COMING HOME TO ROOST: TACTICS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AGAINST FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC THREATS, 1964-1974

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COMING HOME TO ROOST

TACTICS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

AGAINT FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC THREAT, 1964-1974

By

Derrick Ian Goodrich

A Thesis Submitted to The Honors College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Bachelor’s degree With Honors in

Political Science

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

MAY 2008

Thesis Advisor Dr. Wendy Theodore Africana Studies Program

1 Currently, major reforms are being instituted in how the United States intelligence community operates and agencies interact with one another. The historic separations of authority bestowed upon two of the primary agencies of U.S. intelligence, the CIA and FBI, are now being removed by government officials citing their harmful constraints on the mission to protect the country. Once separated the spheres of international and domestic operations are now being blurred. This paper analyzes the dangers posed by these new reforms and the ability for the harsh practices employed abroad by the CIA with finding their duplication being used domestically by the FBI. Illustrate this point, the paper will present an earlier example of the occurrence of when this did take place in U.S. intelligence operations by presenting, through comparative analysis, two case studies transpiring between 1964-1974; CIA covert operations in Chile between 1964 and 1974 focusing on the candidacy and eventual presidential administration of Salvador Allende and his political party Unidad Popular; and the FBI’s operations to quell Black Nationalist sentiment inside the United States within this same time period, in particular, activities aimed at the Black Panther Party,

The United State’s National Security Act of 1947 demarcated international and domestic intelligence operations into two distinct spheres and assigned agencies to oversee those operations. 1 In the international sphere the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sits as the primary actor with a relative free hand to accomplish its missions abroad. Domestically the task of internal intelligence is that of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) which operates under stricter guidelines in its domestic operations. Under the original intentions of the 1947 Act there was to be a clear separation between the two spheres, as the Act states the CIA “shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.” 2 This grounding principle of two, distinct spheres has undergone changes over the years but it has generally remained intact. However, following the attacks of September

11, 2001 government officials and scholars have published works calling for fundamental

1 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 496 (1947). 2 Ibid.; Theoharis, Athan, Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p 5; Mike McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 52; Amanda Anderson, LTC U.S. Army, “What Role for DOD Intelligence in Support of the Homeland Security Mission?” USAWC Strategy Research Project (2005): 3.

2 reform and the integration of these two spheres with joint efforts on the part of the CIA and FBI so as to better fight the new War on Terrorism. 3

This thesis will argue that the integration of the two spheres that is now being instituted by the U.S. intelligence community and backed by scholars in the field will greatly enhance the opportunities for interflow to transpire between the two spheres and, thereby, the institution of aggressive practices that violate the civil liberties of U.S. citizens. 4 Interflow, as it will be used in this paper, describes the phenomenon by which practices and methods employed solely in the international sphere of intelligence operations percolate into the domestic sphere creating the dangerous conditions the 1947

Act sought to prevent from occurring. The thesis will present an earlier example of the occurrence of interflow in U.S. intelligence operations by presenting, through comparative analysis, two case studies transpiring between 1964-1974; CIA covert operations in Chile between 1964 and 1974 focusing on the candidacy and eventual presidential administration of Salvador Allende and his political party Unidad Popular ; and the FBI’s operations to quell Black Nationalist sentiment inside the United States within this same time period, in particular, activities aimed at the Black Panther Party (BPP).

This thesis will examine and compare the methods used by both the CIA and FBI during their respective operations. The methods, for analytical purposes, have been broken down into four main factors and will serve as the framework for the comparative analysis:

3 For examples, see Raymond Wannall, “Undermining Counterintelligence Capability,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15 (2002): 321-329; Deborah Barger, “It is Time to Transform, Not Reform, U.S. Intelligence,” SAIS Review 24 (2004): 23-31: Mike McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 49-58. Todd Masse, “Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States,” Congressional Research Service (2003). The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Report: The Complete Investigation, New York Times edition (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2004). 4 Interflow is terminology used in hydrology describing the lateral movement of water between the soil water above ground and the groundwater below the vadose zone.

3 molding public perceptions, finding conduits, economic constriction, and use of violence.

The CIA and FBI attempts at molding public perceptions entails propaganda campaigns to strip their targets of popular support and to radicalize the targets’ opposition. Finding conduits pertains to the powerful allies that the agencies attempt to incorporate into their overall mission in order to achieve mission objectives. Economic constriction covers both agencies’ endeavors to disrupt and cutoff the designated target’s financial resources. The fourth factor is the use of violence which concerns CIA and FBI efforts to forcibly remove

(i.e. kidnapping) or intentionally cause physical harm to members associated with the targeted groups or individuals viewed as blocking the mission.

In order to facilitate the discussion, the thesis is divided into five sections. The first section is a review of the literature that has been done that discusses the covert operations of the CIA and FBI and the separation between international and domestic spheres.

Section two provides the historical context for each of the cases in order to detail the factors leading to the emergence of Allende and the BPP. The third section takes each of the four methods and compares how they were applied in each case: CIA involvement in

Chilean politics between 1964 and 1974; and FBI involvement in domestic Black

Nationalist politics inside the same time frame. Each of the four factors are examined in turn across both cases. The last section briefly recounts the parallels between the CIA and

FBI during this period and offers a future analytical framework for potential use in the study of other cases involving CIA or FBI covert operations.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The scholarly literature on the subject of U.S. intelligence and the concept of international and domestic spheres can be divided, for the most part, between pre-9/11

4 literature and post-9/11 literature in how most authors approach the subject. Scholarship dating before the momentous events of September 11 th differs amongst each other towards agreeing on the proper roles of the FBI and CIA in the security of the country, but prevailing through each is a consistent devotion to spending significant time illustrating the past historic abuses committed by the CIA and FBI that went beyond their legal authority.5

The acknowledgement of an abusive past on the part of the intelligence community acts to ground the policy recommendations offered by these authors from investing too much power with the intelligence community. Following the events of 9/11 sufficient attention on the abuses of the past appears to be lacking in much of the work offered by officials and scholars in the field of intelligence. 6 In the wake of 9/11, some authors have announced the need for a total break from past guidelines that act to constrain intelligence operations such as Lieutenant Colonel Amanda Anderson, whose study for the Pentagon’s Strategy

Research Project asserts simply, “In times of war, government grows and liberty yields.” 7

There are notable exceptions such as author Loch Johnson where, in his 2004 article, he offers a detailed account of intelligence abuses which were revealed as a result of the

5 For example, see Richard Morgan, Domestic Intelligence: Monitoring Dissent in America (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1980), specifically chapter three, “The FBI in Cold War and Social Turbulence,”37-59, and chapter four, “Other Domestic Intelligence Operations,” 60-88, and chapter seven, “The Dangers and the Needs: Weights in the Balance,” 126-143; John T. Elliff, The Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), specifically chapter two, “The Policy Debate,” 14-30; Athan Theoharis, Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), passim; Mark Riebling, Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1994), specifically chapter sixteen, “Blowback,” 315-342; Loch Johnson, “On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations,” “On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations.” American Journal of International Law 86 (1992): 284-309, and Kenneth O’Reilly, Hoover and the Un-Americans: the FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983). 6 For example, see Raymond Wannall, “Undermining Counterintelligence Capability,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15 (2002): 321-329; Deborah Barger, “It is Time to Transform, Not Reform, U.S. Intelligence,” SAIS Review 24 (2004): 23-31: Mike McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 49-58; Amanda Anderson, LTC U.S. Army, “What Role for DOD Intelligence in Support of the Homeland Security Mission?” USAWC Strategy Research Project (2005): 1-18. 7 Anderson, “What Role for DOD…,” 1. Also see McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence,” 49-58.

5 Congressional investigations. 8 However, on the whole much of academia and government officials support the current aim of U.S. intelligence to integrate all its agencies including the CIA and FBI to form, what they consider to be, a more effective defense against terrorism.

However, missing from the works of these more contemporary authors and even those that preceded them is the use of a comparative analysis between the actions of the

FBI and CIA that explores the potential for interflow. Thus, a comparative analysis between these two intelligence agencies is warranted for several important reasons. First, it contributes to the wealth of scholarship that has been done in the area of U.S. intelligence by presenting a documented case illustrating the tremendous pitfalls associated with integrating the international and domestic spheres of intelligence operations. Secondly, by offering a comparative analysis on these two cases, an overall framework of covert operations can emerge from which other cases involving hostile U.S. covert actions may be analyzed. Third, the research can also illustrate how the occurrence of interflow is further heightened when the “enemy” the government is targeting is not defined by borders or flags but by an abstract concept like ideology.

In the years 1964-1974, two of the many threats the United States government concerned itself with were the socialist leader of Chile, Salvador Allende, and the leading group of the Black Nationalist movement by the mid-1960s, the Black Panther Party. The key factors playing a role in the emergence of these groups is profound and it would require the work that is beyond the scope of this paper to truly bring to light the historic roots of these movements. Focusing on pertinent background to this analysis, the following

8 Loch Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies: The Experience and Legacy of the Church Committee,” Public Administration Review 64 (2004): 3-14.

6 section will provide a brief historical background on the rise of each group in order to demonstrate the significant challenge they presented to officials in the U.S. capital.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

This section examines the background to the rise of Salvador Allende in Chile between 1959 and 1964, and the leading influences on the founding members of the Black

Panther Party in the United States. In Chile, the political climate was changing as the poor and working class continued to be economically disenfranchised despite a closer economic relationship with the Untied States and the viability of the political left of the country led by Salvador Allende increased substantially. In the United States, legislative progress such as the Civil Rights Act failed to bring substantial change to African American communities and many Black youths found an appealing philosophy of self-empowerment with the messages of Black leaders such as Malcolm X. Amidst the enduring legacy of Malcolm X, following his death in 1964, and the riots of the mid-1960s and early 1970s, the BPP emerged in Oakland in 1966.

American Interests in Chile & the Rise of Allende

The 1959 Cuban revolution reinvigorated the United States’ anti-communist policy objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean. With the threat of communism being exported by Fidel Castro following 1959, the U.S. executed a massive plan in an attempt to counter communism’s possible advance in making a foothold beyond the shores of Cuba. 9

Under the Kennedy Administration (1961-1963), the “Alliance for Progress” was created with a twofold purpose; to counter the attempts by Castro to spread revolutionary ideology to Latin America and to economically link U.S. business with Latin markets gaining

9 Alistair Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile: Allende’s South America (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), 24-25.

7 economic profit and political leverage in the process. 10 Towards those ends, the U.S. government pledged a total of $20 billion to reform-minded Latin American countries over the next ten years beginning in March 1961. 11

Chile because of its political stability and pro-American policies became the focal point of Alliance for Progress assistance. It received over $1 billion in U.S. aid from 1962-

1969, more per capita than any other Latin American nation. 12 As the Senate committee in

1975, referred to as the Church Committee, investigating CIA activities in Chile concluded,

“Of all the countries in the hemisphere, Chile became the showcase of the new Alliance for

Progress.” 13 Working with Chile’s pro-American parties, such as the Liberal and

Conservative Parties (later merging to form the Partido Nacional [National Party – NP] in

1966) and the Partido Democrata Cristiána (Christian Democratic Party – PDC), the U.S. sought to advance its agenda to counter Castro. 14

Despite American attempts to showcase Chile as the positive alternative to Castro’s call for Marxist revolution, the growing leftist trend in Chilean politics that began in the

1950s persisted and threatened to undermine U.S. efforts. One reason for the growing

10 Ibid.; Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), 64. By the end of 1968, U.S. foreign investment in Latin America made up twenty percent of U.S. foreign investment as a whole. 11 Horne, Small Earthquake in Chile , 25. This aid package compares with the $12.7 billion spent during the Marshall Plan following World War II. The economic aid was stipulated upon Latin American governments instituting political and economic reforms wanted in Washington. 12 U.S. Senate. The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , 94 th Cong, 1 st sess., 18 December 1975, 151; hereafter referred to as Covert Action in Chile . 13 Covert Action in Chile, 151. The Committee was led by Idaho Democrat Frank Church. The rationale for the formation of this committee stemmed from media reports of alleged abuses by the nation’s intelligence agencies in the early 1970s as well as a break-in into an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania in 1971 by an activist group calling themselves the Citizens’ Commission who left away with over 1,000 classified FBI documents. The group, subsequently, leaked these documents to news outlets around the country. These revealing documents, coupled with the Watergate Scandal of 1972, triggered enough public demand for the Senate to form the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The multiple internal reviews of government actions that were to follow are still considered the most in-depth and exhaustive inquiries taken by a U.S. Congress on the subject of U.S. intelligence activities. 14 The PDC was established in 1957 as a more left-center party to the Liberal and Conservative Parties which later merged in 1966 to form the conservative National Party.

8 trend was the failure of successive Chilean administrations backing closer relations with

U.S. business, President Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez (1958-1964) and President Eduardo

Frei Montalva (1964-1970), to improve the lives of average Chileans.15 Studies conducted in

1968 showed that two percent of the Chilean population took in forty-six percent of the national income while the bottom twenty-eight percent received only five percent. 16 Adding to the wealth disparity was the fact that despite large increases in foreign investment by the

United States and increased production in the economy, especially in regards to copper production, real wages in the country fell steadily throughout the implementation of the

“Alliance for Progress.” 17 This growing frustration among the populace led to the growing influence and political viability among Chile’s more-left-wing parties. 18

The two most prominent left-wing parties were the Partido Communista de Chile

(Communist Party of Chile – PCCh) and the Partido Socialista de Chile (Socialist Party of

Chile – SP). Founded in 1922, the PCCh played a leading role in Chile’s workers’ union development and established itself as a pivotal player in Chilean politics before being outlawed in 1948 and, following its re-legalization in 1958, retaking efforts to gain back political prominence. 19 Adhering to what the CIA reported as “ via pacifica ,” the PCCh sought a nonviolent Marxist revolution through the election ballot and a gradual economic

15 Prior to the 1970 election, Chile had been governed by two, pro-American business presidential administrations; President Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez (1958-1964), an independent backed by the old established Conservative and Liberal Parties of Chile and President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970) of the PDC. Also important to note concerning Chilean election rules at the time, the presidential term in Chile was six years but it could not be held for two consecutive terms though the office holder could run again in the following election six years later. 16 Hersh, Price of Power , 259. 17 Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 21. 18 James Petras and Morris Morley, United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 8; Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 21. 19 Haslam, Nixon Administration… , 7; Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 246.

