THE FRANCO-BAVARIAN ALLIANCE DURING the WAR of the SPANISH SUCCESSION. the Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1969 History, Modern

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This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 70-6777 GAEDDERT, Dale Albert, 1938- THE FRANCO-BAVARIAN ALLIANCE DURING THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1969 History, modern

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DURING THE WAR OF j?HE SPANISH SUCCESSION

DISSERTATION Presented In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By Dale Albert Gaeddert, B.A.» M.A. ******

The Ohio State University 1969

Approved by

Adviser Department of History PREFACE

This study has developed out of my work begun in the seminars of Dr. John C. Rule at The Ohio State University. I am grateful for his help in the formulation of this topic and for his assistance in the subsequent research and writing. The manuscript material was gathered in Munich, Germany in the collections of the Bayerlsches Geheimes Staatsarchiv and the Geheimes Hausarchlv. I wish to thank the director of the latter. Dr. Hans Rail, for his aid. Finally I am Indebted to Mrs. Elinor Whitman for reading this manuscript and to my wife, Judith, for typing it.

li VITA February 10, 1938 . . . Born - Newton, Kansas i9 6 0 ...... B. A., Bethel College North Newton, Kansas

1 9 6 3...... M. A., Kansas University Lawrence, Kansas

I963-I965 ...... Instructor, Department of History Texas College of Arts and Industries, Kingsville, Texas

I965 -I968 ...... Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

I968-I969 ...... Instructor, Department of History University of Nebraska at Qnaha, Omaha, Nebraska

FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Early Modern History. Professor John C. Bule French Revolution. .professor John C. Rule Renaissance and Reformation. Professor Harold J. Grimm Medieval. Professor Frank J. Pegues Colonial and Early National. Professor Paul C. Bowers

ill TABLE OP CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... ii VITA ...... H i LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS...... v Chapter I. HAPSBURG AND WITTELSBACH...... I II. BOURBON AND WITTELSBACH...... 24 III. THE FORMATION OP THE FRANCO-BAVARIAN ALLIANCE ...... 44 IV. JUNCTION OP THE FRANCO-BAVARIAN ARMIES . ?6 V. MAX EMANUEL AND VILLARS ...... 95 VI. 1704— THE YEAR OF DISASTER ...... 11? VII. AFTER BLENHEIM ...... 140

VIII. THE POLICY OF RESTITUTION ...... l6 l IX. CONCLUSION...... I89 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY ...... 202 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 216

iv LIST OP ILLUSTRATION Page 1. Nap of South Germany ...... 2. Map of Spanish Netherlands...... 160

v Chapter I HAPSBURG AND WITTELSBACH

This paper is a study of the Franco-Bavarian Alliance in the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-171^. The European powers had failed ito agree on a candidate to succeed Carlos II of Spain before he died on November 1, 1700. Then Louis XIV accepted the last will of Carlos II, which gave all the Spanish lands to the Bourbon claimant Philip of Anjou, and sent French troops into the Spanish Netherlands and the Milanese to secure Philip's claims. England, the United Provinces, Austria, and the major German states of Prussia, Hanover, and Saxony revived the Grand Alliance in 1702 to oppose what they considered was the extension of French pow;er over the Spanish Empire. France created a count er-cojallt ion of Portugal, Savoy, Cologne, and Bavaria. However, the French coalition j collapsed after the Allies occupied Cologne in 1702, and j Savoy and Portugal switched to the Allied side the next year. Only Bavaria remained a consistent French ally.

I contend that France andI Bavaria tried to avoid a i prolonged war over the problem of the Spanish Succession. 1 The French occupied the Spanish lands in 1701 In order to 2 hold these areas until Austria, particularly, was ready to accept the division of the Spanish Inheritance. The French considered Bavaria to be the keystone state if a protracted war were to be avoided. A strong Bavaria blocked a con certed Allied attack against the French armies either in the Low Countries, Italy, or In the Rhineland. Not only did Bavaria*s strategic position protect France, but since Prussia and Saxony were the most probable states to desert the Allies, France needed Bavaria's military and diplomatic strength within the Empire. Thus an alliance with Bavaria offered France the best means of breaking the solidarity of the Allied states.

In the Partition Treaties of 1 69 8 and 1699 between Louis XIV and William III of England, France had worked for a division of the Spanish Hapsburg's lands: Spain, the Spanish Indies, Naples, Sicily, the Milanese, and the Spanish Netherlands. As the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the Spanish Succession diminished in 1701, France relied upon Franco-Bavarian cooperation in the Empire to make the Allies accept a compromise. This was the best way to force the Allies to enter negotiations in a situation in which France held a strong military position without having first to endure a protracted war. Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria (Max Emanuel as he is called by Bavarian historians) seized upon the advan tageousness of his position in 1701-1702. He joined 3 with Prance In order to enlarge Bavarian territories, to make Bavaria a kingdom, and to acquire a part of the Spanish lands, preferably the Spanish Netherlands. This policy was not pretentious; rather, it was commonplace among the leaders of the lesser states in the early 1 7 0 0's. Savoy, for example, had the support of England for similar goals. French policy, also, was within the traditional limits of European diplomacy. Louis XIV did not seek either to gain the entire Spanish Inheritance or to destroy the Empire, but he expected to retain a major part of the Spanish Inheritance. I, also, maintain Max Emanuel's diplomacy represented Bavaria’s attempt to become one of the powers within Germany. He failed in his bid for three reasons. First, he was not the type of leader to resist the ruthless military tactics that the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy, the leaders of the Allied armies, used against Bavaria in 170^. Second, he failed because of an unforeseeable series of French defeats: Blenheim (170^), Ramillies (1706), Turin (1706), Oudenarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709). The war did not become a stalemate between France and the Allies which would have permitted Bavaria to maintain its strategic position between Austria and France. Instead, France defended Itself against the Allied attempt to force it back, at least, to its boundaries of 16**8. Third, the conflicts over military 4 strategy between Prance and Bavaria In 1703 caused a mutual distrust which contributed to the temporary end of Franco- Bavarian power in Central Europe as of 1704. France fought for ten more years to reconstruct the balance of power that had existed between the Allies and the Franco-Bavarians on the eve of the Battle of Blenheim on August 13. 1704. This study points out the significance of dynastic and personal honor in influencing the formulation of diplomatic policy. Max Emanuel demanded that the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons respect the House of Wittelsbach. In his opinion he had to ally with France in 1701, because Austria had refused to reward him for his military services in the

1 6 8 0's and 1 6 9 0*s by giving him additional titles and territories. The final rebuff to his pride came when Leopold I raised Prussia to the rank of a kingdom in 1701, while refusing to do the same for Bavaria. At the end of the war Louis XIV 1 s sense of dynastic honor was a major reason for the Elector's restitution in Bavaria. When the Allies demanded that France abandon Max Emanuel in 1709- 1710, Louis XIV refused, just as he also declined, in those desperate years for France, to evict Philip V from Spain. Max Emanuel's participation in the War of the Spanish Succession was a return to the policy of his grandfather, Maximilian I, during the Thirty Years War. Maximilian I had made Bavaria a powerful state in the Empire during his long electorship, 1598-1651* He placed the Bavarian Army in the service of the Emperor Ferdinand XI for which he hoped to gain the Hhine and the Upper Palatinates and the title of elector. Maximilian I failed to keep the Rhine Palatinate by the Peace of Westphalia in 16**8; however, he became an elector and made Bavaria the second ranking power behind Austria in South Germany. Ferdinand Marla reversed Maximilian I's policy after the latter*s death in 1651- Instead of a policy of expansion like his father's, Ferdinand Marla, during his electorship, 1 6 5 1-1 6 7 9, pursued the goals of retrenchment within Bavaria and peace abroad. Like other German princes he avoided foreign conflict through a neutrality compact with France. Within Bavaria he consolidated his adminis trative authority as a part of his plan to organize Bavarian recovery from the destruction of the Thirty Years War. His wife, the Electress Adelaide of Savoy, played an important part in Bavarian affairs. She changed the somber, formal, Spanish-style court that Maximilian I had kept in Munich to one patterned after the French which she had known in her native Savoy. She persuaded Ferdinand Maria to pursue a pro-French policy over the opposition of his mother, Maria Anna of Austria. The court and govern ment, largely through Adelaide's influence, was dominated 1 by French cultural and political attitudes. Max Emanuel had his mother's Savoyard vivaciousness 6 i rather than his father1s Hapsburg solemn righteousness, even though he was, by repeated Hapsburg-Wittelsbach inter marriage, more Hapsburg than any other prince outside the 2 immediate Hapsburg family. Gallantry, honor, pride, and vanity were the marks of Max Emanuel's personality. As elector, he preferred the battlefield to the council 3 room. His charge at the head of a new brigade, his first command at Mohacs against the Turks in 1685, carried the battle for the forces of the Emperor. He always considered this his finest achievement. He suffered his bitterest disappointment in 1692 when he was not named to succeed the Imperial General, the Duke of Lorraine. Instead, Leopold I selected Louis of Baden, partially, because his state was not powerful enough, in contrast to Bavaria, to represent a threat to the Emperor, and, in part, because the Prince of Baden was a prudent, plodding man while the Bavarian Elector was impetuous and flamboyant. The Emperor was a shrewd Judge of men, as seen in his promotion of Eugene of Savoy's career. He refused to place Max Emanuel in command of the Imperial Army, although

■^Karl Theodore Heigel, Quellen und Abhandlungen zur neueren Geschlchte Bayerns (2 vols.; Munich, 1884-1890), II. 33. 2 Michael Doeberl, Entwlcklungensgeschlohte Bayerns (2 vols.; Munich, I9 2 8), II, 1&. 3 Heigel, Quellen und Abhandlungen. II, 103. 7 he did like and respect him; however, Joseph I, 1705-1711• 4 who succeeded Leopold X, Intensely, disliked him. The most interesting contemporary description of Max Emanuel comes from Count Mdrode-Westerloo of Brabant, He, like his ancestors, was a Knight of the Golden Fleece and an advisor of the governors of the Spanish Netherlands. When Max Bnanuel came to Brussels in 1 6 9 2, he Impressed the Count with his earnestness and dignity. But Mdrode- Westerloo*s approval changed to condemnation after Max Emanuel surrounded himself with personal favorites, spent excessively on his own equipage, and illegally brought Bavarian troops into the Spanish Netherlands. Initially the Elector carefully cultivated the support of the greater nobility, but his style of light-hearted living, his exclusion with his courtiers, and his open liaison with the

The manuscript material cited in this study is from the Bavarian Archives in Munich, Germany. The first set of papers from the Geheimes Hausarchlv is the correspon dence of Louis XIV and Max Bnanuel, 1688-1712: Korrespon- denz Max Emanuels rait Ludwig XIV, 1688-1712; Korr-Akt Nr. 753,64. These letters are designated GH, K-A. The second set of papers from the Geheimes Hausarchlv is a miscellaneous collection of correspondance: Max Emanuel Heg'lerung Polltlsche Akten, I6 9 6 -I7 I5, Nr. 753,65* These letters are designated GH, PA. The major manuscripts used here are from the correspondance of the Bavarian Ambassador to France, Count Ferdinand de Monasterol, with Max Emanuel in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv: Kasten/Schwartz 17008-17017, 17043, and 170^4. These are cited as GS, KS. The statement about Joseph I's hostility to the Elector is in a letter from Monasterol to Max Emanuel, February 21, 1?05* GS, KS 17016. 8 Countess Kaunltz irritated Hdrode-Westerloo. m e latter knew* also, that Max Bnanuel was an able, ambitious man, who had served the Empire and the Catholic Church.^ In a moving passage, Mdrode-Westerloo described Hax Bnanuel escorting him into the sick room where the young Eleotoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand lay dying in 169 9 . Max Bnanuel placed his hopes of further glory and power with this boy of seven, who had been chosen by the Spanish in 1698 as the successor of Carlos II. In the sickroom he was subdued and compassionate; yet, he was bitter that his son was near 6 death and his own hopes were dashed disastrously. The French marshals Vlllars and Tallard considered Max Bnanuel ambitious, but in contrast to Mdrode-Westerloo, they thought he was too self-indulgent to be an effective i political and military leader. Vlllars had known him since they campaigned together against the Turks in 1683. Vlllars' reports from Munich in the 1680*s and in 1703 were critical of the Elector for sacrificing Bavarian lnter- 7 est too often for his personal pleasures.

Comte de Mdrode-Westerloo, Mdmoires (Brussels, 181*0), 71-73. Ibid.. 163. 7 Claude due de Vlllars, Mdmolres (eds.), M. Anquetll, Nouvelle collection des mdmolres relatif 4 l'hlstolre de France (Paris. lBkl). 22-27; and. Charles, marauls.de Vogllrf(ed^), Vlllars d'aprfes sa correspondance et des documents lnddits (2 vols.^ Paris. 1^881■ II. 128. 9 Max Emanuel emerged in this study as a complex personality of immense dignity and constant purpose. This centrality of his personality was often hidden by those aspects of his character that appear chivalric— a thirst for honor and a love of pageantry--and by his periodic indolence. These attributes were not conducive to his success as the head of state in the Age of Absolutism, He 8 sought power without the tenacity to procure it. He had the victories of Maximilian I as a model. Although he tried to surpass his grandfather's achievements, he lacked the religious fervor, tenacity, and rigorous self- discipline that were necessary effectively to wage a hazardous war in order to increase Bavaria's power in the War of the Spanish Succession the way Maximilian I had 9 done it in the Thirty Years War. Prom the beginning of his reign in 1681, Max Emanuel strove toward greater personal power. He set aside Ferdinand Maria's trusted advisor, Chancellor Kaspar von Schmid, who had dominated the government since 1666. Dietrich Heichard became the Chancellor and he governed Bavaria during the Elector's long absences. Reichard exercised the elector's powers over a very centralized

A. DllrrwSchter, "Zeitalter Bayern unter Ferdinand Maria und Max Emmanuel," Historlsches Jahrbucher, XXXV (191*0 . 565. 9 Heigel, Quellen und Abhandlungen. II, 93, 10 government composed of the Privy Council, the Council of Secretaries, and the Bentmelsters. the Bavarian equivalent of the French lntendants. The traditional municipal and noble privileges had been standardized and were placed under the Jurisdiction of the electoral courts. The Independence of the electoral government from the nobility and towns was made complete through the direct collection of the heavy 10 military tax levies by the Rentmelsters. Max Emanuel depended upon Baron von Malknecht to handle the government in the Spanish Netherlands, Just as he relied on Relchard in Bavaria. Malknecht went with the

Elector to the Spanish Netherlands in 1 6 9 1, and he remained to handle Max Emanuel's Interests after the latter's return to Munich in 1701. While Relchard was a servant of the state in the manner that Jean-Baptiste Colbert had been for Louis XIV, Malknecht was the devoted personal representative, as the Earl of Portland was for William III. In matters of foreign policy, Malknecht and Relchard loyally followed Max Emanuel whether he favored an Austrian or French alliance. Count Johann d'Arco, the President of the Court War Chancellery and General Field Marshal of the Bavarian Army, influenced both military and foreign affairs.

Doeberl, Entwlcklungensgesohlchte Bayerns. II, 72-75. 11 He was an able military administrator and strategist whom Max Emanuel always consulted. He belonged to the group of Savoyard courtiers with whom the Elector surrounded him self. D'Arco and the other Savoyards, particularly 11 Monasterol, favored closer ties with France. Count Ferdinand de Monasterol, a marshal in the army, was the major partisan of a Franco-Bavarian Alliance. After he went to Versailles as the Bavarian ambassador in 1700, he constantly advocated closer Bavarian cooperation with the French. In France he persistently and faithfully advocated Bavarian interests, although he tended to give Max Emanuel assurances of French exertions for Bavarian interests that the French could not fulfill. After the war began, he urged repeatedly that Bavaria make greater

12 • sacrifices in the struggle against the Allies.

Recuell des instructions donndes aux ambassadeurs et mlnistres de France depuls les traitds de Westphalle .lusqu1^ Revolution franoaisei VII; Bavlfere. Palatinat, Deux-Ponts. (ed.), Andrd Lebon (Paris, 1889)',, 81. Hereafter cited as Recuell Bavifere. 12 Monasterol to Max Emanuel, November 23, 1701, GS, KS 17009; Monasterol to Max Emanuel, September 26, 1?03* GS, KS 17013* The Monasterol correspondence is the major source for the study of.Bavarian diplomacy in the War of the Spanish Succession. Max Braubach, ’’Die Polltlk des KurfUrsten Max Emanuel von Bayern im Jahre 1702," Hlstorlsches Jahrbuoh. XLIII (1923)* 51-92; and, August Rosenlehner in two extensive articles: "Die Stellung der Kurfttrsten Max Emanuel von Bayern und Joseph Klemens von KBln zur Kaiserwahl Karls VI, 1711," Historlsohe Abhand- lungen, XIII (1900), 1-1^7; and ”Zur Restitutlonspolltlk KurnSrst Max Snanuels von Bayerns," Forsohungen zur Geschlchte Bayerns. X-XI (I9OI-I9 0 3 ), 39-82, 294-316, rely on this correspondence. 12 Relchard, Malknecht, d'Arco, and Monasterol were Max Emanuel's major advisors on Bavarian affairs, and each of these men held his position at the will of the Elector. They functioned as able servants of the Elector over a centralized and prosperous state in the last decades of the seventeenth and early years.of the eighteenth centuries. Although the Wittelsbach's had gained control of other territories since the Reformation, their power rested in Bavaria. The other important area that the Wittelsbach ruled was the Archbishopric of Cologne whioh they had acquired during the Reformation in order to prevent its conversion to Protestantism. They subsequently kept Cologne in their family through the support of the Hapsburgs. In the years preceeding the War of the League of Augsburg, the Hapsburg-Bourbon struggle focused on the pending election of the Archbishop of Cologne. Leopold I and Pope Innocent XI backed the Wittelsbach candidate, Joseph Clemens, the younger brother of Max Emanuel, even though he was under age and not in religious orders. In 1688 he was appointed archbishop despite French opposition. Joseph Clemens accepted the crosier reluctantly. Only seventeen at the time of his election, he preferred court life in Munich or in the Wittelsbach castles of Dachau and Schliesshelm to the spiritual and political duties of an 13 13 electoral archbishop. Since Prance occupied Cologne in 1688 at the beginning of the War of the League of Augsburg, Joseph Clemens did not enter his see until I6 9 2, four years after his appointment. He and his advisor, Johann Karg von Bebenburg from Bavaria, never effectively governed the archbishopric. First, the Prussians and Dutch kept occupation troops in the territory in the 1 6 9 0*3 . Second, the magistrates of Cologne and Bonn refused to grant him enough revenue for 14 his administrative and military expenses. Joseph Clemens had to depend on Austrian subsidies, which were meager but irreplaceable in the 1690's. In return for Hapsburg assistance, he followed Max Emanuel in backing the Emperor within Germany and against the Turks and the French. The Hapsburgs and the Wittelsbachs had been allied within the Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Maximilian I made it the cornerstone of his policy from 1598 to 1651» After he died, his wife Maria Anna, the daughter of Emperor Ferdinand II, tried to retain the alliance between the two families. Following her death

13 George F. Fruess, "KurfUrst Joseph Klemens von Kbln," Forschungen zur Geschiohte Bayerns. X-XI (1901- 1903)* 221. Brlschar, "Fenelon und der Kttrfurst Josef Clemens von iCdln" Der Katholik, II (1888), 492-494; In his article Brlschar concludes that Archbishop Fenelon, alone, pursuaded Joseph Clemens to remain in the priesthood after the latter fled into exile in France in 1702. 14 Pruess, "ICurfUrst Joseph Klemens von K*<31n," 225» 231. 14 In 16 6 5, Ferdinand Marla re-oriented Bavarian policy toward

„ 15 a coalition with France until he died In 1679* But this was only a temporary Interruption of Auetro-Bavarian cooperation. The regent In l6?9-l681« Duke Maximilian Philip, the Landgrave of Luxemburg and Max Emanuel's uncle, had begun to realign Bavaria with Austria. The Duke took Max Bnanuel to Vienna for an audlenoe with Leopold 1 In 1681. where the latter swore his allegiance to the Bnperor and the Empire. Chancellor Schmid, as stated above, was the chief architect of a pro-French diplomacy. Thus his removal and 'that of Bavarian Ambassador to France, Mayr von Gberschellang, signaled a change In Bavarian foreign 16 policy when Max Bnanuel became elector In that year. Bavarian policy conformed with the movement toward greater solidarity within the Bnpire to oppose the Turks In the eaBt and the French In the west during the 1680*s. With the Empire faced by this double threat on Its borders the re-emergenoe of an Austro-Bavarlan Alliance was a natural combination. On February 17, 1682, Bavaria and Austria signed a defensive agreement. The. following year

13------The Franco-Bavarian Treaty of 1670 was further assured by Princess Marla Anna's, Max Emanuel'a older sister, marriage to the French Dauphin in 167 9. Thus, Max Emanuel was Philip of Anjou's uncle. 16 Karl T. Heigel. Quellen und Abhandlunaen. II, 5 5 , 102. 15 they entered a formal alliance, aimed at both Turkey and France, which Austria underwrote with a subsidy for 17,000 17 Bavarian troops. The Bavarian ties with Austria grew stronger during the campaigns against the Turks In the 1680*s when the Bavarian troops fought with distinction. In this period the Austro-Bavarian Alliance was further consolidated by Max Emanuel's marriage to Archduchess Marla Antoinette on July 15* 1685. This marriage created the possibility of another claimant for the Spanish Inheritance, since Maria Antoinette, the only child of Leopold I's Spanish Hapsburg wife Margaret Theresa, carried a better claim to the Spanish throne than Leopold's sons by a later marriage, Joseph and Charles. Furthermore, Philip IV of Spain had designated Margaret Theresa as his heir prior to his death which added to the strength of Maria Antoinette's claims to the Spanish lands. In the marriage contract she re nounced her rights to both the Austrian and Spanish in- 18 heritances. Austria bound Max Emanuel to the alliance by promising him the governorship of the Spanish Netherlands. Soon after the marriage, Leopold I asked Charles II to appoint Max Emanuel as governor. The Spanish court feared the

17 Ibid.. 85. 18 Hfcfler, Carl (ed.), "Habsburg und Wittelsbach." Archly ftir tteterrelchlsche Gesohlchte. XLIV (1871), 2 7 8. 16 consequence of appointing a strong, Independent German elector. But the Spanish Queen Mother, the major supporter of the Wittelsbach in Madrid, and the Queen of Spain over came the King's hesitancy. However, before the appointment could be made, French opposition needed to be surmounted. Louis XIV wanted the governorship for the Duke of Burgundy, which Spain had agreed to by the terms of the Franco- Spanish Armistice of 168^. The French party in Madrid 19 effectively blocked Max Emanuel's bid until 1688.

The Austro-Bavarian Treaty of May if-, 1 6 8 9* stated the position of both parties on the Spanish Inheritance. It reaffirmed Maria Antoinette's relinquishment of her claims to the Austrian and the Spanish Hapsburg territories, but this treaty, like the marriage contract, explicitly excluded a renunciation of the Spanish Netherlands. The treaty projected Hapsburg-Wittelsbach cooperation to secure the Spanish Netherlands for Bavaria and the remainder of the Spanish Inheritance for Austria. Eight days later Austria signed the treaty with the Dutch that formed the

Grand Alliance of Vienna, 1 6 8 9* A secret article of that alliance bound the Dutch to support Austrian claims in the Spanish Succession, and, by implication, the Dutch

19 Georg F. Preuss, "IDsterrelch, Frankreich, und Baiern lm der spanishchen Erbfolgefrage, I6 8 5 -I6 8 9 ," Hlstorisohe Vlertel.lahrsohrlft. IV (1901), 333 • 17 recognized Max Emanuel’s title to the Spanish Nether- 20 lands. The Elector allowed the Austrlans to further his interests in Madrid. He acted cautiously toward Spain, even though he coveted the governorship. The Spanish nobility and Carlos II admired Max Emanuel as a crusader against the Infidel in the Spanish tradition. He had distinguished himself in the Battles of Vienna (I6 8 3 ), Mohacs (l685)» and Belgrade (1688), in which he led the besieging forces of the Empire. His reputation and Austrian persistence overcame the Spanish fear of the alienation of the Spanish Netherlands by his appointment. In 1691, he received the patent of Lieutenant Governor and Captain General of the Spanish Netherlands. The Spanish government had appointed Max Emanuel in response to Austrian pressure, despite their fears that his installation as governor would be the first step toward losing control over all their lands in the Low Countries. Spain suspected correctly that he meant to de tach the Spanish Netherlands from Spain and to make them 21 his sovereign provinces. He did work for many years

20 ~ Ibid.. 4 9 6 . 21Theodore Juste, ”Le gouvernour gdndral des Pays-Bas Espagnol, Maximilian-Emmanuel de Bavifere,” Revue natlonale de Belgique. XIII (1845), 13• 18 toward gaining these territories as the hereditary possession of the Wittelsbach. In fact, he was the governor for twenty-three years, 1691-171*1-, and he lived there from I6 9 I to 1701 and from 1 7 0*1- to 171**-. Max Emanuel replaced the Marquis de Gastanga, an ineffectual minion of Madrid. The Spanish control of the Spanish Netherlands rested on the traditional bonds between the nobility, the Catholic Church, and Spain. During the seventeenth century Spain did not attempt to centralize the government in the Spanish Netherlands. The powers of the governor remained limited by the feudal prerogatives of the nobility, the cities, the courts, and the provincial estates. In addition, the Dutch had placed garrisons in the major strategic centers like Maestricht. Max Emanuel faced entrenched interests against which he used the latitude of the governor's prerogative successfully, only 22 once, to centralize the revenues in the Finance Council. The governor held the position of a Spanish viceroy; that is, he represented the position and prerogative of the king in the king's absence. However, the Spanish government directly appointed the six provincial governors

22 Georg F. Preuss, "Verfassungsgeschichte des spanischen Niederlande unter dem KurfUrsten-Statthalter Max Emmanuel von Bayern," Forsohungen zur Gesohlchte Bayerns. VII (1 9 0 0), 2 2 7. 19 and the Spanish Secretary which limited the governor's administrative powers. In addition, the great nobility made their voice heard in the Privy Council which traced its origin to the court of the Dukes of Burgundy in the fourteenth century. It had not fallen into disuse, as was the case In most of the states of Western Europe. The provincial estates in each province were controlled by the nobility and the towns. Finally, the towns retained their traditional liberties and corporate privileges Individually and as a unit through their participation in the Magistrate 23 Communals. The Spanish Netherlands in the seventeenth century remained the most thoroughly feudalized area of Europe. The complete lnfeudation of its society and a century of ineffectual Spanish rule made It a difficult area to govern. Max Emanuel had to exercise his authority by the force of his own personality, since the territories had no centralized administrative structure that could enforce direct executive action. The division of authority between governor, provincial governors, provincial estates, and municipalities was traditional in theory and practice— none had fallen into disuse. The decline of Spain and the rise of the Dutch had caused the general degeneration of the

23 Ibid., 220 20

Spanish Netherlands. In 1 6 9 8-1 6 9 9, a number of projects began for repairing the destruction suffered during the War of the League of Augsburg. But the more extensive propo sals for canal construction, a protectionist tariff, and the formation of an East Indies trading company were only plans 2^ when the war broke out in Europe again in 1701. The governor could rule only through the greater nobility, and Max Emanuel had alienated many of them during the first decade of his rule. Mdrode-Westerloo's account in his Memoires typified the impressions of the nobility who had been traditionally loyal to the Spanish Hapsburgs. Mdrode-Westerloo and his colleagues, the Count d'Egmont and the Princes de Vaudemont and de Ligne were members of one of the proudest nobilities in Europe; therefore, they assumed that they were the peers of any Wlttelsbach. The Flanders and Brabant aristocracy placed great hope in Max Emanuel’s appointment. After all, he was a young prince, distinguished in battle against the Turks and married to the heiress of the Hapsburgs. By reputation he was intell igent, generous, and able. In addition, he was considered adroit in civil and military affairs as well as a man of 25 courage and valour.

