RICE UNIVERSITY

LEARNING TO LIVE: TACTICAL TRAINING

FOR THE AEF, 1917-1918

by

John Albin Almstrom

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN

PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

Thesis Director's Signature:

Houston, May 1972 ABSTRACT

Learning to Live: Tactical Training

for the AEF, 1917-1918

America entered World War One almost totally unprepared.

Her most urgent problem was the training of at least one million men. This thesis describes the content of tactical training in the United States Army, the development of an efficient system for producing qualified replacements for combat units, and the theoretical differences between Allies,

American Expeditionary Forces and authorities at home.

Because cavalry was employed on only the most minimal scale during the First World War, no attention has been paid to training for ,ll,arme blanche.11 Supporting forces such as aircraft, engineers or signals have been left out of this discussion in order to save space.

An analysis of American tactical doctrine concludes this work. Ideas concerning methods of assaulting machine guns are the author*s own, for which full responsibility is accepted.

Because the war ended before the full weight of America's military force could be applied, analysis of her performance on the battlefield must be tempered with an awareness that the final sophistication of her training system occurred too late to be of assistance to Pershing's army. The excellence of tactical education as it evolved in World War One would remain unproven until America entered a vaster and more desperate struggle twenty-four years later. CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: THE YEARS BEFORE THE WAR: INNOCENCE AND AMBITION 1

CHAPTER TWO: TRAINING IN 1917: AMBIGUITY, ADVENTURE AND ACCOMPLISHMENT..32

CHAPTER THREE: TRAINING IN 1918: PERFECTION VERSUS NECESSITY 83

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION: THE DEATH OF AUTOMATON TACTICS 120

APPENDIX A: Composition of United States Army, 1916 & 1918 Sources of Commissioned Personnel,1917-1918 Location of National Army Cantonments and National Guard Special Camps in continental United States, 1917. Location of Officers' Training Camps, 1917-1918

APPENDIX B: Billeting and Training Areas, American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1918. British Training Areas Used by the AEF

BIBLIOGRAPHY CHAPTER ONE

THE YEARS BEFORE THE WAR: INNOCENCE AND AMBITION

Americans knew they were special in 1917, when they embarked on their first great overseas adventure. The country had a fresh, clean feeling; and with that unembarrassed sense of purity and lofty purpose went an overwhelming confidence in the American way of doing things. One of the nation's greatest achievements at the end of the war would be the transformation of four million boys into troops tough enough to face the most seasoned army in the world. The story of training Americans in the Great War is a spectacular one of sophisticated organization fashioned under great pressure in scant months of crisis and chaos. Only years after the war would weakness and errors become known. Both the accomplishments and oversights, the utility and uselessness, of

American training are intimately bound up with the country's attitudes and experiences in the years before 1917. In order to understand America's exuberant performance in the most horrid of wars, it is essential to remember that hers was the happiest of homelands.

World War One represents to the American mind energy, benevolence, righteous vindication, unsullied glory. The overwhelming sense of uncomplicated accomplishment remains but slightly adulterated by feelings of betrayal or lost innocence, for the war did not last long enough to scar America's 2

youth or acquaint her masses with holocaust. Indeed, the magnitude of America's military achievements finds few rivals even to the present. A "back-water" police force of 127,000 men, distributed in small groups through a vast land, obsolete in equipment and limited in experience'*' was expanded into an army of over four millions. As many divisions were committed to battle over a period of one year as the British or French were able to commit in four. Housing was erected for 1,750,000 men. New industries were created, an entire economy reorganized, vast new bureaucracies established, and an exhilirating sense of mass participation spread throughout a diverse and indivi- q dualistic society.

Americans saw themselves, without cynicism or trepidation, as crusaders. The generation that led the nation in the great overseas "crusade for human rights," that fathered the "Armies of Democracy," had known neither defeat nor despair. Economic opportunities in a rapidly expanding society had been seized.

Technology had been applied to everyday life in a cornucopia of electrification, better roads, Pasteurized milk, efficient means of communication, even the extirmination of the house fly.

Political power, drawn out of corrupt hands by the osmotic power of public opinion, had been applied to regulate mammoth in¬ dustries and fulfill the paradoxical promise of Thomas Jefferson that the good of both society and individual could be maximized together.^

There seemed little reason to doubt that the redeemed

American could accomplish anything. The period from 1912 to 1914 3

was ore of America's most idyllic, replete with succesful men."*

Bernard Baruch, with a Wall Street fortune made on his own specualtive ability, was "prepared to rise or fall on ... individualism.Herbert Hoover, an orphan risen to millions in mining, was building a reputation for organizational genius and philanthropy. William Jennings Bryan, prophet of the little man, was Secretary of State under a President very typical of his constituents--Woodrow Wilson. Himself the object of a meteoric rise to power, the intellectually potent and unassail- ably idealistic Wilson captured the Democratic Party and the imaginations of enough of a progressive nation to be elected

President in 1912.

As the war in Europe manifest itself in all its horror and futility, America felt at first all the more justified in her sanctimoniousness as "the last best hope of mankind." 'This

European war suggests that maybe the white man’s burden is the white man himself," pontificate d the Buffalo Courier. The

New York Times asserted that the

European nations have reverted to the condition of savage tribes roaming the forests and falling upon each other in a fury of blood and carnage to achieve the ambitious designs of chieftains clad in skin and drunk on mead.

What whould the American do to combat this appalling manifestation of human unseccess? "Sit tight, keep his hands in his pockets and his mouth shut," extemporized the Riverside Free Press.^

British propagandists sensed that reticence, poise or apathy were not particularly prevalent traits in the America of 1914 to 1917. German atrocities, real and imagined, were used 4

by skillful press agents to play on the neutralist public's

O sense of decency and moral outrage. Failure of the Imperial

German Government to do acceptable penance for the 114 American lives lost in the May 1915 sinking of the Lusitania more than compensated for ill feelings created by the British blockade’s q persistent interference with American rights at sea. Prosperity gradually but irrevocably inserted its beguiling influence into the calculus of American opinion on the war, heavy Allied munitions contracts having inflated wages in some areas from 45 cents an hour to as much as $15 a day.'*'®

For what British intrigue failed to provide as impetus in pushing America out of neutrality by April 1917, the relentless

German talent for tactlessness more than compensated. In San

Francisco, consul Franz Bapp was convicted of violating American neutrality and conspiring to restrain interstate commerce by destroying factories, railroad bridges and military trains.^

Haskell, New Jersey was obliterated in January 1917 when the E.I. du-'Pont smokeless powder plant exploded with a blast that was felt fifty miles away. Only a few weeks earlier an increasingly alarmed public had found its own Edith Cavell, when Tessie

McNamara of Kingsland, N.J. stayed at her telephone switchboard 12 to warn workers trapped in yet another burning munitions plant.

German intrigue in Mexico, and the implication of the Imperial embassy in an attempted assassination of J0P. Morgan did much to nullify the $28 million propaganda effort conducted by hyperactive agents of an increasingly nefarious Kaiser.

As America began to feel more and more insecure her attentions 5

turned with intensifying credulity to the bellicose statements of those whose feelings on German perfidy were anything but mixed. Theodore Roosevelt, perhaps the most colourful and popular public figure of the time, assailed Wilson as Ma dema- 13 gogue, adroit, tricky, without one spark of loftiness in him."

For a nation utoo proud to fight," Roosevelt admonished that

To treat elocution as a substitute for action, to rely upon high-sounding words unbacked by deeds, is proof of a mind that dwells only in the realm of shadow and shame.

To such calls for a rebirth of national self-respect and virility, a powerful political response was not long in coming.

Prominent Republicans such as Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge attacked the President as early as 1914 for his failure to come to the aid of Belgium and the other western democracies.^ In December of the same year the American Rights

Committee formed in New York to arouse support for active inter¬ vention on behalf of the Allies. Although war pressure was not to become serious for another two years, popular attention came 16 to be focussed on the military vulnerability of the nation.

That America must rearm herself to survive in the world1s raging Darwinian jungle became apparent to all but the most persistent pacifists after the sinking of the Lusitania.^ National defence became the social crisis to which large segments of the concerned public turned their attention in the middle of 1915.

In June, the National Security League displayed its political 6

muscle by attracting twenty-two state governors to its New York convention. The Navy League raised $25,000 in twenty-five 18 minutes. Masses marched in the streets, women and children waving flags that appealed "Wake Up, America!" Streams of books, articles, and even films with such titles as "Fall of a Nation" and "The Battle Cry of Peace" were directed toward the spineless, the naive, or the unbelieving.^

"Preparedness," as the new crusade came to be called, soon brought to surface the prophets and saints attendant on any militant new faith. Most articulate of the apostles was Frederick

Huidekoper, long a student of American military self-deception.

In the ringing tones of muck-raking fervour so characteristic of

American reformism, he declared that

Our historians ... have painted in glowing colors the successes of our past wars and have extolled the prowess of our Citizen-soldiery,1 but they have glossed over the almost uninterrupted succession of blunders which has characterized our military policy in the past.2^

Huidekoper*s voluminous chronicle of short-sightedness and in¬ eptitude, entitled The Military Unpreparedness of the United States, became as scripture to those most alarmed by his evidence of

America*s perpetual vulnerability. Blame for a pitifully small regular army, further handicapped by gossamer organization for mobilization, a mere trickle of reserves and libratory recruitment was placed not upon the professional military, but upon past and present policy makers whose negligent complacency in matters of 7

national security invariably manifest itself in a disastrous penchant for waste and manslaughter. 22

General Leonard Wood, since his retirement as Chief of Staff

in 1914, had been residing at Governor*s Island, New York in his new capacity as Commanding General of the Eastern Department.

It was now to be his pleasure, so rare among professional American officers, to find a mass movement supporting his concerns and prescriptions for national security. That America would one

day face the necessity of transforming her small peacetime army

into a fighting force large enough to face the first-class land powers of Europe was a possibility never far from Wood*s mind.

He compared the situation of the United States to that of China, her vast wealth serving only to tempt greedy powers well prepared

to seize it. Material prosperity would not translate itself

into military prowess soon enough to save the country unless

careful, deliberate and effective plans were made in peace.

Although not the most gifted of speakers, General Wood possessed

stature and earnestness sufficient to publicize the need for

America to prepare her human and economic resources for a war

n / which would approach as "an avalanche rather than ... a glacier.11 4

Most European armies could turn in time of war to an

immense pool of trained men who had been conscripted to serve

two years with the regular force and a much longer period in

reserve. As such a system for developing a rapidly expansible

army was clearly ruled out by American political realities, many

professional officers despaired of creating an efficient mass 8

army out of volunteer civilians or taterdemalion National Guard 25 units within any period less than years. General Wood did not share such pessimism. While Chief of Staff he had demonstrated that infantry, cavalry and artillery troops could be trained in one year--an estimate he later lowered to six months1 intensive instruction.^

Leonard Wood was not one to separate himself from civilians, as did many of his colleagues. Pressing for the development of America*s military potential in a manner compatible with her national habits and traditions, Wood asserted that officer training, that most vital and time-consuming prerequisite of rapid mobilization must be conducted

with the minimum of interference with (the candidates^} educational or industrial careers, under conditions which will permit the accomplishment of their training during the period of their youth, and once this is accomplished will permit their return to their normal occupations with the minimum of delay.27

From these premises was conceived an important model for what was to come in World War One--the so-called Plattsburg camps.

Since 1866 regular army officers had been teaching tactics at certain public universities and private colleges. In 1913

General Wood decided that much of this training was both defective 28 in quality and deficient in quantity. A circular letter from

the Chief of Staff on May 10, 1913 led to the holding of two

training camps that summer: one in Monterey, California attended by 63 students from 29 institutions; and one of the fields of

Gettysburg, with 151 students from 61 institutions experiencing

the conditions of a soldier*s life. The object of such training, 9

stated General Wood to the presidents of the educational insti¬ tutions involved was

not in any way one of military aggrandizement, but a means of meeting a vital need confronting a peaceful, unmilitary, though warlike nation, to preserve that desired peace and prosperity by the best known precaution.29

From the outset, the summer training camps gained almost meteoric popularity. Henry Sturgis Drinker, president of Lehigh

University, stated upon visiting Gettysburg that American youth needed the experience of rigorous, self-imposed discipline, especially

those with well-to-do indulgent parents, and those who, lacking parental control, have developed an independence of action not consistent in all respects with the proper conventions of society and life.39

Drinker and his colleagues formed an uncritical supervisory Board of College Presidents, which included representatives of Princeton,

Harvard, Yale and Cornell.^ Save for the hot weather at

Gettysburg, the students themselves seemed to enjoy their 32 military experience. Willing to pay for their own transportation, 33 food and clothing, they returned to campus filled with patriotic fervour and scathing intolerance of members of the

Collegiate Anti-Militarism League, those hypocritical, snobbish representatives of the "effeminating tendencies of the timea"^

By geometric proportions grew the appeal of the camps. In

1914 six hundred students attended courses in Burlington, Vt.,

0 c Asheville, N.C., Monterey, Calif., and Ludington, Mich. Nine more camps were added in 1916 at Plattsburg, N.Y., Oglethorpe, Ga., 10

Fort Sam Houston, Tex., Fort Sheridan, 111., Fort Douglas, Ut.,

Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., Fort George Wright, Wash., and the Presidio at San Francisco. Enrollment for 1916 was expected to exceed twenty thousand--a hundred-fold increase in three years. 36

Entry into the strange new world of the military was presented as challenge and adventure. "You will wince at your blisters," cautioned a popular handbook of the day. "You will get no sympathy from any one else. It is the spirit of the camp 37 for every man to bear his own burdens." From the moment he lined up for his typhoid shots, drew his equipment and received his squad assignment, the student was "on a cadet status; that is, treated with the courtesy due prospective officers," but

Q O nevertheless under strict discipline. Day began at 5:45 with reveille, followed by breakfast and a meticulous inspection of tents and equipment. The remainder of the morning passed in strenuous drill. It had been originally planned to leave after¬ noons free for recreation, but such was the enthusiasm of the 39 cadets that the work day was stretched to eight hours. At nine o'clock "lights out" sounded over tired bodies and minds content with the sense of accomplishment.

Much training was crammed into six weeks. Basic drill movements were taught. Cadets became familiar with army routine and administration. Hours on the rifle range and drill fields taught physical discipline and self-confidence. By the end of the summer, the student was controlling as many as a hundred men 11

in realistic mock battle, making maps, discussing signals and engineering problems,^ and finding himself capable of up to a week*s strenuous marching with little sleep or mental relaxation.^

In the uneasy summer of 1915, more than college students were voicing an interest in receiving officer*s training. General

Wood, upon granting the request of several New York businessmen to attend training camps at their own expense, charily stipulated that less than 250 "enthusiasts** would not be considered.^

Sixteen thousand professional and business men, including such

figures as the Mayor of New York, were to attend camps at Plattsburg

/ Q and elsewhere by 1917. Both student and adult enthusiast would spend many an afternoon advancing through fields, taking cover in welcoming folds in the ground, again rushing forward, directing the movements of men, and wondering how many would not get up again were the "enemy" firing real bullets.^

If military education has a way of taking the glory out of war, so too does it add a sense of urgency to the demands of the newly informed for truly effective defense measures. At a time when behemoth armies grappled on the blood-soaked plains of

Europe, the mobile force of the United States, with an addition of 25,000 men, could be seated in the Yale Bowl at New Haven with room to spare. Of state militia forces totalling 120,000, at best half were effective. The House Military Affairs Committee

received testimony in December 1915 that there was enough field artillery ammunition on hand to serve the nation*s inadequate 12

arsenal of guns for but one day. Thence they would stand silent.^

Powerful speakers such as Hudson Maxim, James M. Gurley, Judge

Alton B. Parker and Henry L. Stimson heightened public interest in defence to the point where Woodrow Wilson, facing reelection, had to turn his reluctant attention to military matters in order

A A to prevent a Republican monopoly of the preparedness movement. °

Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison received the order to investigate and recommend a program adequate for rational security on July 12, 1915. By September, the War College Division of the General Staff, responsible for planning and coordination throughout the army, had submitted its views on "A Proper Military

Policy for the United States," An extremely well-written, lucid and convincing document, the War College report stressed that

America*s record of fortuitous survival blinded many to a full awareness of very real dangers which had "never been driven home by the bitterness of defeat."^ The ability of various nations to land large forces unopposed on American coasts was coldly displayed, along with the minimum forces which would be necessary to check the advance of the enemy, and serve as cadre for armies large enough to expel him decisively.^®

So effective were the arguments of the War College that

Garrison placed most of its proposals in a bill to be placed immediately before Congress. The regular army was to be doubled

in size to 280,000, a veteran reserve corps of 500,000 established, and provisions made to raise an additional Continental Army of 49 500,000 by voluntary enlistment in time of emergency. No faith 13

was placed in the National Guard as a reserve, for the War College believed it unreliable due to constitutional limits on federal control over training and deployment.”^

National Guard and ,fstatesl rights1 sympathizers were too strong in Congress to allow the Garrison bill to pass unemasculated.

When Wilson proved unwilling to stand firmly behind a Continental

Army, Garrison resigned. His replacement, affable ex-pacifist

Newton D. Baker, was able to steer a compromise bill through a quarrelling Congress which provided for a slightly larger regular army, a strong National Guard of a half million under firmer federal control, and a small reserve corps of retired officers and enlisted men. A framework for economic mobilization was laid by the creation of the Council for National Defence, a government nitrates’, plant, and authorization to commandeer un¬ cooperative industries in time of war."*'*’

Both good and ill resulted from the National Defence Act of

June 3, 1916. Loyalty of the National Guard to the President had been ensured, some provision made for emergency economic controls, recognition given efforts to train reserve officers in peace,

and authorization granted for wartime recruitment. But the one organization capable of making overall plans for rapid mobilization,

the embryonic General Staff Corps, was directed to station no more than half its members in Washington at any time. In the

spring of 1917, with war imminent, only nineteen junior officers were on duty in the capitol to plan what would become the most 14

sweeping mobilization in American history.

Unlikely though it is that the Germans ever doubted the flaccidity of America’s military muscle, any fears of the high command could not but have been allayed in 1916 by the antics of mobilization efforts along the Mexican border. The National

Guard, 158,664 poorly trained amateurs, was at least 100,000

CO below legal war strength. One unit suffered a 15^% rejection rate due to physical misfits. Railways proved inefficient, por¬ tending a repeat of the scandalous logistical chaos experienced during the 1898 Cuban expedition, should the United States attempt to mobilize more than 150,000 men. Artillery was in short supply, motor repair facilities inadequate, aircraft obsolete and unreliable.

Most amazing in the light of conditions on the Western Front known even to Americans, the army had yet to make up its mind on what type of machine gun to procure!The German General Staff realized that to open total submarine warfare against Allied shipping would bring America into the conflict. But how could

America in scant months turn the tide of victory in Europe before the submarines had strangled Britain? If America could not react effectively against a threat from Mexico, how could her entry into the most colossal and technologically sophisticated war in history be anything more than a pathetic, petulant gesture of impotent bravado?

Sunday, March 11 1917 Dr. Leighton Parks preached at Saint

Bartholomew's, Manhattan. His message: Christ was not a pacifist. 15

The Rev. Clarence A. Eaton echoed the theme at Madison Avenue

Baptist--pacifists made him want "to swear, pray, laugh and weep."“^ Following the sinkings of the Algonquin. City of Memphis.

Illinois and Healdton, angry crowds staged "loyalty parades" in major cities, unaware in their righteous outrage that their signs reading "On to Berlin" or "Down with the Kaiser" bore a tragic resemblance to those carried down European streets three years before. America had been insulted by the cynical despots of central Europe, and would not be taken for granted. Two hundred and fifty former Plattsburg reservists formed a "broomstick brigade" down Broadway. Flags, war news and martial music were everywhere.^

Wilson*s speech to the assembled houses of Congress requesting a declaration of war on Germany brought tears to the eyes of even so crusty an old man as Chief Justice .White. In answer to the President* s plea to "make the world safe for democracy,'* both Senate and House voted overwhelmingly for war on April 6,

1917. It was as if, said the New York World, "no one could have

told that there were two political parties in the nation. It was one patriotically joyous family eager to cry approval of the head of it.""^ Song writer George H. Cohen, born on the Fourth of July and author of "Yoiire a Grand Old Flag" and "I'm a Yankee

Doodle Dandy," created an instant hit with "Over There." A

suddenly pliable Congress moved rapidly to put formidable war

powers in the hands of the President. 16

Events in Mexico had underlined the truth of the War College*s

1916 statement that America*s tradition of volunteer military

service could not ,funder the most favorable circumstances produce

CO anything like the number of men required for national defence.

For years prominent experts on military manpower had assailed

the volunteer system as undemocratic, unreliable, inefficient and

extravagent. 59 When diplomatic relations with Germany were

severed in February, Newton Baker had a conscription bill drafted

for presentation immediately on the outbreak of war.^® By the

time the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917 was law, printed

registration forms and regulations had already arrived at newly

appointed local draft boards.

A twenty-fold expansion of America*s military force was envisaged by the Selective Service Act. The regular army was

to be enlarged from 250,000 to almost half a million. National

Guard units were to grow in strength from 3,803 officers and

107,320 men in June 1917 to over 450,000. Two added drafts of

500,000 men each were authorized to form a National Army up to

one million strong. 61 On June 5, in a process as painless as voting, nine and a half million young men between the ages of

twenty-one and thirty registered for the draft. A fortnight

later, Secretary Baker drew the first number out of a large glass bowl, and each local draft board brought up for consideration

candidate number 258. By the end of the war, twenty-four million men would be registered and 2,758,542 supplied to the armed 17

/TO forces, all but 8,000 of whom found themselves in the army. J

Well might an American ambulance driver serving with the

Canadian army comment in April 1917 that his countrymen did not know Mwhat war means: filth, mud, sickness; ruins and rain."^

Recruiting for the greatest of all adventures was booming, even

Civil War veterans trying to get into the army.^ The offices of the Emergency Peace Federation were smeared with yellow paint. Dachshunds were pelted with stones, sauerkraut became

"liberty cabbage," New York ripped up 5,000 lamp posts for scrap

iron, children rolled bandages or collected paper and tin cans.

