רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) רמה כרמ כ ז ז מל מה ו י תשר עד מל מה ו ד ו י ד ע י י ע ן י ן ו ל ( רט למ ו מ" ר ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ו ל רט ו ר

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, profile of an Iraqi Shiite militia handled by the Iranian Qods Force January 8, 2020

Overview

On December 6, 2019, the US Department of State announced the imposition of sanctions on Qais al-Khazali, the leader of the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (“League of the Righteous”), and on two other senior militia operatives. According to the American statement, members of the militia headed by Qais al-Khazali opened fire at Iraqi demonstrators which resulted in the killing of civilians. Furthermore, it was stated that Qais al-Khazali was handled by the Iranian Qods Force and authorized the use of deadly weapons against demonstrators in order to sow terror among Iraqi civilians.

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (“League of the Righteous”) is an Iraqi Shiite militia handled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Qods Force. It is one of the three most important Shiite militias which are prioritized by the Qods Force in terms of military and financial support. The two other militias are the Hezbollah Battalions (Kataeb Hezbollah) and the Nujaba Movement (Harakat al-Nujaba or Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba). These three militias played a key role during the fighting against the US forces while they were deployed in Iraq. They consist of commanders and operatives who had acquired extensive fighting experience and maintain particularly strong ties with the Qods Force. In recent years, these militias were handled by Iran in various missions promoting Iranian interests, including support of the Syrian regime, fighting against ISIS, and the suppression of protesters against the Iraqi regime. The US has imposed sanctions on all three militias.

In the ITIC's assessment, the removal of the United States from Iran and strengthening the Iranian influence on the Iraqi government are major strategic objectives for Iran. In order to fulfil these objectives, the Qods Force will use the Shiite militias comprising the Popular Mobilization1. In the ITIC's assessment, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Hezbollah Battalions, and the Nujaba Movement, which are part of the Popular Mobilization, are expected to be used

1 The Popular Mobilization is an umbrella framework which includes about 40 militias. Most of these militias are Shiite, affiliated with Iran.

292-19 2 as the spearhead of the Shiite militias in the campaign to remove the US forces from Iraq2. The three leading militias

Right: Emblem of the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. Left: Flag of the Hezbollah Battalions militia

Emblem of the Nujaba Movement militia

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq played a major role in the fighting of the Shiite militias against the US army and Coalition countries in 2006-2011, with the guidance and support of the Iranian Qods Force. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s main “specialty” was planting IEDs along the roads used by the US forces, causing the Americans heavy casualties. The militia is headed by Qais al- Khazali, a Shiite from southern Iraq, who had studied religious studies under senior cleric Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr (the father of cleric Muqtada Sadr, who wields major influence on Shiite current politics in Iraq, see below).

2 The number of US military personnel deployed in Iraq is estimated at about 5,200 (New York Times, January 5, 2020).

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Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (Kanouzmidia, November 10, 2016)

After the withdrawal of the US army from Iraq, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq did not lay down their arms and continued (along with other Shiite militias) to serve Iranian interests. Operatives of the militia were sent to Syria and were involved in the siege on Aleppo and the execution of many civilians. In addition, militia operatives took part in the campaign against ISIS and were involved in the killing and abduction of Sunni and Kurdish civilians in Iraqi regions liberated from ISIS’s control. During the protests in Iraq, operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq were used by the Qods Force as the main instrument for brutal suppression of the demonstrators by firing live ammunition.3 After the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani, Qais al-Khazali promised to avenge the blood of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy commander of the Popular Mobilization (who was killed in the attack against Soleimani). In a television interview, he undertook to implement Soleimani’s aspirations and demanded that the American forces leave Iraq immediately. He noted that they would absolutely not settle for less than the removal of all the forces of “American aggression” from the territory of Iraq. He added, addressing the Americans: “If your forces do not leave [Iraq], or even in the event of a delay in your departure, your forces will be considered as occupation forces and be dealt with

3 What are the reasons for the brutality demonstrated by the Iranians in Iraq as opposed to their restraint in Lebanon? In the ITIC's assessment, in the Lebanese arena, Iran has much more self- confidence due to Hezbollah’s strong position in the internal Lebanese political system, while the potential of risks estimated by the Iranians regarding their influence in Iraq is higher. This is in addition to Iranian concerns about the protest spilling over to their own country from neighboring Iraq. In retrospect, the intensive involvement in the events in Iraq cost Soleimani his life. However, one important Iranian objective has already been achieved: the anti-Iranian discourse that has accompanied the Iraqi protest against the government has almost completely disappeared and has now turned into an anti-American discourse, which is expected to be part of the campaign to oust the US forces from Iraq.

