Anti-Qatar Embargo Grinds Toward Strategic Failure

ISSUE BRIEF 01.22.18 Anti-Qatar Embargo Grinds Toward Strategic Failure

Gabriel Collins, J.D., Baker Botts Fellow in Energy & Environmental Regulatory Affairs, Center for Energy Studies

“The experience of the past thus clearly suggests that blockades or embargoes do not always produce the results originally sought when the decision for action was made.” —Robert A. Doughty and Harold E. Raugh Jr., “Embargoes in Historical Perspective”1

Centuries of history reveal a simple Many of the same countries embargoing strategic truth: embargoes and blockades Qatar are also blockading Yemen, and frequently fail to coerce states into making after more than two years they have still policy changes sought by the embargoing been unable to force a decisive strategic countries and often create unintended resolution, despite intensive use of military consequences.2 Embargoing Qatar was a force. The evidence suggests that even risky decision without a clear endgame an embargo lasting multiple years would that does not appear to have taken into likely still fail to coerce Qatar into making account the ample—and easily accessible— the concessions desired by the embargoing historical records of the many campaigns countries. that have failed, as well as those that The list of 13 demands presented succeeded.3 The reality is that when the in June 2017 by the anti-Qatar coalition— target of an embargo or blockade (1) Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the has a small population, (2) is exquisitely United Arab Emirates (UAE), or “the Anti- Centuries of history well-resourced, (3) is not substantially Terror Quartet” (“the quartet”)—suggests reveal a simple strategic dependent on the embargoing countries a supremely ambitious set of goals behind truth: embargoes and as trade partners for goods that cannot be the embargo, including “red lines” that obtained from other sources, (4) has access touch directly upon Qatari sovereignty and blockades frequently to seaborne commerce, and (5) has had that Doha will almost certainly reject.5 fail to coerce states significant time and warning to prepare The stage is thus set for a contest of into making policy for exactly such a contingency, the action endurance, one that with every passing changes sought by against it will very likely fail to coerce it month looks more likely to result in favor into making the concessions sought by of Qatar. The embargo and its slow-motion the embargoing the embargoers. strategic failure have already unleashed countries and often Even when the target is vulnerable— consequences that will haunt the region create unintended such as Saddam-era Iraq—economic for decades to come, and more effects will consequences. embargoes generally take significant time to become clear as time rolls on. work. Research by sanctions experts before This issue brief provides evidence of the first Gulf War suggests that embargoes the anti-Qatar blockade’s trajectory from aimed at achieving “ambitious” goals can initial shock to emerging strategic failure take at least two years to succeed, and using actual market data. It also discusses additional evidence accumulated since then potential paths forward, and the economic does not undermine their basic conclusion.4 and security ramifications of those options. RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 01.22.18

procured from many other sources. Less THE INITIAL SHOCK easily replaceable goods—such as gas A significant portion of the initial shock turbines and critical technology components caused by the quartet’s embargo came for liquefied natural gas (LNG) liquefaction through disruptions to Qatar’s food supply, plants—are sourced outside the Gulf region most of which was imported and came by and generally lie beyond the reach of the land from Saudi Arabia. These routes were anti-Qatar coalition. Of equal importance, immediately cut off when the embargo Qatar’s key LNG buyers lie outside the Gulf began and motivated drastic initial region, and those that can supply advanced responses, including airlifting dairy cattle to technology goods—such Japan, China, and replace milk supplies lost when the Saudis South Korea—all have compelling strategic closed the border, as well as shipping food interests in seeing Qatar remain a stable from Iran and Turkey.6 baseload global energy supplier. Qatar’s trade patterns bolster its embargo resistance. In 2016, slightly more QATAR’S RESPONSE than 15% of Qatari imports came from the blockading countries, a small enough share The embargo’s initial effects on both the that building new trade networks to replace personal and economy-wide levels were those lost imports in a fairly short time is a palpable. Worried residents crowded into realistic possibility (Figure 1). grocery stores, while central bank reserves The “rapid rebuild” thesis is enhanced and foreign liquidity declined significantly by the fact that much of what Qatar imports as depositors from the quartet pulled funds from its neighbors—food and basic material from Qatari banks.7 The average value of supplies—are highly fungible and can be properties sold spiked to a near-term high of more than 26 million Qatari riyals (QAR) in June 2017, perhaps reflecting a sellout by FIGURE 1 — THE BLOCKADING COUNTRIES’ SHARE OF TOTAL QATARI wealthy asset owners from Saudi Arabia, IMPORTS AND EXPORTS (2000–2016) the UAE, and other states seeking to reduce or eliminate their real property holdings in 25% Qatar (Figure 2). New car registrations—a proxy for car sales—also declined sharply in the wake 20% of the blockade, falling from 2.8 per 1,000 residents in May 2017 to 1.8 per 1,000 residents in June and 1.6 per 1,000 residents 15% in July of the same year (Figure 3). These levels are the lowest seen in more than two years and indicate dented consumer 10% confidence, since new vehicles are big- ticket items that often require a household to commit tens of thousands of dollars—a 5% material portion of household disposable income, even in a wealthy society like Qatar’s. Vehicle sales had already been 0 on a gradual downward trend prior to the