9 transformation from capitalism to socialism. 20 The other dominant leftist party, SP, was founded in 1933 with the help of Salvador Allende Gossen. Allende was a medical school graduate born into a wealthy, political family in 1908. 21 He attained a position of leadership in the party and the Chilean Congress winning a Senate seat in 1945 and becoming the vice president of the Chilean Senate in 1951. 22 In 1956, Allende and the Socialist Party were able to form an uneasy coalition with the PCCh and other leftist groups to establish the

Frente de Acción Popular (Popular Revolutionary Action Front, FRAP) to further their ability to institute their common platforms of land reform, nationalization of major industry, a shift from a pro-U.S. foreign policy alignment, and redistribution of income. 23

Allende ran for the presidency in 1958 as the head of the coalition and came within three percent of beating opposing presidential candidate, Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964), eventually losing in the Congressional run-off vote. 24

Following his powerful performance in the 1958 elections and the Marxist revolution in Cuba just one year later, Allende and his future pursuits of the Chilean presidency in the eyes of those in Washington became synonymous with Castro’s call for revolution throughout all of Latin America and the Caribbean. As a result, he and his political coalitions became the primary target of the agency tasked by the U.S. government with undermining the chances of Allende to show a similar performance in the upcoming election so 1964.

20 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. “A Survey of Communism in Latin America.” Published 11/1/1965, Released 1/18/2006. Case Number F-2004-00826, 67. 21 Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 27. 22 Ibid. 23 Hersh, Price of Power , 259. The Socialist and the PCCh competed with each other for constituents and their relationship was less than friendly as a result of this and other factors. 24 Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 23. In Chilean politics at the time, the Congress cast the deciding vote for president when no one candidate received a majority of the vote.

10 The rising voices of Chile’s disenfranchised were also being echoed inside the United

States as well. The ideology of Black Nationalism within the African American community was resurging in the 1950s, and, by the arrival of the Black Panther Party in 1966, was offering a very different path to attain racial equality in the United States than the nonviolent approach taken by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and others within the Civil

Rights Movement. Fearing its continued rise among radical Black youth, the FBI observed this development with fear and apprehension in much the same light as CIA and its fears concerning Allende subsequent run in the 1964 elections.

Origins of the Black Panther Party

There are many factors that are required to be discussed in order to come to grasp the reasons for the emergence of the Black Power movement of the 1960s and groups such as the BPP. The scope of this paper does not sufficiently delve into all these crucial factors, but, instead, primarily focuses on the main influences of thought that came to bear a tremendous impact on the founding members of the Black Panther Party, Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale. This section will discuss the role the ideology of Black Nationalism played in the origins of the BPP and two historic figures of the Black community that held profound influence over Newton and Seale, Robert F. Williams and Malcolm X.

Popular historical accounts suggest that in the 1950s and early 1960s the Civil

Rights Movement was led by leaders who advocated a nonviolent and integrationist philosophy towards attainting civil rights, and that the militant “Black Power Movement” coming in the 1960s was a historical anomaly without roots in the African American community. 25 However, armed resistance is a frequent theme in African American history.

25 Timothy Tyson, “Robert F. Williams, ‘Black Power,’ and the Roots of the African American Freedom Struggle,” The Journal of American History 85 (1998): 541-542.

11 So too is the ideology in the 1950s that advocated armed defense, Black Nationalism, which stretches back to the Revolutionary War and played a critical role in the Civil Rights

Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. 26 Though Black Nationalism has gone through radical changes, its founding principles revolve around overcoming White oppression by means of achieving Black autonomy in order to foster separate political and economic development for Black society. 27

This philosophy of Black Nationalism experienced a resurgence in the mid-1960s among young African American radicals as the literature and speeches of powerful Black figures advocating the philosophy of Black Nationalism, such as Robert F. Williams and

Malcolm X, competed with the nonviolent doctrines of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and other like-minded leaders within the Black community as to how best to achieve racial equality. 28 The ideology of Black Nationalism along with both Robert Williams and

Malcolm X profoundly influenced the founding members of the Black Panther Party

(BPP), Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale. 29

Williams’s powerful call of armed self-defense as chapter president of the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in Monroe, North Carolina from 1956 to 1959 had an enduring effect on the BPP. He debated Dr. King over the merits of armed self-defense at the 1959 NAACP Convention arguing that, “Nonviolence is a very

26 Ibid., passim; Wilson Moses, ed. Classical Black Nationalism: from the American Revolution to Marcus Garvey (New York: New York University Press, 1996). Classical Black Nationalist thinkers include Martin Delaney (largely regarded as the father of Black Nationalism), Lewis Woodson, Henry Turner, Henry Garnett, and Edward Blyden. 27 Dean Robinson, Black Nationalism in American Politics and Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2-6. 28 David Hillard, Keith and Kent Zimmerman, Huey: Spirit of the Panther (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2006), 27; Frederick Harper, “The Influence of Malcolm X on Black Militancy,” Journal of Black Studies 1 (1971): 387-402. 29 Judson Jefferies, Huey P. Newton: The Radical Theorist (Jackson, MI: University of Mississippi Press, 2002), 16; Noam Chomsky, “Domestic Terrorism: Notes on the State System of Oppression,” New Political Science 21 (1999): 313; David Hillard, Keith and Kent Zimmerman, Huey: Spirit of the Panther , 29; Tyson, “Robert F. Williams…,” 565.

12 potent weapon when the opponent is civilized, but nonviolence is no repellent for a sadist.” 30 Sought by the FBI on trumped-up charges of kidnapping in 1961, Williams fled the United States and set up the radio broadcast “Radio Free Dixie” in Cuba and continued his message of armed self-defense until 1964 when his ideological differences with Cuban and Soviet communists led to his departure from the island. 31 Williams’s published book while in Cuba, Negroes with Guns , is a powerful literary work and one that profoundly influenced Newton and Seale to incorporate the exercise of the 2 nd Amendment as part of their new party’s doctrine. 32

Malcolm X was the leading spokesman for Black Nationalism from the 1950s until his assassination in 1964, and embodied the most militant voice among fellow Black leaders in his calls for racial justice. 33 In his “The Ballot or the Bullet” speech in 1964 he asserted,

“Any time you know you're within the law, within your legal rights, within your moral rights, in accord with justice, then die for what you believe in. But don't die alone. Let your dying be reciprocal. This is what is meant by equality.” 34 Malcolm X criticized Dr. King’s message of social integration as a means of addressing inequality. As long as the severe economic disparity remained, Malcolm X contended, fair and beneficial integration could never take place between the two races. 35 Additionally, Malcolm X’s break with the Nation

30 Williams quoted in Tyson, “Robert F. Williams…,” 561. 31 Timothy Tyson, Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power 2 nd ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001). Williams was sought for a kidnapping charge of a White couple from outside of Monroe who entered the Black area of town when tensions were extremely high following a White mob attack on Freedom Riders in August 1961. Williams lodged them in a house near to his own for their own protection, as reinforced by the account given by the White couple, and guided them out the following morning, but he soon made the FBI’s Most Wanted List and fled the country. 32 David Hillard, Keith and Kent Zimmerman, Huey: Spirit of the Panther (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2006), 27. 33 Harper, “The Influence of Malcolm X on Black Militancy,” 387. 34 Malcolm X, “The Ballot or Bullets,” lecture presented at the Cory Methodist Church in Cleveland, Ohio, April 3, 1964, http://www.historicaldocuments.com/BallotortheBulletMalcolmX.htm (accessed May 7, 2008). 35 Paul Alkebulan, “The Role of Ideology in the Growth, Establishment, and Decline of the Black Panther Party: 1966 to 1982,” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2003), 8.

13 of Islam in 1964, his altered philosophical outlook that accepted coalitions with like-minded

Whites following his pilgrimage to Mecca in that same year, and his equation of capitalism with racism towards the end of his life shaped the mind of the BPP’s theoretician, Huey

Newton, who would also incorporate dialectics in his own philosophical thought and development as leader of the BPP. 36 Malcolm X’s fiery speeches captured the growing anger and frustration inside the Black community as legislative acts of Congress and lip service paid by U.S. Presidents regarding steps toward equality failed to alter the socio- economic inequalities of everyday life inside the Black community. 37

By 1964, the anger and frustration began to show amidst the growing escalation between the Black community and government authorities. Fierce clashes erupted throughout major U.S. cities in the Northeast, Midwest, and West Coast beginning in 1964 and lasting well until the early 1970s. 38 Author Manning Marable calculates that,

“Combining the total weight of socio-economic destruction, the ghetto rebellions from 1964 to 1972 led to 250 deaths, 10,000 serious injuries, and 60,000 arrests, at a cost of police, troops, and other coercive measures taken by the state and losses to business in the billions of dollars.” 39 In the midst of these riots the BPP surfaced picking up the fallen torch of

Black Nationalism after the death of Malcolm X. 40 With its founding in 1966, the BPP proclaimed its “Ten Point Platform & Program” to the American public laying down a

36 Harper, “The Influence of Malcolm X on Black Militancy,” 395-396. 37 Malcolm X, “The Ballot or Bullets.” 38 Paul Wolf, “COINTELPRO: The Untold American Story”; available from http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/coinwcar3.htm ; Internet, accessed 27 April 2007. This document was presented to United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson at the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa by the members of the Congressional Black Caucus September 01, 2001. 39 Manning Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second reconstruction in Black America, 1945-1982 (Jackson, MI: University of Mississippi Press, 1984), 92-93. 40 Judson Jefferies, Huey P. Newton: The Radical Theorist , 16; Chomsky, “Domestic Terrorism,” 313; David Hillard, Keith and Kent Zimmerman, Huey: Spirit of the Panther , 29. The image of the Black Panther was originally used by SNIC in Mississippi and Newton and Seale took up the image because the panther symbolized a fierce animal, but one that would not attack unless provoked.

14 manifesto demanding, among its ten points, African American exemption from military service, economic self-sufficiency within the Black community, the release of all African

Americans from U.S. prisons, and the end to police oppression by all means necessary including armed self-defense. 41 Tapping into a reservoir of anger and frustration, the BPP expanded its membership and opened new chapters across the country.

Faced with these challengers, the United States government tasked out its intelligence agencies to conduct covert operations against Allende and the BPP in hopes of removing the threat they posed. The CIA and FBI employed a multi-faceted approach towards this end. One method of this attack revolved around public perceptions of these emerging challengers. Both agencies fully grasped the power behind formulating these movements’ public image among the populace, and both undertook measure designed to ensure that a negative persona surrounded these groups in order to weaken their support base and further radicalize their opposing factions.

MOLDING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

This section will examine both agencies’ efforts to damage the credibility of their targets and exploit the fears of the opposition using propaganda tactics. First the mass media campaigns launched by the CIA under the orders of Presidents Lyndon Johnson

(1963-1969) and Richard Nixon (1969-1974) against Allende’s presidential runs of 1964 and

1970 will be discussed followed by the efforts taken during Allende’s administration starting in 1970. This will be followed by an examination of FBI efforts to portray the BPP as a grave threat to White America and also its efforts to tarnish the image of the BPP within the Black community. This will be followed by the Bureau’s use of, what it termed,

41 David Hillard, Keith and Kent Zimmerman, Huey: Spirit of the Panther , 31-35; Huey Newton, War Against the Panthers: A Study of Repression in America (New York: Harlem River Press, 1996), 119-122, also see 123-127 to see the ideological shift of the BPP by 1972.

15 “friendly” media contacts to undermine the BPP’s social programs and delegitimize the party as authentic champions to end racial oppression.

A Castro in Chilean Clothing

The major theme underlying the Agency’s efforts to mold the Chilean public’s perception was to portray Salvador Allende as a Fidel Castro in waiting, one who would bring tyranny to Chile’s democracy if elected. In both the 1964 and 1970 presidential elections and throughout the entire presidency of Salvador Allende, the CIA worked diligently to acquire assets inside Chile’s media industry and opposing parties to perform propaganda operations aimed at polarizing the Chilean political environment. The Agency conducted propaganda blitzes through radio airwaves, posters, newspaper articles, and leaflets aimed at instilling this fear of future tyranny into the populace by effectively portraying a vote for Allende as president as a vote for Castro. 42 As the Church Committee illustrated, this scare campaign consisted of a media onslaught bombarding the populace with “images of Soviet tanks and Cuban firing squads directed especially to women.” 43 In one such radio advertisement during the 1964 campaign in which the CIA supported

Allende’s opponent PDC candidate Eduardo Frei, the broadcast began with the sound of machine gun fire followed by the desperate cries of a woman, “They have killed my child… the communists.” The commentary that followed asserted that, “Communism offers only blood and pain. For this not to happen in Chile, we must elect Eduardo Frei president.” 44

The Agency’s campaign also included a tactic that the CIA refers to as “black propaganda,” which is creating and dispersing false material and attributing it to the

42 Covert Action in Chile , 162. 43 Ibid. 44 William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Intervention since World War II (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995), 207.

16 target in hopes of vilifying, misrepresenting, and/or causing internal strife within the target’s organization and supporters. 45 False publications by CIA assets purported to derive from Chilean communist and socialist parties were routinely distributed over the airwaves and among the populace along with posters and leaflets that reinforced the extreme rhetoric of Chile’s right-wing advocates declaring the impending doom Allende would bring if elected and serving to cause internal friction within Allende’s political coalition. 46

The Agency made sure that its efforts to vilify the leftist movement in Chile were seen and heard on a daily basis by the Chilean populace, and it proved highly successful for the CIA in 1964 elections. The third week of June 1964 exemplifies this strategy; the

Church Committee reported:

[A] CIA-funded propaganda group produced twenty radio spots per day in Santiago and

on 44 provincial stations; twelve-minute news broadcasts five time daily on three

Santiago stations and 24 provincial outlets; thousands of cartoons, and much paid press

advertising. By the end of June, the group produced 24 daily newscasts in Santiago and

the provinces, 26 weekly "commentary" programs, and distributed 3,000 posters daily. 47

This media bombardment upon the Chilean voters paid dividends for the CIA when the elections took place in September 1964. Christian Democratic Party candidate Eduardo

Frei easily won over Allende acquiring fifty-six percent of the vote to Allende’s thirty- nine. 48 The propaganda campaign of the CIA, deemed “very successful” by then CIA

45 Covert Action in Chile , 154, 169. 46 Ibid., 154. 47 Ibid., 162-163. 48 Ibid., 152.

17 Director Richard Helms (1966-1973), played an instrumental role at the ballot box. 49 As a

CIA report following the elections stated, Frei’s odds of winning the election “would have been considerably more tenuous, and it is doubtful if his campaign would have progressed as well as it did without this covert U.S. Government support.” 50

Six years later at the end of President Frei’s term in office with the presidential campaigns of 1970 underway, the country’s polarization deepened with both sides of the political spectrum thoroughly angered by the reformist efforts of the Frei administration. 51

As the French ambassador reported in 1968, “Whilst the poorer classes are impatient to see

Frei redeem his promises [of massive reform], there is a good deal of alarm and despondency amongst the rich, who are resentful at the new taxes and at the threat they will lose their properties through the agrarian reform.” 52 In this political backdrop,

Allende ran for the executive office once again with an expanded coalition of the left-wing of Chile’s political spectrum forming Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, UP) earlier in the year.53 His opponent for the 1970 election was former President and, now, National Party

(NP) member Jorge Alessandri. 54 Again, the Agency’s activities continued, this time under the direction of the Nixon administration which entered the White House in January 1969, in its attempt to block the election of a socialist administration in America’s prodigy of free market capitalism in Latin America.