— Juste, "Le gouvernour g6 n£ral des Pays-Bas Espagnol, Maximilian-Emanuel de Bavlfere, 11 135* 1 3 6. 25 ", MSrode-Westerloo, Memoires, 73* 21 Max Emanuel entered Brussels in state on March 26, 1 6 9 2, about a year after his appointment. The official procession Included the greats of the realm; the outgoing Governor, Marquis de Gastanga, Marquis de Bedmar, Prince de Vaudemont, Prince de Llgne, Count d'Egmont, due d'Hauvrd, Duke of Holstein, and Bernardo de Qulros, the Governor of Luxemburg, the Spanish Secretary, members of the Council of Brabant, 26 and the ranking military officers. In the first years of his governorship Max Emanuel had the support of the greater noble families. In the later

1 6 9 0's he lost it by Ignoring them— in fact, by deliberately snubbing them— and through confiding exclusively in the Count d' Clalrmont, the First Secretary of State. Max Emanuel, also surrounded himself with his own men, both Ba varians and Savoyards. Specifically in military affairs,he brought in Bavarian troops, which was illegal by the terms of his appointment, and he channeled money from Spanish and Spanish Netherland sources to his Bavarian officers and troops. By 1 6 9 9, according to Mdrode-Westerloo, Max Emanuel 27 had 30,000 excellent Bavarian soldiers in the provinces. Under Max Emanuel's administration the Spanish Nether lands continued to decline. He sought his pleasures

-g Ibid.. 71-72. 27 Ibid., 1 3 4, 1 3 5. Juste, "Le gouvernour gdndral des Pays-Bas Espagnol, Maximilian-Emmanuel de Bavldre,” 142, estimates 8,000 Bavarian troops were in Flanders and Bra bant. 22 in hunting, music, and mistresses, Popoilin, also referred to as Lelouchier, replaced Countess Kauntiz as his mistress 28 in Brussels. His one achievement was the consolidation of finances which he used to strengthen his Bavarian troops. The armies of the provinces deteriorated (in contrast to his Bavarians) to the point that they received only two 29 months pay and survived the rest of the year by brigandage. In the later seventeenth century the Wittelsbachs' held a significant position in the Germanles and in the Low Countries. Of the two brothers, Joseph Clemens and Max Emanuel, the latter had become a major personage in the diplomatic and military affairs of Europe. The former usually followed his older brother’s advice in the attempt to enhance the position of their house. Through the astuteness of his diplomacy and his abilities as a head of state Max Emanuel had made the Wittelsbach’s a key part of the dynastic structure of Europe. Prom the end of the War of the League of Augsburg in

1697 until the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1701 the major monarchs of Europe— Louis XIV, William III, and Leopold I— sought to gain Max Emanuel’s support 1 28 Sigmund Rlezler, Geschlchte Bayerns (8 vols.; Gotha, 1878-1914) VII, 473* Popoilin became the Countess d ’Arco. She was sympathetic to France. When Max Emanuel left for Munich, she went to Versailles in 1701. 29 Mdrode-Westerloo, Mdmolres. 144. 23 in the imminent struggle over the Spanish Inheritance. Unquestionably he was the major elector in both Southern and Western Germany. Louis XIV, particularly, recognized his significance, and he ultimately agreed to all of Max EmanuelTs conditions for an alliance. Chapter II THE WITTELSBACH AND THE BOUBBONS

France tried to keep the Empire neutral whenever a war between Bourbon and Hapsburg occurred. Francis I had originated this policy in the early sixteenth century in his struggle against Charles V by retaining allies among the electors to check the emperor's strength in the Germanics. Henry IV* Richelieu, and Mazarin also found allies within the Empire in the first half of the seven teenth century. From 1661 to 1679, Louis XIV successfully maintained French support among the German states. In the first and second wars of Louis XIV's reign* the War of Devolution in the 1660's against Spain in the Spanish Netherlands and the Dutch War in the 1670's against the United Provinces, both the Spanish in the former and Dutch in the latter* found themselves isolated. In the third war of Louis XIV1s reign, the War of the League of Augsburg, 1688-1697, the French fought alone against a coalition of the major states of Europe. The French system of alliance in the Empire had broken down largely because the German states drew together in the face of the French reunions in Alsace and Lorraine and their seizure of Strasbourg in 1681. In 1685, Frederick William

Zk 25 of Brandenburg-Frussla ended his alliance with France and Joined Austria. The following year the states of the Rhineland and Bavaria created the League of Augsburg to resist France. Two years later all the major European powers united In the Grand Alliance which then checked the growth of Louis XIV*s power. After the Treaty of Byswick of that year* the French King began to build a system of alliances to preclude the formation of another European coalition against him. Savoy* Portugal* Bavaria* and Cologne were the keystones In Central and Southern Europe that Joined France by 1701. Bach of these states was strategically important if the French army meant to occupy the lands of the Spanish Inheritance. However* the French coalition was ineffect ive in Its military strength, precarious in Its allegiance to France* and hesitant in its actions without the 1 presence of French forces in each member's territory. At the same time, France approached Prussia, Saxony* and Baden; unfortunately* for French ambitions, her states men could not gain the support of any of them. If one of these had Joined this French coalition* it would have meant a major step toward neutralizing the power of the Empire

1 :: ...... Arsfene Legrelle* la Diplomatic franoalse et la Succession d'Bspagne (4> vols., Gand* 1888-1^92}* 249. Hereafter cited aB Diplomatle francalse. 26 and the Emperor. In the ease of Saxony and Prussia, the major French enticement was support in the struggle for the Polish crown. An alliance with either state meant* if it were to be effective. French involvement in the Northern War whloh lasted from 1700 to 1721. However. France already tentatively supported Sweden in the struggle between it. Saxony. Russia* and Prussia for the polish crown and for the control of the Baltlo. In general the French, like the other Great Powers, kept the war in Western Europe separate from that of Northern Europe. Louis XIV offered Augustus II subsidies for his army. diplomatic support for any Saxon territorial conquests in the Sap ire. and aid for the emperorship in an Imperial election. The French King was in a position to give Frederick I better terms for an alliance than he had proposed to Augustus II. Louis XIV promised to back Prussia's claims in the Rhineland to the sovereignty of the Upper Guelder land. Jules, and Berg in addition to the same proposals he made to Saxony. By 1?01 both of the North German eleotors decided to remain loyal to the 2 Emperor. France offered every major German state similar concessions: a subsidy, a guarantee of its lands, the maintenance of its conquests held through the war, and

1 " Ibid.. 2*fl. 27 3 prospective aid In an Imperial election. In the Sapire the lesser states of Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel and Saxe-Gotha Joined Cologne and Bavaria In an alliance with France. Louis XIV wanted his German allies to prevent the Diet from declaring war. This was the most Important Immediate assistance they could give him since an Imperial declaration nominally bound all the German states to' pursue a foreign policy In conjunction with the Enperor, and it bound the Imperial Circles of the Empire to levy troops, fully to garrison fortresses* and to raise tax money for an army to fight under the common banner of the Empire. However* this was a cumbersome process which oould be delayed by pro-French states In the Diet. In addition* the French assumed the Empire would declare war only after Austria* the United Provinces, and England actually placed their armies in the field. Any meaningful Imperial military foroe that oould be sustained for at A least several campaigns needed English and Dutch subsidies. The French used a legalistic approach, which was typioal of the diplomacy of the Old Begime, toward a 1- Hapsburg-Bourbon struggle. They held that the Issues of

5 1 ; ------Ibid., 222, 2^3- Jf Max Braubaoh, Die Bedeutung Subsldlen fttr die Polltlk lm spanlsphen Erbfolgekrlege. Vol. XXIX fBioherel der Kultur und Gesohlchte. Bonn. 10211. 16* 28 the succession to the throne of Spain and of a division of the Spanish lands Involved the Bnperor Leopold I only through his dynastic c la lias. This was not a question which involved the defense of the Bnplre. The French ambassador. M. Rousseau de Chamoy. took this position at the Diet of Regensburg in 1698* Chamoy was instructed by Louis XIV to attempt to have the Diet clearly separate its desire to protect the Bnplre from the Bnperor's hope to acquire the Spanish Inheritance. France took the position that Leopold I* a attempt to use the BapIre for his interests threatened "German liberties", and it could Involve the Bnplre in an unnecessary war. He had already illegally enlarged the emperor's prerogative by making Hanover the ninth electorate in 1692 and by crowning Joseph I King of the Romans, in 1690. France did not threaten the Bnplre; Instead, it sought to keep the peace in Europe and in the Bnplre. In the debates of the Imperial Circles at Hellbronn in 1701 and in the Diet in 1701-1702. Max Bnanuel defended his alliance with Louis XIV on the basis that it did not threaten the security of the 6 Bnplre. 1 The French proclaimed their traditional support of

Reouell des instructions donndes an* ambft^aadeurs et mlnlstres da France depuls lea trait6s de Westphalia Jusou'A la BtfvoHufcion francalse. xVlll. Ditte Germanicue. (ea.). Auerbach (Paris. 1 9 1 2 ). 18, 77* 79* 29 the ancient "German liberties" against the encroachment of the Hapsburg Emperors. Leopold I, who had unified the

Empire under his leadership by policies of marriage alliances, of grants of imperial offices, and of elevation of rank within the Empire, opposed them. In addition to George of Hanover*s support, the Emperor gained Prussian backing by making Frederick I the King in Prussia in 1701. Leopold I bound the offices of the Imperial Chancellor, which was controlled by Lothar Franz von Schonbornn, the Archbishop of Mainz, and the Imperial General, which was held by Louis of Baden, more closely to the service of Austrian diplomacy. Since Leopold I had had the support of Pope Innocent XI in the last crusade against the Moslems in the 1 6 8 0 's, he had used papal Influence -to unite the

Empire. In the wars against the Turks and the French, he

had enhanced his position as the leader of the Empire. In the struggle on the eastern and the western borders of the Empire Leopold I emerged as the champion of the Holy Roman

Empire in 1 6 9 7 , where as Charles V in 15^7 and Ferdinand II in 1 6 2 9 , in their wars within the Empire, had failed despite their military supremacy. The Emperor did not threaten the independence of the electors or the authority of the Diet,

"Manifesto de 1' Electeur de Bavlfere", G. de lamberty (ed.), Mdmolres pour servlr A l'histolre du XVIIe slfeole contenant les nfegelations. tralt^s resolutions (14 vols.s The Hague, 1724-17^0), III, 2«. Hereafter cited as Lamberty, Mdmolres. 30 7 but the Austrians held real suasion and Influence by 1700. To counter Leopold's Influence, Louis XIV was forced to rely on Max Emanuel. After France failed to entice either Saxony or Prussia Into a coalition, Bavaria remained the only significant French ally within the Germanles. Even though France's ambassadors In Berlin, Leipzig, and Begensburg represented Its Interests, French policy In the Germanles worked through Munich. Ambassador Lieutenant- General de Blclous tried to carry out Louis XIV's Instructions by coordinating the efforts of the French 8 envoys In the Empire behind Bavarian leadership. Max Emanuel proved to be an exasperating but effective ally. The price that Max Emanuel exacted in subsidies was very high. Not only did the French pay troops subsidies, but the secret articles of the Franco-Bavarian Treaty of March 9, 1701, contained the stipulation that France would assume Max Emanuel's indebtedness In the Low Countries and 9 pay the maintenance of his courtiers and ministers. France Increased the subsidies twice In 1701 and again in 1702. The price of the Bavarian alliance was raised further by the necessity of active French military support of the

August Bosenlehner, "Bestitulonspolltlk KurftLrst Max Emanuels von Bayern,* 192. 8 Beouell Bavlftre. 114. 9 Legrelle, pipiGeneva to the Dutch 32 10 frontier. The French marshals specifically wanted to destroy the Stollhoffen Lines erected by Louis of Baden on the right bank of the Hhine above Eastatt# The French wanted to acquire specific strategic points and to eliminate all military fortresses on its borders that were controlled by a potential foe# Louis XIV did not seek broad territorial areas as conquests to be Incorporated into France, While this policy was not one of seeking to extend the borders of France to its natural frontiers, it was a policy of securing its military frontiers. This aspect of French policy toward the Empire created frustrating difficulties for France from 1681 to 1?1^, The French fortresses on the left bank of the Rhine rested on the major positions of Strasbourg and Landau, Behind these were Metz, Toul, Verdun, Saarlouis, and Zwelbrucken. On the right bank were the fortress cities of Frledllngen, Old Brelsach, Freiburg, Kehl (opposite Strasbourg), and Phillips- burg (opposite Landau), all of which were held by the Emperor or the Imperial Circles after 1697# In addition to acquiring these cities, the French army wanted Vllllngen, which controlled the route to Bavaria down the Upper Danube, In the French negotiations with the Allies in the

1 5 ------:------Max Braubach, MUm die 'Relchbarrlere1 am Oberrhein, Die Frage der Rttckwlnnung Elaass und die Wiederherstellung Lothringens wShrend des Spanlschen Erbfolgekrleges," Zeltschrlft fttr Geschichte des Oberrhelns. L (1 9 3 6), ^82, 33 latter years of the War of the Spanish Succession, French interest in the fortresses on the right bank of the Rhine 11 was a major source of contention with the Empire. The states within the Empire had developed the concept of a Relchsbarrler similar to that of the Dutch Barrier; therefore, they resisted any French encroachment again on what was gained by the Empire at Ryswick. Military barriers were fundamental to the military strategy of the Age of Absolutism for the United Provinces, France, and the 12 Empire. Ultimately in 1713 the French Army under Marshal Villars captured Freiburg, Kehl, and Landau. But by the Treaty of Rastatt in 171^, France kept only the latter. On the Lower Rhine the French policy was directed toward extending its existing military fortresses into a longer and deeper barrier system. Its army Intended to complete its major line of fortification from Nieuport on the English Channel through Lille in Artois to Charleroi on the Sambre and then down the Meuse through Namur to

Maestricht. In turn this chain of fortresses could be connected with Cologne on the Rhine. Up river from Cologne

IT— Ibid.. 521. 12 Ibid., 482. In 1709 as the French were forced into their last fortresses in northeastern France the represent atives of the Imperial Circles met at Frankfort. They demanded a peace settlement only if the Empire gained a barrier of fortresses which Include Strasburg, Landau, Metz, Toul and Verdun. Ibid., 489. 34 was Bonn, and down river were Kalserworth on the right bank and fiheinburg on the left bank. In 1701 at a time when the French, also, occupied Venloo in the Guelderland, the Dutoh held only Nijmegen to the north of Venloo and Maastricht on the Meuse to the south of Venloo. With the compliance of Max Emanuel as the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands and Joseph Clemens as the Archbishop of Cologne and as the Bishop of^Lidge in 1701, the Frenoh army commanded a powerful defensive position from the Channel to the Lower Bhlne. Louis XIV*s troops had gained 13 all his objectives with the exception of Maestrioht. The first approach to Max Bnanuel by the Frenoh diplomats came with Vlllars1 mission to the Bavarian court, 1685-1689. Max Emanuel and Villars first met in 1683 at the siege of Vienna. In the winter of 1683-1684 Villars was Max Bnanuel's companion in Munich. He stayed in Munich again in the following winters between the campaign seasons. Not only were they companions in court life, but Max Emanuel gave Villars the command of the Bavarian cavalry at the Battle of Zenta in 1687. When Villars re turned to France in 1687, his position at Munich as the confidant of the Elector was formalized by his appointment as envoy extraordinary.1^

Legrelie. Diplomatle francalse. 217-220 14 Villars, Mdmolres. 22-27* 35 Villars1 Instructions from Louis XIV were to draw Max 15 Emanuel away from the Austrians. Villars considered this virtually impossible as long as Max Emanuel was dominated both by his passion for his mistress, the Countess Kaunltz, and the wife of Leopold I's head of foreign affairs, and by 16 his desire for glory in the war against the Turks. The French, also, recognized that Max Emanuel was further tied to Austria by his marriage with the Arohduchess Marla Antoinette. Villars' mission was to forestall an Austro- Bavarian military alliance directed against France in the emerging struggle over the French reunions in Alsace. The Frenoh proposed to draw Bavaria away from Austria by offering a dynastic marriage and by supporting Bavarian 17 territorial aggrandizement. Leopold I wanted a marriage between Max Emanuel's sister, Yolande-Beatrloe, and the future Emperor Joseph I when he became of age. If they were betrothed, she would be crowned immediately as the Queen of Hungary, and later as the Empress of the Holy Homan Empire at the time of Joseph's coronation. The French alternative was a marriage of Yolande-Beatrice to Prince Ferdinand of Tuscany,

Hecuell Bavlfere. 8 8 . 16 Villars, Mdmolres. 2. 17 .. Ibid.. 88. 36 18 a secure French ally. Max Emanuel signed the marriage agreement with the Duke of Tuscany In the spring of 1688. Villars reported that Max Emanuel1s refusal of his sister's marriage to the future Emperor constituted a minor French diplomatic victory and might preclude a closer Bavarian 19 attachment to Austria. Despite the difficulties that Villars encountered at the Bavarian court in breaking Max Bnanuel's ties with the Hapsburgs, he worked to interest Max Emanuel either in 20 obtaining Naples and Sicily or in expanding Bavaria. Max Emanuel at this point dismissed Villars* suggestions for the enhancement of the House of Wittelsbach as beyond the power of French capabilities.

Villars1 instructions of December 3, 1 6 8 7, for the first time elaborated definite French concessions for a Franco-Bavarian alliance. First, the French offered their support in elevating the Elector to the position of emperor. Villars warned Max Emanuel about the extension of Austrian power; he concluded that among the electors only Max Emanuel could with French support halt the Austrian Hapsburg advance. Second, France promised military and.

1 5 ------Louis XIV to Villars, March 6 , 1688, VogttS. Villars. I. 390.------19 Villars to Louis XIV, May 1, 1688, Ibid.. 3 9 5 . 20 Villars to Louis XIV, November 2, 168?, Ibid., 399. 37 diplomatic assistance for Bavaria in acquiring Regensburg, NUrnberg, Augsburg, and the general territory between the Inn and the Danube. Third, Louis XIV would give the necessary subsidies for these conquests. Fourth, if Bavaria supported French claims to the Spanish Inheritance on the death of Carlos II of Spain, France would give Mai 21 Bnanuel Naples and Sicily with the title of king. In the Elector's talks with Villars during January, 1688, he, according to Villars* letters, was not Interested in a French alliance. The major obstacle, as Max Bnanuel stated it, was that for him to gain any of these territor ial objectives meant war with Leopold I. At this point he 21 rejected any action that led to Austro-Bavarlan hostilities.' But Max Bnanuel showed an interest in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies as he would throughout his life. In Villars* Instructions of January 23, 1688, he was told to point out to Max Emanuel that only France could assure him a part of the Spanish Inheritance. Not only would France offer its troops for his use to seize territor ies in Swabia and Franconia, but militarily his position in the Spanish Netherlands was at the mercy of the Frency army.

21 Instructions to Villars, December 3, 1687, Ibid., if01-if02; Becuell Baviftre. 9 1 . 22 Villars to Louis XIV, January 15* 1688, Vogtth, Villars. I, if06. 38 In the case of a war over the Spanish Inheritance, Villars emphasized that France would Immediately seize and garrison 23 the major cities In the Spanish Netherlands. In the fall of 1688 with the approaching War of the League of Augsburg, Villars1 mission to Munich neared Its end. Max Emanuel consolidated his position with the Haps burgs by signing the Austro-Bavarlan Treaty of 1 6 8 9. Villars made a last appeal to delay Max Emanuel1s execution of the agreement. His Instructions of December 21, 1688, stated that France would not consent to the appointment of Joseph Clemens as Archbishop of Cologne. If Max Emanuel accepted an alliance with Louis XIV, then the latter would agree to his brother's nomination. Finally, Villars suggested that the Wittelsbachs were the necessary inter mediaries between the major Catholic powers, France and Austria. He urged Max Emanuel to explore means to create 2b an Austrian, Bavarian, and French understanding. Villars left Munich for Paris in 1689 after the completion of the Austro-Bavarlan Treaty which, together with Bavarian membership in the League of Augsburg In 1686, brought Bavaria actively into the Grand Alliance against

23 Instructions to Villars, January 23, 1688, Ibid.. 410-^-11; Heceull Bavlfere. 93* 24 Instructions to Villars, December 21, 1688, Vogttd, Villars. 422. V

39 Franoe. He failed to prolong Bavarian neutrality and he clearly fell far short of an alllanoe. Villars1 mission was conceived as an exploration in diplomacy* because Louis XIV at this point did not seriously entertain the 25 possibility of a firm agreement. This mission was French diplomacy at its best. They capitalized on the friendship of the two men by using Villars* appointment to enhance the prestige of the court at Munich. His official capacity in 1687 changed an in formal personal friendship between two young military commanders and companions into a formal relationship between two states. In time Max Emanuel came to trust Villars. He was the only French diplomat who oould have penetrated the screen of an Austrian-oriented court in the 1680*s to present Intimately and frankly the French position. Villars candidly outlined the three common Franco- Bavarian interests. First* France would give ample* if not carte blanche. military assistance for Bavaria in Swabia and Franconia. Second* only Bavaria oould serve as the agent of reconciliation between France and Austria. Third*

only France could guarantee him any part of the Spanish

^ Beceull Bavlfere. 85* f 40 Inheritance. Particularly this applied to the Spanish Netherlands which lay under the shadow of French military power. Villars emphasized Louis XIV's willingness to support Max Emanuel* s goal of acquiring the South German Imperial Cities of Ulm, Augsburg, Regensburg, and Nttrnberg. He could take these cities by conquest alone. In a war of subjugation Bavaria needed powerful support which only a 2 6 French army could provide. In 1687-1689 the French military might stood at the peak of Its organization, of the number of men under arms, of the number and the extent of Its fortifications, and of Its reputation In the field. The aggressive aspect of the Franco-Bavarian Alliance of 1701 In terms of the Empire resided in French support for Bavarian attacks on the Imperial Cities. Max Emanuel's designs upon these cities— Regensburg, the customary seat of the Imperial Diet, NUrnberg, a tradit ional strong ally of the emperors, and Augsburg, the symbolic bastion of Lutheranism in South Germany— meant war In the Empire. Only through the support of a French army could the Elector realize the conquest of these cities. Villars suggested to Max Emanuel, that he explore ways

26 Instructions to Villars, January 23, 1688, VogUd, Villars. I, 411. 41 to bring about a reoonoIllation of the major Catholic 27 powers. This Interest In an accomodation among the Catholic states had limited Importance In the policies of Prance, Bavaria, and Austria. The proposal for an alliance of Catholic powers originated In 1559 with ESnperor Ferdinand 1, Henry II of France, and Philip II of Spain. It finally became a reality In the Diplomatic Bevolution of 1756. The importance of a Catholic rapprochement remained a secondary consideration for both Austria and France. Cathollc-Protestant tensions obviously still existed. although policy makers generally sought to minimize them In view of the ravages of the Thirty Years War less than fifty years removed. Max Emanuel did not argue the virtues of the Counter Reformation with the zeal either of Maxlmllllan I or of Ferdinand Marla. But In the Empire he stood as the 28 major secular elector for the power of Catholicism. In the later Bavarian negotiations with the French In 1701. Max Emanuel did fear a split In Catholic strength within the Empire. Until 1705 Max Enanuel tried to moderate his diplomatic and military policy in pursuit of his territorial goals In such a way that he would not cause an Irreparable breach with Austria. After 1705, he hoped to

27 Ibid., 422. 28 Doeberl. Entwloklungensgesohlohte Bayerne. I, 97 42 create a detente among the Catholic states in Burope. The restitution of the Wlttelsbach, in his view* was the first step toward an end of the struggle between France and Austria. The path could then be cleared for unity among 29 all Catholic princes. In general* religious consider ations were deliberately deemphasized in the diplomacy of the War of the Spanish Succession. Yet* common confess ional concerns were a first step toward establishing rapport* and* more significantly* these Interests set limits to the application of force for diplomatic objectives. Villars pointed out to Max Emanuel that only France could guarantee him a portion of the Spanish Inheritance. This would become the most decisive reason for the for- 30 mation of the Franco-Bavarian Alliance in 1701. Frenoh power was predominant In the areas of the Spanish lands on the continent. The Milanese and the Spanish Netherlands could be disposed of only with French concurrence. The Immediate events that preceded the War of the Spanish Succession enhanced the credibility of Frenoh willingness to support the Wlttelsbach. The French agreed to the First Partition Treaty of 1698 while Austria refused. In 1700

29 Monasterol to Max Quuiuel* February 21* 1705# GS. KS. 17016. 30 Instructions to Villars* January 23# 1688* Vogttd* Villars. I. 410-411. 43 Carlos II's last will was recognized by the Dutch and English. By late 1?00 all the Spanish lands* all the major powers except Austria* and many other states (In cluding Bavaria) accepted It. Thus* Louis XIV's ability to compensate Max Emanuel from the Spanish Inheritance became even more probable. Chapter III FORMATION OF THE FRANCO-BAVARIAN ALLIANCE

The formation of the Franco-Bavarian Alliance proceed ed slowly between 1697-1702. The signing of the Treaties of Byswlck in 1697 was the prelude to European-wide negoti ations over the imminent problem of the Spanish Succession. Having lived with the issue since the ascension to the throne of Spain of the sickly Carlos II in 166$. the leaders of European policy were still far from a solution short of war. William III and Louis XIV tried to achieve a peaceful partition. However. Leopold I still believed in the destiny of the House of Hapsburg; thus he rejected any agreement that divided the lands of the Spanish branch of his family. With the great powers unable to agree on a division between themselves. Max Emanuel found himself in the optimum position to enhance the prestige of the House of Wlttelsbach. Against the formal backdrop of the two Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1699, there developed a bitter struggle between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons to domin ate the Spanish court. After the Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand was named primary heir by the provisions of the

44 *5 Partition Treaty of 1698, Max Emanuel entered the Intrigue In Madrid by organizing a party to represent his Interests that October. He gained little real support; but adherents of the Austrian party— -Queen Maria Anna. Cardinal Portocarreo. and Count Melgar— agreed to back the Bavarian prince as a compromise candidate. By his will of November 14, 1698, Carlos II designated Joseph Ferdinand as hiB 1 successor' under a regency headed by the queen. The boy, who was to be taken to Spain and reared at the Spanish court, left Vienna that month and passed through Brussels on the way to Madrid. After a brief illness Joseph Ferdinand died on February 6 , 1699. The seven-year-old boy, Philip IV*s great grandson, was buried In the Chapel of Saint-Sacrement beside the caskets of the children of Isabella and Archduke 2 Albert. The secret clause of the First Partition Treaty that made Max Etaanuel the heir in the event of his son's death was meaningless. Within a week Marshal Tallard, the French ambassador, and William III agreed the treaty no 3 longer existed. Max Emanuel's great expectations were

1 Qnno Klopp, Des Fall dee hauses Stuart. (14 vols.; Vienna, 1875-1888)•" vlll, 263. 2 Mdrode-Westerloo, Mdmolres. 163. 3 Klopp, Des Fall des hauses Stuart. VIII, 312. According to Klopp’, Max Emanuel apparently never knew of the secret clause. 46 cruelly ended by the unexpected death of his small son. The Wittelsbach's cause In Spain was finished. In the Second Partition Treaty of July 11, 1699, signed by William III and Louis XIV* they gave the bulk of the Spanish Inheritance to the Austrian Archduke Charles» later Charles VI of the Bnpire. France gained the Spanish territories in Italy with the understanding these could be exchanged for Lorraine and perhaps Savoy. However, the treaty was not put into effeot. On October 2, 1700, Carlos II signed his last will designating the Bourbon candidate, Philip of Anjou, as the heir of all the Spanish lands. He hoped to prevent a partition of the lands of the Spanish orown by the pro vision that, if the French did not aocept the inheritance, it was to go in its entirety to the Austrians. Carlos il died November 1, 1700, and fifteen days later Louis XIV formally accepted the Spanish Inheritance for his grandson at Versailles. On November 18th Max Emanuel recognized Philip V. On February 6 , 1701, he opened the Spanish Netherlands to the French. A month later on March 9 , 1701, Max Emanuel and Louis XIV concluded a secret subsidy treaty for the maintenance of 10,000 Bavarian troops, and Max 4 Emanuel left Brussels at once for Munich.

4 - Ibid.. IX, 8 9 . 180. 47 Upon his return to Munich that March* the Elector proclaimed his neutrality while secretly he remained an ally of Franoe. At this point he had no real choice but to accept a French treaty* since the Grand Alliance of the Hague did not formally exist. In the winter of 1700-1701* the Austrlans had begun the actual fighting when they sent a token force into Northern Italy to oppose the French. The formation of the Grand Alliance began that spring. By the end of the summer it became a reality in the treaty signed by the Dutch* English* and Austrlans on September 7» 1701. The Empire did not join the Allies until a year later. William h i initiated talks with Bavaria in July, 1701* by sending his agent* Prince Montmollln* to Munich. Montmollln promised Max Enanuel the governorship of the Spanish Netherlands for life and a military command next to william III. In order to assure Max Bnanuels agreement Montmollln offered him an unspecified amount as a personal pension for his own use and a military subsidy for his army of 300*000 gulden (30,000 pounds sterling). Max Emanuel replied that this was not enough. Leopold I must assure him of part of the Spanish Inheritance* either the Milanese or the Spanish Netherlands. In August Montmollln told Max

Georg F. Preuss, "William III. Bayern und die Grosse Allianz 1701." Hlstorlsche Zeltschrlft. XCIII (1904), 199- 201. 48 Emanuel that William III had agreed to support Bavarian 6 claims In the latter area. Montmollln remained In Munich until December 9, 1701, trying to get Bavaria to enter the Grand Alliance. In his last audience Max Emanuel told Montmollln he hoped to retain his freedom of movement at 7 this point by not Joining the Allies. Although Bavaria moved closer to France from 1697- 1701. Max Emanuel like Victor Amadeus of Savoy* negotiated with both sides. Despite Montmollln1s mission, Bavaria held to its secret alliance with France. Max Etatanuel continued to remain neutral while he received French sub sidies as specified In the Franco-Bavarian Treaty of 1701. Then he concluded an offensive alliance with Louis XIV by the Franco-Bavarian Treaty of June 17* 1702; however, he did not ratify the agreement until that fall. In the interim he negotiated with Austria. Leopold I, not William III, had to make the territorial concessions and to grant the title of king to Max Emanuel. With the exception of Kaunitz, the members of the Austrian court evidenced little Inclination to reach an agreement 8 with Bavaria. Count Schllck, the envoy of the Emperor to the South German circles visited Munich three times In the

Ibid.. 207. 7 Ibid.. 223. 8 Ibid.. 217. 49 spring of 1702. During the last call In June he could not make a specific offer to Max Emanuel* but he Implied Leopold I was willing to grant territorial concessions in the Empire and to explore an exchange of Bavaria for Naples 9 and Sicily. An Austro-Bavarlan agreement on this basis was vague* yet Max Emanuel was interested. Schliok's proposal encompassed his goal of acquiring additional territories in South Germany and in the lands of the Spanish Inheritance. The Elector presented his conditions for an alliance. First* Austria must agree to a possible exchange of Bavaria for Naples and Sicily at Max Emanuel*s option. Second, Bavaria would be elevated to the rank of a kingdom. Third* Leopold I must cede him Burgau and the Austrian Tyrol. Fourth, Austria must subsidize 20,000 Bavarian troops. Fifth, Leopold I had to agree to a marriage between one of Joseph I*s daughters and the Electoral Prince Charles Albert•10 Schlick left Munich to take the Elector's proposals to Vienna. From the EJnperor's perspective these terms were •»' absonant. If another elector of the Bnpire became a king* the authority and prestige of the Superor would be severely

9 Max Braubach* "Die Polltik des KurfUrsten Max Emanuel von Bayern im Jahre 1702," Hlstorlsohes Jahrbuch. XLIII (1923). 75. 10 Ibid.. 75. 50 impared. In this resard the exchange project Implied that Max Emanuel would either gain a substantial kingdom out of the Spanish Inheritance or the equivalent needed to be carved out of South Germany. However, the Hapsburg- Wlttelsbach marriage alliance did not represent an obstacle for Charles Albert did marry Joseph I's younger daughter, Marla Amelia. Schlick secretly returned from the Austrian court on August 15, 1702. During the following two days he met with the Elector at the Castle of Schlelsshelm. He assured Max Emanuel he would get a subsidy; nonetheless this was Austria's only concession. Schlick still offered general assurances on the exchange project, but he terminated all discussion of Austrian territorial concession In South Germany. At this point Max Qnanuel broke off the neg ot iatIons• After Bavarian troops seized the Free Imperial City of Ulm on September 8 , 1702, Austro-Bavarlan discussions began again. Max Emanuel reopened talks In October with the Austrlans, even though the Empire had declared war against France and Its allies on September 30, 1702. The Bavarian emissary at the Begensburg Diet, Baron von ZUndt, approached the Austrian representative. Cardinal Lamberg. They conferred for a month on the two Bavarian demands of a subsidy for 20,000 troops and of a lifetime Investiture 51 with the Milanese for the Elector. On November 2nd, the 11 Efrperor ordered Lamberg to end these negotiations. Max Emanuel blamed the Austrlans for the stalemate In their talks. They had refused to make any ooncessions that 12 could lead to a coalition. Max Emanuel sent his final terms to Vienna on November 8th, six days after Leopold I ordered negotiations ended at Regensburg. The Bavarian terms were presented on two separate bases: first, for neutrality and second, for an offensive alliance. If Bavaria remained neutral. Max Emmanuel wanted the immediate cession of Ulm, assurance against an Austrian attack, his confirmation as the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, and a substantial money payment • His demands for an offensive alliance were (1) the cession of Burgau, the Landgravate of Nelleburg, and Neuburg (all these areas bordered on Bavaria); (2) a subsidy secured by the Dutch and the English governments; (3) the cession of the Milanese; and, (4-) either the cession of the Spanish Nether lands or an exchange of the Spanish Netherlands with Elector Johann Wilhelm of Pfaltz-Neuburg for the Rhine 13 Palatinate.