"The most effective means of promoting durable international peace is to prosecute the war against the Imperial German Government,"

echoed the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in response

to the unmistakable sentiments of President and nation.00 Post¬ masters received instructions to report any "suspicious characters,

or disloyal and treasonable acts and utterances." A presidential proclamation of April 6 made it a crime to "tear down, mutilate, 67 abuse, desecrate or insult the US flag in any way."

A nation1s youth marched off to camp in a commotion of musical lightheartedness and ominous repression. To such tunes

as "Let's Keep the Glow in Old Glory (And the Free in Freedom

Too)" and "Your Lips Are No Man’s Land But Mine," draftee and

volunteer boarded his train, sated with the best wishes of friends,

family or the Grand Army of the Republic, not to mention ice

cream and cake. Merle Hay, a farm boy from Glidden, Iowa must 18

have thought himself typical. With eight dollars in his pocket and the smell of flowers from his Sunday School class on his best suit, he entrained for Fort Bliss, Texas. He would be the first to die in France.

Residents of communities as scattered as Yaphank, Long

Island, Macon, Ga., and American Lake, Wash, soon witnessed spectacular scenes of organized activity such as were to charac¬ terize American power to millions all over the world. Typical was the eight week transformation recorded on film by the Little

Rock, Arkansas Board of Commerce, of an empty field bordered by a desolate stretch of railroad track into a city of forty thousand. Great piles of pre-cut limber, pipes, nails, glass and roofing were deposited along the rail line. Shortly, teams of carpenters arrived. In one day the framework for an entire two-storey barracks could be erected; on the next, walls nailed and roofing finished.^9 Other crews dug sewer lines, graded roads, and installed electrical appliances, doorways and windows.

Quartermaster General Henry G. Sharpe instructed the

Construction and Repair Division of his department in March 1917 to prepare estimates for housing an army of a million men. When

Newton Baker created the semi-autonomous Construction Division in May, much planning had already been done.^ Colonel Isaac W.

Littell, head of the new organization, was soon able to draw upon the advice of such men as W.A0 Starrett, prominent New York architect, and a board of sanitation experts from the American 19

Medical Association.^ The success of the camps, traditional

pesthouses, in controlling the influenza epidemic of a year later

offered dramatic testimony to the skill with which these facilities

were planned, built and operated.

Pleas of prominent Congressmen were ignored in the selection

of the thirty-two camp sites which would house National Guard

and National Army divisions.^ Territorial departmental commanders

picked camp areas with careful reference to accessibility to

railroads and medical factors such as flies, flooding, inclement

weather, water supply and living space.^ A standard plan for

a two-storey barracks for the sixteen National Army camps, located

mostly in the northern states, was submitted to the Surgeon

General for approval. Studies were made of ventilation in the

tents which provided housing for the sixteen National Guard camps

in the warmer southern states. When it was discovered that the

men were tying down the flaps of their tents at night, more tents

were quickly provided to lower the occupancy rate from nine to

five men.^ Such concern for hygiene and comfort reflected the

War Departments awareness that the cantonments were to be the

dwelling places for men not accustomed to military life, but to all the conveniences of the average American home.

In general, the aim to create "an environment conducive to military

efficiency and contentment" was realized.^

A full division of about one thousand officers and 28,000 men

was to be accommodated in each camp. As an infantry regiment

required twenty-two barracks of 150 men each, plus six other 20

buildings for the officers, an entire cantonment amounted to at least 1200 barracks plus an administration building, post exchange, quartermaster's depot, 350 kitchens, myriad shower and restroom facilities, laundries, several hospitals, a com¬ missary and recreation hallsNational Guard camps comprised major buildings, and tents erected on wooden platforms with walls up to shoulder level and stoves installed inside. All camps were built around a huge central drill field, the buildings laid out in numbered rectangles on roads totalling twenty-five miles in length. Wayne Heter, with the 40th Division at Camp

Kearney, Calif, described his new home as no less than "a big, busy city, minus the vice and street corner loafers.” 77

Never since the construction of the Panama Canal had so mammoth a venture been undertaken by the United States government.

Using a new devise known as the "cost-plus contract,"^ 200,000 workers built thirty-two complete cities in three months. Five hundred million feet of lumber were consumed, along with six million square feet of roofing paper, 93,000 kegs of nails,

140,000 doors, 686,000 sashes, 29,250,000 square feet of wall boarding, 250 street lamps and three million square feet of screens. 79

When the recruits began to arrive in early September, two-thirds of the camps were fully completed. The remainder reached completion by early October. Recent expansion of the size of a rifle company from 150 to 250 meant that one barracks could no longer hold an entire company. Few problems resulted. So much 21

housing had been constructed that more barracks space was simply allocated to each company. Even so, most camps were seldom filled to capacity.

Induction into the army is a traumatic experience for most men. Few cannot remember the day when they first entered the 81 all-encompassing embrace of the military. At the outset, it was a feeling of shock. Trains for Camp Travis, Texas halted in the middle of the administrative area. Following a light meal, recruits were separated by counties, placed in alphabetical order, and directed to put their valuables in an envelope.

Benumbed youngsters found themselves naked, herded into a shower room, their fellows muttering something about civilian clothes 82 being shipped home. Thence followed the f,bull pen," a thorough examination by the "medicos" for contagious diseases and physical defects. After the hated vaccinations, the recruit found his way to the personnel office where documents on his private history 84 were filled out. He received his clothing and was sent to clean his quarters.

It is a shock to lose one's first name. It is irksome to never be alone. It is utterly dejecting to be spoken to con¬ tinually in harsh, clipped tones; to receive no understanding when one errs out of ignorance; to be constantly criticized and seldom commended. The unavoidable, onorous adjustments that must be made when entering the military have changed but little since the cold winter of 1917. All the more remarkable to the modern 22

eye appears the unmitigated enthusiasm and boundless good cheer

of those hapless recruits. The Canadian border was closed; Provost

Marshal Enoch Crowder was not discouraging vigilante bands looking

for Mslackers.11 Remarkably little protest appeared. One expects

the youth of then to have known what they were getting in to;

to have had some grasp, however rudimentary, of the futility

and tragedy of their crusade. Could they not at least have been

troubled by the sure knowledge, to even so innocent a generation,

that many would never return from their adventure across the seas?

Busy men have little time to brood. The human body and psyche display incredible resiliance when placed in the cauldron of war. The few hours not filled with exhausting training were the object of generous efforts by public service organizations, most notably the YMCA, Knights of Columbus and Jewish Welfare 85 League, to keep the youth of America happy and occupied. Every camp boasted its library, gymnasium, professional song leaders and sports coaches. Night classes were offered by the YMCA, and 86 plays staged by the Liberty Theater. Good food, wholesome and 87 plentiful, evoked few complaints. Veteran preacher Raymond

B. Fosdick*s Committee on Training Camp Activities saw to it that no "houses of ill fame, brothels or bawdy houses" were allowed to operate in the five-mile alcohol-free zone that surrounded each camp. Local communities did provide dancing partners on Saturday night, and some such as Houston quite literally brightened Christmas with immense trees decorated in red, white 23

and blue electric lights.

George Creel's Committee on Public Information flooded camp

and nation with war news. Monthly health reports for each divisional cantonment appeared in the Official Bulletin to reassure

parents that the government was not abusing their trust. Short,

hard-hitting pamphlets villified the enemy and expounded on

America's war mission. Films, popular speakers and visiting war

heroes added to the fervour. Society responded: people grew

victory gardens, observed meatless Fridays and wheatless Wednesdays,

consistently oversubscribed to the Liberty Loans. Wrist watches

gained sudden popularity when it became known that aviators

wore them. The venerable five-minute drill break may have made

the cigarette acceptable—it lasted five minutes, and came in

a packet small enough for army pockets. Possessive mothers

insisted that they would rather their sons went "to heaven in 90 France than to hell in America."

America's young men would learn much, and suffer even more,

in the next fourteen months. Should their determination falter,

Creel made sure that they received plenty of literature on

Germany's "vile and filthy treatment of Belgians," her glee in

skewering babies on bayonets, her use of priests as cover against

machine gun and artillery fire. Recruits in 1917 did not laugh

at images of submariners emptying drinking water from the life¬

boats of torpedoed ships*, or an old Belgian slave labourer sobbing

that "perhaps this shell will kill my son.Including the

scandal and didacticism of the pre-war years, the entire cognizant 24

life of most recruits had passed in an environment of moral

absolutes and direct cures for evil. World War One was to be

not so much a change for America1s newly minted troops, as a

climax.

Metamorphosing civilians into soldiers has changed little

in the half century since World War One. It would seem apparent

that human nature, and wisdom too, have not altered much. But

it was indeed a different generation that went to war in 1917.

It was a generation that trusted its elders—elders who had

known much success, little self-doubt. It was a generation only

beginning to adjust to the changes of belief and behaviour that

mis t accompany urban life. Youth felt the need to prove its

manliness, and thus welcomed combat as had its forefathers.

America possessed immense power, but had only recently discovered

the immensity of the feats that could be accomplished by

sophisticated organization. The very camps the recruits lived in,

still smelling of sawdust and fresh timber, were evidence of

their country1s material prowess. Confidence was a real, under¬ standable, potent force among America1s armies as they began

massing for their redeeming descent on a decayed and despairing

Europe.

But what of professional officers, that select group of

experienced men who would dictate the tactics and direct the

infinitely complex processes of victory? They had always realized

that more than money and flesh were required for success on the 25

battlefield. Yet no despair existed among their ranks, despite

America*s hoary and recent shortcomings. Comforting precedents had been set in the confusing years since 1914. Invaluable legislation had somehow passed. It had proven possible to train soldiers in less than a year. The nation*s leading young men were amenable to intensive leadership training. A small but expert body of military planners was in existence. And the emotional and economic support of an outraged nation seemed irresistable. NOTES

1 Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, Through the Fog of War (New York, 1938), 201.

2 Leonard P. Ayres, The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary (Washington, 1919), 29.

3 Excellent survey works on America1s participation in World War One include Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (New York, 1968); Frederic L. Paxson, America at War, 1917-1919 (Boston, 1939); and Charles Cullen Tansil, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938). A somewhat idealized account is to be found in Lawrence Stallings, The Doughboys: The Story of the A.E.F., 1917-1918 (New York, 1963).

4 Two penetrating studies of the pre-war years are Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York, 1954) and Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York, 1967).

5 Alan Churchill, Over Here! An Informal Recreation of the Home Front in World War I (New York, 1968), 4.

6 Ibid.. 10.

7 Ibid., 18.

8 A.A. Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs (Boston, 1960), 3.

9 See Link, Woodrow Wilson.

10 Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs^ 11.

11 Ibid.. 16.

12 Ibid.. 15.

13 Ibid., 31.

14 Ibid.% 30.

15 Link, Woodrow Wilson, 75. General works on the preparedness movement include C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775 (Harrisburg, 1955); Corrine Bacon, Selected Articles on National Defence (New York, 1915); Allan L. Bensen, Inviting War to America (New York, 1916); Granville Fortescue, Fore-Armed: How to Build a Citizen Army (Phi 1 adc 1 phia, 1916) ; Hudson Maxim, Defenceless America (New York, 1915) and Theodore Roosevelt, Fear God and Take Your Own Part (New York, 1916) and National Strength and International Duty (Princeton, 1917).

16 Link, Woodrow Wilson, 177.

17 Russell F. Weigley. Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York, 1962), 210.

18 Link, Woodrow Wilson, 177.

19 A good example of alarmist literature is Julius W. Muller, The Invasion of America: A Fact Story Based on the Inexorable Mathematics of War (New York, 1916).

20 Probably the most influential account of America*s long history of military unpreparedness was written by Emory Upton, (The Military Policies of the United States) in the 1880*s. This volume was reproduced by the Government Printing Office in 1912. Upton, also a tactician of note, believed that only a larger professional army had any hope of securing America against an invasion.

21 Frederick Huidekoper, MThe Lessons of Our Past Wars,** The Worldfs Work. February 1915, 406-419. See also Weigley, Towards, 204.

22 Frederick Huidekoper, The Military Unpreparedness of the United States (New York, 1916), 269-272.

23 Captain Henry J. Reilly, Why Preparedness (Chicago, 1916), v, vi.

24 Weigley, Towards, 210. Reilly, Why Preparedness, vi.

25 Robert D. Ward, MA Note on General Leonard Wood*s Experimental Companies,*1 Military Affairs, vol. XXXV, no. 3 (October, 1971), 92-93. Also Weigley, Towards; and Major Charles E. Kilbourne, ed., National Service Library (5 vols.: New York, 1917) , I, 287.

26 Ibid., 288.

27 Ibid..

28 Ralph Barton Perry, The Plattsburg Movement (New York, 1921), 11.

29 Ibid., 2, 12. 30 Army nncl Navy Journal, vol. LI, no. 2 (October 15, 1913), 229.

31 Kilbourne, National Service Library, I, 137.

32 _Army and Navy Journal, vol. LI, no. 1 (September 6, 1913),

33 lluidekoper, "The Lessons," 416.

34 Army and Navy Journal, vol. LII, no. 42 (January 19, 1915), 1323:

35 Kilbourne, National Service Library. I, 134. Huidekoper, "The Lessons," 416.

36 Army and Navy Journal, vol. LIII, no. 29 (March 18, 1916), 933. For description of life in the Students' Military Training Camps see Allen French, At Plattsburg (New York, 1917); or Perry, The Plattsburgh Movement.

37 Ibid.. 5, 22.

38 Army and Navy Journal, vol. LII, no. 11 (November 14, 1914), 333. See also 0.0. Ellis and E.B. Garey, The Plattsburg Manual (New York, 1917), 4.

39 Army and Navy Journal, vol. LI, no. 9 (September 6, 1913), 17.

40 Ibid.. vol. LI, no. 48 (August 1, 1914), 1530.

41 Ibid.. 1523. See also Ibid., vol. LI, no. 50 (August 15, 1914), 1593.

42 Ibid.. vol. LIII, no. 2 (September 11, 1915), 48.

43 Churchill, Over Here!. 47.

44 Francis E. Frothingham, "Plattsburgh Lessons," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, vol. LVIII, no. 200 (March-April, 1916), 205.

45 Huidekoper, "The Lessons," 417.

46 Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy. 334.

47 Army War College, A Statement of the Proper Military Policy for the United States (Washington, 1916), 29.

48 Ibid.. 41-45.

49 8ee Weigley, Towards, 218. 50 Army War College, A Statement, 47.

51 See Weigley, Towards. 219; Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 344, 345; Link, Woodrow Wilson, 179-196; Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York, 1967), 348-350; Coffman, The War, 18; and T. Miller Maguire, MThc War Policy of the United States," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, vol. LXII, no. 446 (May 1917), 260-268.

52 Weigley, History. 350.

53 Ibid..

54 Ibid., 351. See also Frank E. Vandiver and the Editors of Silver Burdett, John J. Pershing (Morristown, 1967), 68.

55 Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs, 34-35.

56 Ibid., 36-42.

57 Churchill, Over Here.1 , 43.

58 Coffman, The War, 25.

59 Ibid.; Weigley, History, 354; Leonard Wood, The Military Obligation of Citizenship (Princeton, 1915), 33-34.

60 Coffman, The War, 25.

61 Ibid., 26-28. Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 349-362; Weigley, History, 354; Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, 1932), chapt. xviii.

62 Coffman, The War, 28. See also Ayres, The War with Germany; Weigley, History, 357.

63 Ibid.. Coffman, The War, 29.

64 Quoted in Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs, 54.

65 Ibid., 53.

66 Ibid., 64.

6)7 Official Bulletin, no. 3, 6. Published daily under order of the President by the Committee on Public Information, George Creel, Chairman. Hereafter cited as OB, 3: 8.

68 OB, 118: 1. 69 Frank Freidel, Over There: The Story of America1 s Ftret Great Overseas Crusade (Boston, 1964), 11.

70 Coffman, The War. 29. Prior to the war a War College report had recommended divisional as superior to regimental camps.

71 Ibid.; OB, 220: 16-26.

72 Coffman, The War. 26ff.

73 OB, 220: 23.

74 Ibid.« 25. See appended map for location of camps.

75 OB, 97: 2.

76 Churchill, Over Here!. 86.

77 Freidel, Over There. 11.

78 For financial and legal details of cost-plus contracts for cantonment construction see OB, 26: 16; 34: 6.

79 OB, 97: 1-2.

80 Coffman, The War. 31. Also OB, 97: 1; 220: 24.

81 For an overdrawn but humorous account of first entry into camp see Ring W. Lardner, Treat fEm Rough: Letters from Jack the Kaiser Killer (Indianapolis, 1918), 17-19.

82 Freidel, Over There. 13.

83 Nelson Lloyd, low We Went to War (New York, 1919), 61; Chris Emmet, Give *Way to the Right: Serving with the A.E.F. in France During the World War (San Antonio, 1934), 7. OB, 89: 2. Some effort was made to prescribe remedial exercises for those who could be helped by them. Close attention was paid to detecting organic nervous diseases and mental deficiencies, as well as alcohol and drug addiction. See OB, 73: 1.

84 Lardner, Treat fEm Rough, 18. Each recruit received,if available, two pairs of boots, one hat with cord, five pairs of socks, two shirts and three pairs of breeches.

85 See William Howard Taft, Frederick Harris, Frederic Houston Kent and William J. Newlin, eds., Service With Fighting Men: An Account of the Work of the American Young Mens1 Christian Associations in the World War (2 vols: New York, 1922). Also OB, 147: 8. 86 W.M. Baines, ed. , Houston's Part in the World War (Houston, 1919), 91-92; Ralph D. Cole and W.C. Howells, The Thirty- Seventh Division in the World War, 1917-1918 (Columbus, 1926), 205ff; Alice Palmer Henderson, The Ninety-First at Camp Lewis (Tacoma, 1918), 141, 155, 157; Lardner, Treat 'Em Rough, 58,

87 Freidel, Over There, 22; Coffman, The War, 36, 65.

88 OB, 39: 7; Churchill, Over Here!, 95-96; Franklin H. Martin, ed,, Digest of the Proceedings of the Council of National Defence During the World War (Washington, 1934), 264.

89 Clipping from Army and Navy Journal in Major General Charles D. Rhodes, 1918: Diary of the World War (Unpublished manuscript) , 1-2.

90 Churchill, Over Here!. 53-90.

91 John S0P. Tatlock, Why America Fights Germany (Cantonment Edition) (Washington, 1918), 3-5. CHAPTER TWO

TRAINING IN 1917: AMBIGUITY, ADVENTURE AND ACCOMPLISHMENT

General Joffre, "Victor of the Marne," carried with him to

America as head of a visiting French delegation a well-deserved reputation for imperturbability. His incontrovertable composure, reinforced with a massive frame and impenetrable aura of portly capability, would serve France well in the spring of 1917. For unbeknown to an idolizing public, much less to harried War

Department officials desperately seeking consolation in the chaos of sudden mobilization, Joffre came not as a military messiah but as the representative of a beaten, demoralized, mutinous army. Scant weeks before, General Nivelle's bull-dog attempt to smash through the German lines had cost 120,000 men in two days.

Between Paris and the enemy there now lay not a single reliable division. Order was to be gradually, cautiously restored by the new commander-in-chief, General Henri Philippe Petain, only because he promised to "await the tanks and the Americans.

Because her own troops would tolerate no more offensives, France needed the Americans as surrogate soldiers for her generals1 strategic appetites. In order to survive, the French would attempt no less than to capture the soul of an army.

As a result of the Joffre visit, and possibly encouraged 2 by his insistence that trench warfare required little training, the War Department decided to dispatch to France a regular division, 3 brought up to strength by new recruits. Of much more influence 33

on the future of the American Expeditionary Force to be assembled in Europe was Secretary Baker*s decision to ask the British and French for instructors to assist ‘in training the new divisions being raised at home.^ Generous French instructional and material assistance was gratefully accepted in the confusing summer of 1917, Who was to know that it was seductively and cynically proferred on the theory that unity in materiel between

French and American forces would lead to tactical unity; that

American reliance on French weapons, particularly artillery, was expected in turn to create a dependence on French instructors,^

French tactics, French doctrine, French leadership? Joffre*s final report stated that Americans were strong, able to assimilate knowledge quickly, and likely to make good soldiers. The fifteen page letter, to Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau himself, also stressed that should the French actively encourage the

formation of an autonomous, separate American army, France would

c. be the more likely to win American support than Britain.

In the first two months of the war, the situation at the

War Department was "... as nearly a perfect mess as can be imagined.**^

Five semi-independent bureaus competed with one another in placing supply contracts. Few surplus stocks with which to equip the swarms of recruits that would enter the cantonments in September had survived the Mexican campaign. Care had to be taken not to interfere with vital Allied needs already under production in the nation's factories. And to make matters worse, Congress 34

g passed no appropriations until June 15. General T.M. Bridges of the British Military Mission regarded the War Department as an octopus without a head:

The Chief of Staff is past his work, and nearly all the heads of Departments in the War Office are over sixty years of age.9

Joffre noticed hesitancy among staff officers in making decisions, incertitude about organization, ignorance of facts, and a penchant to consult President Wilson on everything.^*® But despite outward appearances of confusion, delay, or even ineptitude, a General

Munitions Board had been established, civilian talent was being recruited, and provisions made to stimulate public involvement to the utmost.*^ On May 14, the transfer of "a proportionate number of men of each grade” from regular to newly created regiments had been ordered as a first step in creating cadre for the 12 training camps under construction. Even as foreign critics penned thier dispiriting despatches, the education of an army was well under way.

Officer training was by far the most urgent problem facing the War Department. Without sufficient qualified officers, training the private soldiers who would descend upon the army in

September would be absolutely impossible. The usual ratio of officers to men is one to twenty. If an army of one million were to be created in September, there would have to be 50,000 officers on hand. Only enough men could be spared from the regular army to provide commanders and staff officers from battalion level 13 up. Many National Guard officers lacked training. No time was wasted in solving America's gigantic leadership problem. 35

America's junior leaders for World War One were not born.

