The Finnish Army at War Operations and Soldiers, 1939–45
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CHAPTER THREE THE FINNISH ARMY AT WAR OPERATIONS AND SOLDIERS, 1939–45 Pasi Tuunainen In April 1948, Generalissimus Josef Stalin drank a toast to the Finnish Army. He is reported to have remarked: “A country that has a poor army, nobody respects, but a country with a good army, everybody salutes!”1 Stalin’s comment was not just a compliment. He knew what he was talking about, because he had been in charge of the Soviet Union’s war eff orts in World War II. Th e Soviet Union, having over- whelming power and endless resources, could have occupied Finland had it wanted to do so. But, in the end, it did not employ the required amount of both its forces and time to fulfi ll this surprisingly trouble- some military task. Th is had a lot to do with the will of Stalin and the remote geographical location and geopolitical position of Finland; this strategic direction was simply not a priority, but more like “a northern sideshow” for the Soviet Union. Th e Soviet decision to relinquish its plans to occupy Finland, however, was, to a major degree, infl uenced by the military performance of the Finnish Army. Despite the territo- rial losses and defeat in the Winter War and the Continuation War, the Finnish Army was not annihilated and it did not capitulate, neither in March 1940 nor in September 1944. In the research concerning military eff ectiveness and innovative- ness, victory is not the sole criterion for success. Eff ective militaries are those that are able to convert their resources into maximum fi ghting power. Combat eff ectiveness means the quality of performance in the battlefi eld. Other criteria are eff ective command, good initiative and logistics. Th ese are linked with the level of democracy, as the best motivation comes from a soldier’s personal interests, which deter- mine what kind of motivation and control is required to ensure combat eff ectiveness. In short, this eff ectiveness is determined by technical 1 Quoted in U.E. Moisala & Pertti Alanen, Kun hyökkääjän tie suljettiin (Helsinki, 1988), p. 159. 140 pasi tuunainen elements of the military system (military justice, tactics, administra- tion, organization and command) combined with the psychological aspects of the motivational system (morale, primary group cohesion and motivation).2 In this chapter the reader is fi rst introduced to the complexities of events on the fronts of the Winter War, the Continuation War and the Lapland War. Th e two fi rst sections of the chapter are dedicated to the chronology of main military events for Finland in 1939–45. Th e chap- ter seeks to discuss the Finnish military art with a clear focus on the operational level of land warfare. Th e conclusion that the Finnish Army performed reasonably well in World War II requires an explanation. In the third section of the chapter, combat eff ectiveness and motivation are, therefore, analyzed by utilizing military sociological and social psychology viewpoints. I. Th e Winter War, 1939–40 Prewar Preparations and Resources Th e Soviet Union had made operational plans related to Finland dur- ing the 1920s, and since 1930 its objective had been to take over the whole of Finland. Th e Leningrad Military District was strengthened in 1938, and soon the preparations for an invasion of Finland got under way. In June 1939, Stalin gave orders to check war plans for an off en- sive. He approved the plans before the signing of the Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939. Th e Red Army concentrations of the attacking troops were initiated in September 1939, and the fi nal attack order was issued on 15 November 1939. Th e objective was to annihilate the Finnish Army and swift ly occupy the country.3 2 Allen R. Millett, Williamson Murray & Kenneth H. Watman, “Th e Eff ectiveness of Military Organizations,” in Military Eff ectiveness: Th e First World War (London, 1988), p. 2; Dan Reiter & Allan C. Stam, “Democracy and Battlefi eld Military Eff ectiveness,” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 42 (1998): 3, pp. 259–77; John A. Lynn, Th e Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–94 (Westport, CT, 1996), pp. 21–3. 3 Ohto Manninen, Miten Suomi valloitetaan: Puna-armeijan operaatiosuunnitelmat 1939–1944 (Helsinki, 2008), pp. 29–32, 36–40. A shorter version of Manninen’s study is available in English, Ohto Manninen, Th e Soviet Plans for the North Western Th eatre of Operations in 1939–1944 (Helsinki, 2004); Sampo Ahto, “Talvisota,” in Sotien vuodet 1939–1945 (Pori, 2009), p. 31..