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2021-01-20 The Ballot before the Bullet: The Panther Party's Identity and the People's Campaign of 1973

Grabia, Kayla

Grabia, K. (2021). The Ballot before the Bullet: The 's Revolutionary Identity and the People's Campaign of 1973 (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/113010 master thesis

University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

The Ballot before the Bullet: The Black Panther Party’s Revolutionary Identity and the People’s Campaign of 1973

by

Kayla Grabia

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JANUARY, 2021

© Kayla Grabia 2021

Abstract Historical analysis of the Black Panther Party (BPP) has primarily concentrated on the founding of the organization in 1966 till 1971 when two key leaders– Huey P. Newton and

Eldridge Cleaver— disagreed about the use of self-defence as the organization’s sole revolutionary strategy. This moment, popularly known as the Split, marked the beginning of a new era of the Panthers, led by Newton, that pursued revolutionary change through mainstream electoral politics. As a result, the organization’s revolutionary identity and performance evolved during this period. However, this transition has been interpreted through a binary of reform vs. revolution associated with the and Movement, reclassifying

BPP as social democratic and reformist without examining the reasoning that fueled the use of elections as a practical revolutionary tool. This study argues that the People’s Campaign of 1973 was part of the Party’s long-term strategy to achieve a revolution and liberate oppressed people.

Themes of gender, race, and class are examined throughout this thesis. Chapter One explores the internal and external influences that forced Newton to rethink the BPP’s strategy and how the reframed approach was received by Party members and the public. The trajectory of the election is examined in Chapter Two through analysis of and political campaign material to reveal how the People’s Campaign and candidates and were represented. The third chapter explores the daily contributions and dedication of Party members in the field to increase voter registration and raise political consciousness by connecting with low-income, Black, and minority people in Oakland, . The thesis concludes that ideologically and practically the People’s Campaign of 1973 represented the evolution of the

Black Panthers’ revolutionary identity and performance beyond self-defence.

ii

Acknowledgements

To my supervisor Dr. Elizabeth Jameson, I will be forever grateful for the opportunity you granted me to be your graduate student. Your wisdom, passion, and knowledge not only made this study a possibility, but it has also inspired and challenged me to be a better student of history. Without your kindness and patience, especially in my time of need, I am not sure I would have finished this thesis. I am very thankful for Lori Somner and her guidance and support. Thank you to Dr. Jewel Spangler for always having time to talk to me about my project during my time at the University of Calgary, and Dr. Paul Chastko and Dr. Ted McCoy for being a part of my committee and providing me with insights to improve my future research. A special thank you to Tim Noakes, head of the University Special Collections Department at Stanford

University that assisted me during my research in September of 2017. The accommodations made allowed me to collect all the material I needed to complete this project.

Thank you to my mother Zail, my grandmothers Sharron and Cheryl, and my grandfather

Michael for nurturing my love of learning that has shaped the woman I am today. To my brother

Cyrus and my sister Halia, you are bright lights in a dark world, and I am lucky to be your sister.

To Mark Shaw for cheering me on and supporting me. And to Jordan Ortega, for the last two years you have brought so much joy to my life, thank you for helping me get back to what is important. There are so many wonderful people that have read and supported me throughout, but

Joseph Hubbard has been my foundation, sounding board, and everything in between. Our walks, coffee dates, playlists, and much more are intricately connected with the outcome of this journey.

September 6, 2016 brought me a friendship I will cherish for a lifetime. Lastly, to Mya Grabia.

Your love and support has helped me get to this finish line. I am thankful every day you are my sister, and that we have persevered through this life together.

iii

For all the strong women in my life, you are my fire.

iv

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii

Acknowledgements ...... iii

Dedication ...... iv

Table of Contents ...... v

List of Figures and Tables...... vi Introduction ...... 1

Chapter One: Reframing Revolutionary Tactics: Huey P. Newton and the Evolution of Black

Panther Party Ideology ...... 25

Chapter Two: “For Righteous people’s government, Chairman Bobby is the man.” The People’s

Campaign and Representing the Revolution ...... 61

Chapter Three: Behind the Headlines: Campaign Workers and the Frontlines of Political

Consciousness ...... 103

Conclusion ...... 139

Bibliography ...... 146

v

List of Figures and Tables

Figures Figure 1: Picture of Attendance at the Black Community Survival Conference ...... 54

Figure 2: Picture of Bobby Seale Packing Bags of Groceries ...... 54

Figure 3: Black Panther Campaign Map for Sections 1-8 ...... 72

Figure 4: John Reading “Together” Campaign Brochure ...... 79

Figure 5: John Reading “It Takes Leadership” Brochure ...... 79

Figure 6: Leaflet for Voter Registration Dance in Section 3 ...... 118

Tables Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Individuals Surveyed on October 20, 1972 ...... 57

Table 2: Candidate Preference by Race of Individuals Surveyed on April 6, 1973 ...... 84

Table 3: Candidate Preference by Age of Individuals Surveyed on April 6, 1973 ...... 84

Table 4: Candidate Preference by Race and Income of Individuals Surveyed on April 6, 1973 ..84

Table 5: BPP Sections 1-8 Final Election Results for Elaine Brown, April 17, 1973 ...... 100

Table 6: BPP Sections 1-8 Final Election Results for Bobby Seale, May 15, 1973 ...... 100

Table 7: Assignment of Panther Members to Section Leader and Assistant Positions ...... 107

vi

Introduction

In an attempt to explain the rise of Black Power, Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. wrote in

1967:

[T]he Northern ghetto dweller still lives in a schizophrenic social milieu. In the past decade he supported and derived pride from Southern struggles and accomplishment. Yet the civil rights revolution appeared to drain energy from the North, energy that flowed South to transform life there while stagnation blanketed Northern Negro communities. This was a decade of role reversal. The North, heretofore vital, languished, while the traditionally passive South burst with dynamic vigor. The North at best stood still as the South caught up.1

The language employed by Dr. King reveals the dichotomies categories of the 1960s that have become deeply entrenched in memory and history thereafter: North versus South, non-violence versus self-defence, and Black Power versus Civil Rights.2 Among the most concerning is the belief that the only legitimate form of civil rights activism was formed in the American South utilizing the non-violent tactics enacted and preached by Dr. King. When the spotlight turned to non-Southern cities like , , and Oakland, the tactics to undermine de facto segregation and unjust socioeconomic practices became painted as violent, contentious—the antithesis to the peaceful Southern protests. This belief that has prompted the relegation of a

1 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1967), 19. 2 I have chosen to capitalize Black, White, Latinx, and Indigenous where applicable in my own writing, leaving primary and secondary source quotes unchanged. I understand there is an ongoing debate regarding capitalization. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, “The Case for Capitalizing the B in Black,” The Atlantic, June 18, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/time-to-capitalize-blackand-white/613159/ (accessed January 10, 2021).

1 diverse movement, involving different political philosophies, into the shadows. It is this narrative that has complicated and obscured the history of the Black Power era.3

Provocatively, historian and political commentator Peniel E. Joseph stated that “in both conservative and liberal analyses of the 1960s, Black Power contains virtually no redeeming qualities, except perhaps for the promotion of . In the process, the movement’s rich political history is forgotten, its intellectual insight buried, contemporary relevance abandoned, and grassroots activists dishonoured.”4 Current scholarship has sought to unearth and track the social, political and intellectual development of the (BPM) through a variety of ways: “by pushing the chronology of black radicalism back to the 1950s and forward into the 1970s,” placing it within the Cold War context, examining the roles of both prominent actors and everyday people, and seeking to displace and challenge the premise that the BPM was the inverse to the Civil Rights Movement (CRM).5 Initially perceived as an isolated blip in

African American activism and history, scholars of Black Power Studies have argued that the

BPM should be seen as developing in parallel and in conjunction with the CRM, not as a marker of the CRM’s demise. For example, Rhonda Williams explored the roots of Black Power by analyzing the intellectual predecessors of the BPM such as Ida B. Wells-Barnett, W.E.B. Du

Bois, Hurbert Harrison, A. Philip Randolph and .6 Similarly, Yohuru Williams has argued that examining the CRM and the BPM as the Long Black Freedom Struggle, “can serve to highlight the similarities and continuities as historical actors traversed familiar issues of

3 Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” The Journal of American History 91, no. 4 ( 2005): 1233-1263; Peniel E. Joseph, The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era (New York, NY: Taylor & Francis, 2006); Peniel E. Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America, (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 2006); Yohuru Williams, Rethinking the Black Freedom Movement, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015); Rhonda Williams, Concrete Demands: The Search for Black Power in the 20th Century, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015). 4 Joseph, The Black Power Movement, 10. 5 Ibid., 9-10. 6 R. Williams, Concrete Demand.

2 social economic, and political inequality, not to mention cultural identity, over the course of the

20th century.”7 Furthermore, Peniel Joseph emphasized that “ understanding the history behind the iconic Black Power imagery—clenched fists, , racial upheavals, - and -wearing militants—requires plumbing the murky depths of a movement that paralleled, and at times, overlapped, the heroic civil rights era.”8 To simply isolate either movement as integrationist or separatist, violent or non-violent and so on, undermines the relationships among actors and the range of political philosophies employed by black communities across the United

States to address issues such as segregation (de jure and de facto), decent housing, disfranchisement, and workers’ rights.9 Ultimately, a failure to comprehend the relationships among actors and objectives in both these movements skews our understanding of the concept and ideals of ‘Black Power,’ especially when analyzing the role of the Black Panther Party and grassroots mobilization.

The Black Panther Party for Self Defence (BPP) was formed in 1966 by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale in Oakland, California to fight for Black liberation against the

Government.10 Despite the Civil Rights Act (1964) and Voting Rights Act (1965), African

American communities across the country were still challenged by , economic disparity, political disfranchisement, and ghettoization. Until the party’s dissolution in 1982, the

BPP and its movement attempted to eradicate the systemic issues of and inequality in

7 Y. Williams, Rethinking the Black Freedom Movement, xiii. 8 Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour, xii. 9 Yohuru Williams used the terminology of ‘six degrees of segregation’ to describe and isolate the different economic, social, and political discrimination tackled by the CRM and BPM. See Y. Williams, Rethinking the Black Freedom Movement, xiii. 10 Although, the BPP, as we know it today, was established by Newton and Seale in Oakland, the roots of the organization started in Lowndes County, Alabama following the Selma to Montgomery March. The Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCFO, also known as the Black Panther Party) worked alongside the Student Non- Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) to become a recognized political party and politically empower Black people in the county to vote out the White establishment. For information about LCFO see Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, Vintage Edition (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1992; New York, NY, Random House Inc., 1967), 98-120. Citation refers to Vintage Edition.

3 more than forty communities. Although, 55 years have passed since the founding of the Black

Panthers, their history and memory still remains controversial. Determining the character of the

Panthers was an extremely difficult task when government entities, such as the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), had used the COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence Program, founded in the

1950s) to undermine the revolutionary rhetoric and perceived violence of the organization.11 The

FBI, alongside media, academics, and journalists, painted the BPP as an aggressive, hyper- masculine organization willing to use violence to overthrow the accepted status quo; this perspective emerged as the prominent depiction of the party.12

However, when the dominant narrative of violence was juxtaposed with accounts from

BPP members and literature published since 1990, many academics have suggested that the BPP has been misrepresented. For example, in 1998, Charles E. Jones and Judson L. Jeffries argued that the legacy of the BPP was “neglected, distorted, and discounted” by what they called

“Panther Mythology.”13 The BPP was “characterized…as an anti-White, ultra leftist, lumpen- based and media-created organization” that relied on violence; these characterizations undermine the legacy of the Party’s community efforts, such as survival programs, and its involvement in politics.14 These contradictions in the BPP’s portrayal beg us to establish who exactly the Black

Panthers were: were they primarily aggressive, hyper masculine Black men who were willing to use violence to get their way? Or are they better defined by their survival programs that provided

11 The of BPP leader and the Split of 1971 involving BPP leaders and Huey P. Newton are examples of FBI tactics to undermine the organization. Both will be discussed in Chapter One. 12 For examples of this type of depiction: Hugh Pearson, The Shadow of the Panther: Huey P. Newton and the Price of Black Power in America, (, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1994); Kate Coleman, “Just a Pack of Predators,” , June 22, 2003; Adam Hochschild, “Mythologizing the Black Panthers Means Picking the Wrong Heroes,” The Sun, June 4, 1995. Also note that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) still lists the Black Panthers as a black extremist organization. See FBI, “FBI Records: The Vault – Black Panther Party,” https://vault.fbi.gov/Black%20Panther%20Party%20 (last accessed October 15, 2020). 13 Charles E. Jones and Judson L. Jeffries, “‘Don’t Believe the Hype’: Debunking the Panther Mythology,” in The Black Panther Party Reconsidered, eds Charles E. Jones, (Baltimore, MD: , 1998), 26. 14 Ibid., 37.

4 necessities to marginalized individuals that the state was unwilling to supply? Contemporary research has probed these questions in order to further understand one of the most prolific Black

Power organizations of the twentieth century.15

Untangling the complexities of the BPP and understanding its role in the Long Black

Freedom Struggle is at the forefront of contemporary academic and non-academic efforts.

Beginning with the publication of three memoirs by former Panthers Elaine Brown, David

Hilliard, and there has been a movement to change the historical record.16

Published in 1998, the first major assessment of the organization was the Black Panther Party:

Reconsidered followed by Liberation, Imagination, and the Black Panther Party: A New Look at the Panthers and Their Legacy.17 Both were a compilation of essays written by former members and academics assessing a range of topics and themes such as gender, legacy, organizational structure, and reasons for decline. These formative texts influenced the necessity to probe the impact, experiences, and legacy of chapters that were established in cities across the nation.

15 For example, see Charles E. Jones, The Black Panther Party Reconsidered, (Baltimore, MD: Black Classic Press, 1998); and George Katsiaficas, Liberation, Imagination, and the Black Panther Party: A New Look at the Panthers and Their Legacy (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001); Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams, In Search of the Black Panther Party; Jane Rhodes, Framing the Black Panthers: The Spectacular Rise of a Black Power Icon, (New York, NY: The New Press, 2007). 16 Assata Shakur, Assata: An Autobiography, (, England: Zed Books, 1987); Elaine Brown, : A Black Woman’s Story, First Anchor Books Edition, (United States: Anchor Books, 1994; New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1992) Citation Refers to the Anchor Books Edition; and Lewis Cole, This Side of Glory: The Autobiography of David Hilliard and the Story of the Black Panther Party, First Edition, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1993). A less known memoir was published in 1991 by the late Fred Hampton’s partner: , My Life with the Black Panther Party, (Oakland, California: Burning Spear Publications, 1991). Since the 1990s there have also been many former Panthers who have written about their experience in the BPP. See Mumia Abu-Jamal, We Want Freedom: A Life in the Black Panther Party, (Cambridge, MA: , 2004); Flores Forbes, Will You Die With Me? My Life and the Black Panther Party; (New York, NY: Atria Books, 2006); Steve D. McCutchen, We Were Free for a While: Back to Back in the Black Panther Party, (Baltimore, United States: Publish America, 2008); , My People Are Rising: Memoir of a Black Panther Party Captain, (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2012); , Baby Panther: A Life of Rebellion and Reinvention, (New York, NY: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 2012); , From the Bottom of the Heap: Autobiography of Black Panther Robert Hillary King, (Oakland, CA: Pm Press, 2012); and Wayne Pharr, Nine Lives of a Black Panther: A Story of Survival, (Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill Books, 2014). 17 Jones, The Black Panther Party Reconsidered; Cleaver and Katsiaficas, Liberation, Imagination, and the Black Panther Party.

5

Despite a central headquarters in Oakland, the organization was rhizomatic in nature; with over forty different chapters nationally, the Panthers’ prevalence could not be isolated to only the

Oakland experience. For Judson L. Jeffries, Yohuru Williams, Jama Lazerow, and Jakobi

Williams the invisibility of other chapters—such as Chicago, New Haven, Los Angeles, and

Philadelphia in the historiography—obscured the relationship of the Panthers to each other, their communities, and their governments nationally and locally.18

However, it was Black Against the Empire (2013) written by Joshua Bloom and Waldo E.

Martin Jr. that provided the first comprehensive history of the organization from 1966-1971. The immense undertaking explored the political and intellectual framework, key leaders, events, and societal conditions that contributed to the Panthers’ influence and eventual demise. Bloom and

Martin concluded that between 1968-1970, the Panthers’ politics of self-defence, in conjunction with the socioeconomic and political climate, were critical to the Party’s ability to “forcibly contest the legitimacy of the American political regime.”19 In the late 1960s, American political conditions were steeped in disagreement: heightened racial tensions surrounding police brutality and unique conditions for Black outside the South, the rise of the , and opposition to the Vietnam War. These circumstances, combined with the Panthers’ self-defence strategy and practice—as well as the unjust state repression of the organization—drew people to their cause and attracted allies, domestically and internationally. Overall, the base of their support was derived from “three broad constituencies: , opponents of the Vietnam War,

18 Judson L. Jeffries, Comrades: A Local History of the Black Panther Party, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007); Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams, Liberated Territory: Untold Local Perspectives on the Black Panther Party, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Judson L. Jeffries, On the Ground: The Black Panther Party in Communities across America, (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2010); Jakobi Williams, From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Chapter of the Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015). 19 Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin Jr., Black Against the Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party, Special Edition, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013; Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2016), 13. Citations refer to the 2016 edition.

6 and revolutionary governments internationally.”20 As a result, by 1969, the Party had expanded nationally as the proclaimed vanguard party. However, maintaining support proved difficult as the organization grappled with internal conflict and the FBI’s unrelenting efforts to suppress it by any means necessary. The following year circumstances started to change dramatically. The backing for the BPP’s revolution waned with Nixon’s de-escalation of the Vietnam War, and the

“increasing access to mainstream institutions undercut the basis of blacks’ support of the

Panthers’ politics.”21 In reaction, the 1970s was a period of transformation for the Panthers: they retreated from the politics of self-defence and disbanded nationally to regroup and reorganize in

Oakland, California.

Bloom and Martin utilized Antonio Gramsci’s ideational and political definition of revolutionary to support their argument that the Panthers were only a revolutionary movement from 1968 to 1970. Ideational meant that all insurgent revolutionary organizations must operate with the assumption that “consciously separates the world into two camps; those who seek to reproduce the existing social arrangements and those who seek to overthrow them.”22 Politically, a revolutionary movement is defined by its ability “to win the loyalty of allies, articulating a broader insurgency” and a direct challenge to the state.23 The popularity and support derived from the Panthers’ politics of self-defence fulfilled both the ideational and political revolutionary movement requirements. Bloom and Martin’s assessment relies on the importance of self- defence politics and national impact to paint the organization as ineffective and reformist during the 1970s. By regarding this era of the organization as its demise, the understanding of the

Panthers’ theoretical and practical transformation as a revolutionary movement was overlooked.

20 Bloom and Martin, 346. 21 Ibid., 349. 22 Ibid., 399. 23 Ibid., 399.

7

It ignored the revolutionary work conducted at the local level, and more importantly, neglected the contributions of comrades who continued to live for the revolution in their day-to-day work.

Revolution was defined by the Panthers as the complete transformation of institutions and society by eliminating imperialism and capitalism as governing structures in order to liberate

Black and oppressed people.24 In 1971, Newton and Eldridge Cleaver (the Minister of

Information) contested the strategy of self-defence and revolution by the bullet. Newton contended that Black people in America were not ready to orchestrate the revolution, and that the

Panthers were disconnected from the community they claimed to represent. He argued that oppressed people did not have the means to care about institutional change, and that the Panthers must first focus on providing the people the necessities to survive with their survival programs, combined with political education, in order to gain support for the revolution.25 Cleaver demanded the immediate call to arms to achieve liberation. Eventually, the dispute over tactics created a split in the organization leading to the exile of Eldridge Cleaver and his followers.

In , Newton, as the leader, and political intellectual of the party, explained that:

24 See Huey P. Newton, “To the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam: August 29, 1970,” in To Die for the People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton, (New York, NY: Random House, 1972): 178-181; Newton, “On the Middle East: September 5, 1970,” in To Die for the People, 191-196; Newton “United Against the Common Enemy: October 23, 1971,” in To Die for the People, 207-214. 25 The Black Panther Party had several different survival programs that served the needs of the community. The following are examples of the survival programs and services offered by the Black Panther Party: Intercommunal Youth Institute, Community Learning Center, Son of Man Temple (not religious, but political education), Seniors Against a Fearful Environment (SAFE), People’s Free Medical Research Health Clinics, Sickle-Cell Anemia Research Foundation, People’s Free Ambulance Service, Free Breakfast for Schoolchildren Program, Free Food Program, People’s Free Employment Program, Intercommunal News Services, People’s Cooperative Housing Program, People’s Free Shoe Program, People’s Free Clothing Program, Free Plumbing and Maintenance Program, People’s Free Pest Control Program, and Legal id and Education Program. See the Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation, The Black Panther Party: Service to the People Programs, ed. David Hilliard, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2008) for more information and details about the survival programs and how they were organized.

8

[R]evolution is not an action; it is a process. Times change, and policies of the past are not necessarily effective in the present. Our military strategies were not frozen. As conditions changed, so did our tactics…. Our community programs—now called survival programs— were of great importance from the beginning, we had always planned to become involved in Black people’s daily struggle for survival and sought only the mean as to serve the community’s needs.26

The People’s Campaign of 1973 would become the next step in this revolutionary process— towards the liberation of oppressed people. Newton’s formula for revolution was comprised of several interconnected parts. First was the expansion of survival programs which were viewed as a “tactical tool and strategy used to organize people to make revolution.”27 Political education, through voter registration and grassroots organizing, was another important component for achieving the revolution. The People’s Campaign of 1973 combined not only both of the former elements but was also motivated by gaining access to the , which was needed to finance the struggle. The ballot would make the future need for the bullet a possibility.

However, the gradualist approach taken by the Panthers was cast by exiled Panther

Members and other leftist and revolutionary organization as reformist due to their abandonment of self-defence politics.28 This notion has influenced how the People’s Campaign of 1973 has been framed as “social democratic” within historiography by academics like Joshua Bloom and

Waldo Martin, as well as Robyn Spencer.29 This framework is only justifiable when the principles, ideas, and expressions of the Panthers’ “revolutionary dream” during this period are

26 Huey P. Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, Edition, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2009; New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1973), 356. 27 Undated note written about the survival programs, series 2, box 46, folder 8, M0864, Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation Inc. Collection, Special Collections, Green Library, Stanford University. (hereafter HPN Collection). 28 Robert Self, “The Black Panther Party and the Long Civil Rights Era,” in In Search of the Black Panther Party, eds. Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams, 42-43. 29 Bloom and Martin, 383-386, and 394.

9 denied examination.30 Rather than focusing on abstract definitions of revolutionary movements or tactics, I am going to approach the election through a different lens: how the Panthers navigated their revolutionary identity and performance.31 I propose to examine how the Black

Panthers revolutionary identity evolved and was defined through “the performance of everyday acts of social transformation” during the People’s Campaign.32 The first chapter of my thesis will discuss how Newton defined the organization’s revolutionary identity during this period and how it was adopted within the organization, the second will examine this revolutionary identity in the context of media representation, and the third chapter will analyze how Panther members lived for the revolution in their day-to-day campaign work.

Acknowledging that electoral politics was a part of the revolutionary process is not enough.33 From the Party’s inception to demise, the end goal of the organization was the liberation of Black and oppressed people from the United States. In turn, it is essential to analyze how the Panthers navigated the tools and strategies necessary to achieve a revolution,

30 Robin Kelley states that, “revolutionary dreams erupt out of political engagement; collective social movements are incubators of new knowledge” in Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination, (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2002), 8. 31 Tim Lake uses a post-structural pedagogical approach to examine how Newton and Cleaver viewed “the gun” in relation to the revolution and revolutionary identity. He states that the use of “a post-structural pedagogical approach sharpens our appreciation of the different interpretations (significations) of what the gun might mean (sign) for the revolution (signified) and the BPP (signifier). What we learn from this approach is that our tools for representing reality—words, gestures, and symbols—are inherently ambiguous, and therefore, in terms of what it means to be a revolutionary, a single meaning is nearly unachievable. This approach, then, in examining the ever-shifting identity that went on in the Party, provides the opportunity to interrogate, and learn from, the marvelous militancy of the BPP”. This same approach can be used to examine how the Panthers used the ballot as a tactical tool and viewed their campaign objectives as revolutionary performance during the early 1970s. See Tim Lake, “The Arm(ing) of the Vanguard, Signify(ing), and Performing the Revolution: The Black Panther Party and Pedagogical Strategies for Interpreting a Revolutionary Life,” in In Search of the Black Panther Party, eds. Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams, 318. 32 Ibid., 320. 33 Historian Robyn Spencer mentions how the election was considered part of the revolutionary process, but she framed the election outside of the revolutionary ideology that still influenced the organization. She argued that in the 1970s, the Panthers had “replaced their Marxist rhetoric with politics of pragmatism.” However, what is left unexamined in her research is how Newton and other Panther members situated the People’s Campaign in the context of other communist and revolutionary struggles. Further, if Spencer defines rhetoric as how the Panthers changed their public demeanor, her study does not critically examine how public representation intersects with the internal Party dialogue and inspiration. See Robyn Spencer, The Revolution Has Come: Black Power, Gender, and the Black Panther Party in Oakland, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 121.

10 and what influenced the organization to do so. The People’s Campaign was an example of the adaptability of the organization—its theories and practice did not remain static. Bloom and

Martin contend that as the political and social landscape changed, the strategy and rhetoric of self- defence that contributed to the early success of the organization became less relevant.

Newton recognized this and sought to create the conditions for revolution using the BPP Survival

Programs and grassroots politics. These were the new ways that the Panthers sought to elevate community consciousness and establish a stronger support base.

The relevance of the Panthers during the 1970s has been undervalued in scholarship.

Historian Robyn Spencer has assessed that “this era has been the least studied aspect of their history, but their engagement with urban renewal, alternative education, and community control reflects a continuation of their quest for Black Power.”34 Over the course of their history, the

Panthers’ ideological underpinnings evolved and adapted. From self-defence to survival pending revolution, the change in rhetoric and tactics can be seen through analysis of the Black Panther newspaper, interviews, memoirs, and academic analysis. The support for the BPP changed dramatically as it focused their attention away from militant self-defence organizing. Due to pressure from the state (local and national) “in dramatic fashion the Panthers moved beyond their youth base in the ‘campus and the street’ to force broader networks across interracial divides of generation, class, and migration status.”35 As Newton hypothesized, serving the needs of the community through survival programs opened the doors to further link their demands to the direct needs of the people.36 It was this change that made it possible for the Panthers to focus

34 Robyn Spencer, The Revolution Has Come, 4. 35 Donna Murch, Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 169. 36 Huey P. Newton, “On the Defection of Eldridge Cleaver from the Black Panther Party and the Defection of the Black Panther Party from the Black Community: April 17, 1971,” in To Die for the People, 44-53.

11 their attention on gaining traction and popular support for the People’s Campaign in Oakland,

California.

Extending beyond the purview of revolutionary performance and identity, it is also important to question why the BPP selected Oakland as their base of operations. How did the

Panthers define their relationship with Oakland residents, and how would their campaign seek to tackle racism and oppression that had deep historical roots in the Bay Area? The concept of space and its relationship to politics, economics, and society presents numerous opportunities for historical analysis. Space can be fixed, unique, and dynamic. Historian, Robert Self advanced in

American Babylon: Race and Struggle in Postwar Oakland, “we cannot separate historical actors from their spatial relationships. Class and race are lived through the fabric of urban life and space. Civil rights, black power, and tax reform political movements did not call for rights in abstract terms and ill-define spaces.”37 When discussing the Black Panthers there must be a recognition that space determined the relationship between the Panthers, the state, and their prospective communities.

Furthermore, the necessity to study northern and western cities in their own light should be paired with an acknowledgement of a national African American experience. Donna Murch explored the relationship of “southern migration, black pride, the promise and peril of increased educational access, and the destructive effects of the carceral state” that influenced black radicalism in Oakland and the Bay Area.38 In her study regarding politics and intellectual developments in the Area, Murch utilized the Black Panther Party as a primary case study for linking political motivations of southern migrants to the west coast

37 Robert Self, American Babylon: Race and Struggle for Postwar Oakland, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 17. 38 Donna Murch, Living for the City, 3-4.

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Black Power Movement. The importance of Black southern diaspora transcending the boundaries of the north versus south divide contributes to an understanding of the objectives and actions of the Oakland African American population and the Black Panthers. It was the direct involvement of migrant communities in urban movements that reveals how ideas and imagery during the

Black Power Era were not solely a northern phenomenon. Fundamentally, “the Panthers’ core leadership, as well as their rank and file, consisted of recent migrants whose families travelled north and west to escape the southern racial regime, only to be confronted with new forms of segregation and repression.”39 Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale were part of the generation of migrants that directly experienced racism and class oppression in Oakland; these experiences were motivational.

The first chapter of this thesis will explore the relationship between Oakland’s history of civil rights organizing and the creation of the Black Panther Party. It will demonstrate how the origins of the Party and the creation of the Ten Point Platform served as an important building block for Newton’s reframing of tactics. The conflict between Cleaver and Newton, and events like Newton’s trip to , were also important factors in the development of the Panthers’ revolutionary identity and performance strategies. However, the reaction to Newton’s new vision was not unilateral, and garnering support was a fundamental part of the pre-campaign planning.

Creating cohesion and ideological understanding within the party was the first step. Memoirs and autobiographies written by Party members reveal their understanding of the campaign within the context of the organization’s greater revolutionary pursuits. The second important element was developing mechanisms to understand the community’s grievances and their responses to the

Party’s programs and candidates. The BPP’s intimate understanding of the ills affecting the

39 Donna Murch, 6.

13 community was reflected in its message and helped determine the areas and people to focus on during the campaign.40

Although there were many talented individuals that could have been suitable to run in the election Newton handpicked the candidates: Bobby Seale ran for Mayor of Oakland, and Elaine

Brown ran for a city council seat. Seale had grown up in Oakland and, alongside Newton co- founded the Black Panther Party in 1966. Always in the media spotlight, Seale had been involved in several notable events that contributed to his national fame—such as the storming of the California State Assembly in 1967 and criminal trials in Chicago (October – November 1969, repealed 1972) and New Haven (March 1970 – May 1971)—which highlighted the unjust practices of the system against leftist and Black Americans.41 Brown, raised in

Philadelphia, had joined the BPP in Los Angeles in , after she had moved to pursue a career in show business. She was actively involved in the publication of the Black Panther, wrote and recorded revolutionary music with Records, and at the request of Newton had worked between the L.A. and Oakland chapters.42 Both Seale and Brown had the charisma and drive needed to run as candidates in the election, and the announcement of their intention to run in March 1972 generated much publicity. Bobby Seale was prominently featured in newspaper

40 The use of “the people” or “the community” is not to imply that the Oakland population was a singular defined, unified group of people. Collective terms such as “the community” and “the people” were purposefully used by the Panthers to create the perception that the organization was speaking on behalf of everyone. It reinforces the Panthers positioning themselves as having popular appeal, at odds with mainstream presentation of them as radical and dangerous. In turn, the “People’s Campaign” sought to brand their message to appeal to and engage with the diverse oppressed population – regardless of race, gender, class, and/or sexuality. Their attempts to get this message to the community will be explored in the third chapter of my thesis when there is a broader discussion of where and who the Panthers engaged with in the field. 41 Seale and the Panthers were protesting the Mumford Act at the California State Assembly in Sacramento, which is discussed further in Chapter One on pg. 37-38. Popularly known as the Chicago 7 Trial, Seale was charged with the conspiracy to incite riots, and was bound and gagged by the judge to prevent him from defending himself. In relation to the New Haven Trail, Seale was charged with conspiracy to commit murder. For California State Assembly and Chicago Trail see Bobby Seale, , (London, England: Arrow Books, Ltd., 1970), 183- 203, 325-402; For New Haven Trail see Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin Jr., Black Against the Empire, 247-266. 42 Elaine Brown, A Taste of Power: A Black Woman’s Story.

14 coverage during the trajectory of the campaign, as political commentators and journalists struggled to unravel the purpose of the Panthers entry into mainstream politics. A great deal of the discussion centered around the question of whether or not the Party’s new approach could be considered revolutionary.