It was necessary to make them. Some officers command by charisma; some by caste; some by contrivance. Charisma, being a gift beyond the power of man to bestow, remained valuable but not mandatory for successful command. Caste often evoked unquestioning obedience and trust in European armies, including the class-ridden

British. But American society bestowed no birthright to command.

Obedience was owed no man except he who earned it by demonstrating his superiority to those placed under him. Farsighted and astute attention was paid by the military professionals, who selected candidates for commissions, to the social prejudices and habits which the civilians soldier would bring with him to camp and battlefield. For the first time in

American history, unfaltering effort was made to adhere to the

"merit principle" alone in choosing officers.

An "experienced class of men" was sought after, with varying degrees of success, for officer candidacy. The preferred age was over thirty-one, although men as young as twenty years and nine months were eligible if they could prove

"preeminent qualifications or considerable military experience.

Interested persons were informed that "no man need make application whose record is not in all respects above reproach and who does not posses the fundamental characteristics necessary to inspire respect and confidence.Particularly prized were an ability, coupled with mental and physical energy, to instruct, manage and lead new regiments as they formed.^ As many suitable enlisted 36

men an possible were to be given the opportunity to earn

commissions, contingent only upon the principle that "it

is better to rely on the excellent men of the next camp than

to rely on weak men, no matter how experienced."^

On the fifteenth of May began the sixteen First Series

Officers* Training Camps, located at thirteen army posts.

Approximately 38,000 candidates, of whom 8,000 were reserve

officers, attended. 18 Pressure on limited positions was immense:

160,000 applications for 30,000 vacancies.^ when the first

camps ended on August 14, 27, 341 new officers were available

with which to begin training the first 500,000 enlisted men

two weeks later. 20 Most commissions were granted in combat

branches, with three infantrymen graduating for every artillerist 21

In order to supply replacements for officer casualties, and

provide leaders for a second half million troops, another series

of officers* training camps was conducted at nine different posts

between August 27 and November 27. One thousand civilians

entered from each of the army*s sixteen territorial divisions, 22

in addition to 7,000 promising enlisted men, ex-officers, US

citizens qualified as non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in Allied

armies, and individuals with "valuable military experience and

adaptability for commissioned grade.1' Enthusiasm having been chastened by the imperious notices of the War Department

concerning youthful applicants, it became necessary to relax

the proscription on men in their twenties in order to solicit 37

enough applications to ensure Wide selectivity. "Men under 31 years of age are what are particularly wanted in this camp," recanted the General Staff. "Lack of military training in no way bars availability." Brains, courage and physical ability to stand the test of war became the new yardsticks by which eager civilians assessed their last immendiate opportunity to lead men.^ Applications, after a slow start, again soared above

25 vacancies by the July 15 deadline. In December the camps made available another 17,237 officers. Henceforth, candidates would be accepted only from among enlisted men^ and members 27 of military programs at selected universities. Graduates in the new year were to be commissioned only when needed to replace officer losses.

Throughout most of the war, the General Staff groped for the best means of organizing officer training. The first two camps had attempted to draw off qualified persons from army and

society in general. After the second camp, it was decided to cease operating separate schools at scattered posts. Officer training was put under the direct control of the divisions being built up since September. Each division commander was to operate

his own school and select his own candidates. Accordingly, a

third series of camps took place from January 5 to April 19 in

each of twenty-seven divisional training areas, producing 11,659

eligible officer replacements.In the spring of 1918, the

prospect that most divisions would hurriedly depart for France

in the near future made it unlikely that sufficient time would 38

be available to train a fourth series of officers. Furthermore,

events of the preceeding winter, both at home and in France,

had finally convinced the War Department to establish firm central control over training and tactical doctrine. Hence 46,000

candidates, attending division schools since mid-April, were

transferred in June to the five newly established Central Officers1

Training Schools (three infantry, one machine gun and one field

artillery) that were to provide replacements for the gigantic 71 army of 1919. Senior students at 647 institutions commenced

on leadership programs as well. But by the time uniform

training standards and a coordinated flow of officers had been

ensured by this final reorganization, the war was over.3f

Plattsburg proved to the army that much could be expected

of the intelligent officer candidate. The same type of training 33 would be followed now, with students being expected to master

the basics of soldiering in one month, and the essentials of 34 infantry or artillery command in a further eight weeks. No veteran of those early camps would forget how impossible it

seemed to rise to that challenge upon which the lives of thousands 35 would depend. Perhaps mercifully, lack of spare time

squelched such worries with sheer hard work. Reveille sounded

at 5:30, followed by a half-hour of "setting-up exercises," group

calisthenics designed to develop physique and muscular coordination.

After breakfast and inspection, the morning passed in a frantic

oscillation of parade square drill, classroom discussions of

the Infantry Drill Regulations, and communications or weapons

practice. Hard study in the evening followed a busy afternoon

filled with target practice, grenade throwing competitions, 39

tactical problems or short route marches.

An atmosphere of grave dedication precluded any complaints about the strenuous six day week. If one were to qualify as

"trench digger, clerk, target operator, prosecuting attorney, chambermaid, landscape artist and second lieutenant," 37 it was necessary to temper good intentions with a "grimness that bodes ill for the enemy." One had not only to develop the mind; indifference to hardship and ungrudging acceptance of discipline were prerequisite to leadership. The cadet soon realized that his status, "six inches below that of the assistant janitor, could only be elevated by a combination of aggressive study, attention to detail, and firm resolve to "obey the law and keep your mouth shut."^

Basic infantry training comprised the first month1s curriculum

for all cadets. Each camp was formed into an infantry regiment, with cadets alternating as privates, non-commissioned officers and platoon guides.^ The prospective officer began his professional education by learning how to stand at attention, move in various directions on the parade square, and give drill commands to the other eight members of his squad. He memorized

the parts of his rifle, and learned how to care for and aim it.

His shooting skill was refined on the rifle range. Packs, tents

and cooking utensils became familiar items through a series of

short practice marches which developed the physique and accustomed

one to living in the open with large groups of men. The basic 40

methods of advancing against enemy fire be spreading out in

long thin lines or running from cover to cover were made second

nature by repeated "extended order*'-drills. Commands and signals

for concentrating rifle fire on the enemy prior to the final 42 assault with bayonet were relentlessly practiced. One cadet

described his afternoon as "like hosing the garden on a rainy

day and lying down every few minutes,"^ Hours of sleep had

to be sacrificed in order to study infantry or field service regulations, those "perplexing, problematical, particular, pre- 43a sumptive propositions" which read like Webster's Dictionary. H

During the final two months of training the officer

candidate was exposed to the essentials of either artillery or

infantry up to company level. This period of "intensive drill,

long study and nerve-wracking examinations"^ was even more

demanding than the first four weeks had been. Infantry candidates mastered the intricacies of large parade formations, studied

the convolutions of court martial procedure, and attended

conferences on hygiene, first aid, or military regulations.

Skills with pistol and rifle were further honed. Hours x^ere

spent thrusting bayonets into sandbags, digging trenches, throwing

grenades, flapping semaphore flags, and studying for endless

examinations in tactics, administration or the abstractions of

trench warfare.^

All infantry candidates were expected to make close friends with Sergeant Hill, a creation of some imaginative officers from 41

the Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Problems selected from Studies in Minor Tactics, 1915 provided all types of vicarious combat experience for cadets who would have few opportunities to lead their fellows because of a plethora of students coupled with paucity of time. A group of students might be required to place themselves in the role of commander of a small patrol hidden beside a road deep in enemy territory.

Suddenly, a few enemy soldiers, blissfully unaware of proximate danger, approach the patrol. What whould the commander of the patrol do? Why? How would he return to friendly lines? What would he report? To answer such questions one had to know the

tactical objectives of the mission, the most prudent and

effective means of carrying it out, the capabilities and limitations of friend and foe. Passages laboriously memorized from field

service or drill regulations had to be rapidly exhumed from

tired minds, and logically applied to the peculiarities of the

situation in which one was placed. The imminent certainty of

urgently needing such knowledge in war, needless to say, more

than compensated for any failings of the imagination with a

dogged determination to le arn.

Artillery training being a much more technical matter than

infantry, most effort was expended in a crash program to make

cadets familiar with the basic mechanism and operation of guns,

caissons, wagons, signal and range finding equipment, and pro- fa jectiles. It was still necessary to learn how to train, care

for and drive the horses which pulled field pieces. Instruction 42

in fire control, planning barrages and other advanced aspects

of artillery usage was severely handicapped by a shortage of

equipment that was not rectified until well into 1918. Cadets

were obliged to learn how to adjust fire onto targets chalked

on blackboards. 47 Much reliance had to be placed on abstract

study of selected passages from the Field Artillery Drill

Regulations. which covered everything from basic equipment to signals or the movement of assembled batteries in parade and , , 48 battle.

Lack of equipment and absence of central control were the

major criticisms made by General Snow when appointed Chief of

Artillery in early 1918, and charged with developing a truly

effective training system. Instructors at Fort Sheridan at

one point had only four three-inch guns with which to train

six batteries. 49 Partly due to unequal distribution of what

little equipment was available, but mainly because of the

virtually independent control that each camp or division commander

exercised over training in his area, General Snow remarked that

as late as December 1917

the only uniformity among (officer training camps] was the ... wholly inadequate course of instruction, ... incompetent instructors and ... inefficient equipment.

Late one October night, a thin, haggard, nervous looking

man in an odd blue uniform was apprehended wandering through

the rain soaked streets of the Plattsburg Officers1 Training 43

Camp. Brought into one of the cadre*s quarters to dry, the stranger identified himself as Second Lieutenant Henri Poire, of the 8th Battalion, Chasseurs a Pied, French Army. An in¬ auspicious entree. An unassuming rank. A friendly, open, helpful man. This battered veteran, and dozens like him, was to become the object of some of the most venemous memoranda and bitter recriminations ever exchanged in the torpid, duplicity- ridden record of Allied coalition warfare.

Baker*s request for British and French instructors was still being processed at the end of August--too late to be of any influence on the first officers* camps.^ The French were particularly anxious to despatch instructors to America as soon as possible **to enable them to exercise their influence from the 52 outset.*' It was hoped that five officers, fluent enough in

English not to be disadvantaged by their British colleagues, could be sent to each camp to teach artillery, machine guns, 53 bombs and grenades, liaison and fortification. One hundred and thirty French officers reached the second series of camps, 54 with another 120 being placed in divisional cantonments. By

October 14, an advance party of 55 British officers and 101 senior NCOs had departed the Tower of London for American training camps. Eventually 261 British officers were employed teaching gas, bayonet drill and physical training. A total of 268 French officers concentrated on artillery and staff work.“^

Almost from the outset, subtle rivalry set in between the 44

French and British advisory missions for the tactical convictions

of the Americans, The British wished, on the advice of the US

military attache in London, to concentrate all their instructors

in a central school which would train American specialists.^

Authorities in the War Department chose rather to disperse 58 British and French instructors through all the training camps.

No instructors above the rank of captain were desired as the

recent arrival of British majors had caused the French to accuse 59 their Allies of currying undue favour. In March 1918 the

same complaint was still being made,^ although British majors

sent to USA served as captains,^ and the attache always stressed

tact in dealing with the French.^

Foreign instructors were seldom in direct contact with

American troops. Rather, they served as advisors to those 63 American officers directly involved in training. In the

absence of strong central authority and snooping supervisers,

it was only natural that inexperienced American officers slipped

into excessive reliance on their foreign assistants, even for

training decisions. American troops looked up to the decorated,

confident, foreign officers, acknowledged experts in the strange,

fascinating, frightening art of killing. Very soon, major changes

in emphasis began to appear in training.

From August 11 to August 14, candidates at the First Series

officers' camps engaged in a three-day field exercise, based

on open warfare tactics as taught by the Infantry Drill Regulations 45

of 1911. Company was pitted against company. Advancing groups put scouts out in front of their formations, and held support, reserve and main groups in readiness to deploy should major resistance be encountered. Surprise attacks proved a constant threat. When in defense, positions were prepared as directed by field service regulations. There was much exciting scout work, heated clashes, rifle snappings and "battles strenuously fought, with victory claimed by both participating sides.

Trench warfare too lad not been neglected. Cadets at Fort Sheridan spent nights in a realistic strongpoint, successfully repulsing dark forms which attempted to work their way forward by a caterpillar-like succession of rushes across the furrowed ground.^

Those who attended the Second Series had different, less attractive experiences. At Plattsburg, the week of September 24 was completely occupied in digging trenches. The process was repeated on October 15, culminating in a twenty-four hour occupation 66 of the complex. Cadet Chester V. Easum at Fort Sheridan re¬ marked that the trenches he occupied could not be drained, "so we sloshed in the mud in the cold weather. For sheer hardship

67 this surpassed the trenches in France." Conditions at his camp provided very realistic training for European warfare.

Exact battle conditions were reproduced as faithfully as possible, with rifle fire and salvos of artillery keeping up a continuous roar day and night. Enemy patrols attempted to steal past sentries, wiring parties went out after dark, careful camoflagc 46

was insisted on as part of a meticulous trench routine.

Captain Georges Etienne Bertrand of the Chasseurs Alpins seemed particularly pleased to see Americans expending such effort to 69 learn the realities of modern war.

Much vehemence in the future debate on officer training was perhaps unjustified. Fate had indeed been kind to the

American army in the summer and autumn of 1917. Shortcomings in artillery training excepted, the nation had been able to produce enough officers to commence training her soldiers in

September. Despite the lack of central control and standards for the camps, general use of the same set of drill regulations had been possible. Had prewar work assignments at the War

College been different, many manuals might not have been written in time for the hurried training of 1917. The effect on America*s crash instruction efforts would have been severe. As it was, a well-chosen group of exceptionally intelligent, extremely motivated and usually experienced men was exposed to enough training and information to set it on the path of successful self-education, once assigned to divisions.

Like long, bewildered lines of school children, the non¬ descript recruits filed into their training camps in the first weeks of September. One observer, at Camp Travis, described them as

less impressive than any other outfit £he had ever] seen. In intelligence, it was probably a little below, the American average, in education certainly. ... Its manners were atrocious, its mode of speech appalling, its appetites enormous, its notions of why we were at war rudimentary. 47

Every effort had been made to prepare draftees in the summer

before camps opened. The Official Bulletin, which was displayed

in all public buildings and probably reached most persons,

printed a thirty-lesson course for the prospective recruit.7 / He

was enlightened on America*s mission to protect the rights of

man. He learned what type of training to expect. And he was

prepared for a dramatic personal change:

You will be less wrapped up than you have been in many purely personal questions. You will cut loose from many of the petty details that tend to smother a man's individuality.72

The reader was advised to avoid poor food, alcohol, tobacco, and

indolence. Especially stressed was the necessity to eschew

**those things which tend to promote sexual excitement and desire,

particularly obscene conversation, reading matter and pictures.u/°

Creating an army at short, notice falls most heavily on the

recruit. After assigning men to their units within the division,

primarily infantry and artillery, basic training commenced. By

a relentless process of ,,drill, drill, drill, drill and then

occasionally ... details more tiresome than drill," it was

hoped to teach the recruit in three weeks what his prewar

7 fi predecessor had learned in three months. Life was orchestrated

to the sound of the camp's steam whistle, from reveille at 5:45

until lights out at 10 p.m.^ The intervening hours passed in rigorous drill, save for an hour or two of lectures on the articles

of war, America's war aims, or the need for "soap and sunshine"

at all times, flies being regarded as "more dangerous to soldiers

than bullets. 48

Basic training is intended to cultivate discipline and physical fitness. The American army, unlike most of its counter¬ parts, made an appeal to the intelligence of the average recruit in order to obtain fullest cooperation as he underwent the troubling transformation from individualism to a sense of corporate identity, mission and responsibility. “As a citizen soldier you are chosen for a post of special distinction,“ said the Official Bulletin. General Hugh L. Scott, then Chief of

Staff, made known his conviction that

The conditions under which modern wars are fought are ever making increasing demands on the individual soldier. ... The individual soldier must know how to interpret accurately orders and signals, for the enemy*s fire may so isolate him from his leaders and comrades ... that he may be thrown on his own initiative in making his actions conform to those of the whole line; he may have to use his own judgement in opening fire, in advancing, in intrenching.79

Qualities of loyalty, obedience, physical fitness, intelligence, cleanliness, cheer, spirit, tenacity and self-reliance were express criteria by which the best recruits would be selected as non-commissioned officers to replace their regular instructors 80 after basic training was finished.

Every day, following breakfast, company commanders inspected quarters, causing one Private C.W. Stubbs to report that he was “learning another trade, ... laundress.Each soldier mounted guard once a week from noon one day until noon the next, thus learning the intricacies of the Manual of Interior Guard

Duty. Evening parade and retreat, when the flag was reverently 49

lowered and furled, preceeded supper and such evening recreation 82 at the YMCA as tired bodies could sustain.

For most of the day, it was "fall in, fall out"®^ under

"lynx eyed officers"®^ who explained to the skeptical that

success in winning victories is the object for which the Army exists. In comparison nothing else matters. ... It is usually the Army with the strongest sense of team spirit that fights its way through to victory.35

Drill taught instant unquestioning obedience. Insistence on the minutia of guard duty introduced the individual soldier to direct personal responsibility for the safety of his comrades, that was to be discharged in a definite, precise manner. As groups of men saluted, changed step, marched by a flank or

turned on fixed pivots, they were acquiring new habits of humility, precision, concentration, timing, and most important-- teamwork.^

Infantry soldiers were taught that the rifle was their best friend. In 1917, there were insufficient Model 1903 Springfield rifles to equip all recruits, so recourse had to be made to

British Lee Enfields or Krag Jorgensens left over from the 88 Spanish American War. Leonard Wood, training a division at

Camp Funston, was obliged to have his soldiers whittle rifles 89 out of wood in order to practice the Manual of Arms. By demonstration if necessary, recruits learned the parts of a rifle, 90 and how to strip, assemble and clean it. The first targets were pieces of paper held on the end of a stick, as future

snipers learned how to hold and aim the weapon, control breathing 50

and gently squeeze the trigger. By early November, rifle ranges

had been completed, usually a day*s march from camp. Most

soldiers gained experience at ranges up to one hundred yards,

with some exceptionally well-trained units shooting at six

hundred. 91

Tactics to the soldier of 1917 meant "extended order drill."

Means by which to advance toward an enemy position and once

within rifle range to fire effectively upon it prior to bayonet

assault were taught successively by squad, platoon and company.

Squads of eight men learned how to spread out in a long extended

line on receipt of the command "as skirmishers deploy" from

their corporal. They were also practiced in the acrobatics of

springing from the ground, running forward a few yards, and falling

down again behind cover. It took some time to learn how to

fling oneself into a full run from lying flat on the ground, without first advertising one's intentions to the enemy sniper

by bracing legs or raising elbows and torso. Loading and firing

in positions on the ground or behind cover also became matters

of squad drill. What was believed by the army's tacticians to

be basic survival skills were pounded into the soldier until 92 they became second nature.

Section drills for forming skirmish lines, or reassembling

into marching columns, were duplicated on a grander scale at

platoon and company level. When the company commander decided

that enemy fire was too heavy to permit further advance in 51

vulnerable dense columns, the order was given to deploy by squads or platoons in a particular direction. Again, corporals would select their part of the skirmishing line and columns of men would dissolve at the double in a swirl of organized con¬ fusion as a thin line of men was formed. Sections or platoons might be directed by turns to rush or crawl a few yards closer to the enemy, until the entire skirmish line had worked its way close enough for effective fire and bayonet assault.

Fire control, as much as the evolution of combat formations, was a vital aspect of extended order drills. Elaborate hand signals were devised by which the company commander could indicate where and at what rate he wanted his men to shoot. Platoon commanders, lying behind their men, would look to the rear on hearing a whistle blast for the hand signals of the company commander. Corporals, lying behind the middle man of their section, would be watching for platoon commanders to pass on signals received from the captain. The section commander would then pull

the leg of the man in front of him, crawl up and whisper the new fire information in his ear. This man would then pass

the changes in target or rate of fire down the line of riflemen.

Warfare as envisaged in 1917 was an intricate affair. Aside

from the usual habits of obedience and self-reliance that must be inculcated into any soldier, a man had to learn where to move on receipt of various hand signals from higher authority,

how to operate his rifle rapidly and accurately under any conditions, 52

and what advantage to take of hillocks, trees, heaps of earth, rocks, gullies, or ditches as cover from enemy fire. A common means of indicating targets had to be established throughout the company so that the shooting efforts of 250 men could be controlled, despite the confusion and noise of battle, by one man. Natural fears could only be overcome by education and discipline. It took time to convince recruits that "a man 93 running rapidly toward the enemy furnishes a poor target.*1

Only long, hot hours of strenuous exertion could develop the physique and tenacious determination to advance against a rested foe taking cool aim behind elaborately constructed

defenses.

Marching, according to the Infantry Drill Regulations, con- 94 stituted the principal occupation of troops in campaign.11

Lives could be saved by constant practice in advancing under

fire, outshooting the enemy and storming his position with

bayonet. Energy was to be conserved for battle by teaching the men how to live in the field and march great distances with

minimal exertion. From the outset, daily practice marches

hardened the feet and famliarized recruits with packs, shelter

tents, entrenching tools and the rest of the sixty pound load

designed to render him self-sufficient for several days. One

learned how to drain blisters, or make a canteen of water last

the entire day. It soon became easy to erect a tent in seconds,

or dry boots by placing hot pebbles in them. Such training 53

evidenced itself, often dramatically, in faces bronzed, backs straightened and shoulders squared. Carriage and mannerisms changed. By Christmas the recruit of September was regarding himself as a veteran, looking contemptuously upon the constantly

arriving newcomers.^5

Artillery training suffered for at least five months from 96 a severe lack of equipment. Little could be accomplished

toward training efficient gun crews or skilled fire planners.

Use of demonstrations and printed material, plus the rotation

of available equipment through regiments, permitted some useful

activity. Important progress was made in October, when the

Army War College published a sixteen-weelc syllabus for the

guidance of artillery commanders, many of them inexperienced.

