DOCSLIB.ORG

Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq, Profile of an Iraqi Shiite Militia Handled by the Iranian

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq, Profile of an Iraqi Shiite Militia Handled by the Iranian רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) רמה כרמ כ ז ז מל מה ו י תשר עד מל מה ו ד ו י ד ע י י ע ן י ן ו ל ( רט למ ו מ" ר ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ול רט ו רור Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, profile of an Iraqi Shiite militia handled by the Iranian Qods Force January 8, 2020 Overview On December 6, 2019, the US Department of State announced the imposition of sanctions on Qais al-Khazali, the leader of the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (“League of the Righteous”), and on two other senior militia operatives. According to the American statement, members of the militia headed by Qais al-Khazali opened fire at Iraqi demonstrators which resulted in the killing of civilians. Furthermore, it was stated that Qais al-Khazali was handled by the Iranian Qods Force and authorized the use of deadly weapons against demonstrators in order to sow terror among Iraqi civilians. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (“League of the Righteous”) is an Iraqi Shiite militia handled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Qods Force. It is one of the three most important Shiite militias which are prioritized by the Qods Force in terms of military and financial support. The two other militias are the Hezbollah Battalions (Kataeb Hezbollah) and the Nujaba Movement (Harakat al-Nujaba or Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba). These three militias played a key role during the fighting against the US forces while they were deployed in Iraq. They consist of commanders and operatives who had acquired extensive fighting experience and maintain particularly strong ties with the Qods Force. In recent years, these militias were handled by Iran in various missions promoting Iranian interests, including support of the Syrian regime, fighting against ISIS, and the suppression of protesters against the Iraqi regime. The US has imposed sanctions on all three militias. In the ITIC's assessment, the removal of the United States from Iran and strengthening the Iranian influence on the Iraqi government are major strategic objectives for Iran. In order to fulfil these objectives, the Qods Force will use the Shiite militias comprising the Popular Mobilization1. In the ITIC's assessment, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Hezbollah Battalions, and the Nujaba Movement, which are part of the Popular Mobilization, are expected to be used 1 The Popular Mobilization is an umbrella framework which includes about 40 militias. Most of these militias are Shiite, affiliated with Iran. 292-19 2 as the spearhead of the Shiite militias in the campaign to remove the US forces from Iraq2. The three leading militias Right: Emblem of the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. Left: Flag of the Hezbollah Battalions militia Emblem of the Nujaba Movement militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq played a major role in the fighting of the Shiite militias against the US army and Coalition countries in 2006-2011, with the guidance and support of the Iranian Qods Force. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s main “specialty” was planting IEDs along the roads used by the US forces, causing the Americans heavy casualties. The militia is headed by Qais al- Khazali, a Shiite from southern Iraq, who had studied religious studies under senior cleric Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr (the father of cleric Muqtada Sadr, who wields major influence on Shiite current politics in Iraq, see below). 2 The number of US military personnel deployed in Iraq is estimated at about 5,200 (New York Times, January 5, 2020). 292-19 3 Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (Kanouzmidia, November 10, 2016) After the withdrawal of the US army from Iraq, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq did not lay down their arms and continued (along with other Shiite militias) to serve Iranian interests. Operatives of the militia were sent to Syria and were involved in the siege on Aleppo and the execution of many civilians. In addition, militia operatives took part in the campaign against ISIS and were involved in the killing and abduction of Sunni and Kurdish civilians in Iraqi regions liberated from ISIS’s control. During the protests in Iraq, operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq were used by the Qods Force as the main instrument for brutal suppression of the demonstrators by firing live ammunition.3 After the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani, Qais al-Khazali promised to avenge the blood of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy commander