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Home , Bizone, Erich Honecker, Inge Viett, Otto Winzer, Petar Mladenov, Todor Zhivkov

The Establishment of Bulgarian–West German Diplomatic Relations within the Coordinating Framework of the

✣ Jordan Baev

The normalization of official relations between and the Federal Re- public of (FRG) was significantly influenced by two major factors: the policy of closer coordination and consultation within the Warsaw Pact; and the somewhat slower process of detente´ and security negotiations in Eu- rope. On several occasions starting in the late 1940s, the German question and the postwar model of two German states provoked dangerous international crises in Europe. These crises spurred the start of a prolonged and complex European security negotiating process that would unfold during the last two decades of the . Two additional factors spurred the bilateral effort toward normalization: a visible change in Bulgarian foreign policy in seeking a rapprochement with and the Balkan members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the mid-1960s, and the formulation of the new West German at the end of the decade. Because no serious disputes or controversies had yet divided the and West Germans, relations between the FRG and Bulgaria improved markedly despite times of sharp East-West confrontation in the final Cold War decade. Relationships within the Warsaw Pact have been among the less discussed problems in contemporary historiography. However, a vast amount of newly accessible archival documentation has underscored the differences in the aims and intentions of East European governments over foreign policy tactics and security issues. Multilateral and bilateral coordination of the Soviet bloc grew out of a variety of preliminary talks at senior levels as well as additional “consul- tative” visits by high-ranking Soviet officials to the respective East European capitals. Coordination of policy at the highest levels was accomplished in two formats: officially at meetings of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee (PCC) and gatherings of the Pact’s foreign and defense ministers, and unofficially at multilateral and bilateral meetings of and state leaders. Each of the Warsaw Pact allies had its own role in and made

Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2016, pp. 158–180, doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00656 C 2016 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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its own contributions to the alliance in accordance with the specific views and positions of its leaders and with its national traditions and geographic location. Whereas Poland, , and constituted the Pact’s frontline Northern Tier, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania con- stituted a secondary Southern Tier. Given the withdrawal of Albania from the Pact in 1968 and the maverick policies of Romania, Bulgaria assumed chief responsibility for allied strategy in the Balkans. This article is based on a diverse set of Bulgarian political, diplomatic, and intelligence archival records that have been declassified in recent years. My research was initially part of an international academic comparative project that began within the framework of the much larger Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact.1 Some of the results have been discussed in one of my recent monographs and in several other publications.2 Nonetheless, the particular story of the establishment of Bulgarian–West German relations and their development during the final two decades of the Cold War is presented here for the first time.

The Initial Two Decades of the Cold War

The initial negotiations between Bulgaria and western Germany were estab- lished in the economic domain, beginning shortly after the signing of the Peace Treaties with the former European allies of . On 4 October 1947, the first commercial agreement with the U.S. and British occupation zones in Germany (the so-called Bizone, which became the FRG in 1949) was signed, supplemented by a wider agreement in August 1949. During bilateral commercial negotiations in Bonn in August 1952, the FRG agreed to exchange official trade representatives with Bulgaria. The issue was discussed by Bulgar- ian political leaders in April 1953 at the initiative of Bulgarian Foreign Trade

1. D´etente and CSCE in Europe: The States of the Warsaw Pact and the Federal Republic of Germany in Their Mutual Perception and Rapprochement 1966–1975, a multilateral project coordinated by Manheim University and sponsored by Volkswagen Stiftung (December 2005–December 2008). In 2006, the Parallel History Project (PHP) changed its name to Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP) in Zurich. The PHP ended in 2011. 2. Jordan Baev, Sistemata za Evropeiska sigurnost I Balkanite v godinite na Studenata vojna (Sofia: Damyan Yakov Publishers, 2010); Jordan Baev, “Bulgaria and the Warsaw Pact Consultations on the CSCE Process: From Helsinki to Belgrade,” in Vladimir Bilanzic and Ditmar Dahlmann, eds., From Helsinki to Belgrade: The First CSCE Follow-Up Meeting and the Crisis of D´etente (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2012), pp. 107–118; and Jordan Baev, “Die blockinterne Koordination des Warschauer Pakts und die DDR,” in Oliver Bange und Bernd Lemke, eds., Wege zur Wiedervereinigung: Die beiden deutschen Staaten in ihren Bundnissen 1970 bis 1990 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013), pp. 183–202.

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Minister Zhivko Zhivkov. The trade liaisons established between Hungary and the FRG served as a precedent. Soon thereafter, a Bulgarian commercial repre- sentative was sent to , and his West German counterpart was sent to Sofia. Although the commercial bureaus of the two countries held unofficial status, mutual commercial exchange nonetheless increased significantly, rising from $25 million in 1952 to $57 million in 1960.3 In September 1955, the member-states of the newly formed Warsaw Pact held confidential discussions about the results of the in July 1955. Afterward, the Bulgarian government sent a note to the West German government via the French legation in Sofia, proposing the establishment of Bulgarian–FRG diplomatic relations. The document underscored the necessity of developing cultural and academic exchanges as well as further increases in commercial exchange. A note from the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry stressed that the The old traditions of close scientific, technical, and cultural connections be- tween the Bulgarian and German nations could and must serve as the basis for the development of future friendly relations between Bulgaria and the German Federal Republic and for further extension of the scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation between the two nations. The note was accompanied by an official hint delivered by Deputy Prime Minister Georgi Chankov in a public statement in Sofia on 8 September 1955. In March 1956, had insisted through the Soviet embassy in Sofia that the Bulgarian government would need to “exert certain pressure on the government of [Konrad] Adenauer for acceleration of the establishment of diplomatic relations” with East European countries. Soviet leaders proposed that a propaganda campaign be organized in the central Bulgarian mass media with “a responsible Bulgarian statesman” giving an interview to West German media in which he would stress the necessity of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the FRG.4 In April 1956, complying with the line of the 20th Soviet Party Congress, the First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP), , became the foremost political leader in Bulgaria, a position he strengthened

3. Protocol of BKP Session No. A-160, 14 October 1952, in Central State Archive (TsDA), Sofia, Fond (F.) 1-B (BKP Central Committee Records), Opis (Op.) 6, A.E. 1677; Agreement for trade exchange with , 31 August 1949, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 6, A.E. 1787; and Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. 61/18, April 1953, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 6, A.E. 1787. 4. Luben Gerasimov to Mincho Neichev, August 1955, in Diplomatic Archive (DA), Sofia, Op. 14-P, A.E. 248; Verbal Note from Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the French Legation in Sofia, September 1955, in DA, Op. 14-P, A.E. 248; and Luben Gerasimov to Mincho Neichev, 4 March 1956, in DA, Op. 14-P, A.E. 248.

