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The Establishment of Bulgarian–West German Diplomatic Relations Within the Coordinating Framework of the Warsaw Pact

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The Establishment of Bulgarian–West German Diplomatic Relations Within the Coordinating Framework of the Warsaw Pact The Establishment of Bulgarian–West German Diplomatic Relations within the Coordinating Framework of the Warsaw Pact ✣ Jordan Baev The normalization of official relations between Bulgaria and the Federal Re- public of Germany (FRG) was significantly influenced by two major factors: the policy of closer coordination and consultation within the Warsaw Pact; and the somewhat slower process of detente´ and security negotiations in Eu- rope. On several occasions starting in the late 1940s, the German question and the postwar model of two German states provoked dangerous international crises in Europe. These crises spurred the start of a prolonged and complex European security negotiating process that would unfold during the last two decades of the Cold War. Two additional factors spurred the bilateral effort toward normalization: a visible change in Bulgarian foreign policy in seeking a rapprochement with Western Europe and the Balkan members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the mid-1960s, and the formulation of the new West German Ostpolitik at the end of the decade. Because no serious disputes or controversies had yet divided the Bulgarians and West Germans, relations between the FRG and Bulgaria improved markedly despite times of sharp East-West confrontation in the final Cold War decade. Relationships within the Warsaw Pact have been among the less discussed problems in contemporary historiography. However, a vast amount of newly accessible archival documentation has underscored the differences in the aims and intentions of East European governments over foreign policy tactics and security issues. Multilateral and bilateral coordination of the Soviet bloc grew out of a variety of preliminary talks at senior levels as well as additional “consul- tative” visits by high-ranking Soviet officials to the respective East European capitals. Coordination of policy at the highest levels was accomplished in two formats: officially at meetings of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee (PCC) and gatherings of the Pact’s foreign and defense ministers, and unofficially at multilateral and bilateral meetings of Communist party and state leaders. Each of the Warsaw Pact allies had its own role in and made Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2016, pp. 158–180, doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00656 C 2016 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 158 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00656 by guest on 27 September 2021 The Establishment of Bulgarian–West German Diplomatic Relations its own contributions to the alliance in accordance with the specific views and positions of its leaders and with its national traditions and geographic location. Whereas Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia constituted the Pact’s frontline Northern Tier, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania con- stituted a secondary Southern Tier. Given the withdrawal of Albania from the Pact in 1968 and the maverick policies of Romania, Bulgaria assumed chief responsibility for allied strategy in the Balkans. This article is based on a diverse set of Bulgarian political, diplomatic, and intelligence archival records that have been declassified in recent years. My research was initially part of an international academic comparative project that began within the framework of the much larger Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact.1 Some of the results have been discussed in one of my recent monographs and in several other publications.2 Nonetheless, the particular story of the establishment of Bulgarian–West German relations and their development during the final two decades of the Cold War is presented here for the first time. The Initial Two Decades of the Cold War The initial negotiations between Bulgaria and western Germany were estab- lished in the economic domain, beginning shortly after the signing of the Paris Peace Treaties with the former European allies of Nazi Germany. On 4 October 1947, the first commercial agreement with the U.S. and British occupation zones in Germany (the so-called Bizone, which became the FRG in 1949) was signed, supplemented by a wider agreement in August 1949. During bilateral commercial negotiations in Bonn in August 1952, the FRG agreed to exchange official trade representatives with Bulgaria. The issue was discussed by Bulgar- ian political leaders in April 1953 at the initiative of Bulgarian Foreign Trade 1. D´etente and CSCE in Europe: The States of the Warsaw Pact and the Federal Republic of Germany in Their Mutual Perception and Rapprochement 1966–1975, a multilateral project coordinated by Manheim University and sponsored by Volkswagen Stiftung (December 2005–December 2008). In 2006, the Parallel History Project (PHP) changed its name to Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP) in Zurich. The PHP ended in 2011. 