Lowering the Sword Author(S): Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) Source: Foreign Policy, No

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC

Lowering the Sword Author(s): Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) Source: Foreign Policy, No. 78 (Spring, 1990), pp. 92-112 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148631 Accessed: 14/04/2010 09:12

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http://www.jstor.org LOWERING THE SWORD bySalah Khalaf (Abu Iyad)

The past year has seen tumultuous and unforeseen change in the world order as it has stood since the end of World War II. A new and as yet unpredictable global balance is in the making, with consequences that will be felt everywhere, including in the Middle East. Turbulent as these times are, the Palestinian people and their representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), see new prospects for peace in the Middle East. As the tide of change in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, South Africa, and elsewhere has swept away obsolete notions and structures, the Palestinian people are very much a part of this historical process, albeit with their own specific conditions and challenges to face. This process has brought to the fore the great issues of self-determination, freedom, and basic human rights; and the Palestinian struggle cannot remain iso- lated within a world environment where such rights are becoming universally acknowledged and recognized. In this context, the PLO regards its own current political program offering a two-state solution to the century-old conflict over the land of Palestine, together with the nonmilitary uprising of its people in the occupied territories, as being entirely consonant with the spirit of the times. The PLOdecision to recognize Israel and to call for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on only part of our ancient patrimony is rooted in pragmatism, openness, and the readiness to dissolve the long-standing presuppositions, attitudes, and antagonisms of the past. The PLObelieves that its peace initiative has breached the "Berlin Wall" that previously stood as an insurmount-

SALAH KHALAF, known by the nom de guerre ABU IYAD, is a memberof theFatah Central Committee and headof national security affairsfor the Palestine Liberation Organzzation. 92. Abulyad able obstacle to a settlement. The task now facing all those who are truly striving for peace must be to enlarge this breach so that the re- maining barriers to a peaceful and free existence for Arab and Jew in the Holy Land will be brought down. Never have the international and local conditions for a settlement been more opportune. Global rivalry between the superpowers has receded. The arms race and with it the dangers of a nuclear holocaust have been reduced to a minimum. Both superpowers appear ready to cooperate in dealing with regional conflicts, as seen in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. From a Western point of view, the "Soviet threat" has all but been eliminated as the USSRundergoes profound internal changes and reassesses its commitments in the Third World. Communism, as an ideology, appears on the wane, as basic human values reassert themselves. Some have argued that the new era of de- tente, combined with such changes, will actually decrease the pressures on Israel to reach a peaceful settlement. The PLOsees things in an entirely different light. For although it may be true that the chances of a global war arising from the situation in the Middle East have diminished, other local threats to Israel and to vital Western world interests may yet be gener- ated by a continuation of the conflict. These threats include a return to extreme nationalism (already apparent in some parts of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union), the rise of Islamic fundamentalism even among Pales- tinians, the threat of nuclear, chemical, or bio- logical warfare (especially in view of Israel's unrestricted efforts in these fields), and in- creasing internal instabilities among those countries in the Middle East considered to be close to the West. By itself, a solution to the Palestine problem may not necessarily eliminate all these threats. But such a solution will go far toward defusing their dangers. What is certain is that the ab- sence of an equitable solution will exacerbate existing and potential tensions, perhaps to a point where policies such as the PLO'scurrent pragmatic and open approach will become neither possible nor relevant. 93. FOREIGN POLICY

This places a unique burden on those in Israel who still oppose a settlement and points to the absolute necessity of the United States' maintaining a truly constructive engagement in the peace process. The policies of the present Israeli government represent a throwback to the old order and fly in the face of all the positive changes that are taking place in the world. The idea that colonial rule can be main- tained indefinitely over a people who are bent on attaining freedom and self-determination is surely no longer acceptable or sustainable in the closing decade of the twentieth century. And yet this is precisely what the Shamir plan, named for Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Sha- mir, is offering Palestinians in return for their readiness to negotiate an end to the conflict based on mutual recognition. AmericanReluctance