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even further in 1962. From then on, he ruled without serious challenge until his abrupt downfall in November 1989. As Zhivkov solidified his political rule, he did his best to establish close personal relations with a succession of leaders of the Communist Party of the (CPSU)—, , Yurii Andropov, , and Mikhail Gor- bachev. With the leaders prior to Gorbachev, Zhivkov succeeded in forging close ties. However, he failed to develop such a connection with Gorbachev (al- though he never allowed himself to speak out against Gorbachev’s , as East German leader did). Unlike the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaus¸escu, Zhivkov displayed staunch political loyalty to Moscow in return for economic benefits and stability—a formula that proved effective for nearly 30 years. Zhivkov generally established his policy with the objective of maintaining close ties with the Soviet Union, using the tactics and slogans of “a comprehensive rapprochement” between Bulgaria and the USSR in his dealing with Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The same “most loyal ally” approach was employed within the Warsaw Pact coordinating framework. The first-ever contact between political representatives of Bulgaria and West Germany was during a visit of two Free Democratic Party (FDP) deputies to Sofia in October 1956. In May 1959, a delegation from West Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) visited Sofia as well.5 However, Bonn’s strict application of the was a serious obstacle to the normal- ization of diplomatic relations. A further impediment was the unresolved German question. GDR leaders went to great lengths to hinder any polit- ical, economic, and cultural contact between Bonn and the East European governments—efforts that were indirectly endorsed by the Soviet Union and Poland. In a detailed report to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in Lon- don after traveling to Eastern Europe in May 1961, the British ambassador to Warsaw, Sir George Clutton, compared the attitudes of the East European countries toward Germany and the USSR. According to Clutton, Poland was unique in its aversion to both the Germans and Moscow, whereas Bulgaria was unique in the opposite direction, lacking both anti-German and anti-Russian sentiments.6 Trade between Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Germany increased in the late 1950s and early 1960s—despite the lack of official diplomatic re- lations and in spite of the escalation of the second Crisis (1958–1961).

5. Information from BKP Foreign Policy and International Relations Department on the visit of a SPD delegation to Bulgaria, 20 May 1959, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 91, A.E. 149. 6. Dimitar Dimitrov, Savetska Balgaria: 1956–1963: Iz arhiva na Foreign Office (London: BBC, 1994), p. 90.

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During the period from 1961 to 1968, West Germany ranked first among Western countries in trade with Bulgaria. On 30 September 1963, the Bul- garian commercial representative in Frankfurt, Penko Penkov, was invited to Bonn to meet with officials at the FRG Foreign Ministry. The main purpose of the meeting was to review the opportunities for development of official relations without neglecting the Hallstein Doctrine. As a result of these pre- liminary consultations, a bilateral agreement was signed on 6 March 1964 that gave diplomatic status to the FRG’s commercial office in Sofia and to the Bulgarian commercial office in Frankfurt.7 Soon, a political counselor with the diplomatic rank of second secretary was appointed to the Bulgarian commer- cial office. His main task was to keep the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry apprised of the political situation in the FRG, including its role as a member-state of both NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC).8 The “Peace Note” put forth by ’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU)-FDP coalition government on 25 March 1966, which called for the improvement of West German relations with Eastern Europe, provoked mixed reactions among the Warsaw Pact states. The Soviet Union immediately proposed a European conference on the German issue, whereas Poland stressed acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line by the West German government. On 17 May 1966, the Romanian foreign trade minister began talks in Bonn with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroder and Minister for Economic Affairs Kurt Schmiicker, aiming to improve economic relations between the two countries. The Bulgarian government received the “Peace Note” through its embassy in on 26 March. However, after senior BKP analysts sent confidential information about it to the BKP Politburo on 10 April, no further action was taken.9 Soon after the Bucharest Declaration “for consolidation of peace and security in Europe” was announced at the Warsaw Pact summit in July 1966, the West German government made its first overtures to normalize relations with Eastern Europe. In September 1966, a senior West German official visited Bulgaria under the pretext of attending the annual Fair. During this visit, Rolf Lahr, the permanent secretary at the Foreign Ministry in Bonn, availed himself of the opportunity to talk with the Bulgarian ministers of

7. Maria Mateeva and Hristo Tepavicharov, Diplomaticheski otnoshenia na Balgaria 1878–1988 (Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1989), p. 297. 8. Information from Boris Ivanov regarding discussion on NATO, 31 March 1966, in DA, Op. 22, A.E. 957, pp. 2–8. 9. Information from BKP Foreign Policy and International Relations Department to BKP Politburo, 10 April 1966, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 91, A.E. 154.

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foreign affairs and foreign trade, Ivan Bashev and Ivan Budinov, as well as with several other high-level officials. In a meeting with Bashev on 21 September, Lahr acknowledged that the real goal of his visit was to discuss the state of Bulgarian–West German relations. He said his government was not ready to propose concrete initiatives for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, but it did want to initiate a process of normalization with all Warsaw Pact countries that still had no formal ties with the FRG. Lahr stressed that there were no obstacles or bilateral problems between Bulgaria and West Germany. Confidentially, Lahr noted that the FRG’s relations with Poland were extremely difficult. The West Germans had encountered problems with Czechoslovakia as well. The most favorable conditions for the normalization of relations existed with Bulgaria and Romania. Bashev replied that his gov- ernment favored the normalization of bilateral relations, based on the postwar political reality.10

Ostpolitik and Normalization with Eastern Europe

The establishment of the FRG’s Grand Coalition government in December 1966 under as chancellor and as foreign minister created new opportunities for FRG–East European dialogue. This prospect evoked negative reactions in both Warsaw and , albeit for different reasons. Both Władysław Gomułka and managed to persuade Soviet leaders to prevent any “unconditional” normalization of po- litical relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.11 On 30 January 1967, Foreign Minister Bashev informed the BKP Politburo about a memorandum of the East German government regarding the “eventual establishment of diplo- matic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.” The GDR insisted that if Bulgaria held negotiations with Bonn, it should resist any revision of the postwar borders in Europe and any attempt to pressure states intending to recognize the GDR. East German leaders called for the Warsaw Pact foreign

10. Memorandum on talks between Ivan Bashev and Rolf Lahr, Sofia, 23 September 1966, in DA, Op. 22, A.E. 950, pp. 2–7; and Information on the visit of Rolf Lahr to Bulgaria, Sofia, 10 , in DA, Op. 22, A.E. 950, pp. 37–43. 11. Douglas Selvage, “The Warsaw Pact and the German Question, 1955–1970: Conflict and Con- sensus,” in Mary Ann Heiss and Victor Papacosma, eds., NATO and the Warsaw Pact Intrabloc Conflicts (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2008), p. 183; and Csaba Bek´ es,´ “The Warsaw Pact, the German Question and the Birth of the CSCE Process, 1961–1970,” in Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart, eds., Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe (Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books, 2008), p. 118.