of the Popular Mobilization (who was killed in the attack against Soleimani). In a television interview, he undertook to implement Soleimani’s aspirations and demanded that the American forces leave Iraq immediately. He noted that they would absolutely not settle for less than the removal of all the forces of “American aggression” from the territory of Iraq. He added, addressing the Americans: “If your forces do not leave [Iraq], or even in the event of a delay in your departure, your forces will be considered as occupation forces and be dealt with 3 What are the reasons for the brutality demonstrated by the Iranians in Iraq as opposed to their restraint in Lebanon? In the ITIC's assessment, in the Lebanese arena, Iran has much more self- confidence due to Hezbollah’s strong position in the internal Lebanese political system, while the potential of risks estimated by the Iranians regarding their influence in Iraq is higher. This is in addition to Iranian concerns about the protest spilling over to their own country from neighboring Iraq. In retrospect, the intensive involvement in the events in Iraq cost Soleimani his life. However, one important Iranian objective has already been achieved: the anti-Iranian discourse that has accompanied the Iraqi protest against the government has almost completely disappeared and has now turned into an anti-American discourse, which is expected to be part of the campaign to oust the US forces from Iraq. 292-19 4 accordingly.” Al-Khazali reiterated his threat, conveying a stronger message: “If you do not leave [Iraq immediately], or stall, you will be facing a strong Iraqi response that will make the earth tremble under your feet and turn the sky above your heads into hell. The decision is yours” (Al-Ahed TV Channel, January 5, 2020). Al-Khazali sending a blatant threat at the United States: if the American forces do not leave Iraq immediately, they will pay dearly for that (Al-Ahed Channel, January 5, 2020). The purpose of the current study is to analyze the profile of the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al- Haq as a model of a Shiite militia prioritized by the Qods Force, such that Iran is expected to use in the Iraqi arena as part of a campaign against the Americans. At a later stage, the ITIC will publish additional studies, analyzing the profiles of the militias of Hezbollah Battalions and the Nujaba Movement and examining the nature of their ties with Iran and the Qods Force. Appendices Appendix A: Profile of the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq: The activity of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq against the US forces in Iraq (2006-2011) Handling Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq by the Qods Force after the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq Selected statements by Qais al-Khazali Handling Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq by Iran to suppress the protest against the Iraqi government Participation of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq operatives in a break-in at the US Embassy compound in Baghdad Appendix B: US imposes sanctions on senior operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq 292-19 5 Appendix A Profile of the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq The activity of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq against the US forces in Iraq (2006- 2011) As shown by his name, Qais al-Khazali’s origin is from the Shiite tribe of Khazael, which is one of the largest tribes in southern Iraq. He was born in 1974 in Madinat Sadr, a Shiite neighborhood of Baghdad, home to many of the tribespeople from southern Iraq (who immigrated to Baghdad in the last century). Al-Khazali attended elementary and high school in Baghdad, and later studied biology in the University of Baghdad’s Faculty of Sciences. In 1994, Al-Khazali started religious studies under senior cleric Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr,4 the father of Muqtada Sadr, who currently plays a major role among the Shiites in Iraq. In 2003, Al-Khazali joined the Mahdi Army, a militia which was then headed by Muqtada Sadr. From its inception, this militia has been affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and supported by them.5 In 2006-2007, the Mahdi Army took part in the civil war between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, and was involved in acts of murder and harassment against the Sunni community on grounds of sectarian affiliation. In 2006, Khazali left the Mahdi Army along with a network called the “Special Groups,” headed by him, and established the militia of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (“League of the Righteous”). The new militia was established by the Qods Force in collaboration with the Lebanese Hezbollah. The operatives of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq were financed, trained and equipped by the Qods Force. They were also trained and supported by Lebanese Hezbollah operatives. In 2006-2011, members of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq played a major role in the fighting in Iraq against the US army and the Coalition countries. They carried out guerrilla actions against the forces of the US and its allies.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Hezbollah's Syrian Quagmire