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 blockade as the local car market matured and roads became saturated with traffic. Imports from blockading countries as % of total Nonetheless, the sharp departure from trend Exports to blockading countries as % of total after the embargo was imposed suggests that it has impacted consumer confidence, SOURCE Observatory of Economic Complexity at least in the short-term.

2 ANTI-QATAR EMBARGO GRINDS TOWARD STRATEGIC FAILURE

Announcement of LNG Capacity Expansion FIGURE 2 — MONTHLY PROPERTY SALES IN QATAR Since Qatar is the lowest-cost global LNG supplier, its July 2017 announcement that it 30 800 would expand LNG export capacity to 100 million tonnes per year (up from 77 million) 700 25 was largely a warning shot across the bow of competing exporters. But it also served 600 other strategic purposes by (1) affirming the 20 500 country’s systemic importance to global gas markets and (2) demonstrating that even in a 15 400 low price environment, the country’s revenue generation potential would continue to be 300 Properties Sold capable of underpinning its sovereignty and 10 economic capacity to withstand exogenous Millions of Qatari Riyals (QAR) 200 financial pressures, including embargoes by 5 neighboring powers. 100 To put the planned capacity expansion into a strategic perspective, consider the 0 0 following: Qatar plans to expand LNG output by 23 million tonnes per year. At a sale price SEP 2014NOV 2014JAN 2015MAR 2015MAY 2015JULY 2015SEP 2015NOV 2015JAN 2016MAR 2016MAY 2016JULY 2016SEP 2016NOV 2016JAN 2017MAR 2017MAY 2017JULY 2017SEPT 2017 of $5 per million BTU and with each tonne of Average value of properties sold (QAR) Number of properties sold LNG containing 51.7 million BTU of energy, this would translate into nearly $6 billion per SOURCE Qatar’s Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics year in incremental revenue from gas alone. Condensate and natural gas liquids produced alongside the methane would likely add significant additional revenues, since these products are generally more valuable than FIGURE 3 — NEW VEHICLE REGISTRATIONS PER 1,000 RESIDENTS natural gas on an energy content basis. IN QATAR BY MONTH In 2016, Qatar imported about $5 billion in goods and services from the countries 6 now embargoing it and exported roughly

$5.6 billion of goods and services to them. 5 This suggests in purely economic terms that the incremental revenue gains from the planned LNG capacity expansion could 4 offset more than half of the combined loss of bilateral trade caused by the embargo. 3 The offset effect is enhanced by the fact that a material portion of Qatar’s trade with the embargoing bloc comes through its gas 2 June 2017 — Embargo imposed, new car sales to the UAE via the Dolphin Pipeline— registrations fall by 36% year-over-year the region’s first cross-border gas supply 1 project, which can supply approximately 2 billion cubic feet of gas per day to the UAE. The Dolphin project is integral to UAE energy 0 and water supply security and, despite the embargo against Qatar, continues supplying SEP 2014NOV 2014JAN 2015MAR 2015MAY 2015JULY 2015SEP 2015NOV 2015JAN 2016MAR 2016MAY 2016JULY 2016SEP 2016NOV 2016JAN 2017MAR 2017MAY 2017JULY 2017SEP 2017 gas to the UAE.8 Future demand for Qatari gas could be reduced by domestic discoveries SOURCE Qatar’s Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics and alternative energy supplies, such as the 2,400 megawatt Hassyan coal power station now under construction in Dubai.9 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 01.22.18