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ministers to hold urgent consultations on that issue.12 The East German “pre- ventive” initiative, however, came too late. On 31 January Romania established diplomatic relations with the FRG without consulting any of its allies. Initially, the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers’ meeting was projected to begin in East Berlin on 7 February. However, after strong criticism of the Romanian decision by , the meeting was moved to Warsaw. The principal issue discussed by the East European foreign ministers on 8–10 February 1967 was their attitude toward the new Grand Coalition govern- ment in Bonn.13 Before the session began, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had held a confidential meeting with his Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German colleagues—, Vaclav David, and — to coordinate a firm stance against the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG. Gromyko claimed that the new West German approach was designed to “fragment” the East European countries’ “unity.” A member of the Bulgarian delegation, Ambassador Raiko Nikolov, re- called in his memoirs that the initial Bulgarian position—approved by Todor Zhivkov in Sofia—was in favor of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG. But after Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev arrived in Warsaw, Gromyko held an unusual “preliminary” meeting with him. Bashev returned unhappy, noting that the Soviet government was against the immediate nor- malization of East European ties with the FRG.14 During the first ministerial session, both Bashev and Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos´ Peter´ remained silent when the Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German foreign min- isters insisted on rejecting the establishment of bilateral relations until the German issue could be settled on the basis of recognition of the postwar borders. The opponents of normalization thus denied the “claims” of the gov- ernment in Bonn to speak for “all Germans” and demanded that the FRG permanently renounce any intention to acquire nuclear weapons. Later on the evening of 8 February, Bashev received instructions from Sofia to accept the Soviet position. Two weeks after the foreign ministers’ meeting in Warsaw, Heinz Her- rmann, the West German commercial representative in Sofia, delivered an official proposal for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The proposal was renewed during Herrmann’s talks with Bashev on

12. Memorandum from Ivan Bashev to BKP Politburo, 30 January 1967, in DA, Op. 24, A.E. 933, pp. 2–3. 13. Romanian leaders decided on 3 February to send a deputy foreign minister to Warsaw. 14. Alexander Yankov et al., eds., Ivan Bashev: Politik, darzhavnik, diplomat (Sofia: Sofia University Press, 2010), p. 352.

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1April.15 The West German initiative provoked a special session of the BKP Politburo on 13 April, which decided to postpone the establishment of diplo- matic relations with West Germany because “the favorable conditions were not ready to be put into practice.” The BKP Politburo nonetheless recommended searching for new opportunities to develop bilateral economic relations.16 Shortly afterward, Zhivkov held an animated discussion on the issue in Bucharest with Ceaus¸escu, who insisted that the establishment of Romanian– West German relations had fully conformed to the principles laid out in the Warsaw Pact’s Bucharest Declaration of July 1966.17 He said that establishing preconditions for the normalization of East European relations with the FRG meant “to start with the end.” Zhivkov responded that the German question was decisive for European security. He argued that the West German case required preliminary consultations among the socialist states to “determine unanimous positions” toward the FRG, and he then summarized Bulgaria’s stance:

We do not have any categorical decision to forgo the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG. ... When we consider this issue, we proceed from the assumption on how it will reflect the correlations of forces in Europe, and how it will strengthen our own positions. The main problem of European security, in our view, is the West German case. At Zhivkov’s request, the final communique´ after the Bulgarian-Romanian talks included a paragraph reaffirming the three preconditions agreed on at the foreign ministers’ session in Warsaw two months earlier: the “actual reality” of the existence of two German states, the existence of the postwar borders, and the necessity of preventing West German access to nuclear weapons. Bulgarian leaders informed both Moscow and East Berlin about his discussions with Ceaus¸escu. During a meeting with East German leaders in , Zhivkov tactfully opposed Ulbricht’s appeal for a “united front against West German militarism.” Although Zhivkov promised that Bulgaria would observe “the common position” of the Warsaw Pact countries, he hinted that Bonn had made “great efforts to court” Bulgaria with a promise of a $150 million loan in return for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In a talk with the West German Communist leader Max Reinmann

15. Mateeva and Tepavicharov, Diplomaticheski otnoshenia na Balgaria, p. 297. 16. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. A-156, 13 April 1967, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 6, A.E. 6655, p. 22. 17. Shorthand record of the talks between Todor Zhivkov and Nicolae Ceaus¸escu, 18 April 1967, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 34, A.E. 53, pp. 18–50.

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in June 1967, Zhivkov had explained that Bulgaria had significantly increased its economic ties and tourism with the FRG in the past three years, putting West Germany ahead of all other Western countries in trade with Bulgaria.18 After the BKP Politburo adopted a certain “limitation” of political and cultural contact with the FRG, the Bulgarian government evaded any discus- sion about the normalization of bilateral relations until the end of 1969.19 Contrary to initial Bulgarian goals, this stance affected the development of bilateral economic relations. As a result, by 1969, replaced the FRG as Bulgaria’s number one trade partner in Western Europe. Petar Mezhdurechki, who became the first Bulgarian ambassador to Bonn in March 1974, recalled in his memoirs that in the late 1960s Foreign Minister Bashev received with “visible displeasure” the East German ambassador, who would go about “in- terrogating” the Bulgarians about bilateral contacts with the FRG. Bashev also remarked that the East German leaders’ concept of “a socialist German nation” was “ridiculous” because there were two German states but not two German nations.20 In August and October 1969, the East German Foreign Ministry prepared two drafts of the GDR’s “strategic aims” stipulating that the principal goal was to gain international recognition and United Nations (UN) membership for the GDR via a coordinated Warsaw Pact policy. Other prospective goals were to “restrain” the development of a “special relationship” between the and the FRG, to prevent the EEC from transforming into a “political union,” and to obtain tactical advantages from eventual discord among the NATO member-states.21 This particular line was adopted by East German leaders at the suggestion of East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer. In a memorandum dated 11 September, Winzer proposed the elaboration of a “common approach” among Warsaw Pact countries against West Germany. Supplementing this proposal, an SED Politburo¨ member and Central Com- mittee Secretary, Herman Axen, noted that the East German position had

18. Shorthand record of first session of talks between Todor Zhivkov and Max Reinmann, 2 June 1967, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 34, A.E. 57, p. 20. 19. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. A-224, 27 May 1967, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 704, p. 68; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs report on the development of political, economic, and cultural relations with the German Federal Republic, 1969, in DA, Op. 16-MOD, A.E. 527, pp. 1–6. 20. Yankov et al., eds., Ivan Bashev, p. 340. 21. GDR Foreign Ministry “Strategic Aims” Drafts, in Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen¨ Amts (PA AA), Berlin, Akten der MfAA der DDR, C 367/78, S. 42–50, pp. 53–97. The documents from the GDR Foreign Ministry were delivered by Oliver Bange. See Oliver Bange and Stephan Kieninger, eds., “Negotiating One’s Own Demise? The GDR’s Foreign Ministry and the CSCE Negotiations: Plans, Preparations, Tactics,and Presumptions CWIHP,” CWIHP E-Dossier, No. 17, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC, 2008.