    Hezbollah’s Syrian Quagmire BY MATTHEW LEVITT ezbollah – Lebanon’s Party of God – is many things. It is one of the dominant political parties in Lebanon, as well as a social and religious movement catering first and fore- Hmost (though not exclusively) to Lebanon’s Shi’a community. Hezbollah is also Lebanon’s largest militia, the only one to maintain its weapons and rebrand its armed elements as an “Islamic resistance” in response to the terms of the Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s civil war and called for all militias to disarm.1 While the various wings of the group are intended to complement one another, the reality is often messier. In part, that has to do with compartmen- talization of the group’s covert activities. But it is also a factor of the group’s multiple identities – Lebanese, pan-Shi’a, pro-Iranian – and the group’s multiple and sometimes competing goals tied to these different identities. Hezbollah insists that it is Lebanese first, but in fact, it is an organization that always acts out of its self-interests above its purported Lebanese interests. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Hezbollah also has an “expansive global network” that “is sending money and operatives to carry out terrorist attacks around the world.”2 Over the past few years, a series of events has exposed some of Hezbollah’s covert and militant enterprises in the region and around the world, challenging the group’s standing at home and abroad. Hezbollah operatives have been indicted for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri by the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague,3 arrested on charges of plotting attacks in Nigeria,4 and convicted on similar charges in Thailand and Cyprus.5 Hezbollah’s criminal enterprises, including drug running and money laundering from South America to Africa to the Middle East, have been targeted by law enforcement and regulatory agen- cies.
    [Show full text]
  • The Resurgence of Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq
    December 2012 Sam Wyer MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 7 THE RESURGENCE OF ASA’IB AHL AL-HAQ Photo Credit: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq protest in Kadhimiya, Baghdad, September 2012. Photo posted on Twitter by Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. ©2012 by the Institute for the Study of War. Published in 2012 in the United States of America by the Institute for the Study of War. 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036. http://www.understandingwar.org Sam Wyer MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 7 THE RESURGENCE OF ASA’IB AHL AL-HAQ ABOUT THE AUTHOR Sam Wyer is a Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, where he focuses on Iraqi security and political matters. Prior to joining ISW, he worked as a Research Intern at AEI’s Critical Threats Project where he researched Iraqi Shi’a militia groups and Iranian proxy strategy. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from Middlebury College in Vermont and studied Arabic at Middlebury’s school in Alexandria, Egypt. ABOUT THE INSTITUTE The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. ISW is committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq
    Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq MICHAEL KNIGHTS POLICY FOCUS 137 Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq MICHAEL KNIGHTS THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica- tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2015 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Design: 1000colors Photo: A Kurdish fighter keeps guard while overlooking positions of Islamic State mili- tants near Mosul, northern Iraq, August 2014. (REUTERS/Youssef Boudlal) CONTENTS Acknowledgments | v Acronyms | vi Executive Summary | viii 1 Introduction | 1 2 Federal Government Security Forces in Iraq | 6 3 Security Forces in Iraqi Kurdistan | 26 4 Optimizing U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq | 39 5 Issues and Options for U.S. Policymakers | 48 About the Author | 74 TABLES 1 Effective Combat Manpower of Iraq Security Forces | 8 2 Assessment of ISF and Kurdish Forces as Security Cooperation Partners | 43 FIGURES 1 ISF Brigade Order of Battle, January 2015 | 10 2 Kurdish Brigade Order of Battle, January 2015 | 28 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My thanks to a range of colleagues for their encouragement and assistance in the writing of this study.