292-19 4 accordingly.” Al-Khazali reiterated his threat, conveying a stronger message: “If you do not leave [Iraq immediately], or stall, you will be facing a strong Iraqi response that will make the earth tremble under your feet and turn the sky above your heads into hell. The decision is yours” (Al-Ahed TV Channel, January 5, 2020).

Al-Khazali sending a blatant threat at the United States: if the American forces do not leave Iraq immediately, they will pay dearly for that (Al-Ahed Channel, January 5, 2020).

The purpose of the current study is to analyze the profile of the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al- Haq as a model of a Shiite militia prioritized by the Qods Force, such that Iran is expected to use in the Iraqi arena as part of a campaign against the Americans. At a later stage, the ITIC will publish additional studies, analyzing the profiles of the militias of Hezbollah Battalions and the Nujaba Movement and examining the nature of their ties with Iran and the Qods Force. Appendices

Appendix A: Profile of the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq: The activity of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq against the US forces in Iraq (2006-2011) Handling Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq by the Qods Force after the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq Selected statements by Qais al-Khazali Handling Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq by Iran to suppress the protest against the Iraqi government Participation of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq operatives in a break-in at the US Embassy compound in Baghdad Appendix B: US imposes sanctions on senior operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq

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Appendix A Profile of the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq

The activity of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq against the US forces in Iraq (2006- 2011) As shown by his name, Qais al-Khazali’s origin is from the Shiite tribe of Khazael, which is one of the largest tribes in southern Iraq. He was born in 1974 in Madinat Sadr, a Shiite neighborhood of Baghdad, home to many of the tribespeople from southern Iraq (who immigrated to Baghdad in the last century). Al-Khazali attended elementary and high school in Baghdad, and later studied biology in the University of Baghdad’s Faculty of Sciences.

In 1994, Al-Khazali started religious studies under senior cleric Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr,4 the father of Muqtada Sadr, who currently plays a major role among the Shiites in Iraq. In 2003, Al-Khazali joined the Mahdi Army, a militia which was then headed by Muqtada Sadr. From its inception, this militia has been affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and supported by them.5 In 2006-2007, the Mahdi Army took part in the civil war between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, and was involved in acts of murder and harassment against the Sunni community on grounds of sectarian affiliation. In 2006, Khazali left the Mahdi Army along with a network called the “Special Groups,” headed by him, and established the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (“League of the Righteous”). The new militia was established by the Qods Force in collaboration with the Lebanese Hezbollah. The operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq were financed, trained and equipped by the Qods Force. They were also trained and supported by Lebanese Hezbollah operatives. In 2006-2011, members of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq played a major role in the fighting in Iraq against the US army and the Coalition countries. They carried out guerrilla actions against the forces of the US and its allies. Their main “specialty” was planting IEDs along roads used by US army forces (EFPs, among others), resulting in many hundreds of fatalities

4 Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr was executed by Saddam Hussein in 1999 because of the former’s refusal to express support for Saddam Hussein’s regime. 5 Today, Muqtada Sadr heads the Saeroun Coalition, a faction of 54 members in the Iraqi Parliament. He was formerly affiliated with Iran, but today he feels estranged from the Iranians. Muqtada Sadr advocates Iraqi nationalism without foreign intervention. He currently heads the Peace Battalions (Saraya al-Salam) militia, which belongs to the Popular Mobilization.

