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Issue Brief V
Dragon in the Desert: China’s growth strategy in the Middle East
Arjun Gidwani Research Intern,
Chennai Centre for China Studies
December 23 2019
About the Author
Arjun Gidwani is currently an International Business Analyst based in Hyderabad and has more than 10 years of experience in Market Research, Industry and Sector Analysis, Trade analysis, Macroeconomic forecasting and Financial Analysis. He has earned his post- graduate degree from the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT), Delhi and has also completed his studies in Advertising Management and Public Relations from MICA, Ahmedabad. Specializing in research and strategy, he has worked on market entry strategies for Indian manufacturing companies into new geographic markets with a focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, revenue generation strategies for a Hyderabad based consultancy, and has been a member of the policy drafting Race Committee for the Dubai World Cup – Horseracing.
About C3S
The Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S), registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act 1975 (83/2008 dated 4th April 2008), is a non-profit public policy think tank. We carry out in depth studies of developments relating to China with priority to issues of interest to India such as geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics of India-China relations, Chinas internal dynamics, border issues, Chinas relations with South Asian countries, prospects of trade, the evolution of Chinese politics and its impact on India and the world, ASEAN and SAARC relations, cultural links, etc. C3S attempts to provide a forum for dialogue with China scholars in India and abroad and give space for the expression of alternate opinions on China related topics. We also provide a database for research on China with special attention to information available in Chinese language. Additionally, events, lecture discussions and seminars are organised on topics of current interest.
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Abstract
In the last few years the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made great efforts to expand its strategic presence and its economic clout in the Middle East Region. Prior to this, China’s involvement in the Middle East was relatively passive and restricted to mainly two strategic priorities: 1. The sale of arms to client countries in the Middle East Region, with the most obvious and conspicuous client being the Islamic Republic of Iran. 2. Acquisition of the Middle East Region’s energy resources to fuel the Chinese Economy expansion.
This article studies China’s drive for regional importance in the Middle East which is extremely consequential to the future of the Middle East and its relations with its major partners in the subcontinent, namely India. Also, China’s drive to establish regional supremacy in the Middle East is the least reported. Through this article, we will understand China’s approach to its Middle East strategy in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the pillar of its foreign policy. The article also gives brief insight into India’s current strategic involvement in the Middle East, its progress and the challenges it faces. The article concludes with brief note on the way ahead for India.
Chinese presence in the Middle East: An Overview:
In the last few years the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made tremendous efforts to expand its strategic presence and its economic clout in the Middle East Region. Chinese growth in the Middle East is of prime importance to Middle Eastern countries and their trading partners as China holds the power to reshape regional markets. This happens as the local governments reorient their economies to take advantage of the Chinese outreach and initiatives. Up till a few years ago, China’s engagement in the Middle East was relatively passive and was restricted to two main strategic priorities: 1. The sale of arms to client countries in the Middle East region, with the most obvious and conspicuous client being the Islamic Republic of Iran. 2. Acquisition of the Middle East region’s energy resources to fuel Chinese economic expansion
A few indicators of the recent explosion in China’s involvement in the Middle East are: - Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visits to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran in 2016 followed by a visit in 2018 to the UAE with the view to reinforce the strategic importance of the Middle East Region to China - The Saudi monarch, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s visit to Beijing in 2017, where MOUs were signed with President Xi Jinping exploring USD 65 billion in JVs. - Pledging of USD 23 billion in loans and development aid to the countries in the Middle East region by Chinese officials in the July 2018 Ministerial Meeting of the China – Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASF). A decade ago, the Middle East region as a whole received just USD 1 billion in total Chinese annual investment. - China’s involvement in many infrastructure and construction projects in the region such as the Madinat Al Hareer (Silk City) project in Kuwait and the Port of Duqm in Oman.
The Rationale: China’s Foreign Policy
The Belt and Road Initiative has become the central pillar of China’s foreign policy. It is a series of hard and soft infrastructure projects consisting of the Silk Road Economic Belt, an overland route across Eurasia, and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative traversing the Indian Ocean Region. Though the BRI was conceived as a means of addressing a shortage of infrastructure investments in Asia, its main focus is on expanding China’s influence and power across Asia into Middle East, Africa and Europe. As its assets and interests increase in states where it has traditionally played an insignificant role, China’s foreign policy transitions from being that of a regional power to that of a global power.