What is most surprising and painful is not the position of Shamir or those of a similar bent in Israel, but rather that of the United States. While for its part the PLOhas spared no effort to show goodwill and flexibility toward the United States, the United States appears unwilling or unable to distance itself from the more extreme Israeli positions and policies. In- stead of responding positively to those voices of reason in Israel such as Abba Eban, Ezer Weiz- man, Yehoshafat Harkabi, and many others, the U.S. administration has adopted the Sha- mir plan in its entirety. The truth is that there has been little U.S. evenhandedness so far. Then President Ronald Reagan publicly promised a "substantive" dialogue with the PLOwhen the decision to hold U.S.-PLO talks was made in December 1988. Few issues have yet been discussed and the United States refuses to answer questions of substance in these talks at a time when the status of this dialogue appears to have been unilaterally downgraded by the Bush administration. As a result, the PLO still has no clear or serious understanding of why the United States itself---as distinct from Israel--does not support the two-state solution or on what its objections to such a solution are based. This is a matter of crucial importance and the PLO would dearly like to clarify the issues involved. 94. Abulyad

The PLO feels that its good intentions have been amply demonstrated and that the United States could do more to show that it is not totally constrained by its special relationship with Israel. Reviving and strengthening the Tunis-based dialogue would be a useful and productive exercise in this context. More sig- nificantly and practically, the United States could emphasize its rejection of Israel's settlement policies in the occupied territories and take direct measures to ensure that all such policies come to a halt in line with Secretary of State James Baker's own position on this issue as he declared it in May 1989. Of vital interest as well is the question of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union. For years, the central human rights issue as far as the United States was concerned was that of obtaining freedom of movement for Soviet Jews. And yet at the precise moment that unrestricted emigration of Soviet Jews becomes possible, the United States, in concert with Israel, has closed its doors to these emigrants despite their "human rights" and individual preference. Shamir has seized upon the pros- pect of thousands of emigrants to justify his "Greater Israel"policy and as a decisive answer to the demographic concerns underlying the Labor party's support for "territorial compro- mise." Palestinians cannot believe that the United States with its vast territory and resources is incapable of absorbing tens of thousands of new immigrants every year. Nor can they believe that it does not see dangers inher- ent in channeling such numbers exclusively toward Israel, given the propensity of the current leadership in Israel to extend its colonial presence in the territories. Further, they do not see how the United States can support the "right" of Soviet Jews to go to Israel but not support the Palestinians' right to return to their own lands. The PLO calls upon the United States to reconsider its decision to restrict Jew- ish immigration because of the dangerous and destabilizing impact on the conflict and the prospects for peace that continued emigration will have. Such a gesture could demonstrate American goodwill toward the Palestinians without straining U.S.-Israeli relations and would signal the U.S. determination to main- 95. FOREIGN POLICY tain a minimal distance from the more extreme and obstructionist Israeli policies. Strange as it may seem at first glance, Israel and the Palestinian people have similar and compatible goals. Israel wants to be master of its own fate-an independent state, secure, and at peace with its neighbors. We ask for nothing more than the same rights for ourselves. The Israeli government believes the two nations' objectives are mutually exclusive. Its view is that the independence, security, and peace of Israel are attainable only if the Pales- tinians' right to those same privileges is denied or at least severely restricted. The Palestinians now believe that the two peoples' separate quests for independence, security, and peace will either fail together or succeed together. The Palestinian peace plan is built on that conviction. It was offered to Israel in No- vember 1988, when the Palestine National Council (PNC), the highest political authority of the Palestinian people, adopted resolutions calling for a two-state solution and partition of the land between the two peoples. The plan itself is simple. The state of Israel would live in peace with the state of Palestine, which would be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. This final settlement would be part of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli agreement that would establish peace between the Jewish and Arab states, thus allaying Israel's security concerns and allowing it and its neighbors to invest their resources and energies in a prosperous and peaceful future for their children. Within the context of such a comprehensive peace, the Palestinians are open to any kind of local, regional, and international security guarantees and arrangements that do not encroach upon the sovereignty of any of the states involved. In presenting its peace offer, the PLO was aware of the difficulties involved, not least of which are the psychological hurdles that Israelis and Palestinians must clear before ear- nest negotiations can start. Palestinians