292-19 6 among the Americans. In addition, they abducted hostages and eliminated rivals, mainly in Baghdad. In 2007, Qais al-Khazali was caught by the Coalition forces, along with a senior Hezbollah operative named Ali Daqduq, who served as a senior advisor to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. Qais al- Khazali was released in December 2009, as part of a prisoner exchange deal in which a British hostage was released (computer consultant Peter Moore). After his release from prison, Qais al-Khazali continued his religious studies in Qom, Iran. Ali Daqduq was released by the Iraqi government, was returned to Lebanon, and resumed his activity in the ranks of Hezbollah (in 2018, he was appointed commander of Hezbollah’s military network in the Syrian Golan Heights6). Handling Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq after the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq

After the US army withdrew from Iraq, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq did not lay down their arms, on the pretext of political instability and uncertainty as to the functioning of the US Embassy (in Baghdad). Along with their military force, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq also established a political wing, Al-Sadiqoun, with 15 deputies in the Iraqi Parliament (website of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, December 29, 2020). Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq was part of the Shiite militias in Iraq which were sent by the Qods Force to Syria to support the Assad regime. According to Qais al-Khazali, about 700 operatives were killed in fighting against ISIS7 (Al-Khazali’s Twitter account, November 26, 2018). Operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq reportedly operated in the Syrian arena as part of the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade Shiite militia, which comprised Iraqi operatives of Iranian-handled militias: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Hezbollah Battalions (Kataeb Hezbollah), and the Promised Day Brigade8.

6 See the ITIC's Information Bulletin from March 19, 2019, “Ali Mussa Daqduq (Abu Hussein Sajed): portrait of the commander of Hezbollah’s military network in the Syrian Golan Heights (“the Golan Portfolio”). . 7 It can be assumed that some of them also met their death in Iraq. 8 Operatives of Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade operated in various fighting zones, including the Set Zaynab shrine and the areas of Quneitra and Daraa in southern Syria. Abu Fadl al-Abbas, after whom the brigade was named, was the son of Imam Ali bin Abi Taleb who is a holy figure for the Shiites. He is the one, who along with his brother Hussain, led the fighting in the battle of Karbala against the Umayyads (680 C.E.). The battle ended with the massacre of many of the family members of Ali and their supporters and became an ethos of sacrifice for the Shiites. Abu Fadl al-Abbas became a symbol of heroism among the Shiites.

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Operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq south of Albukamal. They were careful not to display identifying signs of the militia (Al-Madar al-Siyasiya, July 7, 2017)

In 2016, operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq took part in the siege of Aleppo, and according to the UN Commissioner of Human Rights, they were involved in the execution of dozens of civilians. According to Human Rights Watch, operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq were involved in the killing and abduction of Sunni and Kurdish civilians in Iraqi regions liberated from ISIS’s control (US Congress findings prior to the imposition of sanctions on Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, US Congress website, March 11, 2017).

Operative of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq who was captured by Jaysh al-Fatah, an organization affiliated with Salafist jihadi Islam, in fighting south of Aleppo. In the released video, he calls on Al-Khazali and the Iraqi Prime minister at the time Nouri al-Maliki to bring about his release (Al-Jazeera, January 15, 2016) Selected statements by Qais Khazali

Qais Khazali’s remarks, which are strongly influenced by Iran, reflect a decidedly anti- American and anti-Israeli ideology. At the heart of this ideology is the establishment of a Shiite Iranian sphere of influence, which will extend from Iran through Iraq and Syria and end in Lebanon.

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Establishment of a Shiite Crescent

On May 10, 2017, Qais Khazali addressed his militia operatives and presented the Shiite Iranian vision to take over the Middle East: “We are continuing on our way. The takeover of Mosul [from ISIS] will be completed; Tal Afar [north of Mosul] will be liberated; Rawa (160-170 km northwest of Ramadi) and Al-Qaim [near the Iraqi-Syrian border] will be liberated, and we will reach the border [with Syria]. Our brothers in Syria will also reach the [Iraqi] border. People used to talk about the Shiite crescent; with the help of Allah, we will have a Shiite full moon. We will have the land in full, from east to west. With the help of Allah and in the spirit of the last Shiite imam, the deployment of our fighting forces will be completed – from the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, through Hezbollah in Lebanon, through Ansar Allah [i.e., the Houthi rebels] in Yemen, the holy Mobilization [i.e., the Popular Mobilization] in Iraq and with the brothers of Al-Zaynab (i.e., the Shiite brothers defending the holy shrine of Al-Set Zaynab, located south of Damascus), their brothers [in Syria]” (Al-Jazeera; Qanat al-Iraq Iraqi channel, May 10, 2017).