The Middle East Strategy
The Middle East, outside of the Asia-Pacific, is the most important region for China. China’s strategy in the Middle East is driven by its economic interests. The Middle East is a strategic location as it connects China, through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean and Europe, thereby providing access to economic markets around the world. The region is also, an area of expanding economic ties and a very critical source in fulfilling China’s energy needs. With its sights set on establishing itself as a superpower in the eyes of the Middle Eastern countries, China has adopted a strategy that emphasizes the maintenance of positive relations with all the countries in the region without getting overtly involved in the various conflicts in the region.
Image Courtesy: Business times
Economic Interests
China is the top oil customer of both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and imports half of its oil from Middle East and North Africa. As per the International Atomic Energy Agency, China is expected to double its imports from the region by 2035. The stage was set for a higher profile growth in the economic relationship between China and the Middle East with the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. At the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of Communist Party in China, the Middle East was designated a “neighbor” region by Beijing. The signifies that the region falls into China’s top priority geostrategic zone. Energy, infrastructure and construction, new energy sources, finance, agriculture and investment in nuclear power forms the focus of China’s trade and investment in the region involving the Gulf Countries.
Central Node of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI): IRAN Strategic Importance:
The central node in the Belt and Road Initiative for China in the Middle East has been the Islamic Republic of Iran and this can be observed by the growing number of Chinese factories, road, rail and port projects there. There is already a direct freight train between China and Iran. The route is referred to as the New Silk Road and it stretches 2300 kms from Urumqi in western China’s Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region to Tehran, connecting Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan cutting transportation from 45 to 50 days (by sea) to 14 to 15 days. As a part of the global New Silk Road, China is also building a 926 km railroad from Tehran to the eastern city of Mashhad, Iran’s primary pilgrimage site. The proposed period for the construction of the electrified railway by China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation (which is an SOE – State Owned Enterprise), is four years. On completion it will reduce the travel time from 12 hours to 6 hours and increase transportation capacity to 25 million passengers and 10 million tons of cargo per year
Global Policy Challenges:
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
Under US and UN sanctions that preceded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), China, despite being affected, continued its trade and oil imports from Iran. This resulted in many Chinese banks and companies being sanctioned themselves. Till the JCPOA was concluded in July 2015, China developed its plans for the BRI megaproject circumventing Iran so as to not be the target of sanctions. Post the conclusion of the JCPOA, China changed course, re-planning its initial BRI routes. The central land and sea routes were to cross Iranian territory recognizing Iran’s strategic central position between Asia on one side and Europe and Africa on the other. Following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, many Chinese enterprises were cautious about getting involved in the Iranian Economy. Despite this, the Chinese government, public and even some of its major private firms signed several billion dollars’ worth of contracts with their Iranian counterparts. The Chinese – Iranian businesses grew especially in the oil, gas and auto industries.
Re-Imposition of US Sanctions
China was purchasing 650,000 barrels per day of Iran’s crude at the time the US sanctions were re-imposed i.e, 7% of total Chinese imports est. at USD 15 billion. On the eve of the imposition of sanctions in November 2018, the US announced that eight nations would be exempted from the sanctions. The countries announced eventually were India, China, South Korea, Japan, Italy, Turkey, Greece and Taiwan. This waiver would be applicable for six months. As they had not got the waivers by November, Chinese oil giants Sinopec and CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) stopped loading Iranian oil in November 2018. This was resumed once the US waiver was received which allowed them to buy 360,000 barrels per day for 6 months, an amount which was half of what was being imported at the time of the announcement of sanctions. Apart from oil purchases, the sanctions have had an impact on oil and gas development projects.
South Pars Project
The CNPC became the dominant investor in November 2018 in plans for expansion of South Pars, the world’s largest gas field after French giant Total withdrew from the project in August 2018. Unfortunately for Iran CNPC suspended the deal in the following month amidst mounting pressure from US sanctions.
China’s future with Iran
As targets of rising US antagonism, the natural transition course in the China – Iran relationship is towards closer cooperation on economic matters. According to a Press Tv report, in November 2019, a Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture (TCCIMA) delegation visited Beijing and an arrangement was agreed upon under which barter trade would be carried out with Iran both through mainland China and Hong Kong. Iran and China are currently working out a barter system for trade that aims to bypass restrictions on dollar denominated transactions imposed by US sanctions. It is also reported that China is keen on investing in Iran’s early return mineral and agricultural plans and in Iran’s power plant projects. Chinese travel agencies have also, reportedly, announced their readiness in turning Iran into a destination for Chinese tourists in order to channel a portion of the revenue to Iran. President Xi Jinping had stated earlier this year that China’s resolve to develop the comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran would remain unchanged irrespective of changes in the international and regional situations.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Middle East Investments:
The Belt and Road Initiative projects being implemented in the Gulf countries are of two types: a. Projects that support the Gulf domestic development programs or what is referred to as the Gulf “Vision” plans. b. Projects that build regional connectivity
The latter type of projects in the Middle East reveal a bit more of China’s larger strategy of positioning itself as a global heavyweight.