The second chapter will discuss the dynamics and trajectory of the election by examining campaigning material and newspaper coverage. Building on Jane Rhodes’s comprehensive media study of the Black Panthers from 1967 to the early 1970s, the second chapter will analyze media representation of the Black Panthers during the election in 1973.43 How did their past impact the representation of the candidates and the Party during the campaign? How was the

Panthers’ revolutionary intentions reported? Were Brown and Seale represented differently?

Moreover, the question of what it meant for a Black woman to run for a political election during the early 1970s prompts the need for inquiry into how categories of race and gender shaped her representation. Although looking at external media perspectives is important, the language employed by the BPP through the Black Panther will also serve as an important location for understanding the roles gender and race played for the Panthers in the election. Overall an analysis of media-orchestrated perceptions, or lack thereof, is key to illustrating the power dynamics between gender, race, and politics. In turn, the campaign also tells another story: of the gender dynamic in the organization, as well as the perception and involvement of women in the political arena. This chapter will explore whether putting Elaine Brown on the ballot for a council position to challenge the status quo of Oakland politics – where no woman, let alone

Black woman, had served—stands as another example of the progressive gender politics pursued

43 Jane Rhodes, Framing the Black Panthers.

15 by the Panthers. Further, Brown’s candidacy serves as an opportunity to examine the tension between Black power and during this period.

In order to reconceptualize the Black freedom struggle, historians have also sought to further complicate and complement the narrative by illustrating the experience and agency of women (Black and White). By focusing on key female figures in African American history such as Mary McLeod Bethune and , to unearthing the experiences and strength of ‘every- day’ Black women, in and out of organizations, there is a plethora of literature seeking to challenge the male-focused historic record.44 A major theme in Black Power Studies is exploring the complex relationship between feminism, womanhood, and the Black freedom struggle. In contention is the belief that for all Black women the race struggle has always been at the forefront of their motivation and efforts, assigning their role and rights as women as secondary.

However, determining where race ends, and gender begins, undermines the intersectionality of

African American women’s contemporary and historic struggles. Historian Robin Kelley in

Freedom Dreams argues that “radical black feminists have never confined their vision to just the emancipation of black women or women in general, or all black people for that matter. Rather they are the theorists and proponents of a radical humanism committed to liberating humanity

44 Bettye Collier-Thomas and V.P. Franklin, eds, Sisters in the Struggle: African American Women in the Civil Rights-Black Power Movement, (New York: NYU Press, 2001); , Women, Race, and Class, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1983); Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The Roots of the Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left, (New York, NY: Knopf, 1979); Christina Greene, Our Separate Ways: Women and the Black Freedom Movement in Durham, North Carolina, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America (New York, NY: William Morrow and Compact Inc., 1984); Lisa Levenstein, A Movement Without Marches: African American Women and the Politics of Poverty in Postwar Philadelphia, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Danielle L. McGuire, At the Dark End of the Street: Black Women, Rape, and Resistance—a New History of the Civil Rights Movement from Rosa Parks to the Rise of Black Power, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2010); Annelise Orleck, Storming Caesars Palace: How Black Mothers Fought Their Own War on Poverty, ( Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2005); Belinda Robnett, How Long? How Long? African American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights, (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 1997); Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, Want to Start a Revolution?:Radical Women in the Black Freedom Struggle, (New York, NY: NYU Press, 2009); and Rhonda Williams, The Politics of Public Housing: Black Women’s Struggle Against Urban Inequality, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).

16 and reconstructing social relations across the board.”45 The dual discrimination which has been, and is, the reality of Black women’s experience must be considered in historical analysis of the

Black Power Era and the development of Black radical thought.

As the Black Power Movement has been considered predominantly male and violent, it entrenched the stereotype that all Black power organizations imposed gender hierarchies— soliciting women to take a back seat to the movement.46 Yet, within the Black Panther Party, women held a diverse number of important positions from rank and file to leadership. Efforts have been made by historians like Robyn Spencer, Angela Le’Blanc-Ernest, Tracye Matthews,

Jakobi Williams, and Mary Phillips to capture and contextualize the role of women and gender politics in the party.47 Their pursuit of a more inclusive history that analyzes the contributions of

Panther women challenges gendered misconceptions of the organization, as well as builds on a growing body of historical literature that seeks to give voice and agency to Black women in the

BPM. Publicizing the duality of Panther women’s identity of being both female and Black contributes to deconstructing the dichotomous nature of Black power and women’s rights as inherently separate political objectives and categories. Although women in the Black Panther

45 Robin Kelley, Freedom Dreams, 137. 46 Rhonda Williams, “Black Women and Black Power,” OAH Magazine of History 22, no. 3 (2008): 22-26. 47 Antwanisha Alameen-Shavers, “The Women Question: Gender Dynamics in the Black Panther Party,” Spectrum: A Journal on Black Men 5, (2016): 33-62; Samuel Josephs, "Whose Revolution is This? Gender’s Divisive Role in the Black Panther Party," Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 9, (2008): 403-426; Linda Lumsden, “Good Mothers with Guns: Framing Black Womanhood in the Black Panther Party, 1968-1980,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 86, no. 4 (2009): 900-922; Mary Phillips, “The Feminist Leadership of in the Black Panther Party,” Black Diaspora Review 4, (Winter 2014): 187-221; Mary Phillips, “The Power of the First Person Narrative: Ericka Huggins and the Black Panther Party,” Women’s Studies Quarterly 43, no. 3/4 (2015): 33- 51; Mary Phillips and Angela LeBlanc Ernest. “The Hidden Narratives: Recovering and (Re) Visioning the Community Activism of Men in the Black Panther Party,” Spectrum: A Journal on Black Men 5, no. 1 (2016): 63- 89; Robyn C. Spencer, “Engendering the Black Freedom Struggle: Revolutionary Black Womanhood and the Black Panther Party in the Bay Area, California,” Journal of Women’s History 20 (2008): 90-113; Jakobi Williams From the Bullet to the Ballot and “‘Don’t no woman have to do noting she don’t want to do’: Gender, Activism, and the Illinois Black Panther Party.” Black Women. Gender & Families 6, no. 2 (2012): 29-54; Amy Washburn, “The Pen of the Panther: Barriers and Freedom in the Prison Poetry of Ericka Huggins,” Journal for the Study of Radicalism 8, no. 2 (2014): 51-78.

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Party may have not used White middle-class feminist language, or even referred to themselves as feminists, they still fought to be recognized as equals in their organization, and their contributions to the party cannot be undervalued. Furthermore, a well-rounded analysis of gender requires reconsidering the hyper-masculine stereotypes imposed on male Panthers. The images of men in leather and berets, holding guns and vowing to protect their communities was the dominant representation, and has detracted from their involvement in the community-oriented programs employed by the party.

Gender politics in the BPP were far from static, continuously transforming and developing throughout the existence of the organization. For example, from 1968 to 1971,

Tracye Matthews determined that the gendering of the Panthers “was an ongoing process affected by concrete material realities.”48 Initially an all-male group in search of regaining their manhood, “the increased presence of women, the shift from paramilitary to community service focus, the incarceration, assassination, and exile of key male leaders, and the increasing pressures of state-sponsored repression, all affected the internal dialogue about gender roles.”49

Matthews explored how the “gender ideology of the BPP, both formally stated and as exemplified by the organizational practice, was critical to its daily functioning as was the Party’s analysis of race and class dynamics in Black communities.”50 For Matthews, the presence and magnitude of gender politics in the organization “affects its ability to function as an effective political organization.”51 In order to compare the internal/external processes to dialogue

Matthews outlined the historical context and influence “cultural nationalism, feminism, and the

48 Tracye Matthews, “No One Ever Asks, What a Man’s Place in the Revolution Is”: Gender and the Politics of the Black Panther Party 1966-1971,” in The Black Panther Party Reconsidered eds by Charles E. Jones, 277. 49 Ibid., 277. 50 Ibid., 268. 51 Ibid., 268.

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Black matriarchy/tangle of pathology thesis” that influenced the BPP’s dynamic gender politics.52 For example, the official party mandate opposed the cultural nationalist premise that women were and should be subordinate in order to uplift Black men.53

Following Matthews’s gender theory-based analysis, Angela D. LeBlanc-Ernest examined the role of women in the party based on four periods: revolutionary (1966-1971), deradicalization (1971-1974), Elaine Brown’s leadership (1974-1977), and the downturn (1977-

1982). Complementing Matthews’ argument, LeBlanc-Ernest outlined the activities of women in the organization, ranging from violent encounters with law enforcement and state oppression to fundamental involvement and leadership in survival programs. Pointedly, LeBlanc-Ernest stated that “the invisibility in the narratives of the Black Panther Party is symptomatic of the paucity of scholarly attention devoted to African American women’s activism during the Black Power Era

(1966-1975).”54 Exploring the attitudes and opinions of key female leaders in the movement such as , JoNina Abron, Joan Kelley, Elaine Brown, Kathleen Cleaver, and Ericka

Huggins, LeBlanc-Ernest sought to combat the dearth of academic scholarship about Panther women’s contributions. Both LeBlanc-Ernest and Matthews point to the progressiveness of the organization, but also push readers to understand that celebrating the Panthers as the most progressive Black Power organization in this period in relation to belies the efforts of Panther women that made it possible to overcome sexist limitations.

Robyn C. Spencer’s research has focused on the emergence, resilience, and political metamorphosis of the Black Panthers in Oakland. One of the first scholars to have access to the

52 Matthews, 271. 53 Tracye Matthews explains that organizations like US organization under argued that women were meant to serve “complementary roles” to men, supported by assumptions of “biological determinism.” In practice this meant that women did not hold leadership positions and were responsible for duties like cooking and housework instead. See ibid., 235-236. 54 LeBlanc-Ernest, “‘The Most Qualified Person to Handle the Job’: Black Panther Party Women, 1966-1982,” in The Black Panther Party Reconsidered eds by Charles E. Jones (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1998), 305.

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Huey P. Newton Collection located at Stanford University, Spencer focused her research on revealing the perspectives of the rank and file, speaking to the controversies of COINTELPRO and state repression, and the ways that global revolutionary struggles influenced the framework and directives of the Black Panther Party; among these topics Spencer attempted to integrates gender into her analysis. Spencer was most successful in her analysis of gender in relation to state repression and self-defence, as well as highlighting the motivations of both men and women to join the organization. Panther women were active participants in all aspects of the organization, including the advocacy of and involvement in self-defence. Illuminating this challenge, the typecasting of Black women as victims during the Black Power era and reinforces the necessity of exploring women’s agency during this period. Spencer explains that:

The historiography of the black freedom movement has most often depicted black women as victims, or combatants against, patriarchal black nationalist men. Adopting a similar focus on Black Power’s misogyny, the historiography of the women’s movement has located black women’s agency and action during the Black Power era in autonomous women’s organizations. As a result, black women have remained on the outskirts of Black Power: their marginality central to the movement’s definition, but their agency and empowerment within the movement effectively obscured.55

To overcome this Spencer explored the ways that the BPP adopted female in their organization. Like Matthews, Spencer highlighted the gradual change of rhetoric and ways that women influenced this in the organization. For example, Spencer articulated that during the growth of the party’s popularity in the 1960s, Newton and Seale “uncritically embraced the gendered assumptions of masculinity self-defence rhetoric, and their initial members were men.

Despite the fact that women too were supports and practitioners of armed self-defence, the

55 Spencer, “Engendering the Black Freedom Struggle,” 91.

20 prevailing dialogue had at its core the assumption that men would be on the front lines of white violence serving as protectors of the black community.” 56 As the gender demographics of the organization changed, the vocal position taken by women who “boldly cast themselves in the image of a Black Panther…would push the Panthers to broaden their conceptions of self-defence in ways that they had never conceived.”57 Yet, even as the first woman in the organization,

Tarika Lewis demanded the right to carry a gun. Men in the organization also challenged gendered roles through active participation in the survival programs.58

An article written by scholars Mary Phillips and Angela Le’Blanc-Ernest confronts the premise that only women were involved in the community work by highlighting the experience of men who worked and enjoyed participating in survival programs. Illustrating that the popular understanding of the Black Panthers being angry, Black men “constructs a threatening black manhood that fails to recognize BPP men as nurturers and community builders.”59 This article focuses on the opinion of three men who participated in survival programs from which Phillips and LeBlanc-Ernest push for a recognition that there were “male activists performing everyday hard labor necessary for a community to survive under institutional attack, and they did this alongside their female peers.”60 Furthermore, it reveals that male BPP members were also willing to embrace the elements of the Black Panther organization not centred on self-defence politics. Not all men were predominantly keen on joining and remaining in the organization to assert or establish their masculinity.

56 Spencer, The Revolution Has Come, 37. 57 Ibid., 38. 58 Ibid., 47. 59 Mary Phillips and Angela LeBlanc-Ernest, “The Hidden Narratives,” 63. 60 Ibid., 64.

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By 1973, the heightened focus on survival programs and community uplift meant that the majority of the male BPP members in Oakland were involved and at the forefront of the electoral campaign. The relationships among Panthers can be explored through analysis of section reports.

Interestingly, at the beginning of the electoral campaign all but one the sections were run by men, perhaps pointing to a discrepancy in gender equality within leadership roles, prompting the inquiry of whether participation in the election was gendered or not. Section leaders’ discussions of successes, opportunities, and activities within their reports bring to life the day-to-day interactions among members in the organization, as well as their interactions with the community. Furthermore, “as the bulk of the Panther[s’] rank-and-file membership women occupied the most democratic layer of the organization and served as the public face of the organization in poor communities” discussing their involvement in the electoral campaign will serve as another example of their contributions and efforts.61 If challenging the notion that

Panthers statically adhered to gender binaries, such as men being naturally poised to hold positions of power and women naturally suited for caregiving community support roles, is crucial to incorporating Panther women and men into the organization’s history, how did men and women work together to run the People’s Campaign of 1973? Who held positions of leadership and did gender play a role in administering tasks?

Finally, the third chapter serves to illuminate and is influenced by what historian Charles

Payne calls “the view from the trenches.”62 The internal correspondence written by Panther members during the election offers an unaltered perspective on how they viewed their role in the campaign, and their work in the community. The efforts of comrades, who will be introduced in

61 Spencer, “Engendering the Black Freedom Struggle,” 91. 62 Charles Payne, “Debating the Civil Rights Movement: The View from the Trenches,” in Debating the Civil Rights Movement, 1945- 1968, Second Edition, (Lanham, MD: Row & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006): 115-155.

22 the chapter, were critical to orchestrating the campaign. Their contributions and perspective during the election have not been critically examined in current scholarship. An analysis of the rank-and-file membership perspectives provides relevant examples of how the Panthers lived for the revolution in their campaign work and community engagement, and how the Panthers’ new revolutionary identity came to life in the People’s Campaign.

Through the examination of memoirs, Panther political writings, internal correspondence and files from Stanford’s Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation Inc. Collection, and newspaper representation of the election the intentions and purpose of the election can be determined. The choice to pursue electoral politics does not have to signify the transition of the Party from a radical to a reformist organization. A comprehensive analysis of the People’s Campaign helps to expand the understanding of the organization’s approach to revolutionary performance and identity beyond the scope of self-defence politics and tactics; transcending the time constraints that have been established within the historiography. In order to accomplish this task, the

Panthers’ strategies, tactics, and goals should not be compartmentalized in either or categories.

Their pursuit of electoral politics can be just as radical and revolutionary as their use of self- defence rhetoric and strategies.

Further, an in-depth examination of the People’s Campaign will not only contribute to a greater understanding of the Black Panther Party, but to the Long Black Freedom Struggle as well. The evolution of the Black Panther Party and its rhetoric did not occur in isolation, from

Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) campaigns in Mississippi and Alabama to ’s 1964 Ballot or the Bullet speech, the fight for civil rights within electoral

23 politics was not a new strategy.63 However, the why behind what motivated the Panthers to utilize this strategy and how it was employed offers another instance of the movement’s ideological and practical complexity. It provides an opportunity to capture the agency and mobilization of grassroots actors within a local context; revealing how race and class played a role in the development of, and reaction to, an organization in Oakland, CA, motivated by communist and Black power ideologies.

63Malcolm X spoke about how the United States had the ability to participate in a bloodless revolution by changing institutions to grant all rights and freedoms to Black Americans. See Malcolm X, “The Ballot or the Bullet,” speech, , MI, April 12, 1964, http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/blackspeech/mx.html ; For SNCC voting and electoral campaigns see In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation; , Walking with the Wind: Memoir of a Movement, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998); and Wesley C. Hogan, Many Minds One Heart: SNCC’s Dream for a New America, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

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Chapter 1—Reframing Revolutionary Tactics: Huey P. Newton and the Evolution of Black Panther Party Ideology

The rise of the Black Panther Party (BPP) was influenced by the social, economic, and political conditions faced by poor and working-class in post-war Oakland,

California. Although many African Americans experience geographic and economic mobility during WWII, those opportunities contracted after the war, and most working-class African

Americans endured poverty and segregation. Moreover, in Oakland, the struggle for control over community resources and decision making was deeply woven into post-war politics, especially among Civil Rights and Black Power organizations, and the motivations of the BPP would be no different. It would be within the context of the demands for community control over poverty programs—the mobilization of Black ghetto leadership—that the Black Panther Party for Self

Defense would emerge as activists in Oakland. This chapter will start by outlining the economic conditions and race relations in Oakland that impacted Black southern migrants in the 1950-

1960s. An examination of Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale’s experiences show how these circumstances—combined with the perceived failure of government institutions and Black

Liberation organizations—contributed to their political awakening and understanding of oppression that inspired the creation of the Black Panther Party.

The development of the Party’s revolutionary identity and the evolving tension between two distinct political factions in the organization will be explored in the second section. From

1966-1970, the Party’s national expansion and popularization was associated with their pragmatic self-defense strategies. Additionally, the unrelenting repression orchestrated by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and state arms of the justice system fueled support for the organization. As external forces forged together, tension developed between two distinct political

25 factions in the Black Panther Party regarding how the Panthers would remain a viable and supported revolutionary force in the 1970s.1 The guiding question for the BPP was: how would revolution be achieved? In pursuit of revolution, Newton sought to evolve BPP methods and tactics, which led to a quarrel with competing party visionary Eldridge Cleaver. Newton called for a focus on community uplift and consciousness raising as a means to capture the needed support for the revolution. His vision of revolutionary activity involved creating institutions that mirrored the Party’s survival programs and seizing community control as an interim measure that preceded the pending revolution. Cleaver echoed the call for seizing control over institutions but demanded the continuation of their self-defence tactics and mobilization. The tumultuous Party split of 1971 marked the beginning of the next Panther era that emphasized the necessity of new tactics and strategies, like electoral politics, that would define the collective revolutionary identity and performance.

The final portion assesses Newton’s writings and speeches, Panther memoirs, and primary source material from the Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation Collection to demonstrate how and why Newton adopted electoral politics as part of his radical agenda. A return to the

Party’s original vision and external events provided the groundwork and justification for the eventual decision to use electoral politics as a vehicle for revolutionary change. Newton’s announcement to pursue power through electoral channels would ignite a debate regarding the

Party’s revolutionary identity. Nevertheless, the internal celebration and acceptance of the

People’s Campaign by remaining Panther members translated quickly into preparation for the

1 See Belinda Robnett for her discussion of the external and internal forces that impacted the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and changed its organizational structure and focus; a similar thing occurred for the Black Panthers in the early 1970s. Belinda Robnett, ““Eternal Political Change: Collective Identities and Participation in Social Movement Organizations” in Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 266-285.

26 election and enhanced engagement with the community: voter registration and grassroots organizing were deemed the key to the organization’s success. In 1972, the Party announced its election bid while giving away 10,000 bags of groceries with a chicken in every bag to instill the message that the Panthers would advocate for the people’s needs. However, political consciousness raising and convincing the public that the People’s candidates—Elaine Brown and

Bobby Seale—represented their needs would prove more difficult than anticipated and set the tone for the election period.

In central California, industry flourished as the demands of the Second World War increased exponentially. Supported by Federal Government investment, the Port of Oakland and

San Francisco Bay Area was alive with the sound of machinery and bustle of employees working to fulfill the quotas created by World War II.2 Drawn by the potential of upward mobility and less racial hostility, African Americans migrated from southern states. As a result, by 1950 the

Black population in Oakland increased from 3 to 12 percent of the residents.3 Alongside changes to the general population, African Americans “transformed West Oakland, a magnet for 85 percent of Oakland’s Black population, into a bustling vibrant community complete with it’s own retail corridor that became known as the ‘Black downtown’.”4 At the forefront of the transformation and institution building were African American women who encouraged migration and established support mechanisms within the community.5 However, looming over the vibrant growing community was de facto segregation. Infiltrating the daily lives of Black

2 Gretchen Lemke-Santangelo, Abiding Courage: African American Migrant Women in the Community (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1996), 50. 3 Donna Murch, Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 15. 4 Robyn C. Spencer, The Revolution Has Come: Black Power, Gender, and the Black Panther Party in Oakland, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2016), 8. 5 Lemke- Santangelo, Abiding Courage, 6.

27 migrants, the color line manifested itself in issues such as housing and employment.6

Discriminatory housing practices pushed Black migrants into specific neighborhoods, like West and North Oakland.7 The scope of employment was impacted by segregation within industries, like railways that prevented Black workers from skilled labour positions.8 In turn, “black workers in the 1940s found employment as cooks, waiters, Pullman porters, car cleaners, and redcaps, and, though less commonly, in the manufacturing, machine-tool, and repair shops of the

Southern Pacific Railroad.”9 Despite the unjust conditions organizations like the Brotherhood of

Sleeping Car Porters, Alameda County NAACP, and Shipyard Workers Committee Against

Discrimination challenged job discrimination in Oakland.10 After the war, the economic prosperity dwindled, and the post-war conditions exacerbated race and class tensions. Many

African Americans were unable to find employment; meanwhile, affluent Whites began to out of West Oakland into single detached homes within neighbourhoods like East Oakland and the Foothills.11 Subsequently, a variety of real-estate and banking practices in the 1950s onwards prevented Black home ownership, and purposefully reinforced racialized geography.12 As the rich fled to the suburbs, minorities were segregated into areas such as West Oakland which became associated with urban decay.13

6 Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003), 51. For details regarding the pre-war period on racial discrimination before the mass migration of African Americans to the East Bay Area, see Lemke-Santangelo Abiding Courage and Chris Rhomberg’s No There There: Race, Class, and Political Community in Oakland. 7 Self, American Babylon, 49-54. 8 Ibid., 46-51. 9 Ibid., 51. Further, Lemke-Santangelo explains that “most migrant women entered the wartime labor force at the lowest level of the occupational ladder, filling jobs that were both circumscribed by race and gender.” Abiding Courage, 6. 10 Self, American Babylon, 49-58. 11 Ibid., 43. 12 For a discussion of the consequences and challenges to housing segregation see Ibid., 159-170, 13 Ibid., 43.

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The Oakland elite was central to the demand for action against what was viewed as the increasingly unsafe and dilapidating downtown core, and more specifically West Oakland.14

Despite the lack of adequate funding for housing and social programs, the issue was racialized: the problems in the metropolis were directly associated with the growing African American population.15 City reconstruction was aggressively pursued. Mayor John Houlihan established the Oakland Citizen’s Committee for Urban Renewal (OCCUR) in 1954, which recommended the formation of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency (1956) and helped construct the

Neighborhood Renewal Plan (1957).16 Controversially, OCCUR membership consisted of corporate officials hailing from national banks, homebuilders’ associations and even large retailers that had a vested interest in programs that would benefit the business community, regardless of the cost to local residents.17

Equally problematic was the concentration of fiscal conservatism amongst Oakland

Municipal Councillors, who favoured limited government intervention, which meant that

Oakland City Council generally turned a blind eye to the social impact of business activities.18

This political stronghold was maintained by appointing likeminded individuals midterm. For example, “between 1953 and 1969, nine councillors and one mayor were originally appointed, all of whom won their ensuring elections while overall, 85 percent of incumbent candidates in council elections returned to office.”19 A result of the concentration of pro-business representation in government meant the needs of poor Blacks were not a primary concern.

14 Chris Rhomberg, No There There: Race, Class, and Political Community in Oakland, (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2007), 119. 15 Rhomberg, No There There, 120-144. 16 Self, American Babylon, 143; Rhomberg, No There There, 125. 17 Rhomberg, No There There, 125. In 1969 grievances were lodged “neighbourhood leaders” against the OCCUR for their exclusion of poor and minorities, see ibid.,165. 18 Ibid., 127. 19 Ibid., 126.

29

In 1959, the General Neighborhood Renewal Plan (GRNP) outlining the “extensive renewal of a 250-block area of West Oakland” breezed through City Council.20 The first area targeted by the GRNP was the Acorn Projects, where residents were “78 percent black…,” and

“nearly half the households were dependent on some form of welfare, pension, or social security.”21 The proposed plan for this area did not mandate the replacement of public housing, or any measures for relocation, and although the NAACP pursued a campaign to ensure the inclusion of low-income housing, within or outside Acorn, it was unsuccessful.22 Opposition to

Acorn was dominantly led by Black middle-class leadership.23 Since many advocates lived outside the targeted area, skepticism arose regarding their ability to relate to the lived experience of Acorn residents and their level of commitment to challenging the status quo—this prompted effected residents to respond to the Oak Center Renewal project.24 The Oak Center

Neighborhood Association (OCNA) was “established by homeowners and long-time residents in

West Oakland” who utilized their own middle-class standing and leveraged federal government programs to protest and prevent the demolition of their property.25 Historian Chris Rhomberg suggested that the opposition to the city’s Oak Center proposal foreshadowed the future emphasis on “the defence of neighborhood and the role of indigenous organizations within majority black areas…”.26 Furthermore, “leaders and organizations within the ghetto would increasingly claim their independent right to speak for themselves for the black community.”27

20 Rhomberg, 127. 21 Ibid., 128. 22 Ibid., 129-131. 23 Ibid., 131. 24 Ibid., 131-132. 25 Rhomberg states that “through their organization and sophisticated use of strategic allies in the federal government, they compelled the regime to incorporate their interests as middle-class property owners in a majority black neighbourhood.” Ibid.,133. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., 133.

30

The voice of the Black poor remained underrepresented, as organizations like the NAACP and

OCNA focused on their collective needs, which did not prevent the displacement of thousands.

The impact of urban renewal from 1960 to 1966 was unprecedented leading to the demolition of public housing and forced migration.28 Gentrification wreaked havoc on poor and working-class communities, generating little economic benefit or uplift.

Due to the alarmingly high national poverty rate of 19 percent, on 8 January 1964

President Lyndon B. Johnson announced his administration’s famous initiative the Economic

Opportunity Act (EOA), also known as the War on Poverty. As Rhomberg explains, the circumstances in Oakland warranted the federal government’s special attention: the

“unemployment rate of 8 percent in 1960 was roughly twice the national average, though in the older industrial flatlands the official jobless rate ran close to 14 percent.”29 The Flatlands were comprised of neighbourhoods in North, West, and East Oakland, as well as Fruitvale (located between West and East Oakland). Of the estimated 150,000 people lived in the flatlands, it represented “more than three-quarters of the city’s black population and more than half the

Spanish-surnamed population.”30 A targeted effort at poverty reduction in the Flatlands was necessitated by the fact “more than half of the residents were defined poor…”31 However, the focus of, and control over, poverty programs became a site of .

The Oakland Economic Development Council (OEDC) was formed to develop and manage the federally funded EOA poverty programs, with all twenty-five positions filled by mayoral appointment. Like the issues surrounding urban renewal, the challenge of developing an

28 For example, “More than 7,000 housing united in Oakland were destroyed by urban renewal, freeway and BART [()] construction, and other governmental action, and in West Oakland alone almost 5,100 units were removed, resulting in a new outmigration from the neighborhood of about 14,000 residents.” Ibid., 125. 29 Ibid., 137. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.

31 entity that answered to the needs of the community at large remained, and to navigate these limitations Target Area Advisory Committees (TAACs) were created. A TAAC would help provide the infrastructure for local, hands on, representatives to interact with recipients of poverty programs and vocalize their needs to the OEDC.32 The OEDC had the jurisdiction to allocate funds and form policies without the involvement of city council, but decision-making capacity was not extended to TAACs that worked directly with the community. Further, the

Black membership of the OEDC came predominantly from the professional middle class, whereas the TAAC were more inclusive and local.33

The visionary chasm that would emerge between the OEDC and the TAACs would be fueled by class and political differences. Unlike members of the OEDC, representatives of the

TAACs had “much less faith in established institutions and believed that what the poor needed most were direct, immediate benefits—like jobs, legal aid, and child care—not technical assistance, information referral, or even education programs… aimed exclusively at future generations.”34 Each side claimed the right to speak on behalf of the community; however, the

TAACs “based their claims to authenticity on their everyday experience and knowledge of the neighborhood, and regarded white activists as useful allies who were working for the residents.”35 Tension continued to build as TAACs demanded more and more administrative controls over programs, and guidelines for membership, until target-area residents had self- governing over their community programs.36 Representation was rooted in the lived-experience within a community, and in turn, economic and social status divided the Black community. As

32 Rhomberg, 138. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., 140. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., 143.

32

TAACs fought for community control over federally funded poverty programs, two young men were developing their own political consciousness. A movement would unleash across the

United States, as a result of their lived experience and personal consensus that the governing infrastructure had failed to address racism and oppression.

Both born in the South, Bobby Seale in , and Huey P. Newton in Louisiana, they had migrated with their families during the Second Great Migration in pursuit of wartime prosperity, and intimately knew the socioeconomic effects of the post-war Bay Area. Seale grew up in Cordonices Village, a housing project in Berkeley, and he remembered that his father lacked a steady income and the crowded, unclean living conditions.37 Newton too recalled how his family struggled, remarking that “my father’s consistent preoccupation with bills is the most profound and persistent memory of my childhood.”38 The pursuit of knowledge and education, alongside the struggle to survive economically, dramatically changed both men’s outlook of the world.

In 1959, after Seale was discharged from the Air Force for bad conduct. He was stationed at Ellsworth Air Force Base at the time of his discharge. Afterward he struggled to find work, which led him to pursue engineering at a year later.39 Newton, who was attending Merritt College, supported his lifestyle through petty crimes, theft, and burglary. On several occasions Newton was tried in courts on countless charges, and each time he defended himself with his working knowledge of the law.40 Newton and Seale met in 1962 at an Afro-

American Association rally to protest the Cuban Blockade. Over the next three years, Newton

37 Bobby Seale, Seize the Time: The Story of the Black Panther Party, (London, England: Arrow Books, Ltd.), 20. 38 Huey P. Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, Penguin Books Edition, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2009; New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc.), 39. Citations refer to Penguin Edition. 39 Seale, Seize the Time, 22-27. 40 Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 79-88.

33 and Seale’s paths crossed intermittently, until 1965 when Newton was released from prison after serving 6 months for a felony, and they developed a close relationship.41 Both men shared frustration with Black nationalist organizations, like the Afro-American Association and the

Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), which failed to articulate a program that reflected the needs of the community.42 Reflecting on the period leading up to the creation of the Party,

Newton wrote, “Bobby and I entered into a period of intense exploration, trying to solve some of the ideological problems of the Black movement; partly, we needed to explain to our own satisfaction why no Black political organization had succeeded.”43 They attempted to work with a campus organization called the Soul Student Advisory Council (SSAC) to establish a self- defense initiative, but were ultimately unsuccessful.44

By 15 , Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale developed a mutual desire to change Oakland politics. Influenced by their experiences, the Black Panther Party for Self

Defence (BPP) was created inside the walls of a War on Poverty community center. Newton and

Seale were searching for the means to encourage action from brothers on the block. The inspiration behind the party cannot be distilled to one specific individual or event; several things influenced the creation of the BPP and the development of its platform. Newton derived his belief of the necessity of self-defense as a mechanism for liberation from the writings of Frantz

Fanon, as well as the philosophical thought and successful movements led by Mao Tse-tung and

41 Newton was charged for a felony—assault with a deadly weapon—but he only served time for a misdemeanour. See Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 89-92. 42 Newton stated, “the Soul Student’s Advisory Council, RAM, the Muslims, and the Afro American Association were not offering these brothers and sisters anything concrete, much less a program to help them move against the system. It was agonizing to watch the brother move down those dead-end streets.” Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 74. 43 Ibid., 111. 44 Seale, Seize the Time, 46-50; Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 112-114. Newton describes how the SSAC was a “front group” for the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) that “was a recognized campus organization.” (Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 110).