The first four weeks were to be devoted to subjects common

to all field artillery soldiers. Nomenclature and service of

guns, care and riding of horses, dismounted foot drill, calisthenics,

interior guard duty and hygiene received careful attention.

Some instruction was possible in outdoor cooking, protection

from gas attack, signals and side arms. 977

Twelve weeks of specialist training filled the final three

months of the War College syllabus. Personnel were grouped

into signallers, telephone operators, mechanics, horseshoers, 98 saddlers, drivers, cooks, and of course gunners. Once these

specialists had mastered their trades, artillery units were to

go to the field for battery live firing exercises designed to 54

perfect efficiency in operating pieces. Only then could be developed the skills of officers in analyzing types of fire appropriate to different targets, adjusting points of impact or planning various barrages. Most such advanced training was 99 not to take place until well into 1918.

For the first two months, training in the cantonments was

a matter of harried commanders and inexperienced junior officers

throwing together such information as they felt necessary from

their own understanding of existing regulations and unfamiliar conditions on the Western Front. In early November, foreign instructors arrived at the canps.^® Immediately, these veterans

of the European trenches expressed scorn for teaching the

rigid drills and tactical precepts of manuals written as long

as six years ago. Trench warfare, they said, was not a matter

of drill and mass formations, but rather one of specialists and

small teams. Emphasis at most camps, under the dynamic and

overbearing influence of British and French instructors shifted

from drill to class work. All grasped eagerly for the exotic new skills introduced by the foreign experts, officers lining

up to do the bidding of tactfully workmanlike British sergeants

or the ingenuously versatile French.Subtly but unquestionably

the overriding emphasis in training altered from attacking an

enemy in the open by dash and determination to outsmarting him

in defence, inflicting casualties by artifice and sophisticated

application of a wide range of special weapons. 55

Immediately upon arrival of French and British instructors, bayonet, sniping and special weapons schools appeared at each 102 camp. Grenades being rare, soldiers learned the awkward overhand pitch necessary to obtain high trajectory by throwing stones or tomato cans into rings laid out at various distances. 103

Gas attacks, ,fnot the kind your father has,11^®^ were the subject of constant sombre foreboding, the box respirator destined for notoreity as the greatest single nuisance in a soldier's life. Individuals selected to be members of the machine gun nsuicide club" received long and demanding training in giving fire orders, estimating ranges, locating a camouflaged enemy, judging windage, or stripping and assembling a complex weapon in the dark. Those not firing became acquainted with the insatiable appetite of this Concentrated essence of infantry,11 carrying ammunition to the firing points while awaiting their turn on the target range.

Bayonet skills received some mention in the US infantry drill regulations. British instructors, usually hardened sergeant majors with rasping voices and boundless energy, made of cold steel a fetish. "Every goddam mother* s son is scared,"^"* reported one soldier after viewing his instructor careen wildly from sandbag to sandbag, screaming like a Bantu at the top of his lungs and lunging viciously at the inoffensive, inert forms laid out to represent a hapless foe. Training in this supreme manifestation of the will to conquer began with simple movements, 56

progressed through man-to-man duels with masks, pads and long sticks, and concluded on a serpentine bayonet course with straw bundles hanging off gallows to represent human targets. Through strenuous practice under the biting harrassment of bellicose instructors, the soldier developed confidence in his ability to "put it where he wants it." The apt pupil could make as many as three lunges in a flash, any one of which would be lethal.

Some students entered into the game so heartily that they broke their bayonets pulling them out of dummy Huns. Very scien¬ tifically, and with painstaking attention to detail, the primordial savagery of hitherto amiable boys was nurtured.

November brought with it a crucial decision to base all artillery instruction on French methods, largely to bring training in the US into line with that of the American Expeditionary

108 Forces. More time was to be devoted to building shell-proof emplacements, establishing elaborate telephone circuits with forward observation posts, and taking precautions agAinst sudden gas attack. Pamphlets on recent operations in France were dis¬ tributed in the evening officers1 classes to supplement existing regulations.T _ 109

Trench warfare was an element of American doctrine before the war. Readers of the Official Bulletin the previous summer were advised that it would be foolish

to look on practice in digging trenches as if it were drudgery. Skill in seeking and making cover from the enemy1s fire is far from being a sign of weakness. 57

. . . The clay is gone when either officers or men are expected to stand out in the open. They should use every effective means of self-protection as long as it helps to gain ground and defeat the enemy, -J^Q

Most instructors had not had time to teach much about trenches

by November. Foreign instructors changed matters immediately.

Every camp was soon filled with sweating, cursing men as elaborate

trenches were laboriously dug. Defensive positions constructed

by the 27th Division at Camp Wadsworth eventually totalled eight miles.Once constructed, these full-scale trenches became

objects of all the sanguinary techniques of attack and defence

developed over three }ears in Europe.

After lectures describing trench routine, troops occupied 112 their subterranean positions for between 24 and 72 hours. A

vast jargon had to be acquired: duckboard, sap, listening post,

sump channel, mortar plate, parados, and parapet all came to

signify not simply lines on a neat chart, but items paid for with

hours of punishing labour. Once acquainted with defensive

routine, one learned how to crawl by night across tortured ground

without getting lost, how to cut wire quietly without receiving

a welcoming burst of machine gun fire, how to work down an enemy

trench by throwing grenades. A full scale assault with supporting

artillery fire climaxed a usually thorough course of instruction

that left most soldiers confident that when the time came they 113 would go "through them Dutchmen like they was fly paper."

Trench warfare is a mixture of utter monotony and unmitigated

drudgery, punctuated with demoniacal intoxicants of a sudden

attack, an eventful raid, a precarious defence. Training for it 58

was very realistic, including live gas attacks, generous use of available artillery, target ranges lit with flickering lights to simulate flares, and full scale battles with bayonet and barrage. But high American officers were loath to see their troops subtly seduced by machinery and gradually subverted out of their traditional reliance on accurate marksmanship as the prime means to destroy the enemy. General Dickman wrote that great attention was being devoted to instruction in defensive warfare, "grenades and bayonet being considered equal to, if not superior in value to, rifle fire.11 This looked to many of his colleagues like "false doctrine, ... a departure from the traditional American dependence of bkill with the rifle.

In their conviction tha: the novelty of trench warfare was "often exaggerated, "^5 America's military leaders by the end of 1917 were forming an implacable resolve to ensure that training returned to first principles: discipline, marching, target practice, and the spirit of the offensive.

Optimism about America's military prowess had considerably declined by the end of 1917. It had been a cold, sobering winter.

Once the novelty wore off and September's sunshine became

October's winds and November's frost, the camps took on the dreary appearance of lumber mills or mine shafts. Tarpaper

shacks floating in mud puddles, the rough hewn barracks with their

sparce, cold rooms offered little solace after a day's hard drill in the rain. A nagging insistence on discipline, particularly 59

saluting "ninety-day wonder" officers, was never well received by the troops.British observers noted a "false democratic sentiment which places officers and men on equal footing off parade," officers who failed to assert themselves, an NCO class 118 without authority. Most soldiers doubtless did not feel any such absence. For many, the winter of 1917 was the most trying period of their service. There was the relentless constancy and sameness of drill.There were nagging discom¬ forts: lack of cots, no warm clothing, oppressive cold. Suicides 120 and rebellion were not unknown.

Progress in forming a vast army was nevertheless' spectacular.

No less than forty divisions, or one million men, had been inducted, housed, and given at least rudimentary training. If

Pershing*s loyal followers believed after the war that the adoption by the General Staff of the "heresy of the trench warfare cult" imported by foreign instructors "merely meant that invaluable time was wasted," 121 the retort can be made that American doctrine had not come to grips with the developments in war, and that troops destined for European service could not but have learned much from experienced European soldiers.

General Pershing knew his mind and did not waste time. More independent than perhaps any overseas commander in US history, the purposeful and demanding chief of the American Expeditionary

Force selected the Lorraine sector personally as his army*s area of operations and training. The trenches between the hills of the Vosges and the forests of Argonne were to be America*s 60

122 crucible. French plans to establish American training camps

in Lorraine were already in existence as early as May 28, two weeks before Pershing*s arrival in Paris. It was envisaged that

infantry troops would be billeted alongside a*French division which would train specialists and officers in its own schools,

as well as provide instructors for the general soldiers. Billets

at Gondrecourt and Neufchateau were soon ready. Artillery was

to be detached from parent division for separate training at

Le Valdahon, near the Swiss border. As training would total

three months, camps were to be available to newly arriving

divisions just as their predecessors in turn departed for active

service. On June 28, Pershing*s headquarters approved the

French scheme.

Four divisions would arrive in France before the end of 1917:

the 1st and 2nd "regulars** and the 26th and 42nd National Guard.

All would comprise mainly untrained recruits, experienced men

having been leached out to fill new units being developed in USA.

Instruction of the embryonic AEF had to begin at the lowest

level.The first month was passed under the tutelage of

French divisions, who taught basic weapons and trench warfare:

grenades, trench mortars, machine guns, automatic rifles, the 126 37-mm cannon, rolling barrages, bombing teams, night patrols.

American officers tried to ensure that instruction in basic

open warfare drills and essential discipline was not overlooked.

A second month passed gaining direct experience holding a quiet 61

sector of trenches under the command and supervision of a French division. At this point artillery units rejoined their divisions to help provide fire support. The division remained together for a third month of open warfare maneuvers which culminated 127 the training process. Hopefully, by then the unit was fit both to occupy trenches in the immediate future and exploit the inevitable breakthrough of the following year.

By a combination of design and circumstance, the small

American Expeditionary Force of the summer of 1917 was destined

to develop into an independent army in all but name, symbolized by the overseas cap and the Sam Browne belt. Pershing from

the outset provided the sort of central control and overriding

authority that was lacking in America. He had an outstanding

staff selected from among the best of the nation*s officers to

assist him. Paternalistic but thoughtful care was taken to

ensure that morale remained high. Special postal regulations 129 kept up a supply of American reading material, ruthless 130 suppression of prostitution virtually eliminated veneral disease,

and the establishment of the Stars and Stripes provided a 131 sense of corporate identity to a widely scattered army.

Despite undeniable elements of truth in the allegations

of critics that General John J. Pershing was an autocrat unable

**to distinguish determination from stubborn obstinacy in his

own conduct,*' that he was incapable of honest self-examination 132 and surrounded by sycophants, Pershing was a man of such 62

iron character to be capable of genius and error on only the grandest scale. Bearing without complaint the wretched loneliness of the truly superior, he became impervious to criticism--both petty and pertinent. Through a long series of constant carping, nagging intrigue and relentless pressure to conform to Allied concepts of war, Pershing clung to his unshakeable convictions about how an army must grow and fight.

Discipline of West Point standards was expected at all

times in the AEF. In September, Pershing wrote in the first of many pleas to Washington that he could not

too strongly impress on the War Department the absolute necessity of rigid insistence that all men be thoroughly grounded in the school of the soldier. Salutes should be rendered in ... most military manner. ... The loyalty, readiness and alertness indicated by strictest adherance to this principle will immensely increase the pride and spirit of our troops.^33

Discipline accustoas men to doing the unreasonable, the inexplicable,

the unpleasant. It also accustoms them to doing dangerous things,

and thus justifies itself.

Underlying Pershing1s stress on discipline was a conviction

that open warfare alone could bring decisive victory. Trench

training was not to interfere with the development of expertise

and confidence in offensive field operations. Men had to be made capable of exploiting the impending breakthrough by fighting

fluid battles and winning by superior initiative.For such

combat, Pershing insisted that rifle and bayonet were the decisive weapons; marksmanship and teamwork, winning skills. 63

In August 1917 Pershing took the novel step of removing training responsibility from his Adjutant General and placing it under the independent control of a separate branch of the staff--G-5, under Major General Paul B. Malone. Malone*s organization was to develop courses, establish and operate training centers, determine doctrine, investigate methods of

IOC instruction, write manuals and promulgate regulations. Forceful directives soon began to flow from General Headquarters at

Chaumont to arriving troops.

No more than in America could the AEF be trained without making provisions for qualified instructors. One thousand lieutenants from the First Series Officers* Training Camps were sent to

French or British schools immediately upon arrival. By October

1 they were sufficiently trained to be sent to the 1st Division as specialist instructors in gas warfare, machine gunnery and 136 minor tactics. During the same two months independent American schools were being established to instruct platoon and company leaders, teach the use and tactical employment of various infantry weapons, and train instructors for such specialties as gas warfare or camouflage. Plans were made for a staff college, courses for higher commanders, and aviation and artillery facilities.

On October 15, the first corps schools opened, which produced 137 12,235 more instructors and leaders by December 21. ' Artillerists 138 and engineers were emerging from French schools and staff 139 officers hard at study in Langres by November. 64

Very soon after arrival, Pershing decided that his officers

and men were "far and away superior to the tired Europeans.

Early establishment of what was to be an extensive system of

AEF schools ensured that sometime in 1918 the Americans would

be totally free of any reliance on the Allies for training. In

the interim, forced to use French instructors while his own

were educated, Pershing watched very closely the content of the

training of his first divisions and impatiently awaited the

day when he would not have to exorcise heresy from his command.

Winter of 1917 symbolized and consummated three years of

European misery. The weather was colder than the ubiquitous

old men could remember. Food was meager, fuel rare, luxury vanished. In the major cities, such joy as was seen seemed

overcast with desperation or shrouded in cynicism. Women were

past weeping. There was no more youth to weep for.

Elements of the 1st Division began landing at St. Nazaire

on June 17.One battalion paraded in Paris on the Fourth of

July, inspiring hope from the desperate and despair from the

knowledgeable. An American observer thought the troops of the

I/O 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry looked "very young and very green." 4

One man in the crowd was known to remark that "if this is what

we may expect from America, the war is lost. These men are

not soldiers; they are a uniformed rabble.'1 The correspondent

of L1Illustration felt that

with their olive-green uniforms, their broad-rimmed 65

felt hats, their pocketed belts and their appearance reminding one of the cowboys of the American West, they brought a new and piicturesque note into our war atmosphere,

Both seemingly contradictory observations were accurate. America*s

first military emmissaries to France were at once totally

untrained and unreservedly enthusiastic. How literally one might

take their image as a blood transfusion for the battered Allied

armies would depend on the training they were about to receive

as much as on their undeniably invaluable spirit.

Exuberance was soon put to the test*. By the 14th of July

infantry was at Gondrecourt and artillery at Le Valdahon. Hardship

and inconvenience soon became familiar. Bed might be a niggardly

pile of rotting straw under a leaky rook in a filthy barn. Rain

and mud provided an unchanging backdrop to a dreary life of

interminable drill and fitfull sleep. It was cold, and fuel

strictly rationed. The French were cordial but odd--especially

for their lack of cleanliness. Manure piles had to be shovelled

away from doorways, and proper urinals built with pictures of

the Kaiser in them so the natives would feel encouraged to change

their sanitary habits. Food often amounted to little more than hardtack, weak coffee, boiled potatoes, and a few spoonfuls of rice. Pay was a farce.

At five o*clock in the morning, shivering men crawled out

of bed and cooked their greasy bacon. Usually while it was

still dark the recruits marched several miles to the training

fields. There eight hours passed in relentless drill, regardless 66

of weather. At four o'clock, as darkness approached again, troops marched back to their billets to chase rats, shoot craps and sleep. For those officers not attending schools, evening passed in frantic study for the next day's teaching.

French instructors provided some comic relief. A short, scrawny, sloppy individual with wispy black moustache and truncated gait, "Froggy" was anything but stentorian. One soldier, underlining with exaggeration a universal impression, noted that his tutor

smokes cigarettes somethin awful and dont say much. ... It must be awful not to talk English, think of not bein able to say nothin all your life without wavin your arms around and then lookin it up in

a dickshunary. £icj U6

In fact, men of the 1st Division were trained by the elite Chasseurs

Alpins—"Blue Devils" of the famed 42nd. Language problems still cannot be overcome by martial prowess. Continual demonstrations without explanations required both liberal patience and imaginative gesticulation. Soldiers nevertheless learned not to throw a grenade like a baseball. Training accidents gruesomely shocked the dilletante into respecting this weapon. Considerable progress was made learning to assemble and strip the Hotchkiss machine gun and Chauchat automatic rifle. Some difficulty was encountered coming to the realization that machine gun fire tends to go high unless carefully watched, that gas masks must be fitted in the smoke room, that dirty rifle grenades misfire.

Once familiar with basic weapons, the men of the 1st progressed to combined operations, with bombers working from shell hole to 67

shell hole under the protection of bayonet and rifle men, Chauchats firing on the flanks, and 37-mm cannon blasting machine gun nests.Extensive trenches were dug, including a complex known as Washington Center, large enough to stage divisional attacks. Soldiers became accustomed to trench routine, the tactical employment of various weapons, the conduct of small raids, the technique of regimental attack and defense. Brilliant rocket displays livened 'communications practice with artillery.

Dramatic demonstrations put on by the Blue Devils included rolling barrages, bangalore torpedoes, and perhaps some hint of the old French elan.^^

Pershing was never far away. Like a husband teaching a scatter-brained wife how to drive an auto, he continually made unannounced visits to examine the content of French training and ascertain the progress of the division. Though the French might teach pragmatic survival skills acquired at agonizing cost at Verdun or on the Somme, American soldiers were not to be distracted from open warfare training. Every suitable hill butt became a rifle range. Afternoons passed in turnip fields forming skirmish lines, rolling in the mud, charging through the snow, and marching, marching, marching.Memoranda flowed from Chaumont to the 1st Division and its compatriots.

Always stressed were close order drill, the bayonet, the daily march, the infantry drill regulations.

Artillery regiments progressed rapidly in their tidy, com¬

fortable camp. Four and one half hours each day passed in live 68

firing, gun crews mastering their drill in this most direct fashion.Pershing interfered very little with the syllabus, content to trust the famous French reputation in matters of gunnery. American theoretical training at the officers' camps the preceeding summer had been sound. For most officers, only the perfection of theoretical knowledge and practice of skills were necessary. Gun crews learned nomenclature, orientation and drill regulations, then moved on to live firing. Afternoons were devoted to a critique of the morning's performance on the range. At the end of the first month, specialists departed for separate training as liaison officers, aerial observers and orientation experts. By the time the artillery brigade rejoined its division for practical trench duty, it was able to adjust fire from different points of observation, plan and adjust all types of barrages, neutralize targets and move 152 efficiently on the march.

Save for a surprise German raid which killed three men on the night of 2/3 November, little of note happened during the month the division spent in the trenches between Luneville and

Nancy. Artillery fired desultory shots, the usual patrols went out, the odd rifle fusilade sounded forth. But in general it was a quiet sector which the French did not wish to see spoiled by. naive, rambunctious153 Americans. The division departed without medals or citation, but rather with the invaluable confidence that comes from having been under hostile fire and survived. A 69

sense of maturity outweighed the frustration of those like

Private Ray Congledon, who announced to the Literary Digest how badly he wanted to

Lick the guy whom you have cursed for months and who is the cause of all your hardships and sufferings.^54

Yet the intoxicants of 1914, imbibed As it were from the weeks esconced along old battlefields, flowed strongly in the veins of American troops. Only a battle of a nightmare could check effectively the eagerness of a generation raised on peace, progress and patriotism. It was as if the Allies had resurrected their dead of 1914. The Germans might transfer a score of divisions from the Eastern front, but they were tired troops.

Enthusiasm, even according to the most pessimistic French observers, was the most valuable asset of the American Expeditionary

Force.

Pershing did not want enthusiasm sapped by sedentary training.

On October 6, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the French in a strong document which directed all instruction "to contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offensive. Attack was to be a habit of thought. "The general principles governing combat remain unchanged," asserted G-5. Special weapons may have their use, but training was to be directed and assessed according to the venerable trinity of Drill Regulations, Small Arms Firing

Manual and Field Service Regulations. Rifle, bayonet and discipline were to receive maximum stress.

In early December, the 1st Division, under a new commander 70

and thoroughly purged by Pershing, began a month’s open warfare maneuvers. Full scale assaults were conducted at Washington

Center. Miles of telephone wire were unreeled, command posts set up and closed down, aircraft flown, gas alarms sounded.

Hot food from the mobile kitchens gave tired soldiers 6ome hope of survival until they had finished "training their officers." 157 On January 5, the division was finally decreed ready for combat.

Training of the 26th Division, which arrived on October 31, was slowed by the need to use large bodies of men in construction gangs along the AEF line of communications. A sound, and rare, background in marksmanship gained in the USA provided some relief from a crowded training schedule, basically the same as that followed by the 1st Division although located at another 158 camp with another French instructional unit. The 42nd

Division arrived on November 8.^-^ On December 12 a three day march brought the division to a new area. A third move commenced on December 26 that was to take the division 100 miles in five days. With ill-fitting boots supplied only hours before departure, and heavy packs, twelve miles through driving snow were covered in the first day. Lunch was two slices of cold bacon on a piece of bread; bed, an icy wooden floor. Bleeding feet marked the division’s path the following day. Upon arrival at Perrogney five days after setting out, this division was inoculated to suffering and learning the wisdom of soldierly 160 stoicism. 71

Allied reaction to the performance of the Americans in the first eight months of the war was much akin to that of a weary teacher to a clever but truculent pupil. Enthusiasm among the troops was admired by all. But what of their numbers and quality? By January 1918 only five divisions had arrived in France. One was ready for action. Things were moving slowly in America, too. An unsigned report of the French

Military Mission in USA predicted that Americans would not fight in great numbers during 1918, due mainly to an excessively long period of abstract training, shortage of equipment and insufficient transport. ^1 The "slowness of American military administration, ... and the backward state of mind of some of 162 its leaders” was also attacked by Field Marshal "Wully"

Robertson, who accused the Americans of "proceeding as if they had years in which to prepare.” The Chief of the Imperial

General Staff regarded Pershing as "rather tired," lacking "a considered view of the nature of his task, or how to set about it." America seemed, with some justification, "a very weak reed, to, -Ilean upon. ,,163

Not only the Allies wanted change in America1s mobilization performance. General Sibert, when commander of the 1st Division, remarked that his troops soon became bored under French instructors. He wished the Allies to provide only advice and 163 guidance in trench warfare exercises for officers. Pershing heartily agreed, writing to Pdftain on January 6 that "our troops 72

have made better progress under their own instructors and

according to our own methods."164

Things were being done to Pershing*s army that he did not

like. Preventive action would have to be taken before troops

set foot in France. On October 2, Pershing noticed some men

of the 1st Division failing to use their rifles while taking 165 trenches. A cable was immediately sent to Washington, whence

it was promulgated to training camps throughout USA. Pershing

suggested that all troops receive a complete course in rifle practice before departure for France as rifle ranges were

scarce in the AEF. Trench warfare was on no account to be

allowed to interfere with the basics of marksmanship and extended

order drill.^6 But t^e chief Qf the AEF could only suggest,

not prescribe, training in America*s camps. Befuddled, over¬

worked minds in Washington proved pliable to the suggestions

of a large and assiduous Allied training mission. One circular

stated trench warfare to be of paramount importance, particularly

maddening Pershing.^7 Some sort of coordination between

training in America and training in France was being requested

by both Allies and AEF, although for different reasons.