__ Ibid.. 90. 12 Max Baanuel to Cardinal lamberg, October 12, 1702, GH, PA. 13 Max Qnanuel to Leopold I, November 8 , 1702, GH, FA. 52 Max Emanuel's sincerity in the negotiations is unknown; nevertheless he had negotiated from a more realistic position than had Leopold I. The opportunity existed for him to extend Bavarian territory in South Germany* to acquire part of the Spanish Inheritance, and to raise the Wittels- bach to the rank of royalty. However, the Emperor refused to recognize these realities, instead he sought to gain the Elector as a clientele prince through a subsidy. Max Braubach, the authority on Imperial affairs during the War of the Spanish Succession, holds that Leopold I missed an opportunity to gain Bavarian support in the war by negotiating to gain time instead of to reach an accord. Braubach also concludes that Max Emanuel himself evidenced indecision and irresolution when he returned to Munich from Brussels in 1701. Firmness and resolution were essential if his expansionist policy were to be consum- lJf mated. It was, indeed, the wrong time for indecision. Bavarian negotiations within the Etapire were never completely broken off. Intermittently, from the fall of 1702 until the fall of 1704, these negotiations occurred

— Braubach, "Politlk des Kurfflrsten Max Emanuel," 92. Georg Freuss maintained that no insurmountable Austro-Bavarlan animosity existed. In the war Max Emanuel opposed Austria only with the greatest reluctance. Preuss, "tisterrelch, Frankreich, und Balern," 503* 53 either at Regensburgt where the Diet sat until l?Ok, or In Munloh with the emissaries of Frederick I of Prussia or Leopold I. Max Emanuel's involved policy of holding the balance between France and Austria in Central Europe by retaining oontaots within the Empire and by relying on the threat of French power at his back required a facile and flexible diplomacy* He nearly suooeeded* At the same time that Max Enanuel negotiated with Leopold I and William III, he moved toward a closer alliance with France* The French generally were aware of his approaches to the Allies* The French government viewed these negotiations ambivalently: on the one hand, they did not want to lose the alliance with Bavaria; on the other hand, they would aoquiesoe to Bavarian neutral ity if it could lead to the neutralization of the Empire* This was the original purpose of French policy vls-A-vls 1—* Bavaria. France hoped first and foremost to keep trie Empire neutral. Max Bnanuel remained the major Frenoh hope for building an effective neutrality league, which Louis XIV viewed as the best means to gain his primary 15 objective* The formation of the Franco-Bavarian Alliance had had

15 ! ' ' " ' Jean-Baptiste. Colbert, marquis de Torcy, Mdmolres four aervlr A l'hlatolre des ndgoolatlona. dopula le raltd de BIBwlok .lusou'A la palx d'Utrecht, lefl.k Edouard Monnals (Paris, 185*0* 551* 54 a concrete beginning with Max Emanuel's second marriage in 1695* He refused another Hapsburg marriage to a sister of Joseph I and Carlos II* The new Electress, Theresa* was pro-French as was her family* the Sobieskis. She reinforced French influence at the court in Munich in the same manner that his first wife* Archduchess Karla Antoinette* had represented Austrian Interests before her death in 1692* The second major step in the consolidation of the Franco-Bavarian Alliance came with the First Partition Treaty in 1698. Leopold I refused to aocept the treaty. By 1700 France* rather than Austria* was willing to accommodate Bavaria by giving it a share in the Spanish Succession.- 16 The first Franco-Bavarian Treaty of March 9, 1?01, was a subsidy compact in which France supported 10*000 Bavarian troops in return for Bavarian neutrality. France allied with Bavaria as a part of its broader objective to create a group of neutral powers between the Dutch and 17 the Austrlans. The emergence of the Grand Alliances, which Included all the electors of the Bnpire except the Uittelsbach, and the failure of France's Neutrality

1 5 ------Freuss* "Wilhelm III. Bayern und die Grosse Allianz, 1701," 21?. 17 Monasterol to Max Emanuel* April 18* 1702* GS, KS 17009. 55 League within the Germanics meant Franee needed to make Bavaria a strong military power and a firm ally* The French foreign secretary Torcy approached the Bavarian ambassador Monasterol In February* 1702, to obtain an offensive alliance that would go beyond the existing arrangements. Monasterol stated that, above all, Bavaria needed a substantial Increase In troops beyond the 18 original 15,000 provided by the treaty of 1701. The Bavarian conditions for an offensive alliance were a subsidy for an additional 10,000 troops and real security for Max Emanuel by a French pledge to give him an equiva lent compensation of another state in case Bavaria was 19 lost to him In the war with the Grand Alliance, Torcy agreed to the troop subsidy. Still Monasterol continued to urge further augmentation of the Bavarian Army through larger French subsidies in the spring and summer of 1702.^° The negotiations proceeded smoothly. On the question of financial support for the Spanish Motherland troops Baron von Malknecht, Max Bnanuel's faithful personal representative In Brussels, Count Bergeyck, the Treasurer

15 Braubach, "Polltik des KurfUrsten Max Emanuel," 23. 19 Monasterol to Max Emanuel, March 13, 1702, GS, KS 17011. 20 Monasterol to Max Emanuel, April 25, 1702, GS, KS 17011. 56 General* and Marquis de Bedmar* the Governor of Brussels* handled negotiations for the subsidies in the Spanish Netherlands* Lieutenant General Puysdgur and Marshal Boufflers* the commander of the French Flanders Army 21 represented Louis XIV* There was no disunity* Until 1705 the French gave ample military support for the Spanish Netherlands and Bavarian troop contingents. The negotiations between Monasterol and Torcy in France were also harmonious* since Monasterol was an ardent French partisan in the Bavarian court* He wanted firmly to consolidate the Franco-Bavarian Alliance on the basis of mutual trust and confidence as well as by formal treaty. He liked Torcy* in their official capacities they met regularly* almost weekly, from 1701-1714* In his dispatches to Max Emanuel he gave a favorable Impression of Torcy both in terms of the letter's intentions and his abilities* Not only did he report the French position as he gained it through his Interviews with the Foreign Secretary* but he also Included Torcy's personal opinions. Monasterol's advice* which often went on at length* usually 22 correlated with Torcy*s expression of French desires*

21 " ' Legrelle* Diplomatle francalse. 221* 22 Monasterol to Max Eknanuel* September 15, 1701, GS, KS 17009s Monasterol to Max Bnanuel* April 18* 1701* GS* KS 17009. 57 In both his Journal and Mdmolres Torcy never directly stated his opinion of Monasterol. Quite dearly he pre ferred him to Max Emanuel. Torcy was a member of the Colbert family of Louis XIV* s ministers who had entered the foreign service as an aide to his father* Charles Colbert de Crolssy In 1683. By the time of the War of the Spanish Succession he was a superbly trained foreign minister since he had carried out the functions of foreign secretary in conjunction with his father and then with his 23 father-in-law* Arnauld de Pomponne» in the 1690's. The development of the Franco-Bavarian Alliance must be viewed in relation to their respective goals in the Germanics in 1701-1702. In the fall of 1701, the French policy sought to create the Neutrality League within the Empire. Torcy engaged in active correspondence with the courts of Saxe-Gotha, Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, and Mainz. Louis XIV hoped to maintain the peace within the Empire through a Neutrality League that could prevent the Circles of the Empire from aiding the Austrian campaign in Italy. The French, acoordlng to Monasterol, placed too great an emphasis on the Neutrality League. He did not think Prussia i — See Introduction by Frtfddrlo Masson (ed.), Journal inddlt de Jean-Bautlste Colbert, marquis de Torcy. Ministre et annges 1769. 1710 et 17ll. ?Paris. 18BM. rierWfcar--- cited as Torcy, Journal. 58 or Saxony would adhere as the French hoped. The French also misjudged the military capabilities of the states In the western and southern parts of the Empire. An armed league formed In these areas would have no military Zk significance. Monasterol* Torcy* and Max Bnanuel all hoped that* at least* the states In the Neutrality League could delay action by the Imperial Circles to actively support the 25 Emperor. Torcy, as stated above* placed greater emphasis on the Neutrality League than the Bavarians. Although Max Bnanuel originally found support for a Neutrality League among the states on the Bhlne when he traveled from Brussels back to Munich In the spring of 1701, he held that the 26 Elector of Saxony was the leader who had to be won. The French and Saxons had signed an agreement on December 17, 1700, In Versailles that provided for Saxony's efforts In the Empire to keep It neutral In return for French support In Poland and In Saxon territorial acquisitions within the 27 Empire. But Augustus II never ratified the treaty.

2% Monasterol to Max Enanuel, September 15* 1701* GS, KS 17009; Monasterol to Max Emanuel, November 25, 1701, GS, KS 17009. 25 Monasterol to Max Emanuel, December 18, 1701. GS, KS 17009. 26 Legrelle, Diplomatle francaise. IV, 226. 27 Ibid.. 2^1-243. 59 Bavaria won Initial successes among the Imperial Circles, The clrolee of the Electoral Bhlne, Upper Bhine* Swabia, Franconia, and Bavaria entered a compact of armed neutrality by the Heilbronn Covenant of August 31, 1701. The Heilbronn Covenant was not tied directly to the French sponsored Neutrality League of the states of Cologne, Bavaria, Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, and Saxe-Gotha. The Heilbronn Covenant signed by the above imperial circles provided for a common neutrality and joint military cooper ation toward all outside powers. Seven months later In March, 1702, the circles changed their position, with the abstention of the Bavarian Circle to the support of the 28 Grand Alliance in principle, not by treaty. These circles had resisted Max Emanuel's Inducements of French subsidies 29 and his threats of devastating their countrysides. The next month the Swabian Circle sent troops to aid Louis of Baden at the siege of Landau. While Max Qnanuel worked among the circles Louis XIV concentrated on creating the Neutrality League of German States. The problem of a Neutrality League centered'on the struggle over the Polish Succession. The Poles wanted to adhere to a French alllanoe, but France was reluctant

5 5 — :------:------:------Doeberl, Entwlcklungensgeschlchte Bayern. 11,139-141. 29 Roger Wines, "The Imperial Circles and Heichsreform in the late Seventeenth Century." Journal of Modern Hlstorv. xxxix (1967). 26. ------60 since this would certainly drive Prussia Into an Austrian alliance. The issue of the Polish Succession complicated the formation of the League. For If Saxony or Prussia stayed out of the League, it could not isolate Austria within the Bnpire. But neither Prussia nor Saxony wished to antagonize either Austria or the Maritime Powers over issues in Western Europe that would he detrimental to 30 Saxon and Prussian interests in Northern Europe. Saxe-Gotha, Brunswick-Wolffenbuttel, Cologne, and Bavaria signed the treaty that created the Neutrality 31 League in February, 1702. By mid-April, 1702, Louis XIV began to send subsidies to all its members in order to make it a military force which could keep an armed peace in Germany. Torcy told Monasterol the French wanted to make the League militarily strong enough to keep the Diet from declaring for the Allies. If this failed, France hoped the Neutrality League could succeed in appearing as the defender of the peace within the Empire, while Austria and those German states that joined it in the Grand 32 Alliance would appear as the aggressors. However, France’s Neutrality League started too late to effectively check

30 Monasterol to Max Emanuel, January 18, 1702, GS, KS, 17011. 31 Monasterol to Max Emanuel, February 23, 1?02, GS, KS 17011. 32 Monasterol to Max Emanuel, April 12, 1702, GS, KS, 17011. 61 Austria's coalition In the Germanics* The diplomatic skill of the Austrlans brought Prussia* Hanover* and Hesse-Cassel into an Austrian alliance In April* 1701. In 1702 the Austrian emissary* Count Schlick, succeeded in changing the position of the circles that signed the Heilbronn Convention, except the Bavarian Circle* to a position of active support of the Bnperor Leopold I In the raising of troops for the Imperial Army and in the 33 deliberation on foreign affairs in the Diet. In the 1702 campaign of Allies against Prance along the Lower Rhine* Saxon contingents made their appearance along side the Dutch and the English* With the fall of Cologne and the coercion of Saxe-Gothe and Brunswick-Wolfenbattel into leaving the Neutrality League and joining the Allies* Bavaria was isolated In the Empire, The Bavarian objectives emerged clearly by April* 1?02» in Max Emanuel's Instructions to Monasterol* The major goal of his policy was to add the Rhine Palatinate (Rhein- Pfaltz) and the Palatinate of Neuburg to Wlttelsbach territories* If these areas could not be added to his lands or If Bavaria was lost* he wanted the Spanish Nether lands. Max Bnanuel hoped to secure the Palatinate

33 Preuss* "Wilhelm III* Bayern und die Grosse Allianz 1701," 218. 62 territories by gaining either the Spanish Netherlands or the Milanese as pawns for an exchange at a general peace conference at the end of the war* His second objective was the acquisition of territories that bordered on Bavaria: the Imperial Cities of Augsburg* Nttrnberg, Regensburg, and Ulm, as well as miscellaneous areas from the Austrlans of Hottenberg, Kufstein, Kltzbtthel, Burgau, Neuburg on the Inn, the Duchy of Gelslingen, and the Duchy 34 of Tyrol* When the Franco-Bavarian negotiations for offensive alliance began in spring of 1702 the situation in the Etapire had changed* Since Max Emanuel was isolated in the Germanies, and not Leopold I, Bavaria could not avoid a war with the other German states* Therefore, he meant to risk the war only if he could be very certain of gaining major territories* France supported Bavarian territorial acquisitions in South Germany* But Louis XIV feared he would alienate the Spanish nobility if he forced Philip V to cede either the Milanese or the Spanish Netherlands to Max Emanuel. Torcy proposed that Naples be designated as the compensatory area for Max Emanuel if he should lose Bavaria in the war.

34 Instructions to Monasterol. April 30, 1702, GS, KS 17011. ' v/7 63 If the Elector did not gain the Palatinate areas at the end of the war* he would, according to the French, retain the lifetime governorship of the Spanish Guelderland and 35 Limburg• The Bavarians and the French were near agreement by the end of April, 1702, Max Bnanuel emphasized In the Instructions to Monasterol of April 30, 1702, that the core of a Franco-Bavarian offensive alliance was the French concession to his demand that the Spanish Netherlands was his security now for gaining the Palatinate territories at the end of the war. The Wlttelsbachs were to be granted Immediately the hereditary governorship of the Spanish Netherlands, and the sovereignty of four provinces— the Spanish Guelderland, Limburg, Luxemburg, and Namur— as a 36 pledge of French support for the Palatinates. In May, 1702, Max Bnanuel agreed to accept a treaty with France primarily on the basis that France would force the Spanish government to grant the Wlttelsbach the hereditary governorship of the Spanish Netherlands. The general outlines of the Franco-Bavarian treaty had been 37 outlined In March of 1702. The French agreed to these

35 Monasterol to Max Bnanuel, May 15. 1702, GS, KS 17010. 36 Instructions to Monasterol. April 30, 1702, GS, KS 17011. 37 Monasterol to Max Bnanuel, March 13, 1702, GS, KS 17011. 6k fundamental points: first, to aid Max Emanuel in acquir

ing the Palatinate of the Rhine and the Duchy of the Neuburg Palatinate and second, to secure their pledge by giving him the hereditary governorship of the Spanish

Netherlands and the full sovereignty of Limburg and the

Spanish Guelderland. However, Max Emanuel delayed giving

Monasterol full authority to sign a treaty until he could receive an absolute guarantee of French troops joining him in Bavaria, once Bavaria took the field against the 38 Allies. Louis XIV realized that Bavaria would not actively

enter the war on the side of France without the Elector being assured of sufficient French military support. In the Instructions of 1701 to Lieutenant-General Ricious, a

French officer, Torcy stated that his primary duty was to reassure Max Emanuel of Louis XIV1s support. Ricious was

instructed to facilitate French cooperation with Max

Emanuel in the expansion of the Bavarian Army and in the planning of his military strategy. France would send the necessary subsidies. The immediate French goal was to

create a Bavarian army of 30,000 men that could effectively

•^Braubach, "Politik des Kurfttrsten Max Bnanuel,N 68. block Austrian access to the Hhlne. Torcy emphasized 39 Bavaria was a very valuable ally. Franco-Bavarian cooperation was further enhanced by having Villars stop at Munich after his departure from Vienna. He spent five days with Max Emanuel, reassuring him of French assistance and discussing general strategy. After negotiating for three months. Monasterol and Torcy signed an offensive alliance on June 17. 1702. The Treaty had five major points. First, Max Emanuel, in return for the support of Bourbon claims to the Spanish Inheritance, received an additional subsidy for 10,000 troops. This meant France supported an army of 25,000 total in Bavaria. Second, France agreed to aid the Elector in acquiring the Palatinate areas with which would go the title of king. Third, if Bavaria failed to gain the Palatinates, Max Emanuel would receive the hereditary i governorship of the Spanish Netherlands and the full sovereignty of the Spanish Guelderland and Limburg. Fourth, if Bavaria were lost in the war, Max Emanuel would be compensated by the full sovereignty of the entire Spanish Netherlands. Fifth, France agreed to help Bavaria keep all 40 conquests it made within South Germany. This was the

Heoeull Bavlftre. 106-112. 1 Braubach, "Politlk des Kurfttrsten Max Emanuel,M 71. 66 treaty that Max Emanuel ratified In August, 1702, In essence, France backed Bavarian land aggrandizement In the Empire and made the Spanish Netherlands the compen satory area If Bavaria were lost. This was the price France paid to gain an ally of military significance within the Empire. Although France had hoped to create a viable Neutrality League, without the entrance of either Saxony or Prussia the League's military value was stillborn. Bavaria, from the French point of view of necessity, had to 41 be maintained as a strong military ally. The problem of getting French subsidies and supplies from the Rhine through the Black Forest to the Danube was difficult to solve. This line of communications through the hostile lands of the Duke of Wurttemburg and the Circle of Swabia was always a tenuous Franco-Bavarian link. If Louis XIV wanted to coordinate French military and diplomatic strategy with Bavaria, he had to take the calculated risk of placing a French army deep in hostile territory. Max Emanuel was not a clientele prince. He did not Join the French alliance because of greater subsidy offers from the French than from the Allies. He had successfully pursued the polioy of an independent

41 Ibid.. 57 67 sovereign for twenty years* 1681-1701. The French were quite aware that he might reverse his policy and become a neutral or Join the Grand Alliance— a probability that France needed to forestall or it could cost them a French army. In 1681 Max Emanuel had taken Bavaria out of a French Alliance and Into an advantageous one with Austria that lasted without a break until 1697. in the following years he moved toward a more pro-French position which placed him in the position of optimum bargaining power. After the death of his son Joseph Ferdinand in 1699 and the announce ment of Carlos II*s last will* Max Bnanuel had little choice but to turn over the Spanish Netherlands to a French military occupation. The occupation's legality rested upon French seizure of the Spanish Netherlands to insure its retention for Philip V. Max Emanuel's alliance with Louis XIV secured his title as Governor of the Spanish Netherlands* and at the same time* it gave him French support to make territorial conquests In the Germanles. This was Max Emanuel's position when he left Brussels In March* 1701* The Allies In their negotiations In 1701-1702 with Max Bnanuel never granted terms equivalent to those given by the French. After Max Emanuel returned to Bavaria In 1701* he advanced cautiously from a position of neutrality to an 68 offensive alliance with Prance In 1702. Max Emanuel did not go "beyond neutrality until he was assured of adequate 42 French military and financial support. By the early summer of 1702. Bavaria was the strongest military power within the Empire. This was due. In part, to the Prussians' and Saxons' Involvement In the Northern War, In part, to the fact that the Austrian forces were tied down In the campaigns against the French In northern Italy, and, In part, to the fact that those forces mustered by Baden and the Imperial circles were engaged at landau. After Max Emanuel received the Franco-Bavarian Treaty of June 17, 1702, which Monasterol had signed, he was In a position to negotiate with Austria again. He did. Max Bnanuel used Philip V's grant of the patent of Vicar General of the Spanish Netherlands to the Duke of Burgunday as an excuse to delay his ratification of the treaty. He demand ed that Louis XIV make Philip V rescind the Duke of Burgundy's patent. Bavaria would remain neutral as long 4-3 as the Duke of Burgundy held the patent. After It was withdrawn, the Elector delayed further by demanding that this patent be formally granted to him by the Spanish

5 2 ------Max Emanuel to Monasterol, June 7> 1701, GH, K-A. In this letter the Elector stated his Intention to prooeede cautiously as long as the Emperor held a position of military superiority In the Empire. 43 Monasterol to Max Emanuel July 13, 1702, GS, KS 17011. 44 court. £n Brussels that summer. Malknecht secretly carried out Max Emanuel's order to convert his assets Into bank notes for quick transport to the Dutch border In case 45 Bavaria dropped its pro-French policy. Concurrently, In early August the Austrlans offered specific terms for an alliance, and the French threatened to halt their military subsidies. AustrlA proposed essent ially, after enticing Bavaria all summer with territorial concessions, little more than a military subsidy. At the same time that Max Emanuel ended the talks with Austria on August 17th Torcy warned Monasterol that if Max Emanuel did not ratify the treaty, all subsidies would be iramed- 46 lately withheld. Max Emanuel signed the treaty and he accepted the patent from Philip V which made him Vicar General and Captain General of the Spanish Netherlands. This confirmed his previous position as supreme political and military head of the Spanish Netherlands. The negotiations with both Austria and France were nearly over by the end of the summer. As it became more

44 Braubach, "Polltik des KurfUrsten Max Emanuel," 76-77. 70 probable that Bavaria would have to fight Austria* Mai Bnanuel tried to avoid a war with the Bapire, too* Throughout the summer of 1702 Bavaria had worked at the Diet of Begensburg to prevent a declaration of war by the Enpire against France* The Bavarian representative* Baron von Zttndt* had delayed the Diet proceedings* which were protracted anyway. There was no declaration of war 47 by the Empire that summer* Although the diplomatic negotiations continued until August* 1702* Max Emanuel had prepared Bavarian military strategy by the previous May. Bavarian troops had four objectives: to take a defensive position In the Upper Palatinate* to seize Ulm in order to secure it together with Ihgolstadt as the major fortresses on the Danube, to close the Tyrolian passes as an Austrian supply line Into North Italy, and to establish communications with a French army that would invade Swabia. This military strategy would force the Imperial Circles to accept a position of neutrality and would isolate Austria from both the Italian 48 and Rhineland theaters of the war. Max Bnanuel delayed action until the end of the oampalgn season of 1702 because

Arnold Berney, "Der Reichstag zu Regensburg 1702- 1704," Hist oris che Vlertel.lahressohrlf t. XXIV (1924), 390-391. 48 Memorandum of Max Emanuel on the Military Campaign. May 24, 1702. GS, KS 17012. 71 if9 of his negotiations with Austria. On September 8 t 1702, Bavarian forces seized the city of Ulm. On October 1. 1702, the Bavarians oaptured Memmingen, which was also an Imperial City. These were the two major fortified cities in the Swabian Circle. Finally the Diet made a formal Declaration of War on France and its allies. In retaliation a Bavarian force encircled Regensburg and threatened to disrupt the entire Diet proceedings. Only after the city and the Diet agreed to declare the city neutral, did the Elector's troops with- 50 draw. In September, 1702, the Bavarian Army threatened the whole of the Swabian Circle as far as Basle. At the same time, even ZfLrioh feared an attack from French troops that were Investing Friedlingen. However, the only other city to fall to the Bavarians was the Imperial city of Kempton. At Kempton, as in previous capitulations. Max Enanuel proclaimed that he acted only from military necessity and did not Intend to change the traditional laws and customs

Qnno Klopp stated that Max Bnanuel in a letter to Bergeyok in the summer of 1702 refused to openly enter the war without a French commitment to make the Empire their major theater of the war. Klopp, Des Fall des hauses Stuart. X, 127-130. 50 Berney, "Der Reichstag zu Regensburg 1702-1704," 391. 72 51 or interfere Kith the existing government. simultan eously with these operations in SKabla, other Bavarian troops moved dOKn the Danube toKard Donauwbrth in the effort to hold the Danube all the Kay to Passau. Max Emanuel gained most of his objectives in the year 1702. By delaying all summer before entering the Kar, he avoided the cost and risk of a long campaign. At the end of the campaign season of 1702* Bavaria gained all the major fortresses in SKabla* Kith the exception of Vllllngen on the Upper Danube. These actions clearly expedited the Diet's Declaration of War* on September 30* 1702. Despite Max Emanuel's failure to persuade the Diet to designate Louis XIV alone as a foe of the Empire* he Kas not completely isolated. The Diet and the circles both Kere ineffective in their efforts to raise enough money and troops seriously to fight a Kar. In addition the Bavarian Army movements Kere vieKed Kith suspicion by the Protestant states in the Diet Kho feared a Hapsburg- Wittelsbaoh agreement on the taking of Ulm. For they remembered the Hapsburg-Neuburg cooperation against the 52 Palatinate Protestants. Max ESaanuel held a strong

51 Gerold Meyer von Khonau* "KurfUrst Max Enanuel von Bayern und die schKeizerische Eldgenossenschaft In den Jahren 1702 und 1703,” Hlstorlsche Zeltschrlft. CXI (1913), H- 50. 52 Berney, "Reichstag su Begensburg 1702-170^," 395. 73 position in a divided and suspicious Empire. He was not yet surrounded by German states and circles ready to join in a concerted attack against him. Bavarian policy in the summer of 1702 raised French apprehensions, too. The suspicions and cross-purposes of the Franco-Bavarians, latent in 1702. became open in I703. The French could never be certain of Max Emanuel's loyalty. In 1703 the French would suffer a serious blow with the defections of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance. As further enticement, Louis XIV granted Max Enanuel even more generous terms than those of June 1?, 1?02. On November 7t 1702. France and Bavaria signed another treaty. By its provisions Max Emanuel gained the Spanish Netherlands in full sovereignty, with the exception of the frontier fortresses which were reserved for France; in addition Louis XIV promised to support Max Emanuel's acquisition of all the territories of the Electorate of the Palatinate as 53 they had existed in 1618. Max Enanuel's major problem as a leader of one of the intermediary states of Europe was to maintain his indepen dence of action— not to be at the mercy of a Great Power as either a foe or ally. This meant he could not be Irrevocably tied to France by losing all contacts with

Treaty November 7. 1702. GH, K-A. 74 Austria. Through 1702 he skillfully maintained a position of independence* and he increased his influence within Europe. The negotiations with Louis XIV* William III* and Leopold I left no real alternative for Max Emanuel but an alliance with France, that is* if he hoped measureably to enhance his power. The Dutch and English urged the Austrlans to make the necessary concessions that would bring Bavaria into the Grand Alliance. Austria refused to 54 offer anything more than a military subsidy. In contrast, the French gave Max Enanuel very favorable terms by the Franco-Bavarian Treaty of November 7* 1702. The terms were too favorable; in fact, these implied the recreation virtually of the fifteenth century Burgundian state. Yet, Max Emanuel's demands were advantageous to French policy. France recognized that they could not obtain the Spanish Netherlands at a peace conference. Certainly* neither the Dutch nor the British would allow France to absorb this area. However* Max Enanuel was a suitable governor or sovereign from the French point of view. The problem for France was thus the timing of the announcement by Philip V and Louis XIV of Max Enanuel*s suzerainty9 in order not to cause disaffection in Spain

-5 Braubach, "Polltlk des Kurftlrsten Max Emanuel* ** 90. 75 and the Spanish lands. In regard to Max Qnanuel's desire for the total Palatinate* these territories In Wlttelsbach possession would be advantageous to the French on the Middle Rhine. Particularly* Phlllipsburg* across from Landau* would then be In Max Ebanuel's control. Finally* the territorial growth of Bavaria In South Germany meant Bavaria would be an effective check to Austrian power. Chapter IV JUNCTION OF THE FRANCO-BAVARIAN ARMIES, 1?03

The oourse of the War of the Spanish Succession changed markedly in 1?03. By the Metheun Treaties signed between England and Portugal that May, England pledged Itself to drive Philip of Anjou out of Spain by military force. The Portuguese entered the Grand Alliance only on the stipulation that an Allied army would operate from their territory to evict Philip V. In return, England gained Lisbon as a naval port for use in the Mediterranean. No longer did their fleet need to return to England in the fall; English ships could remain in the Mediterranean the year around. By a series of treaties in 1703, the Grand Alliance changed from a coalition to separate the crowns of Spain and France and force a compromise division of the Spanish Inheritance to an aggressive alliance to gain the entire Spanish Inheritance for the Archduke Charles of Austria. For England, this policy meant a total commitment, in which the control of the Spanish Indies and the Mediterranean was 1 at stake. The HApsburgs could maintain themselves in

- G. M. Trevelyan, England under Queen Anne (3 vols., London, I93I-I93IO, II, £o, 131. 76 77 Southern Italy and Spain only through English naval power. A new theater of the war opened in the Iberian Peninsula when, in 1703, England provided the money for provisioning a motley Portuguese, English, and Allied army. It was a olvll war between Catalonia and Castile, a war for the Spanish throne between the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs, and an Anglo-French struggle for the Mediterranean. By the Peaoe of Utrecht, England became the dominant sea power in the Mediterranean, through its control of Gibraltar and Minorca, the Bourbons won the crown of Spain, and Castile ended Catalonian particularism. The Archduke Charles and his small entourage left Vienna in the fall, 1703, and came to England. Queen Anne assured Charles of her intention to provide him with all the support he needed to secure the Spanish crown. The invasion fleet sailed for Lisbon with a collection of troops drawn primarily from the Protestant states. This army of 1*1,000 Allies backed by 16,000 Portuguese meant to win the support of the most militant Catholic population in Europe. After turning back in the storms of the early winter in the Bay of Biscay, the fleet set out again in late February, 1704. On March 7th, it arrived in Lisbon. A new theater of the war opened in which the passion in spired in the claimants Philip of Anjou and Archduke Charles for their respective causes was compounded by the 78 Dutch and the British vision of entering the fabled markets 2 of the Spanish Indies, This Intensified the fervor 3 provoked by the war far beyond those evidenced In 1702. The strategy of the Grand Alliance in Italy, the Rhine land, and the Low Countries began to formalize at last In 1703. In Italy the first two campaigns had involved an Austrian force of 20,000 men against the French. This was a token commitment that was prevented from becoming a farce by Eugene of Savoy's consummate military skill. In the Rhineland an Imperial army of 20,000 men under Louis of Baden took the French fortress of landau because of French Ineptitude. Only the Dutch with 100,000 troops in the field during the campaign of 1702 on the Lower Rhine and the Lower Meuse met their commitments as stipulated In the Treaty of the Grand Alliance. Austrian and Imperial troops totaled approximately 40,000. This fell far short of the 120,000 troops they had agreed to supply. England, which had pledged 40,000 troops, began to approach that

- Julian S. Corbett, England In the Mediterranean; a Study of the Rise and Influenoe of British Power within the Straits. 1603-1711. (2 vole.. London. 1Q171. II. 406. 3 Alfred von Arneth Das Leben der kalserllchen Feldmar» schalls Grafen Guldlo Starhemburg. 1657-1737 fvienna. 185*3). 324-326. Arneth presented an account both of the Allied Involvement In Spain, the nature of the civil war, and the reluctance of Charles VI to extract himself after 1711. On English policy also see Arthur Parnell, The War of the Succession In Spain during the Reign of Queen Anne. 1702- 1711 (London, lfesb). number In 1703. That year the English and Dutch subsidies began to have an impact on the smaller states. Significant numbers of Danish. Prussian, Saxon. Hanovarian, and Hessian troops began to take the field in all theaters of the war under Marlborough. Prince Eugene, and Louis of Baden. Above all, at Vienna a group of reformers led by Joseph I— Count Gundaker Starhemberg, Count Johann Wratislaw. and Prince Eugene— began to impose military, financial, and adminis trative reforms. They began the arduous process of strengthening the Austrian government's finances and admin istration.^ After they gained outside funds from Anglo- Dutch subsidies, the Austrians raised the quantity and quality of equipment and men in their army. England granted a 100,000 pounds sterling subsidy to Austria, and the Dutch subscribed a loan of 200,000 pounds sterling. In addition, the English and Dutch agreed to arm additional forces for the Allies of 100,000 men by the beginning of the 170^f campaign.^ Thus the increase in the size of the armies was not

- Braubach, Subsldien. 73. ^Max Braubach, Prlnz Eugen von Savo.ven: elne Biograp hic (if vols.r Munich, 1963-196^), I, 360-364. ^Braubach, Subsldien. 39* 88. These amounts are based on Braubach's conversion table: One pound sterling equals four Kronen or Relchsthaler; one pound sterling equals ten Dutchgulden; and one pound sterling equals twelve llvres. Ibid.. 17. 80 felt until after the 1703 campaign* In fact* the French put their largest army In the field in 1705* even though they lost an army at the Battle of Blenheim the preceding year* The financial basis for expanding the scope and magnitude of the war, however, was laid in 1703* A French army of 200,000 men stood unscathed and rested in strong defensive position of the Brabant Lines and the fortresses behind it in Flanders and along the French frontier in 1703* This powerful defensive line of natural obstacles, earthen works, and strategically placed magazines provided a defense in depth when it was manned by a strong army* It posed a formidable front through which to pass an invading force intact* From Antwerp on the Scheldt to Namur on the Meuse, the Brabant Lines followed the course of the Demer river and its tributary, the Dyle. As long as a French army held the Brabant Line it kept the Scheldt closed as a route of invasion* The bulk of these French forces stayed within their fortifi cations in 1703. For that campaign the French intended to maintain a strong defensive position in the Spanish Netherlands and in Spain* In the latter area they had to send aid to the Spanish forces of Philip of Anjou to repel an Allied attack along the Portuguese border* Only in Germany and 7 Italy did the French plan an offensive* In Italy, Vendfime1s 81 army was reinforced and ordered to drive the Austrlans out of Mantua and Mirandola In order to cut off the Austrian supply lines through the Brenner Pass. Beyond this* French strategy toward Austria was not clear, France did send sub sidies and supplies to Prince Rakocy in Hungary, who had 8 begun to raise significant forces there. By the end of 1703, the Hungarian rebels expelled the Austrlans from the territories east of the Theiss Biver. However, no carefully outlined plan existed for an attack against the Austrian Hapsburgs through a three-pronged attack from Hungary by Hakocy, from Italy by Vendftme, and from Bavaria by Max Emanuel and Vlllars. The French hoped to force Austria out of the war, but they failed to develop a strategic plan to do it. In 1703, Vlllars* Bavarian expedition had top priority. A French army needed to join forces with the 9 Bavarians in order to insure the Elector's allegiance. The French strategy of holding all the territories of the Spanish Inheritance with its army was seriously impared

7 ! “ J. J. G. Pellet and F. E. de Vault, (eds.), Mdmolres mllitalres relatlfs \ la Succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV. extralts de la corresnondance de la cour et des gdneraux" (II vols., Paris,Ib35-l8b2 j, Vol. IV, part 3, Campagnes de Flandre. d 1Italic et d 1Allemagne en 1703. 5. Hereafter cited as Memolres mllitalr*« rtampagne en 1703. 8 Legrelle, la dlplomatle franqalse. IV, 311. 9 Louis XIV to Vlllars. March 27. 1703. Vogtttf. Vlllars. II, 283. ------82 by the defection of Portugal and Savoy to the Grand Alliance in 1703* The Iberian Peninsula and Savoy became areas that required French money and troops. Lisbon gave the Allies a base for both an army and navy, without which no major operation could be undertaken in either Spain or the Mediterranean. The Savoyard garrisons needed to be disarmed if French supplies were to continue to flow to the French forces in the Milanese. The defection of Portugal and Savoy reasserted the urgency of delivering aid to Bavaria. The presence of French troops was deemed essential by Louis XIV to maintain the Elector's loyalty. Bavaria was the only military power beside Spain, the prize of the war. whose support the French retained by that summer. Louis XIV ordered the French army to join the Bavarians; otherwise, Max Emanuel would desert France.0 The Franco-Bavarian policy was not coordinated in either 1702 or 1?03* After the Bavarians had attacked Ulm. they had marched east on the Danube toward Begensburg instead of west to join the French army on the Upper Bhine, which had been waiting throughout the summer. Again in 1703 no clear strategy existed beyond that of placing a French force in Bavaria and securing its military supply lines back to the Bhine.