Call on the US to withdraw its forces from Iraq

Following US President Donald Trump's secret visit to Iraq on November 26, 2018, Al-Khazali wrote in his Twitter account: “Trump's visit to a US army base without respecting diplomatic norms reveals the truth about the US plan in Iraq. [Trump], the Iraqi response will be through a parliamentary decision to remove your military forces against your will. If they do not leave, we have the knowledge and capability to remove them in another way that is known to your forces that were forced to make a humiliating retreat in 2011” (Khazali’s Twitter account). Al-Khazali’s threats to Israel from the border fence with Lebanon

On December 9, 2017, a video was posted on social media showing Khazali visiting Lebanon, accompanied by Hezbollah operatives. He was photographed at the border gate with Israel (“Fatma Gate”), wearing an army uniform. In the video, Khazali said: “We – together with our Hezbollah brothers – announce our total readiness to stand by the Lebanese people and the Palestinian cause in the face of the oppressive Israeli occupation that is hostile to Arabs, Islam and humanity” (Lebanese Channel OTV, December 9, 2019).

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Right: Khazali (on the left) on the Lebanese-Israeli border, standing with a Hezbollah operative near “Fatma Gate.” Left: Hezbollah operative, whose face is blurred, guiding Khazali (standing on the left) on Lebanese-Israeli border. He is apparently pointing at the Golan Heights and telling him “this is the Golan Heights” (Lebanese Channel OTV, December 9, 2019). Handling of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq by Iran to suppress the protest against the Iraqi regime

In the past three months, there have been widespread protests in Iraq against government corruption, rising unemployment, and the Iraqi government’s failure to provide its citizens with proper basic services. The protests were concentrated in the capital Baghdad and the Shiite south. So far, hundreds of Iraqi civilians have been killed and thousands more have been wounded in the efforts to suppress the protests. During the demonstrations, the Iranian regime deployed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in order to suppress the demonstrations by firing live ammunition at the demonstrators, stabbing and ramming them. One of the violent incidents took place in the city of Nasiriyah in southern Iraq. Operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq fired at demonstrators, killing at least nine of them (The Jerusalem Post, October 26, 2019). In response, a protest rally took place in front of the local headquarters of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. A video distributed on social media shows the demonstrators setting fire to the entrance to the headquarters while operatives from Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq fire at them with the intent to kill. Later, it was reported that the shooter, a senior commander in Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq named Wissam al-Alyawi, was wounded and evacuated by ambulance. The demonstrators shook the ambulance, lynched him, set his body on fire and hanged it (Al- Hurra, October 27, 2019).

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Right: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq operative Wissam al-Alyawi firing at the demonstrators. He was wounded and captured by the protesters, who lynched him (Al-Hurra, October 27, 2019). Left: The local headquarters of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in Amara. Alongside the organization’s emblem are visible the figures of Khazali, Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr (the father of Muqtada al-Sadr) and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (YouTube, October 30, 2019).

The protest against the Iraqi regime was also of a clearly anti-Iranian nature. The demonstrators protested against the Iranian presence and influence of Iran in Iraq and burned posters bearing the image of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. On November 3, 2019, dozens of demonstrators attacked the Iranian Consulate in Karbala. During the attack, demonstrators climbed on the barriers erected around the consulate, removed the Iranian flag from the building and replaced it with the Iraqi flag. On November 27, 2019, demonstrators set fire to the Iranian Consulate in Najaf. During the demonstrations, pictures of Khamenei were also set on fire (ISNA, November 4, 2019). Demonstrators cried: “Iraq is free – Iran out” (MBC, October 27, 2019). On the other hand, Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the Iranian radical daily Keyhan, called on “Iraq’s young believers and revolutionaries” and on the Iraqi Shiite militias to take control of the US and Saudi embassies in Baghdad a. According to Shariatmadari, there was clear evidence indicating that these embassies were involved in organizing the riots and therefore they should be taken over, similarly to the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 (Keyhan, October 30, 2019).