By December, America was revealing her inherent impatience.

Dramatic shortcomings, especially in clothing and weapons, 00

provoked Chairman George B. Chamberlain of the Senate Military

Affairs Committee to charge that **the military establishment of

America has fallen down ... because of inefficiency in every 73

department of the Government of the United States." Ships were known to have been loaded before coal was available for

them to sail, while other vessels full of coal stood idle.

Space had been wasted shipping bath tubs, cuspidors, floor

wax and lawn mowers to an exasperated Pershing.170 Shivering

troops in the cantonments represented a slap in the face to

the trust of American parenthood.

Most supply problems were on their way to solution by

December. The need for more rigid training organization had

been recognized by foreign advisers, overseas commanders and

the War Department. America’s army was getting pondorously

to its feet, like a massive dinosaur goaded into fight. Problems

had been identified and solutions proposed. But war remains

essentially a race against time. Would the new year catch

America’s soldiers short of life-saving training? And would

their training fit them for the realities of imminent combat? NOTES

1 Barrie Pitt, 1918: The Last Act (New York, 1962), 61. Also Weigley, History, 355; and especially Richard M. Warot, Dare Call It Treason (New York, 1963) .

2 Field Marshal Joffre, The Personal Memoirs of Joffre (New York, 1932), 571, 574.

3 Weigley, History, 335.

4 Army and Navy Journal, vol. LV, no. 1 (September 1, 1917), 1. Spiers to Fagalde, August 13, 1917, Public Records Office, London: American Expeditionary Forces, War Office, lo6/474/ELS 201 2. Hereafter cited as PRO, AEF, WO 106/474/ELS 201 2.

5 Tardieu to Ribot, July 16, 1917, Quai d'Orsay, Etats-Unis, Armees Americaines, vol. 1, 190-191, no. 707 MO.

6 Joffre to Clemenceau, May 20, 1917, Vincennes, Mission Militaire Fran^aise, carton 17, dossier 2.

7 Hugh Johnson, author of the Selective Service Act, quoted in Coffman, The War, 31.

8 Ibid., 33.

9 General T0M. Bridges to Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) May 3, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/351.

10 Joffre to Clemenceau, May 20, 1917, Vincennes.

11 Weigley, History, 361.

12 OB, 28: 3.

13 See Ayres, The War with Germany, 29; Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 363.

14 OB, 25: 3.

15 Ibid..

16 OB, 26: 9.

17 Ibid..

18 Historical Section, Army War College, Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (Washington, 1931), I, 79-86. 19 OB, 48: 1.

20 Colonel de Chambrun and Captain de Marenches, The American Army in the European Conflict (New York, 1919), 24; OB, 33: 6; George H. Allen, et. al.. The Great War (Philadelphia, 1921), V, 179; Historical Section, Order of Battle. Ill, 78-86.

21 OB, 86: 3.

22 OB, 33: 6.

23 Ibid..

24 OB, 48: 1.

25 OB, 51: 2 and 72: 8; 73: 6.

26 OB 126: 10; Each division commander could appoint up to 1.7% of his enlisted strength for officer training.

27 See OB, 126: 10; 287: 1.

28 Historical Section, Order of Battle. Ill, 84.

29 Ibid.. 86-87. De Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army. 179.

30 0B, 358: 9. Allen, The Great War. V, 179.

31 Ibid.. 56.

32 Coffman, The War. 35.

33 Ibid.. 55.

34 Ayres, The War with Germany. 29.

35 Myron E. Adams and Fred Girton, The History and Achievements of the Fort Sheridan Officers' Training Camps (Fort Sheridan, 1928), 333.

36 Ibid.. 186, 339.

37 Kay Pea, From Private to Shavetail (New York, 1918), 10.

38 Adams, History and Achievements. 197.

39 The Plattsburger, 1917 (New York, 1917), 20.

40 0B, 40: 2.

41 0B, 24: 2. 42 Ibid,,

43 Adams, History and Achievements, 197; Pea, Private, 11.

43a Ibid,. Coffman, The War, 35.

44 Historical Committee, 79th Division Association, History of the Seventy-Ninth Division, AEF, During the World War, 1917-1919 (Lancaster, 1922), 31.

45 OB, 28: 2. See also Captain James P. Cole and Major Oliver Schoomaker, Military Tactics Manual (New York, 1917), 2-39 for an exact daily schedule for the second officers* training camp held at Plattsburg.

46 Adams, History and Achievements, 202.

47 OB, 29: 2.

48 Adams, History and Achievements, 342.

49 Ibid., 212.

50 Coffman, The War, 58.

51 Spiers to Fagalde, August 13, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/474/ ELS 201 2.

52 Spiers to Fagalde, August 13, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/474/ M 105 8.

53 Spiers to Fagalde, PRO, AEF, SO 106/474/ELS 210 3, dated August 15, 1917.

54 Army and Navy Journal, vol. LV, no. 1 (September 1, 1917), 10.

55 I.C.Chambers to General Officer, London District, October 6, 1917. PRO, AEF, W0 106/468/0. 153/2820 pt. 4, no. 74.

56 Ayres, The War with Germany, 20.

57 Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (DCIGS) to Military Attache, Washington, October 6, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/474/42645 cipher 6.

58 PRO, AEF, WO 106/468/T./156 pt. 4, no. 85.

59 Military Attache, Washington to Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), October 31, 1917, PRO, AEF, W0 106/484/T.207 4. 60 Tardieu to Jusserand and Foch, March 20, 1918, Quai d'Orsay, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, 7423/mo.

61 Military Attache, Washington to DMI, October 20, 1917, PRO, WO 33/924/44771 cipher /Ti35 2609A.

62 CIGS to Military Attache Washington, November 5, 1917, PRO AEF, WO 106/484/44771 cipher 13.

63 Army and Navy Journal, vol. LV, no. 1 (September 1, 1917), 10.

64 Adams, History and Achievements. 205,208.

65 Ibid..

66 Cole and Schoomaker, Military Tactics Manual. 2-39.

67 Coffman, The War, 57.

68 Adams, History and Achievements. 355-372.

69 Ibid.. 352.

70 Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs. 74.

71 OB, 80: 7.

72 OB, 90: 7.

73 OB, 86: 8.

74 OB, 99: 6.

75 Wisconsin National Guardsman John C.Acker quoted in Coffman, The War. 65. One miserable duty seems to have been peeling onions. A soldier at Camp Travis did it with his gas mask on--see HEidel, Over There. 18.

76 Freidel, Over There. 11.

77 Ibid.. 15.

78 OB, 85: 3.

79 Ibid..

80 Freidel, Over There. 24.

81 OB, 81: 7; 82: 9.

82 OB, 84: 7.

83 Churchill, Over There. 92.

84 Cheseldine, Ohio in the Rainbow (Columbus, 1924), 59.

85 OB, 91: 7. 86 Manual of Interior Guard Duly, para. 8.

87 0.0. Ellis, The Plattsburg Manual, 28ff, 63ff.

88 Coffman, The War, 38.

89 Churchill, Over Here!, 92.

90 Gregory Mabry, Recollections of a Recruit: An Official History of the 54th US Infantry (New York, 1919), 21.

91 Lardner, Treat 'Em Rough. 11. Also L. Wardlaw Miles, History of the 308th Infantry, 1917-1919 (New York, 1927), 17; Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn, The 131st Infantry in the World War (Chicago, 1919), 20.

92 Ellis, The Plattsburg Manual provides one of the clearest accounts of extended order drill and tactical doctrine in use during the period under s tudy.

93 0B, 100: 7.

94 Infantry Drill Regulations, para. 623. See also 0B, 87: 7.

95 Miles, History of the 308th Infantry. 13.

96 Major General William J. Snow, Signposts of Experience: World War Memoirs (Washington, 1941); Cole, The Thirty- Seventh Division, 326; Rhodes, 1918, 1. The author, commanding the 7th Field Artillery Regiment, 33rd Division at Camp Logan, Texas had only 5 out of 24 guns, one-third of necessary saddles, very few sidearms. Rhodes himself was a cavalryman with no artillery experience.

97 Army War College, Field Artillery Training, Enlisted, 8-14.

98 Ibid., 15ff.

99 See Cole, The Thirty-Seventh Division, 327.

100 Charles F. Dienst, History of the 353rd Infantry Regiment, 89th Division, National Army, September 1917-June 1919 (Wichita, 1921), 8-10; History of the Seventy-Ninth, 30.

101 History of the 353rd Infantry, 11.

102 Mabry, Recollections, 14; Gerald F. Jacobsen, History of the 107th Infantry USA (New York, 1920), 11.

103 Lardner, Treat fEm Rough, 77.

104 Henderson, The Ninety-First, 230. 105 Churchill, Over Here!, 94.

106 Frcidel, Over There, 25.

107 Ibid..

108 Vignal to Minister of War, Washington, November 11, 1917, Quai d'Orsay, £tats-Unis, Armies Americaines, II, 194. See also Spiers to Fagalde, November 12, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/484/ELS 976.

109 Jay M. Lee, The Artilleryman: The Experiences and Impressions of an American Artillery Regiment in the World War: 129th Field Artillery. 1917-1919 (Kansas City, 1920), 27-28.

110 OB, 88: 7.

111 Jacobsen, History of the 107th Infantry. 11.

112 Ibid. . For (drawings of the ideal tr.ench system see Pitt, 1918, 9-11.

113 Lardner, Treat 'Em Rough, 67.

114 Dickman, The Great Crusade, 19.

115 OB, 107: 7.

116 Dickman, The Great Crusade, 19.

117 Emmett, Give 'Way, 75.

118 Spiers to Fagalde, January 18, 1918, PRO, AEF, WO 106/ 474/ELS 198 10.

119 Emmett, Give 'Way, 75.

120 Ibid., 32. Also Cole, The Thirty-Seventh Division, 359; Rhodes, 1918.

121 Major General Robert Alexander, Memories of the World War, 1917-1919 (New York, 1931), 2.

122 Coffman, The War, 125.

123 Historical Division, Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919: Training and Use of American Units with British and French (Washington, 1948^ 238. Memorandum from Chief, Liaison Group, GHQ to Chief of American Military Mission, Paris, dated GQG, French Armies in France, Compiegne, May 29, 1917. Hereafter cited as OH, III. See also Coffman, The War. 1. 124 Adjutant General, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force: 226 Report, Paris, July 28, 1917, in OH, III. Hereafter cited as AG, G1IQ, AEF.

125 Weigley, History, 376.

126 OB, 26: 3.

127 John Spencer Basset, Our War with Germany: A History (New York, 1919), 109. See also de Weerd, President Wilson Fights His War: World War I and the American Intervention (New York, 1968), 214; History of the First Division During the World War, 1917-1919 (Philadelphia 1922), 19.

128 OB, 26: 3.

129 OB, 72: 6; 42: 2.

130 See Coffman, The War, 133.

131 See Sergeant Alexander Woollcott, The Command is Forward: Tales of the AEF (New York, 1919), vi.

132 Pitt, 1918, 66-67; Stallings, The Doughboys, 28-31.

133 Quoted in Freidel, Over There, 115.

134 Ibid., 116. Also Weigley, History, 355-371.

135 Report of Commandant R£quin, Paris, July 21, 1917, Vincennes Fonds Clemenceau 62, Forces Expeditionnaires Americaines en France. Also De Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army 46.

136 Shipley Thomas, The History of the AEF (New York, 1920), 45. See also Pershing1s Official Report to the Secretary of War on September 1919 in MThe Vast Reorganization of America for War,11 The Great Events of the Great War, V, 429.

137 Thomas, History, 37; OH, III, 355 (General Order, AEF, 1917, no. 45, October 8, 1917); de Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army, 71.

138 Weigley, History, 387.

139 OH, III, 247.

140 Quoted in Ibid., 355.

141 General John J. Pershing, General Pershing's Official Story of the American Expeditionary Forces in France (New York, 1919), 8. 142 John Gardner Coolidge, A War Diary in Paris, 1914-1917 (Cambridge, 1931), 246; Churchill, Over Here!, 80-81; History of the 1st: Division, 10.

143 Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs, 91.

144 Quoted in General Richard Tlioumin, The First World War (New York, 1963), 357.

145 See History of the 1st Division. 10-19; Stallings, The Doughboys, 27; Coffman, The War, 132; Heywood Broun, Our Army at the Front (New York, 1919), 56-63; Freidel, Over There, 86.

146 Streeter, Dere Mable: Love Letters of a RooKe (New York, 1918), 50; Broun, Our Army at the Front, 87-90.

147 See note 115. Also Broun, Our Army. 90; And They Thought We Wouldnft Fight, 87-90.

148 History of the 1st Division, 20-22.

149 Ibid., 136; Broun, Our Army, 87; Stallings, The Doughboys, 27-34; Coffman, The War, 136-137.

150 OH, III, 427. Memoranda of July 18, September 10, October 5, 1917.

151 Coffman, The War, 138.

152 History of the IstDivision, 26.

153 Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs„ 148.

154 Quoted in Churchill, Over Here!, 139.

155 Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs; History of the 1st Division, 30.

156 Quoted in John J. Pershing, Official Report of September 1, 1919 in "The Vast Reorganization of America for War," The Great Events of the Great War, V, 429.

157 History of the 1st Division, 35-40.

158 Located at Training Area 4--see appended map. OH, III, 594.

159 Ibid., 645.

160 See Walter B. Wolf, A Brief Story of the Rainbow Division (New York, 1919), 9-10; OH, III, 664. 161 Unsigned report, French Army, Washington, January 8, 1918, Vincennes, Fonds Clcmenccau 61.

162 E. Requin to Minister of War, Washington, August 11, 1917, Ibid., no. 44/B.

163 Robertson to War Cabinet (after interview with John J. Pershing in Paris, 9/10 January 1918), January 12, 1918, PRO, AEF, WO 106/440/0.1/135/388 39.

164 General William L. Sibert to Pershing, in Freidel, Over There, 117-118. See also letter to Pershing, October 8, 1917 in OH, II (Policy Forming Documents), 56-57. AG, GHQ, AEF: 3140.

165 Pershing to Petain, January 6, 1918, in OH, III, 262.

166 MGood Advice from General Pershing, Importance of the Rifle," Army and Navy Journal, October 17, 1917, 232.

167 Ibid..

168 Pershing, My Experiences, I, 258.

169 Coffman, The War, 36.

170 Ibid., 160. See also Weigley, History, 367.

171 Hoehling, The Fierce Lambs, 135. CHAPTER THREE

TRAINING IN 1918: PERFECTION VERSUS NECESSITY

Pondorously, relentlessly, inexorably, the Russian steamroller

was moving during the closing months of 1917. But it was moving in reverse. On the night of November 6/7, unpaid

soldiers and subverted sailors threatened to turn their guns

on Alexander Kerensky*s bewildered cabinet, which for six months after the abdication of the Czar had been attempting to

drag Russia kicking and screaming into the twentieth century.

Kerensky was determined to honour his country*s commitment

to fight the Germans to the finish. That commitment had

already cost over nine millions. But the liberals in Petrograd

did not realize that it was Russia that was finished. The next

morning, their government fled. Lenin took power as exhausted,

humiliated and sick of suffering, the Russian armies walked

away from war. On December 22, negotiations commenced between

the Soviet regime and the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, a dreary,

isolated railway siding in occupied Russia. The Allied

sledge hammer poised threateningly in the German rear had

dissipated into the arctic mists, leaving the Western Front

naked before the inevitable onslaught of the entire German army.

Only America could succour the exhausted British and French,

The loss of Russia, threats to Italy, and the impending numerical

superiority of Germany on the Western Front put Allied leaders 84

in a position where they could no longer be obsequious or even diplomatic in requesting immediate, massive American military commitment. Impatience was understandable: in January, only one American division was available for combat.'*' Total AEF strength was only 120,000 semi-trained men scattered throughout 2 France. Shipping was scarce, training time-consuming, Pershing seemingly uncooperative.

General Pershing commanded the AEF virtually without supervision from President or War Department. His original instructions from Newton D. Baker directed him

to cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea /was toj be kept in view that the forces of the United States were a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved.

This fundamental rule of military autonomy was subject only to

"such minor exceptions in particular circumstances11 as Pershing*s judgement approved. How much Pershing would be required to cooperate with the Allies was left ultimately to his **full 3 discretion.'* President Wilson and Secretary Baker, despite the pleas and pressures of Allied leaders, never violated this rule. If the Allies wished to use American troops, they would have to convince Pershing to deny his own overweaning ambition

\ of commanding a unified army.

Petain, supreme commander of the French army, approached

Pershing in late December with a new training proposal to speed the entry of American troops into battle.^ Each American 85

infantry regiment, bolstered with artillery and engineers, was to be attached directly to a French division for two or

three months* training and combat experience. After this period, which was not to be limited to quiet sectors, these regiments would be regrouped as American divisions. Pershing promptly

turned down the plan, partly because he foresaw French reluctance

to weaken those divisions from which American regiments would

be withdrawn after training, but mainly because of the language barrier to effective instruction, and the impossibility of high-ranking American officers gaining any useful staff and

command experience while their regiments were under French

control.^ French designs to engage Pershing*s troops on her own front, under the guise of a training expedient, may also

£ have been suspected.

Judgi_ng by the training of the 1st and other divisions the previous autumn, it seemed to Pershing that the French had

little to offer in return for the use of American divisions under training as temporary reserves. The British, on the other hand, could provide invaluable shipping which would speed the

assembly of the American Expeditionary Forces. Britain too was

short of reserves, Lloyd George himself writing in December

that '*even half-trained comjanies or battalions would fight well

if mixed with two or three year veterans. **^ Colonel House,

Woodrow Wilson*s personal confidant, was asked by the British

ambassador to consider presenting a proposal for shipping and 86

O training assistance to the President. Pershing, after initial reluctance to acquiesce in Wilson1s decision to cooperate with

the British, began discussing training arrangements a few weeks later. On January 30 1918 it was decided that the British would ship six complete American divisions to France and train

them in the British area prior to releasing them to Pershing.

Not only would the British provide complete infantry training, with combat employment limited to emergencies in rear areas, 9 but much equipment would be supplied by the British. This arrangement allowed for more rapid application of American manpower to winning the war, speeded the shipment of at least

six divisions to France, and aided in the procurement of equipment 10

Training for officers and men was placed under firm American

supervision after the creation on February 20 of II Corps,

directly linked to GHQ, AEF and charged with coordinating all matters of instruction with Malone1 s training staff.'*''*'

Those divisions already in France continued their training,

comprising drills in the countryside and short spells in quiet 12 sectors under French supervision. The Second Division was

ready for service by March 14. 13 Valuable lessons were learned.

A full scale raid conducted by the 1st Division in the St.

Mihiel sector exemplified a widespread need for better night navigation skills. The loss of four hundred men during a German

raid on Seicheprey of March 20 underlined the need for constant 14 patrols to provide information on enemy activity. French 87

divisions in the quiet Baccarat sector were relieved in the crisis week of April 5 by the 26th and 42nd Divisions, "excited, interested and happy" to have responsibility at last for their own sectors.All American formations engaged in aggressive 16 patrolling to sharpen fighting skills. The inevitable sobering experiences accumulated. Not untypical was an eager soldier of the 26th Division wandering out alone looking for

Germans, only to be shot by a friendly sentry as he tried to return. Rescue being impossible, the youth bled to death before the eyes of his comrades, a dreary huddle of trumped-up glory.17

With devastating force, the German offensive of March 21 pushed the British back behind the Somme. The entire Fifth

Army was wiped out, Amiens threatened, the Germans surging 40 miles before encountering serious opposition. On March 26,

Foch was appointed to coordinate the Allied armies. A week later, Pershing offered all possible assistance to Foch,^ by now holding full powers of supreme command. German attacks were to continue with diminishing force up and down the Allied line until the middle of July, but under Foch*s coordination each spasmodic advance of the enemy would be checked.^ American training during the months of crisis between March 21 and July 15 became a matter of expediency juggled with deliberation. The

AEF would have to perfect its curriculum and training facilities under constant pressure to get troops into action as quickly as 88

possible. But if Pershing*s army were to tip the scales in

France, the forty-one divisions being prepared in America would first have to arrive much more rapidly than had their predecessors.

In January, the 32nd Division arrived, only to be q?lit up as a reserve. The 93rd Provisional Division, which arrived in February, was disbanded two months later. On April 6, the

3rd Division arrived at Bordeaux, destined for six weeks* training in Area 9 (CtuJteauville) before entering the line on May 31.^

As late as March 18 the AEF comprised only six divisions, or 22 325,000 men, a mere mockery of America*s potential to turn defeat into victory.