per year in June 2017 to a high of $125,200 FIGURE 4 — QATAR AND RUSSIA FIVE-YEAR CDS SPREAD VS. BRENT per year in early July 2017. This cost has CRUDE OIL PRICES since fallen back to approximately $102,000 per year (101.89 basis points) (Figure 4).10 1,200 $160 Oil prices crash, Yet this upward bump pales in sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and EU $140 comparison to how markets priced default 1,000 risk in the wake of the global oil price Saudi-led coalition imposes embargo $120 collapse in late 2008 and early 2009, on Qatar 800 when it cost as much as $381,000 per year $100 (annualized) to insure $10 million in five- year debt against default. The historical 600 $80 context provided by the credit default swap

Basis Points (CDS) data—particularly when compared to $60 400 other resource exporter countries such as Russia—reveals three important facts: $40 1. First and foremost, global investors do 200 $20 not view the Saudi-led embargo as an existential threat. 0 $0 2. Sudden, sharp commodity price drops 2011 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 impact markets’ perception of Qatari credit-worthiness much more than trade Brent Crude (USD/bbl) Qatar Five-year CDS Russia Five-year CDS warfare by regional actors.

SOURCES Bloomberg, author’s own analysis 3. Although default risk is generally inversely correlated with oil price movements in major exporters—even Furthermore, even without an increase in the event of major commodity price in LNG exports, the “lost” trade volumes declines—Qatar’s credit risk profile caused by the embargo do not just changes much less per dollar decline in disappear. Rather, they are likely temporary oil prices than is the case for other major disruptions that will be replaced over time exporters such as Russia or Mexico. as Qatar builds relationships with new

trading partners. The price spread between Qatar’s 10-year term treasury bonds and 10-year MORE SIGNALS OF FAILURE: US Treasury bonds also reflects market MARKETS BELIEVE COMMODITY perceptions of risk. And once again, this PRICES POSE A MUCH GREATER metric also supports the notion that crude oil and commodity prices to have a far RISK TO QATAR’S ECONOMY THAN stronger effect on Qatar’s international THE EMBARGO financial risk profile than adverse actions Financial markets recognize Qatar’s by its neighbors (Figure 5). fundamentally strong position, and traders are pricing a future that sees WHAT IT TAKES FOR AN EMBARGO Doha successfully resisting the embargo. TO WORK IN THE GULF REGION Credit default swap prices for five-year Qatari sovereign debt (basically, insurance The most recent successful use of economic payments in case of default that serve as a warfare in the Gulf region was the US-led proxy for economic stress) spiked in early sanctions campaign that helped bring Iran to July 2017 immediately after the embargo the nuclear negotiating table and ultimately was imposed. The cost of insuring $10 culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan million of five-year Qatari debt rose from an of Action signed in Vienna in July 2015.11 annualized rate of approximately $88,000 4 ANTI-QATAR EMBARGO GRINDS TOWARD STRATEGIC FAILURE

The sanctions regime ultimately worked for Quartet lobbying efforts against Qatar three fundamental reasons: are likely to fail. Chairman of the US Senate 1. The US and the EU—whose members are Committee on Foreign Relations Bob Corker collectively a cornerstone market for is deeply critical of the quartet’s blockade Iranian oil—presented a united diplomatic of Qatar, noting that “when you live in glass front, and EU members agreed to houses, you shouldn't throw stones,” and is embargo Iranian crude shipments. unlikely to support Senate passage of House bills aimed at sanctioning Qatar.15 Sen. 2. Nearly all crude oil traded globally is priced Corker has also publicly pledged to block in US dollars, which means that there must further US arms sales to GCC countries until be a dollar-clearing function in order for there is a clear diplomatic path to resolving transactions to occur. The “pecunia franca” the crisis.16 Finally, as with the blockade status of the dollar gave the US enormous itself, time is not on the quartet’s side on jurisdictional leverage and allowed it to cut Capitol Hill either, since additional time off dollar-clearing transactions for Iranian provides more opportunities for members oil that touched US soil. of Congress to properly comprehend 3. The United States’ massive global Doha’s strategic importance to US interests financial heft—both from the size of its across the broader Middle East. The upside domestic market and its financial power of all this is that despite the dogfight in projection through the omnipresence of Washington, Qatari assets and financial the dollar in oil markets—allowed it to activities in Europe, Asia, Australia, and present buyers of Iranian crude oil and North America are likely safe—even if the financial institutions that facilitated such quartet seeks to escalate its economic transactions with a stark choice: either warfare campaign. cease doing business with Iran, or face exclusion from the US and associated portions of the global financial FIGURE 5 — SPREAD BETWEEN QATARI 10-YEAR BONDS AND architecture.12 10-YEAR US TREASURY BONDS VS. BRENT CRUDE OIL PRICES