realize that more than half a century of hate and fear, with the attendant bloodletting, cannot be pa- pered over with one document approved by the PNC. Many in Israel and the West have voiced their suspicions of our real intentions. How- 96. Abu lyad ever these doubts, whether justified or not, must be overcome if the cycle of death and destruction is to end. This has been the major objective of the PLOfor the past year. During this time we have worked virtually unassisted, and sometimes actively resisted, by the other concerned parties to answer the troubled questions of our own people, Israel, world Jewry, and the international community. While some Palestinians remain doubtful about whether Israel is sincere in its desire for peace, many Israelis remain convinced that the PLO is engaged in some demonic scheme, the ultimate aim of which is the destruction of Israel-a view that, unfortunately, is shared by some in the West. In the final analysis, nothing short of the achievement of self-determination will satisfy the Palestinian people about Israel's true intentions. And nothing will convince the Israelis that the PLO seeks to live in peace with them but the actual practice of a life of peace between Israelis and Palestinians. In the mean- time, however, misgivings on both sides threaten to abort the process before it gains the trust-generating momentum that will prevent both sides from slipping back into the cycle of violence. These doubts need to be addressed. The PLO has put aside the dream of establishing one democratic Arab-Jewish state in pre-1948 Palestine. We have done so because we have come to the conclusion that that dream is attainable only by an Arab-Jewish con- sensus. A unitary, binational state cannot be built without the acquiescence of both commu- nities; and if it is established by force against the will of one of the two, it cannot stand the test of time. The day may come when the Jews of Israel and the Arabs of Palestine, their mutual trust nurtured by a period of peaceful, prosperous, and cooperative coexistence, decide that their interests lie in some form of union. But unless and until that day comes, both peoples' interests would be served best if each went its separate way. The PLOhas not given up on basic Palestin- ian rights and has no intention of doing so. We have made many gestures in an effort to demonstrate the seriousness of our peace initiative. In the occupied territories, while retaining our 97. FOREIGN POLICY right to resist by all means possible, the intifada has adopted nonmilitary forms of struggle, even though Israeli guns are still killing Pales- tinians. We have recognized United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, condemned terrorism in all forms, and accepted Israel's right to a secure and peaceful existence, even though Israel continues to deny Palestinians that right. We have declared ourselves ready to sit down with any Israeli official and discuss our differences, even though Israeli law still prohibits its citizens from having any contact with the PLO. Our flexibility so far, however, should not be construed as readiness to concede the Palestin- ian people's right to self-determination in their own land in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. That is a concession that will never be made, unilaterally or otherwise, and the sooner everyone realizes this the closer the Middle East will draw to peace. The PLOis not ready to strike a separate deal with Israel at the expense of other Arab states. The PLOseeks a Palestinian-Israeli solution as an integral part of a comprehensive Arab- Israeli settlement to be negotiated at an international peace conference in order to ensure a lasting and stable settlement for all concerned parties. Answersfor Israel The more common questions asked by Israeli and diaspora Jews and their supporters in Europe and the United States also need to be addressed by the PLO: * The proposal of a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeliproblem is not the first phase of a plan to liquidate the Jewish state. Such a plan would have to be built on three assumptions: that the Palestinian people, who are now governed by an iron fist, will one day decide to attempt the subjugation of another people with equal or greater numbers; that the small Pales- tinian state that emerges in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will at some time in the future have the military muscle to defeat the strongest country in the Middle East; and that the international community will stand by and watch it happen. Those assumptions cast the Palestini- ans as masters of guile and workers of miracles and ascribe total moral bankruptcy to the 98. Abu lyad world at large. They hardly qualify as grounds for the rejection of an offer that promises to bring peace and prosperity to the Middle East. The PNC's endorsement of the two-state solution supersedes the one-state objective men- tioned in the Palestinian National Charter. Israel's acceptance of that solution would like- wise have to supersede the commitment to establish a "Greater Israel." * The Palestinian state would not be a base of Palestinian or other terrorist operations against Israel. Since the PLOdoes not expect Israel to take its word for it, the organization expects that security accords will be signed and security arrangements will be made to deal with such contingencies. * It is true that not all Palestinians or Palestin- ian groups approve of the PLO'speace initiative or consider themselves bound by PLOpolicies. Some Palestinians, in the occupied Palestinian territories and outside them, have on occasion made statements and taken actions