Soon after the German attacks, Lloyd George expressed willing¬ ness to ship 120,000 American troops each month for April through to July if the British Expeditionary Force could train them. President Wilson agreed, contingent on Pershing*s approval. 23 Because the British wished to transport only desperately needed infantry and machine gun troops, Pershing disliked the shipping plan. He wished that only complete divisions, including artillery, be sent to France. Moreoever, Pershing did not believe that the American people would approve of combat under the British, **even though the President and his advisors

9 / should learn that way.'* As late as the first of May, Pershing seemed adamant, preferring to see the British pushed into

the sea and the French behind the Loire, rather than risk piece¬ meal amalgamation of his troops into harrassed foreign divisions. 89

Victory would in any event be inevitable once a united American army bad assembled and singlehandedly beaten the Germans after

2 proper preparation. 5

On May 2, Pershing relented, possibly due to an awareness that without British ships the AEF would never grow fast enough to prevent Allied collapse. The British immediately began transporting 10 divisions to their own area for training.26

Only infantry, engineer, machine gun and signal troops, plus divisional and brigade headquarters, were shipped. Artillery and corps troops followed as space became available. 27 As a result of British sea power, arrivals soared from 11,000 in April to 244,407 in May, 277,894 in June, and 306,302 in July.^

Pershing built a quarter of his ultimate force of two million on close cooperation with the British. Whether the additional shipping space was worth subjecting ten American divisions to

British training seemed a pointless question in May 1917. With the Germans driving toward Paris, insistence on tactical cant was a luxury Pershing could not afford, and Foch could not allow.

It was the bayonet that provided the first connecting link between British and American tactical thought. Bayonet displays by British instructors were often spectacular, involving laying out every German through three successive lines of trenches, clearing dugouts, firing accurately after strenuous exertion.

"The more foolish the game, the more rapturously the British 29 joined in," remarked one observer. Another more august critic, 90

General John J. Pershing, noticed with approval the British

or\ stress on aggressiveness and self-confidence. u American troops undergoing British instruction would be exposed at worst to

an excessive emphasis on trenches or certain weapons--not to 31 totally false attitudes such as those of the French.

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, phlegmatic commander of

the British Expeditionary Force, cooperated candidly and

scrupulously with Pershing. In an order of March 12, he directed

that training be ,!in accordance with American regulations and 32 ... instructions recently issued or to be issued.11 It was

impressed on the Director of Training, General Bonham, that

Americans were not to be ordered about, but helped by advice

and experience to become leaders and instructors. Particular

attention was to be paid to discipline, route marching, musketry

and staff work.33 Haig, in a rare burst of thoughtfulness, even

directed that the peculiar appetites of his guests be attended

to, with bulk rations such as Hominy or rice increased.34-

Training was patterned after theoriginal January agreement,

Pershing himself believing that "it could not be improved 3 5 upon." On arrival, American troops were affiliated with

British cadre divisions in rear areas for a month*s preliminary

training in drill, marksmanship, and special weapons such as

the machine gun, Lewis gun, trench mortar, grenades and gas.

American officers and NCOs, once returned from British specialists*

schools, were to play a direct role in this training. Three 91

weeks were to be spent in British trenches, attached to companies as platoons, then to battalions as companies, brigades as battalions, and divisions as regiments. Staff officers would serve with appropriate headquarters. A final month would pass practising open warfare at regimental level under American officers, whereupon divisions would be reassembled and sent to Pershing.^

Major General George W. Reed's II Corps administered and supervised all troops passing through British hands, maintaining close liaison with Pershing, who also had personal representatives attached to Haig's headquarters. American officers were at all times responsible for the administration and welfare of

37 their troops. At the end of May, five divisions were located with the BEF (94th, 28th, 35th, 77th and 82nd) all of which were ordered elsewhere by Foch before training could be com- pleted. 39 Most of the five additional divisions sent to the

British (27th, 30th, 33rd, 78th and 80th) remained long enough to complete the instructional program. In August, Haig uncom¬ plainingly released the 33rd, 78th and 80th Divisions to

Pershing, the 27th and 30th fighting with the BEF until the end of the war.^

American soldiers made a strong impression on the British.

One veteran of the 38th Division described an American sergeant attached to his unit for instruction as

a splendid type, brim full of the old enthusiasm we had in 1915. As for me I have been weary, so weary, and this strong American soldier glowing with health and strength and a desire to do his bit and make up 92

for lost time makes me ashamed I have fallen off and can only pray that fresh enthusiasm may come to me

again.41

Sir Philip Gibbs noticed a high level of intelligence among the rank and file of the American 77th Division, which would combine with health, optimism and modest training to produce

/ o excellent fighters.

As few men received exhaustive rifle instruction before departure for France, there was little difficulty adjusting to the British Enfield that replaced the Springfield rifle in the first week of training.^3 Contentment about British food, however, was less than universal. MWe are on the British ration here so we are all losing weight as no one could get fat on their ration,11 wrote one private in the 6th US Engineers.^4

Another soldier recalled that ,feveryone admired the limeys for their guts, and there were few fights between us. We admired them even more when we ate the kind of chow they fought on."^3

Boiled eggs and "barn rat" notwithstanding, most Americans respected the British, although few were not aware of the exhaustion among even the best units. It was apparent to most students that the British "had learned through the school of hard knocks just about what is necessary to beat the Germans," and that America was "benefitting by being taught ... things that otherwise she would have to learn herself.Officers from the 27th and 33rd Divisions were particularly impressed with a course offered at the Gas Defence School, which was 93

"thorough, business-like and excellent in every respect, ... as at all British schools. The instructors aimed to teach

... the essentials learned after four terrible years of exper- ience--everything else was eliminated.

British training by 1918 offered the residue of lessons learned from three years1 hard fighting. Instructors circulated from combat to teaching duties to ensure that new tactical concepts were immediately introduced into training programs.

Men were taught to master particular jobs with a thoroughness often exasperating to Americans unaccustomed to memorizing perfectly the convoluted formulae of asphyxiating gasses or the myriad sear springs and cotter pins of a machine gun. But hard practicalities had long since replaced theories in British schools after the pitilessly dashed hopes of Loos and the Somme.

Training progressed rapidly from bayonet and rifle exercises to very realistic tactical problmes for small infantry formations.

Attacks on machine gun nests by groups of platoon size were particularly stressed, convincing many that real action was not far in the offing.^ British NCOs could illustrate graphically to the novice the need to treat one’s sidearm as a personal friend in a way no tongue-tied Frenchman or inexperienced American could hope to emulate. 49

A few weeks in the slimy trenches of the visceral Belgian lowlands cured cocky tendencies such as that of Lewis gunners 50 to impatiently dismantle weapons with hammer and chisel. 94

Troops hardened to boredom, discomfort, and casualties. Officers

applied lessons of earlier map problems and tactical walks,

and made some progress toward that cool state of expertise and

confidence that makes it possible to dominate men. The 33rd

Division completed its training most realistically in a model

Australian tank and infantry assault on Hamel, earning ungrudg¬

ing praise from General John Monash, himself one of the most 52 innovative amateurs of the war.

Haig, reflecting the prevalent British view, considered the

Americans to be "some of the most splendid men he had ever seen. J

Fresh troops picked up new training very quickly, said the

British, and proved robust and adaptable enough to go into the

line much sooner than expected. Such compliments, however

flattering to the American soldier as an individual, did not

include any praise for the organization to which he belonged.

In May 1918 the American army had yet to coordinate training

between the AEF and the camps at home. A constant British

complaint was the high number of untrained men arriving in France,

usually mixed at random with units possessing anything from

minimal to considerable training.The 27th Division, for

example, possessed little experience except foot drill and

physical conditioning. The 33rd Division, at least, was grounded

in basic military skills.^ When the 4th Division hurriedly

departed for the Marne on June 10, many members of the 39th

Infantry had never fired a rifle. The 8th Field Signal Battalion 95

still had not been properly equipped, possessing holsters but 57 no pistols. Clearly, if the AEF were to function without the tutelage and paternalistic indulgence of Allied armies, the nation*s excellent human resources would have.to be better assessed, organized and equipped to fill varied positions in a complex, constantly fluid organization subjected to the acid test of war.

On Monday, January 28, 1918 the hearing room of the Senate

Committee on Military Affairs was hushed not with the expectation of momentous decision, but rather with the anticipation of incisive, vitriolic, devastating criticism that would demolish

Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. In a few terrible hours, the diminutive, precocious little man would be frightened back to his idealistic, naive coterie of intellectual incompetents in Cleveland. Too often, powerful, ambitious men mistake small stature for simplicity; humility, for impotence. The **gnome in a big black hat,'* jokingly referred to as **Newtie Cootie,** administered a lesson in human nature to Senator George Chamberlain and his fellows, winning their full support in a clear, well- informed and tactful report on the operations of the War

Department since the outbreak of hostilities.

Most glaring shortcomings in supply and organization were demonstrated to be exceptions to a spectacular performance in

CO the face of great confusion and haste. Armed with a new fund of public support, Baker on March 4 appointed Peyton C. March, chief of artillery in the AEF, as the new Chief of Artillery. March 96

immediately reorganized the entire General Staff, and assured its complete control over army activities in USA by placing all matters of supply and transportation under Major General

George W. Goethals, who untangled America* s logistical problems in short order. Bernard Baruch as head of a rejuvenated War

Industries Board bludgeoned business into cooperation when necessary by withholding raw materials. Organizing, equipping and training the armies destined for Europe could now progress

Smoothly under strong and expert central control from Washington,

finally free of demoralizing public criticism, bureaucratic rivalry and the caprice of incompetents. 7

Drastic measures taken to improve artillery training in

February 1918 set a pattern for the elaborate system of instruc¬

tion which existed in the American army at the end of the war.

Only 275 artillery officers in April 1917 had more than one

year's experience. The need to, rely on unqualified instructors

in 1917 was further complicated by a dearth of equipment.®® When

Major General William J. Snow occupied the new post of Chief of

Artillery in February 1918, he found levels of training in

such basics as fire discipline, occupation of position, communi¬

cations and calculations ranging from ghastly incompetence to

marginal mediocrity. Troops lacked a sense of urgency, technical

knowledge, proper equipment, qualified American instructors,

and basic discipline.Refusing to allow exasperation to

cloud deliberation, Snow set limited, realistic standards of

gun drill, calculation, knowledge of weapons and fire planning 97

to be attained by all units. Equipment was to be redistributed,

training coordinated with the AEF, and special centralized 63 schools established for all artillery instruction.

Because it would take too long to develop American weapons,

it had been decided to rely on French 75-mm and 155-mm guns as

standard field pieces. But use of French guns made unavoidable

an all too often supplicant reliance on French instructors.

When Snow assumed his challenging position in February, French

officers at each divisional artillery camp had gained so much

power as to be setting training syllabus and schedule without

any control from American authorities. The senior French officer

at Camp Funston practically commanded the artillery brigade

of the 89th Division, and demanded to be made Assistant Commandant

of the School of Fire at Fort Sill. Removal of such undue

foreign influence would not be easy. French guns were borrowed

for training purposes on condition that French officers and

NCOs accompany them. Until their departure in August 1918,

French officers continued to interfere with and even defy the

instructions of an ever more irate Chief of Artillery.^

Pershing and Snow had a similar problem with foreign

instructors. Neither could operate an adequate training estab¬

lishment without outside experts; yet lack of control and the

propagation of what were regarded as incorrect notions could not

be honestly tolerated by any commander. Solutions to this

emasculating dilemna came only with the development of an

extensive American school system at home and in France. Just 98

as Pershing placed immediate stress on building an elaborate instructional organization, Snow moved quickly to centralize and rationalize artillery training in USA. All artillery troops were placed in separate camps, beginning in early May. Officer preparation was centralized at Camp Zachary Taylor, graduates being dispatched to the artillery replacement depots at camps

Jackson and Zachary Taylor to instruct recruits until called for by the A1F. The School of Fire at Fort Sill was enlarged.

Centers where brigades could fire at will on ample ranges under experienced AEF veterans appeared at Camp Jackson, S.C.,

Fort Knox, Ky., and Camp McClellan, Ala. All specialist training in such fields as radio or surveying were taught by the artillery school, ending a previous debilitating reliance on rejects from the engineer or signal corps.^ While America's supply of instructors grew, the ability of the French to spare qualified officers from their own hard-pressed organizations diminished.®® By August 1918, the return home of French instructors may have been as much relief as rebuff to the exhausted matron of Napoleon, the master-gunner.

Measures began taking effect in the first half of 1918 to coordinate training between the AEF and US camps, as well as to put all home instruction under central control. In December

1917 a Committee on Training had been established under Major

General J.F. Morrison. This group never obtained firm power to direct instructional activities throughout the country, but was able to function as a coordinating agency through which to 99

make arrangements with Allies and Pershing, Morrison*s board made no ruling on the controversy of what balance between

trench warfare and open fighting was to be set in the training

syllabus. Instruction remained essentially unchanged from

that of the preceeding year. A sample program printed in

the Infantry Journal in July 1918 provided for an almost even

balance between rifle and extended order training, and education

in gas warfare, the bayonet, bombing, special weapons and trench

construction. Marches were interspersed with realistic recreations

of trench warfare much alike those of 1917, but more elaborate 68 due to the greater availability of resources. Many of both

AEF and French suggestions were ignored, possibly because the

Training Cimmittee could not make up its mind on who to believe

and consequently preferred to do nothing.^

Moulding a motley group of twenty-five thousand strangers

into an integrated, uniformly trained division in the American

army was as elementary as trying to hold water in a sieve. Results

were not so much disappointing as bewildering. Throughout the war, a constant complaint from British, French and Pershing

alike was the unevenness of training possessed by virtually all

American divisions. The BEF found itself receiving men with

six months1 training side by side with raw recruits.^® Artillery

brigades from the same divisions, sent to French camps while

the British trained their infantry comrades, were no less

diverse in levels of accomplishment. Reports of the French 100

Mission in Washington described one brigade as having "one reg¬ iment in fair shape, the other two not well instructed.11

Another brigade had just received forty-one green officers from the Replacement Depot. Almost all brigades were labelled as "not prepared for overseas duty." Discipline and thorough 71 training were often lacking. General Harbord, Chief of

Staff of the AEF, wrote laconically in his memoirs that many troops

were arriving From America who had never fired a rifle or marched a mile, who knew nothing of gas protection, though fairly well set up, with a working knowledge of customs and courtesys of the service.

Harbord sardonically added that

nearly all had drilled and ... sung in mass singing under leadership. With that lack of thoroughness in training, some sang but once more, and that the swan song before the enemy.72

If Pershing and the Allies agreed on only one thing, it was that

America1s system of dispatching troops to Europe, and reinforcing those already there, needed drastic revision.

Famous fighting organizations do not spring into existence

simply because several thousand brave, eager young men are brought together in one place and given some sort of training

that enables them to function as a team. Divisions must be

nurtured. But until the last months of the war, most American units were continually being pruned as soon as they started to

blossom into effective combat formations. The first divisions 101

sent to France lost many of their best men to training camps.

Half the so-called regulars who arrived in France in 1917 were raw recruits. The process of transferring men indiscriminately

from a division in training in USA to another about to depart

for France continued through the first half of 1918.

As soon as sufficient officers and NCOs were accumulated in a division to allow combat effectiveness, many of the most

competent persons would be called away to provide instructors

for other formations. The 79th Division, for example, was worn down by constant drafts to less than 15,000 men at the end of March.^3 After three months1 training, 3,000 newly qualified men from the 82nd Division were called away to special schools. Other men were transferred to divisions higher on

the priority list for shipping overseas. Infantry companies

in the 78th Division fell from 175 to less than 59 men between

November 1917 and January 1918. In the first half of April,

the division was still less than half strength. Yet this same

organization departed for France at full strength two months

later--at the expense of some other divisions even lower on

the priority list.^

During the rapid buildup of the AEF in the spring of 1918,

it became blatantly apparent that the depot brigade located at

each cantonment, intended to provide specialists and replacements

for the parent division, was unable to perform its function without cannabilizing some other unit. Chief of Staff Peyton 102

C. March decided to set up separate infantry, artillery and machine gun schools which would send men directly to any needy division after training. The new centralized system of training involved the use of then revolutionary new means of personnel selection. All soldiers began filling out five by eight inch cards describing their civilian qualifications and experience.

These cards were to be used when making branch assignments, along with tabulated results from the "alpha and beta11 exami¬ nations administered by a group of experts under the direction of Dr. Walter D. Scott of the Carnegie Institute of Technology.^

It was planned to sort men by capability and intelligence, thus streamlining training by fitting recruits to the tasks to which they were suited.

Pershing was unable to benefit much from Peyton C. March1s changes in training and reinforcement organization at home.

During the Meuse Argonne offensive, entire divisions were disbanded to provide reinforcements for others. No help came

from home, perhaps because politicians feared linking training directly to reinforcement. Creation of mammoth training complexes, photographed in newspapers and captioned as reserve depots for

the AEF, would have indicated to the public that the government expected massive casualty lists. Scattered cantonments, on

the other hand, bore much more remote resemblance to slaughter pens. Most inhabitants came from the same part of the country,

and had other things in common than an uncertain future in combat. 103

But the precedent set by the end of the war would be invaluable in organizing America*s future mobilizations. At last the principle of selecting men carefully, making maximum use of talents and education possessed on entering the army, and permit¬ ting units to draw qualified reinforcements of known ability

from a central depot had been stumbled upon after a year of trial and error. Twelve months1 spastic fumbling by the War

Department for an efficient means of organizing training at home so as to ensure a reliable, homogeneous flow of properly trained men to France had nevertheless been a costly passage

from bewildered confusion to unruffled competence. The gyrations of America*s emerging pattern of military instruction proved

in fact an unspectacular but extremely sanguinary danse macabre, the cost of which would be borne by Pershing*s polyglot legion of innocents.

By means far more deliberate than those of the authorities

in USA, Pershing had developed an integrated, sophisticated and productive training organization by July 1918. Army schools were

educating staff officers, officer candidates and instructors

for the three corps school systems established to supply teachers

and specialists to the divisions in the field.^ Most schools were located near Chaumont, as were the divisional training

areas. Close personal supervision by Pershing and G-5 was as

simple and convenient as an hour*s drive by auto.^

Under the deliberate program of education initiated by 104

Pershing in August 1917, the Army General Staff College at

Langres had produced 554 graduates by the end of the war; the

School of the Line, 497 tacticians; the Infantry Specialists1

Schools, 5,382 experts in musketry, bayonet, light trench mortar, 37-mm cannon, grenades and sniping. The Infantry

Candidates School had 1,370 graduates and 5,500 students on hand when the war ended. Three series of corps schools, the

last of which began operations on September 2, graduated 12,235

instructors in special weapons, machine guns, field engineering,

signals and gas warfare.

Pershing was more than wearied of being forced to allow his troops to imbibe Allied pessimism while procuring inappropriate

education. In June 1918, with a steady flow of American

specialists emerging from the Army and Corps schools, the commander

of the AEF decided to "insist very strongly11 to the Allies on

getting his troops f,out of leading strings.,f,y In this resolve

Pershing had the full acquiescence of irascible Harold B. Fiske,

Chief of Training since February 1918. On July 4, Fiske gave

vent to his patriotic faith in the AEF by an acrimonious attack

on Allied instruction. The French lacked aggressiveness; the

British, initiative, thundered G-5. To allow American troops

to associate with demoralized armies was to condone the assimi¬

lation of bad attitudes and habits which would be impossible to

eradicate. Moreover, the time had come to stand up to the smug

Allied belief that the Americans were incapable of training their 105

own men. Because the British and French fatuously distrusted

American methods of fighting, they continually blocked training in open warfare and tore down what shreds of individualism the AEF had attempted to graft onto lopsided training. Allied tutelage hindered the development of responsibility and self- reliance, stunted the growth of an independent army, and pro¬ vided more and more insult to American prowess with less and less justification to train men rapidly for action. Eloquently and effectively, Fiske begged General Pershing to secure 80 American "emancipation from Allied supervision." Accordingly,

Allied instructors started disappearing from the Staff College at Langres and other AEF schools. The process was not complete at war's end, but American dominance of her own institutions was unquestioned.

Throughout June, July and August, American troops flooded into France, only to be replaced in the camps at home by a massive new draft of twenty divisions, twelve regular and eight

National Army. America's follow-up punch never reached France before the armistice on November 11. The six divisions that arrived in June 029th, 37th, 83rd, 90th and 92nd) had an organized longevity of approximately eight months, although all included a large percentage of men drafted as recently as four months previously. Men of the 89th Division were given an intensive, exhausting six-week training program on arrival in

France. This "crash" course, intended mainly to make raw members 106

of the division fit for combat as rapidly as possible, comprised extended order drill, compact training for specialists, and a great deal of marching. The division conducted trench exercises in the Washington Center at Gondrecourt and suffered through 81 a ten mile forced march before assignment to a quiet sector.

As the crucial events of the summer occurred with ever accelerating momentum, newly arriving units were directed to lose no time in rest areas or awaiting the development of the tactical situation. Lectures, night classes, and short demonstra¬ tions filled the day, along with spot tests in first aid, care 82 of the feet, protection against rifle fire or trench routine.

The 91st Division, one of the seven July arrivals (along with the 6th, 36th, 79th, 81st and 85th) passed the month before departure for the front on September 7 in long, exhausting marches, oo incessant drill and frequent extended order exercises. Men of the 79th Division buiiilt target ranges for those comrades who, by the vicissitudes of the reinforcement system, had arrived in

France without so much as firing a rifle. Each division sent an advance party to the AEF to report on the state of training of arriving units, and coordinate with G-5 an intensive instructional program intended to ensure that no man entered 84 combat totally untrained. Remedial training prescribed for the 79th Division was particularly trying. None failed to realize suddenly "that the lessons of Camp Meade had been little more

thein the primer of warfare." Entry into combat did not end 107

training. The 77th Division caught up on open warfare training believed to have been neglected in the confusing months between rushed British instruction and hurried participation in the

Vesle operations. Field maneuvers were conducted on August 11, during a lull in combat.

A man of Pershing1s organizational genius could not be expected to remain satisfied with a haphazard policy of ten day refresher courses and "on-the-job" training as his main means of ensuring that all combat units were exposed to the basics of survival and victory. As early as December 1917, the 41st

Division had been designated a depot division. Located on the line of communications that fed new arrivals into the American training zone, the 41st gathered together miscellaneous newcomers, discharged hospital patients and stragglers, equipped then, apportioned them to temporary training units and provided as much instruction as possible before individuals were called for by the fighting formations. By the end of the war, five more divisions (33rd, 76th, 85th, 39th and 40th) were performing 87 a similar function. Nevertheless, despite the iron grip of G-5 on all Americans at loose in France, insufficient reinforcements were coming through the pipeline at the end of the war to supply the hard-pressed forces in the Meuse Argonne.