Unlike the US, quartet members lack 2.50 $140 offensive global financial power projection capacity. The recent Saudi anti-corruption 2.25 $120 actions are prima facie evidence of this, as 2.00 the Saudis had to apprehend the person first in order to capture the money. In 1.75 $100 contrast, the US can track, freeze, and 1.50 interdict financial assets around the world $80 with the alleged perpetrator in absentia. 1.25 $60 As such, Qatar’s opponents will likely find 1.00 it extremely difficult to exert offensive Points Percentage financial pressure anywhere beyond the 0.75 $40 immediate geographic region. 0.50 A lack of extraterritorial reach may help $20 explain a recent surge in quartet members’ 0.25 lobbying activities in Washington, D.C., where 0 $0 successful influence over US legislation could effectively harness American power JUN 2014SEP 2014DEC 2014 JUN 2015SEP 2015DEC 2015 JUN 2016SEP 2016DEC 2016 JUN 2017SEP 2017 to serve their own narrow strategic goals.13 MAR 2015 MAR 2016 MAR 2017 Some quartet lobbying efforts appear to be Qatar 2026 bonds (in USD) spread over 10-year US Treasury bonds (percentage points) influencing certain legislators, as suggested Brent crude, CO 1 contract (USD/bbl) by the text of House Resolution 2712, a.k.a. the “Palestinian International Terrorism SOURCES Bloomberg, author’s own analysis Support Prevention Act of 2017.”14 5 RICE UNIVERSITY'S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 01.22.18

From this point, the embargo could ECONOMIC AND SECURITY remain in place for years and Qatar IMPLICATIONS could very likely withstand the effects When embargoes prove ineffective, this with decreasing impact each year as forces the embargoing countries to either it increasingly emphasizes economic back off, maintain an ineffective campaign, relationships outside the Gulf region. For or escalate, often using military force.17 Such instance, Qatar is net self-sufficient in an outcome can ultimately undermine the steel production (including rebar critical embargoing countries’ diplomatic influence. for construction as it prepares for the 2022 20 In the current case, rivalry between Arab World Cup). Likewise, the new Hamad neighbors has likely permanently damaged Port—capable of storing enough cereal the GCC, creating a large set of strategic grains to satisfy multiple years of local The embargo and its consumption, able to handle more than 3.5 slow-motion strategic openings that Iran can exploit. The chances of a negotiated settlement million 40-foot shipping containers per year, failure have already appear low for the foreseeable future. The and able to accept 1.7 million tonnes per year unleashed consequences blockade against Qatar is on the wrong in general cargo—is already replacing import that will haunt the end of powerful diplomatic and strategic trade that formerly came by land from Saudi Arabia and by sea from the UAE.21 region for decades to dynamics and is likely to weaken as time progresses. Yet escalating pressure against To the extent that incremental supplies come, and more effects Qatar also does not seem a realistic option, of cement, certain steel products, and will become clear since moving the embargo from its current other goods may be needed for World Cup as time rolls on. footing into a bona fide blockade backed by 2022 and other projects, seaborne supplies military force would likely trigger a strong procured from India, Iran, and Turkey— reaction from Washington. The September among other potential partners—can very 28 meeting between US Secretary of likely fill any gaps left by the cessation of Defense James Mattis and Emir of Qatar land shipments from Qatar’s neighbors. Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani at the Al The embargo is now passing from Udeid Air Base highlights Qatar’s strategic the phase in which original motivations importance to American interests and also mattered into a new realm that is much carries important symbolic weight, given more about hard, cold, long-term Mattis’ apparent influence with President consequences. As the anti-Qatar coalition’s Donald Trump.18 Likewise, Al Udeid remains campaign grinds on, these consequences Financial markets deeply enmeshed in the fabric of US air will begin to reveal themselves more fully. We do not know how the embargo will recognize Qatar’s campaigns in the region, with video footage from November 2017 showing a B-52 culminate and precisely what the long- fundamentally strong bomber taking off from the base to bomb term consequences and ramifications will position, and traders heroin production facilities in southern be. But past uses of economic warfare are pricing a future that Afghanistan.19 demonstrate a range of unpleasant and unanticipated surprises ranging from the sees Doha successfully loss of influence of a failed embargoer, resisting the embargo. CONCLUSION to potential domestic political instability, to escalation as one or both sides seek to At this point, it is difficult to envision Qatar break out of a strategic stalemate. As the making unilateral concessions that could embargo continues, diplomatic and political lead to the embargo being lifted. The worst relationships between many Arab countries of the post-blockade capital flight is likely will likely suffer further damage, and Iran’s over, the country is rebuilding its trade links relative influence in the region will likely rise and food supply chain to bypass imports as a result. The ultimate consequences of previously obtained via Saudi Arabia and increased Iranian influence across the region the UAE, and LNG exports remain robust, remain debatable, but from the perspective underpinning Qatari cash flow. of the countries embargoing Qatar as well as that of the United States, this is clearly an unintended consequence. 6 ANTI-QATAR EMBARGO GRINDS TOWARD STRATEGIC FAILURE