49 Ibid., 156; Jaechun Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War: A Case Study of the U.S. Covert War in Chile,” Journal of International and Area Studies 12 (2005), 30; Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 4-5; Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 48-49. 50 CIA Santiago Station quoted in Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 48. 51 French ambassador to Chile quoted in Haslam, Nixon Administration… , 18. 52 Ibid. 53 Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 249; Popular Unity was a coalition comprised of the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Radical Party, the Social Democratic Party, and MAPU ( Movimeiento de Accion Popular Unitario ). 54 Ibid. The National Party had formed in 1966 as a merger between the Liberal and Conservative Parties.

18 The CIA re-employed many of its 1964 tactics in 1970 in hopes of capitalizing on the fears of Chilean conservatives and instigating internal discord within Allende’s loose coalition. Tactics included covering over 2,000 walls around urban areas with the slogan su paredon – ‘your wall’ and an outline of individuals lined against the wall. This scare tactic was designed to replicate the impending communist firing squads accompanying an

Allende presidency to the Chilean passerby. 55 Additionally, the CIA played on the fact that over ninety percent of the Chilean population considered themselves Roman Catholic by disbursing false materials and booklets describing how they would be forced to forfeit their religion should Allende be voted in. 56 The method of “black propaganda” was also utilized in other forms, as it was in 1964, in the Agency’s attempt to sow strife within Allende’s coalition and offer false information to reinforce the claims of the far-right. 57

The CIA added however in the elections of 1970, an expansive use of anti-Allende media outlets the Agency provided funding to or simply created to prevent an Allende victory. As the Church Committee reported; “Instead of placing individual items, the CIA supported – or even founded – friendly media outlets which might not have existed in the absence of Agency support.” 58 Among the media outlets the CIA founded were the periodical Qué Pasa , the populist daily paper the Tribuna , and right-wing tabloid Sepa which ran daily segments portraying Allende as a drunk and a womanizer. 59 In addition to starting up anti-Allende media, the CIA also sought out friendly contacts inside Chile’s media in order to influence publications aimed at undermining Allende and Agency’s ideal

55 Covert Action in Chile , 169. 56 CIA, “The Chilean Situation and Prospects.” Number 94-63 National Intelligence Estimate, 3 October 1963; Covert Action in Chile , 169 57 Convert Action in Chile , 168. 58 Ibid., 8. 59 Haslam, Nixon Administration… , 65; Human Rights Watch, “Freedom of Expression and the Press: A Historical Briefing,” accessed on April 28, 2008; < http://www.hrw.org/reports98/chile/Chilerpt-03.htm#P558_149351 >.

19 prospect was the oldest and largest newspaper publication in Latin America; El Mercurio.

Based in the Chilean capital of Santiago, this politically conservative paper reached well over five million listeners throughout Latin America, and the paper was owned by

Augustín Edwards who possessed access inside Washington circles and pressed the need for the end of the Allende regime. 60 By 1968, the CIA possessed direct influence over the contents found within significant sections of the paper with an end result of a daily CIA- guided editorial hitting the country’s newsstands each day in addition to being broadcast throughout the country by various radio networks; thus, attaining a tremendous multiplier effect. 61

Despite these efforts and others by the CIA, on September 4, 1970 Salvador Allende and his UP coalition won a narrow plurality of votes over Alessandri; however, Allende lacked a popular majority.62 Therefore, under Chilean law the Chilean Congress was charged with determining the next president. The vote, scheduled for October 24th gave the Nixon administration time to order the CIA to take immediate action to influence the vote using not only the $250,000 authorized to attempt to bribe Congress members but also sustaining the propaganda blitz through El Mercurio and other news venues. Towards those ends, the Agency brought in twenty-three journalists from at least ten countries into the country to write over 700 damning articles against Allende and his UP coalition in the weeks leading up to the vote in Congress. 63 Nonetheless, the Agency failed to influence a

60 Ibid., 22; Hersh, Price of Power , 260; Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 91. 61 Covert Action in Chile , 166. 62 Haslam, Nixon Administration… , 56. Allende captured 36.3 percent to Alessandri’s 34.9 percent with third place Radomiro Tomic (of the PDC) garnering 27.8 percent. 63 Hersh, Price of Power , 272-273, 278.

20 Chilean Congress quite accustomed to determining the presidential election in a run-off election, and overwhelmingly voted in favor of the winner of the popular vote. 64

The Agency along with its assets continued, however, to undermine Allende after he was sworn in on November 3, 1970. CIA-backed articles were published forecasting the impending economic doom of the country in hopes of encouraging hording by a fearful public further exasperating Chile’s economic woes of supply and demand and empowering a growing black market.65 In 1971, President Allende withdrew government advertising from El Mercurio in hopes of shutting down the newspaper. Not willing to lose such a powerful asset, the CIA provided the funding needed to pay the costs of continued operations spending over $1.95 million in 1971 to keep the paper operational. 66 With its major media asset secured, the CIA incorporated Chile’s media with it mission in other methods. For example, these publications laid blame for numerous domestic terrorist attacks on leftist groups when they were actually being executed by paramilitary groups founded and funded by the CIA. 67 Furthermore, roughly beginning in early 1973, media outlets such as the influential El Mercurio began openly calling for armed uprisings against the Allende government. 68 When the Allende regime fell to a military coup in 1973, the CIA disclosed that El Mercurio “played a significant role in setting the stage for the military coup of 11 September 1973.” 69

64 Since 1900, every Chilean president had been elected off less than fifty percent of the vote save for one; the election of Frei which was fortunate enough to receive millions in CIA aid. Additionally, at the time of Allende’s presidential victory the Chilean Congress was dominated by parties opposed to Allende and his UP coalition, yet tradition took precedence after Allende signed a pledge to safeguard the country’s democratic way of governance. 65 Covert Action in Chile , 170; Human Rights Watch, “Limits of Tolerance.” 66 Peter Kornbluh, “The El Mercurio File,” Columbia Journalism Review 42 (2003): 18. 67 John Rector, History of Chile (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 175; Haslam, Nixon Administration… , 62; Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 91. 68 Richard Fagen, “The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches,” Foreign Affairs 53 (1975), 306-307; Haslam, Nixon Administration… , 122. 69 Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 94.

21 The effects of the CIA’s ability to mold public perceptions towards Allende and his coalition proved very effective. It framed the elections of 1964 and 1970 as one on which that Chilean democracy would live or die thus feeding the frenzy of the extreme right and left to disintegrate national unity and divide the public between two warring camps.

Moreover, when democracy functioned to place Allende inside the presidency, the CIA’s campaign was heightened so as to coalesce with the other methods the Agency incorporated to end the new administration. This was done by aggrandizing the economic chaos of 1972 and 1973, falsely blaming leftist groups for terrorist attacks carried out by the far-right, and beating the drums for military intervention once congressional elections failed to remove Allende in early 1973. 70 By acquiring Chile’s media through funding or direct installment of new media, the CIA mobilized a campaign that assisted in effectively delegitimizing a president elected in a legitimate democratic process.

The BPP Becomes America’s Nightmare

As the Agency and its assets played on the fears of the Chilean populace with portrayals of Castro-like tyranny with Allende’s election, the FBI undertook its goal to construe the image of the arising Black Panther Party as the precursor to the Communist vanguard in the United States. Playing on the historic unease in White America surrounding African American political mobilization, the FBI utilized its media operation that held hundreds of “friendly” contacts within U.S. major media in order to present the

BPP as a Marxist-inspired, racist group to the American public thus alleviating the audience from addressing the extreme poverty, oppression, and bleakness that truly inspired the rise of the BPP. However, the Bureau’s main focus was to conduct efforts

70 Ibid., 105-106; Haslam, The Nixon Administration… , 161. Though the PDC and NP merged to form a united opposition party to Allende in the March 1973 elections, they failed to acquire the two-thirds majority needed to Congressional evict the Allende government.

22 aimed at cutting off support the BPP received from the Black community, religious institutions, and others in an effort to uproot the Party from their surrounding community.

The FBI Director during this time period, J. Edgar Hoover (1924-1972) utilized his strong public support he held from powerful individuals within government that shared his anticommunist philosophy. Hoover acquired a reputation he had crafted well before the

1960s that enabled him to frame the FBI’s confrontation with the BPP within the settings of the Cold War and not within the framework of racial injustice. 71 From the powerful

Director’s pulpit, Hoover reiterated again and again the tremendous and immediate dangers the Black Panther Party posed to the country. On September 8, 1968 Hoover told the New York Times and more importantly the millions of American readers who would read the paper that day that the BPP constituted, “the greatest threat to the internal security of the United States.” 72 The Director continued this message throughout the campaign against the BPP in front of House Committee sessions and other public forums.73

With the passing of Director Hoover in early 1972, political rhetoric against the BPP continued with President Nixon in his re-election campaign of 1972 with his slogan of “law and order” that he had also successfully used four years earlier. 74 Nixon pointed to Black radicals as the reason behind increased crime and lawlessness and called for greater law enforcement capabilities to crack down of these groups. 75

In addition to the public pulpit, the FBI also employed a powerful network of contacts within America’s media to help to consistently portray the BPP in a negative light.

71 Arthur Hulnick, “Intelligence and Law Enforcement: The ‘Spied Are Not Cops’ Problem,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10 (1997): p 269-270; Loch Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies: The Experience and Legacy of the Church Committee,” Public Administration Review 64 (2004): 10. 72 Churchill and Wall, COINTELPRO Papers , 123. 73 Ibid. 74 Marable, Race, Rebellion, and Reform , 126. 75 Ibid.

23 In the mid-1950s the FBI had developed a vast network of friendly contacts within

American media outlets that could be called upon to distribute news to the American public in a way that served FBI interests, it coined its network the “Mass Media Program.”

A decade later, this program established a network of over 300 hundred newspaper reporters, columnists, radio commentators, and television investigators that the Bureau could count on to advance the agenda of the Bureau and counter publishing by, what the

FBI termed, liberal press outlets.76 The Bureau’s “Media Program” consisted of portraying the BPP as racist, armed, and out of control radicals for the White community while, at the same time, delegitimizing the group among its potential supporters within the Black community. The Bureau passed false or classified information to these contacts to assist them in producing television segments, documents, or damning articles against the

Panthers or its supporters such as the Los Angeles-based “Friends of the Panthers.”77 The

FBI’s operation also included targeting specific individuals within the BPP. In an to discredit BPP leader Huey Newton, the FBI provided the San Francisco Examiner with information concerning Newton and his newly acquired upscale residence along Lake

Merritt in Oakland. It was featured as a page one article in the paper, and the FBI circulated the piece to other newspaper editors. 78

In addition to the focus the FBI had towards utilizing the media, the Bureau also sought to uproot the BPP the African American community. Much of the support for the

Panthers from the community originated from the many social programs the BPP carried out in the poverty-stricken ghettos of urban America. Among the many social programs

76 Kenneth O’Reilly, Hoover and the Un-Americans: the FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), 200; Theoharis, Spying on Americans , 164-165. 77 Churchill and Wall, COINTELPRO Papers , 117, 119; Panther Senate Report , 208. 78 Panther Senate Report , 220.

24 (such as free health care services, anti-heroin program, and child care) instituted by the

Panthers was the free breakfast program designed to feed impoverished children in the urban ghetto that, at its peak, fed 70,000 children annually. 79 However, Director Hoover did not view this social program as positive efforts to improve the situation in the lives of urban, Black Americans. Rather, Hoover claimed that who thought this was the case had,

“obviously missed the point. This program was formed by the BPP for obvious reasons, including their efforts to create an image of civility, assume community control of Negroes, and to fill adolescent children with their insidious poison.” 80 Soon the breakfast program was targeted by COINTELPRO operations. Towards this end, the FBI engaged in “black propaganda” and constructed a Black Panther coloring book for children, complete with anti-White illustrations and commentary, attributed the children’s book to the BPP and then dispersed it to the many donors of the breakfast program as proof of the BPP’s indoctrination of the Black Youth with hateful ideology. As a result, many donors withdrew their sponsorship and the BPP suffered a severe loss of funding. 81

Additionally, church groups that offered their assistance to the BPP’s social programs were subject to FBI tactics that aimed to further handicap the efforts of the

Panthers by stripping the party of locations where these events could take place. This normally entailed a visit by FBI agents whereby the church group would be “counseled” as to the negative conduct they were engaging in by supporting such militant radicals. Other methods included FBI mailings or telephone calls under the alias of “concerned

Christians” to the higher echelons of the particular church whose members provided

79 Jane Rhodes, “Fanning the Flames of Racial Discord: The National Press and the Black Panther Party,” The Harvard International Journal of Press Politics 4 (1999): 100; Jefferies, Huey P. Newton , 17. 80 Churchill and Wall, COINTELPRO Papers , 144-145. 81 Panther Senate Report , 210. These donors included Safeway Stores, Inc., Mayfair Markets, and the Jack-in-The- Box Corporation.

25 assistance to the BPP. Catholic priest, Father Frank Curran, was the target of such an operation after he allowed the Panthers to use church facilities for their free breakfast program. A letter was sent by the FBI San Diego office followed by three telephone calls in

August 1969 to the Bishop of the San Diego Diocese calling for an end of Father Curran’s activities. A month later, the same FBI office reported back that Father Curran had been transferred to New Mexico for permanent reassignment. 82

Through the use of the FBI’s position as the leading law enforcement agency in the country, its contacts within the U.S. media, and “black propaganda” used to weaken BPP social-welfare activities, the Bureau was able to mold, to a large degree, how the country was introduced to the BPP. This proved highly valuable for the FBI as its more aggressive methods in suppressing the BPP, such as early-dawn raids and mass arrests of BPP members, were executed. The monstrous public image of the BPP developed as a result of these FBI actions served to help mute potential public outcry from large segments of the country; only the African American community erupted in public condemnation as these efforts by the Bureau transpired.