By November, at least six divisions had to be skeletonized (31st,

34th, 38th, 84th, 86th, 93rd and 4th) to provide reserves for an increasingly exhausted army. 88° 108

American artillerists have always been a complacent crew. Ever since the days of John Knox, the United States government has taken trouble to produce technologically advanced gunners, though the rest of the atmy might languish in in¬ competence, obsolescence, or even apathy. Good luck, as usual, accompanied the field artillery in the AEF. Their training camps were pleasant and habitable, whereas the infantry passed its rodent existence in filthy hovels and rat infested holes.

The French had a good reputation in field artillery, and opened their schools to the Americans without hesitations. Pershing seemed to trust the artillery to manage its own training. By the end of hostilities, American light artillery was training at Le Valdahon, Coetquidan, Meucon, Souge, La Courtine, Ornans,

Redou, Bordeaux, Rennes and Poitieres. Heavy artillery method¬ ically operated its guns at Liboume, Limoges, Clermont and

Angers.The most discomforting experience was wearing gas 90 masks on surprise drill. Intellectual challenge was readily available, with 800 officers a month attending the Saumur and

Fontainebleau artillery schools, and otherrlearning specialties such as tractor operation and maintenance, aerial observation 91 and railroad or motorized artillery. American regiments, when returned to their divisions, proved competent and provoked few complaints when the AEF finally threw its pondorous weight into the delicate strategic situation of a twilight war.

World War One was for America a dream-like experience. Serious 109

combat opened for the AEF in a frantic series of desperate, last-minute reinforcing actions as the Germans staged their last drive between Soissons and Rheims. It is likely that the sudden influx of eager, ardent Americans, anomalously avid for the fray, was instrumental in stopping the German drive 92 toward Paris, during the first six weeks of the summer.

Determined American assaults on Belleau Wood, Vaux and Cantigny demonstrated the sort of ardour and blind offensive fury unseen

for years on the Western Front.^3 Qn june 20, Foch opened his grand offensive that crumbled the German army, resulting in the peace of exhaustion of November 11. Nine American divisions took part in a drive across the top of the Soissons salient, which forced the Germans to retreat to their starting 94 point of the previous March. The AEF had made the transition from a sprawling military school to a potent fighting force.

On August 10, the First American Army came into existence, and commenced planning for the first large AEF operation of the war--the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient which had so long threatened communications between Paris and beleagered

Verdun. The assault of September 12 has a euphoric quality very rare for World War I. Seven American divisions (assisted by

French infantry, artillery and tanks) advanced against minor resistance to clear the entire objective in four days. Boasting

14,500 prisoners and 443 captured guns, Pershing*s army shifted west, through the pastoral countryside of Verdun, toward the convoluted, contorted, treacherous tongue of land between the river Meuse and the forests of the Argonne. 95 110

Nightmare descended on the Americans on September 26. Tightly packed divisions were to smash through the German outer defenses in one day, leading to a triumphant march into the enemy*s vitals such as had been intended at St. Mihiel. But the German

'*outer defense** was cleverly sited and carefully prepared with interlocking lanes of machine gun fire. It was to take not days, but long, dreary, discouraging weeks of continual

frontal attack, not to mention hours of personal desperation, before the five layers of wily human and malevolent natural obstacles would be pierced. Divisions, whether Veteran or novice, aggressive or indolent, were decimated. When armistice mercifully ended the struggle, Pershing had been forced to use eight of the thirteen divisions that had arrived since the

end of July as reserves for fueling the hellish baptism of

the AEF.96

How well did the AEF perform in combat? The Germans did

not regard the Americans as serious tacticians. One report

attributed to the German General Staff the remark that the 97 AEF supplied comic relief in the deadly drama of 1918. The

enemy seemed to have been impressed with the efficiency of US 98 artillery, and amazed the intrepidy of American troops. But

leadership that allowed infantry to attack in dense masses, despite

the lessons of 1914 to 1917, came under acid criticism from

both Ludendorff and Ilindenburg, who believed that a heavy

price had been paid in learning the lesson that *'the business

of war cannot be learned in a few months.**^ Ill

American training was too disorganized and diffuse through¬ out most of the war to allow accurate analysis of its role in the successes and shortcomings of the AEF. It is apparent that as late as September 15 inadequate men were being sent to Pershing, who was forced to send some into combat with only five or six days1 instruction,But the necessary schools had been established, and an efficient organization moulded, by the end of 1918. Had the war continued into the next year as originally anticipated, a dramatic improvement in training would have occurred. Tactics, less than perfect during the

Meuse Argonne campaign, would also have been likely to change.

On September 6, Pershing directed that instructors be completely rotated between combat and depot divisions every five months.

Experienced men would have brouglt battle field tested techniques into the classrooms within months.'^'*'

Poring over movements reports in an effort to ascertain how long a division was in training is useless. In World War

One, men flowed so rapidly in and out of different military organizations that the only means to obtain an accurate picture of the AEFfs training record would be to study each individual who served. This the General Staff did after the war, discovering

that the average man obtained six months of instruction; four

in USA and two in France. The average division had been organized

in USA for eight months before departure for Europe, where it 102 trained for two additional months before entering the line. 112

Despite erraticisms, foibles, blunders and mishaps, the guns

fell silent on a massive, and dynamic, American achievement;.

Forty-two divisions, each twice the size of its British and

French namesakes, were in France. By July 1919, thirty-eight more, all much better trained, could have arrived. But

strategic statistics meant little to the homesick soldier.

Insomnia once again replaced nightmare. A few days* extra sleep, a move to more comfortable quarters in the Rhineland,

and Pershingfs crusaders found themselves crawling once again

through turnip patches, marching to rifle ranges, sweeping

the parade square. But this time there was no villain to promote ardour, no cause to sanctify suffering. As fast as it had sprung into existence, the AEF disintegrated into a surly mob of individualists, each charting his own course and setting his sights on a bright future in elysian America.

Besides, the surly soldier of 1919 was a veteran. He knew

the realities of combat, and had legitimate questions to ask about the same old drills that filled the dismal days before embarking for home. NOTES

1 Historical Section, Army War College, The Genesis of the American First Army (Washington, 1938), 9.

2 Memorandum on the American Army, General Staff, 3eme Bureau, GQG, December 8, 1917, Vincennes, Fonds Clemenceau 61, no. 8420; Spiers to Fagalde, February 27, 1918, PRO, WO 106/474/ELS 2826 11.

3 Quoted in Pitt, 1918. 65.

4 Historical Section, Genesis, 9ff.

5 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War (2 vols: New York, 1931), I, 272.

6 See Tardieu to Clemenceau, New York, January 8, 1918, Quai d'Orsay, Operations Strategiques, Dossier General VIII, 29-31, no. 4543.

7 Lloyd George to Reading, December 5, 1917, PRO, WO 106/313/0.1/135/388 41.

8 Extract from Minutes of War Cabinet, December 5, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/478/ war cab 292. Also General Tasker H. Bliss' agreement to open suggestion to Pershing--DCGS to C.M. Wagstaff, December 13, 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/466 1; Pershing's initial refusal, although Harbord sympathetic, Wagstaff to DCGS, December 18, 1917, PRO, AEF, W0 106/ 484/BL 451 3; Pershing's final decision to consider the plan, Wagstaff to DCGS, December 1917, PRO, AEF, WO 106/466/36/ 410 2.

9 See Versailles agreement, January 30, 1918, PRO, AEF, WO 106/466. Also Notes on Discussion with the Americans, February 4, 1918, PRO, WO 106/466/14A/OB/2141.

10 OH, III, 1-2.

11 Ibid.. 3.

12 Pitt, 1918. 62.

13 See Coffman, The War. 152; OH, III, 491.

14 See Page, "The Truth About Our 110 Days' Fighting,I," The World's Work (April, 1919), 627. 15 Sec Sibley, With the Yankee Division in France (Boston, 1919), 53-59; Freidcl, Over There, 134-141; Wolf, A Brief History of the Rainbow Division (New York, 1919), 14; Coffman, The War, 147; Cheseldine, Ohio in the Rainbow, 123.

16 See 42nd Division, March 9, in Coffman, The War, 151; nightly 3-man patrols, Cheseldine, Ohio, 113-114, 133; 26th Division in April, Coffman, The War, 147ff; Freidel, Over There, 137-141.

17 Sibley, With the Yankee Division, 63.

18 See Pitt, 1918, 47ff.

19 See Pitt for full accounts.

20 Vandiver, John J. Pershing.

21 OH, III, 542; Wagstaff to DCGS, April 1, 1918, PRO, AEF, WO 106/466/EM 17/58. Destined to form III Corps with 5th, 35th, 4th, 33rd divisions--had the decision to train with the British not changed original plans.

22 Stallings, The Doughboys, 43; Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 356.

23 Pitt, 1918, 141.

24 Ibid..

25 Ibid., 143.

26 Pershing, My Experiences, I, 15.

27 Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1918 (London, 1937), 444-445.

28 Weigley, History, 384; Pitt, 1918, 143; Edmonds, Military Operations, 584; Coffman, The War, 212.

29 Broun, At the Front, 92-94.

30 Pershing, My Experiences, I, 151.

31 British training in ,f0pen warfare and the spirit of the offensive" was being ordered by December 1917. See Haig Memorandum on Defensive Measures" of December 14, 1917, which expressly ordered defence in depth and frequent rifle and field firing practice, "so that infantry may develop confidence in their power to stop the enemy by rifle," Haig Papers, OAD, 291/29 "SECRET." 32 OH, III, 61.

33 Haig, Diary, May 3, 1918.

34 Ibid.. May 31, 1918.

35 Ibid., April 19, 1918.

36 OH, III, 36 —training agreement with British, Versailles, January 30, 1918, AG, GHQ, AEF 14903-2. Also R. Butler to AEF HQ, February 9, 1918, PRO WO 106/466/OB 2141 9; British orders of March 12, 1918, OH, III, 63ff; DuCane to Weygand, May 29, 1918, PRO, WO 158/72/ — .

37 Pershing to Haig, May 7, 1918, Haig Papers.

38 War Office to Bridges, May 3, 1918, PRO, WO 106/500/ 59284 cipher; Stallings, The Doughboys, 80.

39 OH, III, 191.

40 Ibid., 3.

41 Extract from British report on morale in France, May 3, 1918, Imperial War Museum, Thompson Papers.

42 Miles, History of the 308th Infantry, 34.

43 See Back, The Fourth Division (Garden City, 1920), 48.

44 ,fAmerican Troops with the BEF,n June 1-July 13, 1918, Imperial War Museum, Thompson Papers.

45 Stallings, The Doughboys. 238.

46 Letter of a private, Infantry, MAmerican Troops in BEF,n June 1-July 13, 1918, Imperial War Museum, Thompson Papers.

47 Leland, From Shell Hole to Chateau with Company I (New York, 1958), 37-38.

48 Jacobsen, History of the 107th Infantry, 42; Leland, From Shell Hole to Chateau, 57.

49 See "Varied Ground," Infantry Journal, vol. XIV.

50 Letter of British soldier, July 3, 1918, in Imperial War Museum, Thompson Papers.

51 Major General Harold B. Fiske, new G-5, directed all American officers to inspect and tactfully correct British instruction, plus solve map problems each week to the satisfaction of the British headquarters to which they were attached. II Corps held weekly tactical walks for all higher commanders in open warfare, OH. Ill, 142.

52 Sanborn, The 131st Infantry. 37; C. Bonham Carter for CGS to DuCane, July 11, 1918, PRO, WO 106/500/T/l/K.

53 Knowlsby Derby Diary, June 12, 1918.

54 Ibid..

55 See Bridges to DMO, May 17, 1918, PRO, WO 106/499B/1 (Report of GHQ, BEF, June 12, 1918).

56 OH, III, 151.

57 Stallings, The Doughboys. 159.

58 Coffman, The War. 20-21; Churchill, Over Here!. 46; OB, 320: 9-30 for direct reprint. ,

59 See Coffman, The War. 32, 49, 160-167, 176; Weigley, History. 366-367, 378-380; 0B, 191: 16 provides chart of labyrinth of War Department organization prior to reorganizing done by Peyton C. March; OB, 231: 6 details the reorganization begun December 22, 1917 under General Orders No. 160. P. C. March became Chief of Staff on May 25. On May 20 Goethals assumed control of logistics.

60 Order of Battle. Ill, 201.

61 Snow, Signposts. 23-25. On lack of equipment see Coffman, The War. 40-42; Weigley, History. 362; Churchill (then British Minister of Munitions), The World Crisis. 1916- 1918 (London. 1927), II, chapter xx.

62 Snow, Signposts. 24-25.

63 Order of Battle. Ill, 202.

64 Snow, Signposts. 41-46.

65 Ibid.. 52-57, 70-87; Order of Battle. Ill, 199-204; OB, 338: 8.

66 See Spiers to Fagalde, May 4, 1918, PRO, W0 106/474/ELS 3951-23; Tardieu to Clemenceau, May 9, 1918, Vincennes, Fonds Clemenceau 61, no. 9693 M0.

67 Pershing, My Experiences. I, 266; Oil, III, 256. 68 Infantry Journal, vol. XV, no. L (Jlily 1918), 19ff. See also Lee, The Artilleryman. 35; Freidcl, Over There. 28; Henderson, The Ninety-First Division, 188-220; Sanborn, The 131st Infantry. 25.

69 Lack of coordination from the General Staff was a constant French complaint. See unsigned French report of May 2, 1918, PRO, WO 106/474/40102 24; Tardieu to Clemenceau, May 14, 1918, Vincennes, Fonds Clemenceau 61, no. 91815 MO; Analysis of documents received by Franco-American Office, May 20-30, no. 1018 A/ll, Paris, May 30, 1918, Vincennes, Fonds Clemenceau 62, divers 1918.

70 Extract from Minutes of War Cabinet meeting, April 24, 1918, PRO Cab 23/6, para. 2; Reading to Lloyd George, May 24, 1918, PRO, W0 106/496/2356. Also OH, III, 149, Memorandum to G-5, GHQ, AEF, June 12, 1918 on polyglot rifle training of US units arriving for training with BEF.

71 Snow, Signposts, 64.

72 Harbord, The American Army in France, 1917-1919 (Boston, 1937), 485.

73 History of the 79th Division. 31.

74 Coffman, The War, 76; Pershing, My Experiences, I, 379; Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 364; Order of Battle, III, 63. Infantry Replacement Centers were at Camps Lee, Gordon, Pike and Mac Arthur; Engineers at Camp Humphries;;FieldArtillery at Camps Jackson, Zachary Taylor and Machine Guns at Camp Hancock.

75 Coffman, The War, 59-61; 66, 68; OB, 214: 15; Batchelder, Camp Dix, Camp Lee, Camp Upton (Boston, 1918).

76 Pershing, My Experiences, I, 154-155; uTraining the AEF," Infantry Journal, vol. XV, no. 6, 487.

77 Ibid., 487. For infantry training areas, AEF, see appended map. Corps schools were located at Gondrecourt, Chattillon- sur-Seine and Clamency.

78 Best account of American schools is in de Cliambrun and de Marenches, The American Army, 65-71. See also Major George C. Marshall, "The American Army in France,11 chapter LXVI of The History of the First World War (New York, 1965), 1101- 1118. On courses at Langres and doctrinal jealousy between British, French and Americans see Thomas, History of the AEF, 36-37; T. Cunninghame, Chief of British Instructors at American Staff School, Langres, to Wagstaff, September 9, 1918, PRO, WO 106/499A; "Training the AEF,,f Infantry Journal, vol. XV, no. 6, 490-492.

79 Pershing.My Experiences, II, 189-190.

80 See memorandum from G-5 to Chief of Staff, July 11, 1918, in Pershing Papers, National Archives, Record Group 120; also "General Pershing and his Headquarters in France," Military Review, vol. XX, no. 78 (September 1940), 5-9; Colonel Grant, Notes of conversation with General Weygand, June 24, 1918, PRO, WO 106/1456; "United States Army: Notes on Present Situation," by S02b, July 9, 1918, PRO, WO 106/516--.

81 See Dienst, History of the 353rd Infantry, 33-43.

82 Ibid.. 34. See also Emmett, Give 'Way. 98-110 for similar experiences of the 90th Division.

83 Story of the 91st Division, 1-7.

84 De Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army, 58.

85 Story of the 79th Division, 46-47.

86 Miles, History of the 308th Infantry, 57-75.

87 See Robert Alexander, Memories of the World War. 1917-1919 (New York, 1931), 20; "Training the AEF," Infantry Journal,vol. XV, no. 6, 487; Order of Battle, III, 1, 1310-1316.

88 Ibid.. Also J.P. DuCane to CIGS, October 19, 1918, PRO WO 106/513/--225/.

89 De Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army, 62-63; Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre, Tome 6, vol. 1 (Paris, 1931),198.

90 Lee, The Artilleryman. 50.

91 De Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army, 69-70; Rhodes, 1918 is a very good account of training in France in the summer of 1918 for artillery units.

92 The period from May 31 to July 15 comprises the battles at Chateau-Thierry on June 1 and July B (2nd and 3rd Divisions), and the defence of Rheims (42nd Division). See Stallings, The Doughboys. 78-89; Coffman, The War, 214-227; Vandiver, John J. Pershins, 81-82 and especially Pitt, 1918, 142- 183. 93 On Belleau Wood, June 6-26, see Stallings, The Doughboys, 91-109; Vandiver, John J. Pershing, 81; Coffman, The War, 215-220; Pitt, 1918, 142-183.

94 See Stallings, The Doughboys< 141-171; Coffman, The War, 234-257; Vandiver, John J. Pershing;, 82; Pitt, 1918, 186-191.

95 See Stallings, The Doughboys, 217; Vandiver, John J. Pershing, 82; Basil H. Liddell Hart, The Real War (Boston, 1930), 450-452; Coffman, The War, 263-283; Pitt, 1918, 134, 224-231.

96 See Pitt, 1918, 231-237; Vandiver, John J. Pershing, 83-84; B.H. Liddell Hart, The Real War, 380, 461-466; Coffman, The War, 305-351; Stallings, The Doughboys, 225-248; Crutwell, A History of the Great War, 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1936), 567.

97 Information from the entourage of the King of Greece after a visit to the front, furnished by General Hutchinson, ADC to King George V, Lausanne, April 18, 1918, Quai d*0rsay, Operations Strategiques, Front de l'Ouest, VI, 278-281.

98 Intelligence Officer of High Military Command of German Army, reporting on battle of St. Mihiel, September 25, 1918, quoted in Page, ,fThe Truth, 11" 84.

99 Hindenburg, Out of My Life, 437; Ludendorff, My War Memories, I, 610-630, 676.

100 Cable of September 15, 1918, Pershing, My Experiences, II, 278. Some men of the 89th Division got one week of training in the USA and two weeks in France,then were thrown into combat without having fired a rifle, thrown a grenade or handled automatic rifles. Some had to be shown how to load rifles at the last minute--personal note by Captain Francis Leigh, OC B Coy, attached to Dienst, History of the 353rdl Infantry.

101 Historical Division, Department of the Army, United States Army in theWorld War, 1917-1919: Policy Forming Documents, American Expeditionary Forces (Washington, 1948), 597. Hereafter cited as OH, II, 597.

102 Ayres, The War with Germany, 25-34. CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION: THE DEATH OF AUTOMATON TACTICS

At five o'clock on the morning of June 6, 1918 men of the

4th Marine Brigade sprang to their feet, took positions yard abreast, and began advancing across the softly undulating fields toward a blot on the horizon known as Belleau Wood.

No bitter memories of waste or muddle stunted the faith of those troops in their leaders and training. None straggled, no sergeants with drawn revolvers enforced the mordant rhythmn of assault. Fifteen yards behind the first wave, another line of soldiers started moving toward the woodline, followed in succession by yet two more waves. Confidence was high.

Had not the artillery pounded and thundered for thirty minutes?

Would not this assault, practiced for months, make possible the break in the enemy line that would bring about open warfare at which Americans naturally excelled?

Suddenly, a flat, syncopated slapping sound started chopping overhead. Then the ground was swarming with bullets.

As the German machine gunners adjusted their aim, .30 caliber

slugs started thudding into stomachs, shattering bone and

shredding flesh. Like corn stooks sheared off by a mechanical reaper, Americans lay evenly spaced, in neat regular lines. The

survivers looked up from pockets of sheltering earth, some tried

to crawl forward or rush to likely fire positions. Again the 121

slapping sound. Again the cries of the wounded. Most of the brigade never got across the field, let alone entered the woods to clean them out with bayonet.^ Ambitious lines on a chart at 2nd Division Headquarters looked no less silly at nightfall than those on Haig's maps in the sullen, sorrow¬

ful summer of the Somme. The Americans had done no better.

Now, as had their enthusiastic British counterparts of two years past, the Marines huddled in shell holes, squirmed for cover from the machine gun fire, and awaited nightfall.

Eventually, three weeks later, Belleau Wood did fall, after repeated assault and massive artillery preparation. Courage never accomplishes absolutely nothing. Often in World War One, it missed that nadir by a mere hair breadth. Persistence did gain ground, but at such fearful cost that it became dangerous

to count losses. Calm assessment of progress and casualties would have drawn the Allies out of the war years ago.

In later years of less apologetic mediocrity, World War

One generalship provided a great deal of comfort to those

intellectual narcissists who felt the need to carp at the indemnic

idiocy of the military. But if any truly useful lessons are

to be drawn from the tactical cant of the Western Front, an honest effort must be made to understand the logic in the minds

of the authors of the drill regulations then in use. The same

generation that vowed never to fight for "king and country" in

the 'thirties did not suffer the consequences of bad tactics 122

in World War Two, largely because military thinkers learned the lessons of 1914 to 1918 and translated them into appropriate training. Although most of Pershing's close associates insisted that "the Field Service Regulations of 1911 ... stood the

o test of the war better than those of any other army," a state¬ ment more modest than intended, the United States Army was rewriting its manuals of instruction by 1920, incorporating major changes in concepts of land warfare.