    [Show full text]
  • The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Beyond
    THE JIHADI THREAT ISIS, AL QAEDA, AND BEYOND The Jihadi Threat ISIS, al- Qaeda, and Beyond Robin Wright William McCants United States Institute of Peace Brookings Institution Woodrow Wilson Center Garrett Nada J. M. Berger United States Institute of Peace International Centre for Counter- Terrorism Jacob Olidort The Hague Washington Institute for Near East Policy William Braniff Alexander Thurston START Consortium, University of Mary land Georgetown University Cole Bunzel Clinton Watts Prince ton University Foreign Policy Research Institute Daniel Byman Frederic Wehrey Brookings Institution and Georgetown University Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Jennifer Cafarella Craig Whiteside Institute for the Study of War Naval War College Harleen Gambhir Graeme Wood Institute for the Study of War Yale University Daveed Gartenstein- Ross Aaron Y. Zelin Foundation for the Defense of Democracies Washington Institute for Near East Policy Hassan Hassan Katherine Zimmerman Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy American Enterprise Institute Charles Lister Middle East Institute Making Peace Possible December 2016/January 2017 CONTENTS Source: Image by Peter Hermes Furian, www . iStockphoto. com. The West failed to predict the emergence of al- Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and North Africa. It was blindsided by the ISIS sweep across Syria and Iraq, which at least temporarily changed the map of the Middle East. Both movements have skillfully continued to evolve and proliferate— and surprise. What’s next? Twenty experts from think tanks and universities across the United States explore the world’s deadliest movements, their strate- gies, the future scenarios, and policy considerations. This report reflects their analy sis and diverse views.
    [Show full text]
  • THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR and ITS CONSEQUENCES for HEZBOLLAH by Benedetta Berti
    DECEMBER 2015 THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR HEZBOLLAH By Benedetta Berti Benedetta Berti is a TED Senior Fellow, a Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and an independent human security consultant. Her work focuses on human security and internal conflicts, as well as on post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding. Dr. Berti is the author of three books, including Armed Political Organizations. From Conflict to Integration (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013) and her work has appeared, among others, in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Al- Jazeera. In 2015 the Italian government awarded her the Order of the Star of Italy (order of Knighthood). Beginning as a largely non-violent, non-sectarian political mobilization, the Syrian revolution gradually morphed into a protracted and bloody civil war as well as into a regional proxy conflict that has directly involved both regional states and non-state actors alike. Today, the Syrian conflict remains deeply internationalized, militarized and fractionalized. The domestic battlefield is characterized by a crucible of different political and armed movements. But while the fragmentation and proliferation of armed groups within the anti-Assad camp is well known, the Syrian regime has also been relying on a number of non-state allies. These include Syrian local ‘community-defense’ groups and other pro-regime paramilitary organizations; Shiite militia groups (mostly from Iraq) and, most notably, the Lebanese Hezbollah. Indeed since the very beginning of the Syrian revolution, Hezbollah clearly sided with the Bashar-al Assad regime, shifting from offering political support and solidarity to becoming one of the warring parties.
    [Show full text]
  • Mcallister Bradley J 201105 P
    REVOLUTIONARY NETWORKS? AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN TERRORIST GROUPS by Bradley J. McAllister (Under the Direction of Sherry Lowrance) ABSTRACT This dissertation is simultaneously an exercise in theory testing and theory generation. Firstly, it is an empirical test of the means-oriented netwar theory, which asserts that distributed networks represent superior organizational designs for violent activists than do classic hierarchies. Secondly, this piece uses the ends-oriented theory of revolutionary terror to generate an alternative means-oriented theory of terrorist organization, which emphasizes the need of terrorist groups to centralize their operations. By focusing on the ends of terrorism, this study is able to generate a series of metrics of organizational performance against which the competing theories of organizational design can be measured. The findings show that terrorist groups that decentralize their operations continually lose ground, not only to government counter-terror and counter-insurgent campaigns, but also to rival organizations that are better able to take advantage of their respective operational environments. However, evidence also suggests that groups facing decline due to decentralization can offset their inability to perform complex tasks by emphasizing the material benefits of radical activism. INDEX WORDS: Terrorism, Organized Crime, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Insurgency, Networks, Netwar, Revolution, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Mahdi Army, Abu Sayyaf, Iraq, Philippines REVOLUTIONARY NETWORK0S? AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN TERRORIST GROUPS by BRADLEY J MCALLISTER B.A., Southwestern University, 1999 M.A., The University of Leeds, United Kingdom, 2003 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSPHY ATHENS, GA 2011 2011 Bradley J.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia and Iran in Syria— a Random Partnership Or an Enduring Alliance? an Interim Report