The Gulf “Vision” Projects
There are many Chinese state-owned enterprises and private firms contracted to several projects across the Gulf region. The history of construction in this region predates the BRI. As per the estimates of Heritage Foundation, Chinese companies had tendered contracts worth USD 30 billion in the Arab Gulf States between 2005 and 2014. Some of the key domestic development projects are: Saudi Arabia: - Light railway connecting Jeddah to Mecca and Medina - The Yanbu refinery - The Middle East’s largest power plant, Yanbu III power plant
Qatar: - The Lusail Stadium, the opening and closing venue for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, is a joint project with China Railway Construction Corporation Limited and a Qatari contractor HBK Contracting Co. W.L.L. - MoU with China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) and QTerminals for the Expansion of Hamad Port in Doha - Construction of a mega reservoir as part of the Qatar General Electricity & Water Corporation’s (Kahramaa) project
UAE: - In Dubai, a Chinese-Saudi bid (Shanghai Electric and ACWA Power respectively) was awarded the contract to build an extension (the 4th phase) of DEWA’s (Dubai Electricity and Water Authority) Mohammed bin Rashid Solar Park - China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) is building Zawaya a mixed-used (blend of residential, commercial, institutional, entertainment) advancement in the Dubai Motor City
All over the Arabian Peninsula, Chinese firms are involved in projects supporting the infrastructure and construction plans of the Gulf States.
Regional Connectivity Projects
The projects are aligned with official policy documents of the BRI and China’s approach to the Arab world outlined in the “Arab Policy Paper” of 2016. These projects also feature in Chinese initiatives with a focus on China-Middle East Cooperation, which are not discussed about enough, like the “Industrial Park- Port Interconnection, Two Wheel and Two Wing Approach” plan. “Two Wheel” refers to the cooperation between the Oil & Gas and the low- carbon energy sectors, while the “Two Wings” urges cooperation between science & technology and finance sectors. The objective of this kind of China-Middle East cooperation goes beyond the pursuit of commercial benefits and focuses on shaping the future of China’s power in the Gulf while it builds a physical presence that enhances its political, economic and eventually military capacities. Four industrial parks and ports have been identified under the park-port approach, of which two are in the same complex, where Chinese multinationals plan to link supply chains and build business clusters.
The Industrial Parks are: - Khalifa Industrial Zone Abu Dhabi - China-Oman Industrial Park in Duqm - Saudi Arabia’s Jazan City for Primary and Downstream Industries - TED-Suez Zone, in Ain Sokhna, Egypt
The Ports are: - Khalifa Port Free Trade Zone, Abu Dhabi - Duqm Special Economic Zone Authority, Oman - The People’s Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti - Port Said, Egypt
These form a horseshoe starting from the Gulf, continuing along the Arabian Sea, up the Red Sea and finally into the Mediterranean Sea. These projects reflect the importance of regional connectivity in the BRI and indicate the shape of China’s expanding influence and interests in the Middle East.
Diplomatic and Military Interests
China’s military and diplomatic efforts in the Middle East are largely carried out with a view to serve its economic objectives. However, China does welcome its recognition as a global power and sees its relationships in the Middle East as counters to US influence. China emphasizes its principle of non- interference, overtly, in the internal affairs of other countries in its Middle Eastern diplomacy. This is exemplified by its significant relationships with both Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is important to note that thus far, China has gotten by to a large extent by free riding on US efforts to ensure security for the region. However, with US President Donald Trump, looking to reduce American military involvement in the region, China may be compelled to make some adjustments to their military strategy in the region. One of China’s major goals besides its energy requirements and the welcoming of its recognition as a rising power by the Middle Eastern countries, is ensuring its own security, both inside China and along its periphery.
Internal Security: The Uighurs of Xinjiang
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The Uighurs are a minority Muslim population that reside largely in the western region of Xinjiang. The Uighurs in particular are a domestic concern for Beijing. Beijing fears the spread and influence of radical Islamic ideology and observes reports of Chinese Uighurs joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with a lot of concern. Chinese diplomats have ensured through a lot of hard work that, the Middle Eastern countries avoid criticizing China publicly for its treatment of the Uighur population over the years and its establishment of large-scale internment camps in Xinjiang. China fears that publicity would inflame the already discontented population and would also inspire material support from within the Middle East for the Muslim Uighurs. The Uighur treatment, however, is a tinderbox that China is sitting on, which might not be contained for long and may have long term ramifications for its own internal security.