American open warfare tactics in World War One followed the Infantry Drill Regulations composed in 1911. Published in a small, blue book, with very close type and numbered paragraphs, the drill regulations bore a scriptural quality that was not mitigated by the tone of prose contained within. The intention behind all the very detailed instructions crammed into the manual was to fit troops for offensive campaigning in open country. Marching, castramentation, close and extended order drill, target training, fire control and the bayonet received painstaking attention.

Basic principles of combat were implicit, when not explicit, in the course matter of cadets in World War One. Verbatim memorization of passages from the drill regulations inculcated a prescribed habit of thought. Inaction is of advantage to the enemy, offense alone delivers decisive results, quick, energetic advance minimizes casualties. An enemy position could be neutralized by accurate, well-controlled rifle fire, without necessarily resorting to artillery support. Constant movement 123

toward the enemy, whether by rushes, crawling or skirmishing

lines, minimized the effect of his fire. The closer one was

to the foe, the less likely his chance to inflict casualties.

Positions once taken were to be held, for it was regarded as

death to withdraw in the face of enemy fire made more sure

o by the confidence of successful defence. Attack by rifle and bayonet, with artillery and other weapons playing a secondary role, was insisted upon as an inviolate, changeless recipe

for victory, regardless of recent developments in machine guns,

light cannon, trenches, grenades or wire.^

Harold Fiske, in a lecture on January 29, 1917 to graduates at Fort Leavenworth, dealt with the question of altering drill regulations in the light of events in the European war. He saw no need to change tactics.-* Offense remained basic. To conduct only a spectacular defence in the trenches was to be like a boxer who can parry and block, but never drives home the knock¬ out punch. An enemy could not be shot out of position by gunfire. It was necessary to frighten and pry him out with the bayonet. Advance against modern firepower was still possible in narrow columns, which made of the assaulting team poor artillery targets. Gunners could not react quickly enough to rapid, irregular rushes at constantly changing ranges. Heavy

casualties were unlikely before the scattered groups of infantry had advanced and taken cover. The closer one approached the

enemy1s.position, the more rattled he became. The victim1s 124

increasingly shaky aim could be countered once within rifle range by a sudden stream of well-directed steel from 250 weapons.

While the enemy was taking cover, an assaulting force could approach safely and assault with the bayonet.^

In order to assure success in the type of war going on

in Europe, Fiske suggested not changes in tactics, but a reor¬ ganization of the infantry regiment so as to enable it to more

easily sustain the existing pattern of frontal advance and bayonet assault. American regulations recommended that regiments

deploy for the attack in four groups: one to form a firing

line, followed by another to reinforce those marksmen lost

to enemy fire, a third group to conduct the final assault, and

a final group to reinforce the captured position against counter¬

attack. As established prior to Pershing's adoption of Fiske1s

suggestions, the company was not believed to be large enough

to successfully carry out any one of those functions without mixing in men from the remainder of the regiment. Fiske re¬

commended a company of 250 men so each quarter of the regiment

could play its part in the standard attack tactics without breaking up companies and confusing leadership. The AEF doubled

the size of its divisions in the process of expanding infantry

companies from approximately 120 to over 250 men, mute but

overwhelming testimony to Pershing1s faith in the drill regulations

of 1911.

Fiske did not wish more machine guns to be added to the 125

regiment, as they were heavy, consumed awkward amounts of ammunition, and thus hampered offensive mobility. Gas and grenade training was suggested, only as an ancillary aid to assault and defence. Artillery was regarded as limited in value because it could not move forward fast enough to aid advancing troops. All the more reason, then, to insist on a very high standard of marksmanship, for infantry ought to be able to depend on rifle fire alone to cover its aggressive movements.^

Tactical decisions according to American open warfare doctrine rested with the company commander. It was he who decided what formations to adopt for safe and rapid advance; and it was he who selected targets and controlled rifle fire prior to ordering the assault. Lieutenants, or platoon commanders, served merely to train their men, and pass instructions from

the captain to their segment of the company. Infantry operated

in teams of 250 men, all of whom performed essentially the same

function with the same weapons. With enough training, 250 riflemen could maneuver well and produce devastating fire.

But they provided a big target. And in World War One, there was not enough time for exhaustive training. Most important, the rifle faced newer weapons of immense firepower and range.

Draftees enthusiastic enough to read the course presented

in the Official Bulletin in the summer of 1917 were told that machine guns had little effect against men lying on the ground 126

o or crawling. By using the standard procedures taught in extended order drill, troops could advance as well against machine guns

as rifles. Belleau Wood, not to mention the cauldron of the

Meuse Argonne, demonstrated that the rifle was not the master of the battlefield, especially when set against machine guns.

The inability of American tacticians to understand the nature

of the machine gun goes far in explaining why they clung

stubbornly to outmoded drill regulations, as well as why the best trained troops often gained no more ground than the worst.

Americans regarded the machine gun as a rapid fire, but

cumbersome, rifle. Rapid fire guns were sited alongside riflemen

in trenches as a source of additional firepower. Because one bullet kills as effectively as twenty, it was thought that a man could rush as many yards when surprising a machine gunner

as he could "steal" against a sniper. Once safely esconced

in some shell hole, a man was as safe against machine gun as

against rifle bullets. But the Germans did not oblige the

Allies by using machine guns in such a simplistic, wasteful

manner.

Any projectile follows a trajectory, which near the point

of origin is almost flat. Some distance from the weapon, the

trajectory attains such height as to no longer pose a threat to

a standing man. That portion of space covered by a bullet capable of hitting a man directly from the front is termed the zone of

grazing fire. At a range of approximately 1,000 yards, the bullet 127

attains its maximum height, and begins to fall toward earth.

Bullets dropping vertically at the end of their trajectory are termed plunging fire, and the ground beneath comprises the beaton zone. Much like water being sprayed from a hose, the size and shape of a beaten zone can be predicted and controlled according to the angle of the gun and the contours of the ground.

Obviously, hillocks, rocks, trees or gullies do not provide any protection against plunging fire. The Germans, taking advantage of the stability and accuracy of fixed machine guns, sited their weapons to cover with plunging fire every inch of ground before their defensive lines. Extremely accurate surveys of the terrain which would have to be crossed by an attacking enemy were possible over the long years of stalemate on the

Western Front.

Any low areas or reverse slopes which were immune to grazing fire were covered by absolutely reliable plunging fire from machine guns sited in front of and beside the main trench complex.

Outer systems of machine gun pill boxes, immune to all but a direct hit by artillery, dotted the approaches to the German defenses. Each gun had data with which to set trajectories that would lace every inch of vital ground with death. Come fog or darkness, the machine gunner had only to pull the trigger, and a hail of plunging fire pulverized a substantial piece of ground eight hundred to one thousand yards away. 128

Snipers make rough allowances for the rise anddrop of a bullet*s trajectory when shooting at extended ranges. But two hundred and fifty hurriedly trained men, frightened in the heat of battle, cannot hold their rifles steadily enough to play the machine gun*s game. Using direct grazing fire, the maximum effective range at which a rifleman can engage an enemy with firm hope of hitting him is six hundred yards. When riflemen, whatever their formation, began to advance on the

Germans during World War One, they came under sudden machine gun fire from the flank. Shooting at the side of an advancing

line of skirmishers at sufficient range for plunging fire, a veteran machine gunner could place a long net of fire over the helpless infantry. The attackers, when armed only with rifles, could not retaliate as machine guns were beyond effective range. It was impossible to maneuver 250 men under fire to

face an entirely different direction, as the punishing fire came not from the main enemy position in front but from a hidden source off to a flank. Unable to risk moving, subjected

to constant loss while trapped in the machine gunner*s zone

of fire, Americans found that attacking was not a matter of

invinceable onslaught, but of impotent misery until night

and the enemy's fatigue or mercy allowed stealthy, painful

progress back to friendly lines.

American experience against machine guns was not new.

Throughout the futile offensives of 1915 and 1916, the French 129

and British had endured similar ordeal and greater loss. The

instinct for survival eventually wore down the hidebound tradition

and pedanticism of even the British army. As the crux of

restoring mobility to the battlefield was elimination of

machine guns, some means of increasing the range and firepower

of an infantry team had to be devised. By the end of 1917, the

British and French had perfected a simple, reliable and powerful

series of weapons light enough to be carried in an assault.

The Lewis, a light automatic rifle, could spit 47 bullets toward

an enemy machine gun or trench in seconds. Easily changed magazines were carried by the gunner’s assistant. A French

invention, the 37-mm cannon, was a miniature artillery piece

capable of smashing a one-pound shell into a pillbox. Rifle

grenades acted as miniature mortars, dropping explosives on a

tormenting machine gunner's head. In the ooze and gore of the

Ypres salient, young officers and grizzled NCOs perfected means

of using the new weapons in concert to immobilize, dominate

and defeat the enemy.®

In 1916 British manuals were little different from the

American drill regulations.^ A year later, a revolutionary new

system of assaulting pill boxes and entrenchments without undue

casualties had developed from the roots of the BEF. Platoons

were no longer mere rosters of riflemen trained only to shoot

and move on command. Each platoon now comprised four teams of

about eight men: a Lewis gun section, a section of bombers, a 130

squad of riflemen, and a group of rifle grenadiers. These four

elements of the platoon combat team practiced assaulting pill boxes and trenches until action was taken without hesitation

to dominate and close with the enemy. On coming under fire,

Lewis gunners and grenadiers pinned down the enemy marksmen.

Meanwhile, riflemen and bombers worked their way forward by

clever use of covered approaches. Once the mobile half of the platoon reached their objectives, Lewis gunners and grenadiers

shifted their fire to cut off any enemy retreat. Germans

cowering to evade bullets and shrapnel were stabbed with the

bayonet, shot, or blown to bits by grenades.^

Division of the platoon into four teams, each with its

own weapons and mission, transferred tactical decision from

company commander to lieutenant. Captains decided only whether

to reinforce hard-pressed platoons, or by-pass time consuming

opposition in an effort to drive as far as possible into the

enemy1s rear. Soldiers could no longer passively obey fire

orders. Lewis gunners had to switch their fire late enough

to prevent the enemy from manning his weapons, yet not so late

that friendly riflemen and bombers were endangered as they

approached the objective. Rifle grenadiers had to develop

unerring aim with an awkward weapon. Close cooperation between

riflemen and bombers was necessary to ensure mutual protection

and expedite destroying the enemy before he recovered from the

shock of sudden assault. 131

American observers charged the British instructors with 12 attaching excess importance to each particular weapon. Such criticism reveals more than a natural desire to find fault with those on whom one is unwillingly dependont. British training was generally acceptable to American authorities, largely because much stress was still laid on rifle and bayonet as the climax of assault. But neither Pershing nor his colleagues understood the nature of trench assault, or the technicalities of the duel between machine gun and rifle. General Alexander asserted after the war that the rifle was the prime weapon 13 of infantry. Pershing supported him in that conceit. The

AEF's leadership had not learned new tactics before the war ended. It was probably a mercy that British and French instruction was prevalent in the AEF. When hardened troops in the final battles turned to new weapons when the rifle failed, some knew how to operate the life saving tools.

Pershing underestimated the prowess of his Allies as much as of his enemy. In his memoirs he wrote that

It was logical to expect that the French should take //the view that trench warfare training held first priority^ ... as they had been on the defensive, at least in thought, during the previous half century.^

It is difficult to believe that Pershing knew nothing of the French theorists of the du Picq and Grandmaison schools, who blithely despatched entire armies, clad in horse plumes, red trousers and white gloves, to their death. The French developed a 132

swollen reliance on massive artillery preparation after the slaughter of 1915, as the only available means by which to save precious lives. French artillery training, reflected in the performance of the AEF, was excellent. French infantry had been developing a system of attack much like that of the British since 1916. But Gallic troops made a poor impression on

Pershing. The Americans had not been in the war long enough to appreciate the desperation with which exhausted armies grope for cheap means of survival, if not final victory. Pershing never empathized with the French dislike for casualties, and supplemented the training of American troops with the same infantry drill regulations that had served him so well from the plains of Kansas to the howling wilderness of Mindanao. Whether open warfare training would have made the battered French soldier of 1918 more aggressive is doubtful. The poilu did not seek more laurels. That he had survived was glory enough. The break¬ through Pershing trained for never occurred; the grandiose expectations of open warfare tactics were never tested. But the

Germans in the Meuse Argonne proved that machine guns were as mobile as an attacking force tangled up in supply problems growing more severe with every yard of newly won ground. There is no reason to expect that the unequal contest between machine gun and rifle would have been any different in open ground than it was between the trenches.

Pershing had an acute awareness of the vital role of morale in successful combat. Ilis belief that open warfare training 133

developed initiative, aggressiveness and resourcefulness held much truth, at least for fresh troops.^ Were morale not high in the AEF, it is unlikely that as much would have been accomplished by improperly trained troops as was apparent by the end of the war. How much Pershing would have condoned the sort of grass-roots resourcefulness that gave birth to the

British team tactics must remain one of the most intriguing

speculative questions of the war. By November 1918, officers returning to training camps from combat units were injecting new

tactical concepts into the American army. Men were no longer

to be encouraged to deploy in skirmish lines at half-pace

intervals. Spacing expanded to fifteen feet at least between men in extended order. Platoons were divided into two groups,

each one covering the advance of the other with the assistance 16 of a Lewis gun. A vital step had been taken in the evolution

of the tactics that were to prove successful in America's next

world war.

Throughout almost the entirety of its existence, the AEF

was confronted with a very unusual problem in American history.

Neither before nor after World War One has America been a junior

partner, forced to scrap for every shred of sovereignty. It

would be facile to criticize Pershing for failing to acquiesce

to Allied training and command. Reliance on another's ideas

was especially repugnant to the American of 1917. The only

coherent body of American tactical doctrine had been written

by the same group of men who dominated wartime training. It could 134

not be expected of them to foresake their own concepts of warfare for the diffuse stream of tattered after-action reports and training directives that set Allied instruction after the lessons of three years.

War expresses more eloquently and profoundly the character of a people than literature, music, dress or diversions. America was an optimistic country. Her troops, despite tedium and frequent poor leadership, displayed no serious lapse of enthusiasm until well into the final battle. Civilians exerted themselves to the utmost to master the skills of military life, and rapidly began evolving new ideas to replace those that proved inapprop¬ riate in action. Great organizational talent manifest itself in the development over one year of an intricate, dynamic and efficient training system. And perhaps most important, the ability of talented men to rise to positions of great responsibility with relatively minor interference from privileged classes resulted in a concentration of very able leaders at the head of the training establishment in a very short period of time.

Troops returned home to prohibition, xenophobia, crazed greed, cloying self-righteousness. America turned her back

on the world, partly out of moral outrage at Allied cynicism, partly out of a disconcerting, although unspoken, realization

that her own people bore the same evils of mass paranoia and militarism as the enemy. But frustration is not the most important

legacy of America's first crusade. The nation's record was

successful and gave her no cause to doubt her ability to make 135

decisive intervention in the affairs of the world. Americans were also once again wakened to the cataclysmic proportions of

total war. Although not herself exhausted by 1918, it was noticeable to America that modern war had no victors. In 1941,

there was no outburst of religious zeal such as that which

sent a million boys to camp in September 1917. Pearl Harbor

Day struck as much tragedy as enthusiasm into the hearts of a new generation of citizen soldiers. Yet these youth could

return home four years later chastened but not embittered

largely because of very practical, mundane lessons learned by

America's military leaders in World War One. For a system

of fitting training and tactics to the changing realities of

modern weaponry and strategy had been evolved by 1918, and was

copied closely in a successful effort to save lives twenty years

later. Training in the world's most futile war presents the

paradox of mankind learning from history, and the promise of

past suffering attaining a small pittance of redemption in the

cultivation of human wisdom. NOTES

1 Pitt, 1918, 64, 152-159, 192; Stallings, The Doughboys, 91-109; The Plattsburger, 1917, 14; Coffman, The War, 215-320; Johnston, First Reflections, 6.

2 Ibid..

3 See Captain J.JC Christian, What Every Soldier Ought to Know (Kansas City, 1917), 38.

4 Kilbourne, National Service Library, I, chap. IX, 114; OB, 108: 7.

5 Fiske, Notes on Infantry (Fort Leavenworth, 1917), 3.

6 Ibid., 17-21.

7 Ibid., 28. On reorganization of the American army see Coffman, The War, 47-48.

8 OB, 94: 7; Infantry Drill Regulations, para. 542, 545-546; Field Service Regulations, art. IX, 157-176.

9 On weapons see Dooly, Great Weapons of World War I (New York, 1969); on German tactics and machine gun siting see Longstaff, "The Tactics of the Machine Gun5*,11 Journal of the United States Cavalry Association, vol. XXVIII, no. 117 (January 1918), 117, 326ff.

10 See !,Infantry Tactics, 1914-1918," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, vol. LXIV, no. 455 (August 1919), 455-460. See Anderson, The War Manual (2 vols: London, 1916), vol. 2 for British tactics in 1916. Applin, "Tactics of the Machine Gun," Infantry Journal, vol. XIV, no. 10 (April 1918), 755-763; Haking, Company Training (London 1913); Wakefield, The Platoon Commander's Vade Mecum (London, 1916); Stewart, Thirty-Minute Talks (Washington, 1920), 229.

11 On British tactics, see Major Donald McRae, Offensive Fighting (Philadelphia, 1918), recommended by Secretary of War; McKellar, Machine Gun Practice and Tactics (New York, 1917); Gillman, The New Platoon Commander: Complete in Tactics andDrill as Required in France (Cleveland, 1918); Dion, Tanks, Gas, Bombing and Liquid Fire (New York, 1917); Dyson, Grenade Fighting: The Training and Tactics of Grenadiers (New York, 1917). 12 Robert Alexander, Memories, 17.

13 Ibid.. 45.

14 Ibid.. Vandiver, Pershing. 76, 180, 187-188; Pershing, My Experiences, I, 153 on primacy of rifle.

15 Ibid., II, 152. On French tactics see Rouvier, Present- Day Warfare (New York, 1918); Chapuis, Infanterie: Instruction Theorique et Generale (Paris, 1917); Leroux, L'El^ve Soldat (Paris, 1918); Bertrand, Tactics and Duties of Trench Fighting (New York, 1918),

16 Dienst, History of the 353rd Infantry, 36. APPENDIX A: Composition of United States Army, 1916 & 1918. Sources of Commissioned Personnel, 1917-1918. Location of National Army Cantonments and National Guard Special Camps in continental United States, 1917. NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL CAMPS

Division Camp Location

26 Green Charlotte, N.C, 27 Wadsworth Spartansburg, S. C. 28 Hancock Augusta, Ga. 29 McClellan Anniston, Ala. 30 Sevier Greenville, S.C. 31 Wheeler Macon, Ga. 32 McArthur Waco, Tex. 33 Logan Houston, Tex. 34 Cody Deming, N. Mex. 35 Doniphan Fort Sill, Okla. 36 Bowie Fort Worth, Tex. 37 Sheridan Montgomery, Ala. 38 Shelby Hattiesburg, Miss. 39 Beauregard Alexandria, La. 40 Kearney Linda Vista, Calif. 41 Fremont Palo Alto, Calif. NATIONAL ARMY CANTONMENTS

Division Camp Location

76 Devens Ayer, Mass. 77 Upton Yaphank, L.I. 78 Dix Wrightstown, N.J. 79 Meade Annapolis Junction, Md 80 Lee Petersburg, Va. 81 Jackson Columbia, S.C. 82 Gordon Atlanta, Ga. 83 Sherman Chillicothe, Ohio 84 Taylor Louisville, Ky. 85 Custer Battle Creek, Mich. 86 Grant Rockford, 111. 87 Pike Little Rock, Ark. 88 Dodge Des Moines, Iowa. 89 Funston Fort Riley, Kansas 90 Travis ‘ Fort Sam Houston-, Tex. 91 Lewis American Lake, Wash.

OFFICERS' TRAINING CAMPS.

First Series, 15 May to 11 August, 1917 16 camps at 13 posts Plattsburg Barracks, N.Y. Fort Sheridan, 111. / Madison Barracks, N.Y. Fort Logan H. Roots, Ark. Fort Niagara, N.Y. Fort Snelling, Minn. Fort Myer, Va. Fort Riley, Kansas Fort Oglethorpe, Ga. Leon Springs, Texas Fort McPherson, Ga. Presidio, San Francisco Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.

Second Series, 27 August to 27 November, 1917 16 camps at 9 posts

Plattsburg Barracks, N.Y. Fort Myer, Va. Fort Niagara, N.Y. Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind Fort Oglethorpe, Ga. Presidio, San Francisco Fort Sheridan, 111. Fort Snelling, Minn. Leon Springs, Tex.

Third Series, 5 January to 19 April, 1918 27 camps located under divisional control in the National Guard Special Camps and National Army Cantonments. APPENDIX B: British Training Areas Used by the AEF, April-July 1918

Beljiurrf p8>ii !wja$

Arrtts

Atotens

°3d

/^0t,//c(0u.d‘

O Dou /!et\S

O /4/n/e/jj APPENDIX B: Billeting and Training Areas, AEF, 1917-1918 DIVISIONAL AREAS:

1 Gondrecourt 2 Neufchateau 3 Bourmont 4 Rimaucourt 5 Vaucouleurs 6 Colombey-les-Belles 7 Rolampont 8 Nogent-en-Bassigny 9 Chateauvillain 10 Prauthoy 11 Bourbonne-les-Bains 12 Mussy-sur-Seine 13 Bar-sur-Aube 14 Aignay-le-Duc 15 Angy-le-Franc 16 Tonnerre 17 Fays-Billot 18 Donjeux 19 Seinelay 20 CHAUMONT 21 Semur 22 Norcy-le-Bourg (not used) 23 Tronville-en-Barrois 24 Wassy 50 Le Valdahon 51 Joinville 52 Chalindrey 53 Langres 54 Vitrey

General Headquarters, AEF CHAUMONT

Services of Supply (SOS) TOURS

(Map based on Statistics Branch, General Staff, Headquarters, Services of Supply, American Expeditionary Forces) BIBLIOGRAPHY

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