34

Che Guevara.45 Also influential was North Carolina’s NAACP president Robert William, author of Negroes with Guns, and the group Deacons of Self Defense in Louisiana which provided examples of home-grown self-defence activism from which to draw.46 Malcolm X’s influence was also pivotal. Huey P. Newton reflected in Revolutionary Suicide that “the words on this page cannot convey the effect that Malcolm has had on the Black Panther Party, although, as far as I am concerned the Party is a living testament to his life work. I do not claim that the Party has done what Malcolm would have done…but Malcolm’s spirit is in us.”47 The symbolism of the panther was a direct influence of the political organizing in Alabama by the Student Non-Violent

Coordinating Committee (SNCC) under the leadership of . In 1965, SNCC formed the Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCFO), as well as the Lowndes County

Black Panther Party to drive voter registration and influence local politics. The panther, as

Newton described, was a fitting symbol since it “is a fierce animal, but he will not attack until he is backed into a corner; then he will strike out.”48 The social, political, and economic conditions had backed Oakland’s poor and working-class population into a corner for too long—it was time to act, he believed.

Newton and Seale established the Ten Point Program, a guiding platform for the party: this mandate demanded self determination, full employment, an end to police brutality, as well as the right to “land, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace.”49 Utilizing the same powerful revolutionary language found in the Declaration of Independence, Newton and Seale stated that when a government failed to procure the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of

45 Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 116-117. 46 Ibid., 118. 47 Ibid., 118. 48 Ibid., 119. 49 Newton and Seale, “Ten Point Program,” October 15, 1966 in Huey P. Newton, To Die for the People, (New York, New York: Random House, 1972), 5.

35 happiness for their people, “it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government….”50 A particular concern, and the main initial focus of the organization, was tackling police brutality in Oakland and providing a means to confront this issue. Point seven of the BPP program pointed to “organizing Black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our Black Community from racist police oppression and brutality.”51 In turn, a call to action was a call to arms; evoking the right of the second constitutional amendment, the Panthers preached that Black people had to mobilize and defend themselves against the Establishment.

Newton felt that “‘the brothers and sisters have to relate to this because this is what they want.

This is what they’ve told me. This is what they’ve told every other leader in the country.’”52

More importantly, as sociologist Joshua Bloom and historian Waldo E. Martin Jr., assert, “the platform and program emphasized the nationalist character of the Party as a steward of black people’s interests. The Party was not just about armed action; it was a legitimate voice of black people, and as such, it intended to take care of a broad range of community’s needs.”53 The principles of the Ten Point Program would act as the axis from which the Panthers would pursue their political initiatives, pivoting their focuses as circumstances demanded.

The initial focus was patrolling the streets with guns in order to prevent against the Black community—an issue that was being tackled by the TAACs and other grassroots organizations in the Bay Area.54 The Panthers were not the only group to organize against police brutality. , a former Lowndes County SNCC Black

50 Newton and Seale, “Ten Point Program,” in To Die for the People, 6. 51 Ibid., 4. 52 Seale, Seize the Time, 83. 53 Bloom and Martin Jr., Black Against the Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party, (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2016), 70. 54 Seale, Seize the Time, 94; Robyn Spencer discusses the national response to uncover the reason behind anti-police sentiment across United States after the LA Watts Riot. Due to heightened attention around this topic, Spencer articulated that targeting police brutality was an ideal initiative for the Panthers to take on. Spencer, The Revolution Has Come, 38-40.

36

Panther, and founder of the Oakland Committee (ODAC) (1965) observed police conduct in patrol groups.55 Expressing their second amendment right and preaching the Ten

Point Program, Seale recalled: “we floated around the streets, and we patrolled the pigs. We followed the pigs. They wouldn’t even know we’d be following them…. We’d just be going to a meeting. We’d have our shit on us, and while we were going to the meeting, we’d patrol those pigs, trying to catch them wrong.”56 The patrolling conducted by Newton and Seale resulted in several confrontations that drew attention to their case. Access to weapons, the language of self- defense, and the hope of finally achieving basic fundamental rights drew both men and women to the Party.

Establishing a home base by opening their “first office for $150 a month on Fifty-sixth and Grove street,” Newton and Seale invited people to educate themselves about revolutionary politics and involve themselves in the cause.57 The first official member of the organization was

Bobby Hutton, “affectionately dubbed ‘Lil Bobby,’ who had met Seale while attending the North

Oakland Anti-Poverty Center.”58 Shortly after David Hilliard, a childhood friend of Newton joined the party.59 However, by 1967, membership in the organization was still small: “the organization had received no coverage in the press and was known only by those with whom the

Party had direct contact, or through word of mouth.”60 Several events during the course of the year would tip the scale in favour of the Party, starting with an invitation for the Panthers to act as and escort , widow of Malcolm X, to a memorial in San Francisco

55 Spencer, The Revolution Has Come, 39. For more information about Comfort and the ODAC also see Spencer, The Revolution Has Come, 15-24. 56 Seale, Seize the Time, 98. 57 Ibid., 99. 58 Spencer, The Revolution Has Come, 41. 59 David Hilliard and Lewis Cole, This Side of Glory, First Edition, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993). David Hilliard became the Chief if Staff and leads the Party when Newton was imprisoned in October 1967 for the murder of Oakland police officer John Frey. 60 Bloom and Martin, Black Against the Empire, 48.

37 for her late husbands’ death on 21 February 1967.61 During the event, Newton had a confrontation with the police that impressed Ramparts magazine influential writer, Eldridge

Cleaver who, as a result, decided to join the Black Panther Party.62 In April came the next event that helped raise the Panther profile: their initiative to confront the unjust murder of unarmed

Denzil Dowell by the police.63 In an attempt to harness the anger boiling in the community and garner support for self-defence, Seale and Newton held rallies, speaking about their mission.64

Community members were finally beginning to feel like they had an outlet, a group, that represented their beliefs. During the rally for Dowell, “something startling occurred that had never happened at any other Panther event [:] Neighbors showed up with their own guns…as a gesture of support and solidarity.”65 Cleaver also became involved in the organization by helping the Panthers create their own apparatus for disseminating information: The Black Panther – the

Black Community News Services.66

The ruckus that had been caused by the Panthers had caught the attention of legislators and law enforcement keen on stopping their rising popularity. Republican States Assemblyman

Donald Mulford was extremely interested in stopping the Black Panthers and proposed a ban on the use of loaded guns in public—a direct attack on the Party’s tactics.67 In protest, on 2 May

1967, the Panthers arrived at the Sacramento State Capitol building in their iconic black leather

61 Bloom and Martin, 48-49; Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 138-140. 62 Bloom and Martin in Black Against the Empire concluded from interviews and Seale’s memoirs that Eldridge Cleaver gave “full support to Huey P. Newton as the legitimate heir to the legacy of Malcolm X.” Bloom and Martin, 50; Also see Seale, Seize the Time, 159-162; Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 136-144. 63 Dowell was killed by the police on 1 April 1967. Newton described the importance of Dowell’s death: “It led to our first national exposure, and it also helped us launch our paper, which was a way of interpreting events to the community from a Black perspective…. In a way, The Black Panther newspaper is a living memorial to him. Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 152; Also see Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 145-152; Bloom and Martin, 50-57. Seale, Seize the Time, 162-179. 64 Bloom and Martin, 54-55. 65 Ibid., 57. 66 Ibid., 56. 67 Ibid., 57.

38 berets and attire to oppose the passing of the .68 Disarmed and escorted out of the legislature, reporters were ready to hear what Seale had to say. After receiving their confiscated weapons and leaving the event, Seale and his followers were confronted by the police at a gas station where they were arrested. 69 This event was instrumental to propelling the Panthers to the national stage with their “new vision of black politics” and Black liberation agenda: “Rather than appeal for a fair share of the American pie, the Panthers portrayed the black community as a colony within America and the police as an ‘army of occupation’ from which blacks sought liberation. In their view, the racist power structure was the common enemy of all those engaged in freedom struggles.”70 Eldridge Cleaver joined as the Minister of Information, membership sky-rocketed and within a few years chapters started to pop up all over the country involving individuals who would contribute greatly to the party. For example, the Los Angeles Chapter

(founded 1968) would include Erica Huggins and Elaine Brown, who became key players in the organization. Essentially, as the expansion occurred, so did multi-level state repression of the organization.

The rise of BPP popularity struck fear in the hearts of many, especially the United States

Government and the FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover who declared in 1969 that the “‘Black

Panther party, without question, represents the greatest threat among the black extremist groups to the internal security of the United States.’”71 The crackdown from the FBI and local law enforcement across the nation was covert and diligent, leading to the murder and wrongful prosecution of several Panthers. On 28 October 1967, Newton was arrested and charged with the

68 Bloom and Martin, 59. 69 Ibid., 58-60. 70 Ibid., 61. 71 “Black Panther Greatest Threat to U.S. Security,” Desert Sun, Volume 42, Number 296, 16 July 1969, 17, accessed via .com by Ancestry Database, 2020, https://www.newspapers.com/, (accessed February 2020).

39 murder of Oakland police officer John Frey and was not released and acquitted until August

1970.72 In January 1969, Los Angeles chapter leaders and were killed by members of Ron Karanga’s US organization, and in Fred Hampton was assassinated by the Chicago Police Department.73 By 1971, Seale, Ericka Huggins, and

David Hilliard were all imprisoned and were later acquitted.74 The fear of the Panthers also meant that many of their community survival programs like the Free Breakfast for Children were targeted due to their far reach and positive community reception.75 The number of survival programs increased in size and number in spite of the legal challenges the Party faced.

The community survival programs were another face of the Black Panther Party that drew many people, especially women, into the organization and served as a means to help the community gain necessities not easily available through the discriminatory economic and political system.76 The BPP People Programs focused on providing access to free health care, education, food, and additional resources that were otherwise unavailable. Alongside supplying essentials, it established a direct line of communication between the organization and the people they sought to revolutionize. Seale expressed how the Party programs should not be

72 Newton, Revolutionary Suicide, 181-316. 73 For the killing of Bunchy Carter and John Huggins see Bloom and Martin, 219-221. For Hampton’s assassination see Bloom and Martin, 237-246 and Jakobi Wiliams, From the Bullet to the Ballot: the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party and the Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago (Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina University, 2013), 167-190. 74 Seale and Huggins were charged with conspiracy to commit murder of and David Hilliard was charged with threatening President Nixon’s life. For Seale and Huggins, see Bloom and Martin, 247-266. For David Hilliard see Hillard, This Side Glory, 266-267. 75 Seale, Seize the Time, 456. 76 For examples of women talking about their experience with BPP survival programs see: “Voices of Black Panther Women,” recorded by University of Berkeley, 1990 October 26, California Audiovisual Preservation Project, Film, https://archive.org/details/cabemrc_000016 (accessed September 1, 2020); “Ericka C. Huggins oral history interview conducted by David P. Cline in Oakland, California, June 30 2016,” from the Library of Congress, Civil Rights Oral History Project, Film, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.afc/afc2010039.afc2010039_crhp0144 (accessed July 1, 2020); “Norma Mtume oral history interview conducted bv David P. Cline in Los Angeles, California, June 27, 2016” from the Library of Congress, Civil Rights Oral History Project, Film, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.afc/afc2010039.afc2010039_crhp0138 (accessed July 1, 2020).

40 misconstrued as reformist. By his assessment, “a reform program is setup by the existing exploitative system as an appeasing handout, to fool the people and keep them quiet.” From his experience, “examples of these programs are poverty programs, youth work programs, and things like that which are set up by the present demagogic government.”77 Unlike reform programs, he emphasized how “the objective of the programs set forth by revolutionaries like the

Black Panther Party is to educate the masses of people to the politics of changing the system,” thus, making it a revolutionary program.78 Further, the programs demonstrated the Party’s capability to convert the Ten Point Platform into practical, real solutions that targeted the community’s problems. At Newton’s request, the development and expansion of these programs was overseen by Panther Chief of Staff, David Hilliard.79 However, the survival programs created division within the party regarding the future of the organization.

In particular, Eldridge Cleaver was vehemently against the Party’s focus on the survival programs and took active measures to ensure the focus on armed revolt and police confrontation.80 In Moscow, during the summer of 1970, Elaine Brown recalled an argument she had with Cleaver in which he said that “the vanguard party has become a breakfast-for-children club.”81 Attacking leadership decisions, he continued, “Revolution has to be won, not coddled like eggs. The Hilliards are so punked-out [sic] and gun-shy, they’re making the vanguard look like a reformist bitch.”82 Although Cleaver was exiled in operating the international chapter of the Party, he and his philosophies remained a powerful force within the Party and influential for many comrades—this fueled internal conflict.

77 Seale, Seize the Time, 457. 78 Ibid., 457. 79 Ibid., 457. 80 David Hilliard, This Side of Glory, 175-177; 180-186. 81 Elaine Brown, Taste of Power: A Black Woman’s Story. First Anchor Books Edition, (United States: Anchor Books, 1994; New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1992), 220. Citations refer to First Anchor Books Edition. 82 Ibid., 223.

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The ideological struggle had ensued between the New York Chapter and Oakland leadership regarding whether the future of the party would take a gradualist or violent, by any means necessary, approach to achieving revolutionary goals. In one camp resided party leaders

David Hilliard, Bobby Seale, Ericka Huggins, Elaine Brown and Huey P. Newton who advocated for the survival programs that directly benefited the people and would empower them to have the means to take control of their communities. The other faction formed by Eldridge

Cleaver and famous Panthers like and the New York 21, embraced the gun as the mighty force of change.83 Cleaver’s cohort clung to the belief that the revolution was born by the bullet, claiming that any other tactic was an impediment to the cause. The New York 21 publicly denounced gradualism and “hailed the as one of, if not ‘the true vanguard’…. [Calling for] all out revolutionary violence that they believed would attract a broad following and eventually topple the capitalist economy and the state….”84 Both sides reflected the ongoing debate in Black Power and Civil Rights circles regarding how Black Liberation would be realized. However, it was Newton, the leader and political intellectual of the Party, who had the power to define and control the collective revolutionary identity of the organization as gradualist and “living for the revolution.”85 Newton, although a dreamer, steeped his perspective in stark realism: he knew it was impossible to win without the power of the masses

83 Geronimo (Elmer) Pratt was the leader of the Southern California Chapter. The New York 21 was comprised of comrades from the NY Chapters—Afeni Shakur, Jamal Joseph, Lumumba Shakur, Joan Bird, Robert Collier, Richard Harris, Shaba Ogun Om, Kwando Kinshasha, Abayama Katara, Baba Odinga, Curtis Powell, Dhoruba Bin, , Cetewayo Tabor, Clark Squire, Larry Mack, , Mashina (Thomas Berry), Lonnie Epps, Mkuba (Lee Berry), and Ali Bey Hassan—were arrested and imprisoned on multiple charges of conspiracy. For Pratt’s leadership assignment see Bloom and Martin, 222-224; For more information about the New York 21 see Jamal Joseph, Baby Panther: A Life of Rebellion & Reinvention, (New York, NY: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 2012); Bloom and Martin, 213-214, 248, 250, 361-362; 373. 84 Bloom and Martin, 359. 85 The expression “living for the revolution” is defined by Francis Beal in “Black Women’s Manifesto; Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female” (1969) as “to die for the revolution is a one-shot deal; to live for the revolution means taking on the more difficult commitment of changing our day-to-day life patterns.” Francis Beal, “Black Women’s Manifesto; Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female,” 1969, http://www.hartford- hwp.com/archives/45a/196.html (Accessed September 18, 2020).

42 who were subjected to the injustices of poverty. From Newton’s standpoint, at its core, the vision of the Party had always been rooted in the Ten-Point Platform that sought to “develop a lifeline to the people by serving their needs and defending them against their oppressors who came to the community in many forms, from armed police to capitalist exploiters.”86 In order to control the narrative and promote the new Panther platform, expelling Eldridge Cleaver, Geronimo Pratt, the

New York 21 and any other “anti-revolutionary” member was integral to Newton’s success.

In 1971, the division between Newton and Cleaver came to a head, and the Black

Panthers parted ways with the faction that openly preached armed revolution. Although the

Panthers were not privy to it at the time, the FBI was involved in exacerbating tensions between

Newton and Cleaver.87 During this period, Eldridge Cleaver was exiled in Algeria after fleeing persecution by the United States Government, but still held the Minister of Information position and oversaw the international division of the party. Cleaver was replaced by Elaine Brown as the

Minister of Information, and Newton explained that Cleaver’s departure was because the

Panthers, “would not order everyone into the streets tomorrow to make a revolution. We recognize that this is impossible because our dialectical ideology and our analysis of concrete conditions indicate that declaring a spontaneous revolution is a fantasy.”88 Unlike Cleaver,

Newton questioned the viability of armed revolt against the full strength of the United States government. Newton declared:

We are now free to move toward the building of a community structure which will become a true voice of the people, promoting their interests in many ways. We can continue to push our basic survival programs, we can continue to as advocates of their true interests, we can truly become a political revolutionary vehicle which will lead the people

86 Huey P. Newton, “On the Defection of Eldridge Cleaver from the Black Party and the Defection of the Black Panther Party from the Black Community April 17, 1971,” in To Die for the People, 45. 87 Spencer, The Revolution Has Come, 102-111. 88 Newton, “On the Defection of Eldridge Cleaver,” 52-53.

43

to a higher level of consciousness so that they will know what they must really do in their quest for freedom. Then they will have the courage to adopt any means necessary to seize the time and obtain that freedom.89

Further, Newton argued that the falling out with Cleaver revealed Cleaver’s defection from the

Party’s original vision, and as a consequence the Party fell off course, failing to maintain a positive relationship with its primary base of support—Black Americans.90 The struggle had unearthed the contradictions in the party and guided its realignment: recapturing the trust of the

Black populace in Oakland would require the Panthers to return to their original vision, and as a result begin to influence community consciousness. He emphasized that deriving support and commitment from the community to rise to action against oppression was always the principal focus of the Party, and the survival programs were critical to creating the change they were pursuing. The programs were intrinsic to establishing a stronger connection with the people, delivering the services the system would not, and demonstrating the organization’s ability to act with precision. In addition to the foundation the programs provided, many factors would influence Newton’s philosophical and practical understanding of protracted fight, and his eventual decision to use the political arena as a vehicle for the long-term revolutionary struggle.

Newton believed in an internationalist approach to the revolution that required global support in order to overthrow the United States government. He prioritized making other revolutionaries see that the Panthers were capable of establishing alternative institutions that served the needs of the people.91 Newton believed that the Black American struggle was a part of the global socialist revolutionary struggle against the U.S. Empire and “reactionary

89 Newton, “On the Defection of Eldridge Cleaver,” 53. 90 Ibid., 44-45. 91 Brown, A Taste of Power, 303.

44 intercommunalism.”92 Intercommunalism was a concept that Newton introduced at the

Philadelphia Revolutionary People’s Constitutional Convention in 1970.93 In his speech at the conference, Newton began by exploring the history of BPP revolutionary thought and contemporary U.S. control over global socioeconomic conditions and politics. The power of the

United States to control capital and external societies had expanded dramatically beyond its borders; it had become an empire that “transformed itself into a power controlling all of the world’s lands and people.”94 For Newton, the inability of each nation or colony directly to challenge and defeat the monolithic power—since they had become so “integrated into the imperialist empire that it is impossible to ‘decolonize’”— mean that the classification of nations, states and colonies were no longer applicable. The communist struggle had become between the oppressed community/communities and U.S. imperialism. 95 Newton explained:

The world today is a dispersed collection of communities. A community is different from a nation. A community is a small unit with a comprehensive collection of institutions that serve…a small group of people. And we [(the BPP)] say further that the struggle in the world today is between the small circle that administers and profits from the empire of the United States, and the peoples of the world who want to determine their own destinies. We call this situation intercommunalism. We are now in the age of reactionary intercommunalism, in which a ruling circle, a small group of people, control all other people by using their technology.96

Therefore, it was necessary for revolutionaries, like the Black Panthers, to seize control of governing bodies and establish provisional governments as China, had, and as

92 Huey P. Newton, “Intercommunalism (1974),” Viewpoint Magazine, https://www.viewpointmag.com/2018/06/11/intercommunalism-1974/ (Accessed December 27, 2019). 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. Self argued that the Newton’s theory of intercommunalism influenced how the campaign “reconceived the special logic of the Metropolitan Oakland Area Program…[where] Oakland was both center and periphery, home to both colonizers and colonized.” See Self, American Babylon, 301. 96 Newton, “Intercommunalism (1974).”

45

Vietnam was attempting to do.97 Only when communities “expropriate[d] the expropriators” would revolutionary intercommunalism be achieved, and the people strive to reach the final stage of revolution: communism.98 Before the Philadelphia crowd, Newton emphasized that

“black people are the vanguard of the revolution in this country, and, since no one will be free until the people of America are free…black people are the vanguard of the .”99

In turn, it was the mandate of the Black Panther Party to raise the consciousness of the vanguard in the United States and create a platform to initiate revolution one community at a time.

The organization’s blueprint for change began to take shape with another major inspiration for Newton—his trip to Communist China. In September 1971, Elaine Brown, Robert

Bay and Newton boarded their flights. During their visit Newton embraced the daily experience in China; “he wanted to dress like the Chinese, eat Chinese food, be absorbed by Chinese life.”100 The trip to China was a part of Newton’s plan to undermine the intentions of the Nixon

Administration that had received an invitation to visit China. Newton wanted to engage the

Communist Republic of China and assert the Black Panthers’ relationship to the global

Communist struggle by meeting with the Chinese Premier, Chou En Lai. Alongside meeting their Chinese comrades, Newton met Samora Machal who was the leader of the Mozambique

Liberation Front (Frelimo), a communist revolutionary organization focused on ending

Portuguese colonialism. Problematic for Newton was the fact that Machal and his followers still believed that Cleaver was involved in the Black Panther Party, and they were not privy to the new direction that involved the survival programs.101 Brown recounted how enlightened Newton

97 Newton, “Intercommunalism (1974).” 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Brown, A Taste of Power, 302. 101 Ibid., 303.

46 was by their travels, which resulted in his epiphany: “the party’s character had to change…. We had to develop mass organizing mechanisms, as the Chinese had. We had to do everything possible to embrace more and more of our people, if we were to become a revolutionary force in the world.”102 The Party needed to inspire a greater number of people to believe in the cause and the Panthers’ ability to achieve results.

However, the direction the Panthers would take to develop institutions and take control over their community was another question entirely. It would take the inclusion of China in the

United Nations (U.N.) Security Council—viewed as “a tactic of socialist revolution”—and the sudden death of political activist and close friend George Jackson, for Newton to strategize that his next course of action was to have the Panthers wage an electoral campaign.103 Newton’s decision was a controversial step that had the potential to exacerbate external criticism among leftist groups regarding the revolutionary status of the Black Panther Party. Regardless of the possibility that critics would paint the Panthers’ entrance into establishment politics as reformist,

Newton likened it to China’s U.N. membership which “was neither contradictory to China’s goal of toppling U.S. imperialism nor an abnegation of revolutionary principles….”104 Further, if BPP involvement in electoral politics did have the potential to undermine support from factions on the political left, and Panthers who clung to Cleaver’s revolutionary vision, that no longer mattered.

Brown stipulated in her memoir that, “we would act whether or not what we did conformed to the notions of the various leftist groups.”105 Regardless of the Left’s condemnation, she continued, “the benefits that could result from a Panther electoral campaign outweighed all of

102 Brown, 303-304. 103 Ibid., 313. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid.

47 that.”106 The effectiveness of Panthers’ power to instill revolutionary consciousness of the people could be determined through the election; Newton figured that “casting a vote for a Black

Panther candidate would be the first concrete expression of that consciousness.”107 With an upcoming election in 1973, Oakland became the base of operation from which the Panthers would orchestrate the People’s Campaign. If successful, the Panthers would gain access to more resources, through the Port of Oakland that would enable them to continue to wage the revolution, and it would empower the Panthers to instigate change by simply mirroring their efforts in other poor, Black and minority communities across the United States.

There were several qualified Panther leaders in the organization, but Newton selected

Elaine Brown and Bobby Seale to run in the municipal election—Brown for council and Seale for Mayor. In her memoir, Brown recalled her dismay of being selected as Seale’s running mate, begging Newton to allow her to just run the campaign instead. Her desire to limit time around

Seale was motivated by the instances of conflict between them during her time in the Party.108

However, his mind was made up, “Bobby Seale’s name was highly recognizable in and beyond

Oakland,” which was imperative for running a successful election; and Brown would “‘not only soften the blow,’” she could “‘keep Bobby in check.’” 109 Newton’s decision was final, and the planning stage was set in motion. Creating the groundwork for success involved surveying the community and conducting research about the socio-economic conditions in Oakland. In order to

106 Brown, 313. 107 Ibid., 313-314. 108 In her memoir, Brown reflected on how Seale’s behaviour was crucial to raising her awareness of in the party. On one occasion Seale had advocated for women to use sex to reward male members in the party for their involvement and withhold sex when they were not fulfilling membership obligations: this was called pussy power. She also recalled incidents when Seale was aggressive towards her when she was appointed editor of the Black Panther newspaper, especially when she stopped publishing his editorials, she wrote, “he decided to confront the issue from the rear, under the cover of his title.” (273) Seale found a reason to blame her for a late newspaper publication—only an hour late—and he whipped her in front of other party members as punishment. See Brown, Taste of Power, 189-192 and 273. 109 Ibid., 314.

48 coordinate it would take all the personnel and resources that the Panthers could get their hands on, and this would involve Panthers from across the country committing to the organization’s revolutionary strategy that deviated from self-defence politics.

The first step of orchestrating a powerful election bid was consolidating membership.

Stretched thin across the country the Panthers needed to band together as one unit. A mix of excitement and trepidation infiltrated the party, as Panthers from all over the country closed shop in some of their communities and made their way to Oakland to put all their focus into creating a base of operations that would establish change.110 David Hilliard presented the decision for the

BPP to pursue community control, through the People’s Campaign of 1973, as an example of

Newton’s revolutionary intellectual prowess. He stressed that Newton was “not simply handing us conclusions, but providing us with an ideology, concepts for long-term protracted struggle, an analysis of revolution….”111 Aaron Dixon, co-founder of the BPP Chapter, expressed how consolidation supported the long term objective “of taking control of all aspects of the city, from the politics to the streets.”112 Echoing Dixon, Flores Forbes, who started his journey in San

Diego, outlined that Newton’s consolidation was necessary “to regroup and organize a real base of operations from which to relaunch our revolution.”113 Further, the strong relationships cultivated between party members was also thought to create better and more effective revolutionary leaders that would relocate and replicate the party objectives.114 Forbes recalled how Brown framed the new approach as Newton’s version of the Mao’s Long March where,

110 In some cities, such as Chicago and New Haven, Black Panthers remained open and continued to participate in the community with their own survival programs. 111 David Hilliard and Lewis Cole, The Side of Glory, 327. 112 Aaron Dixon, My People Are Rising: Memoir of a Black Panther Party Captain, (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2012), 218. 113 Flores Forbes, Will You Die With Me? My Life and the Black Panther Party, (New York, NY: Atria Books, 2006), 65. 114 Ibid., 66.

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“they retreated, trained, regrouped, and re-educated themselves for the long haul that was ahead,” and that was precisely what the Panthers were going to do.115

When Seale announced the People’s Campaign, Forbes recounted how Seale’s speech emphasized the long-term goal of using the campaign model for orchestrating the revolution across the United States, “We have determined that if we take over the city of Oakland and make it our base, we can wage a righteous revolution that will free the people of this city. And once we’ve done that, you comrades will be trained so that you can go back to your chapters and branches and do the same thing.”116 Forbes was captivated, he wrote, “I sat there breathless, as I am sure everyone else was. That shit made sense to me….”117 After Seale finished his candidacy declaration, Forbes described how “the room erupted. Panthers were on their feet, clapping and pumping their fists, stomping and grinning like they had all been delivered unto the promised land. I knew I had.”118 For many Panthers, the greater purpose outweighed personal sentiments and reluctance to temporarily close their chapters and relocate to Oakland. Steve McCutchen relocated from Baltimore because he believed in the “the idea of building a base of operation in

Oakland carried the opportunity of a new and intensive experience for party members, who could then return build in their own communities.”119After leaving Seattle, Dixon noted that “if this new move would further our cause, bring us to the brink of victory, there was no reason for debate. And despite the controversy around the split…I still had faith in the party and in the belief that victory would eventually be ours”120 For many Panthers the end-goal of revolution remained intact, and comrades who did relocate, like James “Bubba” Young from New York,

115 Forbes, 66. 116 Ibid., 67. 117 Ibid., 68. 118 Ibid., 68. 119 Steve D. McCutchen, We Were Free for a While: Back to Back in the Black Panther Party. (Baltimore, MD: Publish America, 2008), 145. 120 Dixon, 221.

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James Pharms and Cheryl Curtis from Los Angeles, and Audrea Jones from Boston, would be integral to the People’s Campaign.121

However, the euphoria was not universal. A former panther, Mumia Abu-Jamal, stated that the centralized support for the campaign meant abandoning local survival programs and support for other communities, and “for some Panthers, this was simply unacceptable. Many people left the Party.”122 Esutosin Omowale Osunkoya, the founder and defence captain of the

Sacramento branch opposed consolidation. In an interview conducted by Yohuru Williams and

Bryan Shih, Osunkioya recounted, “I thought this was the logic of a lunatic,” which left the Party vulnerable. 123 He remembered thinking, “‘You close all the Panther programs across the country and bring everyone to Oakland, they could wipe us out in one swoop.’” 124 Overall, dissenters were not tolerated. With monetary support dwindling across the country, the choice was simple: either join the movement in Oakland or leave the party altogether. There were chapters that continued their community operations although they essentially stopped receiving funding and support from the centralized executive operation in Oakland. Regardless of the naysayers who clearly did not support the gradualist quest for revolution, the Party had retained enough members committed to living for the revolution. The next hurdle was setting the tone to cultivate local support for the People’s candidates.

The Party made motions to obtain a larger electoral base in Oakland by focusing on voter registration—targeting Black, minorities, and low-income areas (i.e. the flatlands). Beyond door

121 Dixon, 222-225. 122 Mumia Abu-Jamal, We Want Freedom: A Life in the Black Panther Party, (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2004), 224. 123 Esutosin Omowale Osunkoya, interview with Yohuru Williams and Bryan Shih, ND, NP cited, published in The Black Panthers: Portraits From An Unfinished Revolution, edited by Yohuru Williams and Bryan Shih, (New York, NY: Nation Books, 2016), 124. 124 Ibid.

51 knocking in the community, to kick-start their campaign, the Panthers held the Black

Community Survival Conferences on March 29-31, 1972. To publicly showcase that the Panthers were capable of leading the charge against the ills of poverty, during the conference 10,000

Oakland residents received groceries that included “A Chicken in Every Bag”. In addition to addressing community hunger, free sickle cell anemia tests were provided, as well as information about the free health clinics run by the BPP in Oakland and surrounding areas. The first free grocery giveaway was held at Oakland Auditorium on 10th Street, the second at Greenman Field on 66th Avenue, and the third was at San Pablo Park on 2800 Park Street in Berkeley.125 In an effort to bring together “black political power like it’s never been done before,” high profile representatives were advertised as coming to the event, such as Angela Davis, California

Congressman Ron Dellums, National Chairman of the Welfare Rights Organization Johnnie

Tillman, and Wisconsin State Assemblyman Lloyd Barbee. Other notable names included former

SNCC member and then Georgia Senator , Berkeley Black Caucus member Don

Davis, and Father Earl Neil of St. Augustine Episcopal Church. 126 However, based on the Black

Panther published 1 April 1972, the following were highlighted as speakers: Lloyd Barbee,

Reverend Frank Pinkard of Faith United Presbyterian Memorial Presbyterian Church, Bobby

Seale, Ericka Huggins, and Elaine Brown, who introduced Seale. 127 Prior to the conference the

BPP held meetings to gather voter registrars in the community, hoping that the conference would register over 10,000 more people to vote.128

125 Poster “10,000 Free Bags of Groceries Including a Registration Form” n.d., series 2, box 18, folder 8, M0864, Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation Inc. Collection, Special Collections, Green Library, Stanford University. (hereafter HPN Collection). 126 Poster “10,000 Free Bags of Groceries Including a Registration Form.” 127 Ibid. 128 Memorandum, “Attention All Representatives of the Mass Media,” n.d., series 2, box 18, folder 8, HPN Collection.