External Security: Protecting China’s Economic Interests
Through Military Presence
China established a small military base in 2017, in Djibouti, which is strategically located in the Horn of Africa. Djibouti offers third party state actors a prime opportunity to observe and defend their international commerce passing through the Bab el Mandeb (“Gate of Tears”) strait. This strait is considered the fourth most important chokepoint in the world for oil exports and imports. China’s motive behind setting up this base is to monitor its shipments and combat piracy as the strait is in close proximity to Somalia and the piracy originating from its shores. China had sent three naval vessels in 2008, to participate in counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and continues to be involved in such operations. Beijing has worked hard to expand its military posture throughout the Middle East and North Africa. This includes frequent port visits by the Peoples Liberation Army and Navy (PLAN) in the southern Persian Gulf and an extended deployment of Chinese Military Vessels in the Gulf of Aden. China has broadened its peacekeeping presence in the region and has become the second largest financial contributor, after the US, to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. It must be clear that China has an expansive view of national security, one which necessitates proactive military engagement in the Middle East region on the part of the PRC and this is supported by China’s “National Military Strategy” in 2015. As per its latest annual report to Congress on China’s Military Power, the Pentagon warned that Beijing could soon parlay its overtures into the creation of military bases across the region.
Through Social Control
China has allowed the digitally enabled authoritarianism that it uses to shape its own society in a more rigid, censored and compliant direction to proliferate in the Middle Eastern Countries. This can be seen through some of the cases reported by the Middle East Forum: - Chinese Telecom giant ZTE, post the Green Revolution of 2009 has allowed Iran’s clerical regime to censor, curtail and monitor the communications of the country’s population, through the provision of sophisticated surveillance technology for domestic applications - Huawei, has been identified by the US government as engaging in similar questionable commerce with Iran in violation of the US sanctions - Egypt has allowed China to obtain a major stake in its communication sector and to disseminate technologies to strengthen President Abdel Fatah’s Sisi’s grip on power at the expense of freedom of expression. This makes Egypt the only other country in the world, besides China to violate all nine of the “key internet controls” outlined by the freedom watchdog, Freedom House. - Chinese firms like Huawei and Hikvision are marketing biometric surveillance systems throughout the Persian Gulf and meeting with tremendous commercial success.
China’s tech giants are thereby helping empower and improve the repressive practices of the region’s autocrats which keeps China in their good books. Greater the expansion in the Middle East, the greater are the means of social control available with China to manipulate the regional population to safeguard its own political and diplomatic interests. This China model of “Social Control”, though proliferating slowly, could soon become an export commodity in Beijing’s dealings with the Middle East.
Understanding India and its current Middle East Strategy
With India’s emergence as a major economic force and a global player, Indian policymakers have, perhaps, for the first time, expanded their horizons and begun to see the Middle East in strategic terms. Through much of India’s history as an independent nation the relationship it shared with the Middle Eastern countries was a commercial one characterized by energy trade and remittances which ensured positive relations. The relations were constrained in the past by the Cold War rivalries, India’s ongoing rivalry with Pakistan and the challenge of terrorism. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has been credited as a central figure driving the change in relationships in order to transcend the constraints with his two over-arching foreign policy objectives: a) Position India as a global player on the world stage b) Leverage foreign relations to boost India’s economic development and growth
Under Modi’s signature, Make In India initiative, a scheme predicated on attracting greater foreign investment, India is looking at the Gulf countries and encouraging them to see India as an economic partner and an investment destination. India has always been highly dependent on energy from the Middle East. In 2017, India sourced nearly 64% of its oil imports from the Middle East Region, with Iraq being the largest supplier, followed by Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. The economic codependency between India and the Middle East is here to stay as energy trade with the Middle East has been critical to India’s economic rise and as per the International Energy Agency (IEA) data, India will remain similarly dependent through 2040 with oil and natural gas making up approximately 30% of its energy mix.
Middle East Investments in India
Middle East countries have not been a major source for FDI in India. With Modi challenging the Gulf partners to change that, there has been an enthusiastic initial response. - Saudi Aramco and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) have reached an agreement with India to jointly develop the largest greenfield refinery in Ratnagiri, Maharashtra. The proposed agreement, involves not just Saudi investment in an Indian refinery but also an agreement for Gulf partners to supply at least 50% of the crude that the refinery would process - In 2018, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) signed a USD 1 billion investment agreement with India’s National Investment and Infrastructure Fund (NIIF) on energy, transportation, water and infrastructure. - In 2019, through a JV with NIIF, Dubai’s DP World acquired a 76% stake in the Indian railway logistics company Kribhco Infrastructure Limited after securing a USD 78 million contract to build warehouses in Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT), India’s largest container port.