The effectiveness of both the CIA and FBI campaigns can be seen by their polarizing effects each of them had on the targeted society. In the case of Chile, the

CIA and its assets’ propaganda served to exacerbate the political polarization already taking place in the country. 83 Through such tactics as paintings on a wall showcasing the outlines of a lineup in front of a future firing squad or impending tanks killing an innocent child, the Agency’s campaign fueled the political mentality

82 Ibid., 210-211. 83 Covert Action in Chile , 166, 170.

26 that life and death rested on whether Allende entered the presidency. Similarly, the

FBI operated within a racially polarized American public and easily exploited this by churning out countless articles through its Mass Media Program that played on the deep-seated fears of White America by presenting the BPP as the forerunner to the impending Communist invasion. Lastly, both operations were successful as well in weakening the potential support Allende or the BPP could draw from for further support for their movement. Successfully able to mold much of the public’s perceptions toward their targets, each agency was now better able to solidify its relationships with powerful allies each needed in order to put an end to its target existence.

FINDING CONDUITS

The CIA and FBI sought out conduits possessing powerful legal authority in which to incorporate into each agency’s campaign in order for them to carry out the tasks of ending the challengers found in Allende’s presidency and the BPP. The incorporation of these conduits were crucial for both agencies for it provided a more powerful instrument for the agencies’ more overt, and potentially more exposing, tactics to be carried out through than the agencies could hope to marshal alone. Thus, the agencies would greatly enhance their capabilities while still ensuring that their covert role in the whole affair was not jeopardized. In Chile the Agency sought to deepen its relationship with high-ranking officers within the Chilean military and National Police. In the United States the FBI utilized a conduit possessing legally-mandated coercive force as well, the nation’s local law enforcement departments. This section will detail these relationships, first highlighting the

CIA’s successful attempts at establishing high-ranking contacts within the Chilean military

27 and National Police followed by attempts inside the United States by the FBI to expand its domestic intelligence mandate and assimilate the nation’s law into its operations against the

BPP.

Building Rapport

As operations began in Chile to undermine Allende’s government, the CIA sought to gain influence over its two ideal conduits to use against Allende. The Chilean military and

National Police were ideal candidates for several reasons; they held superior coercive force capabilities within the country, the Agency already possessed contacts inside the ranks of the Chilean military to draw upon, and, once they were motivated to move against Allende, would not require a degree of logistical support that risked CIA exposure.84 The latter attribute proved especially attractive to the Agency, as a CIA report stated at the time,

“every effort would be made to ensure that the role of the United States was not revealed, and so would require that the action be effected through Chilean institutions, Chileans and third-country nationals.”85 Thus, the CIA capitalized on a number of existing contacts within the Chilean military that were established during the U.S.-run program called, at the time, the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA) which was then located in Panama.

This program, founded in 1946, was and continues to be a program whereby Latin

84 Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 96-97; Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 114; Haslam, Nixon Administration… , 57. 85 CIA quoted in Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File , 8; for a very different interpretation of the CIA’s actions with regards to the Chilean military, see Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 168-172. Gustafson asserts that the U.S. military aid was intended to prevent an arms race in Latin America and also to prevent the Chilean military from seeking military equipment from the Soviet Bloc and thus edge closer to becoming a Soviet client. However, it is clear Allende never sought to end U.S. aid or equipment from reaching Chile’s military as this was politically unfeasible. Had he done so the reaction from the Chilean Congress (dominated by opposition parties), let alone the powerful military (that Gustafson, himself, describes as anticommunist and Western-oriented), would have almost assuredly led to his removal from power long before the coup of 1973.

28 American governments send its military personnel to in order to receive military training from the U.S. armed forces in an effort to strengthen its fighting capability. 86

Though Chilean graduates of the SOA program greatly assisted CIA efforts, the effort on the part of the CIA to establish contacts within the military hierarchy and

National Police was far from difficult given that, while there did exist supporters of the UP government within its ranks, the overall composition of the military and police force was that of anti-communist and Western-orientated organizational cultures.87 This dominant trait made them very receptive to CIA messages regarding the danger posed by their new president taking office in 1970. Before Allende took office in November, the CIA had established twenty-one contacts inside the military and police force between October 5,

1970 and October 20, 1970 including influential active duty military officers such as

Brigadier General Camilo Valenzuela (commander of the Santiago garrison), Air Force

General Joaquin Garcia, High commander of Chile’s police forces General Vicente Huerta, and retired generals renowned for their extreme opposition to Allende such as Generals

Arturo Marshall and Roberto Viaux. 88

86 Dana Priest, “U.S. Instructed Latins on Executions, Torture: Manuals Used 1982-1991, Pentagon Reveals,” Washington Post , 21 September 1996, A1; Steven Myers, “Army Changing Mission of a Training Academy,” New York Times , 18 November 1999; Lisa Sullivan, “Fighting to Close the Torture College,” People’s Weekly World 21 (2006): 10-12; Molly Todd, “Anti-SOA Campaign Enters Tenth Year,” NACLA Report on the Americas 33 (1999): 54; The school has developed a very controversial reputation largely as a result of the actions of some of its graduates and the Pentagon’s acknowledgment of using training manuals prior to 1992 that contained instructions on how to torture and other suppression tactics such as false imprisonment, kidnapping targets’ family members, and execution. The Pentagon claims that they wanted to instruct their trainees on these tactics so that they would have a clear understanding of what violates internationally-recognized human rights; however, over 300 of its graduates failed to grasp this message as they graduated and went on to commit horrible crimes against humanity. At the Pinochet Trial in 1998, ten of the thirty high-ranking officials charged alongside Pinochet for crimes against humanity were SOA graduates. 87 Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 154. 88 Gustafson, Hostile Intent 119; Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 15-16. The Agency pursued contact with the more radical elements of this group by, what is known in the intelligence community as, “false-flaggers.” These are Agency assets not connected with the CIA in any official way and are used to make contact with high-risk contacts whose background and reliability is in question or who’s reputation and past actions might inflict damage to the Agency’s public relations should word of this relationship become public.

29 With the establishment of powerful and influential contacts in uniform, the U.S. government introduced measures aimed at assisting the CIA in their attempts to solidify the relationship with their primary conduit, the Chilean military. Throughout the years of the Allende administration Chilean military officers continued to attend the SOA program and, more importantly, U.S. military aid to Chile doubled from the previous four years of the Frei administration amounting to a total of $45.5 million from 1970-1973. 89 This dramatic increase in funding transpired while at the same time the United States withdrew all but a small amount of its financial credit, aid, and loans bestowed onto Chile in the previous decade. 90 Moreover, the United States made its stance on a potential coup against

Allende known to its contacts at the outset of his presidency through CIA operatives and

SOA instructors informing Chilean military personnel that the U.S. welcomed a coup and would provide necessary aid to the new government. 91

Lastly, in their efforts to incorporate their primary conduit into the mission, the

Agency effectively played on the fears and suspicions of the military when it undertook deception operations shortly after Allende’s presidential election. In the fall of 1971, the

CIA placed false intelligence inside Chilean ranks concerning a secret plot between Castro and Allende to “revolutionize” the military by way of purges and ideological litmus tests in order put an end to the military’s autonomy and bring it under Allende’s control.92

Additionally, in early 1972 the CIA began subsidizing an anti-Allende newsletter distributed to the military containing a fabricated list of military personnel described to be on President Allende’s “hit list” along with supposed deception operations ongoing in the

89 Richard E. Feinberg, “Dependency and the Defeat of Allende,” Latin American Perspectives 1 (1974): 30-43. 90 See pages 38-39 below. 91 Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 145; Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 119. 92 Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 95.

30 country by the UP government. 93 Through the use of these tactics, the Agency strengthened its relationship with its conduit by radicalizing those in the officer and enlisted corp exposed to CIA-crafted false information.

Nonetheless, highly placed military officials remained steadfast in their commitment to the nation’s constitution and duly elected government despite some of their reservations about the Allende government, and this presented a severe obstacle in CIA efforts to get the military to move against it. This respect for the democratic process was mainly due to the fact that over thirty years had passed since the last military intervention in Chilean politics took place and it symbolized the unique stability the country possessed in relation to the unstable and often overthrown governments found elsewhere in the region. 94 As a CIA report concluded, “[t]he security forces would probably maintain a constant surveillance over it [a Communist-supported administration], and would plan to move against it only if they were convinced that Chilean institutions, especially their own, were threatened.” 95

Getting the military to act collectively to end the socialist government required more than

CIA encouragement and misinformation, other factors needed to come into play to force the military’s hand. Once the CIA was successful in getting the military to act, however, it was confident it would not require any assistance from the CIA that would jeopardize exposure.96

The CIA eventually succeeded in helping to push the military into breaking this thirty-year absence from intervention and this is due to the multiple tactics employed inside Chile by the Agency. The intricate and multifaceted approach of the CIA entailed

93 Ibid; Covert Action in Chile , 186. 94 Jaechun Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War,” 37. 95 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Chile,” Published 1/28/1969, Released 7/7/1998. Case Number F-1993-01478, 6. Emphasis added. 96 Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 96-97.

31 more than the aspect of its relations with the military; it was more encompassing as each method employed by the Agency reinforced the other. The CIA utilized the growing polarization within Chilean politics thanks, in part, to its unrelenting and polarizing propaganda campaign it had begun in 1964 and continued until the actual coup in 1973 as a means to further pressure hesitant officers in the military to act. In addition to these efforts, the economic squeeze, industrial sabotage, and political violence (discussed later in the paper) executed against the Chile on the part of the CIA or its assets all culminated to exact a powerful force unto the reluctant military. The far-reaching strategy greatly influenced a political environment that brought on purges and resignations inside the military that removed military leaders supportive of adhering to the country’s constitution and replaced them with military men more keen on ending the Allende presidency.97

While the CIA helped maneuver their key players within the military closer to positions of power within the Chilean military hierarchy, the FBI found a willing partner to combat political “subversion” in the United States with the nation’s urban police forces.

The vast networking employed by the Bureau enabled the enforcing arm of the FBI to greatly expand their reach into the urban ghetto and overwhelm political groups such as the BPP with daily police harassment, state and federal prosecution, and other acts working to compliment the covert operations conducted by the Bureau against the group.

A Longer Arm of the Law

In the mid-1960s, the inner-city riots were the basis for President Lyndon Johnson’s call for government inquiries to investigate and determine the root causes for the riots. As a result, three separate commissions were held; the National Advisory Councils of the

Kerner (1967) and Eisenhower (1968) Commissions and the McClellan Committee (1967)

97 Haslam, Nixon Administration… , 185, 201.

32 formed in the United States Senate. The Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions reported at the end of their investigations that the main causes for the violent outbreaks were the social and economic factors plaguing the communities where the riots took place whereas the

McClellan Committee, led by Southern Democrat Senator Jon McClellan, used unsubstantiated claims supplied by the FBI to conclude that the riots were the work of communist conspirators. 98 Though drastically different in their interpretation of the riots, all three investigative bodies called for greater intelligence gathering inside these communities by the federal government, and this empowered the FBI to expand its domestic intelligence mandate. 99

With an enlarged mandate for domestic intelligence, the FBI began its

Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) in August 1967 against Black Nationalists groups in the country. 100 The Bureau sought to define what constituted a group advocating

Black Nationalism in such a way as to include any African American participating in a political group deemed “potentially subversive” by the Bureau. Author Kenneth O’Reilly argues, “COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist was unique in that the FBI defined “black nationalist” loosely enough to include, in theory, at least, every member of a particular race who happened to be a member of any organization whatsoever.”101 The first major aspect of this massive surveillance campaign began with what the FBI termed its “Ghetto

Listening Post.” This program acquired over 3,000 informants by the summer of 1969 with which to infiltrate groups such as the BPP, and this number continued to climb the

98 See Kenneth O’Reilly, “The FBI and the Politics of the Riots, 1964-1968,” The Journal of American History 75 (1988): 91-114. 99 Ibid., 108, 111, 92. 100 Kenneth O’Reilly, Racial Matters , 290; Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Policy Repression in Urban America (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 205. 101 O’Reilly, Racial Matters , 280.

33 following years as Director Hoover came to place monthly quotas on each station to acquire additional informants. 102 The “listening post” provided the FBI with informant information that it presented to U.S. courts in order to gain permission for aggressive surveillance, search warrants, and early dawn raids in addition to feeding its propaganda efforts.103 This program was very efficient against the BPP as the group came to gain greater attention by the FBI, and by June 1969, all forty-two chapters of the BPP and its approximate 1,200 members were being investigated by the FBI. 104

The Bureau then set to incorporate local law enforcement into their overall plans to end the Black Nationalist movement inside the United States. In 1968 the Omnibus Crime

Control and Safe Streets Act proposed by Senator McClellan and guided by the FBI called for an increase of officers authorized to attend the FBI National Academy in Quantico,

Virginia from 200 to 2,000 and appropriated a substantial increase for the 1969 fiscal year budget in the process.105 These increased enrollees into the Bureau’s academy assisted in

FBI efforts to build trust and cooperation between the two law enforcement entities, and the contacts established with police officers from around the country attending the academy could potentially be called on thereafter to assist in future Bureau operations.

Additionally, the FBI also successfully built a strong relationship with the Law

Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU). This was a network of over 230 local law- enforcement agencies that shared intelligence with each other regarding organized crime and political subversive activity. Through matters of liaison arrangements between agencies, operational assistance, and exchanging intelligence briefs, the Bureau’s special

102 Ibid., 267; Ward Churchill and Jim Wall, The COINTELPRO Papers (Monroe, ME: South End Press, 1990). 103 O’Reilly, Racial Matters , 267. 104 Ibid., 298. 105 O’Reilly, Racial Matters , 256.

34 agents in charge (SAC’s 106 ) routinely worked with LEIU personnel providing the FBI with an instrumental venue for continued close-working relationships between it and local law enforcement. 107 Information gathered by police departments around the country concerning the BPP were now relayed to the FBI bestowing a vast pool of information upon which to proceed with as they aimed to end the BPP.108

The Bureau also found it necessary to protect its conduit from growing public concern over the aggressive tactics practiced by police squads across the country. In seeking to protect local law enforcement, the FBI Director testified before Congress to ensure that the growing public calls of police brutality were depicted as a communist tactic to divide America. Testifying in front of the Eisenhower Commission in 1968 Hoover asserted that allegations of police brutality in the urban ghettos had to be seen as a communist conspiracy whereby extremists within the Black community alleged police brutality so as to “provoke and encourage mob action and violence by developing contempt for constituted authority.” 109

Beyond framing the argument in ideological terms where the victim of police brutality was to be automatically discredited and labeled a communist agent, the FBI acted to exonerate police officers accused of brutality through its slanted investigations.