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The Panthers were posturing that they were going to play a different political game. Their survival programs were already combatting poverty in the Black community; in turn, what could the Panthers do if their ideas were enacted at the government level? The food give-away brought thousands of potential voters to the event and was a perfect opportunity for Bobby Seale and

Elaine Brown to announce their candidacies in the 1973 Oakland municipal election. Post- conference calculations revealed that 2,071 participants had been registered to vote and 3,687 received sickle-cell anemia testing.129 It was also determined that several in attendance were too young to vote or were already registered.130 Although they did not succeed in registering 10,000 voters, they had engaged the Oakland population and publicly emphasized their new direction.

The Panthers wanted to demonstrate how, unlike the government, their rhetoric translated to concrete actions. They would combat the lack of services and support for communities by prioritizing the needs of the people over anything else. The Black Panther newspaper reported on

“what giving food away had to do with the political power” and Seale’s remarks.131 Seale emphasized how the power structure focused on conducting surveys versus implementing tangible programs. He stated, “‘When you’re giving away 10,000 bags of groceries, mark it down: 10,000 people aren’t hungry anymore, for the next 2 or 3 days.’”132 After all, the Panthers already had ample experience translating their agenda, the Ten Point Platform, into survival programs that were proactively addressing the community’s immediate needs.

129 Report “Statistics for Black Community Survival Conference,” n.d., series 2, Box 18, folder 8, HPN Collection, 130 Ibid. 131 “Youth Gather for survival: Bobby Seale Addresses Black Youth Conference,” Black Panther, March 25th, 1972. Note all Black Panther articles were accessed via Black Thought and Culture Collection, 2020, https://alexanderstreet.com/products/black-thought-and-culture (accessed September 2017). 132 Ibid.

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Figure 1 Picture of Attendance at the Black Community Survival Conference, series 5, box 5 folder 5, HPN Collection.

Figure 2 Picture of Bobby Seale Packing Bags of Groceries, series 5, box 5, folder 5, HPN Collection

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By empowering people to vote, government representation would start to reflect “power by the people” and demands “for more control of the economic, political and social initiatives within the society” would materialize.133 The Panthers were playing the long-term revolutionary game of “a transferral of state power from the hands of the few (the war-mongers, the polluters, the racists of all kinds, the exploiters of the whole world) ‘into the hands of the many’…,” by running their own political campaign and endorsing representatives, like and

Ron Dellums, who were perceived as candidates for the people’s interests.134 Newton articulated in an interview with journalist James Stephens Jr. for Jet magazine:

[W]e have to organize our people to get as many compromises from the system as we can get at every level of government. We say that we will get a certain amount of alleviation from the burden of affliction, the affliction of oppression, by putting our representatives in office who will vote for the survival of people and who are interested in their survival. So, we will organize the people to vote in order to put these representatives into office. After the people feel that they have gotten all that they can get, we will then move to question the whole framework.135

The organization’s agenda, since the creation of the Ten Point Platform, had reflected what

Newton and Seale saw as the solutions to addressing oppression. Alongside the continued use of survival programs, a mechanism for raising political consciousness, electoral politics would be used as a stepping-stone to maximize the Panthers’ ability to begin organizing oppressed people.

In preparation for the campaign, the Panthers researched Oakland and compiled hard data to help support their claims and establish a credible political platform that targeted the key issues—such

133 Newton, “‘Find Someone Who Can Hear the People Cry’ The Black Panther Party Endorses Sister Shirley Chisholm for U.S. President: Press Statement Read by Chairman Bobby Seale, Black Panther Party,” Black Panther, May 6, 1972. 134 Ibid. 135 Newton quoted by James M. Stephens Jr., “Inside Report on the Transformed Black Panthers,” Jet, May 11, 1972, 30.

55 as inadequate healthcare, housing, education, and rising unemployment—that had developed since the 1950s. However, convincing the electorate that the People’s candidates could serve their needs involved grass-roots effort that was adaptable, organized, and thorough.

The organization’s top-down, military governing structure made it easy for the Central

Committee to quickly establish programs, allocate resources, and assign comrades to specific tasks and positions. An Election Committee and the Community Committee for Greater Voter

Registration were established to coordinate voter registration and pre-campaign planning and research. Joan Kelley was the head of the Election Committee, with several other women working alongside her.136 Phyllis Jackson and Pam Perkins assisted in overall area coordination and research, among other administrative duties. 137 Voter registration management was assigned to Cheryl Curtis and Ericka Huggins, which involved the assignment and organization of voter registration precincts and applicable paperwork. 138 In addition, Ericka Huggins was responsible for “laying the foundations for the campaign to elect Bobby Seale for Mayor of

Oakland and Elaine Brown Oakland City Councilwomen.”139 She ensured “the scheduling of other registrars from college campuses, community organizations and individual community volunteers to become registrars (through Alameda County)….”140 Further, Huggins also focused on getting registrars “to register people to vote in the precincts and in areas where large numbers of people shop and gather.”141 Many volunteers would need to be secured in order to register between “50-100,000 Oakland/Alameda County residents to vote by the close of the present

136 Memorandum “Comrades Schedules and areas of work within the Election Committee,” September 21, 1972, series 2, box 18, folder 14, HPN Collection. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid. 139 Ericka Huggins, “Re: Area of Work,” August 4, 1972, series 2, box 5, folder 11, HPN Collection. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid.

56 voter registration period, March 18, 1973.” 142 The work conducted leading up to January was imperative—it established the operational foundations for building the political platform and engagement.

Leading up to the election the Panthers conducted a survey to assess the pulse of the community. More than one version of the survey was drafted before the official study was administered, and the official iteration used on 7 October 1972 focused on determining the perception of Seale in the community and the issues most concerning to residents. Out of the 197 respondents, 149 were Black and 48 were White.143 In relation to the Black interviewees, the responses were broken down by age and income brackets. Based on the demographic breakdown the focus of the survey was gathering insight from lower income Blacks under age

55, which was consistent with the largest portion of the Oakland Black population according to the 1970 Federal Census.144

Table 1 Demographic Characteristics of Individuals Surveyed on October 20, 1972

Characteristic Number of Responses Collective Response Total Black, Age 18-24 34 149 Black, Age 25-64 69 Black, Age 55 and Over 45 Black, Income Under $10,000 98 Black, Income Over $10,000 51 White, Under Age 40 25 48 White, Over Age 40 23 White, Income Under $10,000 22 White, Income Over $10,000 26

Source: Survey L5-2059, October 20, 1972, series 1, box 47, folder 10, HPN collection.

142 Memorandum “Community Committee for Great Voter Registration,” n.d., series 2, box 45, folder 19, HPN collection. 143 I was unable to determine the number of surveys were disseminated and given the low number of respondents it is impossible to determine how representative the survey was. 144 United States Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population and Housing - Census Tracts: San Francisco- Oakland, California, Census of Population and Housing - Final Report PHC(1).

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Even though a larger pool of participants would have been beneficial for extrapolating a more comprehensive understanding of public perception, the results still provided relevant insight into public opinion regarding the BPP and Black political representation. When asked

“what changes, if any, would you expect to see in Oakland, if Oakland had a black mayor?” respondents gave a variety of answers ranging from improve race relations to improved municipal services. Less than 15 percent of the Whites interviewed believed that a Black mayor would curtail racism; only 31 percent of Blacks felt there would be some influence, which pointed to a large majority who felt that change would be difficult to impossible. Further, when asked their opinion of Bobby Seale, among Blacks the responses were split among negative, positive, and general. Forty-nine individuals (31 percent) expressed an array of negative opinions of Seale such as “not experience/not qualified,” “too radical,” “too young,” “black racist,” “not serious-just publicity seeker,” “backed by hoodlums,” and “doesn’t have a chance to win.”145

Slightly more, fifty-one people (34 percent) expressed “strong-to-moderate approval” with the remaining forty-nine expressing ambivalence. Unsurprisingly, the disapproval among Whites was much higher: thirty out of the forty-nine (63 percent) participants expressed distaste and only ten rated Seale in a more affirmative light. Only 28 percent of Blacks surveyed revealed a moderate to strong approval of Seale, and collectively only 2 percent of Blacks surveyed believed that Seale was a candidate “for all poor people” and understood “poor blacks’ problems.”146 The survey revealed the organization’s disconnect with the Black community that

Newton had feared in 1971. In order to bring Newton’s revolutionary vision to life it was clear there was a great deal of work ahead to gain the people’s trust and alter the perception of Seale

145 Survey “LF-2059 Survey Political Survey,” October 23, 1972, p.7, series 1, box 47, folder 10, HPN Collection. 146“LF-2059 Survey Political Survey,” October 23, 1972, p.5, HPN Collection.

58 and the Panthers.147 During the thick of the campaign (1973 January – May), the candidates and organizers were tasked with educating the public on the connection between the campaign objectives and achieving true community control that reflected the people’s demands.

When Newton and Seale established the BPP, the Ten Point Program represented the concrete demands, as well as a guiding force for the organization’s development of survival programs. Their pursuit of self-defence politics from 1966-1971 attracted many people and allies to the organization, but also invited unrelenting state and judicial repression at the hands of the

FBI and local law enforcement. In the wake of 1971, Newton decided to take the organization in a new direction and pursue revolution through the survival programs and raising political consciousness. However, Eldridge Cleaver and his followers were adamant on increasing armed conflict. Ultimately, Cleaver was unsuccessful: he and his supporters were expelled, and his approach eliminated.

The BPP was now free to pursue the revolution by returning to its original vision: a focus on political consciousness raising and survival programs that prepared the people to wage the revolution. Luckily, the remaining members, who relocated to Oakland from multiple cities, believed that the People’s Campaign was an integral part of the revolutionary roadmap. If successful, the organization would gain access to the resources needed to orchestrate the revolution and establish a base of operations to support other communities, in multiple cities, to do the same. During 1972, the Panthers sought to establish foundations for the election by researching Oakland’s social conditions and activating voter registration in the community. With the announcement of Brown and Seale’s candidacies at the Survival Conference, the BPP attempted to show that it was different: with a chicken in every bag and free health care the

147 Unfortunately, the survey was centered on Seale, and obtaining information about his candidacy. As a result, there were no questions focused on Brown to generate any figures regarding public opinion of her.

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Panthers demonstrated their strategy for tackling the pertinent issues affecting people. Ensuring more Oakland minorities were registered, especially African Americans, seemed to be what the organization hinged its success upon, but how would Elaine Brown and Bobby Seale fare in the election? Furthermore, maintaining their image as revolutionaries remained in contention: How was their pursuit of revolution perceived? How did the newspaper coverage represent the

Panthers, Seale, and Brown, as well as and their tactics? What challenges were faced while challenging status quo and establishment politicians? Over five months, from January to May

1973, the Panthers fought for political representation by aggressively pursuing a grassroots campaign, hoping to change their image and the future of Oakland.

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Chapter 2- “For Righteous people’s government, Chairman Bobby is the man.” The People’s Campaign and Representing the Revolution

Every year racist men, with sly deceitful lines. Come talking to the people, stealing your vote and mine. But now the day has come when we are not so blind. A man has come to show us how to seize the time. - Black Panther Party, “Vote for Survival: Bobby Seale for Mayor”1

Once the announcement was made that Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown were running for mayor and city councilwoman in the 1973 election, their public statement received considerable attention from many media outlets across the country, and many people was trying to determine why the sudden change of heart. Civil rights activist and NAACP Executive Secretary Roy

Wilkins explained in an LA Times article that the Panthers had forgone “violence for the ballot box….[Implementing] the strategy which has millions of practitioners in the black minority.”2

Though the previous Panthers were “hot-headed and had a bad influence on black youth by exemplifying violence” their election bid would “do much to quiet some of the fears of the white majority.”3 Working within the system meant that “the Panthers will talk as straight as ever and they will be using their young energy winning friends for their cause and building strength through votes.”4 For Wilkins, the abandonment of violent rhetoric that preached armed conflict, signaled the Panthers were no longer a radical, militant, or revolutionary movement seeking to overthrow the government and status quo. It indicated the BPP’s acceptance of the NAACP’s correct approach for creating change: eliminating racism and inequality by reforming existing

American institutions. However, categorizing the new tactic as reformist detracted from the

1 Black Panther Party, “Vote for Survival Bobby Seale for Mayor,” n.d., series 2, box 46, folder 6, M0864, Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation Inc. Collection, Special Collections, Green Library, Stanford University. (hereafter HPN Collection). 2 , “Black Panthers Swap Violence for the Ballot Box,” L.A. Times, October 2, 1972. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

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Party’s vision that was outlined in Chapter One. As Newton contended, the Party was utilizing electoral politics as an avenue to build political consciousness and establish a base for coordinating the revolution. The People’s Campaign (1973) was intended to provide the Oakland electorate the power to radically change their lives by voting for their survival and electing representatives that understood the explicit needs of poor, Black, and minority communities.

Controlling the narrative became more difficult as the election unfolded. The popularized association of the Panthers’ radical and revolutionary activity with the barrel of a gun did not disappear. Not only did it fuel misconceptions about Panthers’ new tactics, the opposition used the Panthers’ past to paint a dangerous image of the candidates and their intentions.

This chapter argues that contemporary media—newspaper coverage, interviews, and campaign collateral—generally represented the Black Panthers as a revolutionary, radical organization, rather than a reformist one as scholars have retroactively claimed. In addition, the examination of periodicals, especially the Black Panther, revealed that how gender played a role in the representation of Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown and the tension between feminism and

Black power. Finally, an analysis of the trajectory of the election illuminates Peoples

Candidates’ daily determination to convince the electorate—across race and class lines—to vote for their survival, uncovering the challenge of grassroots organizing in Oakland.

Six months after the 1972 Survival Conference, an AP writer, Jeannine Yeomans, interviewed Seale about the BPP’s new direction: He said that the organization was “more of a threat to the established order with ballots in their hands than with guns.”5 Yeomans described a

5 Jeannine Yeomans, “Seale Tells Goals of Candidacy,” , September 18, 1972, p.18. This particular article was published in more than one newspaper and each newspaper selected a different title for the article. In the New Jersey Daily Register, it was titled “Seale Says Panthers have Dropped Guns, Now Aim to Lure More Voters” and it included an editor’s note that reflected on J. Edgar Hoover’s previous labelling of the Panthers as the greatest internal threat to America. Yeomans, “Seale Says Panthers have Dropped Guns, Now Aim to Lure More Voters,”

62 man in formal attire sitting before her, which “contrast[ed] the man who four years ago appeared at San Francisco State in the Panthers’ black leather jacket and beret uniform and said the only answer blacks had to what he called white brutalization was ‘guns and force.’”6 She highlighted

Seale’s past run-ins with the law: the Chicago 7 trial in which Seale had been accused “of conspiring to incite a riot at the 1968 Democratic National Convention” and the two years of prison time served for the wrongful conviction of murdering a New Haven BPP member.7 In the interview, Seale alluded to the Party’s revolutionary vision as it pertained to the survival programs. He explained how former members, like Eldridge Cleaver, who “‘wanted to call breakfast for children programs ‘sissy stuff’…” did not comprehend the power of the survival programs. He concluded “I don’t think feeding people is sissy stuff.”8 The Panthers believed that by alleviating the effects of poverty on the community more people would be able and willing to organize against the establishment. The People’s Campaign served as another mechanism to raise political consciousness: Organizing Oakland’s Black, minority and low-income residents through voter registration and grassroots engagement would enable the Panthers to establish their first revolutionary base of operations.

In early November 1972, Seale travelled to New York. At , where he addressed an audience of 300 people, he said, “‘We can take Oakland’…. ‘We can lay a base and

New Jersey Daily Register, September 18, 1972, p. 13; Yeomans, “Bobby Seale runs, says Panther guns traded for Ballot,” Independent (Long Beach, California), September 20th, 1972, p.21; Yeomans, “Black Panthers Trade Guns for Ballot Box,” San Bernardino County Sun, September 21, 1972, p. 11; Yeomans, “Black Panther Bobby Seale Switches to the Ballot Box,” , September 27, 1972, p. 43; Yeomans, ”Panthers Seale, Huggins Still Fighting – With Ballots , Not Guns,” Hartford Courant, September 18, 1972, p.1; Yeomans, ”Black Panthers Drop Guns for Ballots to Win Goals,” Great Bend Tribune, Kansas, September 18, 1972, p.10. The news even made it’s way across the Canadian border: Yeomans, “The Panthers’ new weapon—the ballot,” Edmonton Journal¸ September 20, 1972, p. 40; Yeomans, “Politics replace militancy in Black Panthers’ protest,” Vancouver Sun, September 18, 1972,12. Citations refer to Oakland Tribune article. 6 Jeannine Yeomans, 18. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.

63 become the first city in the country which can be used as a revolutionary camp.’”9 He was clear that the success of the first campaign would provide the momentum for “spreading political efforts to other cities.”10 Seale emphasized that taking control of government spending, and allocating funds to programs that benefited the people, such as shelter and employment, would benefit the process of consciousness raising. He explained, “‘it’s hard to raise the consciousness of hungry people, or a mother who is worrying about feeding her babies and getting shoes for them.’”11 Organizing the community to combat societal ailments differentiated the Panthers from the “instant revolutionaries in the country that who are not willing to get down to the hard nitty- gritty work.”12 Focusing on electoral politics was a part of “the ‘scientific revolutionary struggle’

[, which] involves getting people to register to vote, feeding the hungry and seizing control of political institutions.”13 In interviews, Seale consistently maintained the revolutionary purpose the motivated the Panthers’ campaign.

In another article, Art Goldberg, a free speech activist from Berkeley, insisted that “the

Panthers look upon their entry into municipal politics the same way they view their survival programs; as a means, and a tool with which to organize people for their future liberation.”14 In an interview with Seale, Goldberg explored the seriousness of the campaign effort proposed by the Panthers and their perspective on being labelled reformist: “The Panther leader rejected the notion put forth by many on the white left, that to engage electoral politics is somehow

9 No Author, “Seale’s ‘Revolt’ Plans: ‘We can take Oakland’”, San Francisco Examiner, November 12, 1972. The same article was published in the Oakland Tribune, but altered the beginning by stated that “Bobby Seale, the Black Panther leader, says the aim of revolutionaries should be to gain control of their communities.” No Author, “Seale Says He’ll ‘Take Oakland,’” Oakland Tribune, November 12, 1972, p. 5. Citations refer to San Francisco Examiner. 10 Special to the Examiner, “Seale’s ‘Revolt’ Plans: ‘We can take Oakland’, San Francisco Examiner, November 12, 1972. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Art Goldberg, “Panther Run in Oakland,” Grassroots: A Berkeley Community Newspaper, Dec 20, 1972, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection.

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‘reformist’”15 Seale asserted that the BPP wanted to prove that the Panthers were capable of solving societal problems by defying misconceptions that fueled opposition and fear of the revolution. He stated, “The conservatives, and all those people who voted for Nixon think that revolution and anarchy means tearing down everything. We have to show them an alternative to that.”16 With the Panthers’ survival programs operating around the city they were making motions towards their goal of showing the people in Oakland their new objectives and image.

Observers admitted that the new Seale also came with a new look, “sheathed in a beige topcoat over a natty suit.”17 He had “moved a long way from the militant murder trial in New

Haven…On the campaign trail, the black power salute and the black leather jackets, are gone.”18

Some White voters were keen to acknowledge the change in behaviour. A White businessman admired Seale for engaging the public in the downtown core stating, “It’s good to see a man turn completely around so much and help his community….”19 Another individual claimed that he

“didn’t realize he’s so clean cut[,]’…after Seale offered his hand.20 Over the course of the campaign reporting made reference to Seale’s wardrobe, advertising a linkage between the

BPP’s new direction and Seale’s suit collection.21 The Panthers understood the association between their past attire and their violent, radical image, and strategically changed their clothing

15 Art Goldberg, “Panther Run in Oakland,” Grassroots: A Berkeley Community Newspaper, Dec 20, 1972. 16 Ibid. 17 Robert Strand, “Bobby Seale runs straight race for mayor of Oakland,” Independent (Long Beach, California), January 1, 1973, 14. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 For example, journalist Ellis Cose wrote how considering the man from the Chicago and New Haven trials, “the Bobby Seale, sipping coffee before a scheduled speech at the University of Illinois last week seemed alien to all of that. In his light brown suit, yellow shirt and brightly patterned tie, he looked very much like the mayoral candidate he is.” Ellis Cose, “Bobby Seale Runs for Mayor of Oakland,” Raleigh Register, 16 March 1973, 4. Also see the following newspaper clippings from HPN Collection: Lon Daniels, “Seale Expects to Win Bay Mayor’s Race,” S.F. Sunday Examiner, 19 March , 1973, p. 16, series 2, box 46, folder 7; “…And a New Bobby,” Newsweek, April 2, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17; Robert A. Deleon, “Showdown in Oakland: Bobby Seale, Otho Green Battle to Become Mayor,” Jet, 12 April 1973, p. 20, series 2, box 45, folder 17; Leroy F. Aarons, “Bobby Seale: From Clenched Fist to the Ballot Box,” Post, 13, April, 1973, p.A2, series 2, box 45, folder 18.

65 to influence public perception.22 However, the organization’s pursuit of political power did raise concerns.

Philip Hager, an L.A. Times correspondent, reported that a prominent official – who remained anonymous—stated, “there is some bona fide concern about what their aims really are and how successful they might be in seeking power here.” Seale’s speech at Columbia

University had been “widely circulated” and his statements regarding Oakland becoming the first base for revolution generated “particular uneasiness” amongst officials.23 The fear of the

Panthers gaining power also prompted Oakland Mayor John Reading, to reconsider his decision not to run for re-election: He was concerned about “Oakland becoming another Berkeley.”24 In addition to local fears, “the FBI’s latest annual report still listed the Panthers as a ‘dangerous threat to internal security.’”25 Still, the degree of danger that the Panthers represented was unclear. For writers at the Palm Beach Post, the “Panthers’ only threat now is to public officials who have too long ignored the problems of their black constituents.”26 However, the Panthers were not the only candidates that sought to gain political power and unseat established politicians.

There was considerable pressure to gain electoral support, particularly given the crowded field of nine candidates. The primary opponents were White Republican John Reading

22 Brown noted that when Seale announced his bid for mayor he was “dressed in a handsome business suit,” and she was also wearing business attire. The news questioned their “‘new image’” and “took photograph after photograph, flashing Bobby Seale’s image all over the country.” She concluded that the work done to change public perceptions during the campaign “successfully created the illusion that Bobby and I were separate from…rough activity, it was as though there were two arms of the party: the militant dark side, and the more moderate, reformist side. I felt we had achieved a state of perfection.” Brown, A Taste of Power, 323 and 333. 23 Philip Hager, “Some Officials Are Skeptical: Panthers’ New Image – Joining the System,” L.A. Times, 4 December 1972, p. 1. 24 Ibid., 25. Hager notes that in the last Berkeley election “self-described radicals captured three of Berkeley’s nine City Council Seats in the elections…and have vowed to take control of the council this year (Ibid). 25 James M. Cox (Chairman), Robert W. Sherman (President), Cecil B. Kelley (Publisher), Raymond Mariotti (Editor), Robert J. Nagle (Associate Editor), “The New Panthers,” Palm Beach Post, January 2, 1973, 14. 26 Ibid., 14.

66

(incumbent) and Democrats Otho Green and John Sutter. The lesser-known candidates were

David Burns Jr., Lothario Lotho, Macklin F. Martin, Larry E. Moore, and Alphonso Zapata.

Brown was running against Black incumbent Joshua Rose and Joe Sullivan for the District 2

(West Oakland) council seat. In an Oakland municipal election, a candidate had to receive over

50 percent of the collective vote in order to win the seat. On election day, 17 April 1973, if one of the candidates did not win majority support, a run-off between the top two contenders would be held.

John Reading, born in Glendale Arizona, moved to Oakland at a young age. After graduating for the University of California, Berkeley he served as an Army Air Force pilot in

World War II.27 He owned and operated his family business, Ingram’s Food Products Co. of

Oakland, and was elected to the city council in 1963.28 The appointed

Reading to be Oakland’s 44th mayor in 1966 as his predecessor John Houlihan faced embezzlement charges.29 In 1969, Reading win his first full four year term.30 He even acknowledged the communication barriers between the Oakland Municipal government and its

African American constituents.31 However, by “1968 he was primarily concerned with keeping the city from burning—with preventing the kind of riot in Oakland that had ravaged so many cities between 1965 and 1968.”32 His anxiety was not unfounded: in the summer of 1967 alone

165 race riots occurred. And the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King in the Spring of 1968 resulted in over 100 riots across the country. Therefore, in order to maintain order, Reading

27 World Heritage Encyclopedia, “List of Mayors of Oakland, California,” Project Gutenberg Self-Publishing Press, http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/eng/List_of_mayors_of_Oakland,_California (accessed February 25th, 2020). 28 Janine Defao, “John Reading/Former mayor of Oakland – his firm made Red’s Tamales,” SFGATE, Feb 13, 2003. https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/JOHN-READING-Former-mayor-of-Oakland-his-2670609.php (accessed February 25th, 2020). 29 Chris Rhomberg, No There, there, 149. 30 World Heritage Encyclopedia, “List of Mayors of Oakland, California,” Project Gutenberg Self-Publishing Press. 31 Robert O. Self, American Babylon, 249. 32 Self, 249.

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“believed that black leaders were obligated to tone down their rhetoric and cooperate with white city officials.”33 The riots influenced Reading’s dichotomous view: Black politics and leaders were simply good or bad, militant or civil.34 This perspective influenced his run in the 1973 election: to prevent the radical Black Panthers from gaining electoral power.

Otho Green moved to Oakland at eight years old from Pine Bluff, Arkansas.35 Known in the community for his business initiatives, Jet Magazine journalist Robert A. Deleon wrote that

Green had “done what President Nixon would call ‘pulling himself up by his boot straps’” and had “become one of Oakland’s most successful Black businessman.”36 After completing his bachelor’s degree, Otho’s work experience and business initiatives centered around employment.

“His first job after college was as director of job development and employment for the Bay Area

Urban League….”37 Green also worked as “a consultant in industrial relations for the California

State Assembly, providing legislative advice in areas of automation, poverty programs and apprenticeship training.”38 Founder and President of Pacific Training and Assistance Corporation

(1968), Otho claimed that his company “an economic and management consulting firm…[, is] one of a few of its kind in the nation that specializes in guiding both private and governmental agencies in such areas as manpower and job training, education, early childhood education, child care, housing and health services.”39 For Green his bid for mayor, as a Democrat, was tied to his

33 Self, 249. 34 Ibid., 250. 35 Robert A. DeLeon, Jet Magazine, “Showdown in Oakland: Bobby Seale, Otho Green Battle To Become Mayor,” April 12, 1973, p.16, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. 36 Ibid., 16. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Undated Poster, “‘The Democrat’: elect Ortho Green mayor of Oakland,” series 2, box 45, folder 19. HPN Collection.

68 legacy and the critical need for someone to oppose radicals like Seale, and ineffective conservative like Reading.40

John Sutter, a first-term Oakland City Councilman, proud White Democrat, and self declared “‘Oakland’s leading conservationist…’” confirmed his candidacy for mayor before a city clerk on 7 Feburary, 1973.41 Sutter had an extensive background in public service having been a commissioner for the Bay Conservation and Development Commission, a member of the

Oakland Charter Revision Committee, and Alameda County Deputy District Attorney.42 Even

Oakland Tribune Journalist, Gayle Montgomery, stated that “in Sutter, the Mayor faces a public official with wide name recognition and proven vote-getting ability.”43 Overall, Sutter felt his involvement in politics would give him an upper hand in the race,

Aside from Bobby Seale, John Reading, Ortho Green and John Sutter there were five minor candidates, from a range of backgrounds. Lothario Lotho held a degree in theater.44

Founder of Jobs Creator Inc., Macklin F. Martin felt strongly that he was qualified for the position based on his experience in business. 45 Alphonso Zapata worked in non-profit and public outreach. 46 Larry E. Moore was a poet. 47 Lastly, David Burns, Jr. a Rock and Roll Promoter and Research Worker for Cutter Laboratories, located in Berkeley, released no statement

40 June Eliot, “Otho Green—pride in the city is his platform,” Monclarion, March 7, 1973, series 2, box 46, folder 1, HPN Collection. 41 John Sutter, “Verified Statements of Candidates for Office…” 1973, p.7, series 2, box 45, folder 19, HPN Collection. 42 Ibid. 43 Gayle Montgomery, “Hot Race for Mayor in April,” Oakland Tribune, January 7, 1973, 40. 44 Lothario Lotho, “Verified Statements of Candidates for Office…,” 1973, p.8, series 2, box 45, folder 9, HPN Collection. Same location till footnote 50. 45 Macklin F. Martin, “Verified Statements of Candidates for Office,”1973, p.3. 46 Alphonso Zapata, “Verified Statements of Candidates for Office,”1973, p. 4. 47 Larry E. Moore, “Verified Statements of Candidates for Office,” 1973, p.6.

69 regarding his qualifications for the position.48 None of these mayoral candidates received much media attention.49

The race for the District 2 council position was between Republican incumbent Joshua

Rose and Elaine Brown, and a third contender named Joseph Vincent Sullivan who presented his background in insurance, religious organizations, and urban renewal as his credentials.50

Brown’s primary opponent was Joshua Rose, who had already served eight years on City

Council, who was well respected in the community for his accomplishments as the first Black representative on the Oakland City Council and his involvement in the Oakland YMCA.

Notably, his breadth of experience in the city, compared to Brown, was substantial. Rose had lived and contributed to the Oakland community for over thirty-four years, whereas Brown only relocated to Oakland from Los Angeles in 1971.51 However, it was the very experience held by representatives like Rose that the Panthers contested.

From the BPP’s perspective, the major candidates –Reading, Rose, Sutter, and Green— were the face of the establishment they opposed. Since Reading, Rose, and Sutter were seasoned politicians and Green a capitalist, they were all active participants in propping up the failing system. From January to April 1973, the Panthers conducted a vigorous grassroots campaign in order to differentiate themselves from their opposition. Their political messaging and campaign platform emphasized the redistribution of funding and wealth in the city, and the promise of jobs and services that addressed the needs of the Black, minority, and poor communities that had been systematically ignored. An analysis of the political messaging in campaign material and

48 David Burns Jr., “Verified Statements of Candidates for Office,” 1973, p.9. 49 Larry E. Moore, Lothario Lotho, and David Burns Jr. were all Black candidates. Alphonso Zapata was Latinx. Macklin F. Martin’s racial identity could not be identified based on the information available. 50 Joseph Vincent Sullivan, “Verified Statements of Candidates for Office,” 1973, p. 12. 51 Joshua Rose, “Verified Statements of Candidates for Office,” 1973, p.13. Brown discussed how Newton ordered her to move to Oakland after the split with Cleaver, deeming it unsafe for her to remain. Newton felt that Brown would be eventually “targeted by Eldridge’s People.” See Brown, Taste of Power, 266-267.

70 interviews shows how the Panthers and their opponents connected their political message to

Oakland’s social, economic, and political issues. The comparisons usually entailed a metaphorical or explicit mention of the Panthers’ violent, radical past and agenda.

On January 18, 1973, Seale and Brown set down their pens after signing their declaration papers to run for office and made their way to the front of the City Hall. The press waited in anticipation to ask the candidates about their visions for the city – their plans for the people.

