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Downloaded on 19Th June 2013)) The Structured Uses of Concepts as Tools Comparing fMRI Experiments that Investigate either Mental Imagery or Hallucinations Eden Tariq Smith ORCID iD: 0000-0003-4058-6619 Doctor of Philosophy September 2018 History and Philosophy of Science School of Historical and Philosophical Studies The University of Melbourne Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Abstract Sensations can occur in the absence of perception and yet be experienced ‘as if’ seen, heard, tasted, or otherwise perceived. Two concepts used to investigate types of these sensory-like mental phenomena (SLMP) are mental imagery and hallucinations. Mental imagery is used as a concept for investigating those SLMP that merely resemble perception in some way. Meanwhile, the concept of hallucinations is used to investigate those SLMP that are, in some sense, compellingly like perception. This may be a difference of degree. Attempts to reliably differentiate between instances of each type of SLMP remain unresolved. Despite this, the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations are each routinely used independently of the other. These uses are especially interesting in those published accounts of experiments where equivalent findings about the neuroanatomical correlates of SLMP are reported in support of diverging knowledge-claims about the role of SLMP in neurocognitive processes. This practice presents a puzzle. To examine one aspect of this puzzle, I compare the uses of these two scientific concepts in three ways: examining their roles in differentiating between types of SLMP; exploring how their respective historical developments intersect; and analysing their contributions in neuroimaging experiments. In presenting this series of comparative analyses, I will draw on three themes from historical, philosophical, and social studies of scientific practices: interest in material contributions to knowledge; accounts of how concepts are used in experiments; and explorations of the historical conditions within which current practices emerge. Building on this literature, my comparative analyses supports five related claims. My first claim is that the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations are each used as independent tools in neuroimaging experiments. My second claim is that, as experimental i tools, the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations are each used for investigating discrete epistemic goals. My third claim is that there are implicit interdependent associations that structure the uses of these two concepts as tools for independently investigating these discrete epistemic goals in neuroimaging experiments. This third claim rests on my analyses of both past and present uses of each concept. Firstly, as seen in their intersecting histories, there are disciplined performances of using the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations that carry-along shared associations about the mediating role of SLMP in thought. Secondly, these interdependent ‘mediator-view’ associations continue to structure the independent uses of each concept as a tool for investigating SLMP in pursuit of specific goals. Taking this further, my fourth claim is that recognising the structured uses of the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations can help to account for how equivalent SLMP-neuro- correlates are generated in support of diverging knowledge-claims. Finally, my fifth claim is that the structured uses of these concepts as tools can contribute to experiments in ways analogous to, yet not equivalent with, the active contributions of material instruments. Bringing these claims together, I argue that the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations operate as structured tools that can actively contribute to the knowledge generated by neuroimaging experiments. In presenting this argument I seek to demonstrate that examining the structured uses of concepts as tools can complement existing approaches to studying how the heterogeneous dynamics of experimental practices can come to contribute to scientific knowledge in unintended ways. ii Declaration This is to certify that: i. the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD ii. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used; and iii. the thesis is fewer than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies, and appendices. Signed, Eden Tariq Smith, 18 September 2018 iii Preface This following is my own work. None of the chapters are published, or in the process of publication. At the time of submission, the only related publication is drawn from just one of the five claims developed further here in Chapter Eight; a claim supported by research detailed more extensively here in chapters Chapter Two, Three, and Four: Smith, Eden T. 2018. ‘Interdependent Concepts and Their Independent Uses: Mental Imagery and Hallucinations’. Perspectives on Science 26 (3): 360–99. https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00278 The research for this thesis was undertaken during my PhD candidature, and has been funded through an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship (Australian Postgraduate Award, 2014 Round 1). In addition to this, I received faculty and school grants that allowed me to travel to international conferences and receive feedback from acclaimed scholars in my field. I am also grateful to academics in the History and Philosophy of Science program who provided teaching and research assistant opportunities throughout my candidature. In relation to this, I would also like to recognise the support shown by professional staff – notably, Sarah Gloger and June McBeth – who went beyond their expected roles in helping me find accessibility solutions. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the history of colonial practices I am a product of. While far from adequate, I offer my respects to the Wurundjeri people on whose land I lived and worked while conducting this research. iv Acknowledgements This thesis would not exist without the support of wonderful individuals and collectives. Most directly, I was fortunate to be supervised by Mike Arnold and James Bradley who both showed an unflappable belief in my abilities. I am also sincerely grateful to Kristian Camilleri, Fiona Fidler, and Gerhard Wiesenfeldt for generous advice and guidance over many years. In addition, my department was filled with so many wonderful people researching fascinatingly diverse topics. I would especially like to thank Tessa Leach, Katia Wilson, Fallon Mody, Kate Mannell, Hannah Fraser, and Martin Bush for the many conversations exploring connections within historical, philosophical, and social studies of science and technology. I also want to take this opportunity to publicly recognise the wide range of support I relied upon to reach this once-inconceivable milestone, and in maintaining an interest in what adventures might follow. Specific thanks are also due: to my parent Gray, for teaching me to question everything; to Fi, for celebrating divergent thinking; to Althea and Brooke, for continuing conversations after our contexts diverged; to Jo, for cultivating my interest in public policy; to Glen, for recognising the beauty of being in the moment and sharing that with me; to Mich, for teaching me to ask for more than I thought possible, and for steadfastly expecting to share whatever the future brings; to Tamlyn, for sharing intentions and enthusiastically investing in me time and time again; to Hän, for teaching me to hope, and repeatedly re-committing to the new puzzles of shared futures; to Wens, for effortless- connections regardless of how time passes; to Nicole, for adapting to my particularities; to Sony, for never taking me too seriously; to Max, for meeting me wherever I am; to Bek, for being such a resilient force of delightful whimsy periodically lighting up my solar system; to Kate, for generously sharing struggles and solidarity; to Frances, for co-creating a space of trust within which we can live alongside each other, regardless of what else may change; to Christopher, for expressing joy in momentary connections of mutual recognition; to Cam, for the unexpected chance to discover our uncanny similarities and valuable differences; to Anna, for demonstrating the power of defying norms, and sharing the challenges and value of resilience; to Naomi, for constantly questioning assumptions; to Bonnie, for such inspiringly nerdy excitement about brains; to Craig, for timely distractions and orbiting in ways that so reliably return to the spaces we create together; to maia, for thinking out-loud and letting me listen; to L, for helping to reframe uncertainties as possibilities; and to Tracey, for helping to build a future where dyslexia is no obstacle to academia – or anything else. v Table of Contents Abstract .................................................................................................................................... i List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ viii Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 Studying Scientific Practices ........................................................................................................................ 3 Using the Concepts of Mental Imagery and Hallucinations in Experiments ...................................... 8 1 Material and Conceptual Contributions to Scientific Practice .....................................
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