that contra- dict the PLO'sposition. The PLOrejects those statements and disowns those actions. How- ever, the existence of a dissident minority is to be expected and must not be taken as evidence of the PLO'sinability to deliver on its commitments. Backed by the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian people in the occupied areas and the diaspora, the PLOnow has the authority to make peace and the power to make it stick. The real challenge to the PLO'sability to make peace, therefore, comes not from groups of Palestinian rejectionists but from Israelis or others who are eroding the hopes of the Pales- tinian people. If they succeed in crushing these hopes, nothing is likely to check the Middle East's slide back into violence. * Jordan is not Palestine. Neither the Palestini- ans nor the Jordanians can accept the East Bank as a substitute Palestinian "homeland." Israeli leaders, including Shamir, who habitually say otherwise appear to be consciously seeking to destabilize the region. It would thus appear that the true threat to the stability of Jordan comes not from the Palestinians but from Israel itself, in spite of those who argue the contrary. No less destabilizing is the idea of an enforced Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. Confed- eration implies the prior existence and subse- 99. FOREIGNPOLICY quent agreement of two or more states. Any kind of union between a state and a nonstate would be more a usurpation than a confederation and would as such be inherently unstable. A Jordanian-Palestinian confederation must therefore await the establishment of a Palestin- ian state, which can then decide of its own free will to enter into a confederation with Jordan, assuming that the Jordanian people have come to the same decision. That said, the PLOwould welcome a Jordanian-Palestinianconfederation with the approval of voters in the two states, and the PNChas repeatedly adopted resolutions to that effect. * A Palestinian state in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza may not be sufficient in itself to solve the problem of millions of Pales- tinian refugees living in subhuman camps a- round the Arab world, and the Palestinian issue will continue to undermine peace in the Middle East until the problem of the Palestin- ian diaspora is settled. We must therefore insist that the "right to return" should be on the agenda of any negotiation for the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; given goodwill on everyone's part, it can be settled in a manner that serves the vital interests of Israel, Pal- estine, and the region. * Finally, in answer to those who wonder whether there is an alternative to the intifada: There is. The intifada is an unarmed Palestin- ian revolt against the loss of Palestinian rights and lands. It will stop the moment a firm commitment is made to give the Palestinian people their political rights, including the right of self-determination in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The intifada will not stop on the strength of a vague promise of negotiations that rules out the right of self- determination. Regrettably, such vague promises form the core of the Israeli peace proposal. One of the proposal's basic premises is that "Israel opposes the establishment of an additional Palestinian state in the Gaza district and in the area between Israel and Jordan." The entire plan is geared toward the denial of the Palestinians' political rights. Thus, Israel refuses to deal with the PLO because, as Shamir has explained repeatedly, the PLOwants Pales- tinian statehood. Israel also refuses to talk to 100. Abu lyad anyone designated by the PLO, for the same reason. In addition, Israel proposes holding elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to select Palestinians to govern the "daily life" of those territories, with the exception of "security, foreign affairs and all matters concerning Israeli citizens" in the West Bank and Gaza. In other words, Israel wants elected Palestinians to "rule" Palestinian land under Israeli military occupation, on the understanding that the 50 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza that have been confiscated would remain in the hands of the Israeli settlers who now represent approxi- mately 4 per cent of the population, and who would not be subject to Palestinian authority. Both the West Bank and Gaza would remain open for additional Israelis to settle there. Israel would make the elections conditional on termination of the intifada, which must end despite the fact that the final status of the Palestinian territories-which Israel refuses to discuss for at least three years-is guaranteed to exclude the basic Palestinian right of self-determination. The ultimate purpose of the even- tual talks on a permanent solution, the Israeli proposal states, is the achievement of peace not with the Palestinians but with Jordan. Israel still refuses to discuss with any Pales- tinian, whether designated by the PLOor not, anything but the modalities of the elections. In other words, Israel rejects any Palestinian attempt to explore the ultimate purpose of the elections or to reason with it in the hope of amending its unacceptable ideas. Israel calls this a peace initiative. With such peace initiatives, who needs declarations of war? The PLOurges the Israeli government to reconsider. Israel has a right to independence, security, and peace, but it is undermining all three by denying the same right to the Palestin- ian people. The Palestinians are offering their hand. We hope that those of courage and vision on the Israeli side will reach out to us in return before it is too late.