Following the massive confrontations between police and protestors at the 1968 Democratic

Convention in Chicago which included prominent members of the BPP partaking in the event, the FBI was tasked with investigating the conduct of the police. 110 The local agent

106 In this context, SAC refers to a FBI agent in command of an intelligence operation; i.e. the SAC of the San Diego station. 107 Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege , 85. 108 O’Reilly, “The FBI and the Politics of the Riots, 1964-1968,” 108. 109 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover quoted in O’Reilly, “The FBI and the Politics of the Riots, 1964-1968,” 109. 110 BPP co-founder, Bobby Seale, was arrested after the Convention charged with inciting a riot and became part of, what became known, as the Chicago Seven in the subsequent trial.

35 responsible for reporting on the matter was sent a cable instructing the agent to, “Develop all possible evidence…to refute these false accusations [of police brutality].”111 Later in

December 1969, the FBI was also tasked with investigating the police raid on the residence of BPP leader Fred Hampton, who was killed by police in the raid, and withheld information from the public and the courts concerning the Bureau’s role in the affair and its possession of incriminating evidence against the police.112

Though the FBI aimed to expand its networks as much as possible, its primary focus was with developing strong ties and collaboration with special units within the urban police forces of the country called red squads. These were units, in the heights of the Cold War, assigned with conducting counterintelligence operations against “the communist threat,” among the more notable units operating at this time were the Criminal Conspiracy Section

(CCS) in Los Angeles the Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU) in Chicago, the Civil Defense Squad

(CD) in Philadelphia, and the Bureau of Special Services (BOSS) in New York City. 113

Working with squads specifically created to aggressively confront communist infiltration into the country allowed the FBI to utilize law enforcement entities, which were given a relative free reign to conduct hard-hitting operations, to use against the BPP’s strategic centers in the urban cities.

To accomplish the goal of greater coordination, the Bureau began efforts to conduct joint operations with the country’s red squads against subversive activity in their respective cities. The FBI worked closely with the GIU presenting routine briefings on

111 O’Reilly, Racial Matters , p. 285. 112 Ibid., p. 313. 113 Panther Senate Report , 220-223; Donner, Protectors of Privilege , 180.

36 radicals in the Chicago area and coordinated with them on raids against the BPP.114 In

Philadelphia, the Bureau’s early involvement with the CD unit in the summer of 1967 against Black activists laid the groundwork for the coming COINTELPRO-Black

Nationalist program that came to be implemented in August.115 While in Los Angeles, the

Bureau found a whole organization in the Los Angeles Police Department that was particularly suited for extremely aggressive tactics against the BPP. During this time period there were an estimated 2,000 members of the LAPD that belonged to the ultra- conservative John Birch Society, a political organization opposed to the Civil Rights

Movement and the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s. 116 This prevalent mentality inside the department and its red squad provided a sympathetic ally in the FBI’s mission to end the

BPP. In addition to these squads, the FBI also developed close working relationships with red squads in Detroit, Michigan, New Haven, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. building a vast network with which to wage a devastating campaign against the BPP. 117

As the FBI brought its powerful conduit in line with a coordinated effort to bring down the Panthers, the results proved devastating for the BPP. The most effective year for

FBI-police collaboration was 1969. In this year alone police raids directed against the BPP took place in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Denver, Sacramento, and New

York. By the end of the year, an estimated thirty Panthers members faced death sentences, forty were given life, fifty-five faced thirty-five years or more, and 155 were either in jail or were sought by authorities. 118 The loss of key members dealt a serious blow to the Panthers

114 Donner, Protectors of Privilege , 180; Jeff Gottlieb and Jeff Cohen, “The FBI On Trial: Was Fred Hampton Executed?” The Nation 223 (December, 25 1976): 681. 115 Ibid., 205; Panther Senate Report , op. cit., 220. 116 Donner, Protectors of Privilege , 252. 117 Ibid., 293, 323-324, 336. 118 Ibid., 180.

37 and their chapters, lacking this essential leadership, suffered as a result with many simply disbanding. 119

The CIA and FBI both proved very successful in enlarging their capacity to carry out their assigned objectives and empowering their conduits with in-depth training; whether at the U.S.-ran School of Americas in Panama or the FBI National Academy in

Quantico, Virginia. Additionally, both agencies were executing a multifaceted campaign against their targets and the mission to find a conduit, while essential, was by no means the only avenue to which the CIA and FBI strove to accomplish their task. A primary objective was also ending their targets’ financial capabilities. A detrimental loss of funds prevented both groups from fulfilling their social objectives that gave them a public following and it kept them from countering other agency tactics such as negative propaganda blitzes. This became an intricate piece to the campaigns undertaken by the CIA and FBI against their respective targets

ECONOMIC CONSTRICTION

The core rationale for the popular rise of the UP coalition was the party’s promise to radically improve the lives of the Chilean low-income classes. Thus, its ability to stay in power rested on accomplishing this goal. Similarly, the BPP’s social programs conducted throughout urban, poor areas of the country served to elevate the party’s legitimacy within the African-American community. Both the UP and the BPP’s continued ability to finance these endeavors was critical for their political and social viability. Therefore, operations designed to severe the two targets from their financial resources became one of the foundational tactics of both the CIA and FBI. This section will first focus on the CIA’s

119 As was the case with the Chicago chapter after the death of Hampton, the New York chapter following the mass arrests of what the media deemed the “Panther Twenty-One.” See Gottlieb and Jeff Cohen, “The FBI On Trial,” 684 concerning the Chicago chapter and Donner, Protectors of Privilege , 191 regarding the New York chapter.

38 efforts to assist in the economic crisis consuming the Allende government by working with assets to execute economic sabotage and labor strikes. Next, the actions by the FBI to dry up the pool of financial resources the BPP were able to draw upon will be discussed.

Assisting in Chile’s Economic Ruin

In Chile, the CIA was greatly assisted in it endeavors by the larger operation being conducted by the Nixon administration to financially isolate Allende. The subsequent role of the U.S. government in Chile’s eventual economic collapse at the end of 1973 has remained a heated debate among academic scholars, and it serves this paper to analyze what impact this policy carried.120 Scholars who reject U.S. direct responsibility generally fault internal Chilean politics undergirded by uncompromising positions undertaken by the far-left and right including Allende’s socialist party. 121 Admittedly, analysis of the internal dynamics of the UP coalition presents a governing body working in completely opposite directions. While the PCCh desired a progressive move towards socialism and sought to gain the support of the politically-moderate Christian Democratic Party (PDC), extreme elements such as Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left

120 Scholars who view the U.S. role in the economic collapse as central to its downfall include James Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975); Edy Kaufman, Crisis in Allende’s Chile: New Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1988), Peter Kornbluh , The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York, London: The New Press, 2004), specifically chapter one, “Project FUBELT: ‘formula for chaos,’” 1-78 and chapter two, “Destabilizing democracy: the United States and the Allende government,” 79-115; Richard E. Feinberg, “Dependency and the Defeat of Allende,” Latin American Perspectives 1 (1974): 30-43; Elizabeth Farnsworth, “More Than Admitted,” Foreign Policy 16, (1974): 127-141; Barbara Stallings and Any Zimbalist, “The Political Economy of the Undidad Popular,” Latin American Perspectives 2 (1975): 69-88. Conversely, scholars that hold primary, if not sole, responsibility for economic collapse with the UP government, see Gustafson, Kristian, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc, 2007), specifically chapter five, “Watching History Unfold,” 139-178; John Rector, History of Chile (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), specifically chapter eight, “Reform Turns to Revolution, 1958-73,” 155-183; Paul Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), specifically chapter eight, “Polarization and Brinkmanship,” 161-187,” and chapter nine, “The Politicization of the Military,” 188-201; Joseph L. Nogee and John W. Sloan, “Allende’s Chile and the Soviet Union: A Policy Lesson for Latin American Nations Seeking Autonomy,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 21 (1979): 339-368. 121 See Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile ; Gustafson, Hostile Intent ; Rector, History of Chile ; Nogee and Sloan, “Allende’s Chile and the Soviet Union.”

39 Movement – MIR) and radicals inside the Socialist Party viewed armed confrontation with the far-right as a foregone conclusion and undermined any attempt by cooler heads within

UP to seek political accommodation with the opposition. 122 Moreover, the economic downturn inside Chile was due in large part to the hastily developed economic plan implemented by Chilean economist Pedro Vuskovic and Allende’s inability to control the more radical elements inside the UP from taking economic policy into their own hands, such as land seizures that initiated devastating losses in food production. 123

However, the actions of the Nixon administration to squeeze the Chilean economy cannot be dismissed. 124 Chile became the focal point of President Kennedy’s Alliance for

Progress whereby Chile under President Frei (1964-1970) came to receive more than $1 billion in U.S. and multilateral aid. 125 This pumped money into an already faltering economy thus establishing a Chilean state dependent upon U.S. aid, loans, and credit. Thus, in order for the Allende government to function properly it required continued U.S. aid, if for no other reason than to quell unrest. When it was revoked in 1970, and given that

Allende was elected primarily on his party’s pledge to institute drastic economic restructuring, it had a devastating effect on Allende’s ability to govern. 126 Economic aid previously at $423 million under President Frei dwindled to less than $20 million under

Allende. Aid from the Export-Import Bank of the United States decreased by $258 million

122 Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon Administration… , specifically chapter five, “The Economic Consequences of Professor Vuskovic,” 98-126 and six, “The Middle Class Strikes,” 127-157. MIR was a radical left-wing group not officially part of UP but very much involved in the UP government nonetheless. 123 Ibid., 98-126. 124 For a well-balanced account that faults both Allende and the U.S. government, see Haslam, Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide . 125 Feinberg, “Dependency and the Defeat of Allende,” 33. 126 Pang, Eul-Soo and Timothy M.Shaw, The International Political Economy of Transformation in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile since 1960 (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2002), 86-87; Jaechun Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War,” 35; Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 84-85.

40 to $4.7 million as Allende entered office. 127 U.S. bank commercial credit to Chile was also withdrawn. Under Frei, U.S. banks granted $220 million per year for Chile’s foreign trade financing and this dropped to $35 million within Allende’s first year as president. 128

Scholars such as Gustafson and Sigmund oversimplify the matter by arguing that

Allende circumvented these financial losses by securing short-term credit and other outside assistance from Western Europe and the Soviet Bloc.129 While true, the Chilean economy rested on its export of copper, which accounted for eighty percent of Chile’s foreign exchange earnings, yet over ninety percent of the replacement parts needed for continued copper production were imported from U.S. companies. 130 With the vast majority of U.S. credit to Chile revoked by Allende’s first year in office, Allende faced an economic dependency for continued copper revenues that could not be overcome without a detrimental disruption in copper production, as Soviet engineers concluded when they arrived in Allende’s Chile to assess avenues for overcoming this dependency. 131 The reliance upon U.S. spare parts also proved very significant in grounding a large percentage

(roughly about a third) of Chile’s industrial and public transportation and played a telling role in instigating the truckers’ strikes of 1972 and 1973. 132

127 Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War: A Case Study of the U.S. Covert War in Chile,” 35. 128 Pang, International Political Economy…, 86. 129 Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende… , 190; Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 150-152. The vast majority of the short-term credit extended to Chile by the Soviet Bloc was only accessible if Allende used it to import Soviet exports. Importing industrial equipment from Communist nations would have required retraining workers and erecting maintenance facilities with Soviet parts in stock. This was economically impracticable, and this is shown by the fact that although Allende obtained $395 million in short-term credit from the Soviet Union, its satellites, and China, only $91 million of it was actually utilized. Scholars Sigmund and Gustafson do not properly take into account the economic infrastructure existing in Chile set up by the Alliance for Progress prior to Allende and therefore fail to acknowledge the key factor that made the U.S. economic withdrawal so devastating. 130 Petras and Morley, The United States and Chile, 10, 22, 92; Covert Action in Chile , 179. 131 Leon Goure and Morris Rothenberg, Soviet Penetration of Latin America (Miami, FL: Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami, 1975), 142. 132 Covert Action in Chile , 180.

41 With the economy reeling from the actions of the Allende government and the U.S. policy of isolation, the actions of the CIA and its assets further destabilized the worsening

Chilean economy. 133 One critical consequence of the U.S. economic withdrawal was the gaining power of the dollar in Chile. The CIA spent $6.5 million dollars during Allende’s time in office to undermine his administration; however, the real purchasing power, given the black market and Chile’s increased inflation, was at least $40 million inside Chile. 134

The CIA spent part of the $6.5 million to fund an extreme right-wing paramilitary group called Movimiento Cívico Patria y Libertad (Land and Freedom). 135 Jonathan Haslam cites a former member of the group who asserted that Patria y Libertad was formed in

September 11, 1970 with the direct assistance of the CIA. 136 This was a fascist group that called for the eradication of Marxism in Chile, and a permanent end to the country’s liberal-democracy, which they wanted replaced by corporatist rule. 137 Patria y Libertad was strongly supported among high-level officers within the Chilean military and the

National Party (NP), and engaged in acts of terrorism and industrial sabotage, such as oil pipeline and train bombings with the goal of inducing a military takeover of the

133 For a very different interpretation of CIA efforts during the Allende years, see Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 160, who offers this account, “Without this support [CIA funding opposition], the UP’s opposition would be starved of funds and intimidated out of conducting any coherent opposition to the UP in Congress, despite the PDC and PN majority, and so allow the dismantling of Chilean democracy.” This statement does not find a lot of support when Gustafson, himself, admits that the Chilean military, which held a combat superiority over that of any left-wing group multiple times over, was largely “anti-Communist and Western-orientated.” Secondly, the NP was closely working with right-wing paramilitary group, Patria y Libertad, in calling for a military coup. These groups were far from being intimidated. However, this flawed logic on the part of Gustafson may stem from his source, Professor Sigmund’s, assertion that following the assassination of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Schneider, “most of the extreme Right had either fled or been imprisoned after the Schneider assassination,” (147). Neither he nor Sigmund provide sources for this claim, and contrary to their assertions the far-right continued successful operations in industrial sabotage, infiltration of the military, and developing close-working relationships with the National Party throughout the early 1970s. Indeed, it is Gustafson, himself, who discusses the pivotal role Patria y Libertad played in the June 1973 military uprising, (170). 134 Covert Action in Chile , 189; Kim Scipes, “It’s Time to Come Clean: Open the AFL-CIO Archives on International Labor Operations,” Labor Studies Journal 25 (2000), 15. 135 For a counterview to this, see Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 174-175 or Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende , 286-287. 136 Haslam, Nixon Administration… , 62. 137 Jean Grugel, “Nationalist Movements and Fascist Ideology in Chile,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 4 (1985), 116-117.