milk-boycott-dairy-flown-in-airlift- ENDNOTES boycott-a7836786.html; see also “Qatar 1. Col. Robert A. Doughty and Maj. receives 3000 tonnes of food products from Harold E. Raugh Jr., “Embargoes in Historical Turkey through Hamad Port,” The Peninsula, Perspective,” Parameters 21, no. 1 (Spring July 5, 2017, https://www.thepeninsulaqatar. 1991): 21-30. com/article/05/07/2017/Qatar-receives- 2. See Doughty and Raugh. Please also 3000-tonnes-of-food-products-from- see Carla Anne Robbins, “Why Economic Turkey-through-Hamad-Port. Sanctions Rarely Work,” Bloomberg 7. Zahraa Alkhalisi, “Qatar burns $38 Businessweek, May 24, 2013, https://www. billion in reserves as boycott bites,” CNN bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-23/ Money, September 14, 2017, http://money. why-economic-sanctions-rarely-work; cnn.com/2017/09/14/news/economy/qatar- and David T. Cunningham, “The Naval isolation-economy-reserves/index.html. Blockade: A Study of Factors Necessary for 8. Tom Finn and Rania El Gamal, “Qatar Effective Utilization” (master’s thesis, Army has no plan to shut Dolphin gas pipeline to Command and General Staff College, June UAE despite rift: sources,” Reuters, June 6, 1987), http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/ 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-gulf-qatar-gas/qatar-has-no-plan- pdf?AD=ADA185939, which show the record As the embargo of a broad sample of physical blockades over to-shut-dolphin-gas-pipeline-to-uae- a period of multiple centuries. despite-rift-sources-idUSKBN18X1WA. continues, diplomatic 3. See, for instance, Gary Clyde Hufbauer 9. “DEWA begins construction of and political relationships et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd 2,400MW Hassyan clean coal power between many Arab station,” Power, November 9, 2016, http:// ed. (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for countries will likely International Economics, 2009). www.powermag.com/press-releases/ 4. Kimberly Elliott, Gary Hufbauer, dewa-begins-construction-of-2400mw- suffer further damage, and Jeffrey Schott, “The Big Squeeze: hassyan-clean-coal-power-station/. and Iran’s relative Why the Sanctions on Iraq Will Work,” 10. For reference, 100 basis points influence in the region equal 1 percentage point. To demonstrate The Washington Post, December 9, 1990, will likely rise as a result. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ how basis points translate into dollar archive/opinions/1990/12/09/the-big- amounts when assessing credit default swap squeeze-why-the-sanctions-on-iraq- payments, 100 basis points or 1% of $10 will-work/15eb0221-6315-4d0f-9839- million is $100,000. 7644cb74035e/?utm_term=.d3d219d3955b. 11. “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” 5. Zainab Fattah, “Qatar’s Emir Defiant Vienna, Austria, July 14, 2015, http://eeas. as Dispute With Saudi-led Bloc Drags On,” europa.eu/archives/docs/statements- Bloomberg, October 30, 2017, https://www. eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint- bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-30/ comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf. qatar-s-emir-defiant-as-dispute-with- 12. Juan C. Zarate, Treasury’s War: saudi-led-bloc-drags-on. For the 13 The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial demands, see Patrick Wintour, “Qatar given Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013). 10 days to meet 13 sweeping demands by 13. See, for instance, Theodoric Meyer Saudi Arabia,” The Guardian, June 23, 2017, and Nahal Toosi, “Lobbyists cash in on https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ dispute between Qatar, Saudi Arabia,” jun/23/close-al-jazeera-saudi-arabia- Politico, July 19, 2017, https://www.politico. issues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end- com/story/2017/07/19/lobbyists-cash-in- blockade. on-qatar-240735. 6. Mohammed Sergie, “Qatar crisis: 14. The text of the bill can be found at First batch of dairy cows airlifted to sidestep https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr2712/ Saudi-led blockade,” The Independent, BILLS-115hr2712ih.pdf. July 12, 2017, http://www.independent. co.uk/news/business/news/qatar-crisis- latest-news-cows-saudi-arabia-doha-