101. FOREIGN POLICY Questions and Answers with Abu Iyad

Foreign Policy: Whatparallels and diferences are there in the situation of the PLOand Palestinians today,compared to thesituation of theJews in Pales- tineprior to 1948?

Abu Iyad: We can see a number of parallels and differences. In 1948 the Jews had come to the conclusion that the time was ripe to establish their own independent state in Palestine based on a reading of the ability and readiness of the Jewish people both in Palestine and abroad to support and sustain such a state, as well as the readiness of the great powers to recognize its legitimacy. The basic calculus behind this decision was that the Yisbuv-with international support-would be able to persevere in its efforts and overcome Arab-Palestinian opposition, by force if necessary. Now, after more than 40 years, we feel that we are in a some- what similar position. Although we do not have the military capability on the ground that allowed the Jewish leadership to impose the new state by force of arms, we feel that the intifada on the one hand and growing international support on the other have created the appropriate conditions for attaining our goal. At the same time we differ substantially from the Jewish leadership in that we have delin- eated the clear objective of establishing a state in part of our historic homeland that would live in peace with its Jewish neighbor within the framework of an overall resolution to the conflict. By comparison, the Jewish leadership of 1948 did not define its ultimate territorial objectives. Neither have subsequent Israeli gov- ernments. The Israeli government of today still rejects the idea of a two-state solution, which we believe to be the basis of a permanent and equitable solution.

FP: It is oftensaid in Israeland elsewherethat "the PLOoutside" the territories,especially the majority of its leaders,come from locationsthat are now Israel, and that theseleaders cannot be trulysatisfied with a WestBank/Gaza state. In this context, continuing insistenceon "all U.N. resolutions"and the "rightof return"for all Palestiniansare seen as euphemistic 102. Abu lyad formulationsfor inevitablePalestinian irredentism andperpetual claims forparts of Israel. Whatare the PLO'sreal and precise views regardingthe appropriate way to handlethe right of returnissue?

Abu Iyad: The issue of the "right to return" is a crucial one, but it is not an insurmountable obstacle to a settlement as sometimes portrayed by Israel. Our position is that the "right of return or compensation" (and the second part of this proposition is often overlooked) has been legitimized by successive U.N. resolutions since the General Assembly Resolution 194 in 1948. This right derives from the injustice committed against the Palestinian people in 1947-48 as a result of the creation of Israel and the eviction of 1 million Palestinians from their homeland. However, we are not totally unreal- istic when we consider just how this right may be implemented. For one thing, we accept that a total return is not possible, not least because Israel systematically razed more than 400 Pal- estinian towns and villages in 1947-49 precisely in order to make such return physically impossible. In addition, it is not at all sure that large numbers of Palestinians would want to "return"to live under Israeli rule, especially if a Palestinian state existed as an alternative. Equally, we recognize that Israel would not want to accept large numbers of Palestinian returnees who would tip the demographic balance against the Jewish population. Nonetheless, we believe it is essential that Israel accept the principle of the right of return or compensation with the details of such a return to be left open for negotiation. This would ensure that Palestinians in the diaspora and in the camps would have a direct stake in a settlement centering on a state in the West Bank and Gaza alone. Without some attempt to redress the grievances and moral injuries of this vital Palestinian constituency, it is possible to foresee future threats to the stability of any settlement. Thus, in order to minimize disaf- fection and discontent, we believe that Israel should remain open to discuss the right of return while we shall for our part remain flexible regarding its implementation. We also expect the international community to play its full role concerning the matter of compensation, 103. FOREIGNPOLICY and do not expect any one party to carry this burden alone.

FP: The PLOhas renouncedterrorism, while insisting on the Palestinians'legitimate right to resistthe Israelioccupation. This resistance is beingmanifested almost daily in the intifada by Palestiniansin the WestBank and Gaza who are alsofacing the determined effortsof Israel to punish them and demonstrate that Israelcannot be forced into makingpoliti- cal concessions.Where will thiscycle lead? Is thereno alternative?

Abu Iyad: We believe that we-like all other peoples-have the right to resist occupation with whatever means we find appropriate. The intifada,however, has developed its own partic- ular methods for confronting the occupation and we have been very clear about the need to adhere to a no-arms policy within the context of the intifada. While we expect Israeli repres- sion to escalate, we believe that the popular movement in the occupied territories cannot be crushed by military or any other means of intimidation. Our people are fully determined to continue the struggle until we have achieved self-determination and the two-state solution becomes a reality. From this perspective, we view the intifada as irreversible, and there cannot be any return to the status quo before December 1987. For 20 years any acts of resistance were branded as "terrorism" while at the same time we were told that the Israeli occupation was "benign" and that the standard of living in the West Bank and Gaza meant that the Palestinian people were content with the status quo. This has now been shown to be utterly false. The alternative to the cycle of violence is to enter into negotiations on a settlement that will ensure Israeli withdrawal and a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