1 0 Ibid. 83 Both strategically and loglstically transporting an army to Bavaria and maintaining Its communications with France posed a difficult problem* An Imperial army under Louis of Baden held the right bank of the Rhine In the Lines of Stollhofen and the few fortresses of the Black Forest. The Duke of Wurttemburg and the Swabian Circle leaders were hostile and constantly threatened French supply lines. Max Emanuel began demanding French military support after his open entry Into the war* even though his army was the major military force in South Germany. By possess ing the fortresses of Ulm and Ingolstadt on the Danube and a line of earthen defenses and blockhouses In the Upper Palatinate, Bavaria was protected from an attack from the north or the east. With the Austrian army tied down In Italy and the other forces of the Empire concentrated around the Lines of Stollhofen, this left only 7,000 men under General Styrum at Nbrdlingen to oppose Bavaria's 30,000 troops. let Max Emanuel had feared an Invasion of his lands from the time of his entrance Into an alliance 11 with Louis XIV. Austria's position had hardened In the fall of 1702. After Austria broke off negotiations with Hex Emanuel, he

11 Blezler, Gesohlchte Bayern. VII, 5^7* 84- fear ed that the Austrlans were ready to Invade his 12 electorate. Leopold I kept the circles of Swabia and Franconia aligned with Vienna, and he persuaded the Diet to Include Bavaria In Its declaration of war against it France• The Elector tried to appease the hostility within the Empire that had been aroused by his seizure of Ulm. He restricted the Bavarian occupation to military control and avoided Interference In the political and religious life of the city. This was a delicate matter, since Ulm was an Imperial city.’ Repeatedly he assured the Swabian nobility that he would not allow Swabia to become a major theater of the war. Even though Max Emanuel wanted Augsburg and Regensburg, too, he delayed taking them because an attack on either would further Isolate Bavaria In the Enpire. Augsburg was strategically Important since It controlled the Lech river and the approach to Munich from the west. Regensburg was a necessary crossing point on the Danube to control in order to seoure the Danube. It needed to be taken before Bavarian troops could move down river against Passau, the staging point for Austrian forces drawn from Austria and

12 Max Enanuel to Cardinal Lamberg, October 12, 1702, GH, PA. 13 Gerold Meyer von Knonau, "KurfUrst Max Enanuel von Bayern und die schwelzerisohe Eldgenossenschaft in den Jahren 1702 und 1?03," 44, 48. 85 Bohemia. After Bavaria seized Ulm, Max Emanuel tried to appease the other German states. He Justified his short campaign of conquest in 1702 and his opposition to the Diet on the basis that he had to defend himself against an Imminent Austrian attack. Bavaria, like all the major participants In the war, tried to Influence public opinion. Its position was summarized In the "Manifesto of the Elector of Bavaria" of June 1, 1703* Max Emanuel alleged that Austrian in justice toward Bavaria in the last one hundred years had reached the point where Bavaria had no other recourse left but the use of armed force. Austria had embarked on an aggressive policy by ignoring the Peace of Byswick and by rejecting the settlement of the Spanish Inheritance as provided in Carlos II1 s last will. The will had been sanctioned by the papacy and recognized by all subjects In the lands of the Spanish Bmp ire. Max Bnanuel justified his turning over the fortresses of the Spanish Netherlands to the French on the basis that he had acceded to the wishes of the Spanish government. Then Bavaria entered the Neutrality League in order to preserve the tranquillity of the Empire. Above all, since the Spanish Inheritance did not concern the Interests of the Empire, Austrian involve- 14 ment in it threatened to bring war into Germany.

15 Lamberty, Mdmolres. Ill, 28-31. 86 At the session of the Diet the Bavarian representa tive! Baron von ZtLndt, maintained that Austria, not Bavaria, had aoted illegally and disrupted the repose of the Empire• Both, Bavaria and the Papacy recognized the legally binding will of Carlos II, Bavaria was still trying to maintain the solidarity of the Catholic powers of Europe while Austria had entered a coalition with the Protestant powers, who alone would profit immensely by the war being fought 15 over the Catholic territories of Europe, In the Empire Max Emanuel pointed out that the creation of the Electorate of Hanover and the election of Joseph I as King of the Homans violated the constitution. Further, the Emperor illegally extended the Jurisdiction of the Imperial Chancellery, and he used the taxes and troops intended for the defense of the Empire for his dynastic 16 interest. Max Emanuel's defense of his actions and his accusations against the Hapsburgs had no perceptible effect. These provided a thin veneer for his goals of territorial aggrandizement, The Franco-Bavarlans coordinated their propoganda efforts. They proclaimed the Austrlans were the aggressors both within and outside the Empire, In contrast, Franco-

Reizler. Geschichte Bayerns. VII, 5^. 16 lamberty, Mdmolres. Ill, 30. 87 Bavarian actions were undertaken to curb the Austrian 17 threat to "German liberties** and the peace in Europe. This was the traditional French approach in the Germanics; however, it did not work during the War of the Spanish Succession. Max Emanuel held a strong military position in early 1703. The Bavarian Army was an excellent one with its famous cavalry and well-trained Infantry that reached a total strength of 29,000 men by February, 1703* On his return from Brussels in 1701 Max Emanuel had concentrated on building up his army. He brought five well-equipped regiments of Bavarian troops with him. Early in 1701, the provincial militia was ordered to begin to drill regularly. These 13,000 troops were the levies supported, manned, and drilled by local authorities. They were used as garrison forces and as the manpower pool for the regular Bavarian army. Since the militia were never properly armed, they 18 proved of limited value. The regular Bavarian army was mercenary like all armies of the late seventeenth century. Half of the officers came from Savoy and France. Count Johann d'Arco held the dual position of General Field Marshal and of President of the

3 7 ------Louis XIV to Max Etaanuel, September 15* 1701, GH, K-A. 18 Hiezler, Geschlchte Bayern. VII, 496-^9 8 . 86 Council of war. Beneath him were the four Field Marshal Lieutenants: count Thurn, Count Safrd, Count Monasterol (who was also the Bavarian Ambassador to France), and Count von Weiohel, one pf the. ablest cavalry officers of the War of the Spanish Succession. The army lacked artillery and engineering expertise even though Max Emanuel had founded an artillery and engineering school in 1690. Still it was an excellent army completely equipped with the new ring bayonets in the Infantry and with standard ized equipment and uniforms both in the cavalry and in the 19 infantry. Max Bnanuel extracted large subsidies from France in return for an alliance. By 1702 the subsidy for the army alone was 65*000 thalers monthly (16,000 pounds sterling). In addition, he received special revenues from the provin ces of Flanders and Hennegau, which France delivered; and, also, a subsidy from Spain. Finally, the French reimbursed his creditors and provided pensions for the major Bavarian advisors: Monasterol, d ’Aroo, Reiohard, and Malkneoht. The French subvention paid for the expansion of the 20 Bavarian Army, As stated above, Louis XIV feared in the early spring of 1703 that Bavaria might defect to the Allies. The French

19 ~ - Riezler, Geschlohte Bay erne. VII, 499-50*1.

v ■ 89 government realized that Bavarian agents had negotiated; with the Austrlans the previous fall* In order to fore stall Max Emanuelfs possible defection* Louis XIV Issued orders for building a strong French expeditionary force; to 21 join the Bavarians* He sent Vlllars to Strasbourg to; supervise Its oreatlon. Vlllars scoured the surrounding i garrisons for the necessary supplies and men whom he organized Into fifty battalllons and fifty-five squadrons* I This army had to cross the Bhine* take Kohl* successfully avoid the troops of Louis of Baden, force the passes I 22 through the Black Forest* and convoy supplies to Bavaria* i i The Frenoh army under Vlllars* command crossed the' Bhine and took Xehl that lay opposite Strasbourg in I February in the first action of the 1703 campaign. After taking Kehl* Vlllars* main body of troops withdrew across

20 - i Braubach, Subsldien. 4-7-52* According to Braubach*s estimates Max Snanuel gained a subsidy* aside from personal reimbursements* that totaled 1,000*000 thalers (250*000| pounds sterling) per year from 1702 to at least 1709* Thus* the Bavarian subsidies were the approximate equivalent of those paid to Portugal* Braubach also estimates Denmark reoeived 722*000 thalers (181,000 pounds sterling) per year or roughly two-thirds of that of Bavaria. Finally between 1706 and 1712 England subsidized Austria at the rate of 400,000 pounds sterling per year or about twice that of Bavaria. Ibid.. 17ff* 21 j Chamlllart to Vlllars* December 13* 1702* Vogttd* Vlllars.II. 272. j

22Louis XIV to Vlllars, March 16, 1703* Pellet and j Vault* Mdmolres mllltalres oampagne en 1703. IV, part 3i 531. ! 90 the Bhine to refit and wait until the supplies for the Bavarians arrived. In April the French advance began in earnest. Tallard stayed on the Bhine to cover Villars* march. He besieged Old Briesach and then slowly moved against landau. In the early part of the campaign Tallard kept a large part of the Imperial forces of Louis of Baden tied down in the Lines of Stollhofen. The remaining scattered forces of the Bnpire could not hope to halt the 23 French. On May 1, 1703, Villars* force took Hornberg. Its surrender after the loss of 4.000 men opened the way to Vllllngen. the only major Imperial fortress on the Danube. The original plans proposed a Franco-Bavarian Juncture at 24 Vllllngen. This was the first of many disagreements on strategy between them that summer. Thus the long, heated campaign began with its un coordinated military operations and vehement arguments over strategy. Of these, Vllllngen was the first. Since the Bavarians had not moved against Vllllngen, Villars sent a force to besiege it. After a ten day struggle he lifted the siege and detoured by another route. Vllllngen remained a problem for French supply throughout the

" 23 VoglW, Vlllars. II, 80. 24 Ibid.. 85. 91 i campaigns of 1703-1704. Tallard tried again to take the oity In 1704 ij hut he had to he content to go around It. The French forced their way through the Swabian j Circle In the faoe of harassment by the Duke of Wtfrttemburg * s j forces, the Swahlan militia, and a few Imperial troops. They arrived at Beldlingen on Kay 9 , 1703, a day after forward patrols1 of the Bavarian cavalry entered the town. Vlllars, as commanding officer, and Blclous as the French i envoy to Bavaria, met with Max Emanuel, Konasterol, and 25 d'Arco at Beldlingen. Immediately the dispute over strategy began. Max Enanuel wanted to attack the Imperial General Styrum, whose forces were moving along the north hank of the Danube toward Hegensburg. Vlllars needed to rest his troops and i establish a base of operations before any major offensive was launohed. D'Arco agreed and Max gave way. The French army moved into the area of Dim and established Its base ; 26 of operations. 1 With the arrival of Vlllars, Max Enanuel held an even I better military position within the Empire. His army had ably beaten back a Austro-Imperial invasion that March when Austrian foroes numbering 20,000 under Count Sohlick

25 Ibid.. 88. 26 Ibid..j89. 9 2 had entered the Upper Palatinate* and 7*500 troops of the Franoonian Circle under Count Styrum had prepared to attack across the Danube* The Bavarian Army repulsed Sohllck's forces first in a series of battles in early March in the Upper Palatinate and then turned west to defeat Styrum's 2? troops. Thus in May the Franoo-Bavarlans were free to attack in any direction they wished. The French forces concentrated on the western and northern borders of Bavaria. Ulm was the major French base that served as the terminal point of their communi cations route to the Bhine. The major French engineering feat came at Dilllngen, where the French engineers built a fortified base on the north shore of the Danube. It was a very defensible position* with the rapids of the river making it difficult to attack on three sides. The French engineers built earthen ramparts* magazines* and troop accommodations. Dilllngen was a fortified encampment* not a fortress; still* with the river* with the fortifications* and with the supply facilities it served both as a fortress and a staging point for an attack down the river. Originally it was to be the position from whloh the French 28 and Bavarians started their assault on Vienna.

Doeberl, Bntwlcklungensgesohlchte Bayern. II* 145- 147. 28 Vogtt<* Vlllars. II, 9 3 . 93 To oppose the Franco-Bavarian troops the Imperial armies of Louis of Baden and Count Styrum deployed 40,000 men who were scattered from the Rhine to Bohemia. Their forces were split, divided in command, and unequal in armaments and in training to the Franco-BavarIans. Vlllars had 25*000 men which raised the total of the combined Franco-Bavarian forces to over 50,000. The armies of Villars and Max Emanuel were in an excellent position to strike. They held a defensible position, and they had superior troops. The general position of French policy of remaining on the defensive still held in 1?03« Villars1 expedition was originally seen as a means of retaining Bavaria's loyalty. But the balance of military power in South Germany and the rapid initial successes of Vendbme's army in Northern Italy opened the possibility for two" successive Franco-Bavarian offensives to force Austria out of the war. ort lnz 'A

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Kufat VO Chapter V MAX EMANUEL AND VILLARS

The campaign of 1?03 began and ended in disagreement between Max Emanuel and Villars on objectives, strategy, and tactics. From Villars* arrival with the French army in May, 1703, until he left after their last dispute in October, the campaign was hampered by their arguments. The conflict between the two men was due, in part, to a clash of personalities and, in part, to a difference of interests between a leader of a small state and one of a great power. The Elector wanted to make specific territorial gains with a minimum of disruption to the Empire. Villars hoped to defeat the Emperor and force him to negotiate a peace and/or to build a stable base of power for his army. Max Emanuel proceeded cautiously. His primary military con sideration was the defense of Bavaria. Villars tried both to launch an offensive against the Austrlans and to seize the necessary bases in Swabia for protecting the French supply line. Both men were impatient and quick-tempered; circumstances made them share a joint command. The marshal was hardly the type of military leader to play the part of a political general.

95 96 Villars had risen from the lower ranks of the Prenoh Officers Corps. He came from a minor noble family and rose to become a leading general through performance rather than patronage. He was a life long career officer who avoided Versailles. After the victory at Frledllngen In 1702. he became a French marshal. Louis XIV later entrusted Villars with the second-to-the-last French defensive barrier In 1710 and then with the last French army, which the marshal created t o hold the last barrier. the Ne Plus Ultra. In 1711. The army held. In 1712 Villars led the French to their first victory in nine years at Denain and then to victories at Douai, Quesnoy. and Bouchaln that year. In the following campaign he led the French invasion of the Qnpire that began with the repossession of Landau and culminated In the capture of Freiburg on November 16. 1713. the last major battle of the War of the Spanish Succession. Villars ranked with the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy as a dominant commander In the War of the Spanish Succession. As military tacticians, they concen trated on the rapid movement of their forces and the destruction of the enemy's army, for which Marlborough. In particular, was willing to pay a fullfold In blood. Villars* raid on the Hhlne and the Neckar in Germany in 1707 was comparable to Eugene's campaign along the Adige and Po In 97 Italy In 1702. The former*s plan In 1703 to move rapidly down the Danube to strike Vienna resembled Marlborough*s design to move up the Moselle Into the heart of France to attack Paris. These commanders represented a new type of warfare that emerged In the War of the Spanish Succession. Villars, Marlborough, and Eugene of Savoy combined ruthless military tactics, daring strategy, and administrative ability. In the course of the war Prince Eugene overcame the inertia within the Austrian government to creaite an army that conquered and garrisoned Italy and, in 1711. repressed the Hakocy fiebellion in Hungary. Villars* record was similar, both in his recreation of the French Army, 1709-1713. and in his suppression of the Hevolt of the Camlsards in the Cevennes by 1708. Villars was an able, resourceful commander of proven ability when he entered Bavaria in 1703* He had seen his first action at Maestrlcht in 1673 during the Dutch War, and he had held a subordinate command during the War of the League of Augsburg. His rise in the French army was delayed by the animosity of Louvois until the latter*s 1 death in 1691. Madame de Sdvlgnd*s and Madame de

1“ Claude Sturgill, Marshall Villars and the War of the Spanish Succession (Lexington, Kentucky, 1965)* 15* 98 Malntenon's Influence finally helped him to gain a major post. In 1697, Louis XIV sent Villars to Vienna as the French ambassador. He was a part of the "mission of the generals" in which the King also accredited Harcourt to Madrid and Tallard to London. Villars had Secretary of War Chamillart's support; however, he did not have the influence of the marshals Vendftme, Villeroy, Catinat, and - * Tallard. Consequently, he did not get one of the primary 2 French commands in Italy, Alsace* or Flanders in 1701. The 25*000 man army that he led into Bavaria gave him the opportunity for a great victory. He was an ambitious man; the campaign of 1703 offered him his best opportunity after years of frustration. Villars was an able general who needed a striking military success to oatapult him to the top of the French military caste. In addition, he had a volatile, difficult personality. As Claude Sturgill has recently stated, "Five traits of his character have been uncovered so far— conceit, ability, volatile temper, acidity, and exhibit- 3 lonism." Finally, he was a French marshal, and the French Army, since the victory over the Spanish in the Battle of Hooroi in 1643* bad remained the best army in

2 Ibid.. 12-16. 3Ibid.. 15. 99 Europe. Even though Louis XIV had Instructed Villars to defer to Max Emanuel In their operations* he was not the kind of man to accept a division In command. He had a career at stake* and he led an excellent force backed by Tallard on the Hhlne and Vendbme In Italy. Inevitably he quarreled with the Elector. Dissension* suspicion* and harsh allegations had to emerge during their Joint operations that summer. Max Emanuel's personal characteristics and ambitions were of the type that* given the military situation of 1703* he had to clash with the ambitious Villars. The Elector had fought In all the major wars In Europe since 1683* Up to 1703 he had a long* successful military career that was appropriate for seventeenth century prince. He had participated In the Battles of Vienna* Mohacs* and Belgrade against the Turks In the 1680's. In the War of the League of Augsburg he served with William III In the campaigns that culminated In the victory at Namur in 169k, Already In the War of the Spanish Succession* Max Emanuel had successfully opened the Spanish Netherlands to a French army In 1701 by disarming over 15*000 Dutch troops in Mons* Namur* and other fortresses. In 1702* the Bavarian army seized the major strategic points in Swabia

4 Chamlllart to Villars* March 27* 1703* in Vogtttf, Villars II, 285. 100 of Ulm and Memmingen, and the following spring it success ively repulsed two Austrian attacksMax Enanuel was thus a seasoned and victorious general. Except for the debacle of Blenheim in 170^, he succeeded throughout his 6 life on the battlefields of Burope. The Elector was a field commander and not a strategist or an administrator. He never held the command over all operations in a major theater of a campaign. In Hungary he served under the Duke of Lorraine; on the Rhine he was a subordinate of Louis of Baden; in the Low Countries he commanded under William III. In the two campaigns in South Germany, 1703-1704, he shared the first with Villars and the second with Marsin. Thus, the campaign of 1703 for Max Bnanuel, Just as for Villars, meant an opportunity to dominate the operations in an entire theater of the war. Neither man intended to place himself in the sub ordinate position. The Elector was a representative member of the European aristocracy which in the early eighteenth century remained primarily military In its outlook and functions. Au fond he considered himself a soldier. He pointed with pride to his achievements on the battlefields of Europe.

5 Rlezler, Geschlchte BayernB. VII, 558. 6 Doeberl, Entwlcklungensaeschlchte Bayerns. II, 150. 101 Valour, courage, and honor--the basic values of the ar1stooracy— were a part of Max Baanuel's ethic. These qualities as a general were the ones that Marlborough, Eugene of Savoy, and Villars did respect In him as a commander regardless of their suspicions about his duplicity 7 as a diplomat. The new tactics of rapid movement and ruthless de struction, which Marlborough and Villars used, were foreign to the Elector, Neither was he a master of ordin ance nor of fortification. Maxmllllan I and Ferdinand Marla bequeathed Max Enanuel a small but able army, which he augmented and updated. But he did not make Munich, Donauwbrth, Ulm* Dllllngen, or Augsburg Into strong defens ible fortresses, and he never tried to secure Franco-Bavarian communications from Ulm to Strasbourg. Therefore, the changes In warfare by 1703 made Max Eaanuel, a chlvalrlc figure. He was the knight-gallant whose concentration on honor and glory gained In the heat of battle meant little In winning a campaign. Max Emanuel's preparations for a campaign, while these did not neglect his troops, amply supplied his personal needs. Villars was amazed by the elaborate equipage with which the Elector set out for the Turkish campaign, In

7 Rlezler, Gesohlohte Bayerns. VII, 150. 102 8 9 1685* In 1703 he provided, for himself very well again. He had costly tastes and enjoyed the pursuit of expensive pleasures even from the French point of view. This heightened their suspicions that he might be bought off by the Grand Alliance. Lieutenant-General Biclous feared that the Allies would entice him to desert Louis XIV if they 10 offered him enough money. However* like Victor Amadeus of savoy* Max Emanuel was caught between the French and Austrians. The success of his diplomacy depended primarily on his ability to play off one major power against the other. This was of greater importance than his need for money* which never determined his policy. With the arrival of the French* the Bavarian Eleotor was In an advantageous position for negotiating with the Austrians that la* if* he retained his Independence of action vls-d-vla. the French. As long as he could direct French power toward his objectives* he was the arbiter of the Empire. Villars* army was simultaneously a weapon with which to threaten Austria and a hostage for Max Emanuel to

5---" --- '------:------Villars, Mdmolres. 26. 9 Villars to Louis XIV, Ootober 3. 1703. in VogM, Villars. II* 125. 10 ! VogM, Villars* II, 88s Marlborough also thought Max Emanuel oould be brought into the Grand Alliance at the right price. Marlborough to Heinsius July 16, 1704, in B. Van*T Hoff* (ed.)* Correspondence of John Churchill. First Duke of Marlborough with Anthonie Heinsius (The Hague. l5?ll. 19^

t 103 Insure continued French support. Neither the collapse of Austria nor the withdrawal of France was in his interest. He had gained a position from which to deal with Austria from a position of power, preferably by the threat of Franco-Bavarian military strength or, if necessary, by its

UBe. Yet, too deoisive a defeat of Leopold I would Increase Max Emanuel's dependence upon Louis XIV. The Elector needed to maintain his position of holding the balance of power on the Danube between the Emperor and the King of France. Max Emanuel meant to use his power in the Ehplre for what he considered were limited objectives. The Elector's action— neutrality, open alliance with France, seizure of fortresses for defense, and minor territorial conquests— were the extent of his defiance of the Bnperor and the Diet until May, 1703. Then a French army arrived. For him to invade Austrian territory and/or to engage in large-scale operations In Franconia and Swabia involved a far more decisive step in the pursuit of his diplomatic objectives. These were the steps that Villars, not Louis XIV, tried to force upon the Elector. Originally in 1?03, Louis XIV wanted to secure Bavaria1 loyalty. Villars was not instructed by Louis XIV to launch a frontal assualt on Austria. The King had suggested an attack on Nttrdlingen and Nttrnberg, but his orders were not 104 explicit. There existed, of course, the possibility of forcing Austria to negotiate for a peace settlement. How ever , the presence alone of a Franco-Bavarian force on the Danube would divert Austrian and Imperial troops from the major war zones In Flanders and the Milanese.11 Villars thought he was in a position to attack Vienna. At the same time Vendbme's army In Italy had contained the Austrians in Mirandola with unexpected rapidity and then it advanced toward the Brenner Pass. Max Emanuel suddenly and unexpectedly found himself faced with the possibility of a Franco-Bavarian invasion of Austria. From the perspective of Max Emanuel, this created a situation which he, an elector of the Empire In outlook and interests, did not want. *He viewed himself as the First Elector of the Bnpire and the defender of its constitution. This aspect of Max Emanuel was the one that Villars could not understand. The Elector's concern for the general stability of the Etaplre held his ambitions for territorial aggrandizement in the Germanles within certain limits. He did not want drastically to disrupt the system by his military actions. The German Elector and the French marshal began the discussion of campaign strategy at Ulm in early May, 1703.

11 Louis XIV to Villars, March 2?, 1?03, in VoglW, Villars. II, 283. 105 The possibility of an agreement between the two was dim from the beginning. Max Snanuel's cautious policy entailed using the French army as an auxiliary force for his own limited purposes. Villars* bold strategy comprehended a decisive and brilliant victory that would relatively easily, from his point of view, enhance French power In the struggle versus the Allies In all the theaters of the war. Capturing Vienna was a feat that neither Gustavus Adolphus nor Marshal Turenne had performed. In the first councils of war of Ulm in May the conflict began. Max Baanuel, d'Arco. and Monasterol represented Bavaria. The Bavarians suggested that their forces, with some reinforcement of French contingents* launch an offensive Into Franconia. Their objective was to seize Nbrdllngen and Ntlrnberg which might force the Franconian Circle to accept a position of neutrality. This proposal reflected the Elector's Military Memorandum of 1702. In it he stated that Bavaria must isolate Austria from the Italian and Rhineland theaters of the war. This could be done by Bavarian control of the east-west line of communications from Fassau to Strasbourg and the north-south route from Ntlrnberg to the Brenner Pass. Within these areas Bavaria must consolidate its defenses 12 on the Danube from Ulm to Fassau. This memorandum correlated to the Mdmolre for Monasterol on diplomatic 106 policy of November, 1?02. In It Max Emanuel outlined a policy In which France would secure the Spanish Netherlands for Bavaria while It Isolated Austria for France. At the same time the Elector could establish a kingdom between 13 Tyrol and the Danube. These were general goals, but Max Emanuel had not delineated them Into the form of a well-defined strategic plan. Bavarian strategy tinder Max Emanuel was not carefully prepared. Indeed, he not only tended to act Impetuously, but since his return from 14 Brussels In 1?01, he had become more hesitant to act. Prior to the Ingress of the French army Max Emanuel was unduly afraid of an attack on Bavaria. The French arrival lessened but did not remove his overriding concern for the safety of his lands. The French forces at Ulm presented a barrier against an attack on Bavaria by Louis of Baden. In the summer of 1703* the Elector tried to limit the Villars* troops to acting as a defensive force In the north-western districts of Bavaria. Marshal Villars and Lieutenant-General Bicious represented France In the councils of war at Ulm. Villars clearly was In command. True to form he sought an

— Max Emanuel Memorandum on the Military Campaign. May 24, 1702, GS, KS 17012. 13 Mdmolre for Monasterol. November 7, 1702, GH, K-A. 14 Braubach, Subsidlen, 70. 10? aggressive course of action* His primary consideration was the difficulty of sustaining his army for more than two or three months In Bavaria since It was not a wealthy area that could provide the sustenance necessary for 25*000 French soldiers In addition to the 30*000 troops of the Elector* Second* the Franco-Bavarians were ready for action while the Imperials* and the Austrians were not* The opposing forces were scattered and apllt between Louis of Baden in the Lines of Stollhofen, Count Schllck in Bohemia, and General Styrum near Nbrdlingen. only the latter*s army could harass a Franco-Bavarian offensive aimed at Vienna. If his troops were defeated, then only Passau and Linz blocked the route to Vienna. He proposed taking these two cities with an assualt force composed of select battalions and of the Bavarian cavalry. Then the main Franco-Bavarian unit8 could move down river unhindered. Villars wanted a quick and decisive military operation. This was his type 15 of warfare. With Vienna vulnerable, with the French army's sus tenance in Bavaria tenuous, and with his desire for a major victory, Villars* course of action was obvious. He proposed an immediate attack down the Danube on Vienna. But Max Emanuel and Monasterol opposed this strategy.