Prompted by a reporter, “What kind of campaign organization have you put together?” Seale declared:

We are organizing between 2500 and 3000 precinct workers in the City of Oakland. We will work every precinct in the City of Oakland. We will have anywhere between 5 and 10 precinct workers, per precinct, in the City of Oakland to pull out every voter, every Democrat and others…. We’re not going to be jiving [sic] and the people aren’t going to be slowing down. The people are ready to vote. There ain’t gonna [sic] be no riots in this town. We going to the polls…. The people want control over the institutions, so they can begin to change the…very fabric of the oppression that they suffer…. In turn, the city government and its agencies… will…really begin to serve the basic desires and needs of the people. Employing people and jobs, that’s where we [(Brown and Seale)] are coming from. People have a right to a job with or without a skill. I say vote for Elaine Brown and Bobby Seale…. [Applause from crowd] I say, I say keep unemployment down vote for Elaine Brown. [Applause from crowd] ….52

As the press conference ended Seale proclaimed that in the election on “April 17th, the people are going to let their little bit of light shine. Their little bit of light. You know what it is, you know what it is. They vote. They vote. That’s what is gonna [sic] happen.” In unison, the crowd, filled with spectators and campaign supporters broke out into the Panthers’ remixed rendition of the

Harry Dixon Loe’s gospel song, “This Little Light of Mine.” The energy of the crowd indicated

52 “Bobby Seale Elaine Brown Press Conference Filing for Offices at City Hall 1/18/73 2211973,” transcribed from, series 6, cassette box 6, cassette 12, HPN Collection. Issues of transcribing spoken speech respectfully.

71 that they thought that a change was on the horizon: The Panthers were going to win, and unlike

Oakland’s political predecessors, Brown and Seale were the candidates that would successfully establish the change the people wanted in Oakland.53

Figure 3 Black Panther Campaign Map for Section 1-8. Section 9 spanned a larger, unconfined territory, a predominantly White area, that was not incorporated in this map. Picture from “Organizing a People’s Campaign,” The CoEvolution Quarterly, Sept 23, 1974.

Opening up multiple headquarters extended the reach of the campaign by dividing up the city into different segments.54 Nine sections were established, which were further organized into

53 “Bobby Seale Elaine Brown Press Conference Filing for Offices at City Hall 1/18/73 2211973.” 54 The offices for the perspective sections were set up in the following areas: North Oakland (Section 1) on 4421 Grove Street, Temescal (Section 2) on 493-62nd Street, West Oakland (Section 3) on 2100 Market Street, Fruitvale (Section 4) had no office, Eastmont (Section 5) 8129 MacArthur Blvd., Fruitvale and Seminary (Section 6 and 7) on 5229 East 14th Street, and Brookfield Village (Section 8) on 601 98th Avenue. . Two additional offices were set up, one 1524 29th Avenue (Fruitvale Area) and another on 2100 Market Street closer to Oakland downtown core. Section 9 operated mobile and used satellite houses. Information cited from Herman Smith, “Re: Status of Campaign Offices,” series 2, box 46, folder 6, HPN Collection; “Community Committee to Elect Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown to City Office Near You Campaign Offices Near you,” Black Panther, March 17 1973, p. 5; Chuck McAllister, “Mobile Office Duty for Section 9,” , series 2, box 5, folder 11, HPN Collection.

72 sub-sections comprised of voting county precincts.55 Sections were deliberately established in flatland neighbourhoods—located in West Oakland, East Oakland, and Fruitvale—since the areas collectively the highest concentration of minority and low-income constituents.56 In the flatlands which had become “synonymous with the poorest and most dispossessed areas of the city…,” resided the very people the People’s Campaign wanted to appeal to.57 Further, the placement of the campaign sections reflected the results of city’s red-lining policies. For example, Broadway, that marked the eastern border of Section 2, “functioned as the de facto red line, because white property-owners and real [e]state wanted to preserve white racial homogeneity in the apartment district north of and the foothills surrounding

Piedmont….”58 The northern border of Section 4-7, the McArthur Freeway, defined another important boundary: It “divided the city into the flatlands and the foothills, stretching a racial barrier the length of the eastern two-third of the city.”59 The Panthers strategically designed the campaign territory to maximize the ability to reach prospective voters who might relate to their platform.

The Brown-Seale People’s Campaign was determined to take its message directly to the people. Seale and Brown engaged people on the bus, in community centres, schools, churches, and on their doorsteps. Brown painted a typical day in the field:

At dawn every day, Bobby pushed us onto the streets. We might ride a bus on a gray morning to talk to people going to work an early shift. We might parade through a school or a hospital or a shopping mall with balloons and trinkets to give away, along with

55 “Organizing a People’s Campaign,” The CoEvolution Quarterly, Sept 23, 1974. 56 Spencer explains that “historically, flatlands neighborhoods included West Oakland and as well as East Oakland—a middle-class area that was racially diverse and contained majority-white neighborhoods in the foothills—and Fruitvale, the core of the Mexican Community” but this changed with postwar segregation. Spencer, The Revolution Has Come, 9. 57 Spencer, 9. 58 Self, American Babylon, 161. 59 Ibid., 164.

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Panthers to register people to vote. We might show up to greet factory workers when they came off shift. Every evening, we would walk the streets of Oakland, block by block, knocking on doors. At the day’s end, Bobby would gather together all those party members working on the campaign to review his voter maps, to plan the next day, the next week, the next month.60

People were invited to meet the candidates at places like Edison Elementary School, Jefferson

Elementary School, Lockwood Recreational Center, Merritt College Student Union, Bishop’s

Coffee House, and even the Postal Workers Union Meeting.61 Unique campaign benefits, with small donation fees to raise funds, were also utilized to create awareness, such as the “Soul

Explosion” concert at the New Royce Club ($2.00 donation).62 On Friday 30 March, 1973 the

Laney Black Student Union held a “Got Ants in My Pants and I Need to Vote Dance” for a fifty cent contribution. The following Sunday, a film showing in the Pauley Ballroom cost only $1.50.

Sunday Mass was another setting that Brown and Seale used to advocate for their cause.63 Even

Cesar Chavez of the United Farm Workers gave “a sermon at the 11:00 am Mass in the St. Louis

Bertrand’s Church on 100th Ave. and East 14th Street” in support of the campaign.64 Overall, it was clear the Panthers were hitting the street in an effort to get ahead of the competition, as all the candidates tried to differentiate themselves with their campaign message. The People’s

Campaign designed its directives and program to address social and economic inequality.

The job crisis that had been looming over industrial Oakland, not unlike other areas in the

U.S. that had seen wartime growth and postwar struggles, influenced the Brown and Seale campaign. Their plan covered several different industries that they felt could provide

60 Brown, A Taste of Power, 324. 61 See Updated Posters in the series 2, box 45, folder 19 and box 46, folder 1, 3, 4, 5 and 8, HPN Collection. 62 See Undated Posters in series 2, box 45, folder 19, HPN Collection. 63 “Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown at Glide Memorial Church 1/28/73 28MIN 11973,” series 6, cassette box 6, cassette 35, HPN Collection. 64 “Caesar Chavez Support Press Release,” series 2, box 46, folder 1, HPN Collection.

74 opportunities for skilled and unskilled laborers, and consequently it would address the failures of education, health, and housing. For example, they proposed that more teachers from minority backgrounds be hired arguing that “if more qualified BLACK AND SPANISH-SPEAKING people were employed as teachers or teacher’s assistants, we could implement bi-lingual education and alleviate some of the major problems which stunt the education of our children.”65

To improve the substandard housing conditions it was determined that “both housing and economic conditions of poor people would improve if the UNEMPLOYED WERE TRAINED for jobs that develop new housing which maintain building code standards.”66 In contrast to the community survival programs which relied on the viability of Panther membership and volunteers, the potential power of office to create jobs and correct abysmal housing conditions would provide the Panthers with the means to establish change.

Their “People’s Plan” focused on how job training and creation was a solution the varying, but connected, trials that affected Oakland’s poor and minority communities. Their campaign message emphasized that “adequate and full employment for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled unemployed is Oakland’s most pressing social need.”67 They argued that employment opportunities could be generated by confronting other problems. For example, tackling the inadequate housing in Oakland would create jobs that “would enable 400 homes and apartments to be rehabilitated.” An investment in preventive medical services involved implementing training programs “to train and employ young people to staff free health clinics and drive mobile medical units.”68 Making Seniors Against a Fearful Environment Program (SAFE) a city-funded

65 Community Committee to Elect Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown to Oakland City Office, “People Have a Right to a Job With or Without a Skill, Vote for Elaine Brown and Bobby Seale!” n.d., series 2, box 46, folder 1, HPN Collection. 66 Ibid. 67 Community Committee to Elect Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown to City Offices of Oakland, “People’s Candidates,” n.d., series 2, box 45, folder 19, HPN Collection. 68 “People’s Candidates,” N.D., series 2, box 45, folder 19, HPN Collection.

75 initiative, “which provided transportation and escort services against muggings,” created an additional 300 jobs.69 The plan also proposed to create “hundreds of jobs” to improve street lighting and road maintenance in an effort to reduce crime and accidents.70 Additionally, funding for education, as well as environmental and consumer protection all guaranteed some form of employment.71Another important measure was ensuring the availability of subsidized childcare since “Oakland’s poor parents…relay upon childcare centers to enable them to work and go to school.”72 In order “to save our children,” Brown and Seale were committed to “save children’s centers and programs….”73 These poverty-reduction initiatives would be financed by the Seale

Brown Revenue Raising and Sharing Plan.74

Seale and Brown were also transparent about where they assumed the money would be obtained to fund their projects. They proposed to raise revenue by restructuring taxation on the private sector and reinvestment of city capital. They advised that an additional $17.7 million would be generated by “a 1% tax on presently tax-exempt privately-owned intangible stocks and bonds which would raise more than $10.5 million annually for the city,” and “a 5% capital gains tax on transfers of ownership of large corporations. (Home-owners and small businesses would be totally exempt.) This would provide an additional $4.5 million a year.” They intended to generate $750,000 by charging the city-subsidized sport stadium more rent, and an additional $500,000 by putting “an end to so-called ‘Public Utilities’ exemptions like the

Southern Pacific Railroad.” Increasing the fees “for the two city-owned golf courses would add another $250,000 annually” and “re-investing the city’s budget reserves and fund balances in

69 “People’s Candidates,” N.D., series 2, box 45, folder 19, HPN Collection; “Our City Government Can Begin to Belong to All the People,” n.d., series 2, box 46, folder 3, HPN Collection. 70 “Our City Government Can Begin to Belong to All the People,” n.d., series 2, box 46, folder 3, HPN Collection. 71 “Our City Government Can Begin to Belong to All the People.” 72 “People’s Candidates,” n.d., series 2, box 45, folder 19, HPN Collection 73 Ibid. 74 Undated Poster, “Meet Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown Flyer,” series 2, box 46, folder 1, HPN Collection.

76 accounts that pay optimum interest would yield $200,000 per year.” Finally, they were determined to implement a Police and Fire Residency requirement that would add an estimated

$1 million to the city budget because “about [seventy percent] of Oakland’s police and fireman live outside the city, so the bulk of their salaries –totaling around $15 million – is spent to the benefit of other cities instead of Oakland.”75 A one-year residency requirement would ensure

“the bulk of [the] $15 million dollars would remain in Oakland, adding $1 million annually to our city budget.76 In addition, 4.5 million of federal funding would be allocated to the people’s programs, classified as revenue sharing.77 Lastly, the campaign promised to prevent an increase to homeowner property tax over a four-year term.

The Economic Development Project offered another major opportunity: it would establish a “community owned and operated multi-ethnic international cultural and trade center.”78 The proposed budget would allow for $3 - 4 million to be allocated towards the development, and the ability for Oakland Residents to purchase shares “for as little as $10 each,” to make the site a possibility.79 Not only would the construction create up to 2,000 jobs, the new amenities—such as shops, a hotel, recreational activities and much more—would increase “the prestige of the city” ensuring an increase in tourism, and as a result, revenue.80 Seale and Brown were determined to use all possible revenue, shared or generated, to ensure all Oaklanders had access to essential services, adequate housing, education, healthcare, and employment— something they believed the incumbent mayor was unwilling to provide.

75 “Our City Government Can Begin to Belong to All the People,” n.d., series 2, box 46, folder 3, HPN Collection. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid.

77

John Reading ran with the powerful slogans of “Oakland: It Takes Leadership” and

“Together.” The power of the term “together” implied that the other candidates were divisive and potentially unwilling to maintain and support growth and peaceful coexistence in the Oakland community. Reading subtlety hinted at the militancy of Seale’s rhetoric and record. The pictures in Reading’s campaign material suggested that Reading was representing the inclusive needs of the Black and White community: he was the inclusive candidate who embraced diversity.

Reading’s literature defended his record in office. It highlighted job growth, decreased crime, and his promise to fight the Nixon federal budget cuts that threated several anti-poverty programs.81 Most of his campaign material attempted to dispel his opponents’ charges of municipal corruption. It was no coincidence that Reading’s campaign material focused on his efforts to improve the lives of minorities. In relation to unemployment, one pamphlet claimed,

“jobs are up,” and “65% of all construction workers at the City Center project are from minorities. When it’s completed, there will be some 12,000 jobs of all kinds.”82 He argued that his record showed that “Mayor Reading has worked hard to see that job opportunities are created month-in-and month out.”83 The housing development projects, that Brown and Seale would use to create jobs, were, he argued, “completed, under construction, or in final planning”: “2,380 units in Acorn, Oak Center and Peralta projects.” More housing was in the works.84 Despite being the most conservative, Reading was also adamant that he would fight against Nixon’s cuts to anti-poverty programs. He believed that “‘cutting the neighborhood Youth program for summer jobs; manpower training; Model Cities and urban renewal is a very untimely and

81 The Committee of People Working Together for Oakland, “Together,” n.d., series 2, box 46, folder 1, HPN Collection. 82 Ibid. 83 The Committee of People Working Together for Oakland, “Oakland: It Takes Leadership Re-elect Mayor Reading April 17th,” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 1. 84 Ibid.

78 unfortunate step to take….’”85 Regardless of the real circumstances, and the number of people running against him, Reading projected an aura of stability by maintaining the message that he would continue to improve the great foundation that he had already established. Reading was not the only candidate who focused on his experience in municipal politics. Councilman John Sutter also emphasized his experience in his bid for mayor.

Figure 4 John Reading “Together” Campaign Brochure

Figure 5 John Reading "It Takes Leadership" Campaign Brochure

85 “Oakland: It Takes Leadership Re-elect Mayor Reading April 17th,” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 1.

79

Serving the first of what would be three consecutive terms as a councilman, Sutter claimed that as “the endorsed democrat” he would be a “Mayor for ALL of Oakland.”86 John

Sutter emphasized that he was “an active, experienced leader…” and in turn the best choice for mayor. 87 Sutter encouraged citizens not to vote for Seale “a Panther MILITANT…” or John

Reading, “a puppet REPUBLICAN…, front man for downtown business.” 88 He claimed that he

“stood for NICER NEIGHBORHOODS, rather than bigger convention centers, BETTER

SCHOOLS rather than more parking garages, A BEAUTIFUL ENVIRONMENT rather than dirty streets and billboards and DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT rather than one dominated by the downtown.”89 Further, Sutter was focused on lowering taxes and “working with Democrat

Ron Dellums, U.S. Congressman for Oakland, on jobs, job training, child care, and an end to the

Nixon building ban. As an expert from Oakland, COUNCILMAN John Sutter fought the recent federal cuts in Washington and was invited to present the city’s case before the Congressional

Black Caucus.”90 By emphasizing his willingness to work with Democrat Ron Dellums, a respected Black Congressman who had served on the Berkeley City Council and had been politically active in politics since the 1960s, and his relationship with the Congressional Black

Caucus, Sutter was attempting to highlight his intention to work with the Black Oakland community.

Like Sutter, Otho Green was seeking the endorsement of the Democratic Party as the true

“Church Labour Democrat” candidate.91 Green stated he was a “life-long Democrat not just one

86 “Councilman John Sutter for Mayor,” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 5, HPN Collection. No candidate was officially endorsed by the Democratic Party. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 John Sutter, “Verified Statements of Candidates for Office…” 1973, p.7, series 2, box 45, folder 19, HPN Collection. 90 “Councilman John Sutter for Mayor,” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 5, HPN Collection. 91 “Ortho Green Campaign Material Vol 1 – Issue III,” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 1, HPN Collection.

80 at election time,” who would involve more women and minorities in government, clean up the streets, eliminate bus fare for the elderly, increase jobs and ensure that government funding would be used for the betterment of all.92 His knowledge of how to improve social conditions was influenced by his previous work experience and his business efforts through the Pacific

Training and Technical Assistance Corporation. Green emphasized the same issues as Seale,

Sutter, and Reading. Like them, he claimed he would be a mayor for everyone. He would start by “forging a coalition campaign that included Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, whites and blacks and browns, blue-collar and white[-]collar workers.”93 Like Seale, Green emphasized that the “old-guard establishment [were] concerned with the economic well-being of other members of the establishment only.”94 In an attempt to differentiate himself, much of his campaign literature and public message was predicated on smearing Reading, as a “lackluster, reactionary conservative” and Bobby Seale as a threat to public safety.95

In an interview published in the newspaper Montclarion, Green said he thought “Reading is trying to manipulate people into believing that he [Reading] is the knight in shining armor who will save Oakland from the Black Panthers,” that Reading’s behavior played on fears, which divided and confused the people.96 A Green campaign leaflet asserted that “among the major candidates your choice for mayor is clear: You can re-elect Mayor Reading…or, you can vote for

Bobby Seale…or, you can make your vote count by voting for Ortho Green.”97 Reading meant

“four more years of control of City Hall by an administration more concerned about comforting

92 “Ortho Green Campaign Material Vol 1 – Issue III,” 93 Green for Mayor Headquarters, “New Pride for Oakland Ortho Green for Mayor” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 1, HPN Collection. 94 Ibid. 95 June Eliot, “Ortho Green—pride in this city is his platform,” Montclarion, March 7, 1973, series 2, box 46, folder 1, HPN Collection. 96 Ibid. 97 “‘The’ Democrat: elect Ortho Green mayor of Oakland,” n.d. series 2, box 45, folder 19, HPN Collection.

81 the comfortable than in curing Oakland’s social ills…”, and Seale meant “a Black Panther leader who has openly preached violence and defiance of the law….” 98 In contrast, Green offered “new leadership and new pride. He is fair. He is strong. And he listens. Ortho Green is a successful businessman….and because he is strong he will take action to solve programs.”99 Historian Chris

Rhomberg concluded that Green “was endorsed by the [Oakland] Black Caucus, the

Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance, the Baptist Ministers’ Union, and Democratic Party legislators.”100 Further, Rhomberg contended that, “many black activists in Oakland backed

Green, believing that Seale had no chance against the inevitable white back-lash.”101 Overall, instead of concentrating his campaign on what he had to offer, Green’s efforts were focused on dismissing Reading as an ineffectual leader and Seale as a dangerous candidate.

Nothing substantial differentiated the campaign messages of the four candidates. All four focused on job creation, development of housing, as well as formation and maintenance of social programs that benefited the community. However, what was exponentially different was how the players sought to utilize their power. Reading, Sutter, and Green emphasized working within the system, positioning themselves against the radicalism of the Panthers. Newsweek reported that the BPP and Seale publicly avoided “the gun mystique and the off-the-pigs rhetoric….” “[A]t least temporarily, they have swallowed their snarl.”102 Regardless, time and time again the news asserted that “such programs do not represent a basic change in the motives of the Panthers only the means….”103 In turn, “No one was saying that the Panthers have turned cuddly. As one black

98 “‘The’ Democrat: elect Ortho Green mayor of Oakland.” 99 Ibid. 100 Chris Rhomberg, 169. Journalist Robert Deleon reported that it was the Oakland Black Caucus that endorsed Green. See Deleon, “Showdown in Oakland,” 23. 101 Rhomberg, 169. 102 Newsweek, “…And a New Bobby,” April 2, 1973, p.30, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. 103 Lon Daniels, “Seale Expects to Win Bay Mayor’s Race,” SF Examiner & Chronicle, March 18, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection.

82 anti-Panther activist puts it, ‘They want what they’ve always wanted power. But they learned that confrontation is simply not the answer.’”104 Their new professional look was perceived as their complete dismissal of revolution, but Seale reminded his audience: “‘Malcolm X wore ties.’”105 However, whether the Panthers had convinced the electorate of their appeal was a different question entirely.

After a year of grassroots campaigning, on 6 April 1973, the Panthers conducted a second survey seeking to understand the reception of Seale as a candidate. Among 303 respondents, 157

Blacks and 145 Whites, Seale was generally unpopular, but did slightly better than Ortho Green and John Sutter. Notably a significant number of respondents did not voice an opinion about any of the candidates. Seale’s reception among lower-income respondents was particularly interesting, since the Panthers had catered their survival programs and registration to helping the poor. Newton’s noted on the survey “here again we see lack of support by older blacks.” The survey revealed how undecided the people of Oakland were, and the lack of hope they placed in

Seale as a candidate. Amongst Blacks it seemed that the alternative candidates—who were not spotlighted in the media—were polling higher than any of the mainstream representatives.

Newton had figured that the Panthers had not gained traction for their movement because they had not linked their objectives to the voice of the people, they had lost their connection to the

Black community. Yet, the polling results indicated that their vision, even articulated through acceptable avenues like electoral politics, was not generating the desired outcome. It seemed that whether the Panthers and Seale were radical or reformist did not seem to matter, they just were not seen as representative of the interests of people at large.

104 Newsweek, “…And a New Bobby.” 105 Lon Daniels, “Seale Expects to Win Bay Mayor’s Race.”

83

Table 2 Candidate Preference by Race of Individuals Surveyed on April 6, 1973

Candidate Total Respondents Total Black Total White Reading 107 (34%) 30 (19%) 77 (50%) Sutter 8 (3%) 8 (5%) Green 28 (9%) 18 (9%) 10 (6%) Seale 37 (12%) 29 (18%) 8 (5%) Other 123 (39%) 80 (51%) 42 (27%) No Answer 10 (3%) 10 (6%) Total 303 157 145

Source: Survey L5-2706, April 6, 1973, series 1, box 47, folder 10, HPN Collection.

Table 3 Candidate Preference by Age Surveyed Based on Age, April 6, 1973

Candidate Black, 18-24 Black, 25-54 Black, 55+ Whites > 40 Whites < 40

Reading 13 (17%) 17 (26%) 14 (25%) 63 (65%)

Sutter 6 (11%) 2 (2%) Green 5 (29%) 6 (8%) 7 (11%) 7 (11%) 3 (3%) Seale 5 (29%) 22 (29%) 2 (3.0%) 7 (12%) 1 (1%) Other 7 (41%) 34 (45%) 39 (60%) 20 (35%) 22 (23%)

No Answer 3 (5%), 6 (6%) Total 17 75 65 54 91 Responses

Source: Survey L5-2706, April 6, 1973, series 1, box 47, folder 10, HPN Collection.

Table 4 Candidate Preference by Race and Income Surveyed on April 6, 1973

Candidate Blacks, Under Blacks, Over Whites, Under Whites, Over $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 Reading 18 (19%) 8 (35%) 20 (31%) 25 (58%) Sutter 2 (3%) 5 (12%) Green 8 (9%) 3 (13%) 6 (9%) 3 (7%) Seale 20 (21%) 4 (17%) 5 (8%) 2 (5%) Other 48 (51%) 8 (35%) 26 (41%) 6 (14%) No Answer 5 (8%) 2 (5%) Total Responses 94 23 64 43

Source: Survey L5-2706, April 6, 1973, series 1, box 47, folder 10, HPN Collection.

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Robert A. Deleon, a writer for Jet, offered his opinion on why voters, and more specifically Black voters, would not be swayed to choose Bobby Seale on election day. Green’s presence in in the election was one reason: “many community leaders worry that the duo will dilute the Black vote to an extent that Reading will capture his needed 51 percent in the primary.”106 Also highlighting this as a problem, Linda Shepard from Reporter wrote, “if I had but one plea to make to Seale and Brown, it would be if you take the time to unify with other

‘Black’ Oakland candidates, your victory will be assured. Your opponent is not Reading, it’s the division of leadership in Oakland communities.”107 There was also a matter of Seale’s and the

Black Panthers’ complicated relationship with the Black business community and middle class.

Historian, Donna Murch asserted, “with the exception of Congressman Ronald Dellums, who had been a staunch ally of the Party since his earliest days in Berkeley politics, most of the Bay

Area’s black establishment supported Seale’s Democratic opponent, Ortho Green.”108 The

Panthers had outstanding issues with the Black business community related to their demands for monetary support of their survival programs.109 Murch concluded that:

The Party’s antagonistic class rhetoric and its singular focus on the urban poor provided little benefit to the small group of affluent blacks who had abandoned the impoverished flatlands for the East Bay hills. And although the Panthers always had strong allies, a segment of the black middle-class opinion remained decidedly unsympathetic to the Party. 110

106 Robert A. Deleon, “Showdown in Oakland: Bobby Seale, Ortho Green Battle to Become Mayor,” Jet, April 12, 1973, p.24, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. 107 Linda Shepard, “History gives Seale momentum,” Reporter, January 19, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. 108 Donna Murch, Living for the City, 208. 109 Ibid., 208. 110 Ibid., 208.

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The business community in general was skeptical of the Panthers. Jerry Carroll, a journalist for the , wrote “when Bobby Seale began two years ago to build a political machine on a foundation of baskets of free food the Panthers were handing out in poor black neighborhoods, alarm bells began ringing downtown.”111 A memo published by the

Concerned Citizens Committee Inc. had raised the question: “What will your company do if militant radicals take over local governments?”112 The committee claimed that the “radicals” would orchestrate the election through “a small army of door-to-door propagandists assisted by funds from radical organizations throughout the nation,” and that once they were successful in

Oakland they would rapidly spread nationwide.113 Their major objectives would be to “establish confiscatory business taxes” and “expedite the harassment of business and industry, property owners and the police.”114 The committee emphasized that it was critical for the “business community…to support those local candidates blessed with at least a degree of responsibility, statesmanship and business experience.”115 Reading, not Seale, held all the qualifications the committee listed.

There was also the lack of White support for a radical Black candidate. Despite Wilkins’ opinion that the new Panthers would quell the fears of the White community, the recent past could not easily be overcome. “‘For Seale to win a lot of white folks he would have to erase from their memories a history of Panther and police confrontations,’ said an Oakland resident.”116

There was also just a general lack of White support for Black candidates. One panelist, Alfreda

111 Jerry Carroll, “Important Race for Mayor: High Stakes in Oakland Election,” San Francisco Chronicle, April 11, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. 112 Concerned Citizens Committee Inc., “What Will Your Company Do?” Sept 25, 1972, series 2, box 46, folder 6, HPN Collection. 113 Concerned Citizens Committee Inc., “What Will Your Company Do?” 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 “Bobby Seale: the ‘new’ Panther,” Christian Science Monitor, April 4, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection.

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Abbott expressed at the Committee for Change that, “‘We have not been able to affect a real coalition in Oakland…. Black voters support white candidates, but the reverse has not been true….”117 Further, Reading was employing fear tactics in an attempt to influence election outcomes.118 The Oakland Tribune suggested that Reading’s campaign slogan “Don’t let

Oakland become another Berkeley,” alluded to Seale and the domino effect of radicalism in mainstream politics.119 Another example was a message included in the absentee ballot application from John Reading’s Campaign: “a small, well-organized group can take over a city if people forget to vote (in San Jose last month only 22% of voters went to the polls.) Here in

Oakland we’ve worked hard together to achieve real progress. We can’t afford to lose it.”120

Arguably, the greatest concern for the Panthers would have been low-income Whites in the

Flatlands with whom their campaign engaged with. Interestingly, both surveys – this one and the

October edition—emphasized assessing Seale as a candidate, and the general perception of the

Black Panthers as an organization. Brown was only mentioned in a general question regarding opinions of public figures.

Why the Panthers would not focus on both candidates raises some important questions about the intentions of the organization. A highly probable reason for this was the fact that

Brown was not publicly visible, like Seale, during the beginning of the movement when the

Panthers were considered a more militant organization. Since Brown was not directly associated with the negative BPP traits—the violence, the radicalism, or the self-defence politics—

117 Jini M. Robinson, “Strategies for Oakland: Cobb, Seale, Brooks Highlight Political Meet,” California Voice, Dec 7, 1972, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. 118 Chris Rhomberg, No There There, 208. 119 “Bobby Seale, The Wild Card,” Oakland Tribune, April 1, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. In 1971, Warren Widener became the first Black Mayor of Berkeley and endorsed four Democrat candidates in the 1973 election—the student vote was critical to their success. Don Martinez also noted that Reading had run “a quiet but professional campaign base don a ‘let’s not turn Oakland into another Berkeley’ theme” in the SF Examiner on April 10, 1973. 120 People for Mayor Reading, “Absentee Ballot Application,” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 6, HPN Collection.

87 assessing her public image was not imperative. After all, Newton claimed that Brown’s involvement would “soften the blow” and “keep Bobby in check.”121 Another reason might have been Brown’s own reluctance to be involved in the election. In her memoir she explained her dismay when Newton informed her that she was being selected as Seale’s running mate.122 Her immediate response had been “I’ll orchestrate the thing if you want. I’ll manage the campaign, even.”123 Still, the survey was not an isolated incident, internal and external media coverage were also preoccupied with Seale’s candidacy; however, when it came to Brown’s limited inclusion one thing fueled curiosity: the fact that she was a woman.

In the few articles that covered Elaine Brown’s individual candidacy she spoke about her desire to help overcome racism and social inequalities. She was quoted saying, “‘Some time ago,

I committed myself to uplifting conditions under which people live, and I believe we can begin now, right here in Oakland to form a people’s government and concretely begin to alleviate people’s suffering….’”124 She said that as race divided the poor on common issues she “hope[d] to start programs, release information and introduce ideas into the community to halt economic oppression.”125 The Black Panthers’ efforts in the election were tied to their commitment “to the immediate and ending of oppression …[with] practical goals [that] include housing, free health care, an ending of wars of aggression, and full employment of poor people.”126 When comparing her to Seale, one article asserted that “Brown has the additional advantage of appearing more straightforward and sincere.”127 Further, the journalist asserted that , “it is easier

121 Brown, Taste of Power, 314. 122 See Chapter One for further explanation as to the contentious relationship between Brown and Seale. 123 Brown, Taste of Power, 314. 124 “Ms. Brown Proposes 14 Ways to ‘Rebuild” Tribune, April 5. 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. 125 “Mill Student in City Council Race,” The Mills Stream, October 26, 1972, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. 126 Ibid. 127 Morris Wright, “Panthers enter Oakland election,” Guardian, April 11, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17.

88 to find people who think Brown will make it.”128 Still, many were curious how Brown would help all women.

Brown took precautions to ensure that she was not represented as a women’s candidate or a feminist. On several occasions she articulated that she was not running for women specifically, but for Black and oppressed people. For example, after the election filing, she told the press:

In the city council I’ll be fighting for the rights of all people. We recognize special problems of women. There aren’t enough women in the city council. Many women are heads of households and not recognized as such. Welfare women need special attention; there is unequal pay for women in many industries. But Bobby and I will be working on these issues together, along with all those issues which concern the people’s needs. We’ll both be dealing with these issues. Not just Elaine Brown.129

Brown treaded that fine line of drawing attention to how Black women were discriminated based on their race and gender and maintaining that the liberation of the Black race superseded the battle against sexism. As Robin Kelley explained, “it would be a mistake to accept the too common claim that black women activists rejected feminism out of hand. They simply did not separate the fight for women’s rights from issues affecting the entire black community…” and

Brown was no exception.130 In the Black Panther’s election special edition, Brown’s biographical sketch said that “she has chosen to run for office to represent the forgotten and over-looked needs of Black, poor and working women, not as a 'women's liberation' advocate but as a Black woman who knows the special problems of our community."131 The need to position

128 Morris Wright, “Panthers enter Oakland election.” 129 Black Panther, “Bobby and Elaine First to File for City Offices,” January 27th, 1973, 9. For the full transcript see “Bobby Seale Elaine Brown Press Conference Filing for Offices at City Hall 1/18/73 2211973” in series 6, cassette box 6, cassette 12, HPN Collection. 130 Robin Kelley, Freedom Dreams, 141. 131 Black Panther, “Biographical Sketch of Elaine Brown Candidate for Oakland City Council,” April 14, 1973, 14.

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Brown in contrast to the women’s liberation movement was an attempt to quell the perception that she was “a woman attempting the role of leadership …making an alliance with the ‘counter- revolutionary, man-hating, lesbian, feminist white bitches…’.”132 Brown illuminated the tension between the Women’s Liberation Movement and the Black Power Movement.133 As Brown reflected, “if a black woman assumed a role of leadership, she was said to be eroding black manhood, to be hindering the progress of the Black race. She was an enemy of the black people.”134 Simply her involvement could have been viewed in a negative light, because a Black woman vying for power obstructed a Black man from doing so.

