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Stove Bibliography -1- STOVEBIBLIOGRAPHY (Compiled by James Franklin) BOOKS 1. Probability and Hume'sInductive Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973). (www.geoci- ties.com/ResearchTriangle/Facility/4118/dcs/hume/hume.html) [reviews by I. Hinckfuss, Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 52 (1974): 269-76, and by S. Blackburn, Times Liter- ary Supplement n. 3727 (10 Aug 1973): 935 (with correspondence Sept 28 and Oct 12, 1973); comment by J.E. Adler,`Stove onHume'sinductive scepticism', Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 53 (1975): 167-170; Stove's replies to these three in `Hume, induction and the Irish', Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 54 (1976): 140-147; further comment in S. Waterlow, `On a proposed refutation of Hume', Analysis 36 (1975): 43-46; P.J. Mc- Grath, `Hume'sinductive scepticism', Philosophical Studies (Ireland): 24 (1976): 64-81; J. Cassidy,`The na- ture of Hume'sinductive scepticism', Ratio 19 (1977): 47-54; W.K. Goosens, `Stove and inductive scepti- cism', Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 57 (1979): 79-84; G. Gawlick, `Zwischen Empirismus und Skeptizis- mus', Philosophische Rundschau 26 (1979): 161-86); K. Gemes, `Arefutation of inductive scepticism', Aus- tralasian J.ofPhilosophy 61 (1983): 434-8 (repr.inTweyman, David Hume: Critical Assessments vol. 11, pp. 44-48); W.E. Morris, `Hume'srefutation of inductive probabilism', in J.H. Fetzer,ed, Probability and Causal- ity (Dordrecht, 1988), pp. 43-77; R. Lantin, `Hume and the problem of induction', Philosophia 26 (1-2) (1998): 105-17; B.K. Hinton, `Is Hume'sinductive skepticism based upon rationalistic assumptions?', Modern Schoolman 77 (2000): 309-32; further reviews in Tijdschrift voor Filoso®e 35 (1973): 646; Philosophical Books 15 (1974): 24; Philosophia 4(1974): 375; Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974): 72; Philosophical Re- view 84 (1975): 453; British J.for the Philosophy of Science 26 (1975): 85; J. ofthe History of Philosophy 13 (1975): 413; Hume Studies 1(1975): 25; Mind 85 (1976): 297; Canadian J.ofPhilosophy 7(1977): 203; Cri- tique 39 (1983): 960] 2. Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists (Oxford: Pergamon, 1982). (www.geoci- ties.com/ResearchTriangle/Facility/4118/dcs/popper/popper.html) [criticism in R. Sylvan, `Science and science: relocating Stove and the modern irrationalist', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy 1(1984): 35-54; J. Watkins, `On Stove's book, by a ®fth "irrationalist"', Aus- tralasian J.ofPhilosophy 63 (1985): 259-68; S. Yates, `Stove's critique of "irrationalists"', Metaphilosophy 18 (1987): 149-160; K. Jodkowski, `Wspolnoty uczonych, paradygmaty i rewolucje naukowe', Realizm, Racjon- alnosc, Relatywizm vol. 22 (MCS Publishing House, Lublin, 1990), pp. 439-52; K. Jodkowski, `Zde- maskow anie bandy czterech (irracjonalistow), in K. Jodkowski, ed, `Na czym polega racjonalnosc nauki', Re- alizm, Racjonalnosc, Relatywizm vol. 7 (MCS Publishing House, Lublin, 1991), with Polish translations of Sylvan and Watkins articles above and of S. Yates, `Stove o neutralizowaniu slowwskazujacych na sukces'; S.C. Hetherington, `Stove's new irrationalism', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 244-9; summa- ry in J. Srzednicki & D. Wood, eds, Essays on Philosophy in Australia (Dordrecht, 1992), pp. 242-5, 282-4; comment in Z.A. Sokuler,`Several trends and problems in contemporary Western philosophical science', Vo- -2- prosy Filoso®i 1983 (11): 123-33; J.R. Kantor,`Scienti®c unity and spiritistic