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to be cleared with Gromyko before it could be presented at the next foreign ministers’ meeting.22 When the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers met in on 30–31 Oc- tober 1969, a fierce dispute broke out because of differing evaluations of Brandt’s new coalition government in West Germany. The Soviet, Hungar- ian, Polish, and Bulgarian representatives had spoken favorably about Brandt’s “New Eastern Policy” and the eventual development of East European–FRG relations, provoking heated complaints from East German Foreign Minister Winzer. Gromyko took the floor again to counter the harsher East German perceptions. This dispute spurred an urgent appeal from Ulbricht, who requested an extraordinary coordination meeting of all Warsaw Pact leaders. Initially planned for 20 November 1969, the meeting took place in Moscow on 3– 4 December 1969. The assembled leaders discussed current issues such as the War but focused mainly on European security and the German question. On 6 December, after the Moscow meeting, the BKP Politburo adopted a resolution expressing “the readiness of the party and state leaders to continue their consultations and undertake coordinated joint action in the struggle for peace and security.”23 On 13 January 1970, after consultations with Moscow, Bashev proposed a new coordination meeting with his East European colleagues to be held at the deputy foreign ministers’ level in Sofia at the end of the month.24 Once again, tactical distinctions between certain East European countries emerged during these consultations. The development of Soviet–West German and Polish–West German bi- lateral relations also prompted the convocation of two high-level Warsaw Pact meetings in less than six months. The PCC met in Moscow on 20 August 1970, a week after the signing of the Soviet-FRG treaty. During his speech, Brezhnev declared that the agreement with West Germany had been reached as a “result of the coordinated policy of the socialist countries.” Zhivkov em- phasized the “new and positive” features of Brandt’s foreign policy and called on the GDR and Poland to “expedite and diversify” their relations with the FRG.25

22. Notes from Herman Axen, in PA AA, MfAA, C 559/71, S. 1–2, pp. 5–7. 23. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. A-502, 12 November 1969, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 978, p. 1; and Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. A-567, 6 December 1969, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 1044, pp. 1–2. 24. Ivan Bashev to BKP Politburo, 13 January 1970, in DA, Op. 21-P, A.E. 436, pp. 1–2. 25. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. A-505, 17 August 1970, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 1612, pp. 18–19; and Statement of Todor Zhivkov at the Warsaw Pact Summit, Moscow, 20 August 1970, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 1612.

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On 2 December 1970, after the signing of the Polish-FRG treaty, the East European Communist leaders met again in East Berlin.26 This time, Brezhnev requested coordination among the allied countries as a significant precondi- tion and effective diplomatic tool for the implementation of their common aims:

Only as a result of the systematic consultations and coordinated actions of our community have we succeeded in making significant progress in our negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany and in stabilizing the situation in Europe in general. Therefore we must maintain our common activity. ... It is very important that in the future we will be operationally ready to organize our meetings—on the Foreign Ministerial, Heads of Governments, or Communist Party Secretaries level—in order to react operationally to the new processes we are going to face.

Zhivkov enthusiastically endorsed Brezhnev’s “common action directive,” stressing in his own remarks: “The principal thing for us is the fact that we have to maintain, in the future, a united line in resolving such complicated issues as the normalization of our relations with the FRG and the convocation of the European Security conference.”27 On 19 January 1971, the BKP Politburo held a special session to reconsider Bulgarian–West German relations. Accepting Bashev’s proposals, the Polit- buro approved the following steps: the elaboration of Bulgaria’s position on establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries; the enhancement of Bulgarian commercial representation in Frankfurt by significantly increas- ing the staff; the pursuit of new opportunities for economic and industrial cooperation; the creation of joint ventures; the establishment of favorable cir- cumstances for attracting more West German tourists to Bulgaria; the main- tenance of close political contact with the SPD and FDP leaders; and the exchange of parliamentary delegations.28 The BKP Politburo also decided to accept the proposed framework of a forthcoming visit of Bulgarian Foreign Trade Minister Luchezar Avramov to Bonn—the first visit ever by a Bulgar- ian government minister to West Germany. The Bulgarian ambassador to East Berlin, Marii Ivanov, commented that there would be no “negative reac- tions” in the GDR to the visit, although the East German “comrades” would

26. This meeting was proposed at the Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party in November. 27. Minutes of the Warsaw Pact Summit, 20 December 1970, in DA, Op. 21-P,A.E. 78, pp. 119–122. 28. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. A-32, 19 January 1971, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 1927, pp. 221–230.

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“welcome” any reduction or restriction of economic cooperation between Bul- garia and the FRG.29 On 12 February 1971, Avramov signed a new long-term bilateral agree- ment in Bonn for commercial exchange as well as economic and technical cooperation. The most important events of the visit were Avramov’s talks with Chancellor Brandt and Foreign Minister . Both conversa- tions focused on the prospects of further developing bilateral political relations between the two countries. Brandt stressed the principles of “realism and flex- ibility” in his own policy, saying he did not expect the Bulgarians to take steps that might put them into an “inconvenient situation” with their allies. He also explained the fundamental principles of Ostpolitik—its Eastern and Western dimensions, as well as its basic aim to contribute to reducing political and military tension in Europe. At the end of the meeting, Brandt reiterated, “We are loyal partners to our allies, as you are loyal partners to your allies.” Scheel affirmed that there were no unresolved problems between the FRG and Bulgaria and said he would be pursuing further negotiations with Czechoslo- vakia and the GDR and promoting the convocation of a European security conference.30 At the next meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, in Bucharest on 18–19 February 1971, tension between the host country and the GDR came to the surface. Organized at Moscow’s request, the meeting focused on three topics: the preparation of the CSCE, the prospect of strengthening the GDR’s international position, and potential multilateral disarmament negotiations. The Romanian delegation spoke against the draft proposals obligating all member-states to organize coordinated propaganda and exchange information in support of the GDR’s legitimate participation at the CSCE, as well as the accession of East Germany to the UN.31 At a subsequent meeting with the East European heads of mission in East Berlin, GDR Foreign Minister Winzer discussed the status of GDR-FRG negotiations.32 That topic also came up at the next PCC summit, in Prague in January 1972. The PCC meeting was held in a “friendly atmosphere”—unlike some previous meetings—but turned up “divergent views” on two basic issues:

29. Cable from Marii Ivanov to Radenko Grigorov, 11 January 1971, in DA, Op. 5-Sh, A.E. 839, p. 1. 30. Memorandum on Avramov’s talks with Brandt and Scheel, Bonn, 12 February 1972, in DA, Op. 27, A.E. 941, pp. 1–8; and Information on the visit of Luchezar Avramov to the German Federal Republic, Sofia, 15 February 1972, in DA, Op. 27, A.E. 979, pp. 1–8. 31. Information from concerning the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers committee session in Bucharest, Sofia, 1 March 1971, in DA, Op. 22-P, A.E. 282, pp. 3–8. 32. Cable from Marii Ivanov to Ivan Bashev, 4 December 1971, in DA, Op. 5-Sh, A.E. 839, p. 120.

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relations with the FRG and relations with the EEC. The Hungarian leader Janos´ Kad´ ar´ told the Hungarian Politburo on 1 February that several divergent positions were expressed in Prague regarding relations with West Germany: an “extremist” stance defended by the GDR delegation and “tacitly supported by Poland”; an opposing “extreme” view voiced by Romania; and a third stance requesting the “nullification” of the Munich Agreement, expressed by the Czechoslovak delegation and indirectly supported by the Soviet Union.33 According to Kad´ ar,´ the Hungarians “took an intermediate stance,” and the Bulgarians “maintained deep silence.” Brezhnev in his speech in Prague on 25 January 1972 indirectly challenged the “” GDR position toward West Germany. The Soviet leader claimed that the “unified” Warsaw Pact line had induced Bonn to renounce the Hallstein Doctrine, and he called for joint coordinated actions, to elaborated in advance of the next Warsaw Pact multilateral and bilateral consultations. As expected, the most ardent proponent of the Soviet line was Zhivkov, who strongly supported the proposal to set up a permanent PCC commission for the “elaboration of a coordinated foreign policy line and tactics” of the Warsaw Pact member-states.34 Ceaus¸escu’s statements in Prague were consistent with the stance he had taken a few months earlier in a private conversation with the leader of Yu- goslavia, , in Timisoara. According to the Yugoslav version of the talks kept in Tito’s personal records, Ceaus¸escu expressed concern about Soviet–West German ties: Certain compromises were made without consulting the other Warsaw Pact member states. ... Besides the positive aspects of the USSR-FRG agreement, a risk exists that some issues will be settled between the Soviet Union and the FRG at the expense of other countries. Considering the positive results of the Brandt- Scheel policy, we should not close our eyes and forget the words of [Charles] de Gaulle: “The Germans are Germans.” There is a tendency that even this [West German] government is conducting a policy from the position of a great power.35 The West German ratification of the treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland renewed the discussion in Sofia about the normalization of bilateral political relations with Bonn. In mid-May 1972, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Trade

33. Minutes of the meeting of HSWP CC Politburo, Budapest, 1 February 1972, in Hungarian National Archives (MOL), Budapest, M-KS-288, F. 5/573. 34. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. A-82, 28 January 1972, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 2828, p. 140; and Statement of Todor Zhivkov at the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Summit in Prague, 25 January 1972, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 2828, p. 163. 35. “Izvestaj o poseti predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broz Tita SR Rumuniji,” 1 December 1971, in Arhiv Josip Broz Tito, Belgrade, Kabinet Predsednika Republike, I-2, Rumunija, K. 74.

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Ivan Nedev informed Zhivkov about the opportunities for intensifying the FRG’s economic cooperation with East European states.36 On 23 May, the Bulgarian commercial representative in Frankfurt, Penkov, raised the possibil- ity of clarifying the Bulgarian position with a new initiative if the FRG were to support the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. Penkov also proposed the realization of drafted measures for the exchange of governmen- tal and parliamentary delegations.37 However, the BKP Politburo preferred to continue its “wait-and-see” policy until the finalization of negotiations between the two German states and the completion of FRG parliamentary elections. Soon after the clear success of the SPD at the elections, Penkov insisted in a message to Sofia on 21 November 1972 that the “new positive changes” re- quired renewed discussion of the status of Bulgarian–West German relations. He pointed out: Our country is in a situation similar to that of Hungary. A further lack of interest from our side in the full normalization of diplomatic relations will not be in the interest of our country and of the socialist camp. In my view, Bulgaria and Hungary have to undertake fully coordinated, identical, and simultaneous steps toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG. Our “different” actions, if they are not irreversible, will harden the conviction in official circles [in Bonn] that we lack interest in the development of relations with the FRG.38 On 19 January 1973, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry instructed Penkov to find out the exact meaning of the Brandt government’s declaration supporting the “continuation of the political dialogue with the Warsaw Pact states.” Four days later, Penkov had talks with Jurgen¨ Diesel, a high-ranking official in the West German Foreign Ministry who clarified that his government had in mind exactly the issue of the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations with both Bulgaria and Hungary. The Brandt-Scheel government was ready, Diesel emphasized, for negotiations on the issue at any time but was “disappointed” by the continuing Bulgarian “silence” and “policy of waiting.”39 Finally, in May 1973, the BKP Politburo discussed Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov’s proposal to hold negotiations that would lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG. Once again, the decision was contin- gent on the achievement of an agreement between Czechoslovakia and West

36. Ivan Nedev to Todor Zhivkov, 19 May 1972, in TsDA, F. 378-B, Op. 1, A.E. 857, pp. 204–207. 37. Cable from Bulgarian commercial representative to Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sofia, 23 May 1972, in DA, Op. 5-Sh, A.E. 962. 38. Ibid., pp. 96–97. 39. Cable from Bulgarian commercial representative to Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sofia, 25 January 1973, in DA, Op. 5-Sh, A.E. 1075, p. 6.