42 government. 138 Funding for this group took two forms; directly, the group received $38,500 from the CIA between 1970 and 1973; indirectly, as the NP’s more extreme members won leadership inside the party, money spent to fund this opposition party by the CIA was then funneled to Patria y Libertad. 139

The CIA was also assisted by U.S. labor organizations to bring additional disruption to the Chilean economy. The AFL-CIO (the United States’ largest national trade union) and its Committee on International Affairs’ program, entitled American Institute for Free

Labor Development (AIFLD), was one such group. 140 The program was headed by William

Doherty, a staunch anti-communist who also led programs to usher in the downfall of

Marxist leader Cheddi Jagan of British Guyana in 1953 and President João Goulart in

Brazil in 1964. 141 The AIFLD program was used to fund and guide anti-Allende labor groups in order to wreak havoc on the lifelines of Chilean commerce, namely its transportation apparatus and copper production. AIFLD held seminars and advanced courses in Front Royal, Virginia during Allende’s first two years in office and trained close to 3,000 Chileans on the dangers of a communist subversion of the labor force. 142 Through these established contacts within Chile’s labor force, AIFLD possessed influence and funds to help Chilean opposition parties succeed in pushing labor unions to strike. 143 The

AIFLD’s efforts were aided as well by the CIA as it also collaborated in the effort and assisted in financing the resulting labor strikes at the El Teniente copper mine in early 1973

138 Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 170; Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 91; Recker, History of Chile , 175; Grugel, “Nationalistic Movements…,” 117-118; Haslam, Nixon Administration... , 62, 179-180. 139 Kornbluh, Pinochet File , 91. 140 Haslam, Nixon Administration... , 130; Scipes, “It’s Time to Come Clean,” 10-11. 141 Haslam, Nixon Administration… , 131. 142 Scipes, “It’s Time to Come Clean,” 18. 143 Haslam, Nixon Administration , 140, 149-150

43 and the truckers’ strikes of 1972 and 1973, at a cost to the Chilean economy of at least $30 million and more than $240 million respectively. 144

The combination of both the U.S. economic withdrawal with the CIA’s funding of

Patria y Libertad and its and the AIFLD’s strategic funding of the Chile’s labor unions proved to be a critical factor in the ensuing chaos of the Chilean economy. It was by no means the sole cause but its pivotal role is hard to dispute. Far north in the BPP strongholds of urban America, the FBI faced a much easier task than their CIA counterparts. The financial resources drawn by the BPP were anything but concrete and the financial pool they could draw from could easily dry up with well-designed FBI operations.

Stripping Away BPP Sources of Funding

From the outset, the Black Panther Party, though holding members originating from America’s middle class such as founder Huey Newton, operated in the poverty- stricken areas of the urban ghetto and largely relied upon the small donations of those residing in these areas for continued funding. Given that, the organization was extremely vulnerable to any loss of funds and this presented an all too visible weakness for the FBI to exploit. The propaganda campaign served to discredit the Panthers among some in the

African-American community, such as the work done to shut down the BPP’s Breakfast

Program, and, therefore, closed potential avenues of funding.

Other methods were employed by the FBI as well to cause financial strains onto the party. For example, the BPP drew much needed revenues and sought to establish contact with potential funders by speaking at public speaking events on college campuses and other institutions. In its efforts to dry up BPP funding, FBI agents placed anonymous calls to

144 Ibid., 175, 192-195; Scipes, “It’s Time to Come Clean,” 17.

44 BPP members’ households with threatening information that prompted some to cancel their appearance. 145 Also, the FBI utilized the federal agency of the Internal Revenue

Service to inquire into the BPP’s sources of income and that of its members in an effort to bring financial charges against the group. 146 The Bureau also individualized their campaign against the Panthers. FBI agents visited building tenets where BPP functions took place and where individual BPP members resided and later reported that there visits resulted in several evictions of BPP members and the forced relocation of party functions. 147

Another critical target was that of the BPP newspaper, the Black Panther. The party heavily relied upon their widely circulated newspaper to reach Black communities nationwide in their efforts to spread the principles espoused by the party and raise money. 148 The FBI sought to curtail the circulation of the paper by making it more expensive for the party to distribute. The agency contacted United Airlines, who was responsible for the shipment of the newspaper from and to BPP nationwide chapters, and found that the BPP was being charged the general rate for the delivery of its paper. After the conversation between the airline and the Bureau, the FBI reported that the airline would now charge the full legal limit increasing the costs to the BPP for distributing the

Black Panther by forty percent, costing an additional $10,000 in New York circulation alone. 149

Moreover, other sources of funding were equally targeted by the FBI. The organization, Friends of the Panthers, was a mostly White group located primarily in Los

145 Panther Senate Report , 218. 146 Ibid., 214. 147 Ibid., 200. 148 Ibid., 214. 149 Ibid.

45 Angeles, California that publicly supported the BPP and was led by college professor and screenwriter Donald Freed. 150 The organization’s membership included high-profile actors like Jane Fonda and Marlon Brando and was able to offer the BPP significant funding and favorable publicity. Members, specifically Freed, were soon targeted by the Bureau which, according to an internal FBI memo, “felt that any prosecution or exposure of Freed or

[name deleted] will severely hurt the BPP. Any exposure will not only cost the Panthers money, but additionally, would cause other white supporters of the BPP to withdraw their support.” 151

The FBI mailed bogus documents to the BPP falsely attributed to Freed containing racially offensive remarks in hopes of causing a rift between the two organizations, and later the Bureau also succeeded in getting Freed fired from his professorship at San

Fernando Valley College. 152 In July 1969, the FBI dispersed leaflets near a BPP-sponsored national conference “informing” the party that Mr. Freed was in fact a police informant and not to be trusted. 153 Others were also targeted, such as Jean Seberg, a well-known

White actress and member of the Friends of the Panthers. The FBI sought to end her career and thus her financial support of the BPP by planting false allegations in Hollywood columnist papers declaring that the married actress had become pregnant by a BPP member. 154 In each case the message sent to those seeking to support the BPP was clear;

150 Ward Churchill, “To Disrupt, Discredit and Destroy: The FBI’s Secret War against the Black Panther Party,” in Liberation, Imagination, and the Black Panther Party: A New Look at the Panthers and Their Legacy , eds. Kathleen Cleaver and George Katsiaficas (New York: Routledge, 2001), 91-92. 151 Ibid., 92. 152 Churchill, “To Disrupt, Discredit and Destroy,” 92. 153 Panther Senate Report , 208. 154 Ibid., 209. Jean Seberg was publicly scrutinized in the months to follow. She would later miscarry, possibly due to the unrelenting stress this false rumor attracted. Never overcoming her grief, she would later take her own life while living in Paris in 1979.

46 there would be a heavy price for engaging in such activities that supported the Bureau’s target.

Given the Panthers’ limited budget and reliance on outside support, the loss of any effective means to draw funding was devastating. These economic hardships only added themselves to the long list of the multi-faceted approaches the agency used to thoroughly marginalize the party from carrying any political viability within the urban ghettos. The

BPP’s most ardent support came as a result of its social programs and as these became harder and harder to continue due, in part, to the efforts of the FBI, the Panthers’ suffered a loss of legitimacy in a similar fashion that Allende experienced with the Chilean economy spiraling out of control. Struggling to endure the obstacles of economic hardships, both groups were also subjected to an even greater hurdle that proved at least equally devastating; which will now be discussed.

USE OF VIOLENCE

The CIA and FBI executed acts of violence against their targets in an effort to greatly enhance their ability to accomplish their objectives. These extreme tactics included the forceful removal of individuals perceived by the agencies to serve as an obstacle to their mission, the instigation of violent confrontations between agency targets and rivals, and the use of conduits to carry out violent raids against members of either target. This section will detail these events first describing the violent tactics employed by the CIA in Chile followed by similar efforts on the part of the FBI inside the United States.

Removing the Threat in Chile

One of the first employments by the CIA inside Chile of violent tactics aiming to undermine Allende and his coalition took place directly after the presidential election of

47 1970 when it was determined that a final run-off vote was to be held on October 24, 1970 in the Chilean Congress. In hopes of preventing the ascension of Allende to the presidency, the CIA established contacts in early October within the Chilean military ranks that included General Camilo Valenzuela and retired general Roberto Viaux with the goal of organizing the removal of Chilean Commander-in Chief of the Army Rene Schneider, a general who opposed military intervention, and pinning the act on leftist extremists. 155

Weapons, including machine guns and tear gas, and $70,000 (either given or pledged) were passed to the cells formed by General Valenzuela and retired General Viaux to carry out the planned kidnapping of General Schneider.156 The CIA and the generals involved calculated that the abduction of General Schneider and responsibility for it placed falsely on leftist extremists would push the military and national police to carry out massive raids on leftist areas in search of the missing general thus serving to heighten possibilities of violence and drawing the military one step closer to intervention. 157

However, as the date for the kidnapping approached things began to alter. The CIA withdrew its support of the Viaux cell on October 15 th after concluding that it could not successfully pull off the plot while maintaining its support of the Valenzuela cell .158

Nonetheless, the Viaux cell did not heed the CIA’s late request to stand down and eventually carried out the plot seven days later. It ended, in large part due to the

155 U.S. Senate. Hinchey Report : CIA Activities in Chile,” 106 th Cong. 2 nd sess. 2000, http://www.foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp#15 (assessed 24 April 2008); Hersh, Price of Power , 279-286; Haslam, The Nixon Administration… , 69-72. According to declassified CIA memos concerning the plot, it was to be a kidnapping taking the general to nearby Argentina while it would be blamed leftist groups inside Chile held the general. Given the gross inexperience of the group tasked with carrying out the plot, it is highly likely that the CIA gave at least a cursory thought to the idea that something might go awry that would lead to the death of the general. For a different perspective see Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 130-134. 156 Treverton, “Covert Intervention in Chile, 1970-1973,” 7-8; Haslam, The Nixon Administration… , 69-70; $20,000 was directly given to Viaux’s cell with $50,000 promised to Valenzuela’s cell upon successful completion of the act. 157 Kornbluh, The Pinochet File , 24-28; Treverton, “Covert Intervention in Chile,” 8; Haslam, The Nixon Administration… , 69-70. 158 Treverton, “Covert Intervention in Chile,” 8.

48 inexperience of the Viaux cell, in a botched kidnapping whereby General Schneider sustained three fatal gunshot wounds after drawing his weapon to defend himself. 159

Though the CIA had withdrawn its support of the Viaux cell and the weapons issued to the group were not used in the botched kidnapping, it is readily apparent as to the measures the Agency was willing to go in order to prevent the Allende presidency in 1970. The advocacy for a violent solution was not tempered by the Agency due to calls for morality but by its cold, calculated assessment that the plan could not succeed and would actually hurt the chances of further opportunities to instigate a coup later on. 160

Unfortunately for Viaux, Valenzuela, and the CIA, the political gamble at removing the general turned into a fiasco. Soon investigators connected the cells with Viaux and

Valenzuela and public outcry for the murder, along with condemnation from exiting

President Frei, all but guaranteed Allende’s approval by Congress into the presidency. 161

The blowback came to fruition when Allende was later voted in by a considerably wide margin in the legislative halls earning 153 votes to 35 on October 24 th while Viaux was sentenced to twenty-three years in prison and General Valenzuela three years in exile. 162

The CIA now had to find other means to accomplish what, after the Congressional confirmation, was now an Allende presidency other than a quick-fix scheme like the one it attempted in the lead up to the Congressional vote.

One of the other avenues the CIA utilized was the establishing and funding of the most prominent paramilitary group in Chile, Patria y Libertad, in its goal of bringing

159 Haslam, The Nixon Administration… , 70. 160 Kornbluh, The Pinochet File , 24. The CIA dispatch given to Vaiux stated, “ We have reviewed your plans…. and come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities in the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch…. You will continue to have our support.” 161 Haslam, The Nixon Administration… , 71. 162 Ibid., Terverton, “Covert Intervention in Chile, 1970-1973,” 8.

49 further instability to the Allende regime. Serving the Agency’s interests, Patria y Libertad focused its efforts on fueling the tension found in the volatile political atmosphere inside

Chile in an eventually successful attempt to get the military to move against Allende. As one of its leaders, Pablo Rodriguez, stated later in a 1983 interview; “As the political situation became more and more desperate, the movement was inundated with hysterical anti-marxist elements. There were two possibilities for us: either we purge ourselves internally, or we accept the 'dirty work' of creating the conditions for the coup d'etat. I chose the second alternative.” 163

In order to assist in creating the conditions for the coup d’état , the group established training camps inside and outside Chile and conducted bombing operations including that of trainlines and left-wing party offices. 164 When intertwined with the other methods of the CIA, these violent acts of Patria y Libertad, along with the economic sabotage it conducted, were blamed on leftist extremists by the CIA-influenced Chilean newspapers who by early 1973 openly called for the overthrow of the Allende government. 165 With both influential control over major aspects of Chilean media and a paramilitary group engaging in domestic terrorism, the CIA combined both effectively to serve the Agency’s overall mission. The CIA’s paramilitary was further empowered in early 1973 when it came to receive financial support from the National Party, who, along with the PDC, was given $4 million from the CIA in the years 1970-1973. 166 With this cohesion between the legitimate party of the NP and the outlawed Patria y Libertad

163 Grugel, “Nationalist Movements and Fascist Ideology in Chile,” 117. 164 Ibid. 165 Rector, History of Chile , 175; Fagen, “The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches,” 300. 166 Covert Action in Chile , 157; Pang, The International Political Economy… , 81. The majority of this funding went to the PDC, but a significant portion of the $4 million (which in the increasingly desperate-for-dollars Chilean economy held much greater value) did go to the NP.

50 solidified, CIA funding to “support democratic opposition” now could be more easily passed into the hands of the terrorist group with decreased chances of exposure. 167

Another avenue in which Patria y Libertad empowered their goal of toppling the

Allende government and replacing it with a fascist dictator was by successfully infiltrating the Chilean military. Some of the more prominent members or sympathizers of the group was retired general Roberto Viaux who was tried and convicted with his involvement in the failed General Schneider kidnapping. 168 Moreover, the group made its presence felt with its direct involvement in the military uprising by Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Souper and the

Second Armored Battalion in Santiago on the early morning of June 29, 1973, which came to be known as the day of the tanquetazo (tanks). 169 The armored unit was able to encircle government buildings in the Chilean capital including the presidential palace, but the rest of the military remained loyal to Allende and the uprising was put down within twenty- four hours leaving twenty-two people dead and fifty wounded. 170 Despite Patria y

Libertad’s failure in the mutiny, the consequences of the uprising accomplished the goals of

Patria y Libertad nonetheless. First, it further radicalized an already tense situation and empowered the extremist elements on the Left, which awaited such a move by the far-right, who took the opportunity to mobilize and seize some 30,000 properties on the day of the uprising heightening the anxiety of the property-owning and middle classes. 171 Second, the uprising did not spur massive public demonstrations protesting the move by elements within the military against the government, and this acted to embolden high-ranking

167 The idea that the $4 million given to the PDC and NP for the sake of keeping democratic opposition alive has been offered by some scholars, see Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 160. 168 Grugel, “Nationalist Movements and Fascist Ideology in Chile,” 117-118. 169 Ibid., Haslam, The Nixon Administration… , 180-181. 170 Haslam, The Nixon Administration… , 180. 171 Ibid., 181-182.