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Burning an Iranian flag during the Iraqi demonstrators in front of the Iranian

demonstrations Consulate in Karbala (ISNA, November 4, 2019) (YouTube, October 28, 2019)

The anti-Iranian nature of the protests worried the Iranian regime, which decided to deal with the demonstrations brutally. The preferred tool for carrying out this task was Asa’ib Ahl al- Haq. The Iranian regime, through Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, has preferred to employ Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq to suppress the demonstrations because it considers them as a loyal and effective force that accepts its authority. Unlike Lebanon, where Hezbollah has so far displayed extreme caution against the protests, the militias handled by Iran in Iraq, especially Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, exercised brutality against the demonstrators on the orders of Soleimani. The latter did not hesitate to remain in Iraq during the protests, handle the Shiite militias at close quarters and intervene in internal Iraqi politics. This is quite different from the low profile adopted by Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Participation of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq operatives in a break-in at the US Embassy compound in Baghdad

On October 31, 2019, the Hezbollah Battalions initiated a mass demonstration in front of the US Embassy in Baghdad in response to a US airstrike against Hezbollah Battalion targets resulting in the deaths of about 30 operatives. Thousands of civilians and Shiite militia operatives participated in the demonstration. They broke into the embassy compound, set fire to the gates and broke windows, but they did not break into the embassy building itself. The Hezbollah Battalions played a major role in the break-in at the US Embassy compound and the demonstration that took place there. However, in addition to Hezbollah Battalion operatives, operatives of Iran’s preferred other two Shiite militias – Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the

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Nujaba Movement – also participated in the demonstration. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais Khazali and a senior operative in the organization delivered anti-American incitement speeches.

Flag of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (center) hangs on the wall of the US Embassy (YouTube, December 31, 2019)

Right: Khazali during the demonstrations in front of the embassy, standing next to Hadi Al-Amari, head of the Badr militia (YouTube, December 31, 2019)9. Left: Jawad Al-Talibawi, senior Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq operative in an incitement speech at the burning gate of the embassy: “This is a terrorist lair, the Americans are now hiding [in it] like rats ... With Allah’s help, revenge will be fourfold” (Al-Ghad Channel, December 31, 2019).

9The Badr militia belongs to the Popular Mobilization. It is headed by Hadi al-Amari, a pro-Iranian Iraqi who fought in the Iraq-Iran war on the Iranian side.

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Appendix B

US imposes sanctions on senior operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq

On December 6, 2019, the US Treasury announced the imposition of sanctions on Qais Khazali, secretary general of the Shiite Iraqi militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (“League of the Righteous”). Sanctions were also imposed on two other senior operatives in the militia. The sanctions were imposed in view of the violent suppression of civil protests in Iraq by Iranian- backed Shiite militias and especially Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.

The wording of the US announcement of the imposition of the sanctions on Qais Khazali and two other senior militia operatives (US Department of the Treasury website, December 6, 2019)

According to the announcement by the US Department of the Treasury, Qais Khazali, his brother Laith Khazali, and Husayn Falih ‘Aziz al-Lami, a senior operative in the Popular Mobilization, were all involved in human rights violations in Iraq during the protests. The announcement also named Khamis Farhan al-Khanjar al-Issawi, an Iraqi businessman with regional and international ties, who is involved in bribing Iraqi government officials in order to advance his business interests, and in public corrupt activity at the expense of the Iraqi people. According to the announcement, Iran is massacring the demonstrators in an attempt to suppress the legitimate demands of the Iraqi people to reform the government.