    Atlantic Council RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE BRIEF Russia and Iran in Syria— a Random Partnership or an Enduring Alliance? An interim report JUNE 2019 AMBASSADOR MICHEL DUCLOS Russia and Iran are allies in Syria not out of mutual sympathy, but for pragmatic reasons. According to many reports, Iranian leaders—nota- bly including Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Al-Quds force of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC)—were instrumental in convinc- ing Vladimir Putin to send his air force to Syria and save Bashar al-As- sad’s skin in September 2015.1 However, various episodes highlight the limits of what looks like a circumstantial alliance. On February 26, 2019, Assad was received in Tehran by Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution, in a setting evidently designed to showcase the Syrian dictator’s per- sonal allegiance to the supreme leader and his debt of gratitude to the IRGC.2 On the very same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was once again in Moscow, where he met with President Putin.3 The asymmetric priorities in Tehran and Moscow could not seem clearer. A few months earlier, on May 9, 2018, Netanyahu attended the parade on Red Square, alongside Putin, on the anniversary of the end of World War Two ( the “Great Patriotic War” in Russian parlance).4 The follow- 1 Laila Bassam and Tom Perry, “‘Send Qassem Soleimani’: Here’s how Putin and Iran Plotted Out Their New Assault in Syria,” Reuters, October 6, 2015, https:// www.businessinsider.fr/us/r-how-iranian-general-plotted-out-syrian-assault-in- moscow-2015-10.
    [Show full text]
  • Shia Strength - Iraqi Militants Adapt to the US Drawdown
    TERRORISM & INSURGENCY Date Posted: 30-Sep-2011 Jane's Intelligence Review Shia strength - Iraqi militants adapt to the US drawdown Key Points Iranian-backed Shia militants in Iraq are responsible for a disproportionately high number of the US casualties suffered in recent months. Kataib Hizbullah, the most sophisticated group, is considered a direct extension of Iran's Qods Force and could become involved in international operations in support of Iranian goals. Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Promised Day Brigades are Iraqi Shia insurgent groups, whose links to Iran peaked in 2008 and have slowly reduced since then. Iraq's 'special groups', such as Kataib Hizbullah and Promised Day Brigades, have stepped up attacks as US forces look to withdraw. Michael Knights looks at Iran's support for the Shia militants, their operations and their post-US future. The US military suffered its heaviest monthly casualties in Iraq in three years in June, when 14 of its soldiers were killed in action. At least 12 of them were killed by Iranian-backed 'special groups', prompting fresh complaints from the US that Iran was encouraging its Iraqi allies to step up their attacks as the scheduled withdrawal of all US forces from Iraq looms. The surge in attacks highlighted the threat posed by Shia militants, especially if the US and Iraqi governments sign an agreement allowing US forces to stay beyond the 31 December withdrawal deadline. Even if the US leaves as previously agreed, Iran is expected to continue to back Iraqi proxies in order to influence the political situation and retain an ability to strike Western assets in the country and possibly elsewhere.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of the Revolution
    The Evolution of the Revolution THE CHANGING NATURE OF IRAN’S AXIS OF RESISTANCE KENNETH M. POLLACK MARCH 2020 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary ince the earliest days after the 1979 Islamic Soleimani in January 2020 could significantly impede S Revolution, the Iranian regime has sought to build further progress. a coalition across the Middle East to help it achieve its As it stands currently, the Axis is comprised of ideological and geostrategic goals. Tehran understood both state and non-state actors. These groups include that its ability to secure the Islamic Republic in Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liber- overturn the regional status quo, drive out the United ation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC), States, and make Iran the regional hegemon was lim- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and occasionally the ited if it acted on its own. It could only succeed with Kurdistan Workers’ Party. State and quasi-state actors the help of others. openly aligned with Tehran include Hamas in Gaza, However, for the next two decades, the Axis was Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, and the Houthis little more than rhetoric, ascribing greater unity in Yemen. of effort to an amalgam of states,semi-states , and Ultimately, the new operating method of Iran’s non-state actors than was ever the reality. It was pri- Axis of Resistance is a strategy born of necessity. It marily a psychological ploy to frighten its adversaries is a strategy of the weak, unlikely to succeed against and make its members feel less isolated in the face the strong except when they are badly constrained of American hostility.