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Germany on the invalidity of the Munich Pact, as well as the settlement of bi- lateral negotiations in “coordination” with Budapest and Moscow. Mladenov’s proposal included additional conditions, namely, the elimination of discrimi- natory economic restrictions in trade and tourism in Bulgaria, the restraint of hostile activity by anti-Communist emigr´ es,´ and the cessation of Radio Free Europe (RFE) broadcasts from West German territory.40 In mid-June 1973, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry received an official proposal from Bonn for a meeting between Scheel and Mladenov to discuss the CSCE meeting in Helsinki and the possibility of commencing expert negotiations for establishing bilateral diplomatic relations. Mladenov agreed to discuss the first of these topics but postponed the second until the end of July. The real reason for the delay was “the necessity of consultations with the other socialist states,” especially the Soviet Union.41 Mladenov arranged for Scheel to visit Bulgaria at the end of August in order to sign a protocol for the establishment of diplomatic relations. During the talks in Helsinki, Scheel and Mladenov agreed on the finalization of negotiations regarding the normalization of bilateral relations and on Scheel’s forthcoming visit to Bulgaria.42 The negotiations between the two foreign ministries were carried out in Bonn from 30 July to 1 August 1973. The respective delegations were led by Jurgen¨ Diesel and Stoyan Georgiev, the head of the West European de- partment at the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry. Despite initial expectations of unproblematic negotiations, several issues nearly led to a breakdown of the talks. Diesel tacitly brushed aside the Bulgarian request for the cessation of “anti-Bulgarian political activities” and RFE broadcasting “against the Bulgar- ian government” on FRG territory, stating that the request would be delivered to the “competent authorities.” After urgent consultations with the Soviet embassy in Bonn, the Bulgarian delegation finally agreed to alter the official documents, announcements, and correspondence by using the name “Federal Republic of Germany” in place of the earlier “German Federal Republic.”

40. Proposal from Petar Mladenov to BKP Politburo, 9 May 1973, in DA, Op. 24-P, A.E. 50, pp. 1–5. 41. Cable from Stoyan Georgiev to Penkov in Bonn, 27 June 1973, in DA, Op. 5-Sh, A.E. 1074, pp. 59–60. At the multilateral Communist leaders’ meeting in Crimea on 30 July, both Erich Honecker and Gustav´ Husak´ expressed special gratitude to Zhivkov for Bulgaria’s “solidarity” and “internationalist position” toward the German issue. See Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. 497, 7 August 1973, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 4300, pp. 9, 26. 42. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. A-440, 24 July 1973, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 4243, p. 15.

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The most controversial issue to emerge was the “legal assistance” given by the West German consular office in Sofia to the citizens of . Diesel claimed that if no joint position on the issue could be achieved, Scheel’s visit to Sofia would not take place. Ambassador Georgiev responded that they would resist any unacceptable “preconditions” and that he might leave Bonn without an agreement. By the end of the talks, it was clear that a final agreement was not yet feasible and that Scheel’s visit would have to be postponed. In a report to Mladenov on 4 July, Georgiev asserted: “The talks were carried out in quite a frank mood and in a sharp struggle for defending each standpoint.”43 The question of the FRG’s bilateral negotiations with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia was further discussed during Warsaw Pact multilateral consultations in East Berlin at the end of October. Immediately afterward, Gromyko and Scheel met in Moscow and agreed on a formulation for “legal assistance” to West Berlin citizens by the FRG’s embassies in Eastern Europe. That formulation was then accepted by the governments in Budapest, Prague, and Sofia.44 On 2 December 1973, Penkov, the Bulgarian official representative in Bonn, reported that he had been informed about the successive end of the negotiations and that the bilateral treaty between Czechoslovakia and the FRG was ready to be signed. The West German Foreign Ministry had proposed final negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria to be held in Sofia on 12 December. Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister Luben Petrov held the talks with Gunther¨ van Well, political director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was also received by Mladenov and Zhivkov. On 19 December, the two countries exchanged official notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations. The agreement was announced simultaneously in Bonn andSofiaon21December.45 Three months later, on 25–26 March 1974, Scheel finally traveled to Sofia. Memoranda on Bulgarian–West German relations, sent to Zhivkov be- fore Scheel’s visit, claimed that the FRG was once more Bulgaria’s top trading partner among Western countries and that political and cultural contacts were increasing. Among other things, a CDU parliamentary delegation had visited

43. Information from Stoyan Georgiev regarding the preliminary consultations for establishment of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the FRG, 4 August 1973, in DA, Op. 30, A.E. 965. 44. Information from MFA to Todor Zhivkov about the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and the FRG, 26 February 1974, in TsDA, F. 378-B, Op. 1, A.E. 1145, p. 15. 45. Cable from Bulgarian commercial representative to Petar Mladenov, 19 December 1973, in DA, Op. 5-Sh, A.E. 1075, p. 137; and Information from MFA to Todor Zhivkov about the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and the FRG, 26 February 1974, in TsDA, F. 378-B, Op. 1, A.E. 1145, p. 16.

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Sofia, and the number of West German tourists spending their vacations in Bulgaria had increased threefold over the previous two years to reach nearly 200,000 yearly.46 During the Scheel-Mladenov talks, the prospects for indus- trial cooperation and establishment of joint firms were also discussed.

The Final Phase of the Cold War

A new federal chancellor and a new foreign minister were appointed in Bonn in May 1974. Bulgarian leaders initially approached them with great cau- tion, induced at least partly by comments from Moscow. In February 1975, Gromyko told Mladenov: “We are working now with the government of Hel- mut Schmidt harder than with the previous government of Willy Brandt.”47 Mladenov later recalled in his memoirs that Gromyko also voiced a negative appraisal of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, dismissing him as a “narrow-minded policeman” without any international experience.48 However, in the following fifteen years, Mladenov and Genscher met in Bonn and Sofia dozens of times and established a relatively close personal relationship uncharacteristic of offi- cial representatives of the hostile alliances. 49 In his memoirs, Mladenov cites various examples of their mutual understanding and confidential exchange of information, including about the decision to station intermediate-range nuclear forces on West German territory as a response to Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe.50 The most important events in West German–Bulgarian cooperation fol- lowing the establishment of the diplomatic relations included the official visit of Zhivkov to Bonn in November 1975 and the visit of Chancellor Schmidt to Sofia in May 1979. According to assessments by Zhivkov’s personal staff, his visit in 1975 had both “national” and “international” aims. Bulgaria for its own reasons wanted to expand economic ties with the FRG, the leading

46. Information from MFA to Todor Zhivkov about the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and the FRG, 26 February 1974, in TsDA, F. 378-B, Op. 1, A.E. 1145, pp. 11–14. 47. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. 104, 11 March 1975, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 5227, p. 12. 48. Petar Mladenov, Zhivotat: Plusove I minusi (Sofia: Petex, 1992), p. 29, 32. Genscher had earlier served as FRG minister of interior, which accounts for Gromyko’s reference to a “policeman.” 49. Their first meeting took place at a UN session in New York at the end of September 1974. See Cable from Stoyan Georgiev to Bulgarian embassy in Bonn, 24 September 1974, in DA, Op. 6-Sh, A.E. 23, pp. 83–84. 50. Mladenov, Zhivotat, pp. 34–39. During the last Cold War “wave” (1981–1985), the two foreign ministers met regularly (at least once a year). Genscher visited Sofia in July 1981, July 1983, and March 1985; Mladenov visited Bonn in January 1982 and May 1984.