disunity', Psychological Record 34 (1984): 69-71; T.Theocharis & M. Psimopolous, `Where science has gone wrong', Nature 329 (1987): 595-8; A.J.M. Garrett, `Probability,philosophyand science', in J. Skilling, ed, Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods (Dordrecht, 1989), pp. 107-16; The Skeptic 12 (4) (1992): 51 & 13 (2) (1993): 47; K. Windschuttle, The Killing of History (Sydney, 1994), ch. 7; D. Miller, Critical Rationalism (Chicago, 1994), pp. 52-4; reviews in Times Literary Supplement no. 4187 (1 July 1983): 693; Critique 39 (1983): 960; Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'eÂtranger 108 (1983): 369; Philosophy of Science 50 (1983): 350; Quadrant 27 (6) (June 1983): 80; Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 62 (1984): 99; NewScientist 19/1/84, p. 36; Philosophi- cal Books 25 (1984): 250; British J.for the Philosophy of Science 35 (1984): 307; NewIdeas in Psychology 2 (1984): 81; Philosophy of the Social Sciences 15 (1985): 368; Dialogue (Canada) 24 (1985): 177; British J.of Sociology of Education 6(1985): 243; Studia Philosophica (Switzerland) 44 (1985): 237; Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa 23 (1) (1987): 119; Philosophical Studies (Ireland): 31 (1986/7): 356; Philosophy and Litera- ture 12 (1988): 155] 3. The Rationality of Induction (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986). [comment in B. Gower,`Stove oninductive scepticism', Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 68 (1990): 109-112; B. Indurkhya, `Some remarks on the rationality of induction', Synthese 85 (1990): 95-114; M. Rowan, `Stove on the rationality of induction and the uniformity thesis', British J.for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1993): 561-6; P.Maher,`The hole in the ground of induction', Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 74 (1996): 423-32; S. Campbell, `The fallacyofinductive skepticism', The Skeptic Autumn 2001: 25-30; reviews in Philosophy of Science 54 (1987): 612; Philosophical Books 28 (1987): 189; Canadian Philosophical Reviews 7(1987): 464; History and Philosophy of Logic 8(1987): 116; Times Literary Supplement no. 4367 (19 Dec 1986): 1429; Philosophy 63 (1988): 286; Dialogue (Canada) 27 (1988): 178; Modern Schoolman 65 (1988): 292; Reviewof Metaphysics 42 (1988): 411; Nous 23 (1989): 396; Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 67 (1989): 447; Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'eÂtranger 115 (1990): 716; International Studies in Philosophy 22 (1990): 137; Aquinas 33 (1990); 453] 4. The Plato Cult and Other Philosophical Follies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). [translated by Eugenia MartiÂn, El Culto de PlatoÂn y Otras Locaras Filoso®cas (Madrid: Ediciones Catedra SA, 1993); reviews in Times Literary Supplement 22 Feb 1991; Philosophical Investigations 14 (1991): 351; News Weekly 8June 1991; Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 70 (1992): 123; Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'eÂtranger 117 (1992): 572; Philosophical Books 33 (1992): 25; Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1993): 264; Dialogue (Canada) 32 (1993): 402; Canadian Philosophical Reviews 14 (1994): 59-63, comment in A. Mus- grave,`Conceptual idealism and Stove's Gem', in M.L. Dalla Chiara, ed, Philosophy of Science in Florence (Dordrecht, 1999), repr.inA.Musgrave, Essays on Realism and Rationalism (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 177-84, and as `Idealism and antirealism', in R. Klee, ed, Scienti®c Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science (N.Y., 1999), pp. 344-52; M. Huben, `Skepticism of