In general, Newton’s decision to nominate Brown points to the start of the transition from the old guard in Oakland, when men dominated the Executive Council, to a new era of the

Oakland Panthers when women held key positions in the organization.135 Considering the general animosity in the Black Power Movement towards women in power, selecting a woman at all was a very progressive move. Maulana Karenga’s Us Organization, for instance, portrayed strong, powerful Black women as damaging the movement by emasculating Black men, and held that the only way Black people could rise was for women to become submissive in order for

Black men to reclaim their manhood.136 The (NOI) was another organization

Black Power organization that had opposing views from the Panthers by preaching “patriarchy and the cult of domesticity.”137 Overall, it might be easy to dismiss a lesser focus on Brown, due

132 Elaine Brown, A Taste of Power, 357. 133 The topic of tensions between the women’s rights movements and the black liberation struggle has been explored by several scholars. For example, see Sara Evans, Personal Politics; Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter; Kimberly Springer, Living for the Revolution: Black Feminist Organizations, 1968-1980, (Durham, NC: Duke University, 2005). 134 Elaine Brown, Taste of Power, 357. 135 When Brown was appointed as chairman in 1974, she appointed several women to key leadership positions. 136 Tracye Matthews, “’No One Ever Asks, What a Man’s Role in the Revolution Is’: Gender and the Politics of The Black Panther Party, 1966-1971,” 271-273, in The Black Panther Party Reconsidered, ed, Charles E. Jones, (Baltimore, United States: Black Classic Press, 1998). 137 Jeffrey Ogbar, Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity, (Baltimore, MR: Johns Hopkins University, 2004, 32. See 29-32 for his assessment of gender in the NOI, and 100-106 for the Black Panther Party.

90 to the fact that the Panthers were different from other Black Power organizations, which were more opposed to strong women leaders. After all, the Panthers had been the “only male led group” to endorse Shirley Chisholm for president showing they supported women in political positions.138 Also, Newton claimed that the Panthers were an ally of the Women’s Movement and favored the equality of women; yet, how and when gender equality manifested within the

BPP was a different story.139 Seale’s being selected to run for Mayor and Brown for councilwoman reflected the existing gender to power hierarchy within the Party. Men, like

Newton (Minister of Defense), Seale (Chairman) and Hilliard (Chief of Staff), held more prestigious titles and positions compared to Brown (Minister of Information). In turn, it was acceptable for Brown to be a part of the campaign, but not in a way that placed her above Seale.

The positioning of Brown in the election points to this reality, as her relevance lurked in the shadows of Seale’s candidacy for mayor within the Panthers’ own newspaper, the Black

Panther.140

The lack of external media coverage at the national and local level regarding Brown was unsurprising. Seale represented the continuity between the old and the new Panthers: reporting on him enabled newspapers to determine the nature of Panther intentions. Nevertheless, the limited external inclusion could have been mitigated by the Black Panther, but it was not. There were fifteen publications between January 6th and April 14th that included coverage of the election. Within these editions there were sixty-seven photographs that either showcased Seale

138 Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter, 339. 139 Newton, “The Women’s Liberation and Movements: August 15, 1970,” in To Die for the People, 152-155. 140All fifteen publications in their entirety up to April 17th, 1973 of the Black Panther were consulted: Black Panther, January 6, 1973; Black Panther, January 13, 1973; Black Panther, January 20, 1973; Black Panther, January 27, 1973; Black Panther, February 3, 1973; Black Panther, February 10, 1973; Black Panther, , 1973; Black Panther, February 24, 1973; Black Panther, March 3, 1973; Black Panther, March 10, 1973; Black Panther, March 17, 1973; Black Panther, March 14, 1973; Black Panther, March 31, 1973; Black Panther, April 7, 1973; Black Panther, April 14, 1973.

91 and Brown together or Brown and Seale individually. Out of the sixty-seven pictures, Brown was presented alone in only ten (15 percent), exponentially fewer than Seale who featured exclusively in thirty-five images (52 percent). Two of the pictures were regarding the release of

Brown’s album “Seize the Time,” and the other eight images sporadically covered her individual efforts during the campaign, four of which were in the election special that was published on 14

April—three days before the vote. Overall, there was rarely Brown without Seale, but Seale appeared without Brown.

Seale was presented on a more consistent basis, and the content and context of his photographs defined his involvement as the key contributor and orchestrator of the campaign.

Furthermore, only Seale was featured alone on the front cover. In five of the fifteen publications,

Seale was presented on the front page with impactful headlines: “People’s Candidates Denounce

Nixon’s War,” “Bobby Seale Moves to End Secret Government in Oakland,” “Toward Open

Government in Oakland,” “Parents Protest Nixon’s Childcare Cuts,” “To Rebuild Our City: The

Seale-Brown 14 Point Program for Economic Development.”141 Brown could have featured more prominently in any one of these, as she was involved in protests against Nixon’s budget cuts, protests against the Vietnam War, and helped propose the Anti-Secrecy Ordinance to the

Oakland City Council.

Aside from Seale’s presence on the front page of the coverage, he was photographed protesting with the Social Workers Union of Oakland, additional images regarding his fight against government secrecy and Nixon’s budget cuts were printed. Several images and captions

141 “People’s Candidates Denounce Nixon’s War,” Black Panther, February 3, 1973; “Bobby Seale Moves to End Secret Government in Oakland,” February 17, 1973; “Toward Open Government in Oakland: Bobby Seale Demands Media Right to Attend Secret Dinner Meetings,” Black Panther, February 24, 1973; “Parent’s Protest Nixon’s Child Care Cuts,” Black Panther, March 10, 1973; “To Rebuild of City: The Seale-Brown 14 Point Program for Economic Development,” Black Panther, March 17, 1973.

92 revealed Seale as the primary individual involved in running the campaign by opening a campaign office, attending events and holding campaign meetings.142 For example, one picture of Seale holding a registrar meeting with a diverse group of individuals appeared over the caption “if we make over 50,000 residents of Oakland registered voters, it’s over for Reading and it’s a new day (city government) for the people.”143 Support for Seale as a candidate was reflected in the articles, as well as the captions associated with images such as: “the Black

Student Union at Contra Costa College presented BOBBY SEALE with their Black Awareness award for his dedication and service to the people,” “A Short speech by BOBBY SEALE changed frowns to smiles as the early morning bus riders listened to his solutions for community problems,” and “When Brother BOBBY SEALE, finished his speech to the students of Oakland

Technical H.S. during their Candidate’s Day, he was obviously the student’s choice for

Mayor.”144 The photographic representation alone generated the impression that Seale was a man of the people, supporting the people in their grievances and meeting them wherever they might be: in the street and on the buses, at their churches, businesses, and schools, on the picket line, before the government advocating their rights—Seale was everywhere and anywhere.

Together, Brown and Seale were the People’s Candidates, but there was a clear emphasis on Seale’s candidacy over Brown. It is difficult to determine whether Brown’s unequal coverage compared to Seale’s was intentional. Perhaps Brown’s candidacy being represented as secondary

142 For instance see “Decent Jobs, Not Slave Labor: Bobby Seale Comments on Welfare Mandatory Work Laws,” Black Panther, January 20, 1973 p. 5; “Bobby and Elaine File First for City Offices,” Black Panther, January 27, 1973, p. 10; “People’s Candidates Denounce Nixon’s War,” Black Panther, February 3, 1973, p.3, 6, 11; “Getting The Vote Out,” Black Panther, February 10, 1973, p. 5, 10; “Bobby Seale Moves to End Secret Government in Oakland,” Black Panther, February 17, 1973, p. 3; “Almeda Students Welcome Bobby Seale,” Black Panther, February 17, 1973, p. 12; “Toward and Open Government,” Black Panther, February, 1973, p.3; Black Panther, February 24th, 1973, p. 5; “Parents Protest Nixon’s Child Care Cuts,” Black Panther, March 10. 1973, p. 3; “Support the Samuel L. Napier Intercommunal Youth Institute,” March 10. 1973, p. 12; “Children’s Crusade Begins,” March 17, 1973, p. 3; “Bobby Celebrates His Mother’s Birthday,” Black Panther, March 17, 1973, p. 9; “Students Rally to the People’s Campaign,” Black Panther, April 7, 1973, p.3. 143 “Getting the Vote Out,” Black Panther, February 10, 1973, p. 5. 144 Black Panther, February 24, 1973, p.5; Black Panther, March 3, 1973, p. 12; Black Panther, April 7, 1973, p. 3.

93 to Seale’s was a product of the time and sentiments towards women in politics. Examining this aspect of the election was not about undermining the progressiveness of her involvement, but to demonstrate how the inclusion and exclusion of Brown revealed the limits of equal gender representation in the BPP. Regardless, the oversight only served to hinder the potential for the

Party to support both candidates in their electoral bids for municipal council.

Seale wholeheartedly believed that he had “set up what he called an unprecedented political machine in Oakland to reach blacks and other minorities, elderly and ‘the hardcore group of people who’ve given up.’”145 He was convinced that, “‘On April 17 there’s going to be a people’s earthquake in Oakland…. The only thing it’s going to shake is city hall. It’s going to shake the mayor right of our office and me right in.’”146 The campaign had focused on registering more voters, in an effort to swing the election in Seale’s and Brown’s favor. The

Montclarian reported, “The Black Panther party claims to have registered over 35,000 Oakland voters, most of them as Democrats. Seal[e] claims this brings the percentage of black Oakland voters to more than 50% of all those registered. Another 10%, he says, are . And this, he says, is why he expected to win the election in a landslide.”147 Seale emphasized that historic low Black voter turnout had worked in the favour of John Reading and previous mayors, and since he had captured the support of the Black community the only obstacle in his way was getting voters to the polling station on election day.148

After a year of tireless campaigning, the Panthers rose on April 17, 1973 to a cool cloudy morning, prepared with vehicles to drive Oakland residents to the polling station. Optimism

145 , “Seale Says He’ll Win Hands Down,” Oakland Tribune, March 8, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. 146 Ibid. 147 Sue Soennichesen, “More than just a chance in tactics,” Montclarion, March 28, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. 148 Lon Daniels, “Seale Expects to Win Bay Mayor’s Race,” SF Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 18, 1973.

94 coursed throughout the day: this could be the beginning of substantial change, for the Panthers,

Oakland, and then eventually for all Black Americans. However, the hope of a landslide victory was thwarted. Elaine Brown conceded to Joshua Rose. Despite not winning her seat, Brown received 34,845 votes. In the mayoral race the distribution of votes from 436 precincts reported as followed: Reading captured 55,342 votes, Seale received 21,314 votes, Sutter 15,340 votes,

Green 17,460 votes, and 1,395 votes shared amongst the other candidates.149 Since Reading failed to capture 50 percent of the vote, a runoff election would occur on May 15th between Seale and Reading. The run-off gave the Panthers one more opportunity to change the minds of

Oakland residents. Seale’s ability to win more votes than Reading in the run-off seemed virtually impossible. As the San Francisco Examiner put it, “even if Seale managed to garner all of the

34,095 votes cast for the other candidates in the mayoralty race, he couldn’t win unless Readings supporters simply stayed home.”150 Despite these odds, the campaign trudged on.

Sutter spoke to the failures of his campaign to connect with the Black population in his article “Why We Lost.” He explained that his campaign “realized that most Black voters would vote for Otho Green or Seale and most Republicans would vote for Reading. So [they] concentrated on White Democrats and we phoned and worked White Democratic precincts…in

East Oakland.”151 In turn, it seemed that the Sutter campaign conceded a large portion of the

Black Democrat vote by relying on the White Democrat vote that could have leaned in the direction of Green, Sutter, or Seale. As Seale aggressively pursued a grassroots campaign across

Oakland, regardless of race, Sutter, who claimed to be pursuing a campaign for all of Oakland avoided over 40 percent of the population. Despite, like his opponents, speaking to the issues of

149 Charles Houwer, “Strong Seale Showing—Reading Faces Run-off,” San Francisco Examiner, April 18, 1973, 1. 150 Ibid. 151 John Sutter, “Why We Lost,” n.d., series 2, box 46, folder 3, HPN Collection.

95 unemployment, taxation, and dilapidated housing that affected the populace, his popularity dwindled due to his campaign predicating his support on a small subset of the population. Sutter also blamed his loss on Reading’s use of scare tactics. He believed that “‘Reading is afraid to talk about the real issues, so he scares voters with the spectre of Black Panther chairman Bobby

Seale as Oakland’s next Mayor…. Exaggerating Panther Strength….’”152 For Sutter, the potential of a united Democratic campaign, of either him or Ortho Green running, would have awarded a real Democrat the runoff against the Republican they vehemently opposed.153

Although there was consideration by Democratic and labour leaders to support Sutter or Green, the support remained undeclared since there was “some feeling inside the potentially powerful coalition that Reading cannot win a majority in the April 17 election that no endorsement should be made until the runoff….”154 It is noteworthy that Seale “was not considered by the 30 to 40 member group” after announcing his bid.155

Following the initial vote, Seale was endorsed by Black Congressman Ronald V. Dellums who “suggested that Oakland voters should look beyond Seale’s leadership role in the Black

Panther party and focus on issues.”156 Dellums stated that Seale’s campaign reflected “the hopes and dreams and aspirations of a significant number of blacks and other minorities.” He continued, “My hope is that hysteria and fear will be removed and people function out of reason,” and vote for Seale in the run-off.157 Further, Dellums voiced concerns about African

152 No Author, “Sutter Blasts ‘Scare Tactics’” California Voice, February 15, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. Green also expressed that he felt that Reading had done this in the article “High Stakes in Oakland Election,” SF Chronicle, April 11, 1973. 153 John Sutter, “Why We Lost.” 154 Gayle Montgomery, “Demos, Labor Seek Mayor Candidate,” Oakland Tribune January 16, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 17, HPN Collection. 155 Ibid. 156 “Dellums Endorses Seale for Mayor,” Oakland Tribune, April 26, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection. 157 Ibid.

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American turnout. “[T]he congressman said his surveys indicated a substantial portion of the

65,000 eligible residents who did not vote were in the minority community.”158 On election day the voter turnout in key precincts had been disappointing.159 Seale knew that his victory was predicated on getting people out to vote in these key precincts, and winning the support of the more liberal middle class constituents.160 In turn, the Seale campaign promised to continue to

“concentrate on precinct work and a massive get-out-the-vote drive…”, focusing on areas that saw low voter turn out.161

Seale’s opponent, John Reading said that although he had wished to avoid a run-off, he was not concerned about losing.162 Ron Smith, the director of the Reading campaign, explained that their surveys suggested “that 87 per cent of people who voted for John Sutter and Otho

Green…prefer Reading to Seale….”163 However, the assumed advantage, did not prevent

Reading from taking his opponent seriously. The weekend before the election he solicited the support of “over 200 volunteers working a ‘day and night’ telephone bank, widespread leaflet distribution and heavy precinct work.”164 Keeping up the momentum was the key strategy leading up to election day.

Reception in the community seemed to match the energetic fervour of the campaign. For example, Clarence Johnson, a journalist for the S.F. Examiner reported, “There among all the hand-shaking, the baby kissing and the loud cries of ‘right on Bobby’ that bounce off the walls of

158 “Dellums Endorses Seale for Mayor,” Oakland Tribune, April 26, 1973. Seale stated that “’50,000 of them were black people and Spanish-speaking people.’” In Tim Findlay, “What Bobby Seale Must Do,” San Francisco Chronicle, April 26, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 18, HPN Collection. 159 Tim Findlay, “What Bobby Seale Must Do.” 160 Ibid. 161 Gayle Montgomery, “Reading, Seale in Five-Day Drive,” Oakland Tribune, May 10, 1973., series 2, box 45, folder 18, HPN Collection. 162 Fran Dauth, “Reading Has ‘No Qualms’ About Runoff,” Oakland Tribune, April 18, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 18, HPN Collection. 163 Jerry Carroll, “Reading Props Up a Runoff Menace,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 7, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 18, HPN Collection. 164 Gayle Montgomery, “Reading, Seale in Five-Day Drive,” Oakland Tribune, May 10, 1973.

97 the East Oakland housing project, [stood] 36 year old Bobby Seale vigorously continuing an intense campaign for public office.” 165 The campaign sought to keep up with the grassroots momentum. On April 30 Seale spoke at Williard Jr. High, attended a meeting at a local church, and appeared at a rally held in Berkeley in his honor.166 On May 1 starting at 6:30 a.m., Seale was to visit the General Motors Plant to connect with the workers, followed by a meeting with over thirty union leaders at the Building & Trade Construction Council, a speech at Grove St.

College to “a rally in his honor sponsored by the students,” an interview on KNBR radio, finishing his campaigning day with door knocking in Section 8.167 During the subsequent days, planning indicated that Seale would conduct street operations in Sections 1, 2, 3, 7, the Welfare

Office, Downtown Oakland, Food Farm Market, Montgomery Ward, Emby’s Market, and

Square Hill Mall.168 The committee’s planning for engagement in spaces that would bring Seale face to face with the public emphasized the grassroots focus of the campaign.

A possible triumph was on the horizon and the Panthers prepared Seale’s statement and victory parade route that would end in Park.169 On May 15, the votes were tallied:

Seale won 43,719 votes (40 percent) compared to 77,476 votes for Reading. Although the

Panthers strayed away from by the bullet revolutionary rhetoric, the People’s Campaign was unsuccessful at gaining the support of the majority. As Robert Self summarized in American

Babylon:

165 Clarence Johnson, “Seale Keeps Fighting for Runoff Victory,” S.F. Examiner, May 11, 1973, series 2, box 45, folder 18, HPN Collection. 166 “Schedule of Appointments for Chairman Monday April 30th, 1973,” n.d., series, 2, box 46, folder 18, HPN Collection. 167“Schedule for Chairman of Appointments for May 1st – 5th,” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 8, HPN Collection. 168Ibid. 169 “Parade Route,” n.d., series 2, box 46, folder 8, HPN Collection. Holding the parade at Bobby Hutten Park was symbolic. Bobby Hutton, at 16 years old, was the first member recruited into the BPP and was shot on April 6th, 1968 by the Oakland Police. After his unfortunate death, the Panthers used Hutton as a symbol of f the police brutality they were combatting.

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Seale’s Panther past haunted him. Though he gained important endorsements from the city’s liberal community, none was enthusiastic. The memory of his recent jail sentence, the violence of 1968-1971, including his arrest and trail stemming from demonstrations at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, and continued rumours of Panther involvement in local illegal activities hamstrung Seale’s efforts to bill himself as a candidate acceptable to black and white moderate liberals among the city’s crucial swing voters.170

Despite the majority not being ready to support the Panther candidates, the Black Panther believed “that regardless of Reading’s numerical victory, a true People’s victory had blossomed in Oakland politics.”171 In a defiant act against the “power structure,” Seale refused to make a concession speech stating: “‘I don’t make concessions because I will not concede the human rights of any human being.”172 Seale asserted that the consciousness of the community had been aroused, and the Panthers would utilize a “people’s political machine [that] was in motion” to establish their programs.173

When cross-referencing the voter results with the precinct results in Sections 1-8, the

Panthers’ statement disregarding “Reading’s numerical victory,” can be substantiated. The

People’s campaign did not achieve a traditional victory. They had strategically focused their efforts on the flatlands and key urban neighbourhoods, and as a result of their efforts they won the support of the urban core where the majority of Black, minorities, and low-income people resided. The people the campaign sought to radicalize had voted for the People’s candidates. The majority believed in the Panthers’ agenda, but their electoral will was bulldozed by the majority

170 Robert O. Self, American Babylon, 307-308. 171 The Black Panther, “A People’s Victory on May 15th in Oakland,” May 19, 1973, 3. 172 The Black Panther, “A People’s Victory on May 15th in Oakland.” 173 Ibid.

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White suburban electorate. If anything, the outcome only strengthened the notion that the BPP was capable of garnering additional support for their revolutionary vision—it was only a matter of time.

Table 5 BPP Sections 1-8 Final Election Results for Elaine Brown, April 17, 1973

BPP Campaign Brown # Brown % Sullivan # Sullivan % Rose # of Rose % Sections of Votes of Votes of Votes of Vote Votes of Vote Section 1 3912 56% 701 10% 2360 34% Section 2 2567 44% 841 14% 2780 45% Section 3 4237 55% 861 11% 2549 33% Section 4 3611 43% 1241 15% 3537 42% Section 5 3150 51% 819 13% 2267 36% Section 6 1244 21% 1232 21% 3283 57% Section 7 3691 39% 1341 14% 4349 46% Section 8 3295 65% 484 9% 1327 26% Total 25707 48% 7520 13% 22452 40%

Source: Section 1-8 Council District 2 Votes by Precinct, n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 7, HPN Collection. Please note that these percentages have been rounded.

Table 6 BPP Sections 1-8 Final Election Results for Elaine Brown, May 15, 1973 BPP Campaign Seale Seale Reading Reading Sections # of Vote % of Vote # of Vote % of Vote Section 1 5099 65% 2620 33% Section 2 2923 44% 3856 55% Section 3 5835 65% 2901 32% Section 4 4813 48% 4944 50% Section 5 4315 56% 2937 40% Section 6 1578 23% 5068 75% Section 7 5027 43% 5722 52% Section 8 4522 74% 1485 24% Total 34112 52% 29533 45%

Source: “Statement of Results City of Oakland General Information Election,” May 15, 1973, series 2, box 46, folder 7, HPN collection. Please note that these percentages have been rounded.

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The BPP’s pursuit of power through electoral politics, and the misconception regarding their intentions has been fueled by fixed understandings of revolutionary and reformist. When the purpose and principles of the People’s Campaign to activate political consciousness and awaken the community in order to establish a base for the revolution are examined it challenges the following: first, the notion that the organization was reformist simply because it pursued change through mainstream politics; and second, the link between self-defence politics, violent rhetoric, and the organization’s revolutionary standing.

When the Panthers announced their election bid in spring of 1972, there was no telling how they would be received by the community, or whether voters would turn out in their favour.

The Panthers’ rebranding to gain the trust of, and support from, the Black, minority and low- income Oakland communities was fueled by their radical agenda. The combined effort of the voter registration drive and grassroots outreach demonstrated the goal of the People’s Campaign to ignite hope for change. The Panthers would provide what the establishment had failed to.

Brown and Seale were committed to training and job creation, increased access to free healthcare, fighting against systemic poverty and hunger, and restructuring how the city earned and distributed its revenue. The People’s Campaign stressed that, unlike their opposition, the

Panthers were deeply committed to eliminating racial, social, and economic inequality that manifested in the urban core.

An analysis of the campaign messaging and periodical coverage of the campaign has revealed that the organization was using electoral politics as a vehicle for the revolution and did not shy away from vocalizing its intentions. National and local media representation of Seale exposed the Panthers’ revolutionary sentiments and adoption of alternative tactics. The primary opposition in the mayoral race—Greene, Reading and Sutter—proposed that Seale’s pursuit of

101 political power represented a threat to order. Their campaign communication explicitly referenced or alluded to Seale’s militant, radical past. The spotlight, internally and externally, was fixated on Seale’s involvement in the election. As the Black Panther did not showcase

Brown on an equal basis with Seale, it demonstrated the limits of Newton’s progressive inclusion of Brown in the campaign. Further, her sex not only played a role in her lack of representation, but also dictated the questions and external reporting surrounding her candidacy. Brown’s responses reflected the tension between contemporary feminism and the reality of being a woman in the BPM.

Overall, there was victory in this defeat: in spite of all the hurdles standing in their way, by the end of the run-off, the objectives of the campaign had gained the support of approximately

40 percent of the Oakland population. Due to this the Panthers were hopeful that they could win majority support in future elections, which influenced Elaine Brown to run again in 1975. Yet, an examination of the People’s Campaign that explores the role and representation of the candidates only reflects on one side of the story. The concerted efforts of the volunteers, precinct workers, and less-known Panther members remained relatively unpublicized. The following chapter will explore the story of the people that made the People’s Campaign possible.

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Chapter 3—Behind the Headlines: Campaign Workers and the Frontlines of Political Consciousness

On 16 May 1973, maps were still tacked to the walls of Black Panther campaign offices.

Traced along the city streets were lines that designated the sections where volunteers and their leaders had engaged the Oakland community. There was no rest for the volunteers who committed to running their operation seven days a week, reporting their efforts to headquarters daily. Running the campaign had been tedious, grueling, and in most cases exhausted the resources the Party had available. Despite the challenges, the pursuit of electoral gains and desire to educate the populace remained evident throughout the campaign. With each registered voter, each street operation, the hope of the cadre of campaign workers was to raise consciousness:

Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown could provide all people a better future, regardless of class, race, ethnicity, or gender.

In order to run the campaign, the Panthers divided the city into nine sections, which

“were determined by basic geographic, ethnic and economic lines….”1 Party members were assigned to run each section, which was comprised of a collection of precincts that were consolidated into sub-sections. Each sub-section was assigned a section-leader, and each precinct had a coordinator responsible for connecting with the residents. The campaign reporting showed how the Panthers were constantly assessing the pulse of the community and their commitment to empathizing with people based on the socioeconomic and racial demographics in each area, focussing their efforts based on the responses they got. The Party was not immune to the trials and tribulations of electoral campaigning. Every section had its own operational deficiencies,

1 “Organizing a People’s Campaign,” The CoEvolution Quarterly, Sept 23, 1974. For campaign locations see map on page 70.

103 inter-office politics, and community reactions, but woven throughout the reporting were common challenges: the immense difficulties of funding operations and gaining consistent commitment from campaign workers.

In front of cameras and hundreds of spectators, Bobby Seale predicted a landslide victory that would propel him into the municipal office, and which demanded the work of hundreds to succeed. Without the collective effort, work ethic, and belief in the People’s Campaign message coordinated by campaign volunteers and leaders, Seale and Brown could not win. This chapter will explore the contributions of the Panther members who ran the day-to-day operations, from

December 1972 to May 1973, and the dynamics of running a grassroots election outside the media limelight. The section reports reveal an unedited representation of the People’s Campaign experience and how Party members were involved in the election. The reporting uncovers a behind-the-scenes story of the strengths and weaknesses of campaign operations. It also presents evidence of how the campaign was hampered by the very socio-economic factors it sought to address: working-class African Americans had to work or were struggling to survive and support their families on welfare, and therefore had little time and resources to contribute. Even the campaign itself lacked access to funding and transportation needed to orchestrate the campaign.

Finally, the reporting provides an assessment of different communities’ reactions to the election from the Panthers’ perspectives, illuminating the difficulties of predicting voting trends.

The Election Committee’s planning had developed the framework for the campaign organizing, which included assigning Party members to the operation, gathering information about the process and ongoing development of voter registration, as well as determining the

104 section and sub-section boundaries.2 Party members—such as Pam Perkins, Tyronne Edwards,

Arlene Clark, Victor Grayson, and Russell Washington—were a part of the Election Committee and involved in the field operations.3 Even though the campaign was a key priority other Party operations meant that comrades usually had many responsibilities and more than one assignment.4 Aaron Dixon recalled, “The work during this period was intense. In addition to the campaign we still had all the day-to-day party work to sustain, such as the school and Survival programs…. Manpower was sometimes short due to the needs of the campaign.”5 For many

Party members “sleep deprivation was part of being a revolutionary,” especially with the demands of section organizing.6

To keep up with the demands, Section leaders solicited support within the community from whoever was willing to donate their time. This meant that the distribution of responsibilities was generally based on the commitment the volunteer made and their availability. Within the reporting there were 271 campaign workers who were documented by name: 149 were men and 122 were women.7 Generally, an individual would be listed as a precinct worker and/or office worker, and some worked during the election participating in

2 For example, see Elections Committee, Memo to All Section Leaders for Campaign,” November 12, 1972, series 2, box 5, folder 10, M0864, Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation Inc. Collection, Special Collections, Green Library, Stanford University (hereafter HPN Collection); Cheryl Curtis, “Two-Week Schedule of What Must be Done,” January 29, 1973, series 2, box 18, folder 14, HPN Collection; “Suggested Organizing Outline for Massive Voter Registration (For April ’73 Elections),” n.d. series 2, box 18, folder 14, HPN Collection,”; Undated Memo, series 2, box 6, folder, HPN Collection. 3 The Elections Committee, “Comrades schedules and areas of work within the Election Committee,” September 21, 1972, series 2, box 18, folder 14, HPN Collection. 4 For examples of assignments see Elections Committee, “Changes in Section Leaders and Assistants and Assignment of Party members to Sub-Sections,” April 22, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 3 HPN Collection; Undated memo to campaign coordinators, series 2, box 6, folder 2, HPN Collection; Precinct Work Instruction Sheet,” n.d. series 2, box 18, folder 14. 5 Dixon, My People are Rising: Memoir of a Black Panther Party Captain, (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2012), 233. 6 Ibid., 234. 7 There is a high probability that there were additional people that contributed to the campaign, but this only takes into consideration the names that were documented. These numbers do not include the Panthers that were assigned to run the election in order to show the gender distribution of campaign workers that chose to participate in the campaign.

105 activities such as poll watching. There were instances where an individual was a part of the campaign without any assigned task or area listed.

Even though there was no explicit indication that the people’s sexes the work they would conduct during the campaign, women were assigned exponentially more than men to office work. Out of the twenty-six people that were labelled office workers, twenty-two were women and only four were men. Section 6 in particular had six office workers that were all women, with three also assigned to work in a precinct. The skillset of typing was valued, since having steady typists, who were also able to run the campaign office, meant leaders could focus on precinct work.8 Unlike other sections, the information noted in the Section 6 reports made more explicit mentions of women’s involvement in the campaign. For example, in early December 1972, the weekly recap noted that “most of the dependable people that are working in the community are sisters that have large families who can’t devote as much time as they would like. They have been allowing us to hold small section meetings in their home and providing transportation when they have time.”9 Overall, in this section women outnumbered men in all areas of work, especially in the field, where there were twenty women to seven men.10 In addition to general campaign work, there was also an interesting notation regarding campaign workers that were able to cook and clean, all of whom were women.11

Over the course of the campaign period, only two Panther women were appointed as

Section Leaders: Tamara Lacey and Roni Hagopian. However, the male to female ratio of Party members assigned to sub-section roles was closer in range, with thirteen men and ten women

8 Mike Ellis and Victor Grayson, section 6 report, February 17, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5. 9 Section 6, report, December 10-16, 1972, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection. 10 Section 6 and Section 8 were the only sections that had more women than men. Section 8 had thirteen women to ten men. All other Sections were in close range, but Section 2 had the highest number of precinct workers altogether with twenty-one women and twenty-five men. 11 Ellis and Grayson, “List of Current Campaign Workers,” March 21, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection.

106 selected.12 The imbalance of female leadership in field positions was most likely due to several

Panther women fulfilling important roles on the Elections Committee and running survival program operations—like Norma Armour who was appointed as Director of the George Jackson

Free Health Care Clinic. The Elections Committee was organized by Ericka Huggins. Joan

Kelley was also a Committee Head in addition to her work on the Legal Defence Cadre. Phyllis

Jackson and Pam Perkins facilitated research and the overall coordination of section areas, and

Cheryl Curtis managed voter registration precinct sheets and book assignment. All of the work completed behind the scenes was integral to the People’s Campaign.

Table 7 Assignment of Panther Members to Section Leader and Assistant Positions

Sections Section Leaders Before Run-Off Section Leaders/ Assistant After Run-off Section 1 William Roberts William Roberts Section 2 Elbert Howard replaced by Steve Roni Hagopian/Peter Alemeida Long Section 3 James Young James Young/ Steve McCutchen Section 4 Russell Washington replaced by James Pahrms/ Russell Washington James Parhms Section 5 Tamara Lacey replaced by Orlando James Mott/ Orlando Vaughn Vaughn. Section 6 Victor Grayson Omar Barbour/ Mike Ellis Section 7 Bill Jennings Bill Jennings/ Victor Grayson Section 8 Charlie Paul Henderson Mike Cross/ Charlie Paul Henderson Section 9 Chuck McAllister Chuck McAllister

Each section was appointed a Panther to coordinate and run the campaign operations, but this was subject to change based on performance, availability, and other operational needs. There

12 Elections Committee, “Changes in Section Leaders and Assistants and Assignment of Party Members…” April 22, 1973. In some cases, Section Leaders and Assistants were assigned to sub-section roles as well, which was most likely due to lack of available Party members.