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economic power in Europe. Zhivkov, as the first East European leader to visit West Germany after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975, had the task of assessing the FRG’s commitment to the “Eastern Policy” and the CSCE agreements. Another task for Zhivkov was to “allay the West Ger- man misgivings” about Soviet intentions of achieving strategic supremacy in Central Europe.51 Zhivkov held intensive talks in Bonn with Scheel, Schmidt, and Genscher, as well as with Brandt and the opposition CDU leader, . An important discussion was also arranged with the executive managers of leading private firms that together controlled nearly 50 percent of the West German economy. As Otto Wolff von Amerongen, chairman of the German East-West Trade Committee, emphasized at the meeting, the commercial ex- change with Bulgaria exceeded one billion West German marks.52 During Zhivkov’s visit to Bonn, two significant agreements were also signed: one for scientific and technical cooperation and the other for cultural cooperation. The first-ever visit by a West German chancellor to Bulgaria, initially scheduled for 1978, finally took place in May 1979. Besides the expected dis- cussions on further development of economic cooperation and opportunities for larger West German investments into Bulgarian economy, the two leaders engaged in a confidential talk. Schmidt shared his personal views about his conservative political opponents, Kohl of the CDU and Bavarian Prime Min- ister of the Christian Socialist Union, and asked Zhivkov about his assessment of the future of after Tito (who died a year later) and of the Soviet Union after Brezhnev (who died three years later). Zhivkov assured Schmidt that Western leaders should not expect significant changes in the USSR in light of the “collective” nature of decision-making in the Kremlin.53 The unique atmosphere that characterized Bulgarian–West German bilat- eral relations in the second half of the had been unthinkable earlier. The ideological division of Europe in the postwar world made effective cooperation between the adversarial military blocs and opposing political systems in West- ern and Eastern Europe almost impossible, especially in sensitive fields such as regional antiterrorist cooperation. However, on 21 June 1978, four members

51. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. A-437, 10 December 1975, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 35, A.E. 5557, pp. 139–187. 52. A long-term cooperative agreement was signed by sixteen Bulgarian and West German state firms, such as Krupp AG and Hoesch AG. 53. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. A-183, 9 May 1979, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 66, A.E. 1707, pp. 29–49. In his memoirs, Zhivkov highly praises his personal contact with Schmidt and later with Kohl, estimating both as “remarkable politicians.” See Todor Zhivkov, Memoari (Sofia: SIV, 1997), pp. 570–577.

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of the (RAF) terrorist group’s “second generation” led by Till Meyer were apprehended by Bulgarian State Security officers at the Black Sea Sunny Beach resort and handed over to FRG authorities. The decision to undertake such an unprecedented antiterrorist operation and cooperation with a NATO security service was approved at the “highest political level” (i.e., by Zhivkov himself) without informing the “fraternal” East European services in advance.54 This decision caused some tension in Bulgaria’s relations with East Germany.55 By contrast, Yugoslav authorities had refused to cooperate with the West Germans when a group of RAF terrorists were arrested on Yugoslav territory (they were later released). As “retribution” for the “treacherous act” of the Bulgarian authorities, another West German terrorist group blew up two offices of a Bulgarian foreign trade company (Balkan Trading Co.) in Western Europe on 15 July 1978. Six months later, in February 1979, a Bul- garian delegation led by Colonel Dimitar Yotov, the deputy chief of Bulgaria’s Counterintelligence Service, visited the FRG’s Criminal Service headquarters in for consultations.56 This establishment of professional contact could also explain the immediate positive reaction from Bulgaria when two West German antiterrorist experts visited Sofia in December 1985 with a re- quest for cooperation in searching for another RAF functionary, Inge Viett, on Bulgarian territory.57 During the final era of serious bipolar confrontation (1981–1985), re- lations among the East European allies retained the defining characteristics of the previous period. Romania remained the lone maverick in the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union under Andropov continued to demand “firmness” from its allies. As in previous years, Warsaw Pact states strictly coordinated their attitudes toward Western Europe, especially the FRG. In a meeting with Brandt in Sofia in December 1984, Zhivkov noted frankly that despite the excellent bilateral relations between Bulgaria and West Germany he had to

54. That precise phrase was used by Colonel Stefan Stefanov, one of the officers involved, in an interview in Sofia, 9 March 2011. 55. The earliest secret contact between officers and RAF terrorists began in 1978. A few years later, Meyer and some other RAF members became unofficial Stasi informers and were given a “safe place” in East Germany. See John Schmeidel, STASI: Shield and Sword of the Party (London: Routledge, 2008). 56. Report of Col. Dimitar Yotov to Dimitar Stoyanov, 23 February 1979, in Centralized Archive of the Commission for State Security Dossiers (COMDOS), Official Records “M,” F. 1, Op. 12, A.E. 112, pp. 219–222. 57. Report from Gen. Sava Dzhendov to Dimitar Stoyanov, 20 December 1985, in COMDOS, Bulgarian Intelligence Service Records “R,” F. Operational Cases, A.E. 16169, Vol. III, pp. 165–171. Viett lived in those years in , East Germany, under the name of Eva-Maria Sommer. See Inge Viett, Nie war ich furchtloser: Autobiographie (: Nautilus, 1996), p. 281.

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postpone his official visit to Bonn (scheduled for September 1984) because of new obstacles in Chancellor Kohl’s relations with the governments in East Berlin and Warsaw.58 The postponed second official visit of Zhivkov to Bonn was finally held in early June 1987. The most telling event of the visit was Zhivkov’s first con- fidential talk with Kohl at the chancellor’s own initiative. After Kohl proposed a frank exchange of views on “East-West relations,” both leaders declared that there were no obstacles or problems related to their bilateral coopera- tion. The only issue, raised by Zhivkov, was Bulgaria’s need for preferential support (similar to that enjoyed by Hungary) in relations with the European Communities. In return, Kohl proposed—“in the spirit of the old friendship” between the two countries—direct personal contact with Zhivkov in the same manner of his relationship with Kad´ ar.´ Responding to Kohl’s question about the level of support in Moscow for Gorbachev’s reforms, Zhivkov hinted that the only opponents of the reforms were in the “bureaucratic stratum” of the Soviet government—not within the ruling CPSU Politburo or military circles. Indicative of the established atmosphere of confidence was the concluding portion of the leaders’ dialogue:

KOHL: We can do much more together. For this reason we need close personal contact [between ourselves]. We have problems with Romania. Its leader is a difficult partner. ...