15 Vogttd, Villars. II, 90. The Elector gave up his plan to Invade Franconia. Instead he countered with the proposal to attack Austria In Tyrol as a pre-requisite to marching on Vienna. This would open their communications with Vend&me's army In Italy. He considered this as the necessary pre-requlslte to an attack upon Vienna. later, when Villars' plan was referred to 16 Tallard and VendBme, they, also opposed It. But on this point Villars had his way. at least for the moment. The Franco-Bavarian forces moved into position around Dllllngen. The troops were deployed for the attack on Austria; then Max Emanuel left for a brief visit to Munich. The invasion was delayed first by the confusion and recriminations created between the French and the Bavarian officers after the invasion plans fell into the hands of the Austrians. The French suspected, at worst, that the Bavarians had leaked the information deliberately or. at 17 best, that they had committed a foolish blunder. Then Max Emanuel delayed until the end of May while he watched with anxiety the movement of Styrum's troops toward Hotenburg, a Bavarian town near Amberg. He refused to march on Vienna until the outcome of the battle near Hotenburg was determined. On May 26th. nineteen days after the 109 Franco-BavarIans joined at Rledlingen, Max Emanuel took part of the Bavarian army meant for the attack on Vienna and marched to the relief of Hotenburg. This action ended for the moment the possibility of Villars1 design against Vienna. The marshal was angered at the Elector for being concerned with a Bavarian village at a time when the 18 Austrian capital lay open to attack. Max Emanuel's aotlons at Dllllngen presaged the pattern of the enitre 1703 campaign. He never directly opposed Villars* who was a difficult commander to deal with anyway. By his delaying tactics* the Elector kept the French forces performing garrison functions. Villars had been suspicious of the Elector's relations with the 19 Emperor that May. By the following month he suspected that an Austro-Bavarian accommodation might Include the Internment of his French army In Bavaria. In effect* theTBavarian* the Austrian* and the Imperial troops might surround and disarm his whole force. The French had had reason to suspect Max Emanuel's negotiations since the formation of the Franco-Bavarian Alliance in 1701. The beginning of the 1703 campaign only heightened their suspicions. Louis XIV realized In 1?03 that his army of 25*000

18 | Sturgill, Marshal Villars. 41. 19 VoglW, Villars. II, 95* 110 men In South Germany could be cut off either by their own defeat or by a Bavarian defection. He secretly had em powered Villars to negotiate with the Austrians in order to extract his units in case Bavaria changed sides. Since the King had known of the Bavarian-Allied negotiations in the fall of 1702 and he suspected these talks were con tinuing in 1703, he, also, had ordered Villars and Tallard to Join their armies, if necessary, to force their way out 20 of South Germany. By the middle of June the Franco-Bavarians had accomplished very little. While Tallard had taken Old Breisach, he had not moved against Freiburg or the Lines of stollhofen. Instead of attacking Freiburg to clear Villars' supply lines or the Lines of Stollhofen to immobilize the Imperial army, Tallard marched slowly toward Landau in Alsace. Louis of Baden left the Lines of Stollhofen with the bulk of his troops and began to march toward Augsburg, At the same time the Austrians sent reinforcements from Hungary and Bohemia to Sohllck at Fassau. But Louis of Baden seemed anxious to avoid any battle with the Bavarians. In fact, neither he nor Max Emanuel ever displayed any real enthusiasm to confront each other in the field. Throughout Ill the summer Villars suspected collusion between them. For whatever reason* from his point of view, any understanding 21 that might exist between them was a threat to his army. Even with the advance of Louis of Baden toward the Danube the Franco-Bavarians had a numerical advantage of 55*000 to 40,000 men. In addition, there was a French army of 70,000 troops spread through northern Italy, and a part of these were advancing up the Mindlo River toward the Brenner Pass which could further enhance the position of Villars and Max Emanuel. In mid-June Villars urged Tallard and Vendftme to Join him in a concerted attack to completely defeat Austria. If Tallard sent enough soldiers to hold the area between the Rhine and Bavaria and to reinforce Villars1 army, he could Join forces with Vendftme after the 22 latter entered Tyrol. Villars, impatient from inactivity, stayed at Dllllngen to watch the movement of Louis of Baden toward Augsburg and of Count Styrum toward Regensburg. Both cities were technically neutral, but they provided fortified positions that disrupted Franco-Bavarian control of Swabia and the

21 Ibid.. 112. Eugene of Savoy and Marlborough also suspected Louis of Baden's reluctance to attack Max Emanuel In 1704. Braubach, Frlnz Euaen. II, 57* 22 Villars to Louis XIV, June 17, 1703, Pellet and de Vault, Mdmolres mllltalres campagnes en 1703. IV, part 3 , 627, 62ff. 112 Danube. In addition* 10*000 troops of the Empire had gathered at Ntlrnberg under the Marquis of Bayreuth. Villars1 army stood guard duty along the Danube between Dllllngen and Ulm. but It could not prevent Louis of Baden from advancing across the Danube toward the Lech Blver. At the end of June. Max Bnanuel led the Bavarian army Into Tyrol to secure it for the passage of Vend&me's troops Into the Bnpire. The Bavarians easily took Kufstein and Innsbruck. By mid-July they held the route from Kufstein through Innsbruck to the northern exit of the Brenner Pass. The Elector was In position, but Vend&me delayed In attack- '*1 lng Trent; In the end, Vendftme failed to capture that city. At the same time, the peasants of Tyrol began harassing Bavarian troops all along the route from Kufstein to the Brenner Pass, and the people of Innsbruck forced the Bavarian soldiers out of their city. With the French halted before Trent and with Bavarian troops harassed, Max Emanuel withdrew from Tyrol back Into Bavaria. He did so, in part, because he feared that the troops of Louis of Baden would successfully take Augsburg and 23 those of the Marquis of Bayreuth would enter Begensburg. D'Arco marched toward Begensburg to forestall an Dnperlal occupation there, but Max Bnanuel did nothing to secure

23 . _ ~ ' Belzler, Geschlohte Baverns. VII, 575. 113 Augsburg. Instead he stopped at Munich. Villars was angered. Not only had his first plan for an advance on Vienna been thwarted by Max Enanuel's delays in May, but his second hope for an attack on the Emperor's capital had been lost at Trent and Innsbruck that July. Villars went to Munich to urge Max Emanuel to Join forces with him to deal a decisive blow to the army of Louis of Baden as it approached Augsburg. The latter's troops could be defeated in open battle before they entered at 24 Augsburg. Max Emanuel refused because it was too late, in his view, and he accused Villars of failing to keep Imperial troops north of the Danube. Villars blamed the Elector for this inactivity which would allow Louis of Baden to enter Augsburg unhindered. Max Emanuel failed to Join him at the decisive moment when an Imperial defeat could leave the entire area from the Rhine to Bavaria with out a Imperial military force. The marshal wrote to Louis 25 XIV and asked to be relieved of his command in Bavaria. In August the French officers suspected that an Austro-Bavarian agreement was definitely taking shape for Max Emanuel and Louis of Baden's forces remained Inactive that month. They both carefully kept their troops under a

— Vogtttf, Villars. II, 107-111. 25 Ibid.. 112. 114 tight discipline. In fact. Louis of Baden had harshly reprimanded a colonel who had allowed his soldiers to 26 pillage in Bavarian territory. By September, the entire campaign had gained nothing except the capture of Regensburg, but this was offset by the loss of Augsburg. Then Count Styrum began to march toward Donauwbrth. Villars seized the opportunity for a victory that could salvage a part of the campaign. This time Max Emanuel joined him. They crossed the Danube at Dllllngen. The opposing armies met a Blenheim, September 20, 1703* In the First Battle of Blenheim. The Franco- Bavarians won. The route of the Imperial Army showed again the diff erences between Max Etaanuel and Villars. The latter tried to destroy the enemy army. Over the Elector's protests he ordered the French cavalry to pursue the fleeing Imperials in order to capture all their baggage and to destroy any troops who resisted. When the battle was won Villars drove 27 his troops to complete the destruction of Styrum's army. Unlike Villars Max Emanuel fought to carry the battle and to hold the field, but not to destroy the opposing army. It was his misfortune not to learn from Villars' tactics

. . Ibid.. 114. 27 Vogtte, Villars. II, 115. 115 at Blenheim what Marlborough would repeat on the same field the next year. Styrum lost an army in 1?03 and Max Bnanuel lost his army in 1704. The Franco-Bavarian victory precluded the Elector*s desertion of the alliance that fall. But the French leaders still suspected in October as they had in Miay that Max Bnanuel and Leopold had an understanding that neither would 28 violate. In a long letter dated October 30, 1703 Villars outlined a French strategy in the Empire that could operate independently of Bavaria. He thought that the French sub sidies were wastefully misspent since according to his in formation a large part of it went to the Elector's bankers instead of to his army. Max Emanuel's loyalty to the French alliance was dubious, and in Villars' estimate, he was obviously no Maximlllian I. His letter specifically out lined a French strategy of occupying the Danube from the Iller Hlver to Vlllingen. Then the French could work from this base in southwest Germany to create a French-controlled 29 area that extended from Frledlingen to Heidelburg. Max Emanuel demanded that the French Army be placed under his command and that it go into winter quarters in

28 | Louis XXV to Villars, May 24, 1703, Pellet and de Vault, Mdmoires militaries campagnes en 1703. IV, part 3 619. 29 Vogttd, Villars. 124-137. 116 Bavaria. Villars refused, and he began to deploy more French troops in Swabia. Finally, Villars rejected the Elector's proposal directly to attack Augsburg, where Louis of Baden remained with 20,000 troops. Instead, Villars proposed that since these Imperial untis had to depart be fore winter, the Franco-Bavarians should close every route of evacuation. In fact, Villars positioned his force, along the Lech to deny Louis of Baden a line of retreat Into the Empire. With Villars* departure in November the impossible combination of military commanders ended. After Marsin replaced Villars, he and Max Enanuel, took Augsburg that December. But they permitted Louis of Baden to extract his army Intact and to retire back toward the Lines of Stollhofen unmolested. Chapter VI 170^— THE YEAR OP DISASTER

Until the Battle of Blenheim on August 13, 170**, Max Emanuel continued to hold his power base in Bavaria from which he used the alliance with France for his interests. After Blenheim he tried to retain a semblance of indepen dence in the Spanish Netherlands in order to regain Bavaria. Instead of using the French Alliance for his own interests, he became dependent on Louis XIV for his political existence. For the French, Blenheim was a military setback, but it was not an Irreparable loss. It ended the possibility for France to force Austria out of the war. More signif icantly, that battle upset the balance of power in the Empire between the Emperor and the electors and, in Central Europe, between France and Austria. Ultimately it took the French victories of 1713 at landau and Freiburg to restore the previous equilibrium. Then the Wittelsbach were reinstated in their lands and titles. The war had remained a stalemate in 1703. In Italy, Vendftme's army failed to break through into Tyrol and to force the Austrians out of Northern Italy. On the Rhine

117 118 and the Danube the Franco-Bavarian troops under the command of Tallardv Marsin, and Max Bnanuel opposed roughly equivalent forces under the command of Louis of Baden and the Counts Schlick and Styrum at the end of the campaign* All of the military leaders Involved in the campaigns in the Empire that year, with the exception of Villars, used the conventional tactics of holding specified fortresses and of marches and counter-marches. Except for the Battle of Blenheim of 1703* in which Villars* forces dominated, the loss of lives was light. The governments of the major powers pursued restrained and hesitant policies. In France Chamillart was a weak military organizer and coordinator of strategy. He had basically carried through the wishes of Louis XIV to main tain a defensive position astride the Spanish lands and to reinforce Bavaria within the Empire. Of the French marshals, only Villars and Berwick were aggressive commanders. Vllleroy in Brabant, Tallard in Alsace, and Vendbme in the Milanese pursued cautious, hesitant tactics. Since the Austrian government was curbed by gross inefficiency, even by the standards of the Old Regime, It could only attempt to check the French in Italy and to contain the Franco-Bavarians in South Germany. The Dutch also used very conservative tactics. The Dutch Field ■* Deputies, Opdam and Slagenberg, had opposed Marlborough's 119 proposed sweep around the French lines* either along the Channel or up the Moselle in 1?03. The Dutch interests* despite their heavy contributions of subsidies and men* focused in the Spanish Netherlands: Guelderland* Huy* 1 Lifege, and the garrison cities of Maestricht and Namur. The Duke of Marlborough, who rose after the death of William III to dominate English military policy, changed the character of the war in 1704. He like Villars* advo cated a decisive attack to destroy the opposing army. In the campaign of 1703, the Dutch thwarted his attempt to circumvent the French Lines of Brabant at Antwerp. The following year when he led the Allied forces of 60,000 men in South Germany* he Intended to win a decisive victory. No other commander except, perhaps, Villars dared a similar strategy. Morever* Marlborough was the only military leader in the unique position to be able to carry out a large scale assault which entailed the coordination of planning from the levels of the battalions and squadrons up to the chancelleries of Europe. Once he committed his army, Marlborough needed a resounding victory, not just another stalemate. It was Marlborough who destroyed Max Emanuel's position

- - ■ - G. M. Trevelyan, England under Queen Anne. (3 vols., London, 1931), I, 316. 120 In Bavaria. Inherently the Elector was Incapable of deal ing with the Duke's strategy and tactics. While Max Enanuel headed a small state In much the manner of a Renaissance prince. Marlborough was the precursor of Frederick II and Napoleon— combining administrative ability and calculated daring. In Bavaria In the summer of 170*f, Max EJnanuel's people and army bore the brunt of this new warfare. Max Emanuel. d'Arco, MarsIn. and Tallard did not know what they faced as Marlborough began collecting supplies and moving his troops from Maestrlch and Llfege to Coblenz that spring. The Allied strategy which was planned in the preceding winter by Marlborough. Wratislaw. and Helnslus. projected an expedition to relieve the Franco- 2 Bavarian threat to Austria and the Empire. Wratislaw and Helnslus did not realize the scale of the operation that Marlborough ultimately brought to fruition. The purposes of the campaign, even in Marlborough's original plan, were to force the French to retire to the Rhine and to leave Max Emanuel with no alternative but to join the Grand Alliance. From the perspective of both the Allied powers and the Franco-BavarIans, once the magnitude of the campaign emerged, the stakes of the campaign, although it

Braubach, Prlnz Eugen. II, 4?. 121 could not decide the war— this ultimately would be deter mined In Brabant and In Flanders— became higher than either side desired. The scale of the campaign in terms of supply and coordination of armies— each side had three in South Germany— surpassed those in the Germanles during the Thirty Years War. Bach side had over 60,000 men in their field armies in addition to other troops that manned the garrison and guarded the supply lines. In the Allied armies Marl borough commanded *(-0,000 troops drawn from the United Pro vinces. England. Denmark, Hanover, and Prussia, and Louis of Baden led another 20,000 Imperial Soldiers. In the Franco-Bavarian forces, Tallard held 30*000 troops on the Rhine as support for the *15,000 men in Bavaria under Marsln and Max Emanuel. The Elector and the French marshals planned to use their armies to capture Nbrdlingen and Nflrnberg. They hoped this would neutralize the Franconian Circle. With the Swabian Circle already forced to suspend active harassment of French posts, with Augsburg controlled by Franco-Bavarian troops, with Landau and Xehl occupied by the French, and with the Bavarians control of the Danube extended to in clude Passau, the possibility emerged that the l?0*f cam- 3 palgn might be decisive in forcing Austria out of the war.

Doeberl, Entwloklungensgesohlchte Bayern. II, 146. 122 In January of that year Louis XIV had assured Max Emanuel that the French were, still determined to sustain the war In the Empire* He proposed that Bavaria hold the Danube while France seized the Rhine Palatinate. If French troops held the Neckar and the Bavarian controlled the Danube( then, the Swabian and Franconian circles, Baden 4 and Wurttemberg, would have to accept a cease-fire. The campaign was preceded by a flurry of Allled-Franco- Bavarlan negotiations. France approached Prussia at the same time that the latter tried to mediate between Bavaria and the Grand Alliance. The Prussians originally told the French that they wanted NUrnberg as their price for leaving the Allies.^ Frederick I had become very dissatisfied with the Allies because of his conflict with the Dutch and Austrlans over the Guelderland and Cleves. In addition, the Great Powers refused to allow his troops to operate as a unit under Prussian command. But despite his dlssatls- 6 faction, the Prussian King did not desert the Allies. The Prussian-Bavarian negotiations In February, 1704,

5 Mmolre, January 11, 1704, GS, KS 17014. 5 Monasterol to Max Etaanuel, March 21, 1704, GS, KS 17014. Max Emanuel Informed Blclous of Bavarlan-Prusslan negotiations, while Torcy Informed Monasterol of French oontacts with the Prussian government. 6 Carl Noorden, ."Die preusslsche Polltlk lm spanlshchen Erbfogekriege", Hlstorlsche Zeltschrlft. XVIII (1867), 318. 123 were concerned with detaching Bavaria from France* Frederick I'a envoy, Freiherr von Berlepsch, acted as Inter mediary for the Grand Alliance. Max Emanuel refused to leave his alliance with Louis XIV unless the Allies would promise him the Milanese and unless Austria agreed to create a defensible# broad corridor under Bavarian control through Tyrol to Milan, and to permit Bavaria to keep its conquests in Swabia and Pfaltz-Meuburg. The Emperor# how ever# agreed only to let the Elector retain a part of 7 Pfaltz-Neuburg and Burgau. The Emperor also approached the Bavarian Elector through the Elector of Mainz in March and April. The latter told Max Bnanuel that the Empire was about to col lapse in the face of the motions of the Franco-Bavarian armies and the demands of the Protestant prlnoes. However# Leopold I would still make only token concession to Max 8 Emanuel. Monasterol discussed Bavarian withdrawal from the French Alliance with Toroy. The latter agreed to accept Bavarian neutrality if the Swabian Circle# the Duke of WtLrttomberg, and Prince Louis of Baden would' Join Bavaria 9 in declaring South Germany a neutral territory. All of

7 : ”— — — Doeberl# Entwlcklunaensgeschichte Baverne. II, 148. 8 Monasterol to Max Bnanuel# March 5, 1704# GS# KS 17014. 9 Ibid. 124 these negotiations were broken off by the actual implemen tation of the plans of the Allied powers to take the war into Bavaria. In May, as Marlborough started to march from the Low Countries, the Franco-Bavarian armies concentrated at Dilllngen and Ulm waiting for Tallard to send reinforce ments. These were delayed since Tallard had to move down the Rhine from Strasbourg to cover against a possible attack by Marlborough's troops at Landau. Late in May, when the attack along the Rhine appeared less imminent, Tallard sent 15*000 reinforcements to the French Army in Bavaria. On June 6 , 1704, Marlborough reached Weisbach directly east of Phillipsburg and Landau. It was still possible for him to cross the Rhine into France. Instead, the Duke's forces turned southeast and marched toward Stuttgart. Eighteen days later his army arrived on the north bank of 10 the Danube opposite the French at Ulm. Marlborough had successfully brought his army to the Danube by sustained marches of twelve miles a day. His troops were superbly fitted and rested. The Allied armies held the interior position along the left bank of the Danube with Marlborough watching Ulm, with Louis of Baden proceeding through the

Churchill, Marlborough. I, 760-767. 125 Black Forest, and with Eugene of Savoy In the Lines of Stollhofen observing Tallard. Marsln recognized his difficult position at Ulm. In that month over 60,000 troops of Marlborough, Prince Louis of Baden, and Eugene of Savoy stood between Marsln's army and the flhlne. Marsin sent General Legalle to 11 Versailles to petition Louis XIV for more troops. If the reinforcements did not arrive or if Tallard did not attack Marlborough's lines in Central Germany, then Marsin feared that he might be forced to surrender and that Max Emanuel would go over to the Alliance. On June 27th Chamillart ordered Tallard to march into Bavaria. With Louis of Baden advancing toward Ulm and Eugene of Savoy following Tallard along the Danube, the signifi cance of the 170^ campaign continued to grow. In mid-July Tallard stopped at Vlllingen in the futile attempt to take that fortress. At the end of July, his army of 35,000 men entered Augsburg, and Eugene of Savoy's 20,000 troops approached Ulm. The arrival of these two armies initiated the final phase of the campaign in August, which then culminated at Blenheim. But that July Max Emanuel had faced Marlborough alone, while Marsln had waited for rein forcements.

1 1 Ibl^., 7 0 7 * 126 Marlborough's movements determined the entire campaign. At the end of June he marched toward Nttrdlingen to secure his supply line from Ntlrnberg to Frankfort and down the Bhlne to Coblenz. For the remainder of the campaign Marlborough would operate from this supply base. To cross the Danube below Nbrdlingen, the Duke had to seize Donau- wbrth and Its adjacent natural defensive position.- the ' Schellenberg. It was a fortified bluff that overlooked the Danube. This was the key position from which armies could operate either north toward NUrnberg or south toward Munich. Gustavus Adolphus' fortifications still stood on the crest of the Schellenberg. Max Emanuel remained in Dillingen when it appeared the Allies would rest at Nbrdlingen. As an attack on the Schellenberg became imminent, he sent 12 d'Arco and 13,000 men to hold it. D'Arco hastily attempted to complete the earth works as the first units of Marlborough's army approached it on July 2nd. Vlllars had suggested the previous year that these lines be strengthened and the Schellenberg made 13 Impregnable, but Max Emanuel had delayed too long. After a long, forced march from the Nbrdlingen area, Marlborough's 40,000 troops began the attack on the

1 2 ------G. M. Trevelyan, England under Queen Anne. I, 356- 357. 13 Churchill, Marlborough. I, 786. Schellenberg on the afternoon of July 2nd. The Franco- Bavarian army, predominantly Bavarians, ably contained the attack until dusk. Then Marlborough launched a wave of soldiers through the ravines* The last contingents of this attack moved over the trenches and earthworks by walking on the fallen bodies of the previous waves of attackers: finally they broke the Bavarian lines. D'Arco hastily re treated across the Danube with only 6,000 of his 13,000 14 men. The Battle of the Schellenberg cost the Bavarian Army 7,000 of its best veteran infantry. Marlborough admitted to casualties of 6,000 in those four hours of fighting. The bulk of these men, including the Dutch General Goor, the Franconian General Styrum, along with five other generals, were sacrificed in the three bloody infantry assualts straight up the hill, which by sheer numbers and firepower, overwhelmed "the death-angle" of the Bavarian defense. In this battle Marlborough had forced the Bavarians to concentrate at one position: "the death- angle." Then he had sent an assualt group around the flank to trap the massed defenders from the rear while they tried 15 to fight off, the frontal attack.

- j - Trevelyan, England under Queen Anne. I, 364. 15 128 Marlborough would repeat this tactic at Blenheim and Malplaquet, where he sacrificed troops in a ferocious attack at one point of the line In order to make the decisive attack in an area where the defenders had left only a thin screen of troops. Marlborough's troops usually had greater sustained fire power with their flintlock muskets. Thus, his army's rate of attrition was lower than the Franco-Bavarians'. Even Max Emanuel, who had witnessed the massive Turkish sacrifices of troops in the Hungarian campaign, did not know how to deal with the Duke's tactics. Max Bnanuel was appalled and shaken at the cost of the battle. It represented a dress rehersal for Malplaquet in 1709, when Marlborough finally forced the French out of their redoubts in six hours of bloodshed that left thirty to forty thousand French and Allied dead on the field. Bavaria could not withstand this type of warfare. In comparison to the Battle of the Schellenberg, Bavarian military actions in the previous two campaigns were mere skirmishes. The Schellenberg was a staggering blow to the strength and morale of the Bavarian Army. Max Bnanuel lacked the resourcefulness and iron will of Maxlmillian I to fight a holding action while he gathered reinforcements. On July 8, 1704, the Allied army moved up the Lech River toward Augsburg. Marlborough established a triangular base of operation from Neuburg, mid-way between Ingolstadt 129 and Donauwbrth, to Rain* across from the Schellenberg* to Blberbach* midway up the Lech to Augsburg. Max Bnanuel withdrew the Bavarian Army from Dillingen and Neuburg and 16 placed it In Augsburg and along the Tyrol border. Marlborough ordered the devastation of the Bavarian countryside from the Danube to the environs of Munich and Augsburg. At the same time* Austrian forces sporadically pillaged Southern Bavaria from their bases in the Tyrol. However, this destruction upset both Louis of Baden and Leopold I* since it was a territory of the Empire and Max Emanuel was still an elector. They induced Marlborough to halt the desolation while they negotiated a settlement 17 with Max Emanuel. Marlborough stopped the raids on July 12th. But it was only a delay and the first despoliation became a prelude for the second. At the end of July, with the negotiations between the Allies and Bavaria ended* a thorough devastation began. Marlborough ordered his cavalry to range as far as possible into Bavaria and burn whatever was inflammable. Much of Southern Bavaria was put to the torch that month. Desperately* Max Emanuel sent his troops into the countryside to protect the towns and his own estates, particularly. This was Marlborough's

T5------Ibid.. 367. 17 Churchill, Marlborough. I, 815* 130 final act to force the Bavarians out of their alliance with 18 France• It was the only method the Duke had left to force Bavaria to join the Allies* Austria and the Empire had failed to provide the siege train necessary for the reduc tion of Munich and Augsburg. Despite all Marlborough's efforts at the end of July, there were no victories to jus tify his campaign. Ulm, Augsburg, Munich, and Ingolstadt remained intact. Then Tallard's relief force arrived at Augsburg. The last stage of the campaign was set. The Allied armies of Marlborough and Louis of Baden withdrew across the Danube at Donauwbrth to Join Eugene of Savoy, who had arrived at Hbchstadt. Max Emanuel recalled his troops that were dispersed to stop the devastation. At that moment Max Emanuel, Marsin, and Tallard proceded to Dillingen with their combined armies. During July, when the armies of Marlborough and Louis of Baden were in Bavaria and while Tallard's troops were moving down the Danube, Max Emanuel had begun negotiating with the Allied powers. Both Wratislaw, who conducted the talks for the Allies, and Marlborough wanted the negotla-

Trevelyan, England under Queen Anne. I, 368 131 tions concluded before Tallard arrived. They feared, with Justification, that Max Emanuel was stalling until the 19 French troops came. Marsin waited anxiously for French reinforcements. He knew the negotiations were In progress and feared their consequences. In June, Louis XIV had anticipated Allied- Bavarian talks, and he ordered Marsin to separate the French troops from the Bavarian Army in order to move them rapidly out of Ulm and Augsburg Into Swabia, if Bavaria changed sides. The King had no intention of having his army cut off and disarmed as a consequence of the Elector's 20 switching alliances. Wratislaw and Relchard met at the Monastery of Ftlrstenfeld, while Max Bnanuel remained In Munich. The former offered a preliminary treaty with six major provis ions. First, Max Emanuel must drop his French Alliance and Join the Grand Alliance. If he did, there would be no indemnification exacted for his actions in 1702 and 1?03« Second, the Wlttelsbach would gain Pfaltz-Neuburg and Burgau. Third, the Allied powers promised Max Emanuel a 200,000 crown indemnity for the damage to Bavaria caused

19 “ Marlborough to Helnslus, July 16, 1704, Van1 T Hoff, Correspondence of Marlborough and Helnslus. 194. 20 Klopp, Des Fall des hauses Stuart. XI, 142. 132 by the Allied troops. Fourth, the Allies would provide a subsidy for 12,000 Bavarian troops to be used in Italy against the French. Fifth, the Elector must renounce his quest for a kingship. Sixth, The Bavarian Army must not allow the French troops free passage out of Bavarian 21 territory. The draft treaty was signed by Wratislaw and Belchard on July 12, 170^, but Max Emanuel never ratified 22 it. Two days later, when Marsin knew Tallard was approach ing Augsburg, he threatened to pull the French army out of Bavaria immediately and move west to Join Tallard. Marsin's threat of withdrawal, partially, prevented the Elector from signing the treaty. However, Max Emanuel did not sign the treaty primarily because it meant his virtual renunciation of any part of the Spanish Inheritance, whether it be the Spanish Netherlands or the Milanese. The treaty said nothing about Cologne, which the Allied troops occupied. Finally, the treaty offered very limited territorial gains within the Empire, and his goal of a kingship would be 23 gone. The negotiations were over. At this point the Allies despoiled Northern Bavaria, as stated above. Then

Riezler, Geschlchte Bayerns. VII, 606-607. 22 Doeberl, Entwlcklungensgeschlchte Bayerns. II, 1^9 • 23 Trevelyan, England under Queen Anne. I, 369. 133 Marlborough began his withdrawal from Bavaria to Join Eugene of Savoy at the same time that Tallard* Marsin* and Max Emanuel met at Blberbach* the central point between their forces stationed at Augsburg and Ulm. Marsin assumed* as did Max ESnanuel, that the Allied armies were withdrawing toward Nbrdllngen to gather additional supplies before beginning the siege of Ingolstadt. The Elector and Marsin hoped to cross the Danube and seize Nbrdlingen, which would force Marlborough to retire on Nttrnberg and to forego an Investment of Ingolstadt. Tallard* however* was extremely cautious, for both the French and Allied forces were far from their own frontiers. In addition, to have mounted a campaign of this magnitude In a relatively unfortified country* as compared to Northern Italy or to the Low Countries* made the military situation both flexible and precarious. The Franco-BavarIans passed the Danube at Dillingen on August 9* 1704* two days before Marlborough and Louis of Baden crossed at Donauwttrth. They did not attempt to rebuild Dillingen*s defenses, which had been laboriously constructed by Vlllars In 1?03* Once Max Emanuel took Bavarian troops out of Dillingen after the Battle of the

25 Churchill* Marlborough. I, 840i Braubach, Prlnz Eugen. II* 72. Schellenberg, It remained an open camp. Marlborough order ed Its defenses destroyed. This action proved significant. Dillingen could not be used as a point from which to observe the movements of the Allied Army as it withdrew across the 25 Danube at Donauwbrth. On August 11, 1704, the Franco-Bavarian army, mainly French, moved along the north bank of the Danube toward Httchstadt. The Elector was convinced the Allied troops were pulling back. He proposed using the cavalry to active ly harass their withdrawal. Tallard was still uncertain. The following night their army camped at Hbchstadt, but they did not expect to face an attack since they bivouacked 26 in a relatively defensible position. Marlborough and Eugene of Savoy laid their plans for their first great battle. Louis of Baden, whose hesit ancy they feared, was conveniently provided with troops to begin the siege of Ingolstadt. At three o'clock in the -mealing the armies of Eugene on the right and Marlborough in the center and on the left along the Danube began to move into battle formation. The Franco-Bavarian Army hastily formed a defensive line with Max Emanuel in command

25 Mdrode-Westerloo, Mdmoires, 39^* 26 135 on the left (opposite Eugene of Savoy), Marsin In the center, and Tallard on the right around the village of Blenheim. In the course of the struggle during the morning and afternoon of August 13, 1?04, Max Bnanuel ably checked Eugene of Savoy when the latter tried to force his troops through the wooded area above the village of HBchstadt. On the right, Tallard made the egregious mistake of con centrating 10,000 troops in Blenheip, which Marlborough kept under continual pressure. Only a thin screen of French cavalry remained In the center of the Franco-Bavarian line. Although they inflicted very heavy casualties on Allied troops, the French were entrapping themselves. Marlborough forced the center of the French line, and he caught Tallard with all his troops in Blenheim. The entire overloaded right flank capitulated. Max Emanuel and Marsin could not form an orderly withdrawal with the major part of the army pinned between Blenheim and the Danube. Eugene and Marlborough ordered a ruthless pursuit by the cavalry all through the evening and night of August 13th. The next day they regrouped and marched after the remnants of the Franco-Bavarian Army. Marsin and Max Emanuel crossed the Danube at Lauingen the next day. They could not fall back and, at least, briefly reform at Dillingen since it was destroyed. Two days later they entered Ulm with their army completely shattered. Max Emanuel kept together 3,000 troops, mainly his prized caval- 136 ry, while Marsin had 13,000 French soldiers. The Elector left a garrison at Ulm to provide a barrier to slow the 2? pursuit of the Allied armies. The rest of the Franco-BavarIans fled up the Danube with the additional French contingents from Ulm and Augs burg. On August 23, 170^, they reached the area of Villlngen, where Villeroy^ army arrived to cover the re treat, On the last day of August, eighteen days after the Battle of Blenheim, they crossed the Bhine at Strasbourg, Only one forth of the Franco-Bavarian army (15,000 troops) remained effective after Blenheim and the flight to the Bhine, On September 10th the Ulm garrison of 2,500 men capitulated, and on December 2, 170^, the garrison of 12,000 soldiers at Ingolstadt surrendered. With the exception of Ingolstadt only Munich remained unoccupied by October. Austrian troops under Count l£wenstein began the occupation 28 of Bavaria which would continue for ten years. After the fall of landau, Treves, and Tsarbach, by the end of the campaign season, only the Moselle fortresses of Saarlouls, Thionville, and Metz protected central France. The news of what occurred at Blenheim slowly reached the major capitals of Europe. When he heard of the victory

