or gratifications outside his official remuneration – is not conduct that could in any way be connected to his official functions. The alleged payments or gratifications were solely for Mr Zuma’s benefit.

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212. Having pleaded not guilty, Mr Shaik stood trial in the Durban and Coast Local Division of the High Court (Squires J) from 11 October 2004 to 4 May 2005. On 31 May 2005, Mr Shaik was found guilty on all three counts, and, on 8 June 2005, sentenced to an effective term of imprisonment for 15 years. Whilst serving his sentence, Mr Shaik’s appeals to the Supreme Court of Appeal and to the Constitutional Court were dismissed on 6 November 2006 and on 2 October 2007 respectively. A private attorney, Ms Julie Mohamed, and senior and junior counsel, were appointed to represent Mr Zuma’s interests on a watching brief in the Shaik trial, at a total cost to the state of R 1 020 930.40.

213. In March 2016, a onetime A.N.C. member of Parliament named Vytjie Mentor wrote on Facebook, and later in a sworn affidavit, that the Guptas said she could become minister of public enterprises, though only if she helped cancel the India route flown by South African Airways. (The Guptas had links to a rival.) When she declined, Jacob Zuma ambled into the room and told her, in Zulu, “It’s OK, girl. Take care of yourself,” according to the affidavit.

214. The topic is now exponentially more fraught, given its association with the Guptas, who tried to use it as a way to enrich themselves and expand their power. For a young democracy that is grappling with a history of institutionalized racism and trying to spread wealth more evenly throughout the country, the results have been tragic.

215. “The damage done by this campaign is not over,” said Sipho Pityana, a businessman who headed the Department of Labour under the Mandela administration. “It shapes the discourse about inequality in South Africa to this day.”

XXVI. Conclusion

1. We believe based on the merits of our encapsulated filings that the DOJ has a Prima Facia case to Open an Investigation or Bring Charges, as to how the DOJ will commence an FCPA matter is guided by the Principles of Federal Prosecution in the case of individuals, and the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations in the case of companies.

2. The DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution, set forth in Chapter 9-27.000 of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual,288 provide guidance for DOJ prosecutors regarding initiating prosecution, selecting charges and indictement.

3. The Principles of Federal Prosecution provide that prosecutors should recommend or commence federal prosecution if the putative defendant’s conduct constitutes a federal offense and the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction .

4. DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations “The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations”, set forth in Chapter 9-28.000 of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual,

5. We believe that based on the merits of our submission that the nine factors have been met for the DOJ to conduct an investigation, determining whether to charge a corporation, and negotiating plea or other agreements:

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• the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public

;• the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate management;

• the corporation’s history of similar misconduct, including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it;

• the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents;

• the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program;

• the corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance program or improve an existing one, replace responsible management, discipline or terminate wrongdoers, pay restitution, and cooperate with the relevant government agencies;

• collateral consequences, including whether there is disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, and others not proven personally culpable, as well as impact on the public arising from the prosecution;

• the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance; and the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.

6. In our submission of filings, we respectfully ask the Attorney General and the DOJ as a whole, to look within, ask the question of yourself through your very own eyes;

7. To being the torch bearer of Stamping out such acts by the defendants in their criminal conspiracy the world over, on the basis of merits of our submission to open up an investigation.

8. In a civilized world such as ours, it can be said that when a criminal conspiracy perpetrated by conspirators goes unchecked, then you as the DOJ have the great responsibilities alike for the good of the very rights of the citizens of the State Party whom have been destroyed as a result of this criminal cartel which tears at the very fabric of democracy.

9. No self-respecting individual, no self-respecting State, can or ought to submit to wrong, you as Attorney General of the DOJ have in your hands the power to rectify and right such wrongs.

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We look forward to your reply by email in the first instance and or post.

Yours faithfully

Hiraoka Gasperi Social Justice Advocates

Strand, 7139 South Africa