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15. Joe Gould, “Corker chides Saudi Arabia, UAE over terror ties amid Qatar row,” ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Defense News, June 30, 2017, https://www. The author thanks Nosa James for research defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/06/30/ assistance and support of this analysis, as corker-chides-saudi-arabia-uae-over- well as two Middle East experts who offered terror-ties-amid-qatar-row/. commentary. 16. Text of Sen. Corker’s letter to US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson dated June 26, 2017, is available at https:// AUTHOR www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/6.26.17%20GCC%20Letter.pdf. Gabriel Collins, J.D., is the Baker Botts 17. Consider, for instance, the 2003 Fellow in Energy & Environmental invasion of Iraq, which came after more Regulatory Affairs for the Baker Institute than a decade of sanctions and an embargo Center for Energy Studies. He was previously maintained through multiple channels, an associate attorney at Baker Hostetler, including periodic military force, failed to LLP, and is the co-founder of the China coerce Saddam Hussein into renouncing SignPost™ analysis portal. Collins has Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction worked in government and as a private development programs. sector global commodity analyst and 18. “Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis investment advisor, authoring more than visits Al Udeid Air Base,” Defense Video 100 commodity analysis reports for both Imagery Distribution System, September private clients and publications. 28, 2017, https://www.dvidshub.net/ image/3822694/secretary-defense-jim- mattis-visits-al-udeid-air-base. Al-Udeid is a large airbase in Qatar that hosts more than 10,000 U.S. personnel and is a hub for U.S. See more issue briefs at: military air operations in Southwest Asia. www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs 19. See, for instance, “The BUFF Load And Go From Al Udeid Air Base,” https:// This publication was written by a researcher (or researchers) who www.youtube.com/watch?v=ICAGUVxjXGU. participated in a Baker Institute project. 20. See “Steel Statistical Yearbook Wherever feasible, this research is 2017,” World Steel Association, https:// reviewed by outside experts before it is www.worldsteel.org/en/dam/jcr:3e275c73- released. However, the views expressed 6f11-4e7f-a5d8-23d9bc5c508f/ herein are those of the individual Steel+Statistical+Yearbook+2017.pdf. author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s 21. “Hamad Port set to open tomorrow,” Baker Institute for Public Policy. The Peninsula, September 4, 2017, https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/ © 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute article/04/09/2017/Hamad-Port-set-to- for Public Policy open-tomorrow. See also John Davison,

This material may be quoted or “Gulf crisis a ‘blessing in disguise’ for Qatar reproduced without prior permission, seaport,” Reuters, June 15, 2017, https:// provided appropriate credit is given to www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar-port/ the author and Rice University’s Baker gulf-crisis-a-blessing-in-disguise-for- Institute for Public Policy. qatar-seaport-idUSL8N1JC2LJ.

Cite as: Collins, Gabriel. 2018. Anti-Qatar Embargo Grinds Toward Strategic Failure. Issue brief no. 01.22.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.