ZHIVKOV: What times have come—that we have no controversial issues be- tween us. This situation indicates that the world has changed. Our partnership is an illustrative example: that we should sympathize with our partner and not just look at ourselves in the mirror.

KOHL: Perhaps it would be reasonable for you to call Honecker and tell him that this example could be useful for him too.59 Until the end of the Cold War, Bulgarian–West German relations contin- ued to develop dynamically and intensively, especially in the economic field. This process sometimes triggered suspicion, jealousy, or both in East Berlin and Moscow. Even during the USSR’s perestroika in the late under Gorbachev, when the was gradually repudiated, the Soviet

58. Information from Milko Balev and Dimitar Stanishev to Politburo concerning Willy Brandt’s visit to Bulgaria, 12 December 1984, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 101, File 1016, p. 2. 59. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. 505, 6 July 1987, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 68, A.E. 3037, pp. 105–128. The federal chancellor hinted at the eventual first-ever visit of the East German leader to Bonn, which would be postponed twice. Honecker finally paid his expected visit to the Federal Republic of Germany from 7–8 September 1987.

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leader in a few cases continued to “advise” his Bulgarian allies not to follow the “pro-Western” course of unduly close cooperation with West Germany. At a meeting in Moscow on 16 October 1987—soon after Zhivkov had held talks with Kohl—Gorbachev warned Zhivkov: We have been informed that there are people in the immediate circle of Comrade Todor Zhivkov who favor the transformation of Bulgaria into a “mini-FRG.” ... Talks like these are worrying us. There are people with a pro-Western orientation close to you. You should know this. There are people from your circle who believe that technologies from the FRG, from the West, should be adopted. We find such talk, and such an orientation, disturbing. And if there are people in your circle who even only dream of a “mini-FRG” and a “mini-,” you should not keep them close to you.60 This episode was typical of how the coordinating framework for the devel- opment of East-West relations functioned within obligatory restrictive rules and boundaries until the Cold War ended. Each East European government nonetheless tried to elaborate and follow a line appropriate to its particular national interests, further indicating that a simplified image of Eastern Europe would obscure the full story of the Soviet bloc during the Cold War.

Conclusion

The bipolar Cold War world transformed not only the global and regional political map but also the historical and long-term bilateral relations among European states. The new geopolitical phenomenon of “one nation—two states“” with opposing political systems,” as was the case of postwar Germany, further complicated the situation in Central Europe as the “German question” continued to be a key factor in the process of ensuring regional stability and interstate cooperation. Those unique circumstances shaped the development of West Germany’s relations with the Soviet-bloc countries. However, despite the common positions of the Warsaw Pact states, those relationships possessed nuances and distinctions corresponding to the varying national interests of each East European state, as well as the competing personal views and ambitions of each Communist leader. The particular imprint of successive West German governments, as they moved from the Hallstein Doctrine to Ostpolitik and beyond, also played a

60. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. 740, 21 October 1987, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 68, A.E. 3272; and Notes of the talks between Todor Zhivkov and at the Kremlin, 16 October 1987, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 68, A.E. 3272, pp. 33–34.

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crucial role. Although the FRG was a key member of NATO from the time it joined in 1955, political leaders in Bonn followed a course that often differed from that of French or British policy. Although Brandt and Schmidt were the architects of Ostpolitik, the turn of West German policy toward Eastern Europe was not just a peculiarity of these SPD leaders. In the FRG, even a far-right Bavarian politician like Strauss could come to be an eager supporter of ties with the East. Over the last decade of his life, Strauss established un- usually close contact with some Bulgarian rulers while unofficially visiting the small Communist Balkan country numerous times. Similarly, the influential conservative Chancellor Kohl maintained a frank, confidential dialogue with Zhivkov, relying on him, among other things, to transmit important messages to both Moscow and East Berlin.61 Bulgaria was well known within the Warsaw Pact coordinating frame- work as the “most loyal” Soviet ally and satellite. The history of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and West Germany demonstrates that Sofia was careful to maintain regular foreign policy coordination with its Warsaw Pact allies, especially on something as complicated as the German issue. In those circumstances, Bulgarian leaders and diplomats were sometimes forced to step aside, thus neglecting for a while their own actual national goals. Yet it would be historically inaccurate to represent the East European alliance as a mono- lithic bloc entirely dependent on Moscow. To understand the Soviet bloc’s “Orwellian” and “Aesopian” realities, we must read the existing Cold War evidence in a more comprehensive way—between and behind the lines. Once the FRG had become the leading West European political and eco- nomic power and a key member of NATO and the EEC, Bulgarian–West German relations played a critical role in Bulgarian foreign policy. Nonethe- less, from a historical perspective, the evolution of Bulgarian–West German relations was not such a unique case for Bulgaria. Even in the mid-1960s the government in Sofia established relatively good and regular political contacts with a few neutral European states, such as and . However, the most illustrative case was the development of neighboring Greek-Bulgarian relations during the rule of the conservative and socialist governments of Con- stantine Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou in Athens. Facing similar foreign policy challenges during the last Cold War decade, Bulgaria and es- tablished active mutual collaboration even in sensitive fields such as defense and security. In 1987–1988, regular contact and exchanges were arranged be- tween the two neighboring countries’ ministries of defense and General Staffs.

61. Zhivkov, having led his country for 35 years, was the longest-tenured Communist ruler in the Warsaw Pact.

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Furthermore, a secret agreement for information exchange and antiterrorist cooperation was signed between their security services—something almost un- thinkable for neighboring states belonging to adversarial military alliances at the time.62 Because most of Bulgaria’s foreign policy decision-making was motivated by superior coalition goals, the newly available evidence regarding the his- tory of Bulgarian–West German relations during the Cold War inevitably concerns a broader range of interdependencies and political aims of various international actors. Bulgaria’s behavior was typical for a small in the Balkans whose leaders, adhering strictly to the Soviet doctrine of “limited sovereignty,” determined national goals in accordance with the Soviet-led coalition strategy. This article, however, has highlighted the exis- tence of several tendencies (and even groupings) inside the unified Warsaw Pact coordination framework on the German question, showing that they resulted from distinctive—sometimes conflicting—historical, political, eco- nomic, cultural, and perhaps sub-regional reasons and interests. This overview of the establishment of diplomatic relations between a large European state and a smaller one with an opposing political orientation should contribute to understanding the highly complex functioning of Cold War–era international relations in Europe.

62. See Jordan Baev, “The Strange Case of the Bulgarian-Greek Security Cooperation at the End of the Cold War Era,” Etudes´ Balkaniques, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2015), pp. 174–189.

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