107 was also no evidence to suggest that leadership assignments were based on previous experience with political organizing or their relationship with the people in their area. However, it was mandated that the section leaders deliver on voter registration and “try and develop a good relationship with the community,” through proactive engagement, hosting meetings and events.13

Section leader Steve Long, and Sub-section leaders Roni Hagopian and Patti Williams ran a well-organized operation in Section 2.14 During the first few months of the campaign, they focussed on voter registration efforts and precinct organizing, fundraising, as well as organizing a Whites for Bobby and Elaine Rally. Comrades Hagopian and Williams worked long hours to ensure as many people as possible were able to exercise their right to vote. Daily, at least one person was out in the field, frequenting hot spots in the area. Business locations, with high foot traffic, were visited more than once by the campaign.15 The downtown corridor, bus stations, and the community welfare office also saw a lot of attention.16 A testament to their success in section organizing was Williams’s ability to support Section 1 and 3 with voter registration.17 By the 18

March cut-off date a total of 2,149 registrations had been completed by the section.18 To support this effort, dozens of volunteers were assigned to different precincts. Their participation in meeting people at their doorstep was critical to voter registration and educating the voters on the campaign. Unlike other sections, there was no documented difficulty about finding people

13 Elections Committee, “Notes from Section Leaders Meeting,” December 5, 1972, series 2, box 5, folder 10, HPN Collection. 14 Hagopian was initially in charge of Sub-sections A and B and Williams was responsible for Sub-sections C and D. 15 Steve Long, Roni Hagopian, and Williams, section 2 report, Week of February 4, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1. HPN Collection (all from this collection); Long, Hagopian and Williams, section 2 report, February 11-17,1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5; Long, Williams and Hagopian, section 2 report, February 20-26, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 4; Long, Hagopian, and Williams, section 2 report, February 27th- March 5, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5; Long, Hagopian, and Williams, section 2 report, March 6-12, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1. 16 Long, Hagopian, and Williams, section 2 report, Week of Feb 4th, 1973; Long, Williams and Hagopian, section 2 report, Week of Feb 11, 1973; Long, Williams and Hagopian, section 2 report, February 20-26, 1973; Long, Hagopian, Williams, section report, 2, March 6-12, 1973; Hagopian, Williams, and Long, section 2 report, March 13-18, 1973, section 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection. 17 Hagopian, Williams, and Long, section report, March 13-18, 1973. 18 Ibid.

108 willing support the campaign and donate their time. However, the success of the Section 2 voter registration effort was not matched by event and fundraising efforts.

All sections were responsible for coordinating benefits and events that increased the visibility of the campaign, the candidates, and their platform. These events provided a space and time for voter registration and raised money for the section’s operating costs like rent, food, and utilities. These events were creatively designed and usually involved an incentive to attract a larger audience. In Section 2 three events consumed a lot of time: The Whites for Bobby and

Elaine Rally, the Community Bazaar, and the Benefit at Mandrake’s.

In the early planning stages Roni Hagopian worked on writing and designing the brochure for the Whites for Bobby and Elaine Rally scheduled for 17 February.19 The directive was to invite as many White voters as possible to meet Brown and Seale at Oakland Technical

High School. During the day as the section leaders registered voters, the leaflets were distributed at the same time. Over 10,000 copies were “distributed on a door-to-door basis and also at shopping centres.” 20 Section 9, led by Chuck McAllister, supported advertising for the event.

For seven days before the event, twenty-two people distributed 4500 brochures in targeted areas.21 However, attracting a high number of attendees provide difficult. On the day of the rally,

150 people attended. In the assessment of the rally it was speculated that the poor turnout was caused by lack of radio coverage —it had gone unnoticed by the section leaders that no publicity had aired until the afternoon before the event.22 Long and Hagopian, said, “We criticize ourselves for failing to have been aware….If we had of [sic] been aware of the situation before

19 Long, Hagopian, Williams, section 2 report, Week of February 4, 1973. 20 Long, Williams, and Hagopian, section 2 report, February 11-17, 1973. 21 Chuck McAllister, section 9 report, February 19, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection. 22 Long, Williams, and Hagopian, section 2 report, February 11-17, 1973.

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Friday other methods of publicity could have been used.”23 Unfortunately, the low attendance also meant the rally only raised $56 for the campaign. One positive outcome was the addition of forty-eight new registrars (individuals who conducted voter registration), and “many of these people showed great enthusiasm for working consistently on the campaign.”24 There was hope that the other events would yield better attendance and funding results.

The Community Bazaar was scheduled for 24 February 1973, at the Community Center on that had indoor space and a parking lot. Partnering with Section 1, according to Hagopian the “purpose of the function [was] to register people to vote and allow the community to hear Bobby and Elaine speak.”25 She felt that collaborating with another section would likely generate better results. Collecting donations to sell at the Bazaar was top priority,

Hagopian, Long and Williams worked together to solicit businesses, especially in Berkeley. In the weeks before the event they solicited products to sell, such as jewelry, clothing, albums, arts and crafts, as well as food. The initial plan was to offer patrons a plate of hot dogs, beans and cornbread with a beverage for $0.75, or they could visit the cake table to purchase homemade baked goods.26 Two bands were commissioned for entertainment before the main attraction: speeches by Brown and Seale.27 To publicize the event, approximately 6,000 leaflets were distributed, public service announcements aired on radio stations KDIA and KPFA, and a sound truck was driven through both sections on the Thursday and Friday before the event. The organizers hoped for a large crowd.28

23 Long, Williams, and Hagopian, section 2 report, February 11-17, 1973.; McAllister also provided criticism for the lack of radio coverage, and he argued that the brochure did not provide enough specific information about what the event entailed in Section 9 report, February 19, 1973. 24 Long, Williams, and Hagopian, section 2 report, February 11-17, 1973. 25 Hagopian, “Proposal for the Community Bazaar,” n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Section 2, “Report of Coming Events,” n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection.

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The Community Bazaar did not go according to plan. Setup was impeded by weather and lack of volunteers due to voter registration mobilization, and so the start time was delayed.

Overall, it did not draw people in from the community as intended. Up to 75 people attended, and Seale and Brown addressed a small crowd of approximately 30 people.29 In their recap,

Long, Hagopian, and Williams, failed to mention if anyone was registered at the event, but noted

$65 was collected from selling “the rib dinners, records, clothing, pastry and jewelry….”30

However, after spending $15 on the event, the profit of $50 made the occasion hardly worth all the time and energy that could have been channelled toward voter registration and other campaign work.31

Bills continued to pile up and it was imperative to continue holding fundraisers. Section 2 leaders decided that a benefit held at Mandrake’s club could net over $600 by charging two dollars for admission and selling raffle tickets for 25 cents apiece. They projected that possible entertainment included acts like John Lee Hooker, Country Joe, or Tower of Power, but they were only able to book the Bishop Norman Williams Quintet and Nimosha.32 Mandrake’s venue could accommodate 300 people, and Section 2 leadership concluded that “if we publicize heavy on campuses and in the community we could get 300 people there.”33 The Party invested in

10,000 leaflets that were distributed on community college campuses—such as Merritt College,

Laney College, and Grove Street College—as well as the University of California, Berkeley.

Sections 1, 2, 3 and the West Berkeley Center distributed the posters.34 Hagopian contributed her

29 Long, Hagopian, and Williams, section 2 report, February 20-26, 1973. 30 Ibid. 31 Section 2, “Financial Report,” n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 4, HPN Collection. 32 Section 2, “Mandrake’s Club,” n.d. series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection; Section 2, “Re: Report on Mandrake’s Benefits,” March 14, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection. 33 Section 2, “Mandrake’s Club.” 34 Long, Hagopian and Williams, section 2 report, February 27 – March 5,1973; Long, Hagopian, Williams, section 2 report, March 6 – March 12, 1973; Section 2, “Re: Report on Mandrake’s Benefit,” March 14, 1973.

111 welfare cheque for ads on the KPFA radio station.35 The campus paper, the Berkeley, printed the advertisement for free, and twelve dollars was spent to run ads in the Daily Cal.36 Unfortunately, when 13 March rolled around, even “with all this publicity” fewer than one hundred people attended. The reasons for the small attendance were that the benefit was held on a Tuesday evening and lack of “a big name group that would attract a lot of people.”37After all the expenses they netted less than 90 dollars in profits, a far stretch from the $600 they had hoped to raise.38 The silver-lining was successful registration of sixty-three people.39 As a whole, the event in Section 2 did not generate the needed funding or desired turnout but it did provide an opportunity for voter registration and for the candidates to meet constituents.

On election day, ten people were up at 5:30 a.m. to canvass with door-hangers, and by 10 a.m. “most of the door hangers got out…. [They] finished up in Sub Section B except in the most reactionary [precincts] 62140 and 62150. Door hangers were also passed out in hot spots throughout the day and evening.”40 There were approximately seventy people in the field all day, driving people to vote, watching polling stations, or working in precincts. Long was critical of their work, concluding that “it certainly wasn’t a smoothly run operation out of this office.”41 He was concerned that too much energy was focused on watching the polls at the expense of door- to-door activities— “some doors weren’t covered” in certain precincts.42 He mentioned that the campaign workers were not diligent in providing numbers and applicable information in a timely manner. Further, there were several complaints lodged against them at the polling stations, due to

35 Section 2, “Re: Report on Mandrake’s Benefits,” March 14, 1973. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Hagopian, Williams, and Long, “Re: Weekly Report,” March 13 – 18, 1973. 40 Long, “Re: Comprehensive Report on Activities of April 17th,” April 18, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 2, HPN Collection. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid.

112 the poll watcher not staying the designated 100 feet away.43 Long felt he should have been better prepared and organized for election day.44

The leadership gap was apparent when Long was transferred to Section 8 and replaced by

Peter Alemeida and Bill Elder to oversee the run-off operation—with Alemeida and Hagopian listed as Section leaders. Williams and Hagopian reported that this was a welcome transition:

“there is a definite change in attitudes here at the office since Steve left. There is more of a work attitude than a play attitude.”45 On 21 April 1973, a section meeting was held to discuss the outcome of the election, next steps, and for constructive criticism about tactics. The thirty-five people in attendance said that they needed “to be more informed on the campaign program so the workers will be better able to answer the questions of the voters.”46 In response to these concerns, study groups were held for all the sub-sections at their respective satellite homes, on multiple days, to ensure that the majority could attend and learn more about the campaign, and then more effectively canvass their assigned precincts.47 In order to gain support from the community, disseminating the knowledge about the campaign was imperative.

After addressing the information shortage, the campaign worked diligently to cover all the assigned precincts. Section 2 leadership kept a close eye on the progress in the Sub-sections and provided guidance to the volunteers in order to maximize efforts. For example, it was noted that “we talked with the precinct workers, explain that all doors are to be covered before going back to the people who were note home.”48 In addition, “the people that already covered their precinct once over were assigned to other precincts that have not been finished.”49 The entirety

43 Long, “Re: Comprehensive Report on Activities of April 17th,” April 18, 1973. 44 Ibid. 45 Hagopian and Williams, section 2 report, April 17-23, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Section 2, section 2 report, May 1-7, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection. 49 Ibid.

113 of sub-sections A and C were completed, at least once, with enough time left to ensure the completion of sub-section D by utilizing precinct workers from elsewhere.50 There were no efforts exerted in sub-section B since it was deemed reactionary, meaning not receptive to the campaign and the candidate, on a mass scale. This increased their productivity in the other areas and enhanced their chances of swaying votes in their favour in other sub-sections. On 15 May

1973, Section 2 had a 66 percent voter turnout, with 2,923 (42 percent) votes for Seale and 3,856

(55 percent) votes for Reading.51 Seale may have not won in this section, but he won in 11 out of the 24 precincts, winning a high number of votes in Sub-sections A and D. Over 50 people worked on the campaign and there appeared to be no problem finding people willing to donate their time for the duration of the election. Having coverage for all precincts in sub-sections A, C, and D meant that Section 2 was able to focus on voter registration and help thousands of people exercise their democratic rights. Unlike Section 2, other sections would experience major obstacles finding committed campaign volunteers.

In North Oakland, Panther William Roberts led Section 1 for the duration of the campaign. Operations gained momentum in December, as campaign leaders focused on securing offices and volunteers, and coordinating meetings and events to raise awareness of the campaign.

As they searched for workers, Section 1 leaders planned a community meeting at St. Augustine

Church that involved Sections 2 and 3—the neighbouring sections.52 All three sections distributed notices to their respective neighbourhoods, and James Young and Bruce Washington used a sound truck to drive around announcing the event.53 On 18 January, ten volunteers cooked

50 Section 2, section 2 report, May 1-7, 1973. 51 City of Oakland, “Statement of Result of Canvass of All Votes at the City of Oakland Municipal Election,” May 15, 1973, series 2, box 46, folder 7, HPN Collection. 52 William Roberts, section 1 report, January 8-15, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 11, HPN Collection. 53 William Roberts, section 1 report, January 8-15, 1973; Roberts, section 1 report, January 15-20, 1973, series 2, box 5, folder 11, HPN Collection.

114 the food for the 100-150 people who attended. After Seale and Brown spoke, everyone sang and afterwards “everyone got together and ate dinner…people from the community had already prepared.”54 Roberts concluded that the community response was favourable.55

Organizing precinct workers continued to plague the section. Just as they found new community workers two members left the section.56 At the end of January, a campaign workers meeting was held, and Roberts wrote they “discussed how we could make the office function better and to up the circulation of information being passed out to the community.”57 Roberts was explicit: “people have to run the section.”58 He needed to secure people’s commitment to plaster their neighbourhoods with posters and signs and to hand out leaflets. In addition, existing precinct coordinators needed to schedule the adequate time to complete their work in sub- subsections.59 As recruitment consumed Roberts’s time, all other aspects of the Section’s responsibility were delegated to volunteers referred to only as Beverley and Pauline, two part- time community workers. Beverly was accountable for organizing voter registration, public relations, precinct work, donations, and businesses. Pauline’s areas were church, school, and the office.60 After the section meeting in January, there was a gap in weekly reporting till after the 17

April election. According to the daily phone log, Roberts did have active registrars out in the field the week leading up to the cut-off deadline.61 This also included the support of Section 2’s campaign workers.62 Overall, reporting by William Roberts, daily and weekly, was intermittent

54 Roberts, section 1 report, January 15-20, 1973. 55 Ibid. 56 Roberts lost Joseph Mannuel to a stint in jail, while Betty Jones simply wished to work out of the East Oakland Office. See Roberts, section 1 report, January 25-29, 1973, series 2, box 5, folder 11, HPN Collection. 57 Roberts, section 1 report, January 25-29, 1973. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Audrea Jones, daily section leader report, March 14, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection (subsequent from this collection); Jones, report, March 16, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5; Jones, report, March 17, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5; Jones, report, March 19, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1. 62 Jones, report, March 15, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection.

115 based on the archival records, and Audrea Jones mentioned his failure on a few occasions to report Section 1’s activities.63

The last report relevant to the election said that sub-section coordinators were still allocating time to finding more precinct workers.64 In addition, Sub-Section C was planning a get together “in a parking lot with live music,” on 5 May in the early afternoon, “to get more workers in that area.”65 Subsections A and B had as many as twelve workers but struggled to keep them around consistently. Section C fared worse with only eight workers. In addition, there were two campaign workers arrested activities unrelated to the campaign.66 Even though they struggled to recruit volunteers, Section 1 workers were determined to continue working for campaign support, and their hard work paid off. The run-off election produced significant support for Seale in Section 1, where he won 5,099 votes (64.8 percent) compared to Reading’s

2,620 votes (33.3 percent).67

James Young led the operation of Section 3, located in West Oakland. One of the larger sections, Young was responsible for six sub-sections (E, F, G, H, I, and J) that comprised 40 precincts. As in Section 1, Young experienced a volunteer deficit, and in early January, he wrote that his mobilization plans had not materialized: “We are having a problem in so far as being able to get some of the people who have signed up for the precinct and campaign office work to adhere to their commitments, they will do work but not on a consistent basis….It hinders my

63 Jones, report, February 24, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection (all from this collection); Jones, report, March 12, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5; Jones, report, March 24, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5; Jones, report, April 20, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 2. 64 Roberts, section 1 report, April 25- May 1, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 4. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. The arrests were related to traffic warrants and arson. 67 “Statement of Results City of Oakland General Information Election,” May 15, 1973, series 2, box 46, folder 7, HPN collection.

116 work in the field a great deal.”68 He was planning a voter registration dance at the Continental

Club, a venue that could hold 3,300 people, and in turn, generate substantial funding for the campaign. 69 The Party printed 20,000 flyers to promote the event across Sections 1 through 8, and Black Student Unions of five colleges – , Almeda College, Grove Street

College, Merritt College and —contributed to advertising on campus.70 Young solicited the assistance of three female volunteers to cook for the event, Addie Bradley, Mrs.

Pollar, and Mrs. Ruth Jones.71 The food – fried chicken, macaroni and cheese, hot dogs and coleslaw—was prepared offsite due to non-functioning cooking facilities at the club, and cooking locations were secured nearby for ease of transport.72 The unique aspect of the dance was the free admission incentive for all registered voters. Although the Panthers desperately needed funding for the campaign, waiving the fee pointed to their primary objectives: registering voters and persuading them to vote for Brown and Seale. Potential voters had the opportunity to mingle with the candidates between band sets.73 However, the same evening Stevie Wonder was playing at the Berkeley Community Theater, which threatened to impact the turnout. Regardless,

Young planned on having “comrades at the [Berkeley Community] Theater distributing leaflets about the dance…” in hopes that “the crowd left outside [could] be convinced into coming to

[their] set at the Continental Club.”74 Unfortunately the results of the event were not disclosed,

68 Bubber Young, section 3 report, December 30- January 8, 1973, series 2, box 5, folder 11, HPN Collection. Note that James Young’s nickname was “Bubber” or “Bubba,” which he used on his administrative records. 69 Young, “Ref: Section 3,” n.d., series 2, box 5, folder 10, HPN Collection. 70 Young, “Re: Continental Club March 3rd Distribution Breakdown of Leaflets,” n.d. series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection. 71 Young, “People to Contact for Cooking March 3rd,” n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 4, HPN Collection. 72 Young, “Plan for March 3rd Continental Club,” n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 4, HPN Collection; Young, “Re: Continental Club March 3rd,” n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 4, HPN Collection. 73 Young, “Plan for the March 3rd Continental Club,” n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 4. 74 Ibid.

117 but the ambition and intention was clear—register and meet the candidates, while enjoying great food and entertainment.

Figure 6 Leaflet for Voter Registration Dance in Section 3, series 2, box 45, folder 19, HPN Collection

It seemed that operations were trending in the positive direction when Young reported progress in voter registration and information disseminated in fifteen precincts.75 However, by the middle of March, Young was being stretched thin by the amount of work assigned to him. In the midst of running his section—voter registration, volunteer recruitment, and event planning— he was also helping to open an additional office. He was also the Distribution Manager for the

75 Young, section 3 report, February 11, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5.

118

Black Panther.76 Connecting with his workers was also a priority. He noted, “My primary effort was being directed to more or less contacting all of my workers who are becoming precinct coordinators and going to their house and talking to them….”77 With the election about a month away he said that he had fifteen “strong reliable people who I can depend on to get the information out.”78 But fifteen people could not finish all 40 precincts effectively. The following week only a few people were present at the section meeting to learn how to read the precinct map and what a precinct was—Young had anticipated 15 to 20 workers in attendance.79 Ruth Jones and Tyrone Sampson, newly appointed coordinators, as well as Vernell Gleen, Vivian Simson,

Addie Bradley, and Bruce Washington were present, and “pledge[d] to bring at least 2 -3 people with them to the next meeting” in an effort to expand the campaign worker pool.80

By 8 April, a race to the finish line commenced: in the final days before the election, the sub-sections were heavily canvassed door-to-door with campaign material, and there was a motorcade through the streets on 7 April.81 Yet the appointment of new leaders was too close to the election to make an impact, and the voter turnout did not meet expectations. To prepare for the run-off, Young reported, that, “Because of the low voter turn-out we are primarily concentrating our energy on developing the sub-section[s] to build up the precincts.”82 Young planned two weekly meetings or “pep sessions” in the evening to establish guidelines and expectations.83 One meeting was held for sub-section leaders, and the other was for all leaders

76 Aaron Dixon, My People are Rising: Memoir of a Black Panther Party Captain, (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2012), 235. 77 Young, section 3 report, March 15, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 6, HPN Collection. 78 Ibid. 79 Young, section 3 report, -27, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 2, HPN Collection; Young, section 3 report, n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection. 80 Young, section 3 report, March 20-27, 1973. 81 Young, “Weekly Report, 4-03 to 4-10-73, Section 3,” April 12, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 2, HPN Collection. 82 Young, “Progress Report, Section 3,” n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection. 83 Ibid.

119 and their organizers. One discovery that presented a problem for future community engagement was volunteer availability. Twenty people were assigned to precincts, “but for the most part, people…either work or attend school during the week and can only work on the week-ends.”84

Having to work around their schedules proved difficult for advancing objectives in a timely fashion.

The challenge was overcome with fervour as Section 3 continued to work long hours to meet the demands. Young employed a simple-to-follow method to enhance Section 3’s potential impact:

1. go through all of the precincts that have not been finished 2. then we will preceed [sic] to go back to all the houses where people were not home. 3. we will be obtaining the reverse telephone directory to call the voters that have been hard to reach.85

Unlike the first run, Young was prepared and organized. He rented a vehicle during the last week in order to “move and function more efficiently.”86 He ensured that the people volunteering to make phone calls during 14-15 May were prepared, and that the precinct workers and election- day drivers were equipped with the most up-to-date information. When the votes were tallied on

15 May, Section 3 had a 66.3 percent turnout and granted Seale 5,835 votes (64.7 percent) – the highest number of votes that he would receive from any of the sections.

Persistence in the face of volunteer commitment challenges was also prevalent in Section

8 of the East Oakland area. Section Leader Michael Cross detailed the issues that prevented the section from achieving optimal results. One problem was the difficult leadership transition after

84 Young, “Progress Report, Section 3.” 85 Young, section 3 report, May 1- 8,1973, series 2, box 6, folder 4, HPN Collection. 86 Ibid.

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Martin Gordon (also called Simba) left the Party and Charles Paul Henderson was reassigned.87

Cross explained that Simba “had established only personal relationships with a few community people that did come to work….[and] it was very hard for me to reorganize their priorities concerning how they could contribute their skills to the campaign.”88 In the same report, he relayed that poor inter-party communication also needed adjustment in order to support campaign efforts.89 In the following weeks the section continued to battle against low volunteer turnout and uncontrollable issues like bad weather.90 Further, Cross had specific complaints about a campaign worker named Norma Gist. He wrote, “she has not attempted to correct herself or implement any of my suggestions about her incorrect and individualistic thoughts and practice. For the past 3weeks her only campaign work has been 3 bake sales.”91 As the election day quickly approached, Cross was desperate to develop a network of precinct workers.92

Cross acknowledged the ineffectiveness of only calling volunteers, based on the poor cumulative response, and decided to switch the approach: “Our corrective action is to personally visit each volunteer’s home, explain the campaign and the work to be done, while also bringing the literature for distribution of work that can be done to their home.”93 This tactic brought fifteen workers daily into the field to complete precinct work the week of the election. Cross guaranteed that the “organizational and procedural methods to be used…on April 17th…were

87 Michael Cross, section 8 report, February 20-26, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection. The reasons for Martin Gordon was not disclosed in the reporting. 88 Michael Cross, section 8 report, February 20-26, 1973. 89 Ibid. 90 Cross, section 8 report, February 27-March 5, 1973, series 2, box 6 folder 1 HPN Collection (all from this collection); Cross, section 8 report, March 6 –12, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5; Cross, section 8 report, March 13- 19, 1973, series 2, fox 6, folder 1. 91 Cross, section 8 report, March 13-19, 1973. 92 Cross, section 8 report, March 20-26,1973, series 2, box 6, folder 2, HPN Collection. 93 Cross, section 8 report, March 27-April 2, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 2, HPN Collection.

121 tested and revised to ensure efficient precinct operations.”94 Cross and the Section 8 team were prepared, despite all odds, for election day operations.95

Election day reporting from Section 8 was the most thorough of all the sections, breaking down the entire day by time, and having all the precincts assigned to a campaign worker. The hard work paid of. Seale won all but a few precincts.96 After the initial polls were in, Cross collaborated with campaign workers to develop a new strategy that targeted three specific areas of improvement: “1) Methods of approaching voters; 2) Methods of communicating the need to

Vote; [and] 3) Methods of recording and reporting concise, correct data.” Cross developed a program to “bring about an awareness and correction of our shortcomings in these areas as well as a method if improving voter turnout….”97 In response to transportation difficulties, akin to those in Section 3, Cross made plans to rent a vehicle. He “estimated that at least one hour per precinct worker now used in walking or riding the bus can [now] be devoted to precinct work.”98

Like Young, he found that run-off adjustments were necessary to get people out to vote. Section

8 yielded a considerable turnout, 70.9 percent of the registered voters, and Seale garnered his most significant victory: 4,522 votes (73.5 percent).99 The responsive leadership, defined by

Cross’s ability to maneuver the dynamics of running a campaign, was a part of the overall success in Section 8.

Section 4 also had a hard time ramping up at the beginning of the campaign. Russell

Washington, the Section Leader, requested an assistant—specifically a Panther member—to help him run the section. He explained, “the bigger problem I’m having at this time in organizing my

94 Cross, section 8 report, April 10-16, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection. 95 Cross, “Re: Section 8 April 17 Report,” April 19, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection. 96 Cross, “Re: Section 8 April 17 Report,” April 19, 1973. 97 Cross, section 8 report, April 17-April 23,1973, series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection. 98 Ibid. 99 City of Oakland, “Statement of Result of Canvass of All Votes at the City of Oakland Municipal Election,” May 15, 1973.

122 section (4) is that I don’t have any assistance…. I have 41 precincts in section 4 and it’s very hard for one person to deal with that many precincts and people who want to work on the campaign.”100 He had approximately thirty-five people who signed up, and he planned to break

“the various people down into specific sub-sections, precincts, and areas of work to beg[in] to raise to purchase or lease a campaign office.”101 With Washington focused on acquiring funds to afford a campaign office, the precinct organizing was put on the back burner.

To simplify matters, Washington, and Victor Grayson (Section 6 Leader), decided to merge their efforts. They argued that “by combining the sections this will make the area a lot easier to canvass.”102 It would enable them to work “as a cadre to organize the Black and

Chicano precincts….”103 However, instead of leveraging the volunteers to complete precinct work, Washington reported, “Victor and I are going to do the door-to-door operation by doing one or two (1 or 2) precincts in my section and the next day we’ll do one or two (1 or 2) precincts in his section.”104 The following week, campaign worker Tyrone Edwards was assigned

“to deal with the people who we’ve talked to who signed the volunteer cards to do precinct work in the campaign. So… he’ll be getting in contact with precinct workers to try and schedule them for training (practical) in door-to-door precinct work.”105 Further, Edwards and another worker,

Rennie, would “concentrate on following up with people we’ve registered to vote and the precinct workers will be concentrating on regular people who are registered democrats.”106

100 Russell Washington, section 4 report, December 14, 1972, series 2, box 5, folder 11, HPN Collection. 101 Washington, section 4 report, December 14, 1972. 102 Washington and Victor Grayson, sections 4 and 6 report, December 29, 1972, series 2, box 5, folder 10, HPN Collection. 103 Washington and Grayson, sections 4 and 6 report, January 5, 1973, series 2, box 5, folder 10, HPN Collection. 104 Washington and Grayson, section 4 and 6 report, December 29, 1972. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid.

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Precinct workers would also document who needed to be registered before the 18 March 1973 deadline.107

Yet, precinct work continued to progress slowly in both sections. Once again, the need to get organized was emphasized in the weekly recap. On 20 December 1972, Washington reported,

“We plan to initiate precinct work by finding out each week what time and day a precinct worker plan [sic] to set aside for his schedule to do precinct work. On these days one of use will go out and do precinct work with each precinct worker so that we can teach him what to do if he doesn’t know.”108 Washington’s and Grayson’s shared approach to organizing appeared to be reactive.

Their failure to be proactive was noticed by the head campaign organizer, Herman Smith.109 In a memo to Newton, he emphasized that “Sections 4-6-8, with the change in leadership of office, they should increase their ability to organize.”110 At the end of January, Washington was demoted and replaced by James Parhms who made immediate changes to the section. At his first meeting he assigned areas of work to each volunteer. He organized work by food for the Meet the Candidates open house, leaflets and campaign literature, material for open house, transportation, voter registrars, and office duties. Parhms and the campaign workers brainstormed voter registration locations, and types of fundraisers such as a rummage sale and cake and pie sale.111 To become oriented in the section Parhms “spent time familiarizing

[himself] with the Boundaries of Section 4, [and] did a lot of walking in the community,” which included working in six different precincts with campaign workers.112

107 Please note that Rennie had no last name listed in the documentation. 108 Washington and Grayson, sections 4 and 6 report, January 5, 1973 109 Although Herman Smith was the campaign organizer, the information available about him and his participation in the campaign is minimal. There were only a few instances where his name appeared on campaign documents. 110 Herman Smith, “Re: Status of Campaign Offices,” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 6, HPN Collection. 111 James Parhms, “Re: Meeting January 28, 1973,” January 28, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection. 112 Ibid. Although it was suggested that each person who volunteered would be “assigned to the precinct in which he lives” the logistics of securing volunteers meant it did not always pan out that way. See “Suggested Organizing Outline for Massive Voter Registration,” n.d. series 2, box 18, folder 14, HPN Collection.

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Lack of funding and organizing volunteers was a challenge for the duration of the campaign. On 27 February, the reporting stated that “finance in Section 4 is scarce. Daily someone goes out to collect donations. The money is used for bus fare and food for campaign workers….”113 A great deal of time was devoted to getting funding, which could have been utilized for voter registration or door-to-door campaigning.114 The fundraising events were unsuccessful.115 More than once Section 4 reports mentioned that voter registration was poor, even though twenty people were voter registrars.116 As late as May, there were still gaps in knowledge about the campaign message and operations even though volunteers were provided transportation to Political Education Class. Parhms remarked that “many precinct coordinators had run into questions from the community that they could not answer.”117 Seven days before the run-off election, there were still “not enough workers to cover all the precincts.”118

Fruitvale was a racially and ethnically diverse area, home to a sizable Latinx population that the workers in Section 4 concentrated on engaging. Winning the Latinx vote was the core focus of Section 4 and relied on the support and work of the Spanish Speaking Committee to

Elect Bobby and Elaine. They were first tasked with recrafting the campaign message into

Spanish to “reach a cross section of the community.”119 Committee members discovered there was nobody equipped to do translations of political documents, because they were not confident

113 Section 4, report, February 27, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 4, HPN Collection. 114 Section 4, report, n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection; Timothy Thompson, “Re: Section 4 Time Schedule for Next 2 Weeks,” January 20, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection. 115 This included a Card Party (where they spent more than they made), Rummage Sale, and a Benefit at the Player’s Club. The benefit was impacted by the bands canceling last minute. Information can be found in the following documents: Parhms, “Re: Meeting January 28, 1973,” January 28, 1973; Thompson and Renee Perez, section 4 report, February 3, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection; Section 4, report, March 13-19, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection. 116 See Grayson and Washinton, section 4 & 6 report, January 5, 1973; Section 4, report, n.d. series 2, box 6, folder 1; Section 4, report, March 13, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection. 117 Parhms, “Weekly Section Report May 1 – May 7, 1973,” May 8, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection. 118 Ibid. 119 Section 4, report, n.d. series 2, box 6, folder 1.