51 officers in the CIA’s conduit that would take part in the September coup, such as General

Augusto Pinochet. 172

Three months later when the military launched a joint operation on the morning of

September 11, 1973 ending the Allende government and installing a military junta in its place, the ambitions of Patria y Libertad and the CIA were achieved. With its goal accomplished, Patria y Libertad offered its allegiance to the new rulers of Chile and disbanded. 173 However, the CIA conducted yet a darker set of actions as General Pinochet emerged from the military junta as the sole ruler of the country by 1974. Under the guise of instructing Pinochet’s newly established intelligence unit, Dirección de Inteligencia

Nacional (DINA), on how to confront “external” threats, the CIA assisted in training members of DINA inside the United States and Chile beginning in March 1974. 174

Furthermore, beginning in 1975 the head of DINA, General Manuel Contreras, became a paid CIA asset despite the Agency’s full knowledge of his complete disregard for human rights and his possible involvement in the deaths of former Chilean minister under Allende,

Orlando Letelier, and his American assistant, Ronni Moffitt. 175 Fully aware of the violent suppression, the banning of all political parties, and the institution of martial law going on in the country for years afterward, the CIA and the U.S. government did not shy away

172 Ibid. Haslam also makes the argument that the U.S. was directly involved in the actual coup of September 11, 1973 with a select group of officials in direct contact with Washington that bypassed the U.S. Ambassador, the State Department, and the CIA; see chapter seven, “The Hidden Hand Moves,” 158-221. 173 Grugel, “Nationalist Movements and Fascist Ideology in Chile,” 118. 174 John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: The New Press, 2004), 68-70; Kornbluh, The Pinochet File , 214-224; Joseph Trento, The Secret History of the CIA (New York: Prima Publishing, 2001), 394-395. For a perspective that portrays the CIA and the U.S. government completely unable to do anything about the human rights violations of Pinochet’s rule, see Gustafson, Hostile Intent , 235. 175 Kornbluh, “CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet’s Repression: Report to Congress Reveals U.S. Accountability in Chile,” Chile Documentation Project (September 2000) (accessed April 22, 2008) http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20000919/index.html

52 from supporting General Pinochet who would later be tried for the disappearance of over

2,000 people during his sixteen-year rule. 176

The use of violence by the CIA in Chile was, for the most part, effective. Though the operation launched to kidnap General Schneider did not, in its actual implementation, serve to further the goals of the CIA, the other avenues pursued by the Agency more than counter-balanced this. The use of Patria y Libertad radicalized both the far left and right inside Chile and furthered the common perception held by Chileans that civil violence was the impending outcome likely to occur in late 1973, playing into the objectives of the CIA.

Lastly, once the military finally moved against Allende and instituted the new rule, the CIA acted to ensure officials in Washington that the reemergence of leftist groups in Chile was not to be forthcoming for years to come. Proving just as effective and violent as their counterparts in the CIA, the FBI also undertook the use of violence against their target inside the United States.

Inciting & Directing Violence against the BPP

The politicization of the Bureau removed constraints imposed by U.S. statutes and relegated the BPP to an enemy force operating within the United States and was therefore treated accordingly. As the Church Committee argued, “Although the claimed purpose of the Bureau’s COINTELPRO tactics was to prevent violence, some of the FBI’s tactics against the BPP were clearly intended to foster violence, and many others could reasonably have been expected to cause violence.” 177 The most prominent examples of these FBI tactics were its efforts to instigate clashes between the Panthers and rival organizations in San

176 Trento, Secret History of the CIA , 400; Molly Todd, “Anti-SOA Campaign Enters Tenth Year,” NACLA Report on the Americas 33 (1999), p. 54. It was learned in Pinochet’s 1998 trial that ten of the thirty members tried alongside Pinochet for violations of human rights were graduates of the U.S.-ran School of Americas. 177 Panther Senate Report , 188.

53 Diego and Chicago. Additionally, the FBI coordinated with “red squads” to execute raids against the Panthers with the aim of ridding the BPP of strong leadership. These tactics will now be further examined.

The FBI sought to bring about a state of open warfare between the BPP and rival

Black Nationalist organizations. Organization US (referred after as US) was a Black

Nationalist group headed by Ron Karenga that competed with the BPP for the leadership role in the Southern California area during the late 1960s and early 1970s.178 It became the

FBI goal to capitalize upon this rivalry and exploit BPP and US friction in an effort to bring about violence. The Bureau sent false information through anonymous letters to

Black Panther headquarters in Los Angeles “informing” them that US had been made aware of a BPP plot to kill Ron Karenga and that they, in turn, had made plans to retaliate. 179 On January 17, 1969 the “gang warfare” scenario the FBI hoped to create came into being when BPP leaders Alprentice “Bunchy” Carter and John Huggins were shot and killed by US members on the campus of UCLA. 180 A month following the murders, the San Diego FBI office crafted and sent out derogatory cartoons to BPP members attributing them to US members aimed at escalating the hostilities. 181 Further, in an attempt to prevent a truce between the two groups, who began meetings in late March to end the escalating feud, the FBI sent further degrading material to the BPP while again falsely attributing it to US members. The possible truce collapsed and escalations soon

178 Scott Brown, Fighting for US: Maulana Karenga, the US Organization, and Black Cultural Nationalism (New York and London: New York University Press, 2005), 2; Churchill, COINTELPRO Papers , 130. 179 Churchill, COINTELPRO Papers , 132. 180 Panther Senate Report , 190. 181 Ibid., 190-191.

54 followed for which the local Bureau office boasted about creating such as the murder of

BPP member John Savage on May 23, 1969 at the hands of US members.182

The FBI continued to add to the mounting escalation of violence between the two groups as the deaths resulting from the rivalry increased well into the summer. In June,

FBI headquarters became aware of large amounts of ammunition purchases and fire arm training being conducted by US members, some of whom, had been directly responsible for the shootings of BPP members in the past. 183 Although this new information was in the possession of the FBI, the Bureau conducted another series of mailings with the same desired effect of inducing clashes. Two BPP members were shot and wounded and BPP member Sylvester Bell was killed by US members in mid-August. 184 A report filed by the

San Diego office concluded, “In view of the recent killing of BPP member Sylvester Bell, a new cartoon is being considered in the hopes that it will assist in the continuance of the rift between BPP and US. Shootings, beatings, and a high degree of unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of southeast San Diego. Although no specific counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this overall situation, it is felt that a substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributable to this program .” 185 The FBI continued to foment the discord and violence between the two organizations and, as the FBI saw it, “thus grant nature the opportunity to take her due course.” 186

The tactics practiced in San Diego against the BPP were also being used against its

Chicago chapter beginning in 1968 this time using the Chicago gang, the Black Stone

Rangers. The group was co-founded and led by Jeff Forte around Chicago’s West Side in

182 Ibid., 191; Churchill, COINTELPRO Papers , 135. 183 Panther Senate Report , 192. 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid., 192-193. Emphasis added. 186 Ibid., 194.

55 the late sixties. 187 The Chicago police considered this group very dangerous and linked it to over 250 murders between 1965 and 1969. 188 Not surprisingly, the criminal nature of the

Rangers was not of importance to the Bureau as long as they only continued to plague the surrounding Black community. 189 With the arrival of the Panthers who sought to transform urban gangs into politically-active groups supporting the Black Nationalist movement, FBI concerns grew that the Rangers may come to align with the BPP. 190

Twenty-one year old Fred Hampton, head of the Chicago chapter, began actively seeking an alliance with the Black Stone Rangers along with other gangs in Chicago including the

Mau Maus, Puertorriqueno Young Lords, and a white street gang called the Young

Patriots. 191 The FBI sought to prevent this, and efforts by Hampton to build an alliance with the Rangers were directly undermined by the Bureau.

To breakdown opportunities for a coalition between the two groups, the FBI again distributed false information and played upon the personality clashes between Blackstone

Ranger and BPP leaders. As talks began, the FBI’s Chicago office sent an anonymous letter to leader Jeff Fort explaining that the “concerned” writer was well acquainted with the

BPP and forewarned him of a fallacious “hit out for you” by BPP leadership. 192 After this initial start, the relationship between Fort and Hampton escalated and subsided periodically throughout 1969 due in part to clashing personalities, but also due to FBI false-letter schemes with the Bureau’s stated purpose that these letters, “…may intensify

187 Lance Williams, “Black Power, Politics, and Gangbanging” lecture at the UIC School of Public Health in Chicago, Illinois, October 18, 2001 http://gangresearch.net/ChicagoGangs/blackstonerangers/lance.htm (accessed 27 April 2008). 188 Panther Senate Report , op. cit., 195. 189 Kenneth O’Reilly, Racial Matters , 303. 190 Ibid. 191 Church and Wall, COINTELPRO Papers , 139. This alliance among the rival gangs of Chicago was what Hampton referred to as his “Rainbow Coalition,” later used by the Rev. Jesse Jackson. 192 Panther Senate Report , 195.

56 the degree of animosity between the two groups and occasion Forte to take retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership.” 193 The integration of the two groups never took place, though a general peace was adhered to. The possibility of this merger perhaps taking place in the future was lost after the death of Fred

Hampton during a police raid on his apartment on December 4, 1969. 194 The events surrounding the death of Mr. Hampton in his Chicago apartment illustrates one of the most violent operations undertaken by the FBI and its law enforcement assets, and will now be elaborated upon.

As discussed previously, a close collaboration had developed between the FBI and the Chicago’s GIU in their shared interest in actively confronting the BPP. A growing problem shared by both was the emerging Black Panther chapter in the city’s west side led by a charismatic, up-and-coming BPP leader named Fred Hampton. FBI attempts to have

Fred Hampton “marginalized” via their attempts to instigate violence between the BPP and the Black Stone Rangers failed to neutralize the BPP leader. In fact, Hampton had orchestrated an, albeit tenuous, agreement of cooperation between rival gangs of various ethnicities that he coined the “Rainbow Coalition” and was soon to be promoted to the

BPP’s Chief of Staff. 195 Actions by the FBI and the GIU to address this growing individual threat culminated with the early morning raid on Hampton and other BPP members on

December 4, 1969.

As with other COINTELPRO operations, the first stage of directly confronting this threat consisted of successful infiltration. By the time of the raid, the FBI held between

193 Ibid., 197. 194 Ibid., 223. 195 Churchill, COINTELPRO Papers , 139; Todd Fraley and Elli Lester-Roushanzamir, “Revolutionary Leader or Deviant Thug? A Comparative Analysis of the Chicago Tribune and Chicago Daily Defender’s Reporting on the Death of Fred Hampton,” The Howard Journal of Communications (2004), 150.

57 seven to nine informants inside the Chicago chapter while the GIU held twenty. 196 One key informant was William O’Neal who was planted at the founding of the chapter and acquired the position of head of security within the BPP. By mid-November O’Neal met with FBI Special Agent Roy Mitchell to provide a detailed floor plan of the Hampton apartment that included individual sleeping arrangements. 197 The FBI approached Cook

County State’s Attorney Edward Hanrahan, who oversaw GIU operations, and proposed the December police raid based on FBI assertions of illegally obtained weapons residing in the apartment. However, both O’Neal and another infiltrator, Maria Fisher, reported to the Bureau that the firearms in question were obtained legally as early as the 19 th of

November. 198 Despite this, warrants were issued off the claim that informant intelligence pointed to illegal firearms residing in the apartment.

On the early hours of December 4, 1969 a fourteen man police squad gathered outside the apartment with additional police stationed on nearby roofs and around the surrounding block. 199 According to initial police statements, after announcing themselves to those inside the police attempted to enter the apartment when they were greeted with a shotgun volley. A fire fight soon ensued leaving Fred Hampton and Mark Clark (who headed up the Peoria BPP chapter in Illinois) dead and four other BPP members wounded and later charged with the attempted murder of the raiding police officers. 200

The raid was construed by government officials to be a major success and public officials aimed to preempt the potential public outcry especially among Chicago’s Black community. State Attorney Hanrahan declared after the raid, “We whole-heartedly

196 Gottlieb and Jeff Cohen, “The FBI On Trial,” 681. 197 Churchill, COINTELPRO Papers , 139. 198 Gottlieb and Jeff Cohen, “The FBI On Trial: Was Fred Hampton Executed?” 681; O’Reilly, Racial Matters , 314. 199 John Kifners, “Police In Chicago Slay 2 Panthers,” The New York Times , 5 December 1969, 1. 200 Ibid.

58 commend the police officers for their bravery, their remarkable restraint and their discipline in the face of this vicious Black Panther attack and we expect every decent citizen of our community to do likewise.” 201 Despite these attempts at suppressing potential public backlash, facts emerging afterwards came to refute the official line given by government authorities.

As new revelations became known, it became clear that the chaotic gun battle described by police as they entered the apartment was false. Of the approximately ninety- eight rounds fired during the raid, all but one originated from a police firearm. The lone discharge by a Panther, Mark Clark, was fired after he sustained a bullet wound to his heart. 202 These ballistic accounts served to severely discredit Hanrahan’s claim of

“restrained” police behavior during the raid. Further damning the official report was the revelation that the shotgun blast that supposedly greeted the incoming police failed to show itself anywhere near the police entry point. What was found by investigators, however, were makeshift “bullet holes” around the doorway made by authorities attempting to cover up their false allegation by puncturing the doorway area with nails. 203

As to the State Attorney’s account of the “disciplined” behavior on the part of the police; the only disciplined aspect of the raid was the concentrated fire laid down onto the back bedroom and bed that authorities knew Fred Hampton slept in.204 Lastly, the question still lingers as to the whether Hampton sustained the two gunshot wounds to his head after the initial entrance by police as was described by surviving BPP members of the raid.205

201 Hugh Hough and Thomas Dolan, “2 Panthers Killed in Duel With Police,” The Washington Post , 5 December 1969, sec A, 3. 202 Churchill, COINTELPRO Papers , 140; Gottlieb and Jeff Cohen, “The FBI On Trial,” 680. 203 Nathaniel Sheppard, “Plaintiffs in Panther Suit ‘Knew We Were Right,’” The New York Times , 14 November 1982, 82. 204 Francis Ward, “Demand for Probe into Panther Death Grows,” The Los Angeles Times , 12 December 1969, 17. 205 Gottlieb and Jeff Cohen, “The FBI On Trial,” 682.