27 “ Ibid.. 318. 28 Braubach, Prlnz Eugen. II, 7 9 . 137 that month* the Emperor made Marlborough a prince of the Elnplre by creating for him the Principality of Mlndelheim, out of Bavarian territory. The Dutch, who had worried for the entire campaign, rejoiced at the return of their forces to the Hhine. And Marlborough and Prince Eugene became the military heroes of Europe. Blenheim began the cult of their Invincibility which lasted until late In the war. No French army In the reign of Louis XIV suffered so resound ing a disaster as that at Blenheim. In the Marlborough- Eugene victories of Oudenarde and Malplaquet the French lost the battles, but they never lost an entire army. The loss was hardly irreparable to the French nor did it alter the balance of military power In the war decisively, In Italy, Vend&me dominated the Milanese. He had forced the Duke of Savoy into Turin and placed most of the Piedmontese fortresses under French control. In the Cevennes, the Impact of the Revolt of the Camisards, while far from over, was mitigated by Villars' conciliatory policy. Finally, In 1705 the French raised a larger army than they had fielded the year before. The real problem for Louis XIV and his ministers was to create another group of allies within the Empire, because the Wittelsbach had lost their immediate useful ness. With the Allies' occupation of both Cologne and Bavaria, France had failed in its attempt to break the 138 solidarity between the electors and the Etaperor. The restoration of the Wittelsbach was Imperative If France expected to continue Its diplomatic Influence In Central Europe. In addition* Louis XIV meant to restore the Wlttelsbachs because he had pledged his honor In the treaties of 1701-1702 with Bavaria and Cologne. From the French perspective, the Germanles were only a part of the whole pattern of the war from 1704 to 1714. Nevertheless France was bound to the restoration of the Wittelsbach Just as Max Emanuel and Joseph Clemens were tied to the French for their restitution. After Blenheim the Franco-Bavarian Alliance became more stable, if of less value, than in the first years of the war. At the same time that Louis XIV affirmed he would re store the Bavarian Elector, Joseph I resolved he would dissolve the Bavarian Electorate. Bavaria was the emotion al barrier to a settlement for Joseph I before 1711 that Catalonia was to Charles VI after 1711. Austria's domination of Bavaria Illustrated the In flexible policies that emerged among the Allies after 1 Blenheim. With the steady increase in the size of the armies and the scope of their operations from Spain to Flanders, the hardening of the Allied position continued until 1711; the Dutch demanded an extensive barrier In the Spanish Netherlands; the Supire sought an Imperial barrier on the left bank of the Bhine that would even Include Metz, 139 Toul, and Verdun; the English wanted vast trade concess ions from the Spanish and the French In the New World; and* Austria claimed the entire Spanish Inheritance. The 1?04 campaign that culminated In the Franco- Bavarian defeat marked the first major turning point in the war. Both military and diplomatic flexibility ceased. Just as the methods of warfare emphasized brutal victory, the objectives of diplomacy became those of total victory. Max Emanuel, who did so well In advancing his position among the European states by using Bavaria as a balance between Hapsburg and Bourbon, no longer held a meaningful place in European diplomacy in the last seven years of the War of the Spanish Succession. He could only rely on the good will and the ultimate military success of his French ally. A proud, difficult man. Max Emanuel became for French foreign secretary Torcy, particularly, an annoyance with whom he had to deal firmly but politely. Chapter VII AFTER BLENHEIM

The Elector and his troops had fled toward the Rhine In the retreat of the French army. Max Bnanuel ordered d'Arco to rebuild the defenses of Dillingen, but this was 1 only a desperate hope. It was impossible. The Elector arrived at Ulm with part of his baggage and infantry. He and Marsin agreed to leave a Bavarian garrison at Ulm while they regrouped in Swabia. After the Franco-Bavarian units left Ulm they began to pillage the country side as they moved toward Villlngen. Since the Allies went around Ulm and continued to pursue the fleeing Franco-Bavarians, Max Bnanuel and Marsin had to burn the bulk of their impedimenta in order to hurry the withdrawal. At Villlngen the troops reached the advancing army of Villeroy, who had arrived to cover the retreat. At this point Louis XIV ordered his marshals to evacuate all troops from the right bank of the 2 Rhine. Max Emanuel was depressed and exhausted. The pressure

1 " Mdrode-Westerloo, Mdmolres. 318. 2 Ibid.. 328.

140 141 3 of the pursuing army had kept up relentlessly. In his letter to the Electress on August 19* 1704, he urged her to remain In Bavaria to salvage whatever she could for his state and people. If at all possible, she should prevent any further desolation. He vowed to return to his lands at the first opportunity, but at the moment he would, If he had to, flee through Switzerland. Regardless of his plight, he Instructed his wife to do whatever she must for the wel- 4 fare of Bavaria. It was the personal aspect of disaster that so greatly upset Max Emanuel. He fled penniless and without any of the paraphernalia of office with which he had always so amply supplied himself. His money and his papers were gone. He and d*Arco had lost their entire personal train. He literally arrived at Strasbourg as a fugitive who had lost everything and who had lost contact with his family and his state. His letters are those of a proud man deeply humiliated by the disaster that befell him. Suddenly and completely Bavarian affairs were beyond his control.

- Max Emanuel to Electress, undated letter, H&fler, Wittelsbach und Habsburg," 3 6 2. 4 Max Emanuel to the Electress, August 19,1704, Ibid.. 363-364. --- 5 Max Snanuel to the Electress, August 21, 1704, Ibid.. 366-367. 142 Max Emanuel tried( as always, to negotiate with the 6 Allies. Immediately after Blenheim, Marlborough had offered to provide a subsidy for 8,000 to 12,000 Bavarian troops to fight In Italy, even though he suspected the 7 Elector's trustworthiness. The Duke had assumed that Max Emanuel would Join the Alliance for the right price. The previous month he had suggested that Max Emanuel be offered 8 a subsidy of 600,000 crowns for Joining the Allies. On August 18, 1704, five days after Blenheim, the Elector had contacted Marlborough and said he was interested In a 9 settlement on the basis of the July terms. Marlborough and Wratislaw, although the latter apparently acted on his own, sent an emissary, Baron von Zirkenstein, to Seefeld near Ulm to contact Max Emanuel. Bavarian troops were still scattered across Bavaria; In fact, there was still a 12,000 man force In Ingolstadt. As long as the French were unable to regroup against further Allied attacks, these troops were valueless to the Elector. However, under an Allied subvention, these forces could be used either in Italy or in Hungary. In addition to Joln-

Klopp, Des Fall des hauses Stuart. XI, 191. 7 Marlborough to Helnslus, October 23, 1704, Van'T Hoff, Correspondence of Marlborough and Helnslus. 145• Q Marlborough to Helnslus, July 16, 1?04, Ibid.. 111. 9 Marlborough to Helnslus, August 18, 1704, Ibid.. 124. w ing the Allied forces, Wratislaw and Marlborough demanded that Bavaria relinquish Its territorial conquests since 1702. Max Bnanuel refused; Instead, he hoped that he and Marsin, reinforced by Vllleroy, could make a stand In Swabia, and then they would launch an Invasion of Bavaria. Upon reaching Strasbourg, he set out for Brussels to take over the command of the Spanish Netherlands troops. He did not participate In the negotiations with Austria over the occupation of Bavaria. He desired, above all, to restore his military reputation. His great hope throughout the remainder of the war was to return to Bavaria at the head of an invading French army. Louis XIV soothed his feelings by giving him the nominal leadership of the French Army of Flanders, but his vanity and ambitions for an actual command would be frustrated for the rest of the war. That autumn Max Emanuel sought to recoup his losses by reopening negotiations with the Alliance. Helchard, who had come to Brussels with the Elector, sent a letter to Helnslus asking for passports for an envoy to come to The 11 Hague. The latter was interested if the negotiations concerned the Spanish Netherlands, but Helchard apparently wanted to talk only about Bavaria. His contacts ended with

10 Helgel, Quellen und Abhandlungen. II, 207-208. ^Helnslus to Marlborough, October 17, 1704, Van'T Hoff, Correspondence of Marlborough and Helnslus. 142• 144 Helnslus In early November. The French knew that Max Emanuel had approached the Allies. Monasterol told Torcy that the Elector had contact- 12 ed Marlborough In August and Helnslus In early September. Apparently Max Emanuel found no real response from either. Marlborough, particularly, seemed indifferent. After Blenheim the negotiations with the Allies were not as ex tensive as those earlier in the year. The situation had drastically changed. The Bavarian troops had been a real threat to the Allies before Blenheim, but this menace no longer existed. Leopold I was hostile, Marlborough was indifferent, and Helnslus alone seemed mildly interested in pursuing talks with the Elector. Max Emanuel's entrance Into Brussels that September was very different from that of 1 6 9 1. No longer was he the scion of the Hapsburgs with a son who was the direct descendant of Philip IV of Spain; neither was he the ruler of a major German state with the rank of the First Elector nor was he a crusader for Christendom against the Infidel. In 1704, he was one of the losers at Blenheim. Two years later the Ban of the Empire made him a fugitive prince. Malknecht, the Elector's trusted representative in

12 Monasterol to Max Emanuel, September 13, 1704, GS, KS 17014; Monasterol to Max Emanuel, August 21, 1704, GS, KS 17014. 145 Brussels from 1701-1704, and Monasterol, who returned to Versailles after Blenheim, were Instructed by Max Emanuel to press the French to honor his claims In the Low 13 Countries. By the Franco-Bavarian Treaty November, 1702, Louis XIV had agreed to give Max Emanuel the hereditary possession of the Spanish Netherlands. Max Bnanuel sought to have his sovereignty over the Spanish Netherlands announced by Philip V In order again to be a ruling prince with his own state. It was a question of his personal and family honor to end immediately his position as a landless prince. Above all, no serious negotiations, whether secret or as part of general peace talks, could be undertaken without the Wittelsbach's retention of the Spanish Nether lands. By September 1, 1704, Max Bnanuel Impatiently wait- 14 ed for Philip V to grant him these lands. The three-cornered relations between the Bavarians, (Max Emanuel and Malknecht), the Spanish (Philip V and his agent, Bergeyck), and the French (Torcy and his envoy at Brussels, President Roullld), became a complicated struggle for each state's objectives In the Low Countries. Max Emanuel's position was clear, and, according to the

13 ' Monasterol to Max Etoanuel, September 9, 1704, GS, KS 17014. 14 Max Emanuel to Monasterol, September 1, 1704, GS, KS 17014. 146 Franco-Bavarian Treaty of November 7* 1702, it was correct. Repeatedly he asked that the Spanish Netherlands be turned over to him. His correspondence with Monasterol and his later trips to Versailles were primarily concerned with 15 making the French honor their treaty obligations. In a letter to Louis XIV. Max Emanuel Insisted that he recognize his commitment. He contended that the honor of the King, as well as that of France, made the immediate formal cession 16 of the Spanish Netherlands imperative. In addition. Max Emanuel wanted a real military command. The French made him the titular head of their Flanders Army from 1705 to 1708, but the actual leadership 17 rested with Marshal Vllleroy. Louis XIV often used a dual command of this type; for example, the Duke of Burgundy and Marshal Tallard shared the leadership of the Army of the Rhine in 1703* Max Emanuel's own military power was based on the Bavarian troops he salvaged in 1704

Torcy, Journal. 5-18* 143-147* 437* The entries of 6th, 9th and 12th of November, 1709; of the 2nd and 4th of March, 1710; and of the 26th of May, 1711* give the accounts of Max Emanuel's visits to Versailles. 16 Max Emanuel to Louis XIV, December 18, 1704, GH, K-A. 17 Louis XIV to Max Emanuel, June 15* 1705* GH, K-A. There were a number of letters, from Louis XIV to the Elector in the summer of 1705 which emphasized the King's appreciation of Max Emanuel's military actions around Louvain. Louis XIV also assured Max Emanuel that he would provide force's for the letter's projected seige of Ll&ge. For example, Louis XIV to Max Bnanuel, July 21, 1705, GH, K-A. 147 and the very inadequate troops provided him as the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands. His only major garrison was in Brussels because Louis XIV did not Intend to allow him to control Namur or Charleroi, in particular. Max Emanuel soon possessed only a shadow of his former authority as governor. The Battle of Hamillles, in 1706, forced the French to evacuate Brabant, and the Battle of Oudenarade, in 1708, forced their withdrawal from Flanders. With the French retreat Max Emanuel's authority shrank to the cities of Namur, Charleroi, Nleuport, and the Duchy of Luxemburg• Among the townsmen and the nobility of the Spanish Netherlands the Elector acquired little allegiance. He, his officials, and his court were outsiders. He used the revenues, as in the 1690's, on his followers and on his Bavarian troops. Even the loyal Count Mdrode-Westerloo, who had fought with him at Blenheim, retired in 1704, and then he took a post as a cavalry general In the Imperial 18 Army the next year. Neither Max Emanuel's attempted lib eration of Brussels in 1709, nor his entrance into Namur as the Count of Namur in 1711* evoked any excitement among the populace. The Spanish Netherlands was difficult to rule even with meaningful authority; without it, it was

18 Mdrode-Westerloo, Mdmolres. 3 6 1. 1^8 impossible. The question of the cession of the Spanish Netherlands to Max Emanuel brought the first fundamental divergence between Philip V and Louis XIV. The argument for delaying this cession was that it was primarily a matter of timing. Philip V*s obstlnancy in this matter was reinforced by Bergeyek, who handled Philip V's interest, though techni cally as the Spanish Secretary he was subordinate to the 19 governor. In the Low Countries Bergeyek ably represented Spanish Interest against both the Bavarians and the French. Specif ically, he tried to keep the tax revenues and the troops from the provinces under Philip V's control. At Versailles Bergeyek countered Max Emanuel's attempt to usurp the King 20 of Spain's prerogatives in the Spanish Netherlands. In 1709 and 1710, the Spanish asked Max Emanuel to come to Spain as the leader of one of their armies. It was advantageous for both Spain and France to remove Max Emanuel to the Iberian Peninsula. The Elector refused since he did not want to leave the center of European affairs even with the lucrative offer of leading an army

— — - Hosenlehner, "Zur Restitutionpolitik Max Emanuel,” 170. 20 Ibid.. 121. 149 21 in the Spanish theater of the war. Louis XIV and Torcy Intended from 1704 to 1714 to honor the Franco-Bavarian treaties of 1702 by making Philip 22 V give Max Emanuel the Spanish Netherlands. The French King's problem was that he had to keep the Elector as an ally and In a position of military authority that suited his rank, while, at the same time he could not allow Max Emanuel's political and military demands to impinge on French policy. Therefore, French pressure on the Spanish court for the cession of the Spanish Netherlands was min imal until 1708. Torcy neutralized the Bavarians and the Spanish by playing off Monasterol and Bergeyek. The foreign secretary wanted to accommodate the Spanish and Bavarian leaders, but this could be done only If the French could defend Brabant and Flanders first. Torcy tried to delay a settlement on the Issues on the Spanish Netherlands by indicating to both Monasterol and Bergeyek that they must wait for a solution 23 until a general peace settlement was Imminent. While the French delayed in advancing the Elector's

21 Torcy, Journal. 78-81, 146. 22 Louis XIV to Max Emanuel, February 2, 1705, GH, K-A. 23 Torcy, Journal. 81, 3 8 2. 150 Interests in the Low Countries* they were unable for the moment to support his rights in the Germanles. Neither militarily nor diplomatically could Louis XIV intervene against the Allies until 1713* But on November 7* 1704, Torcy and Monasterol signed another treaty that committed France to oontlnue the war until Bavaria was retaken and half of Swabia was added to its territories. Also* by 24 this plan Bavaria would become a kingdom. In Bavaria the Elector had for the moment relinquished his authority by his letter of August 28* 1704* to the Elect- ress. She gave up her attempt to Join Max Emanuel in exile sind returned to Munich after a brief but futile attempt to 25 meet him at Memmlngen. Then she negotiated with the Austrlans. The Bavarians disagreed on continuing the war. Their garrisons refused to surrender at Ingolstadt* Fassau, Kuf- stein* and Straubing* and General von Weiokel reassembled a field army. Thus* both the supplies and the soldiers still existed to resist the Austrlans. But Max Emanuel wanted these men with their material withdrawn from Bavaria to join him in Brabant. Wisely he counseled against con- 26 tinued resistance to the Austrlans. In Munich the

2 4 ------1------Helgel* Quellen und Abhandlunaen. II* 209-210. 25 Max Emanuel to the Electress* August 28, 1704* Hbfler* "Wittelsbach und Habsburg,1* 368. 26 Helgel, Quellen und Abhandlunaen. II* 217* 151 Eleotress overrode the army's desire to continue the war and accepted a cease-fire. Joseph I, who Joined the army of Louis of Baden after the Battle of Blenheim, took control of the Austrian ne gotiations with the Electress. He sought and ultimately carried through, after he became Emperor In 1705, a retrl- 27 butive policy toward Bavaria. The Elector's state pro vided both money and troops for the Emperor's forces in Hungary and Italy. The Austrian occupation marked the be ginning of their military resurgence in the war. Not only did the Franco-Bavarian defeat end the threat to Austrian territory, but Bavaria, as the Milanese after the French evacuation in 1706, bore onerous burdens In taxes and men for the Emperor's armies. Joseph I rejected the proposal of the Bavarian Am bassador Mbrmann and Secretary Neusbnner to recognize the hereditary rights of the Electoral Prince Charles Albert and to partion Bavaria into separate areas of Bavarian and Austrian administration. By the Austro-Bavarlan Treaty of Ilbersheim on November 7» 170^ • the Wittelsbach retained control only of Munich. All military supplies were to be handed over to Austria, and Bavaria, with the exception of

27 Braubach, Frlnz Eugen. II, 101. 152 Munich* fell under an Austrian military occupation. Finally, the Electroas might leave Munich If she wished, 28 but her children could not. The Bavarians Immediately tried to circumvent the agreement. Their troops surrendered with reluctance. At Ingolstadt, for example the garrison resisted for another month after the treaty was signed. The Bavarian Army hid its supplies and tried to transfer Its officers to the Spanish Netherlands. The army never delivered its cannons and siege equipment as scheduled. Immediately Neusbnner corresponded with Rakocy In Hungary. The talks with the Hungarian rebels for combined operations against the Haps- burgs had gone on since 1703 and would continue until Bakocy was driven Into exile in Turkey in 1711. In 1705 Max Emanuel was aware of Neusbnner's and Rakocy's plans for a general uprising in Bavaria, Bohemia, and Hungary against Leopold I. But the Bavarians and Hungarians did 29 not coordinate their strategies. The French encouraged their mutual cooperation, and, in fact, Louis XIV sent small amounts of money and supplies 30 into Hungary. However, French policy toward the Rakocy

28 "Traltd d'llbershelm." Lamberty. Mdmoires. III. 114- 117. 29 Helgel, Quellen und Abhandlungen. II, 220. 30 Monasterol to Max Emanuel, Deoember 5* 1705, GH, KS 17015. 153 Rebellion was like that of the Allies toward the Camisard Revolt in the Cevennes: they kept the insurrection smould ering, but they were never able to create a serious diver sion. Bavarian resentment toward the Austrian occupation mounted in the spring and summer of 1705* The Electress left Munich in February that year to seek papal aid through the Sobieski family, her mother in Venice and her brother, 31 the Duke of Modena. After the Austrlans uncovered the Brussels-Munich correspondence on the Joint rising with Rakocy*s forces, they refused to allow the Electress to return from Venice, and they imprisoned Neusbnner at Graz. Additional occupation troops entered Bavaria in April. Then on May 16, 1?05, eleven days after Emperor Leopold X*s death, Austrian troops under General Gronsfeldt occupied Munich and seized the young Electoral Prince Charles Albert. Throughout the summer of 1?05 the occupation became more stringent as Joseph I, Prince Eugene, and General Gronsfeldt continued to elicit money and troops from Bavaria. Max Qnanuel claimed that by the end of the summer, one year after his defeat at Blenheim, the Austrlans had exacted 32 seven million gulden.

31 ‘ 1 Max Emanuel to Monasterol, December 2, 1704, GH, KS 17044. 32 Ibid.. 223-232. 154 In August, the Austrlans announced the Induction of 12,000 Bavarians Into the Emperor*s army for service In Italy.This proclamation caused a flight to the forests, and sporadic resistance began. These fugitives were Joined by contingents of armed soldiers that had wandered around Bavaria since the formal disbanding of the Bavarian Army. The revolt was kindled further by the rumor that Max Emanuel's children were to be removed from Bavaria late 34 that fall. Joseph I proclaimed a general amnesty on November 19, 1705, for all who immediately laid down their arms. It was too late. Subsequently, the Austrlans suppressed the revolt In the fighting at Munich and Vllshofen. Austrian General Krleschbaum won a major pitched battle near Cham on January 8, 1706, In which 5.000 Bavarians died. With this defeat the revolt ended. The insurrection left the Austrlans in complete control of Bavaria, and It led Joseph I to strip the Wittelsbach of their lands and titles in the Empire.^ The Emperor already had begun the indictment of the Wlttelsbachs, and the insurrection in Bavaria added to his animosity toward them. The College of Electors approved the

— Klopp, Des Ball des hauses Stuart. XI, 416-418. 34 Helgel, Quellen und Abhandlungen, II, 232. 35 Klopp, Des Fall des hauses Stuart. XI, 419-420. 155 Ban of the Empire, but the College of Princes refused. After Its proclamation on April 29* 1706, the kings of Sweden and Denmark and the dukes of Mecklenburg, Wttrttem- berg, and Hesse-Kassel protested the legality of the ban, 36 saying that the princes had never approved It. Max Emanuel would use the same argument throughout the war. In the summer of 1706, Joseph I ordered the four older sons of Max Emanuel— Charles Albert, Philipp Morlz, Ferdinand Marla, and Clemens August— taken from Munich to Klagenfurt. Only the infant Princess Marla Anna and the younger sons Theodore and Max Emanuel remained In Munich. They were separated until Charles VI came to the throne in 1711. Then In April, 1712, all of them were taken to Graz. The treatment of the Elector's children provides a valuable insight into the dynastic-diplomatic affairs of the Old Regime. The children, particularly Charles Albert, received an excellent education under the tutors of the Hapsburgs. After Max Emanuel's restoration and reunion with his family in 171^» he wrote Charles VI to thank him for the education given them. He admitted it was superior to what he. Max 37 Enanuel, could have provided in Munich.

35 ' Heigel, Quellen und Abhandlungen. II, 2^9. 37 Ibid.. 250-252, 265. 156 Charles VI was more sensitive to dynastio privilege than was Joseph I. He shared the views of Wratislaw on the desirability of a Hapsburg-Wlttelsbach reoonoiliat1on. Charles VI had stated in Hay, 1711, that he recognized the 38 necessity of the restitution of the Wittelsbach, He then took a personal interest in the theological and philosophi cal education of Charles Albert whom he hoped to groom as a loyal devotee of the Hapsburgs. After Joseph I's death Wratislaw and Charles VI unsuccessfully promoted a Hapsburg- Wlttelsbach double marriage of Joseph I's two daughters with the two oldest Wittelsbaoh princes. In 1722* Charles Albert 39 did marry M&ria Amelia, the younger daughter of Joseph I. The Ban of the Empire in 1706 had given Joseph I the means of satisfying his territorial ambitions and those of his unde, Johann Wilhelm. Austria annexed the area on the fringes of Bavaria from Salzburg to Passau, while Johann Wilhelm took the Upper Palatinate. The remainder of Bavaria was parceled among lesser claimants and placed 40 under an overall Austrian administration.

“ 3 5 ------Charles III to Wratislaw, Hay 27, 1711. Alfred Arneth, (ed.). "Elgenh&ndlge Korrespondence der KBnlgs Karl III von Bpanien (naohmals Kaiser Karl VI) mlt dem Obersten Kanzler des I&nigsreiohes BBhmen, Grafen Johann Wenzel Wratislaw," Archlv fttr Psterrelohisohe Geschlohte. XVI (I856), 158-159* Hereafter cited as "Korrespondence KarT XI und WTatlslaw." 39 Helgel, Quellen und Abhandlunaen. I890, II, 260-265. 40 Ibid.. 250. 157 The division of Bavaria created another obstacle to a general peace. Joseph I and his ministers, particularly Prince Eugene, pursued aggressive policies by which the House of Hapsburg extended its territories and revitalized its authority in the Empire. The division of Bavaria not only brought additional land to Austria but it gave Johann Wilhelm, a firm supporter of Austria in the Empire, add itional compensation. He and his sister, the Empress Eleanore, were a powerful faction at the court in Vienna 41 who opposed any compromise with Max Enanuel. The Hapsburg-Bourbon conflict in the Germanles centered on their respective support for the Pflatz-Neuburgs and the Wittelsbachs. Dynastic patronage and power in the Germanies were directly at stake. While the French backed Wittels- bach's pre-eminence on the Lower Rhine and in South Germany, the Austrlans backed the Neuburg's in the same areas. Johann Wilhelm wanted to add the Upper Palatinate to his other lands: Neuburg on the Danube, the Rhine Palatinate, and he wanted to add the titles of First Elector of the Empire and of Governor of the Spanish Netherlands. The Influence of the Empress Eleanore enabled him to pursue this policy successfully at Vienna. Between 1703 and 1708 the Hapsburgs agreed to give him the Upper Palatinate and

41 Braubach, Prlnz Eugen. I, 101. 158 and to appoint him as the Governor of the Spanish Nether lands. The English nominally gave their support to such a scheme until 1711. At the negotiations of Rastatt, in 1714, the French forced the Austrians to sacrifice Johann Wilhelm's ambitions to a peace settlement. Johann Wilhelm died two years later. The brief position of influence that the 42 Neuburg's held declined rapidly after Rastatt. The division of the Wittelsbach's lands, was a severe blow to French influence in the Germanies. Their power would have been seriously impared if Austria had succeeded in placing Cologne, the Rhine and Upper Palatinates, the Spanish Netherlands, Jules, Berg, and Bavaria under its authority through Johann Wilhelm's clientage. Just as the Methuen Treaties extended the Allies' war aims In the Spanish lands, the Hapsburg-Neuburg agreements enlarged their goals in the Germanies. Spain and Bavaria became the areas of controversy that precluded a peace settlement. The fighting became more bitter and the armies grew larger in the later years of the war. With Spain and Bavaria as uncompromlsable areas of conflict between France and Austria, the possibility of a general peace receded. As we have seen, the French faced greater difficulties after Blenheim than in the first years of the war. They were

— Georg Sante, "Die kurpfSltzische Politik des KurfUr- sten Johann Wilhelm vornehmlich im spanischen Erbfolgekrieg," Historlsches Jahrbuoh. IVL, (1924), 39-59* 159 forced out of the Germanies and were placed on the defen sive In Spain, Italy and the Low Countries. • The Hague UNITED PROVINCES Illustration 2* Hap of t h Nerawdands Utrecht

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The Allied victory at Ramillies on May 23» 1706, which forced France to evacuate Brabant, marked the beginning of the last phase of the war. Later in that summer a French army, also, was defeated at Turin and had to evacuate Italy* During the first five campaigns of the war the French had occupied the Spanish lands, but after 1706 only Flanders and Castile remained firmly under their control. They fought to protect their own frontiers and to hold Spain. This changed military situation provided the backdrop for the Franco-Bavarian Alliance in the last part of the War of the Spanish Succession. In these years Louis XIV*s primary concern was to defend his northeastern frontier, while Max ESnanuel's major objective was to reconquer Bavaria. A French field army of 60,000 men under the command of Marshal Villeroy and Max Emanuel had held the Brabant Lines in 1705* Early in the next campaign Marlborough successfully pierced their defenses and met them at Ramill ies in the major cavalry clash of the war. Over 25*000 horsemen, including the French crack squadron, the Malson

161 162 du Hoi, fought for two hours that afternoon. When the bat tle ended, the French had lost all their artillery and most of their cavalry, and they retreated. Louis XIV formed another army by recalling his forces on the Hhlne and In Italy. The French then withdrew to Courtral on the Iys Hlver and left Ostend, Ghent, Antwerp, and Brussels to the advancing Allied armies. The last Allied victory of that campaign came at Menln. By the middle of August, Vend&me, who had returned from Italy, formed a powerful field army 1 around Lille, and the retreat ended. The Allies entered Brussels on Hay 28, 1?06, and took another of Max Emanuel's capitals. He moved his head quarters to Hons, where he would remain until the French defeat at Halplaquet In September, 1?09. With the defeat of fiamlllles and the subsequent Allied advance down the Scheldt, the Elector retained partial control of Luxemburg, 2 and of Namur, Charleroi, and Hons. (These areas are re ferred to In the later negotiation as "the four places.") That August Max Bnanuel approached the Allies for a peace settlement. Sersanders, the President of the Council of Flanders, took the Elector's terms to Marlborough first. In return for his restitution In Bavaria or his compensation

- . — Churchill, Marlborough. II, 80-131. 2 ... Klopp, Des Fall des hauses Stuart. XI, 75. 163 with the Milanese, Max Emanuel offered to deliver the "four places."^ Then Sersanders contacted the Dutch field depu ties Baron de Reed de Renswoude and Sicco van Gosllnga, and 4 he repeated the same offer to them. The latter felt that these negotiations could lead to a general peace. In his opinion, Max Bnanuel was sincere and he could turn over the specified areas to the Allies. Marlborough undermined these peace feelers, according to * Van Gosllnga, because he wanted the governorship of the Spanish Netherlands for himself. Even though the Dutch field deputies were interested in further talks with the Elector, Marlborough was not. He doubted that Max Emanuel could actually deliver these strategic positions, because since the French reorganization of their army in the Low Countries after Ramillies, the Bavarian and Spanish Nether- 6 lands troops had been incorporated into the French army. In these negotiations Max Emanuel attempted to regain Bavaria on the basis of its boundaries of 1701 or to acquire the Spanish Netherlands. He assured the Dutch that Louis 7 XIV backed his complete compensation. The Elector pro-

3 Churchill, Marlborough. II, 150. k Sicco van Gosllnga, Mgmolres relatlfs & la guerre de succession de 1706-1709 et!7ll. U.A. EvertIsz and G.H.M. Deiprat (eds.), (Leeuwarden, ib57). 71*

5Ibid.. 7. 27-29* ^Klopp, Des Fall des hauses Stuart. XII, 83-85* 16k posed that the Spanish Netherlands be reorganized as a semi independent republic on the order of a circle of the Em pire. He would be the secular head, like the Dutch Stadt- holder, and a churchman would be appointed as the ecclesias tical leader. Then this state's independence would be 8 accepted by all the powers, particularly by the Bnpire• However, the Dutch could not act alone to reach an agree ment with Max Emanuel on the disposition of the Spanish Netherlands, because the English and Austrlans were invol ved in this area. The French tried to open negotiations after Ramillles, too. Renswoude, also, communicated an offer to Marlborough from what the latter took to be French sources. In a letter of July 27* 1706, Marlborough sent the French terms to' Heinsius* (1) Philip V would retain Catalonia, Aragon; Navarre, Valencia, and Guepusuos in Spain, and only the Milanese from the rest of the Spanish territories; (2) Max Emanuel would receive Naples and Sicily, which he could exchange with Austria for Bavaria; (3) the Archduke Charles would get Castile and the provinces of Western and Southern Spain, the Spanish Indies, and the Spanish Netherlands; and

Letter of Max Bnanuel, July 9, 1706, in G.G. Vreede, (ed..), Correspondance. diplomatique et. mllltalre du duo de..... Marlborough. duGrant-Penslonalre Heinsius et du Trdsorier- Ggndral des Provlnces-Unles. Jacques Ho p . {Amsterdam, ittgO), 236. Hereafter cited as Correspondance Marlborough. Heinsius et Ho p . 8 Max Emanuel letter of July 10, 1706, Ibid., 237. 165 9 (4) the Duke of Savoy would be restored In his lands. At the same time Hennequin, a Rotterdam merchant, was In Paris. The French Informed him that they wanted peace on the basis of a division of Spain. Although they were silent on the Milanese, the French were ready to give the Spanish Indies and the Spanish Netherlands to the Archduke Charles. In addition, Louis XIV offered to restore Victor Amadeus In Savoy If In return, Joseph I reinstated Max Rnanuel In Bavaria or gave him the equivalent redress In Naples and Sicily. The King conceded the Dutch a barrier In the Spanish Netherlands In exchange for his own acqui sition of Luxemburg. Finally, he agreed to recognize the 10 Protestant Succession In England. Although the 1706 negotiations did not go beyond these informal approaches; still, they were the first serious attempt toward a general settlement. Louis XIV had offered concrete terms through different intermediaries: President Roullltf, who was attached to Max Emanuel's court as Louis XIV*s personal envoy, haul also tatlked to Hennequin, and Bergeyek had approached van der Dussen, the Pensionnary of Tergow.‘*"L Torcy thought the Dutch were ready to end the

- Hensius to Marlborough, July 27, 1706, Van'T Hoff, Correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius. 251* 10 Heinsius to Marlborough, July 30, 1706, Ibid.. 253* 11 Ibid.. also see Vreede's introduction In Correspon dance Marlborough. Heinsius et Hop. 166 war. According to the foreign secretary, they agreed to negotiate on the basis that Austria retained the Spanish Netherlands and that they* the Dutch, acquired a barrier 12 In those lands, and commercial privileges In France. These Franco-Dutch contacts continued from August. 1706 to January. 1707* The Dutch leaders felt that Max Emanuel wanted out of the war and that Louis XIV and 13 Secretary of War Chamlllart sought a peace. Heinsius proposed a division of the Spanish Inheritance In which the Archduke Charles kept Spain, the Spanish Indies, and the Spanish Netherlands, and In which Philip V retained the Milanese, Naples, and Sicily. Of course, he specifically demanded that the Dutch receive a number of barrier cities 14 In Brabant and Flanders. In November Torcy offered to enter secret negotiations 15 with Heinsius In either Dutch or French territory. How ever. the Franco-Dutch talks never expanded into serious negotiations at that time, because Marlborough and Joseph 16 I refused to support Heinsius* efforts.