philosophical thought', 1998, www.suite101.com/arti- cles.cfm/skepticism/13673] -3- 5. Cricketversus Republicanism, ed. J. Franklin & R.J. Stove (Sydney: Quakers Hill Press, 1995). [Comment in SydneyMorning Herald 6/1/95 p. 10, 7/1/95 p.18; Courier Mail 1/3/95 p. 8; Media Watch 32 (1995): 20; Philosophy 70 (1995), p. 300; Heraclitus 40 (Mar.1995): 14; Australian Ra- tionalist no. 38 (1995): 38; reviews in Adelaide Review no. 135 (Jan. 1995): 27; Australian 3/5/95: 12; Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 73 (1995): 511; Policy (Autumn, 1995); The Horatian,Summer 1994-5: 41-5; Salisbury Review (Dec, 1995): 41-2.] 6. Darwinian Fairytales (Avebury Press, Aldershot, 1995). [Comment in S. Blackburn, `I rather think I am a Darwinian', Philosophy 71 (1996): 605-16; J. Franklin, `Stove's anti-Darwinism', Philosophy 72 (1997): 133-6; Reviews in Perspective (Dec, 1996): 13-5; Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 75 (1997): 133-5, repr.in Rationalist News 31 (2) (Apr 1997): 8-9; History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 20 (1998): 108-10; Network (Scienti®c and Medical Network), no. 68 (Dec, 1998): 45-8 (www.cis.plym.ac.uk/SciMedNet/library/re- viewsN66+/N68DarwinianFairyTales.htm).] 7. Anything Goes (Macleay Press, Sydney, 1998; repr.as Scienti®c Irrationalism: Origins of aPostmodern Cult Transaction Publishers, Piscataway, 2000). (reprint of Popper and Af- ter,with introduction by K. Windschuttle (www.newcriterion.com/constant/stove1.htm) and Afterword by J. Franklin) [Discussion in A. Olding, `Popper for afters', Quadrant 43 (12) (Dec, 1999): 19-22; reviews in Australian Book Review (June, 1999); The Skeptic 19 (3) (Spring, 1999): 38; Sceptic (U.K.) 12 (3-4) (1999): 45; Washington Times 27/2/00; Comment in SydneyMorning Herald 19/12/98] 8. Against the Idols of the Age: A David Stove Reader: Essays Selected with an introduction by RogerKimball (Transaction, NewBrunswick, 1999) [Reviews in National Post of Canada 28/12/99 (www.isteve.com/Philosophy.htm); Spectator 30/1/00; Washington Times 27/2/00; www.theoccasional.com/Books/B-Goldman2/b-gold- man2.html; The Mises Review 6(2) (Summer,2000): 20-4; Partisan Review 67 (3) (Summer 2000): 500-3 (www.bu.edu/partisanreview/archive/2000/3/campbell.html); Virginia Quarterly Review 76 (3) (Summer,2000): 103; Australian'sReviewofBooks Nov, 2000, 12-13; Philosophy and Litera- ture 24 (2000): 497-9; Quadrant 45 (1-2) (Jan-Feb, 2001): 114-6; comment in Australian Financial Review 6/10/00, p. 82 ] ARTICLES 1. `Goths within the gates', Honi Soit (SydneyUniversity) 21 (5) (7 Apr 1949): 5 & 8. [on `certain vicious aspects of the policyofthe Public Library of NSW'] -4- 2. `Liberals, democracyand the anti-Communist bill', Honi Soit (4 May 1950). p. 5; [comment in P.Coleman, `Nothing but the bill', Honi Soit (18 May 1950), pp. 4-5.] 3. `The conditions of knowing', Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 30 (1952): 47-61. 4. `Anote on "relativism"', Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 30 (1952): 188-191. 5. `Two problems about individuality', Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 33 (1955): 183-188. [comment in J. Bobik, `Anote on a problem about individuality', Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 36 (1958): 210-215] 6. `Are professors overpaid?', The Observer (Sydney) 19 Apr 1958: 133-134. 7. `Popperian con®rmation and the paradox of the ravens', Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 37 (1959): 149-151. [critcism in J.W.N. Watkins, `Mr Stove's blunders', Australasian J.ofPhilosophy 37 (1959): 240-1] 8.
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