112 Teague, Elizabeth. "Signs of Rivalry between Andropov and Chernenko." Radio Free Europe, 25 May 1982. "Andropov and Chernenko: Who's Ahead?" Radio Free Europe, 30 August 1982. "Andropov's First Hundred Days: Domestic Policy." Radio Free Europe, 21 February 1983. Wheatcroft, Stephen G. "Agricultural Reform, the Food Program and the 27th Party Congress." in Miller, Miller, and Rigby, ed. Gorbachev at the Helm. London: CroomHelm, 1987: 161-188. Willerton, John P. "Patronage Networks and Coalition Building in the Brezhnev Era." Soviet Studies 39, no. 2 (April 1987): 175-204. Zauberman, Alfred. "Liberman's Rules of the Game for Soviet Industry." Slavic Review 22, no. 4 (Dec, 1983): 734-744. Zemtsov, Ilya. Andropov: Policy Dilemmas and the Struggle for Power. Jerusalem: IRICS Publishers, 1983. Zemtsov, Ilya. Chernenko: The Last Bolshevik. The Soviet Union on the Eve of Perestroika. Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1989. University of Alberta The End of Stagnation? A Reexamination of Domestic Policy in the Soviet Union from 1982-1985 under the Leadership of Iurii Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko by Meaghan Elizabeth Bernard A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of History and Classics in History Edmonton, Alberta Fall 2008 Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-46949-1 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-46949-1 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privee, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont ete enleves de cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. Canada Abstract This thesis examines the domestic policies enacted by both Iurii Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko during their brief terms as General Secretary of the Soviet Union from 1982 to 1985. Through the examination of a number of official party documents, decrees, speeches and writings, and newspapers, the thesis questions the common perception of this period as one of stagnation that continued from the era of Leonid Brezhnev is disproved. The above-mentioned sources are used to re-examine economic policy, managerial reforms and the development of consumer goods. Not only was this "interregnum" (between Brezhnev's lengthy rule and Mikhail Gorbachev's ascendance) different from the periods that preceded and followed it, but the policies of Andropov and Chernenko differed from each other, thus creating another element that undermines the myth of continued stagnation. It is posited that the existing literature regarding this interregnum fails to recognize the impact that the policy alterations enacted by these leaders had on the future direction of the Soviet Union. Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible without assistance and support from my University. In particular, the Department of History and Classics at the University of Alberta has financially supported my research and travel over the past two years and as such allowed me to gather important documents that otherwise would not be available. Dr. David Marples provided me with invaluable support and advice throughout this process and helped me to realize my full potential. Through its Summer Research Laboratory, the Russian, East European, and Eurasian Centre at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign provided me with essential materials and the university's librarians offered helpful advice on their collections. However, none of this would have been possible without the encouragement I received at Dalhousie University from both Norman Pereira and Natalia Koutovenko who from the very beginning of my university career pushed me to succeed in my studies of both Russian history and language. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends who continued to support me throughout this process, through good times and bad and from all sides of the country. Your support and words of encouragement gave me the confidence I needed to persevere and I appreciate everything. Table of Contents Introduction 1 Chapter One: A Stagnating Economy: Strategic Attempts to Reverse a Recession 14 Chapter Two: Forgetting the Past: The Discipline and Anti-Corruption Campaigns and the Mini-Purges of Andropov and Chernenko 44 Chapter Three: The Impact of Social Issues on the Policies of New Leaders 73 Conclusion 95 Bibliography 101 1 Introduction The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the monumental political and social tumult that directly preceded it, have been examined and reexamined by scholars over the past two decades.1 As the initiator of Perestroika and Glasnost, Mikhail Gorbachev has been regarded habitually as the man who wrenched the Soviet Union out of its decades-long decline and stagnation and thrust it into an environment where every aspect of the country was forced to adapt in order to survive in a technologically and scientifically advanced world. Since Gorbachev's ascendance to power until the present day, scholars have speculated on the origins and motivations behind his large scale reforms without thoroughly searching for their roots.2 The stagnation of the later years of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev's lengthy regime of 1964 to 1982 is often used to accentuate the degree of change that began immediately following Gorbachev's climb to power; however, the interregnum period between these two historic leaders is largely omitted in the scholarship. The argument that economic decline, detente, and a gerontocratic leadership prevailed until March 1985 is commonly perpetuated, when in fact, the interregnum leaders demonstrated both desire and willingness for reform. Though each had very short terms in office, Iurii Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko attempted to See for example: Valery Boldin Ten Years that Shook the World. The Gorbachev Era as Witnessed by his Chief of Staff (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Alexander Dallin ed., Russian and Soviet History 1500- 1991. The Gorbachev Era (New York: Garland, 1992); Mark Galeotti, Gorbachev and his Revolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). See Michel Tatu, Mikhail Gorbachev. The Origins of Perestroika (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1991); and especially Martin McCauley, Gorbachev (London: Longman, 1998) who provides little background on the interregnum period unless it is directly related to Gorbachev's personal advancement within the party. 3 The term interregnum is used throughout this thesis to describe the period of 1982-1985. Although both Andropov and Chernenko were legitimate rulers according to the Soviet pattern, die deaths of three leaders in rapid succession prevented permanent stability in the upper echelons of the Communist Party. It is the temporary nature of these leaders' positions that has prompted the use of this term to describe the period at hand. 2 implement new policies that could have revitalized and restructured the Soviet government and economy. There has been a history of economic reform in the Soviet Union—the interregnum leaders were not the first to implement such a program. As early as the 1920s mechanisms were put in place to ensure and promote economic prosperity in different aspects of the economy. Vladimir Lenin began economic reforms with the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921 in an effort to rebuild the country after years of war and provide impetus for private farming and smaller industrial enterprises. Shortly thereafter, Joseph Stalin introduced the Five-Year Plan system which continued to be used as a central planning system until the end of the Soviet Union. Although this program prevailed, many leaders altered different aspects of its foundations over the years. For example Nikita Khrushchev radically altered the governing structure when he split the government into two factions: one to monitor industry and the other for agriculture. Khrushchev's reforms in agriculture have been criticized as being ill- thought-out