59 Given the severe falsehoods found in initial police statements, the absence of returning fire by the BPP residents inside the apartment, and the concentrated fire upon the room and bed of Fred Hampton, it appears to be a very credible argument that Hampton was indeed the victim of a pre-planned assassination. 206

The loss of Fred Hampton to the Black Panther chapter in Chicago played a key role in the chapter’s dismantlement, accomplishing the objective of the FBI operation.207

The leadership Hampton would have, very plausibly, attained within the BPP hierarchy would have provided a young, charismatic leader to carry on the organization’s voice while its other leaders resided behind bars or outside of the country.

The culmination of all the methods employed by both the CIA and FBI proved devastating. The threat of Allende was now over with and the effective training of the

Chilean intelligence service ensured that a leftist threat against taking place in Chile was now erased for the foreseeable future. Inside the United States, the BPP stood decapitated, internally divided, and financially strapped following the FBI’s effective operations launched against it. Now that all four of these factors have been fully illustrated, the following section will highlight the main parallels emerging out of the analysis.

PARALLELS

206 Some may speculate that if the officers truly intended to assassinate Hampton they would have also murdered the other BPP members in the apartment so as to leave no eye witnesses to testify against them. This question fails to take into consideration the imbalance of the American justice system and the utter lack of credibility surviving BPP members carried with the legal system or major media compared with that of a U.S. government agency and city police department. This was amply proven shortly thereafter. While a grand jury indicted the police officers involved, including State Attorney Hanrahan and informant O’Neal, the case was dropped due to, according to Judge Phillip Romitti, a lack of evidence on November 1, 1972 despite all the emerging evidence pointing to the contrary. The local authorities and the FBI had nothing to fear from the criminal justice system. Nonetheless, the families of Fred Hampton and Henry Clark along with the survivors of the raid continued pursuing a civil lawsuit against the Government and the Chicago Police Department after the criminal case had been dropped. It took over a decade after the raid, but eventually they won a $1.85 million lawsuit against the federal government, city of Chicago, and Cook County in November of 1982. 207 Gottlieb and Jeff Cohen, “The FBI On Trial,” 684.

60 This paper has illustrated the methods and tactics employed by the CIA inside Chile and the BPP inside the United States against designated threats. Four variables were utilized in order to apply and compare each across cases. This section will examine the parallels between cases to show how the domestic and international spheres of intelligence operations experienced interflow and, as a consequence, allowed the harsh tactics reserved for operations abroad to be used against U.S. citizens.

The efforts taken by the CIA and FBI to instill within the targeted public’s psyche that violence and chaos were to be associated with the Allende government and the Black

Panther Party respectively were highly successful. In each case, media outlets were immediately searched out and friendly contacts established. In the case of Chile numerous newspapers such as El Mercurio consistently portrayed Allende as the impending Castro of

Chile. The FBI’s friendly contacts in the media produced articles and documentaries that facilitated the construction of the BPP as the nightmare of White America and discredited the group within the Black community. While the Agency had the words “your wall” plastered on street corners from town to town in an effort to reinforce the fear some

Chileans held concerning a possible Allende presidency, the FBI constructed its own BPP children’s coloring book in an effort to end the social program and reaffirm White

America’s fear about the group.

In seeking conduits, both CIA infiltration of the Chilean military and FBI relations with local law enforcement were based upon the desire to infuse the agencies with a powerful agent of authority in order to accomplish the designated mission. The CIA’s objective of ending the Allende government could only be realistically accomplished if its reluctant conduit was pushed to act. Similarly, the effectiveness of the COINTELPRO

61 program for the FBI largely depended upon whether strong relationships fostering collaboration were formed with police departments nationwide to allow for a coherent, coordinated attack on the BPP. One crucial difference, however, was how each agency had to approach their relationship with their conduits: the CIA faced a reluctant actor that had to be “motivated” to act, whereas, the FBI possessed an ally so eager to act against a politically-radical Black organization that it required the protective capabilities of the

Bureau in the form of corrupt investigations and public testimony dismissing allegations of police brutality to prevent the conduit from jeopardizing the mission.

For the third analytical factor, economic constriction, similarities across cases were also found. The CIA and FBI successfully deprived both the Allende government and the

BPP of vital resources thus weakening their ability to effectively counter the multi-faceted attack the CIA and FBI launched against them. Allende’s inability to overcome the huge economic hurdles facing Chile was further exasperated by CIA operations in the form of sponsoring groups to undertake industrial sabotage and its support of opposition parties who then funded labor strikes in economically vital sectors of the country. Meanwhile, the

FBI used its position of power inside the United States to intimidate those providing shelter to the BPP or placing a phone call with a U.S. airline that subsequently increased their air fare for the circulation of the Black Panther newspaper. Through the use of more covert means the Bureau also was successful at ending support given by church groups for example, with anonymous mailings or false information to journalists.

The use of employing acts of violence or tactics with the aim of causing violence were also similarly used by both agencies. Whereas the CIA founded and funded a paramilitary group to violently confront supporters of the Allende government, the FBI

62 successfully provoked violent clashes between the BPP and rivals such as Organization US and the Blackstone Rangers. Furthermore, the Agency sought and organized the plot to kidnap General Schneider (though it withdrew support for the plot due to reservations about its success) and later it helped train and acquire assets within the brutal intelligence service of General Pinochet. Inside the United States, the Bureau coordinated aggressive police raids against the BPP with the intent to remove leadership in the party, as was done against chapter leader Fred Hampton of Chicago.

Most importantly, each method used by the CIA and FBI worked to build off the other methods so as to have a powerful culminating effect. In Chile, CIA-influenced newspapers laid blame for terrorist attacks on leftist groups while CIA-funded groups actually carried them out. The economic crisis the CIA helped to bring about in the

Chilean economy helped to push high-ranking military officials to support intervention against the Allende government. Inside the United States, the FBI use of “black propaganda” aimed to discredit the Panthers in their surrounding communities which, in turn, closed down potential avenues for financial support. Its tactics to bring about violent clashes between the BPP and nearby rivals provided the needed pretext for increased activity of local police. Through its friendly contacts in media, the Bureau was able to help mold how the public saw the BPP which then helped silence its potential outcry following violent raids by its conduit.

POSSIBLE FUTURE APPLICATIONS

An analytical framework derived from this comparative work may be applicable to other covert actions by the United States government against what it deems to be present and future threats. This section aims to outline that framework. This thesis shows that

63 there are stages through which covert operations precede and that these stages coalesce and are intertwined so as to create a powerful culminating effect onto the target.

MULTI-TRACK MODEL

MOLDING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

The goal is to successfully marginalize the threat by molding the public’s perception in a negative fashion towards the group in a way that: first, diminishes support from potential supporters; and second, motivates opposition elements to rally to confront it. The agencies will seek out the major media outlets of the country where operations are taking place in order to portray the target as a vilified persona that no longer possesses shared traits with members of their surrounding community. Critical then is to break the connection between the target and the public regardless of what that connection is, religious, political, and so forth.

FINDING CONDUITS

In finding its potential conduit, the agencies will look for entities that possess legally-mandated authority and instruments to apply mass coercive force. To acquire influence, agencies court these potential conduits through various means; such as financial incentives, distribution of false and threatening information about the target, greater frequency and intensity of agency/conduit relations in the form of training or joint operations, and/or agency deflection of domestic or international criticism.

64

ECONOMIC CONSTRICTION

The agencies will seek to significantly halt or delay the target’s required resources to maintain stability and group cohesiveness. Further, this will limit the target’s abilities to endure and counter the other agencies’ efforts that are also underway. This may be done by sponsoring groups to carry out strategic industrial sabotage, stripping away financial donors, and/or using agency-friendly organizations to shut down vital sectors of the target’s economy.

USE OF VIOLENCE

The agencies will aim to remove key individuals within the targeted group or individuals holding strategic position inside other institutions. The range of these violent actions may range from kidnapping to assassination. Additionally, the agency may engage in establishing and funding organizations that will violently oppose the target and/or provoking violent escalations between the target and target rivals.

The general framework provided above can assist in the study of other covert operations of the past, where declassified information provides a detailed account, or provide areas of focus when viewing current covert operations. However, unique aspects of an emerging threat or its surrounding community may substantially alter the methods and approach used in these operations. One potential aspect concerns economic dependence. In the two cases this paper analyzes, both were groups economically dependent upon the U.S. economy. In Chile, this can be seen by the lasting effects brought on by the Alliance for

65 Progress and the dominance of U.S. foreign investment in the country prior to Allende.

While in the United States, the BPP drew its financial resources from an economic system that was able to come under tremendous pressure from government authorities like the

FBI. If operations were to be executed in a region not dependent upon continued access to the U.S. economy, the economic constriction method would have to be radically altered possibly incorporating the use of U.S. influence on international banking institutions such as the World Bank in order to remain effective.

In addition to the analytical framework that comes out of this study which may prove helpful in future scholarly inquiries, there lie important lessons to be learned about the potential for abuse by government agencies in charge of the security of the United

States. It is important to understand the consequences that arise from a historic example that demonstrates the occurrence of interflow in U.S. intelligence. Such as, “Why did the constitutional protections each U.S. citizen supposedly enjoys fail to constrain FBI action in its domestic operations?” and, “What were the conditions that erected a gateway for such an interflow to take place, and how can they be prevented from arising again?”

CONCLUSION

The paper has shown, comparatively, that actions taken abroad and at home by the

U.S. government against individuals or groups deemed a threat to national security during a time of great social upheaval bear striking parallels. From this analysis it becomes evident that during the years of COINTELPRO-Black Nationalism and the rise of

Salvador Allende, any clear distinction in how to confront domestic or international threats in the minds of U.S. government administrations and those heading U.S. intelligence simply did not exist. The constitutional protections thought to withstand the infiltration of tactics

66 practiced overseas from being used at home has been seen to bend and, at times, crumble as the very authorities charged with its enforcement dismissed its relevance when it served to impede their objectives. The reasons for this failure are complex, but several prominent features emerge to the forefront.

First, though the words of the U.S. Constitution may be permanently etched in writing and on display in the nation’s capital, they still remain intangible concepts that are only given life when a society and its governing institutions respectfully abide by them. This concept was lost on American society in the midst of the Cold War as a U.S. government came to redefine who constituted a “true” American and, therefore, who warranted constitutional protection. In the crusade of confronting communism, American society bought into the rhetoric offered up by opportunistic politicians and an overzealous intelligence community demanding a sacrifice of constitutional freedoms to withstand such a threat. Furthermore, those who critically questioned the U.S. government were ostracized from the rest of American society. In an ironic twist, it was the work of staunch anticommunists like J. Edgar Hoover and Richard Nixon that allowed for America’s cherished rights of the individual, while boasted about by these same individuals over the social conformity of communism in the rhetoric of the Cold War, were surrendered in the pursuit of rooting out non-conformity in the United States.

The second dominant factor lies in the ethnic dynamics at play in regards to the FBI actions against the BPP. The task of separating those not fitting into the category of what constituted true Americas was made easier by the fact that the radical group in question, the BPP, originated from the African American community. White Americans perceived the emergence of a group like the BPP as simply the work of communist ideology and

67 nothing more; thus, relieving themselves of having to confront the historic and contemporary racial inequalities that were primary factors for the emergence of such a group. Though FBI efforts presented a slanted view of the BPP and U.S. media were biased in their reporting of police raids against the BPP, it does not fully account for the lack of public outcry in the White community. The silence heard from the majority of White

Americans was primarily rooted in just how alien they viewed the BPP and their struggle.

Third, as American society quietly accepted the idea that horrible actions would be taken abroad by the CIA in the name of securing its liberty, it may have falsely believed that consequences for this ambivalence would not be forthcoming. However, as

Shakespeare famously remarked in Macbeth , “We still have judgment here; that we but teach/ Bloody instructions, which, being taught, return/ To plague the inventor: this even- handed justice.” 208 The license given to the CIA to accomplish its mission where

“acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply” 209 may act to secure American interests abroad but it also acts to ease the ability for government officials to institute policies that bring about interflow. This is especially true given a political environment where a particular ideology is the declared enemy and attributes such as loyalty and patriotism are twisted to become synonymous with blind adherence to intrusive and oppressive government policies. Testifying before the Church Committee in 1976, Assistant

Director of the FBI, William Sullivan, stated, “We have used [similar] techniques against

208 William Shakespeare, Macbeth Act 1, Scene 7 http://shakespeare.mit.edu/macbeth/macbeth.1.7.html (accessed on May 4, 2008), 9-11. 209 CIA secret document prepared for President Dwight Eisenhower quoted in Loch Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies,” 10.

68 Soviet agents. [The same methods were] brought home against any organization against which we were targeted. We did not differentiate.” 210

In our contemporary period, this paper should serve to demonstrate the dangerous parallels concerning the current debate ongoing in the United States concerning the balance between security and liberty in the midst of the War on Terrorism. Following the attacks of September 11 th policy makers in Washington and scholars in the field of domestic and international security have asserted aggressive policy reform regarding U.S. intelligence. 211 Current Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, asserts that abiding by the historic distinctions that separate domestic and international intelligence operations, “would be a serious impediment to protecting U.S. national security. The

United States has enemies who seek to acquire and detonate weapons of mass destruction on U.S. soil… and the intelligence community’s work to thwart it must not be constrained by the policies of the past.” 212 Similarly, the Kean Commission, a national commission set up to investigate the attacks of 9/11, offered policy recommendations whereby, “[t]he FBI’s job in the streets of the United States would thus be a domestic equivalent, operating under the U.S. Constitution and quite different laws and rules, to the job of the CIA’s operations officers abroad.” 213

Admittedly, there have been significant reforms in the ability of Congress to oversee the activities of the intelligence community since the days of Salvador Allende and the

Black Panther Party and there may rightly be a need for significant reform in how the

210 William Sullivan quoted in Johnson, “Congressional Supervision…,” 9. 211 For examples, see Wannall, “Undermining Counterintelligence Capability,” 321-329; Barger, “It is Time to Transform, Not Reform, U.S. Intelligence,” 23-31: McConnell, 49-58. Todd Masse, “Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States,” Congressional Research Service (2003). The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Report: The Complete Investigation, New York Times edition (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2004). 212 McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence,” 52. 213 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Report… , 602.

69 intelligence community operates following 9/11. However, this strong push towards securing the homeland needs to be tempered with lessons of the past, such as the one discussed in this paper, so that sensible measures are taken that are effective yet ensure that a repeat of one of the darker chapters of U.S. government abuse of power never again takes place.

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