FP: The intifada beganas an indigenousprotest on thepart of Palestiniansin the territories.It was not instigatedby the PLOoutside. Today, doesanyone controlthe intifada? If thePLO controls it, is thisthe bestway to achievePalestinian aims? If thePLO does not controlit, thenhow can thePLO truly claimto be thesole legitimate representative? 104. Abu lyad

Abu Iyad: The assumption that we did not instigate the intifada is incorrect. The spark that lit the uprising in December 1987 may not have been predetermined or planned by anyone, but the PLOhad prepared the groundwork for this moment over a period of many years by building up our organizational structure and creating the necessary framework for the intifada within the occupied territories. Our cadres led-and still lead-the movement in all its aspects: the demonstrations, the strikes, the popular committees, the social and logistical back-up, etc. Thousands of our young men and women have been killed, injured, or put in jail and yet the intifada continues with its infra- structure largely intact. The PLOleadership on the outside acts with full coordination and in partnership with the leadership and cadres inside. Decisions are made jointly and by common consent. The question of "who is in control" is therefore inappropriate since there is no real difference between the external PLOlead- ership and its extensions inside the occupied territories. This is confirmed by the un- doubted allegiance of the Palestinian people to the PLO and their insistence on its indivisibil- ity. Thus the PLOdoes not merely "claim" to be the sole legitimate representative of the Pal- estinian people, but is actually seen as such by the vast majority of Palestinians everywhere. For us there is no question about the validity of the intifada as a legitimate means to achieve Palestinian aspirations: On this all Palestinians agree.

FP: If thePLO is thesole legitimaterepresentative of the Palestinianpeople, and if this is acknowledged evenby themajority of Palestiniansin the WestBank and Gaza, thenwhat doesthe PLO gain by notgiving a '"greenlight"for WestBank/Gaza Palestinians to engagewith the Israelison the basisof the May 14 electionsinitiative? If thePLO is truly thesole legitimate representativeof the Palestinians, then is it possiblefor Israelto split thePalestinians-even if it refusesto dealdirectly with thePLO?

Abu Iyad: We have no problem with the idea of elections as such and we are ready to accept any serious proposals in this regard as long as 105. FOREIGNPOLICY such elections are truly free and democratic. We are fully confident that any elections would merely confirm the allegiance of all sectors of the Palestinian people to the PLO inside and outside the occupied territories. However, it is not evident that the Israeli government would accept such a result and we believe that it is being deliberately obstructionist by insisting on preconditions designed either to prevent free elections from taking place at all, or to denude them of any real meaning should they occur. The problem is that by demanding the exclusion of the PLOas a prior condition both to the elections and to any future steps toward peace, the Israelis expect us to rule ourselves out of the game. At the same time, Israel is making the absurd and illogical demand that it should have the right to designate the members of the opposite negotiating team. This has never happened in the history of diplomacy and cannot be acceptable to any fair-minded person. We are ready to negotiate all issues, including elections, with the Israeli government, but we will not offer it unconditional surrender.

FP: The PLOnow says that it acceptsa two-state solution.Many Israelisstill believethat this is only a propagandaploy, and that the PLo has not aban- doned,and cannotabandon, itspolicy of achievingits goal of "all of Palestine"in stages. Given the differ- encesof views within the PLO,why shouldmain- streamIsraelis believe that thePLO has truly accepted the historiccompromise of a two-statesolution?

Abu Iyad: The two-state solution was not dreamed up by the PLOovernight. Our recognition of this as the basis for a final settlement has come about after a continuous and difficult process of internal debate and discussion stretching back 15 years. Anyone who seri- ously bothers to examine the evolution of Pal- estinian thinking over the past years cannot but come to the conclusion that we are sincere in our proposals, culminating in the historic decisions made by the 19th PNC in November 1988, which were adopted by all major groups within the PLO. What is the alternative? We put forward our ideas for a binational state many years ago, but this was utterly rejected 106. Abu lyad by the other side. The only other choices are partition or war without end. We believe that the time has come to end this conflict once and for all, to free our people from the occupation and oppression they have suffered for over 20 years, and to bring peace and security to all. In the final analysis there can be no way to judge our sincerity except by putting us to the test. We call upon the Israeli people and their government to enter into negotiations with us for this purpose, and we are willing to discuss any number of security arrangements and guarantees that will confirm our sincerity. It should be remembered, however, that the conflict has not been one-sided. We have been at the receiving end of Zionist and Israeli political and military power for almost a century, lead- ing to the destruction of our society, the denial of our rights, and the dispersal and exile of our people. We could be equally skeptical about Israeli intentions and protestations concerning their desire to "live in peace" and yet we are willing to talk. We must now end this conflict for the sake of both our peoples, for our children, Arab and Jew, and for the stability and security of the whole area. The alternative can only be worse for all.