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The four people on whom US sanctions were imposed (from right to left): Qais Khazali, Laith Khazali, Husayn Falih ‘Aziz al-Lami, and Khamis Farhan al-Khanjar al-Issawi (Rudaw, December 6, 2019)

According to the US announcement, the militia headed by Qais Khazali opened fire on demonstrators and killed civilians. It also states that Qais Khazali was part of a committee which included members of the Qods Force, which approved the use of deadly weapons against demonstrators in order to terrorize the Iraqi public. In addition, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq operatives were involved at the time in the disappearance, abduction, killing and torturing of Sunni civilians in the Diyala Province (north of Baghdad). Khazali’s brother, Laith, who holds a senior role in the militia, was in charge of an operation which took place in 2015 with the goal of removing the Sunni residents from the Diyala Province (where Shiites and Sunnis coexist). In addition, Qais and Laith played a key role in the attack on a government compound in Karbala in January 2007, in which five American soldiers and three Iraqi soldiers were killed (see Appendix B). The announcement calls Husayn Falih ‘Aziz al-Lami the commander of a militia that is a branch of the Qods Force who was put in charge of suppressing the protests (according to Reuters, November 6, 2019, he serves as head of the security apparatus of the Popular Mobilization, the umbrella framework of the Shiite militias). He was part of a committee which included members of the Qods Force, which approved the use of lethal violence against demonstrators in order to terrorize the Iraqi public. In late 2019, Al-Lami ordered assassinations and suppression of demonstrators in Baghdad. In October 2019, he ordered militiamen to shoot demonstrators [in Baghdad], resulting in the deaths of dozens of demonstrators.

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Right: Teenage boy wounded by live ammunition fired at demonstrators (YouTube, October 9, 2019). Left: Teenage boy wounded by live ammunition fired at demonstrators (YouTube, October 14, 2019). Statements made by Qais Khazali following the imposition of sanctions on him

Qais Khazali denied that militia that he heads was involved in any way in the murder of demonstrators and accused Israel and the United States of being behind the protests (which he called “anarchy”). He threatened that “we will avenge this [in Israel and the United States] several times” (BBC, December 17, 2019). Khazali described Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq as victims of the protests, a claim which, according to him, is proved by the brutal killing of Wissam al-Alyawi10, who was a commander in Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (Al-Sumaria, December 8, 2019).

Two days later, Khazali responded specifically to the US announcement during a conference of supporters of the militia. Khazali said ironically: “We are indeed hurt by the decision ... We are hurt by the fact that the US response to us was delayed for such a long time, since 2003 [the year of the US invasion of Iraq. This was also the year in which Khazali began his activity against the United States]. The fact that their [the Americans’] entire law amounts to sanctions alone is indicative of the failure of the Americans [on the ground] …” Khazali added: “Do you know what the results of these sanctions are? The results are that my money in American banks will disappear …” and immediately burst out laughing (since it is implicitly evident that he does not deposit his money in American banks) (Khazali’s Twitter account, December 10, 2019).

10 Wissam al-Alyawi was lynched by demonstrators while on his way to the hospital after having fired live ammunition at them (see above).

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Khazali mocking the US: “Do you know what the results of these sanctions are? The results are that my money in American banks will disappear …” (Khazali’s Twitter account, December 10, 2019)

Khazali’s claim that the American response was delayed is inaccurate. As long ago as November 6, 2017, the US Congress approved the imposition of sanctions on Asa’ib Ahl al- Haq (AAH) and the Nujaba Movement [Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba], two of the Shiite Iraqi militias handled by Iran.

Imposing sanctions on Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in 2017 (US Congress website, November 6, 2017)

The ties between the Nujaba Movement and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, on the one hand, the Qods Force and Hezbollah on the other, and Khazali’s pledge of allegiance to Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei, as mentioned in the law bill (US Congress website, November 6, 2017)

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Additional statements made by Qais Khazali: The US is behind the violent protests through the CIA, mass media and social media. Khazali claims that the US collaborates with Israel and the UAE in suppressing the demonstrations through the money of the UAE, the planning and intelligence of Israel and the US media (Al-Jazeera, December 19, 2019). The US charge of Iraqi protests was a “reverberation” of the Iranian propaganda that accused the West and especially the US and Israel of intensifying the protests with the aim of weakening the so-called resistance front and security and stability in the region. On December 29, 2019, Khazali condemned the US attack against the Hezbollah Battalions [the attack was in response to rocket fire at an American base in the Kirkuk area]. He accused the United States of attempting to undermine stability in “peaceful countries” [sic] and called for heroism against the US conduct (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s website, December 29, 2019).

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