— , ; Torcy, MAnolres. 555* 13 Heinsius to Marlborough, August 3 , 1706, Vreede, Correspondance Marlborough. Heinsius et Ho p . 79; Marlborough to Heinsius. August 10. 1706. Ibid.. fl47 14 Heinsius to Marlborough, August 25* 1706, Ibid.. 102- 103, 15 Torcy to Hennequin, December 5* 1706, Ibid.. 183-184. 16 Ibid.. 266, 267. 16? In these negotiations of 1706, the basis of the out lines of the Utrecht settlement were present: the recog nition of the Protestant Succession in England, a Dutch Barrier in the Spanish Netherlands, and a Hapsburg-Bourbon division of the Spanish Inheritance* The final settlements in 1713-1714 differed basically from the negotiations of 1706 in that the Bourbons kept Spain and the Spanish Indies for Philip V. Spain remained an Independent kingdom in 1712 Instead of being divided, as implied by the terms of 1706 In which the northern and eastern provinces retained by Philip V represented an extension of French territory* At the end of the war Austria acquired Spain's holdings in Italy and in the Low Countries instead of a part of Spain and all of its overseas empire* The negotiations of 1706 pointed out the complete dependence of Max Emanuel upon Louis XIV* First, if he* was serious in exchanging Namur, Charleroi, Hons, and Luxemburg for Bavaria, he could not do it without the King of France's concurrence* Second, the termB received by the Dutch from the French pointed to Louis XIV's firmness in demanding either the restitution of Bavaria, or an equiva lent compensation for the Elector* The Wittelsbachs had been reduced to clients of the Bourbons* Eaoh of the major battles of the last years of the war— Bamillles in 1706, Oudenarde in 1708, and Malplaquet in 1709— constricted Hax Emanuel's freedom of action. He lost his authority In Brabant by the first, his control of Flanders by the second, and after the third he took his small, fugitive court to Compibgne. Since all his major revenues as governor were gone,' he was totally dependent 17 on Frenoh subsidies. After Max Emanuel re-established his court at Compibgne, he left for Versailles. This apparently was his first visit. He conferred with Torcy on November 6 , 1?09, and then traveled to Marly for an audience with Louis XIV six days later. The Elector offered to lead a Frenoh army into South Germany In the next campaign. This force would Join Bavarian insurrectionists to re-establish the Franco-Bavarian position of 1703. The Invasion of South Germany wob con sistently his greatest hope. He also wanted to Neutralize the Spanish Netherlands by an agreement with the Dutch. If these were accomplished, then, he maintained, a general 18 peace would follow.

The visit of the Bavarian Elector to the French court In November, 1709* as recorded in Torcy's Journal, marked one of the major points in the whole development of the Franco-Bavarian Alllanoe. In his conversation with the foreign secretory, the latter agreed to consider an Invasion

17 : “ Rosenlehner, "Zur Bestitutionspolltik Max Emanuel," 200. of the Empire by a Frenoh army In 1710. Two days later Torcy conferred with Louis XIV on the proposed offensive. and Max Emanuel discussed It, too. In an audlenoe with the King. Both Torcy and Louis XIV favored the plan that 20 November. Vlllars had raided the Empire two years before. Late In Hay, 1707. he destroyed the Lines of Stollhofen and seized Stuttgart. In a three-month campaign, until his units were threatened to be cut off by a reinforced Im perial army under George of Hanover, Vlllars* forces marched down the Hhlne and the Neckar exacting tribute. His cavalry had even captured Ulm on the Danube. Balds such as Vlllars! In Germany or the Duke of Savoy's In southeastern France In 1708 were far easier to mount than a major offensive such as Hex Emanuel proposed. In early 1708 Chamlllart, who was the major advocate of an Invasion of the Germanies, had placed Max Emanuel and marshal Berwick In command of the French Army of the Bhlne. However, Berwick opposed an Invasion on the grounds thatit was beyond French capabilities to march against the Imperial troops of both Prince Eugene of Savoy and George of Hanover, The Frenoh crossed the Hhlne, but Kax Emanuel delayed an 170 attack. At this point Berwick persuaded him to be content with short forays Into the German Rhineland. Then the French met defeat at Oudenarde, and they had to recall Berwick with most of the Army of the Rhine to create a new Flanders Army. Oudenarde ended Max Bnanuel's hopes for an 21 offensive Into the Empire for that year. Subsequently Louis XIV did gather large forces on the Upper Rhine In 1710, 1711* and 1713* Only In the latter year did he launch an offensive. In 1710 his military needs In Spain and along the French border In the Ne Plus Ultra Line, the fortresses on the Flanders frontier, did not leave any troops available for operations on the Rhine. In addition, both Vlllars and Berwick had disapproved of an Invasion that year. In 1711 the French forces massed along the German frontier to threaten the election of Charles VI at Frankfort; however, the army did not attack, becausetthe French government feared an Invasion would upset their delicate secret negotiations with England. Cki November 12, 1709* as stated above, Max Emanuel' went to Marly for an audience with the King. In that audience Max Emanuel asked, in addition to his request for an Invasion, that he be included In the Franco-Butch nego-

Charles Petrie, Marshal Duke of Berwick. The Ploture of an Age. (London, 1953). 227. 171 tlatlons and that he be ceded the Spanish Netherlands. He wanted Louis XIV to honor their treaty of November 7, 1702* which made that area the Elector's Indemnification for the loss of Bavaria. Max Emanuel, at this point, hoped he could use the Spanish Netherlands as a pawn to regain his electorate. His talks with Louis XIV and Torcy convinced him that 22 the King firmly supported his restoration in the Empire. In fact, that summer the French High Council had agreed that the restitution of the Wlttelsbaoh had to be included In any preliminary articles. The Council reaffirmed this 23 position in Its meeting of November 2^, 1709. Max Emanuel hoped the Franco-Dutch negotiations would lead to his reinstatement. He was certain Torcy and Louis XIV, at least, wanted the Wittelsbachs represented at a general peace conference. Later the preliminaries of 1?10 excluded them. Even though article twenty-nine barred the Elector from a congress, Torcy assured him of French pro- 2 Zf tectlon for his interests. During the delicate Franco-Dutch negotiations of 1709- 1710, Torcy faced the serious problem of placating Max

22 " Torcy, Journal. 16-19. 23 Torcy, M^molres. 37-38. 2^ Bosenlehner, "Bestltutlonpolitlk Max Emanuel," ?4. 1 7 2 Emanuel. The French position was desperate. The losses which began at Blenheim had continued for five campaigns. The major fortresses of Lille and Toumal had surrendered In 1708 and in 1709* respectively. The French gathered their forces after Malplaquet and built their last army of the war. In addition, the bad winter of 1709 had ruined the crops which caused widespread hunger by the end of the year. Louis XIV appealed to the people of France to defend their homeland, the only such appeal of the reign. The French needed peace, and they accepted most of the Allies1 demands. Rouilltf opened negotiations with the Dutch in 1709. Torcy hoped for a settlement of the pre liminary articles which would be the guide lines of an international congress. Louis XIV abandoned all Bourbon claims on Spain, the Spanish Indies, the Spanish Netherlands, and the Milanese. However, he insisted that Philip V needed adequate compensation, most preferably in Naples and Sicily. In addition Louis XIV wanted the full restoration of the 25 tflttelsbachs within the Bnplre. The talks had begun in early March, 1709, and they continued until that May. Then Torcy himself went to The Hague for the final pourparlers. The French position on the adequate compensation of Philip V and on the restitution of the Wittelsbach remained

Torcy, Mdmolres. 562 basically constant, although they eventually gave way on the latter point. In April Louis XIV had Instructed his envoy to the conference. President Roulllcf; to ignore this question so that it could be relegated to a general con- 26 gress. As Torcy stated, the French desperately needed peace since the Allies now threatened the heart of French power; however, If Louis XIV accepted the Allies' terms, France would surrender Philip V's conquests in Spain and would 27 desert their Wlttelsbach allies. Ch both points the Allies refused to compromise. They neither allowed Philip V part of Spain nor compensation in Italy; nor did they offer reinstatement for Max Emanuel in Bavaria and for ' Joseph Clemens in Cologne. Of the preliminary articles ■ that Torcy agreed to at The Hague in May, 1709, but which the French government soon after rejected, Louis XIV re fused to accept articles four and thirty-seven in the ne gotiations of 1709 and of 1710. Article four required the French to leave Spain and to force Philip V to renounce the Spanish throne. Article thirty-seven required the immediate cession of the entire Spanish Inheritance to Archduke Charles and an immediate cease fire. 174 The French pourparlers continued through the summer and fall of 1709, with the exception of a month's Inter mission after Malplaquet* Max Emanuel feared that an agree ment on the preliminaries might be reached before he again held territory in his own right. First he pressed for an Invasion of the Empire to reconquer Bavaria. But by January, 1710, It was clear the French could not Invade the Empire even if this might relieve the pressure on their Flanders frontier. Torcy told Monasterol on January 1, 1710, that Louis XIV could not mount a campaign on the 28 Rhine with the troops he had available. Then Honasterol pressed Max Emanuel's demand of the patent of the sovereignty of the Spanish Netherlands. Torcy tried to delay it by Insisting Louis XIV could do 29 nothing until he concluded his negotiations with the Dutch. Monasterol again asked Torcy for the patent on February 4th. Torcy assured him the Elector would receive it and he would not be deserted for a peace settlement. In addition, the foreign secretary assured the Bavarian ambassador that the Elector would regain Bavaria. He felt, at the oppor tune moment, the Dutch and some of the German princes would

28 “ Torcy, Journal. 85. 29Ibid.. 89, 112-115. help the French force the Austrlans to restore Max Enanuel 30 In his lands and titles* When Monasterol met Toroy on February 22nd he told him that Max Enanuel wanted Louis XIV's personal assurance that If a peace treaty were signed In which the Wlttelsbaoh were not reinstated In the Bnpire, 31 then Louis XIV would compensate him elsewhere* Torcy's tactics of delaying a definite answer to Max Emanuel's demands until the end of the Gertruydenberg ne gotiations failed. The Elector came to Paris on February 28* 1710, despite Toroy's assurances to Monasterol that his presence at Versailles was unnecessary* Max Emanuel and Torcy talked at length on March 2nd. This was the same day the Council decided to reject the Allied treaty pro posal* because It Included the stipulation that France Invade Spain, if neoessary* to force Philip V off the throne* Slnoe Torcy had been Instructed by the Council to make no commitments to Max Emanuel* he could only assure him that It was In his Interest to wait for a general settlement* Then* In a European congress* according to Torcy* the Wittelsbachs would be reinstated* Max Enanuel concurred* but he wanted Louis XIV to give him specific* tangible assurances* The Eleotor demanded 176 complete certainty that he would be compensated as provided by the Franco-Bavarian Treaty of April 17. 1702. At this moment of the nadir of his fortunes he no longer sought his full compensation both in South Germany and In the Spanish Netherlands as stipulated by the Franco-Bavarian Treaty of November 7i 1702. However, even then he still expected to gain an enlarged Bavaria or Its equivalent. This promise Torcy could not give. Two days later Louis XIV granted Max Emanuel an audience in which he repeated his foreign secretary's general assurances. Later, Torcy felt Max Emanuel appeared satisfied his interests would 32 not be sacrificed to end the war. As stated above, Torcy had kept open the negotiations with Heinslus through 1709. In March 1710, abbd Pollgnac and marshal d' Huxelles were instructed to accept the pre vious articles of May, 1709, with the exceptions of artic les four and thirty-seven. Louis XIV agreed at this point to provide subsidies for Allied troops to force Philip V out of Spain if the Allies demanded it, but his army would not participate. In regard to Max Emanuel, the French and Austrlans negotiated on the basis of a quid pro quo ex change of the restitution of the tflttelsbach in Cologne and Bavaria for the complete cession of Alsace to the

32 Ibid.. 1^3-146. 177 Elector of the Palatinate, Johann Wilhelm. Both Wittels- baohs would keep their titles of elector, but Max Emanuel must cede the Upper Palatinate to Johann Wilhelm and the rank of the First Elector of the Eapire during the letter's lifetime. In the negotiations In Hay-June, 1710, Louis XIV agreed to Joseph I's demand for the French cession of Alsace as the pre-requisite for the Austrlans' rellnqulsh- 33 ment of Bavaria and Cologne. But the negotiations broke down in 1710, as in the previous year, on the question of French aid in evicting Philip V from Spain. On July 25, 1710, the French envoys left Gertrudenberg and returned to Versailles• Max Emanuel's relations with Louis XIV in 1709 and 1710 offers an insight into the diplomacy of the period. He did not attempt to form a party at Versailles to work for his interests. Bather, he pressed his aims through the exchanges between Monasterol and Torcy, through his own consultations with Torcy, and through his audiences with Louis XIV. Max Emanuel found that the formal relations through his ambassador were insufficient. He sought and gained direct reassurance from Torcy and, above all, from the King.

3 3 Ibid.. 651-655* 1?8 Louis XIV tried to sustain his ally in the Franco- Austrian parleys which were a part of his negotiations with the Allies. He had even agreed to give up Alsace for the Wittelsbachs1 reinstatement in Bavaria and Cologne. This agreement did not have to be carried out. in view of the resurgence of French power from 1711 to 1714. Nonetheless. Louis XIV had offered the exchange in order to fulfill his treaty obligations to Max Emanuel. Torcy's handling of the Elector required both patience and the correct procedure. Torcy tried to maintain commun ications through Monasterol. Since there was little he could do about restoring Bavaria until the end of the war. he kept Max Bnanuel generally informed on French military and diplomatic affairs, and he assured him that France would not sacrifice him for a peace settlement. Torcy preferred to deal with Monasterol rather than the Elector. However* when Max Emanuel came to France he always went through the ritual of an interview with Torcy. followed by an audience with Louis XIV and a final conference with Torcy. Only the visit on November 12, 1709, went beyond this routine to include the Elector's formal entertainment as a head of state. Torcy could offer only general assurances and infor mation. and he refused to make concrete, specific commit- 179 ments. He had gaged the situation correctly within the > Germanics. Austria could not continue to exclude the Wlttelsbach from their position within the Empire. The Dutch and German princes would back the French on the ques- 34 tion of the Wlttelsbach restitution. Louis XIV consistently supported Max Enanuel even though his usefulness declined after 1704. Neither the Elector. Torcy. nor Louis XIV seriously considered compen sating the Wittelsbachs in the Spanish Netherlands or in 35 Italy. Max Etoanuel had never gained any significant de gree of control over the Spanish Netherlands after his re turn in 1704. First it was an occupied area, and then it became a battleground. He had no popular support in Brabant or Flanders comparable to that in Bavaria. What authority he had as governor, Bergeyck checkmated in the interests of Philip V. The primary French concern in 1709 and 1710 centered on finding territorial compensation for Philip V. Torcy bitterly reproached the Grand Alliance for refusing to leave Philip V any recompenoe. The English and Austrlans rejected Naples and Sicily as.Philip V*s remuneration for

35 ; : Ibid.. 143. 35 Rosenlehner. "Bestltutionpolitik Max Enanuel," 76. 180 3 6 leaving Spain. In view of the Allies1 Intransigance on the compensation of Philip V there was little likelihood of an area being found suitable for Max Emanuel's Indemnifi cation. The French negotiations with the Allies ended In late July, 1710. in early June, prior to the end of those talks, the Dutch contacted Max Emanuel with the proposal to neu tralize the Spanish Netherlands. Monasterol Immediately ln- 37 formed Torcy of the Dutch approach. In August the Bavarian ambassador told the latter that they had made a concrete offer. First, Max Emanuel would regain Bavaria at the end of the war with the exception of the Upper Palatinate. Second, as compensation for the latter area, the Elector would receive an equivalent territory in either Italy or the Empire. Third, Joseph Clemens would regain Cologne at the time of general settlement with the exception of certain towns reserved as Dutch barrier cities. Fourth, Max Emanuel, In return, would have to renounce his French al liance, and, with Louis XIV*s concurrence, he must neutra- 38 llze Luxemburg, Namur, Charleroi, and Nleuport. Monasterol asked Torcy for French support in the Dutch- Bavarian negotiations. Specifically Louis XIV should force

55 " Torcy, Mdmolres. 556. 37 Torcy, Journal. 201. 38 Ibid.. 236-237.

t 181 Philip V to cede at least "the four places" to Max Emanuel. The French High Council met August 3, 1710, and unanimously 39 agreed to Monasterol's request. Louis XIV then asked Philip V to grant the patent for "the four places" to Max Emanuel that fall. D'Iberville went to Spain to ask for It. In spite of their dislike of the clauses In the Franco-Bavarian treaties of 1702, the Spanish agreed that they would yield to Louis XIV1s request; however, he had to announce the cession of "the four places." 40 Philip V refused to make the grant openly. The French at this point decided to proceed cautiously on the patent. In their councils Torcy opposed relinquish ing the control of the fortress cities before a peace con ference. In the High Council session of October 22nd, Louis XIV decided he would take the patent, but he would 41 not give It to the Elector immediately. Ih January, 1711. the Butch made Max Emanuel another offer: (1 ) when he held "the four places," these would be neutralized under his troops; (2 ) the Dutoh would work for the Wittelsbach's restitution and assure their reinstatement at a peace conference; (3) the Elector would be compensated for his loss of the Upper Palatinate. Miax Emanuel accepted

39 Ibid.. 239. 40 Noailles, Mdmolres. 222, 251. 41 Torcy, Journal. 289. 182 the Dutch offer. Then he asked Louis XIV again to make 42 Philip V deliver the patent.

In January, 1711* Max Emanuel was certain he was near an agreement with the Allies. But by March his talks with the Dutch had collapsed. Philip V reluctantly had sent the patent to Louis XIV, but the latter was no longer interested in expediting the Dutch-Bavarian negotiations. By this time the Anglo-French negotiations were tinderway and appear ed to be a more promising means to end the war than the Elector's pourparlers. Although Louis XIV felt obligated to give the patent to Max Emanuel, he hoped the letter's ne gotiations would collapse. Then the King's honor would be , 43 preserved. Repeatedly Monasterol asked that Spain be forced to cede "the four places". Apparently he did not know that 44 the French held it. Torcy urged patience. The French officers, particularly Vlllars who was in command in the Flanders theater, opposed any neutralization of the Meuse and Sambre which Max Bnanuel's negotiations over Namur and Charleroi implied. The High Council decided to leave the rupture of negotiations to the Allies, while France held back the patent and did nothing to expedite a Dutch-Bavarian

7-g Ibid.. 380. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid.. 388-389. 183 agreement.**'* At the end of March* 1711» Max Emanuel became more adamant In his demands for his Immediate investiture with "the four places". The Dutch had refused to negotiate further. Torcy conveyed the High Council's position to Monasterol on April 1st that Max Emanuel should continue contacts with the Dutch; nevertheless* the Council held the campaign of 1711 would greatly alter the general military 46 situation. Max Emanuel had made a final offer to the Dutch on March 22nd through Courtois* his agent at The Hague. He agreed to give the Allies "the four places" and Join them 47 in return for his restitution in Bavaria. The Allies considered his offer. Count Slnzendorff* the Austrian envoy* Marlborough* and Helnslus conferred at The Hague. Marlborough and Slnzendorff opposed concluding the treaty* on the Elector's terms. While the former agreed to accept the restoration of Max Emanuel if he agreed to place troops in the field* the latter rejected the Elector's restitution. Austria considered this issue to be 4-8 non-negotiable.

5 3 ----- 1----:------i------:------Ibid.. 406. 46 Ibid.. 407. 413, 418. 47 Bosenlehner, "Restitutlonspolltlk Max Emanuel," 178. 48 Ibid.. 172-175• 184 The Allies agreed to give Max Emanuel the governorship of the Spanish Netherlands by a grant from Joseph I at the time of a general peace settlement. In addition, while neither one of the Wittelsbachs would be restored, Max Emanuel would become Governor of the Spanish Netherlands 49 during his life time as a vassal of the Emperor. Although these negotiations continued sporadically Into the summer of 1711, they were of little Importance. The death of Joseph I on April 17, 1711, the resur gence of French military power that year, and the beginning of the Anglo-French negotiations entirely changed the course of the war. With Charles Vi's return from Barce lona, Max Emanuel's position was Improved vls-A-vls the Hapsburgs. While Joseph I was Implacably hostile to him, Charles VI was conciliatory. The latter planned to oppose the Wittelsbachs* restitution until he became emperor; then 50 he would Improve Hapsburg-Wittelsbach relations. In view of the unsettled conditions in Germany pro duced, by the pending election of Charles VI, Max Emanuel tried to organize an attack against the Empire. An inva sion coupled with the possible conclusion of a neutrality treaty with the Duke of WtLrttemberg, he hoped, would open

j— — Ibid.. I87. 50 Charles VI to Wratlslaw, May 27, 1711, Arneth, "{Correspondence Karl VI und Wratlslaw," 158-159. 185 the way for his recovery of Bavaria. On May 28, 1711* Max Emanuel went to Marly to request Louis XZV's assistance for the Invasion. They conferred at length, and the King agreed 51 to prepare an expeditionary force. That June, many French units moved from Flanders to Alsace, but not for an offensive. Instead the French troop movements forced the Austrlans to withdraw their forces from Flanders Into Germany. With the withdrawal of Prince Eugene, the war In Flanders became a stalemate. In England the Whig government and their ally Godolphln had fallen the previous year, and, the new ministry wanted to end the war. In the Anglo-French negotiations that summer, they prepared the outlines of the Peace of Utrecht which left Spain and the Spanish Indies to Philip V and the Spanish Netherlands, Milanese, Naples, and Sicily to Charles VI. Louis XIV and Max Emanuel concluded a new treaty at Marly, July 3, 1711. They agreed to the Immediate cession of "the four places" In the Spanish Netherlands, but France would continue to occupy these fortresses. The major pro visions in that treaty were the French guarantee of the Wittelsbachs1 restitution In the Empire and Max Enanuel's

Torcy, Journal. 1*37. 186 acquisition of the entire Spanish Netherlands, except for 52 that part he would cede to France. Thus, the Elector regained actual territory and the title of the Count of Namur. On January 2, 1712, Philip V ceded the entire Spanish Netherlands to Max Emanuel. At this point it was an empty gesture, for the fate of the Spanish Netherlands rested with the Great Powers. Louis XIV protected the Wittelsbachs in the secret negotiations with the English. While Max Emanuel knew the negotiations were in progress, he did not know their exact content. Torcy's instructions to his agent, Mesnager on August 3, 1?11, provided, with respect to the Wittelsbachs, that they be restored in their lands and renumerated for all damages incurred in the Allied occupations. In addition, if Max Enanuel lost the Upper Palatinate, he was to be 53 compensated with the Spanish Netherlands and/or Sardinia. The French further confirmed the Elector's position in a memorandum signed by Torcy and Monasterol on November 18, 1711* It provided for the full restitution of Max Emanuel in all his titles and lands and the payment of an indemnity by the Allies for the Austrian occupation. Futhermore, Louis XIV agreed to help the Elector acquire the Spanish

52 Rosenlehner, "Restitutlonspolitik Max Emanuel," 196. 53 Ibid.. 211. 18? 5^ Netherlands at the peace conference. However, the King could not carry out the last pro vision. Max Emanuel and Joseph Clemens were excluded from the Congress of Utreoht by the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Decem ber 22. 1711. which debared Philip V as well as the Wittels bachs from attending until the fate of their lands was 55 decided. At Utrecht Prance agreed to give the Spanish Netherlands to Austria. But Louis XIV withheld his re cognition of Charles VI as Emperor until the latter re stored the Wittelsbachs In the Enpire. The Peace of Utrecht did not pertain specifically to the settlement between France. Austria, and the Empire. These treaties came in 171^. at Bastatt and at Baden. Marshal Villars and Prince Eugene of Savoy met at Hastatt on November 26. 1713* The French position had improved dramatically since 1711. In 1712 the French victories began at Denaln and continued until Prince Eugene's Allied Army retreated to Brussels. The Treaties of Utrecht in the spring. 1713* neutralized the Low Countries just as Italy was declared neutral territory in 1706. The fight ing shifted to the fihlne where Villars oaptured Landau and Freiburg prior to the opening of the negotiations at Rastatt. Villars1 instructions were to gain the full restitution

sir " Ibid.. 211. 212. 55 Ibid.. 215. 188 of the Wittelsbach's lands, including the Upper Palatinate, an Indemnification for the Austrian occupation, and the 56 cession of Sardinia as a kingdom. Among the Rhineland fortresses, the French wanted to keep Landau and to acquire either Phlllipsburg, Kehl, or Old Brlsach. The Austrlans would agree only to recommend the Wittelsbachs1 restoration to the Diet, and to relinquish Landau to France. Subsequent ly they were reinstated in all their lands and titles, but Louis XIV paid Max Emanuel's Indemnity.