FP: The PLOhas long insistedon the needfor an internationalconference. Isn't it clearto thePLO that Israelwould refuse to attendan internationalconfer- enceunless its rolewere precisely defined and limited?

Abu Iyad: Our call for an international conference is based on a number of considerations. The first is that we recognize that the balance of power between us (as Palestinians) and Israel is so unequal that any bilateral solution would be tantamount to an Israeli diktat. Second, we are aware of the need? for a comprehensive settlement that will involve all parties to the conflict, including Jordan and Syria, which has land occupied-indeed annexed-by Israel. Without such a comprehensive framework we believe that there can be no stable and lasting solution in the Middle East. Third, we regard international participation in settlement as an essential part of engaging the major world powers such that they would have an interest in guaranteeing and supporting the final out- 107. FOREIGNPOLICY come. This should serve Israel's interests as well as our own. The structure and authority of such a conference are open to discussion, and we have already indicated our readiness to enter into prenegotiations with Israel regarding this matter. Unfortunately this has also met with no response.

FP: If it is clear that Israel would not attend an internationalconference, and the PLOrealizes this, thenis thePLO being serious andpractical in continuing to callfor sucha conference?

Abu Iyad: We hope that the diplomatic process will continue in a manner that would lead Israel eventually to reconsider its attitude toward the international conference. We also believe that it is up to Israel to propose a serious and practical alternative, especially in view of its own stress on the need for a comprehensive settlement, which even the Shamir plan calls for. But the Israelis seem to want it both ways: a separate deal with Palestinians that deals exclusively with the issue of the West Bank and Gaza and excludes the PLOand the Palestinians of the diaspora, and at the same time a deal that obtains universal Arab and international support. This does not make sense.

FP: Assumingthat a two-statesolution were implemented,how doesthe PLOsee the relationsbetween Palestineand Israel? What would be the natureof political and economicties? How would security issuesof mutualconcern be addressed?

Abu Iyad: We aspire to a situation where there would be two states living side by side with full political and diplomatic relations, and with a common stake in cooperation over a broad range of political and security matters. It may well be that this state of affairs will take some time to mature, as we are aware of the deep wounds on both sides caused by decades of conflict and destruction. However, given our proximity, our need to share natural resources, and the powerful economic factors affecting us both, we cannot see how it would be possible to live with an iron curtain between us, especially at a time when such barriers are coming down all over the world. Prudence and interest 108. Abu lyad dictate that we cooperate over issues such as water; the movement of labor, goods, and capital; the supervision of the passage between Gaza and the West Bank; etc. Further, we realize that we can provide a link between Israel and the Arab hinterland, and that Jordan will have to be approached to join a common framework of cooperation. We believe that there should be mutual and free access to the holy places on both sides of the border and that rights of residence for citizens of either state should be available on an agreed basis. It is thus possible that Jewish citizens of Israel could live and work in Palestine, just as Pales- tinian citizens could live and work in Israel. In the realm of security, we will need to establish a mutually acceptable framework to prevent cross-border incidents or disaffected elements on either side attempting to undo the settlement. In all of these matters, as with regard to every element of the peace process, we are ready to sit down and negotiate.

FP: Somekey Palestiniangroups have not accepted the newpolitical courseof thePLO. If thePLO leader- shipcannot discipline these groups, is therenot legiti- matefear that thePLO could not controlan independent Palestinianstate andprevent acts destructiveof peace?

Abu Iyad: The groupings that have not accepted our new policy are marginal and represent the views of a small minority. In addition, we should bear in mind that they are largely financed and supported by certain Arab states that use them for their own political ends. The issue of whether we can "discipline" these groups does not appear to be a legitimate one since no state or political movement can be held accountable for the actions of all its citizens or members, especially when we take into account that the groups concerned are acting outside our jurisdiction, under foreign auspices, and on territory we do not control. The Israeli government has trouble disciplining all its troops on the West Bank and Gaza, but no one in the West seems ready to use this argument to dele- gitimize the Israeli state, or to call into question the sincerity of Israel's commitment to peace. When we have our own state we will find the 109. FOREIGNPOLICY means appropriate to prevent "acts destructive of peace."