2. Jordan Baev, Sistemata za Evropeiska sigurnost I Balkanite v godinite na Studenata vojna (Sofia: Damyan Yakov Publishers, 2010); Jordan Baev, “Bulgaria and the Warsaw Pact Consultations on the CSCE Process: From Helsinki to Belgrade,” in Vladimir Bilanzic and Ditmar Dahlmann, eds., From Helsinki to Belgrade: The First CSCE Follow-Up Meeting and the Crisis of D´etente (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2012), pp. 107–118; and Jordan Baev, “Die blockinterne Koordination des Warschauer Pakts und die DDR,” in Oliver Bange und Bernd Lemke, eds., Wege zur Wiedervereinigung: Die beiden deutschen Staaten in ihren Bundnissen 1970 bis 1990 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013), pp. 183–202. 159 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00656 by guest on 27 September 2021 Baev Minister Zhivko Zhivkov. The trade liaisons established between Hungary and the FRG served as a precedent. Soon thereafter, a Bulgarian commercial repre- sentative was sent to Frankfurt, and his West German counterpart was sent to Sofia. Although the commercial bureaus of the two countries held unofficial status, mutual commercial exchange nonetheless increased significantly, rising from $25 million in 1952 to $57 million in 1960.3 In September 1955, the member-states of the newly formed Warsaw Pact held confidential discussions about the results of the Geneva Summit in July 1955. Afterward, the Bulgarian government sent a note to the West German government via the French legation in Sofia, proposing the establishment of Bulgarian–FRG diplomatic relations. The document underscored the necessity of developing cultural and academic exchanges as well as further increases in commercial exchange. A note from the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry stressed that the The old traditions of close scientific, technical, and cultural connections be- tween the Bulgarian and German nations could and must serve as the basis for the development of future friendly relations between Bulgaria and the German Federal Republic and for further extension of the scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation between the two nations. The note was accompanied by an official hint delivered by Deputy Prime Minister Georgi Chankov in a public statement in Sofia on 8 September 1955. In March 1956, Moscow had insisted through the Soviet embassy in Sofia that the Bulgarian government would need to “exert certain pressure on the government of [Konrad] Adenauer for acceleration of the establishment of diplomatic relations” with East European countries. Soviet leaders proposed that a propaganda campaign be organized in the central Bulgarian mass media with “a responsible Bulgarian statesman” giving an interview to West German media in which he would stress the necessity of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the FRG.4 In April 1956, complying with the line of the 20th Soviet Party Congress, the First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP), Todor Zhivkov, became the foremost political leader in Bulgaria, a position he strengthened 3. Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. A-160, 14 October 1952, in Central State Archive (TsDA), Sofia, Fond (F.) 1-B (BKP Central Committee Records), Opis (Op.) 6, A.E. 1677; Agreement for trade exchange with West Germany, 31 August 1949, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 6, A.E. 1787; and Protocol of BKP Politburo Session No. 61/18, April 1953, in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 6, A.E. 1787. 4. Luben Gerasimov to Mincho Neichev, August 1955, in Diplomatic Archive (DA), Sofia, Op. 14-P, A.E. 248; Verbal Note from Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the French Legation in Sofia, September 1955, in DA, Op. 14-P, A.E. 248; and Luben Gerasimov to Mincho Neichev, 4 March 1956, in DA, Op. 14-P, A.E. 248. 160 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00656 by guest on 27 September 2021 The Establishment of Bulgarian–West German Diplomatic Relations even further in 1962. From then on, he ruled without serious challenge until his abrupt downfall in November 1989. As Zhivkov solidified his political rule, he did his best to establish close personal relations with a succession of leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, Yurii Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail Gor- bachev. With the leaders prior to Gorbachev, Zhivkov succeeded in forging close ties. However, he failed to develop such a connection with Gorbachev (al- though he never allowed himself to speak out against Gorbachev’s perestroika, as East German leader Erich Honecker did). Unlike the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaus¸escu, Zhivkov displayed staunch political loyalty to Moscow in return for economic benefits and stability—a formula that proved effective for nearly 30 years. Zhivkov generally established his policy with the objective of maintaining close ties with the Soviet Union, using the tactics and slogans of “a comprehensive rapprochement” between Bulgaria and the USSR in his dealing with Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The same “most loyal ally” approach was employed within the Warsaw Pact coordinating framework. The first-ever contact between political representatives of Bulgaria and West Germany was during a visit of two Free Democratic Party (FDP) deputies to Sofia in October 1956.
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