125 they could accurately translate the information. They had to get a local professor, Ed Hernandez to translate campaign materials.120 Seale was also driving an initiative to make the ballot bilingual, which Hernandez agreed to help as well. Having campaign workers that spoke

Spanish was an asset to the campaign. Renee Perez, an assistant Section Leader, covered precincts with the help of Carmen and Fred Minshall. An undated report mentioned that “all three of them speak Spanish so it was easier for them to communicate with the community,” and as a result convey the campaign message more accurately.121

Campaign workers spent time attending events and speaking with the community, in order to understand their grievances. For example, Angie Riviera and Reenie Simmons participated in a conference held by La Raza Educators. They recapped the main complaints voiced: “lack of political involvement [,and] inadequate education or bilingual education….”122

The conference concluded that the long-term focus was to “organize the Mexican voting power for community presence,” as well as, “organize with other minorities.”123 In an effort to respond to the explicit concerns raised, Section 4 and the Spanish Speaking Committee emphasized in their campaign messaging that “Bobby Seale favours bilingual education, and more bilingual counselors in the schools.”124 The lack of Latinx representation on city government boards and commissions was also addressed. The committee produced a pamphlet that addressed these concerns, saying that Seale “also calls for the creation of a Board of Human Concerns which would instruct the city government in the area of social services and community concerns. The

120 Perez, “Section 4 – Mexican Community,” March 9, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection. 121 Section 4, report, n.d. series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection. 122 Section 4, report, n.d. series 2, box 6, folder 1. 123 Section 4, report, n.d. series 2, box 6, folder 1. 124 Black Panther Party, “Why Should the Spanish Speaking Community Vote for Bobby Seale for Mayor of Oakland,” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 5, HPN Collection; Black Panther Party, “Porque Debe Votar La Raza Por Bobby Seale Para Alcalde de Oakland,” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 5, HPN Collection.

126 ethnic representation of the Board will be in direct proportion to the population of city.”125

Campaign workers were responsible for sharing the pamphlet and information in their precincts.

During a community meeting held at the Latin-American Library, Seale spoke to approximately 80 people, and a member of the Spanish Speaking Committee, Mary Thomas, translated for the audience. Section 4 reported on 27 February1973 that, “Among those who attended were members of an organization called the Brown Beret. They expressed their willingness to do campaign work in the Spanish Speaking Community specifically passing out leaflets.”126

Founded in 1967, the , according to historian Jeffrey Ogbar “were the first major organization to model itself after the Black Panthers, emerging as a self -described shock troops” for the burgeoning civil rights movement.”127 The Brown Berets’ philosophy was aligned with the militancy of the early Panthers, with many of their programs inspired by the

Party such as their own thirteen point program.128 Interestingly the Brown Berets had officially

“disbanded in the fall of 1972,” which perhaps made the People’s Campaign a popular option for advancing their activism outside of the organization. Further, the BPP sought an endorsement from Caeser Chavez, Director of the United Farm Workers and a major leader in the Chicano civil rights movement. Members of the Spanish Speaking Committee to Elect Elaine and Bobby advised that “the Chairman [should] personally ask Caser Chavez for an endorsement.”129 In

125 Black Panther Party, “Why Should the Spanish Speaking Community Vote for Bobby Seale for Mayor of Oakland,” n.d.; Black Panther Party, “Porque Debe Votar La Raza Por Bobby Seale Para Alcalde de Oakland,” n.d. 126 Section 4, report, Feb 27, 1973. 127 Jeffrey O. G. Ogbar, “Rainbow Radicalism: The Rise of Radical Ethnic Nationalism,” 194, in The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights – Black Power Era, edited by Peniel E. Joseph (NY, NY: Routledge, 2006). 128 Ogbar, “Rainbow Radicalism,” 197-198; The Brown Berets also established a free health clinic in L.A. in 1969 See Ogbar, “Brown Power to Brown People: Radical Ethnic Nationalism, the Black Panthers and Latino Radicalism, 1967-1973,” 261 in In Search of the Black Panther Party: The New Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement, edited by Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). 129 Perez, “Section 4 – Mexican Community,” March 19, 1973.

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April, Seale and Brown eventually received Chavez’s endorsement. He was quoted saying

“Bobby Seale’s campaign… as well as Elaine Brown’s seek to help our people, and through the political process, achieve non-violent social change. We support their efforts and urge all registered voters in Oakland to support them on April 17.”130 Chavez’s statement was carefully worded to disavow appeals to violence and to endorse change through political action, in an effort to commit the BPP to . The support of Chavez and the Brown Berets would have provided legitimacy to the campaign from a broad of voters.

The response from different neighbourhoods varied and depended on the racial, ethnic, and class composition. For example, a Section 4 report noted that the area surrounding the office was “a very unique area because of the amount of white people who live in the area [who] don’t respond well to the campaign that we are organizing.”131 The surrounding precincts 63080 and

63090, campaign workers Carol Killoran and Melvin reported that the “white people of

European decent [sic] who look at the campaign in a very racist view [were] slam[m]ing the door in comrades faces, but about 10 Black people within the precincts said they would vote for

Bobby and Elaine.”132 Precinct 63100, another majority white area, responded negatively.133 This type of response would remain unchanged throughout the campaign.134 However, in the Black

Housing Project, Clinton Park there was

very strong support for the party. The people there have put together a free breakfast program within the project for the youth, so the development is already coming, it just has to be steered in the right direction. There are 200 families living inside the Clinton Park Project. More people in that area are looking more and more at the City Election than ever before. A lot of people look at the campaign with new hope for their well being. 135

130 Mary Thomas, “For Immediate Release,” April 5, 1973, series 2, box 46, folder 1, HPN Collection. 131 Section 4, report, n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 2, HPN Collection. 132 Section 4, report, n.d. series 2, box 6, folder 5. No last name was listed for Melvin. 133 Ibid. 134 Section 4, report, March 24, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection. 135 Section 4, report, n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 2, HPN Collection.

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This was the exact result that the Panthers sought from their campaign organizing: influencing people to view the People’s Candidates and the Party as the key to creating substantial and meaningful change. In other areas that were deemed majority Black (80-90%) by the section organizers, Brown and Seale won substantial victories.136

Despite all the concerted effort made to connect with the Spanish-speaking communities, there were still challenges gaining their support. This was made clear during a meeting on 6 May

1973 when Seale, alongside campaign worker Rosie Tolentino, met with the “Chicano G.I.

Forum and two other [unnamed] Chicano organizations….”137 The dialogue between the parties revealed that “the over-all sentiment of the Chicano community was that the Chicanos are undecided and fearful of the Chairman. His programs to them seem like ‘all other politicians’ – just promises.”138 A rally on 12 May at San Antonio Park was planned, in an attempt to “to bring more Chicanos towards the awareness of the Chairman’s true intentions.”139 However, there were concerns that a speaking event involving the Chairman would not entice Latinx people to attend.140 Further, holding the rally three days before voters went to the polls made it highly unlikely that it would sway potential voters. Yet, the margin between Seale and Reading on 15

May was tight. With 9,987 (64.75%) turnout, Reading won with 4,944 (49.50%) with Seale close behind with 4,813 (48.19%) of the vote. Seale may have not won the section outright, but a 131- vote differential showed that his campaign appealed to a substantial portion of population.

136 Section 4, report, n.d., series 2, box 6, folder 2; City of Oakland, “Statement of Result of Canvass of All Votes at the City of Oakland Municipal Election,” May 15, 1973; Section 4, district 2 vote results, series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection. 137 Audrea Jones, report, May 6, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 140 Parhms, “Re: Weekly Section Report May 1-7, 1973,” May 8, 1973.

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Section 6 was also in Fruitvale, but the leadership changes occurred throughout the campaign period. From December to May three different individuals were appointed Section

Leader. Victor Grayson was the first to head up operations. In early December, as in other sections, Grayson was focused on fundraising for a campaign office, finding committed volunteers, and preparing for campaigning in Fruitvale: a racially diverse area comprised of low- income White, Latinx and Black voters.141 Renee Perez’s “primary function,” he reported,

“[would] be to help organize the Chicano community.” Grayson wrote that “one of the things that I am working towards is recruiting white people to do precinct work in the predominantly white precinct toward McArthur Highway.”142 Volunteers’ limited availability affected organizing efforts because “most of the campaign workers [were] either working or in school during the week.”143 Grayson, like Russell Washington (Section 4), requested a fulltime assistant to help him organize the section.144 He also faced difficulty securing an office, noting that one prospect refused to rent to him because it was for the Black Panther Party.145 By the end of

January, Mike Ellis was assigned as the Section Leader and Grayson was demoted to a support position.146

Ellis was tasked with filling the vacant positions for precinct and office workers. He said that, “the main objective for the next two weeks is getting people to become voter registrars because we don’t have any in our section.”147 Unfortunately the eight people who committed to

141 Victor Grayson, “Progress Report Section 6 (Fruitvale Area.),” December 2, 1972, series 2, box 5, folder 11, HPN Collection. 142 Grayson, section 6 report, December 8, 1972, series 2, box 5, folder 11, HPN Collection. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. After this report Victor Grayson and Russell Washington combine their section organizing; in turn, Grayson probably stopped submitting individual section reports. 146 Mike Ellis, “Re: Outline of Work,” January 30, 1973, series 2, box 5, folder 11, HPN Collection. 147 Ellis and Grayson, section 6 report, February 3, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection.

130 attend the voter registration class failed to attend due to lack of transportation.148 In the following week progress was made: there was one voter registrar and six people in the pipeline to get out into the field to as registrars, and office positions were filled.149 Having more personnel would enable the section “to concentrate on precinct work, fund raising, and making contacts with organizations, churches and businesses.”150 Not having enough volunteers meant that Grayson and Ellis were had to conduct voter registration themselves instead of running overall operations.151 These constraints meant that they were unable to fulfill fundraising expectations or secure food for an upcoming candidates’ night. Ellis confessed that “we are still behind in many areas, which is making it difficult to cope with the fast pace at times.”152 Gaining momentum in voter registration and maintaining precinct organizing continued to be a challenge.

Ellis wrote every week about the obstacles impeding the section from increasing registrations. Again, on 17 February 1973, he reported, “the area in which we are having serious problems is in voter registration. Now we have [ten] voter registrars, ([six] people attended this weeks [sic] class) all of them work [or] go to school and it is very hard to keep in touch with them….”153 Ellis and Grayson committed to securing twenty voter registrars by the end of

February, but only secured “[fifteen] and two of them are moving.”154 Limited volunteer availability inhibited productivity on weekdays; the weekends were slightly more successful. For example, on one weekend they “were able to cover [sixteen] out of [twenty-six] precincts…” and as a result assumed that they could easily finish by the end of the following week.155 As of

148 Ellis and Grayson, section 6 report, February 3, 1973. 149 Section 6, report, February 10, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 1, HPN Collection. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 153 Ellis and Grayson, section 6 report, Feb 17, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection. 154 Ellis and Grayson, section 6 report, Feb 26, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection. 155 Ellis and Grayson, section 6 report, February 17, 1973. The following week’s report does indicate that there was progress with approximately 15-20 people doing precinct work (Section 6, report, February 26, 1973).

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February 27, there were sixteen residents and another six people who lived outside the section, who were listed as key people for campaign organizing.156 However, their reliability and commitment to the campaign were questionable. Ellis and Grayson reported on March 27:

This week we had a great deal of difficulty doing precinct work since most of our volunteers didn’t show up and we had to do a lot of the precinct work ourselves especially distributing information. Also, the voter registrars we have signed didn’t show up when called and they don’t seem to be registering people even when you explain the importance of it. We will concentrate now on getting new volunteers as well as getting the ones we have now to participate. We have been spending too much time passing out information, doing voter registration, and working on event that have been coming up, that we haven’t been door-to-door talking to people like we should [sic].157

Time was running out to engage the community in a similar fashion as the other sections. Helen

Roberts was assigned responsibility of voter registration. In the report Ellis and Grayson, alluded to their lack of involvement as a reason for their lack of success: “we made the mistake of relying on our more reliable campaign worker to organize people when we should have done this more ourselves.”158 Grayson and Ellis had not effectively activated community involvement in the campaign. Their inability to attract campaign workers meant that they alone were responsible for most of the campaigning, fundraising, and registering voters—jobs that were too extensive for only two people.

The capacity to gauge the pulse of the community, as seen in the other sections, was typically aligned with effective organizing. In the middle of March, Grayson and Ellis provided a synopsis of their understanding of sub-sections’ reactions to the campaign. They suspected that

156 Section 6, “Key People (by Precinct),” February 27, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection. 157 Section 6, report, March 6, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 4. 158 Ibid.

132 in “Sub-section C we have a very good base.”159 Sub-sections A and B were considered “a very hard area to organize because a lot of conservatives and racists live in the area.”160 Lastly, “in

Sub-section d [sic] (mostly Chicano) [they would] begin to make a concerted effort.”161 All of

Sub-sections C and D were completed by the end of March, but only one precinct from each of

Sub-sections A and B were finished.162 Despite Sub-section D being noted as complete, they mentioned “one problem we are having…is catching up with some of the Spanish speaking people in our section to distribute the Spanish language brochures we have.”163 Unfortunately, unlike Section 4 there was no established group to connect directly with the Latinx community, there the support from the Spanish Speaking Committee did not spill over into this section. The reception of the campaign was very divided on race lines, and this was reflected in the election results.

A leadership transition took place after the election to regroup to organize support for

Seale in the run-off. Omar Barbour, the new section leader, determined that they had an opportunity gain the Green/Sutter vote by focusing on precincts “where [they] showed a minimum of 16% of the vote.”164 Of the twenty-six precincts, eight were considered possible areas where the Panthers could leverage more support—with the potential to earn 2,206 more votes.165 The trouble with gaining a majority in this section, according to Barbour, was the fact that the “ethnic breakdown is three whites to every Black or Chicano. The greater percentage of support voters are blacks scattered throughout the section in pockets such as apartment houses

159 Ellis and Grayson, section 6 report, March 13, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection. 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid. 162 Ellis and Grayson, section 6 report, March 27, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 2, HPN collection. 163 Ibid. 164 Omar Barbour, section 6 report, April 24-May 1,1973, series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection. 165 Ibid.

133 surrounded by white homeowners.”166 This was likely one of the reasons that for Brown on 17

April and Seale on 15 May, the People’s Campaign did not yield a win in any sub-section or precinct.167 Out of the 8 primary sections, this section had the worst percentage of support for

Seale at only 1,578 votes (23.27%) whereas Reading gained 5,068 votes (74.76%).

If gaining the support of White voters in the city-core was difficult the reaction of the majority White populated suburban areas presented a challenge. Covering over one hundred precincts, the volunteers in Section 9 were tasked with suburban areas of Oakland not covered by the other eight sections.168 With approximately 50 percent more precincts to canvass, the section leader Chuck McAllister had to be strategic with how and where he utilized his campaign workers. The public’s reaction to the BPP varied in this section. McAllister highlighted positive, complacent, and negative responses. During one voter registration outing in February, McAllister reported, “we had several people give us the clenched fist, and tell us that they will vote for

Bobby and Elaine….Some have told us that they have already registered [,and] that we are doing a great thing by asking all the people if they are registered.”169 In one precinct, 62690, out of 102 people surveyed in March, it was determined that 42 people were “thinking about voting for

Bobby and Elaine…and there were 60 that were undecided.”170 The high number of Black residents on Holman Road were considered “strong supporters,” but the “several older white

166 Omar Barbour, section 6 report, April 24-May 1,1973. 167 Brown’s election results by sub-section for 17 April: Section 6, district 2 results, April 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 3, HPN Collection; Seale’s election results by sub-section for 15 May: City of Oakland, “Statement of Result of Canvass of All Votes at the City of Oakland Municipal Election,” May 15, 1973. 168 Unlike, the other sections, Section 9 did not have a concrete list of designated precincts that could be referenced accordingly. In early reports of the campaign sections, Section 9 was not mentioned at all. In one of the reports Chuck McAllister mentioned that they had completed campaigning in 107 precincts and an additional 4 remained, and in another document written by Pete Almeida he noted that there were approximately 90 precincts within the section. See: Chuck McAllister, section 9 report, April 10, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 2, HPN Collection; Pete Almeida, “Planning Committee Meeting,” March 30, 1973, series 2, box 46, folder 3, HPN Collection. 169 McAllister, section 9 report, February 19, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection. 170 McAllister, section 9 report, March 27, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 5, HPN Collection.

134 people who [were] considering voting” for the Panther candidates needed more convincing.171

Some residents of the Moore House Communes, who were “upper middle class and ruling class people,” told McAllister they would vote for Brown and Seale, but none were interested in being involved in the campaign.172 The majority, however, voted against Seale and Brown on election day.

On 17 April, campaign workers in Section 9 were driving people to the election polls and attempting to gauge where the vote was swaying. While conducting community engagement in precinct 62880, the volunteers experienced “a noticeable amount of blatant racists. [The] pulse beat gave 2 supporters out of countless bigots before community worker gave up in exasperation.”173 Gaining support from voters in Precinct 62840 was also deemed impossible since the “buildings are occupied by 90% elderly people who are very reactionary.”174 As a result, McAllister noted “do not go back.”175 The election coverage provided McAllister the information to produce an additional assessment of the challenges faced for the run-off and more promising areas where they should focus moving forward.176 Nancy Delaney, who surveyed precinct 62630, “indicted that this precinct has a high percentage of older, white conservatives who are very hostile…and in many cases refused literature with nasty remarks.”177

Even with their concerted efforts the section did not have a clear prediction on how the vote would go.

Precincts that were determined to be “moderately favourable” or “highly favourable” or even considered “best precinct” within a sub-section translated to little support on election

171 McAllister, section 9 report, March 27, 1973. 172 Ibid. 173 McAllister, “Section 9 Activities on Election Day,” April 18, 1973, series 2, box 6, folder 2, HPN Collection. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid. 176 Susan and Chuck McAllister, “Section 9 Report to Comrades,” n.d. series 2, box 6 folder 3, HPN Collection. 177 Ibid.

135 day.178 For example, in precinct 62600, the “preliminary pulse beat indicated moderate support…from a few blacks and several young white progressives.” However, even in the run- off Seale would only gain 29 votes to Reading’s 237.179 Similarly in precinct 62610, where an average level of support was reported, Seale only won 30 votes compared to the 275 votes for

Reading.180 A “high concentration of favorable voters…” was predicted from precinct 62670, which included “many white progressives…” and “some unusual supporters.”181 The unusual supporters were both identified as White. One was a 65-year-old woman who “felt Bobby was a

‘breath of fresh air to Oakland’ and a good leader ‘of his people’” and the other was a 45-year - old working-class man who changed his mind and chose to support Seale after a violent encounter with a police officer.182 The precinct worker, Bonnie Picket, was confident that there was “much enthusiasm for the campaign.”183 Unfortunately, Seale only received 55 votes, losing the precinct to Reading who received 200.184 A similar judgement was made about precinct

62690, considered “probably the best precinct” within sub-section L, did not produce the result anticipated. It was noted that “initial support was very good. A lot of people, including middle class black people, asked for posters and bumper stickers.”185 Despite the “high level of enthusiasm” indicated, again Seale faced a substantial loss: 112 votes versus 201 for Reading.186

The large territory of this section, which extended beyond the city core and encompassed over one hundred precincts, forced the Panthers to focus their energy in the most promising precincts.

178 Susan and Chuck McAllister, “Section 9 Report to Comrades.” 179 Susan and Chuck McAllister, “Section 9 Report to Comrades.”; City of Oakland, “Statement of Result of Canvass of All Votes…”, May 15, 1973. 180 City of Oakland, “Statement of Result of Canvass of All Votes…”, May 15, 1973. 181 Susan and Chuck McAllister, “Section 9 Report to Comrades.” 182 Ibid. 183 Ibid. 184 City of Oakland “Statement of Result of Canvass of All Votes…” May 15, 1973. 185 Susan and Chuck McAllister, “Section 9 Report to Comrades.” 186 Ibid.

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The perception versus the result demonstrated the difficult task faced by volunteers in Section 9 accurately to assess the genuine support of the People’s Campaign and the candidates in predominately White areas.

Many Sections reported the campaign organizers’ attempts to navigate the diverse racial and class makeup of Oakland. In Section 4, the formation of the Spanish Speaking Committee and the efforts to connect with the Latinx community demonstrated the BPP’s understanding of the Fruitvale demographics and their commitment to understand how oppression specifically impacted Latinx people. Furthermore, the People’s Campaign did not just explicitly engage with

Blacks and minorities, it also engaged with the White population, as seen in Section 9 and with the Section 2 Whites for Bobby and Elaine rally. When Section Leaders reported community response to the candidates and political platform, the racial composition of the neighbourhoods or respondents was reflected in the reporting. This resulted in precincts being designated as

White and reactionary, which allowed for the Panthers to pivot and concentrate on more promising areas.

Access to sufficient funding in all the Sections persisted despite the concerted efforts and contributions of the leaders. When Hagopian contributed her welfare cheque to finance the event at Mandrake’s club it was a glaring example not only of the personal sacrifice members would make for the campaign, but also the stark reality of running a campaign without being “financed, manipulated or controlled by big business interests.”187 The Panthers relied on support from

“Oakland’s poorest and most impoverished communities” which had the obvious limitation of people simply not being able to afford to make donations or attend events.188 Work, education,

187 Community Committee to Elect Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown, donation request letter, n.d. series 2, box 45, folder 19, HPN Collection. 188 Ibid.

137 and family commitments also hindered when and how volunteers could participate in the campaign. Further, the lack of transportation and mobility for campaign workers and leaders restricted the reach of the campaign on more than one occasion. Despite the difficulties these obstacles presented, they illuminated the willpower of the Section Leaders and campaign organizers.

The everyday work of the Panther section leaders continued to emphasize their commitment to the People’s Campaign and to the Party’s revolutionary objectives. If the purpose of the campaign was to generate an electoral base and educate the Oakland population, the concept of victory must be re-examined. Within the concentrated areas where the Panthers pinpointed their efforts – in Sections 1 through 8 – Seale and Brown both earned a majority over their opponents. Building political consciousness and support within communities was far from simple. Focusing on these areas allowed the Panthers to rebuild their relationships within Black communities, and work on gaining the trust and support of other minority communities, as well as poor and working-class Whites in Oakland. The section leaders were determined to overcome barriers they faced such as finding and training campaign workers, the logistics of getting volunteers efficiently out into the field and raising money to sustain the campaign efforts. Huey

P. Newton spoke of revolution as a process, which demanded perseverance and determination.

The seed had been planted; it would just have to be nurtured to generate greater support for the

Black Panther Party’s future revolution.

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Conclusion

In anticipation of a landslide victory on 15 May 1973, the Black Panther Party (BPP) had prepared Bobby Seale’s statement:

It is a new day in Oakland, a new day in the world, a day history shall declare was a day of reckoning for humankind, an ending and a beginning. Upon this victory, we shall move to implement concrete ways, a people’s program for this people of this city, and then other cities and counties and states. We shall build upon this firm foundation, and go from victory to victory across this nation, until the principles of freedom and justice for all shall be delivered to all by the power of all, the power of the people.189

The People’s Campaign of 1973 was a critical example of how the Panthers utilized electoral politics as a stepping-stone towards their end goal of revolution. Huey P. Newton argued that revolution was a process, and the election became a vehicle through which the Panthers sought support for the Party and its goal to achieve the revolution. The key to understanding the campaign as a revolutionary tactic—not reformist—was the intention behind the use of electoral politics. The Panthers were striving to control the Port of Oakland and establish a base from which the revolution could be waged. One by one, the Panthers would use the People’s

Campaign as a model to gain control of cities across the United States, until the Party could finally overthrow the governing power and liberate all oppressed people—the BPP’s revolutionary dream realized.

Although a victory would have been ideal, and sped up the process, the Panthers still viewed their campaign as a successful initiative. The loss did not detract from the fact they had begun to generate a base of support. As Elaine Brown wrote in her memoir. “We did win…. The

189 “Election Victory Statement,” n.d. series 2, box 46, folder 5, M0864, Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation Inc. Collection, Special Collections, Green Library, Stanford University (hereafter HPN Collection).

139

Panther constituency had indeed expanded. We had planted our ideas a little deeper. We had established a foundation.”190 The Panthers had begun to win hearts and minds, with 40 percent of the vote to prove it. From the Party’s perspective this symbolized its ability to successfully raise community consciousness.

Since achieving the revolution was not explicitly contingent on winning the 1973 election, the outcome did not affect the continuation of the survival programs or the Section organizing; both continued to operate and expand following the election. However, in 1974, several changes impacted the Party. Seale was expelled by Newton during a heated argument about Seale’s not using violence against his cousin to defend Newton’s honour, an unfounded accusation. Brown explained, “Bobby’s condemnation had nothing to do with his competence or commitment. There was no justification for it. It had to do with [Newton’s] cocaine-boosted rage.”191 Immediately, Brown was appointed chairman and shortly after Newton was arrested for the murder of Kathleen Smith, a seventeen-year-old prostitute. 192After being released on bail, he fled to exile in to avoid returning to prison.193

From 1974-1977, Brown continued to grow the Panthers’ political influence.194 She changed the gender dynamic of the Central Committee of the Party by appointing women:

Norma Armour as the Director of Finance, Ericka Huggins as Director of the Oakland

Community School, and Joan Kelly and Phyllis Jackson who coordinated the survival

190 Elaine Brown, A Taste of Power: A Black Woman’s Story, First Anchor Books Edition (United States: Anchor Books, 1994; New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1992), 327. Citation refers to Anchor Books Edition. 191 Ibid., 353. 192 Ibid., 356-357. 193 Newton returned in 1977 to face trial, which ended with the jury declaring a mistrial in 1979. See Wallace Turner, “Huey Newton Defense Contends a Key Witness Was Real Killer,” NY Times, March 13, 1979 and Cynthia Gorney, “Mistrial Declared in Newton Murder Case,” Washington Post, March, 25, 1979. 194 My use of Chairman is intentional, Brown described herself as Chairman and that is how her position was defined and understood at the time.

140 programs.195 In 1975, Brown again ran for the District 3 Council position, and despite losing, still gained greater support than she had in her run in 1973, winning 44 percent of the vote, as well as the endorsements of major labour organizations such as the United Auto Workers,

Alameda County Central Labour Council, United Farm Workers, and the Teamsters.196 In 1977,

Brown and the Party were actively involved in Lionel Wilson’s mayoral campaign, when Wilson became the first Black mayor of Oakland. Even though Wilson was not a revolutionary or a

Panther, Newton hypothesized that his victory was a means to an end. He told Brown, “Lionel’s the piece that can link together the potential revolutionary force in Oakland. I want you to put him in office. If you do that, we’ll have the setup to make the base for the revolution in

Oakland.”197 Clearly, BPP involvement in electoral politics, at its core, was to make the revolution a possibility.

The People’s Campaign of 1973 had previously not been holistically examined as the continued revolutionary struggle, defined by Newton, and led by the members in the organization. This analysis of the campaign contributes to a growing body of historical literature by expanding not only the general understanding of the Party’s actions and motivations, but a deeper understanding of the organizing tactics utilized after 1971. It also illuminates the contribution of rank-in-file membership from their point of view, which showcased how men and women worked alongside each other in support of a greater purpose, rather than self-defense.

In Chapter 1 a discussion of Oakland’s history set the tone and background for the creation of the Party by Newton and Seale in 1966. It clarifies how the concept of revolution utilized after 1971 was related to the origins of the organization, such as the Ten Point Program,

195 Flores Forbes, Will You Die With Me? My Life and the Black Panther Party, (New York, NY: Atria Books, 2006), 136. 196 Elaine Brown, Taste of Power, 372- 375. 197 Ibid., 400.

141 and in reaction to the unstable relationship Newton felt the Party had created with the Black community. After the split, Newton framed how the election was a viable revolutionary tactic.

By running candidates on a political platform that targeted poverty and racism in Oakland, the

BPP could demonstrate that it was the best option for the people. Voter registration and community engagement were used as tools to activate community consciousness. Once the

Panthers achieved victory, they would establish a revolutionary base and gain access to the Port of Oakland that would enable the Party to continue orchestrating the revolution across the country.

Chapter 2 analyzed how the media and the community grappled with the Panthers’ new approach. Although competing perspectives emerged, many journalists and commentators spoke of the Panthers’ campaign as a change in tactics, not in goals. Newspaper coverage highlighted the organization’s commitment to the protracted revolutionary struggle. Further, the People’s

Campaign message espoused that support for the People’s Candidates would ensure the distribution of wealth and the formation of People’s Programs that would raise the poor and minority communities out of poverty. Seale’s primary opponents—John Reading, Ortho Green, and John Sutter—emphasized the radical threat that the BPP represented. Alluding to Seale and the Party’s past, the opposition campaign messaging emphasized the danger to peace and order a

BPP victory would bring. Overall, the mainstream contemporary opinion was that the Panthers were still a revolutionary organization.

An exploration of how Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown were represented in internal media also framed the tension between gender roles in the Black Power Movement (BPM) and how the Black Panthers affirmed and deviated from gender constructs that had developed within the BPM. Organizations like the Nation of Islam and Maulana Karenga’s Us Organization

142 believed that a woman’s duty was to cook, clean and raise children, while Black men assumed their place as leaders. In turn, it was transformative that the Panthers selected a woman to run for an electoral position; however, the lack of coverage of Elaine Brown as a stand-alone qualified candidate in the Black Panther highlighted the reluctance to showcase the image of a woman seeking power on an equal basis with a man.

The focus of Chapter 3 was on the members of the organization whose labour made the campaign work possible. The campaign initiative made living for the revolution a reality for many people who believed in the Party’s vision. Ordinary revolutionaries were performing what they saw as their duty in the revolutionary struggle: educating the Oakland population in order to create a politically conscious base that would support the future revolution. Without the efforts of Section Leaders, like Roni Hagopian and James Parhms, as well as the dozens of men and women who volunteered, the ability of the Panthers to connect with thousands and register

14,219 people, would have been limited.198 The story of the campaign as seen through the lens of section reports, a bottom-up approach, showed the extreme difficulty faced by many sections, which struggled with gaining and organizing volunteer support, as well as raising the funds needed for campaign operation. It also revealed the concerted efforts made by the Party to connect with the community and understand people’s grievances. Further, an in-depth examination of Sections 1-8, which the Panthers explicitly targeted, showed that they were successful in winning majority support for the Party’s Candidates, both Brown and Seale.

A principal purpose of this research was to contest the assumption that the BPP’s denouncement of self-defense politics marked the transition of the Party from a revolutionary to a non-revolutionary organization. Historians like Joshua Bloom and Waldo Martin have

198 “Voter Registration Counts,” n.d., series 2, box 18, folder 14, HPN Collection.

143 contended that the moment the Panthers deviated from self-defence tactics to pursue change through electoral channels they became social democrats. In 1971, two visions about the future of the Black Panther Party’s pursuit of revolution collided: would it be the ballot or the bullet?

When Eldridge Cleaver defected from the Party, Newton was free to transform the Party’s revolutionary dream and develop new organizing tactics. Ideologically and practically, the

People’s Campaign demonstrated that the one-dimensional conception of revolutionary that fixates on violence can and should be questioned. The Party’s revolutionary intentions that influenced the People’s Campaign challenges preconceived notions that only arming themselves made the Panthers revolutionary.

Historians Peniel Joseph, Rhonda Williams, and Yohuru Williams have argued the necessity to reconceptualize the Black Power Movement (BPM) by deconstructing the dichotomies of the dominant narrative that have ignored the continuities with the Civil Rights

Movement (CRM). The blanket, false characterization of CRM organizing as reformist, non- violent, and integrationist has fueled the fixation of using violence as a defining factor of the

BPM’s radicalism. How the use of specific tactics, like voter registration and electoral organizing, have been used to neatly sort organizations into one camp or the other is directly tied to how the actions of the BPP have been framed. In turn, defining electoral organization as reformist and guns as revolutionary and radical serves the same purpose as reducing the Civil

Rights Movement to nonviolence and the Black Power Movement to violence. Such an approach limits historical analysis of the Black Panther Party, its objectives and agenda, and the Long

Black Freedom Movement more generally.

The ballot was considered a concrete way to create change, which cannot be exclusively associated with revolutionary or reformist organizations. The ideological underpinnings that

144 fueled the People’s Campaign demonstrated the ongoing negotiation within the Long Black

Freedom Movement regarding how radical transformation would be achieved and uncovered the relationship between the Panthers’ revolutionary identity and electoral politics. With their youthful Panther membership amped to bring their vision to life, at the heart of their grassroots campaign was the dedication to help Black, poor, and minorities in Oakland. The odds were inherently against the Panthers from the beginning, but the People’s Campaign was an extension of their commitment to the revolution and what the Panthers believed in: Power to the People.

145

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