    [Show full text]
  • Defending Damascus, Betraying Beirut: Hezbollah's Communication
    Defending Damascus, Betraying Beirut: Hezbollah’s Communication Strategies in the Syrian Civil War Research Thesis Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with research distinction in International Studies in the undergraduate colleges of The Ohio State University by Maxwell Scurlock The Ohio State University April 2017 Project Advisor: Professor Jeffrey Lewis, International Studies Table of Contents Part 1 – Background Information and Historical Context Introduction – 1 1. Historical and Contextual Background – 6 a. Shi‘ism in Historical Context – 9 b. French Mandatory Period, 1920-1945 – 10 c. Independence to Black September, 1945-1970 – 14 d. The Early Years of the Lebanese Civil War and the Emergence of Hezbollah, 1970-1982 – 17 e. Hezbollah’s Formation – 21 f. Hezbollah’s Early Ideological Framework – 23 g. Syrian and Israeli Occupations of Lebanon, 1982-2005 – 24 h. Political Turmoil, 2006 Lebanon War, and 2008 Lebanese Political Crisis – 29 i. Hezbollah’s 2009 Manifesto – 31 j. The Syrian Civil War – 32 k. Sunni Islamists in Lebanon and Syria – 34 l. Lebanese Christians – 37 Part 2 – Analysis of Hezbollah’s Communications 2. Theoretical Approach to Hezbollah’s Communications – 40 3. Hezbollah in Syria – 44 a. Hezbollah’s Participation in Syria – April 30th, 2013 – 44 b. The Campaign for al-Qusayr, Part One – May 9th, 2013 – 48 c. The Campaign for al-Qusayr, Part Two – May 25th, 2013 – 50 4. Hezbollah’s Responses to Terrorism – 54 a. An Attack in al-Dahieh – August 16th, 2013 – 54 b. The Bombing of Iran’s Embassy – November 19th, 2013 – 56 5. Further Crises – 62 a. The Assassination of Hezbollah Commander Hassan al-Laqqis – December 3rd, 2013 – 62 b.
    [Show full text]
  • The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq
    The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq By Anthony H. Cordesman, Peter Alsis, Adam Mausner, and Charles Loi Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Revised: December 20, 2011 Note: This draft is being circulated for comments and suggestions. Please provide them to [email protected] Chapter 6: US Strategic Competition with Iran: Competition in Iraq 2 Executive Summary "Americans planted a tree in Iraq. They watered that tree, pruned it, and cared for it. Ask your American friends why they're leaving now before the tree bears fruit." --Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.1 Iraq has become a key focus of the strategic competition between the United States and Iran. The history of this competition has been shaped by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 1991 Gulf War, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since the 2003 war, both the US and Iran have competed to shape the structure of Post-Saddam Iraq’s politics, governance, economics, and security. The US has gone to great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq’s main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling. However, containing Iranian influence, while important, is not America’s main goal in Iraq. It is rather to create a stable democratic Iraq that can defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US and its Gulf allies.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies
    Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies Updated May 8, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44017 SUMMARY R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies May 8, 2019 Iran’s national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, perception of threats Kenneth Katzman to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of Specialist in Middle the Iranian regime’s factions and constituencies. Iran’s leadership: Eastern Affairs x Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. x Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. x Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. x Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region’s “oppressed” and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. x Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s national security core goals. Iran’s elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif support Iran’s integration into regional and international diplomacy.
    [Show full text]