Asian economies like India are quickly replacing Western economies as markets for Middle Eastern Energy. In this process the Asian economies get to have a greater say and flex their newfound political muscle. India has expressed its desire to play a global role and has moved to ramp up its diplomatic engagement in the Middle East.
India’s Progress
- After Prime Minister Modi’s visit to UAE in 2015, during which PM Modi and Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed signed a broad range of agreements, the Indian government quickly added the UAE to its short list of potential strategic partners based on Abu Dhabi’s willingness and ability to assist India with its economic transformation. The only other countries on that list were United States and Japan. - Between 2014 and 2018 India invited the leaders of each of these countries as well as the leader of France to attend the Republic Day parade, a high symbolic honor reserved for India’s closest partners. - During the 2017 state visit, when the UAE Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed was chief guest, India and UAE signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement - PM Modi has pursued closer relations with Israel, which is the only fellow democracy in the Middle East and can aid India through Innovation and Technology. This was done by PM Modi, by firstly de-hyphenating Israel from Palestine from India’s Foreign Policy and elevating the relationship to a Strategic Partnership during his historic trip to Israel in 2017 - The relationship with Israel is visible today in robust defense sales and cooperation in areas such as agriculture, water, innovation & technology, infrastructure and pharmaceuticals. - India has also maneuvered to maintain oil imports from Iran and strengthen its diplomatic engagement with the country in spite of the international sanctions on Iran.
India’s Challenges
India has and continues to watch and monitor warily, China’s growth in the Middle East region. India is aware that it has a lot of catching up to do.
A. The Pakistan Challenge:
The challenge that India faces is, its rivalry with Pakistan which has blocked it from having a direct overland trade route to the Middle East or an overland pipeline through which it can import energy securely and efficiently. To work around these challenges India has looked to Iran. Two of India’s most critical infrastructure projects in the region involve Iran: - The Chabahar Port: in Iran on the Gulf of Oman which gives India a portal through which it can ship goods to Central Asia, Eurasia and the Middle East. It also gives India an opportunity to play a larger role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. - The Sage Pipeline: a proposed pipeline India hopes to develop jointly with Oman and Iran which would enable it to import natural gas more cheaply and securely
India has also sought the right to explore Middle Eastern resources directly: - ONGC Videsh has obtained a 10% stake in Abu Dhabi’s offshore, Lower Zakum Oilfield and its attempt in the face of US sanctions to expand Iran’s Farzad B Gas field. - India is also trying to gain the rights from Israel to explore a natural gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean - India has developed domestic oil storage facilities with countries such as UAE to fortify its emergency oil reserves.
B. The Challenge of Balancing Relationships
Several of India’s partners are active rivals of one another and entangled further in complicated relationships with the other global powers: US, Russia and China. - Iran: India has strengthened its long-standing relationship with Iran despite becoming involved with Iran’s rivals – Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States - Israel: The challenge that India faces if it overplays its hand with Israel is that of alienating Israel’s rivals in the Middle East Region (which are all the GCC countries) as well as its own very large domestic Muslim Population, both of which sympathize with Palestine
The Global Playing Field ahead for India
Like in the case of China, in order to be involved further in the Middle East Region and make progress in leaps and bounds, the main challenge for India too would be that of maintaining neutrality in its overt relationships. India has a lot more ground to cover as far as geopolitical strategy in the Middle East is concerned. India will need to make its foreign policy more aggressive and robust to be able to make significant inroads in the region. The Middle East has become more multipolar, with power diffused among many regional and extra-regional actors. India’s present approach has been helped by the structural context that the region finds itself in. US influence is relatively more modest and competes with other powers like China as we have seen and Russia. Russia predominantly after its intervention in the Syrian civil war. In the recent Qatar crisis in 2017, India was under pressure to take sides. Instead it resisted and adopted its famed neutrality as a way of maintaining economic relations with both sides. Be it the Arab uprisings, Iran’s Nuclear Program and the JCPOA and even the much related and closely linked, US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Delhi has kept its head down and maintained neutrality. India has managed in a multipolar Middle East with an approach that balances against different parties and their rivalries. However, power ceases to be disparate. Eventually it will become concentrated and by which time without a more aggressive and strategically aligned foreign policy in the Middle East region, the window of opportunity for India could well close.
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