Ottocar Weber, "Der Frlede von Rastatt 1714," Hlstorlsche Vlertels.lahrschrlft. VIII, (I8 9 2 ), 310. Conclusion

Bavaria had Its opportunity to become a major German power during the War of the Spanish Succession. Since the lands of the Spanish crown were to be divided by the dy nasties of Europe and since the Idea of the Qaplre was moribund, the stage was set for an astute leader of a German state to Increase his power. Against this backdrop Max Emanuel worked to enhance his position. The Elector's goals projected the creation of a kingdom of Bavaria that would encompass the area from Ulm to Passau and from Nttrnberg to Innsbruck. However, he did not succeed. The Immediate reasons for his failure were the Battle of Blenheim In 170*f coupled with the French defeats from 1706 to 1709. The Elector's policy of territorial aggrandizement also failed because he could not overcome the opposition of entrenched interests In South Germany. Regensburg and Augsburg, for example, with their status in the Bnplre as Imperial cities, could be assimilated Into his territories only at the cost of a major war. Any significant Bavarian territorial acquisition Involved serious consequences for the Circles of the Empire, the Diet, and the Emperor. In addition, local particularism was very strong, as evidenced

I89 190 by the Tyrolese insurrection against the Bavarian troops in 1703 and the Bavarian revolt against the Austrian occupat ion in 1705-1706. The importance of corporate bodies and local particular ism was even greater In the other areas of Wittelsbach in terest: the Rhine Palatinate, Cologne, Ll&ge, and, above all, in the Spanish Netherlands. These areas could not be consolidated or effectively governed. Max Bnanuel's acqui sition of these territories meant a struggle with the other German states and with the Great Powers. France made it clear to Max Emanuel that he could gain the sovereignty of the Spanish Netherlands only with Louis XIV1s concurrence In addition, the Dutch, Austrlans, and English, as well as the Prussians and Hanoverians had vital Interests to pro tect in the Lower Rhine and in the Spanish Netherlands. Thus, by 1700 it had become exceedingly difficult for a state, particularly a small one, to enlarge its holdings in Central or Western Europe. In the Empire, only Prussia and, perhaps, Saxony had the opportunity significantly to enlarge their territories. The territorial boundaries re mained relatively stable from 1648 to the wars of the French Revolution. Then it took the new ideology of the Revolut ion coupled with social and economic upheaval to unleash the forces that would redraw the political map of Western and Central Europe. 191 The diplomatic system* like the Internal political and social structure of the Old Regime* was rigid and limited by traditional corporate bodies* local particularism* and elaborate balances of interests of the lesser states and the Great Powers. If Max Emanuel had succeeded, he would have had to break doim this system in South Germany* in the Rhineland* and in the Low Countries. The French policy of accepting the entire Spanish Inheritance also* meant upsetting the diplomatic balances in Europe. This equilibrium between the Hapsburg and Bourbon patronage systems was the result of the legalistic proceed- ure which was used in the pursuit of dynastic claims. The emphasis placed on specific rights and the respect paid to legitimacy in the adjucation of conflicts implied usually that some accomodation needed to be reached that satisfied a number of European houses. This meant a division and subdivision of lands, titles and jurisdictions within a disputed area. For example, Max Emanuel's claims In the Spanish Netherlands at different points in time varied from the complete sovereignty, to the sovereignty over several pro vinces plus the hereditary governorship* to a hereditary governorship alone* and finally to a life-time governorship only. This flexibility of claims within a territory meant the adjudication of disputes still tended to splinter 192 existing political states and Jurisdictions. However, the Treaties of Utrecht in comparison to the Treaties of West phalia represented the first major European settlement in which compensation in another area was substituted exten sively for a division within a disputed one. In this respect the amount of lands in question and the Influence of the English and Dutch, whose claims were not based on dynastic rights, implied that legitimacy could not be the principle upon which a resolution of the issue of the Spanish Succession might be resolved. Still, in the case of the French and Bavarian docu ments there is no explicit reference to a balance of power which was the alternative principle of diplomacy to legitimacy. Implicitly the principle of legitimacy which recognized dynastic claims and inherently involved the tactic of compensation— for no legitimate prince could be excluded from a position of power commensurate with his rank— worked to produce a balance of power. This was not a balance of power among autonomous political entities operating in a system of sovereign states; instead, it was a division of patrimonies among contending dynasties. Yet, in the war Max Emanuel tried to secure the Spanish Netherlands to which he had no dy nastic claim. In this respect Bavaria, like the British 193 and Dutch, sought territories without the sanction of legitimacy. Bavaria tried, above all, to enlarge Its territories In South Germany and, secondarily, to acquire part of the Spanish Inheritance. These goals were similar to those of Prussia which were to gain the Spanish Guelderland or of Savoy which were to acquire Mantua and the Milanese. Victor Amadeus, particularly, played off Austria and France to get the most advantageous terms. Both Victor Amadeus and Max Emanuel hoped to enlarge their states, to gain a kingdom, and to acquire part of the Spanish Inheritance. France, like Austria sought a large share of the Spanish lands, although the French King, Louis XIV, was willing to settle for much less territory than any of the Emperors: Leopold I, Joseph I, or Charles VI. Unfortun- ately for France, the other European powers were amenable to the growth of Austrian holdings while they feared French acquisitions. The problem of the Spanish Inheritance had been a major threat since the death of Philip IV In 1665. The War of the Spanish Succession occurred as the result of the European leaders1 failure to resolve this Issue by 1700.J As to the problem of the origins of the war, as different iated from the question of the duration of the war, my own research suggests that if the Issue of the Spanish Succession 19^ had been purely a matter of the balance of power then the major states could have agreed on an acceptable division of the Spanish Empire, However, other interests and values came into consideration, particularly dynastic patronage and dynastic honor* The importance of these factors is seen in the Bourbon-Wittelsbach relations* In the 1690's the Bourbons shifted from opposition to acquiescence and then to the support of the Wittelsbachs• In I69I they opposed Max Emanuel's appointment as Governor of the Spanish Netherlands and Joseph ClemenB' election as Archbishop of Cologne. By the late l690's, in a complete volte face, they supported Joseph Clemens' election as the Bishop of LfLttlch and as the Bishop of Lifege. Simultan eously the Austrian Hapsburgs shifted their patronage from the Wittelsbachs to the Neuburgs in these bishopric elections. Any division of the Spanish Inheritance had to be a complicated adjudication of the demands of many clai mants to territories and offices from the rank of Hapsburg and Bourbon down Into the lesser nobility. The Importance of personal, dynastic, and state honor is born out by this study for both the making of the French and the Bavarian policy. Louis XIV for himself, the Bourbon dynasty, and France accepted the will of Carlos II. He sustained his grandson Philip of Anjou until the worst ex 195 tremities of 1709-1710. Ultimately, Louis XIV succeeded in placing Philip V on the throne of Spain and in the possess ion of the Spanish Indies. Louis XIV's policy toward the Wlttelsbachs was an exact parallel. Prior to 1704 he sent economic and military aid to Max Emanuel. In the terrible years of 1709 and 1710 Louis XIV offered to relinquish his rights in Alsace to the Neuburgs in return for the Wittels- bachs* restitution in their lands and titles, Just as he sought compensation in Naples and Sicily for Philip V in those years. Subsequently, the French military power forced Austria to restore the Wlttelsbachs, as it also sustained Philip V in Spain. Max Emanuel's reinstatement in 1714 points up the rigidity of the Old Regime. Austrian interest in the ab sorption of Bavaria, particularly under Joseph I, was opposed by the French, the United Provinces, by the states in the Empire, and by the Bavarian people. In the years 1705-1713 Austria attempted to expand westward by In corporating most of Bavaria. Since the Bavarians were loyal to the House of Wlttelsbach, the occupation proved difficult. Then in 1713 France carried the war into the Empire for the express purpose of restoring the Wlttelsbach. Austrian expansion and attention immediately shifted to > Southeast Europe following the Treaty of Rastatt in 1714. 196 One of the major questions posed by this study was whether the Franco-Bavarian Alliance was a well-conceived coalition which offered mutual benefits and pursued viable objectives. Obviously* for Bavaria the alliance was bene ficial. If Bavaria were to become an enlarged state with the rank of kingdom* France alone could provide the necessary aid for that objective. The choice for Max Qnanuel in 1700-1702 was between a French or Austrian alli ance. Leopold I refused all of his demands. Louis XIV not only agreed to back Max Emanuel's goals* but he assured him of an equivalent compensation* if Bavaria were lost* and he supplied the necessary military support. Louis XIV basically fulfilled his treaty obligations. From France's point of view the alliance with Bavaria posed grave difficulties. First* Bavaria needed to be sus tained financially and militarily. Second* France, after the Neutrality League failed* had to grant Bavaria nearly a free hand to conquer additional territory while the French garrisoned southwestern Bavaria. The French found Max Emanuel a difficult ally who pursued his own interests. Bavaria offered significant advantages that outweighed the difficulties. The Bavarian Army maintained an excellent force that was strategically located to isolate Austria and to neutralize South Germany. Above all* Bavaria represent 197 ed the best means of breaking the solidarity of the Grand Alliance. In view of the military and diplomatic problem of maintaining Bavaria's loyalty, the French diplomats proved to be very able. Only Vlllars* mission In 1?03, In retrospect, was a mistake. He wanted to attack Austria and force It out of the war. Max Emanuel forestalled Vlllars' strategy, but at the cost of undermlng almost all of the mutual trust between the French and Bavarians by the end of the 1703 campaign. The final part of the question of the viability of the Franco-Bavarian Alliance concerns the realistic possibility of the success of their goals during the war. Militarily, the Franco-Bavarian position was essentially to maintain a defensive position In the Spanish lands and in South Germany until a general peace conference. Looking back, It appears to have been a feasible strategy. Until the Battle of Blenheim the policy worked. The war was a stalemate. But as of 170*f no significant moves were undertaken by any of the powers toward serious preliminary talks. Then the ' military balance shifted. The Grand Alliance, partially because of Marlborough's Influence, kept Its adhesion by putting off resolving Its internal conflicts of Interest through pressing for a complete French military defeat. One of the major conclusions of this study Is that Marlborough and the type of military and diplomatic policy 198 he represented destroyed Max Emanuel's real opportunities to enhance greatly his position. But Marlborough was a dis ruptive figure, who, through his policies and methods, needlessly prolonged the war by seeking a virtual total victory. Ultimately Marlborough, for all his brilliant abil ities, did not basically alter the patterns of power and pat ronage In European International relations. On the other hand, for the French to gain the throne of Spain and, for Bavaria to acquire the Spanish Netherlands and become an enlarged Danubian kingdom also represented a complete disruption of both the European power system and the balance within the Empire, in this sense the Franco- Bavarian Alliance was ill-conceived, largely because their mutual aggrandizement meant the issues of the Spanish Succession could not be compromised without a long, tragic war. The French finally won a division of the Spanish In heritance, but Bavarian territorial growth had to be fore gone and the Wlttelsbach's claims in the Spanish Nether lands renounced. Cue of the major observations that emerged from this study was the importance of institutions and attitudes that originated in the medieval period which even in the early eighteenth century played a significant role in the for mulation of diplomatic policy. In addition to Max Bnanuel's concern with personal and dynastic honor referred to above, 199 he was preoccupied with hie military reputation. As stated in his manifesto in 1703* he felt the Emperor Leopold I had not rewarded him properly for his services in the wars against the Turks. Au fond he was a military commander. In fact, his contacts with the French basically came through their officers. His great hope after Blenheim was to lead a French army into the Empire and re-conquer Bavaria. In view of the emphasis he placed on dynastic honor and mili tary valor, the War of the Spanish Succession marked a fall for him from the brlllant prospects of 1698 to the position of a fugitive prince by 1709. The study also points to the greater Importance of survivals of the past than of the precursors of modernity. For example, particularism had greater influence on shap ing diplomatic policy than nationalism. This particularism was strengthened by the concepts of gaining barriers, of adding specific cities, of winning bishoprics, and of acquiring titular positions. The Wlttelsbachs are an ex ample of this in their claims to the duchies of Pflatz- Neuburg and Tyrol, and to the cities of Regensburg, Ulm, and Augsburg. In addition, they sought to retain their bishoprics in the Rhineland and, of course, Max Boanuel meant to remain the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands. Yet, the new trends were present which implied making

t 200 reason of state the basis of diplomatic policy. This meant relegating dynastic claims, dynastic honor, and particular- ist objectives to the level of promulgated Justifications of policies. Defensible frontiers, contiguous lands, and consolidated states Implied the emergence of a calculated diplomacy based primarily on power factors— military might, economic strength, and a balance of alliances. In this sense the Wlttelsbachs* defiance of the Diet and their ul timate restitution by the force of French arms meant the Imperial Diet had become a clearing house for the diplomacy between the German states. Austria dominated the Diet in the war by drawing the major territorial states Into the Grand Alliance. The Ban of the Empire invoked against Bavaria and Cologne represented the high point of Austrian predominance in the Empire since Ferdinand II*s Edict of Restitution In 1629. Since the Treaty of Rastatt in 1?14 was an act of international diplomacy which rescinded the constitutionally Imposed Ban of the Empire against the Wlttelsbachs, it meant that external agreements were of greater Importance than internal resolutions in German affairs. The War of the Spanish Succession became increasingly an Anglo-French struggle for power and less of a dynastic quarrel. The Hapsburg-Bourbon dynastic disputes, which 201 had dominated European diplomacy for two centuries* receded as the fundamental factor in international affairs. In addition, the Anglo-French struggle had important commercial and Imperial consequences in that England gained a firm foothold in the Mediterranean, South America, and Canada. The dominance of reason of state as basis of diplomatic policy implied a formalized diplomacy conducted primarily by the foreign ministers of the major states. The Franco- Bavarian relations fit this pattern, particularly on the French side. Their policy toward Bavaria originlated in the High Council and then was carried through by secretary of war Chamlllart and later Desmaretz and Voysin and the military and/or by foreign secretary Torcy and the diplo matic envoys. The basic contacts increasingly came to be through the foreign secretary and the Bavarian ambassador. Torcy tried to maintain this means of cooperation rather than a more personal diplomacy between heads of state that Max Emanuel wanted. Finally, the Franco-Bavarian Alliance had well-delineated objectives, particularly in comparison to the Grand Alliance which never reached a defined policy that collated the policies of its members. Personalities like Marlborough or Charles VI played important roles in changing the policies of the Grand Alliance in the course of the war. Max Emanuel, Torcy, and Louis XIV followed a remarkably consistent policy as outlined in the original aims of the Franco-Bavarian treaties of 1701-1702. Bibliographical Essay

The archival materials for this study came from both the Gehelmes Staatsarchiv and the Geheimes Hausarchiv in Munich. The diplomatic papers of the Bavarian ambassador* Count Monasterol, comprised an extensive correspondence from late 1700 to 1717* This is in the Staatsarchiv des ignated Korrespondenz comte de Monasterol* Kasten/Schwartz 17007ff. The correspondence Is excellent on Max Emanuel's goals in foreign policy. His three goals are explicitly stated: territorial expansion in the Empire, kingship, and the acquisition of part of the Spanish Inheritance. The older interpretation which contends that Max Enanuel sought the emperorship is not substantiated by these letters. The correspondence indicates, which may be Monasterol*s influence, a close Franco-Bavarian cooperation; however, more research is needed on this point. Monasterol's letter show that Bavaria's negotiations with the Allies were under taken with France's knowledge. Torcy's and Louis XIV*s attempts to work through Max Emanuel in the Empire prior to 170^ and to use him later as one means of approach to the Allies can be seen in Monasterol's letters, too. The Geheimes Hausarchiv has the Elector's correspon dence with Louis XIV: Korrespondenz Max Emanuels mlt Ludwig 202 203 XIV, 1688-1712 Korr-Akt Nr 753*64. These letters are formal exchanges which* as expected* emphasized their mutual esteem and support. The miscellaneous collection of papers, Max Emanuel Reglerung Politische Akten, I696-I7I5 Nr 753*65* has several diplomatic and military memorandum of import ance as well as Max Emanuel's correspondence In November* 1702, with Leopold I. A complete study of Bavarian policy would need to Include work with the papers of Baron von Malknecht and Count d'Arco In the Geheimes Hausarchiv. Max Emanuel's Involvement in the Spanish Netherlands and In the primarily military aspects of the war would be complete topics in themselves which would require work in Brussels as well as Munich. The only published source of Bavarian documents ex- plicity related to this study Is the edition of the Elector's letters to the Electress In 1?04 by Carl Hbfler, (ed.). "Habsburg und Wlttelsbach", Archly fttr ttsterreiohls- che Geschlchte. XLIII-XLIV (I871). These letters* besides illustrating the personal trauma of Blenheim for Max Emanuel, point out the continued pressure the Allied armies placed on the Franco-Bavarian troops. G. de Lamberty, (ed.). Mtfmolres pour servlr & l'hlstolre du XVIII slfeole oontenant les ndgoclatlons. tralttfs. resolutions (14 vols•; The Hague, 1724-1740), provide a few documents of interest: "De 1'manifest d*Elector Bavlfere" and the "Traitd d'llber- 1 204 shelm,". The few letters Included of Monasterol and Max Emanuel were of no significance. B. Van'T Hoff, (ed.). The Correspondence of John Churchill. First Duke of Marlborough with Anthonie Heinslus (The Hague, 1951). and G. G. Vreede, (ed.). Correspondance diplomatique et mllltalre du due de Marlborough, du Grand Penslonnalre Heinslus et du Trdsorler-Gdndral des Provinces" Unles. Jacques Hop (Amsterdam, 1850), are basic sources for the diplomacy of the Grand Alliance. These two publications plus Feldzflge des Prlnz Buaren von Savoyen (21 vols.j Vienna, I876-I88I), and Alfred Arneth, (ed.). "ElgenhSndige Korrespondence der K&nlg Karl III. von Spanien (nachmals Kaiser Karl VI) mlt dem Obersten Kanzler des Kfcnlgsreiches Bbhmen, Grafen Johann Wenzel Wratislaw," Archlv fttr Pster- relchlsche Geschlohte. XVI (I856), provide substantial documentary information on the policies of the major states in the Grand Alliance. The letters of Marlborough and Heinslus for 1704 in the Van'T Hoff collection, refer to Max Emanuel's attempt to open negotiations after Blenheim. Both Marlborough's reluctance to negotiate and his desire to defeat France can be seen in this correspondence. Vreede*s edition of their letters gives extensive infor mation on the Franco-Bavarian efforts in 1706 to begin peace negotiations. Arneth's collection shows tfratlslaw's and Charles Vi's Interest in a Hapsburg-Wlttelsbach accom- 205 odation. Their correspondence support my position that the Wlttelsbach*s restitution could not he delayed Indefinitely. Recue11 des Instructions donndes aux ambassadeurs et mlnlstres de Prance depuls les traltds de Westphalia Juscm'A Revolution francalse. VII; Bavlfere. Palatlnat. Deux-Ponts, (ed.). Andrd Lebon (Paris, '1889), is a major source on French policy. The edition of the Instructions for Bavaria by Lebon does not compare to recent volumes on other states in introductory material, bibliography, or content; however, the instructions contain the French view of Max Emanuel and his court as well as Louis XIV*s object ives in the alliance. The Recuell....Dlfete Germaniaue (ed.). B. Auerbach (Paris, 1912) contains only the brief instructions to Rousseau de Chamoy. J. J. G. Pellet and F. E. de Vault, (eds«). Mdmolres mllitalres relatlfs & la Succession d'Esnagne sous Louis XIV. extralts de la correspondence de la cour et des gdndraux. (11 vols.; Paris, I835-I862), is the major pub lished work on the French Army. These documents illustrate the significance France attached to Bavaria in 1703-170**. The volume on the 1703 campaign is less extensive on Vlllars1 correspondence with Chamlllart and Louis XIV than that in Charles Vogtld, (ed.), Vlllars d*aprfes sa corres pondence et des documents lnddlts (2 vols.; Paris, 1888). It is the best source for the campaign of 1703. Claude C. Sturgill, Marshal Vlllars and the War of the Spanish 206 Succession (Lexington, Kentucky, 1965)* is a recent work by an American on the marshal; however, It Is not a satis factory biography* See Andrew Lossky, Review of Marshal Vlllars and the War of the Spanish Succession, by Claude C. Sturgill, Journal of Modern History. XXXIX (1967), 176-179* There Is a work which was unavailable for this study on the Bavarian Army: C* Standlnger (ed*). Geschlohte des kurbayerlschen Heeres unter Kurfttrst Max II Emanuel. 1680- 1726. (2 vols.; Munich, 1904-1905)* However, the Monasterol correspondence has extensive information on military affairs both In Bavaria and in the rest of Europe. Duo de Vlllars, Mdmolres. (ed.). M. Anquetll, (org. publ. 1784, Nouvelle collection des mdmoires relatlfs & l'hlstolre de Prance. Paris, 1881), covers Vlllars* mission to Munich in the l680*s. Marquis de Torcy, Mdmolres pour servlr k l*hlstolre des ndgoclatlons. depuls le traltd de Rlswlck .lusau'ft. la oalx d*Utrecht, (ed.). Edouard Monnais, (org. publ., 1754, Nouvelle collection des Mdmolres relatlfs A l'hlstolre de Prance. Paris, 1854), Is a Justification of 'French policy toward the problem of the Spanish Succession from the point of view of the foreign secretary* I have accepted Torcy's position, which was written with hindsight, that French goals were limited and were guided by the desire to preserve the peace; however, when this became less probable, Louis XIV aocepted the 207 total Inheritance as the means of minimizing his isolation in case of a war. His Mtfmolres also has an extensive pre sentation of the negotiations with the Dutch after 1708 and with the English in 1711. Frdddric Masson, (ed.). Journal lnddlt de Jean-Baptlste Colbert, marquis de Torcy. mlnlstre et secretaire d'fttat des a affaires dtrangftres pendant les anndes 1709. 1710 et 1711 (Paris. 1884), is a major source for French policy after 1709* The Journal indicates the consistency with which Torcy, Louis XIV, and the French High Council sustained the Wlttelsbach position. Berwick, M6molres. (ed.). L. J. Hooke, (Collection des mtfmolres relatlfs & l^istolre de France, Paris, 1828) and due de Noallles. 'Mdmolres, (ed.). abb£ Mlllot. (Nouvelle collection des mtfmolres relatlfs A l^lstolre de France depuls la XIII sldole .lusgu'A la ^ln du XVIII sldole, Paris, 1854), are of greater Importance for Franco-Spanish relations. Sioco van Goslinga, Mdmolres relatlfs ft la guerre de suc cession de 1706-1709 et 1711. (eds.), U. A. Evertsz and G. H. M. Delprat. (Leeuwarden, 1857)• touches briefly on the negotiations of 1?06. Henri comte de Mdrode Westerloo, Mdmolres du Feld-Mardohal oomte de Mdrode-Westerloo (2 vols.; Brussells, 1840), is one of the most interesting mlmolres of thet era. Among the general histories of Bavaria, Sigmund Blezler, Gesohlohte Bayerns (8 vols.t Gotha, 1878-1914), VII, is the most thorough treatment of Bavarian policies 208 through 1704. Rlezler considered Max Emanuel from the point of view of a nineteenth century German nationalist* To Rlezler the Franco-Bavarian Alliance appeared to be personal, that is, it was formed to serve Max Emanuel's visions of grandeur* This work is an essential source of information on Bavarian affairs* Michael Doeberl, Entwlcklungensgeschlchte Bayern (2 vols.j Munich, 1928), is of more value for the reigns of Maximillian and Ferdinand Maria than for Max Emanuel* However, Doeberl has treated Max Emanuel within the context of his own era* A Dttrrwbchter, "Zeitalter Bayern unter Ferdinand Maria und Max Emanuel," Hlstorlsohes Jahrbuch. XXXV (191*0, is a historiographical essay on Bavarian historians. Karl Heigel, Quellen und Abhandlungen zur neueren Geschlchte Bayerns (2 vols.; Munich, 188*J— 1890), is a collection of Heigel1s articles that concern the Wlttelsbach family* Heigel did original research in the areas of the Wittels- bach's marriage alliance and the Bavarian insurrection of 1705-1706. The Bavarian historians Georg Freuss and August Hosen- lehner, who will be considered below, have written out standing articles on Wlttelsbach foreign policy. Preuss concentrated on Max Snanuel's relations to William III* I have relied upon Freuss* article on Joseph Clemens in 209 Cologne: "Kurfttrst Joseph Klemens von KSln," Forschungen Gesohlohte Bayerns. XI (1903)* Preuss also has written a short article on Max Emanuel as the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands: "Verfassunggeschichte des spanischen Nieder- lande unter dem KurfUrsten-Staathalter Max Emanuel von Bayern," Forschungen zur Geschiohte Bayerns. VIII (1900). Preuss' article "Wilhelm III. Bayern und die Grosse Allianz 1701," Hlstorlsche Zeltsohrlft. XCIII (190*0, is the best study on the negotiations In 1701 between William III and Max Emanuel. The Wlttelsbachs in the Rhineland and in the Low Countries is a topic of itself that would illuminate the French-Austrlan-Dutch struggles into which Bavaria, Prussia, and Hanover were drawn over the bishoprics, the Rhine Palatinate, and the territories of Mark, Burg, Jules, and Cleves. Louis P. Gachard, Hlstolre de la Belgique au commencement du XVIII sldcle (The Hague, 1880), is the standard work on the Spanish Netherlands in this period. Of the French historians Ars&ne Legrelle's classic. La diplomatic francalse et la Succession d'Espagne (4- vols,; Gand, 1888-1892) IV. la solution. 1?00-1725. (1892), was essential on Louis XIV1s acceptance of the Spanish in heritance and on his creation of an alliance system. The chapter "La contre-coalitlon de Louis XIV," is a fundamen tal work on French diplomacy in the Empire, particularly in the formation of the Neutrality League. 210 The French historian Vlctor-L. Tapid In "La politique exterieure de Louis XIV," Clio: le XVII Bidole, (eds.). E. PrSclin and Vlctor-L* TapId (Paris, 1949), emphasized the predominance of Louis XIV*s concern with la glolre In his conduct of foreign affairs. Gaston Zeller, De Louis XIV & 1789. part 11, Vol. Ill, (ed.)« P. Renouvln (Hlstolre des relations Internationales. Paris, 1955)# and Louis Andrd. Louis XIV et l'Europe (Paris, 1950), have moderated the connotation of arrogance attached to the concept of la glolre as used by Pleavet. They emphasized that this personal and dynastic sense of honor was tempered by the King's consideration for proper procedure and moderate action. In addition Andrd and Zeller see a broad basis of determiningjoollcy, particularly the careful calculation of the military implications of policy. Ernest Lavlsse, Louis XIV. la fin du rdgne. 1685- 1715. Vol. IV, (ed.). Ernest Lavlsse, (Hlstolre de France. Paris, 193D. and John Wolf, Louis XIV (New York, 1968), provide essential background Information for the French government and court. Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough, his Life and Times (4 vols.; London, 1933)# and G. M. Trevelyan, England under Queen Anne (3 vols.; London, 1931-1934), are the best treatments of the diplomatic and the military aspects of the War of the Spanish Succession In English. Both are well written studies that concentrate primarily on England's 211 role within the Grand Alliance. I have relied on Churchill's narrations of the military campaigns, his maps, and his chapter, "The Structure of the War," for those aspects of this paper that are specifically military. Although in the 170*t campaign, Trevelyan more accurately emphasized the brutality of Marlborough's tactics than Churchill. Unfortunately Churchill's adulatory portrayal of Marlborough not only distorted his treatment of the Duke, but it has made his evaluation of other major personages superficial. The lack of proportion in his treatment of the major Allied leaders and the abscence of critical appraisal of their abilities and policies, as well as those of Marlborough, detract from the value of his work. In contrast Trevelyan's treatment of the era is both critical and analytical. While Churchill approved of English policies, Trevelyan disliked the unlimited goals of their diplomacy after 1703* G. N. Clark, The later Stuarts. 1660-171*1-, (ed.). G. N. Clark (Oxford History of England, Oxford, 193*0, is a thorough political study that provides the background for English Internal affairs. Clark's, "War Trade and Trade War," Economic History Review. I (1927-1928), emphasizes the importance of economic factors in the war. The works of Mark A. Thomson, "Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession," Royal Historical Society 212 Transact Ions. 5th series* IV (195*0* and "Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance* 1705-1710," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research. XXXIV (1961), offer additional insight into the difficulties Involved In compromising the Issues raised by the Spanish Succession between France and the Maritime Powers. These two articles plus others of Thomson's and recent contributions by scholars for the period, 1680-1720, are in Bagnhild Hatton and J. S. Bromley, (eds.). William III and Louis XIV. Essays br and for Mark A. Thomson (Liverpool, 1968). Arthur Parnell, The War of the Succession In Spain during the Reign of Queen Anne. 1702-1711 (London, 1888); Carl Noorden, "Lie preussisohe Polltlk im spanlschen Erbfolgekriege," Hlstorlsche Zeltschrlft. XVIII (1867); Alfred Arneth, Das Leben der kalserllchen Feldmarschalls Grafen Guldlo Starhemberg. 1697-1737 (Vienna, 1853); and Oswald Redllch, Weltmaoht des Barook. Psterrelch In der Zelt Kaiser Leopolds I (Vienna, 1961), are works that cover the diplomacy of the major powers and that offer a balanced appraisal of the meaning of the war in the development of the European state system. William Coxe, History of the House of Austria (3 vols.; *tth ed.; London, 1853)* is an old general treatment of the period. Qnno Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart (l*f vols.; 1875-1888), is still a rela tively thorough study of the politics and diplomacy of the 213 War of the Spanish Succession. Mai Braubach more than any other historian, has con tributed to our knowledge of the Bnplre and Austria In this period. His latest work. Prlnz Bugen von Savoyen; elne Blographle (*+ vols.; Munich. 1963-1965). Is the best bio graphy of Eugen of Savoy and the most complete study of Austrian policy. Braubach*s study on the subsidies. Ole Bedeutung der Subsidies fttr Polltlk lm spanlsohen Erbfolge- krleges. Vol. XXIX (Bttcherel der Kultur und Geschlohte. Bonn. I923 )t Is the only work on this Important aspect of the alliances. He pointed out that the lesser states were not bought, but they used the subsidies for purposes of their own polloy. depending on each's diplomatic astuteness. Although Braubach does not emphasize It. the size of the Frenoh subsidy to Bavaria and the real strength of the Bavarian Army— three times that of Johann Wilhelm's of the Bhlne Palatinate and approximately equal to that of Leopold X's of Austria— needs to be pointed out. Finally. I have relied on Braubach for Max Snanuel's diplomacy in 1702. "Die Polltlk des KurfQrsten Max Emanuel von Bayern lm; Jahre 1702," Historlaches Jahrbuoh. XLIII (1923). Preuss' artlole mentioned above, this one of Braubach*s and the extensive articles of August fiosenlehner: "Zur Hestltutlonspolitik KurfUrst Max Emanuels von Bayern." 21** Forschungen zur Geschlchte Bayerns. X-XI (1901-1903)* and "Die SteHung der Kurfttrsten Max Emanuels von Bayern und Joseph KLemens von KBln zur Kaiserwahl Karls VI* 1711,w Hlstorlsohe Abhandlungen. XIII (1900), are all excellent diplomatic studies. These articles provide the best Intro duction to Bavarian diplomacy in the period* There are a number of articles in the German Journals* particularly* that pertain to Max Emanuel and Louis XIV during the war. Those of Bosenlehner* Braubach* and Preuss were essential to this paper as mentioned above. Arnold Berney, "Der Heichstag zu Regensburg, 1702-1?04-," Hlstor- Ische Vlertel.lahresschrlft. XXIV (192*0, Is a study con cerned with the processes and disputes, particularly the Catholic-Protestant conflicts, of the Diet. He considers the Diet of significance as a clearing house of the diplomacy of the German states. This article is an intro duction to Bavarian relations with the other states in the Empire. G. A. Sttss, "Geschlchte des oberrheinischen Krelses und der Krelsassozlatlonen in der Zelt des spanischen i Erbfolgekrieges, 1697-171*** n Zeltschrlft fttr Geschlchte des Oberrhelns. CIII (1955)* is a similar study for the internal relationships within the Empire. Sttss concentrates on the Imperial circles and their attempt to become significant constitutional and military bodies of the Empire. These are three studies of Johann Wilhelm of Pfaltz- 215 Neuburg: Arthur Kleinschmidt, "Bayern, Pfalz und Sardlnien von 1700 bis 1800," Forschungen zur Geschlchte Bayerns. VIII (1900); Adolf Hllsenbeck, "Johann Wilhelm, Kurfttrst von der Pfalz, von fiyswlcker Frleden bis zum spanlschen Erbfolge- krlege, 1698-1701," Forschungen zur Geschlchte Bayerns. XIII (1905); and G. W. Sante "Die Kurpf&lzische Polltlk des Kurfttrsten Johann Wilhelm vornehmllch lm spanlschen Erbfol- gekrlege, I690-I716," Hlstorlsches Jahrbuch. XLIV (1924), Hllsenbeck*s articles show the rapid rise of the Neuburg's Influence which led to the eclipse of the Wlttelsbach*s at Vienna, Sante's article contains the letters of instruct ion to the Rhine Palatinate envoy at Utrecht on Johann Wilhelm's various alternatives, If he were forced to re scind the Upper Palatinate. Finally, Ottokar Weber, who has also written on Utrecht, wrote a short article on the Treaty of Rastatt: . "Der Frlede von Rastatt 171**," Deutsche Zeltschrlft fPr Geschlchtswlssenschaft. VIII (I892), 273-310. This is the only study that deals with this subject; however, it concentrates on the Austrian position and the various factions within Charles VI's court. Bibliography Archival Material Bayerlaches Hauptstaatsarchiv Geheimes Hausarchiv, Korrespondenz Max Emanuels mlt Ludwig XIV, 1688-1712. Korr.-Akt. Nr. 753.6**. Bayerlsches Hauptstaatsarchiv Geheimes Hausarchiv. Max Emanuel Regierung Politlsche Akten, 1696-1715* Nr. 753.65* Bayerlsches Hauptstaatsarchiv Geheimes Staatsarchiv. Korrespondenz comte de Monasterol, 1700-1717. Hasten/ Schwartz 17007ff. Published Documents Arneth, Alfred von. (ed.). "ElgenhSndlge Korrespondence der KSnlgs Karl III. von Spanien (nachmals Kaiser Karl VI) mlt dem Obersten Kanzler des KRnlgsreiches Bbhmen, Grafen Johann Wenzel Wratislaw," Archlv fttr Dsterrelch- lsche Geschlchte. XVI (I856), 3-231*. Berwick, Marshal de. Mdmolres. (ed.). L. J. Hooke. Collection des m&nolres"relatlfs & l*hlstolre de Prance. Paris: Foucault, 1&28. ■ Feldzttge des Prinzen Eugen yon Savoyen nach den Feldakten und anderen authentlschen Quellen. 21 vols. Wien; Krlegesarchlv, 1876-1881. Gosllnga, Sicco van. Mtfmoires relatlfs & la guerre de succession de 1706-1709 et 1711. teds.). U. A. Evertsz and G. H. M. Delprat. Leeuwarden: Suringar, 1857* Grimblot, Paul. (ed.). 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