Report to Examiners on Phd Thesis Revision
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Durham E-Theses CEO Overcondence and Dominance in Bank Financial Decisions: The US Evidence SONG, WEI How to cite: SONG, WEI (2012) CEO Overcondence and Dominance in Bank Financial Decisions: The US Evidence, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3409/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk CEO Overconfidence and Dominance in Bank Financial Decisions: The US Evidence A Thesis Submitted to the School of Economics, Finance and Business, in partial fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Wei Song Ustinov College University of Durham DH1 3DE February 2012 To my parents and fiancée Wen Wang Acknowledgements I am deeply indebted to my supervisors Dr. Zhichao Zhang and Professor Rob Dixon for their invaluable direction and encouragement during the journey of completing this thesis. With their guidance, I am becoming a more confident researcher and have a better understanding of the PhD training which is full of excitements and painful challenges. I am also grateful to Professor Gioia Pescetto and Dr. Christodoulos Louca for their insightful advice in the early stages of my study. I thank Professor Alessandra Guariglia for her helpful comments on the research design of the thesis, particular the research in Chapter 4. I have greatly benefited from the advice and support of my fellow students at Durham. There are too many of them for me to thank them enough, but I must express my gratitude to Si Zhou for all his understanding and companionship during my study years at Durham. I am also grateful to the funding from the scholarships awarded by the Durham Business School. Most of all, I wish to thank my parents and my fiancée, Wen Wang. This thesis would not have been possible without their patience, acceptance, and cooperation. I devote this thesis to them. Wei Song February 2012 CEO Overconfidence and Dominance in Bank Financial Decisions: The US Evidence Wei Song D.Phil (Finance) Ustinov College February 2012 Abstract This thesis empirically investigates financial and investment decisions of banks and bank holding companies in a managerial behavioural approach with a view to ascertaining to what extent managerial psychology is as important as managerial incentive a determinant affecting the process of instituting an efficient bank governance mechanism. A large sample of US banks and bank holding companies over 1996-2006 is examined for the effects of irrational and powerful bank Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Integrating the analyses of both corporate governance and corporate finance, the thesis uncovers evidence that overconfident, dominating and overconfident-dominating bank CEOs have negative impact on bank financial decisions, such as M&As, payout policy and risk taking as they tend to overestimate their ability and underestimate possible risks of invested projects. Cognitive failures of this origin would have the worst fallout effects when the overconfident CEOs are also dominating the boards. Deploying Holder 67 and CEO-Chair as proxies for overconfidence and dominance factors respectively, the study shows that overconfident, dominating and overconfident-dominating CEOs are more likely to perform mergers with dubious quality, particularly in activity and geography diversifying mergers. The one- and two-year negative post-merger performance of banks ran by overconfident, dominating and overconfident-dominating CEOs bolsters the argument that mergers undertaken by these CEOs are economically undesirable. For the effects of psychological and cognitive biases on bank payout policy, results show that overconfident and overconfident-dominating CEOs are negatively related to the dividend payout ratio and total payout ratio. The negative association becomes stronger when the banks under examination have a higher degree of information asymmetry or with less growth opportunity. Evidence also confirms that CEO overconfidence, dominance and especially overconfidence-dominance have negative effects on bank risk control. CEOs with these attributes have a higher propensity for taking some bank-related risks, such as market-based risk, earnings volatility, credit risk and default risk. Overall, findings of this research suggest the essentiality of taking account of managerial psychological biases in reforming the existing bank governance mechanism, especially in designing appropriate compensation packages for executives and the desirable board composition for banks with overconfident-dominating CEOs. Table of Contents Chapter 1 Introduction................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 2 Managerial Overconfidence, Dominance, and Bank Mergers ............ 16 2.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 16 2.2. Related literature ............................................................................................. 22 2.2.1. Motivations for corporate takeovers ........................................................... 22 2.2.2. Managerial overconfidence, dominance, and corporate takeovers ............ 24 2.3. Empirical predictions ...................................................................................... 28 2.3.1. Target side .................................................................................................. 29 2.3.2. Bidder side .................................................................................................. 30 2.3.3. Combined side ............................................................................................ 31 2.4. Data and methodology .................................................................................... 32 2.4.1. Sample of bank mergers ............................................................................. 32 2.4.2. CEO overconfidence and dominance measurements ................................. 34 2.4.3. Control variables ........................................................................................ 36 2.4.3.1. Merger-related variables ........................................................................ 36 2.4.3.2. Firm-related variables ............................................................................ 38 2.4.4. Regression models ...................................................................................... 41 2.5. Empirical results ............................................................................................. 47 2.5.1. Summary statistics for the bank merger sample ......................................... 47 2.5.2. Univariate analysis ..................................................................................... 53 2.5.3. Multivariate analysis .................................................................................. 61 2.5.3.1. Multicollinearity test ............................................................................. 61 2.5.3.2. Target side ............................................................................................. 68 2.5.3.3. Bidder side ............................................................................................. 72 2.5.3.4. Combined synergistic value .................................................................. 75 2.5.3.5. Merger quality ....................................................................................... 78 I 2.6. Robustness and additional tests ..................................................................... 83 2.6.1. Sample selection bias ................................................................................. 83 2.6.2. Post-merger performance ........................................................................... 91 2.7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 93 Chapter 3 Managerial Overconfidence, Dominance, and Bank Payout Policy ...................................................................................................................................... 96 3.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 96 3.2. Related literature ........................................................................................... 102 3.2.1. Signaling hypothesis ................................................................................. 103 3.2.2. Free cash flow hypothesis ........................................................................ 105 3.2.3. Behavioural bias hypothesis ..................................................................... 106 3.2.4. Share repurchases and dividends .............................................................. 109 3.3. Empirical hypothesis development .............................................................