FP: Someorganizations represented in thePLO have continuedto attemptcross-border attacks into Israel from Lebanon,despite Arafat's December 1988 re- nunciationof terrorism.Has the PLOattempted to stopsuch attacks? Does it plan to continuethem?

Abu Iyad: As for the issue of military action on our part, it must be clear that we have not forfeited our right to resort to arms and that we consider this one of the many means by which we can rightfully confront the Israeli occupation. Israel has not given up its readiness to use military force against us both inside and outside the occupied territories (mostly against unarmed civilians), and it is unclear why we should be expected to disarm unilaterally. Further, Israel has shown no interest in negotiating a ceasefire or in accepting any mecha- nism that would reduce and control the level of military confrontation. Having said this, I should add that the PLO is practicing self-restraint-as confirmed by Israeli Defense Min- ister Yitzhak Rabin himself some months ago -and stands by its commitment to halt all "external"military operations, despite no similar commitment by Israel, as witnessed by the assassination of Abu Jihad in Tunis last spring. In addition we have adopted a policy of extreme caution and selectivity about the targets of our armed operations and will do our utmost to ensure that they are of a legitimate and military nature. This, again, is not matched by the Israelis, who continue to bomb our civilian camps in Lebanon with little restraint. Unfortunately, I believe the military struggle will continue as long as there is no peaceful resolution to the conflict. We will attempt to practice self-restraint in this respect, but we will not prostrate ourselves before the Israeli military machine. We aspire to a situation whereby true peace can be attained for both our peoples and where the weapons of death and destruction will be put aside for good.

FP: What did the PLOhope to attain from its dialoguewith the United States?How doesit assess the resultsso far? 110. Abulyad

Abu Iyad: We cannot hide our disappointment regarding the slow pace and narrow range of this dialogue. We feel that the United States still sees us in an antagonistic framework, and that it is unwilling to make any genuine effort to understand our fears and concerns. Equally, we get the impression that the United States adopts the Israeli line uncritically, with no attempt at evenhandedness between the two parties to the conflict. There is a structural bias in favor of Israel that appears very hard for us to overcome. At the same time we recognize that we still have a lot to learn about the political and decision-making process in the United States, and we hope that a gradual improve- ment in U.S.-Palestinian ties will make this possible. For our part, we will make every effort to safeguard this dialogue because of the vital role the United States plays in the peace process and its special relationship with Israel. We hope that through this process of dialogue and interaction the United States will become more responsive to our basic political demands and will come to realize that our national aspirations are just and necessary for a settlement. Recognition of our right to self-determination would be a vital step toward peace and we are unconvinced that continued U.S. opposition to this right has any real justification, especially since the United States is the only major local or world actor (besides Israel) that is still ada- mant in its opposition to the concept of Pales- tinian independence and statehood.

FP: It is said that thePLO is readyfor dialoguewith Israel, but Israelrefuses to deal with the PLO.Is the PLOserious in saying it is readyfor discussionswith Israel?If so, what concretesteps is thePLO taking to convinceIsrael of its seriousness?

Abu Iyad: Our seriousness is not in question. We have made any number of moves and gestures to indicate our readiness to talk, begin- ning with the resolutions of the PNC, and including President Arafat's appeal in Geneva, my own direct appeal to the Israeli public in February 1989, and tens of meetings between our representatives and Israelis and representatives of world Jewry. (It is Israel, inciden- 111. FOREIGN POLICY tally, that has passed a law making contact with the PLOa criminal offense.) In return we have seen nothing from the opposite side except "no to the PLO,"and "no to a Palestinian state." On top of this we get endless demands for more concessions, more gestures, more efforts to prove our sincerity, with no tangible evidence that this will be ultimately reciprocated. But in spite of this we will continue to try to convince the Israeli public that we mean what we say about a final settlement, and we are aware that we have not yet broken through the psychological barrier between Israelis and Palestinians. At the same time, however, we feel that this process cannot be one-sided and that those making demands on us to make yet more concessions do not seem to be making similar demands on the other side. Both sides must move closer together so as to make peace possible, and we feel strongly that those in Israel and outside who generally support the idea of a two-state solution must take more responsibil- ity for striving to change Israeli public percep- tions and government policies. This cannot be our task alone.

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