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Universidad De Quintana Roo UNIVERSIDAD DE QUINTANA ROO División de Ciencias Políticas y Humanidades La cuestión kurda en el Medio Oriente: evolución e implicaciones regionales. TESIS Para obtener el grado de LICENCIADO EN RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Presenta Juan Carlos Castillo Quiñones Director de Tesis Dr. Enrique Baltar Rodríguez Chetumal, Quintana Roo, México, 2009. 1 2 Agradezco a todos aquellos que ayudaron a la realización de este trabajo. En especial, al Dr. Enrique Baltar, quien con su valiosa dirección e indicaciones, permitió culminar la investigación; así como, al apoyo ofrecido por la Dra. Marta Tawil, con sus atinadas observaciones y comentarios. A mi Familia que me ha apoyado a lo largo de mi vida. A mis Amigos que me acompañaron durante la carrera e hicieron más amena mi estancia en la Universidad. Y al jurado designado que se prestó a leer esta tesis, para enriquecerla con sus correcciones. 3 ÍNDICE Introducción ……………………………………………………………………………….. 5 1. Capítulo I. Antecedentes y origen del conflicto …………………………… 13 1.1. Los kurdos bajo el imperio otomano ………………………………………. 14 1.1.1. Los orígenes del movimiento nacional kurdo …………………………… 16 1.1.2. Las primeras organizaciones nacionales kurdas ……………………….. 22 1.1.3. La Primera Guerra Mundial ………………………………………………….. 24 1.2. Los años de Posguerra ……………………………………………………… 27 1.2.1. El Tratado de Sèvres ………………………………………………………… 30 1.2.2. La guerra turca de independencia y el Tratado de Lausana ………….. 34 2. Capítulo II. Los kurdos en el escenario regional (1945-1990) ………….. 44 2.1. El Kurdistán en Turquía ……………………………………………………… 44 2.1.1. Etno-nacionalismo kurdo en Turquía …………………………………….. 45 2.1.2. Resurgimiento y cambio en el movimiento nacionalista ………………. 48 2.1.3. El PKK y el movimiento de masas …………………………………………. 54 2.2. El Kurdistán en Irán ………………………………………………………….. 59 2.2.1. Formación de la República Kurda de Mahâbâd …………………………. 60 2.2.2. El nacionalismo kurdo y la dictadura Pahlevi …………………………… 65 2.2.3. La revolución islámica y su impacto en el Kurdistán …………………… 69 2.3. El Kurdistán en Irak ………………………………………………………….. 71 2.3.1. El vilayato de Mosul y los intereses petrolíferos del imperialismo británico ………………………………………………….. 72 2.3.2. El movimiento nacionalista y la era pos hashemita ……………………. 76 2.3.3. La llegada del Baath al poder: la consecución de la autonomía kurda. 81 2.3.3.1. La guerra Irán-Irak (1980-1988) y sus consecuencias en el Kurdistán. 85 2.3.4. Los kurdos en Siria …………………………………………………………... 88 3. Capítulo III. Los kurdos en el nuevo escenario internacional (1990-2008). 92 3.1. La guerra del Golfo Pérsico. Lucha armada y autogobierno …………… 92 3.1.1. El Kurdistán iraquí y la dimensión turca en el conflicto ………………… 96 3.1.2. Los kurdos en Turquía y el protagonismo del PKK ……………………… 99 3.2. El resurgimiento del panturquismo y sus implicaciones geopolíticas… 102 3.3. La potencialidad económica del Kurdistán ……………………………….. 105 3.3.1. La importancia del Kurdistán dentro de las rutas de oleoductos Oriente Medio- Mediterráneo y la Cuenca del Caspio ………………….. 112 3.4. La contienda por el Kurdistán iraquí ……………………………………….. 123 3.4.1. La respuesta del Estado turco al reto kurdo……………………………….. 127 3.4.2. La cuestión kurda en la coyuntura de la guerra contra el terrorismo: la invasión a Irak y las consecuencias de la realineación estratégica en la región ……………………………………………………… 131 Conclusiones ………………………………………………………………………………. 145 Anexos ………………………………………………………………………………………. 152 Bibliografía …………………………………………………………………………………. 155 4 INTRODUCCIÓN La etnia kurda, conformada por una población que oscila entre los 24 y 27 millones de personas 1, se distingue por ser la más grande minoría en el Medio Oriente que no se encuentra establecida en alguna forma de Estado nacional. Lo anterior, pese a una larga lucha extendida por más de ocho décadas y que continúa hoy día de forma intermitente en un territorio con una continuidad geográfica. Para fines de este trabajo, los kurdos serán considerados como un grupo étnico en el sentido de la definición de Hutchinson y Smith, es decir “Una población identificada con mitos de un pasado común, que comparte una memoria histórica, uno o más elementos culturales comunes, un vínculo con la patria y sentido de solidaridad entre al menos algunos de sus miembros.” 2 En este sentido, Andrés de Blas señala que, “(…) muy pocos pueblos sin tener una común base territorial y en condiciones tan desventajosas, han podido desarrollar un sentido de comunidad, así como un considerable grado de conciencia nacional como los kurdos” (1997: 239). El sentimiento nacionalista de esta gran comunidad ha tenido como principal argumento a lo largo del siglo XX, la reivindicación de un Estado kurdo independiente, alegando razones de una larga –casi mítica- historia común entre estos grupos de similar origen e identidad cultural. Gradualmente, dicha retórica fue bajando de tono y en la mayoría de las regiones que conforman el Kurdistán (Turquía, Irak, Irán y Siria) la exigencia ahora será obtener amplia autonomía dentro de un sistema verdaderamente federal (Ciment, 1996: 10-14). La cuestión kurda como fenómeno de reivindicación etnonacional ha estado constantemente presente en la agenda regional e internacional desde el colapso del imperio otomano, después de la Primera Guerra Mundial y el reparto colonial de Medio Oriente. Desde entonces, la comunidad kurda fue dividida entre los Estados-nación de Turquía, Irán, Irak y Siria principalmente, así como una pequeña porción de su territorio en Armenia y Azerbaiyán (la provincia autónoma de Najichevan). Dichos Estados, progresivamente, por los avatares políticos de la región y las guerras, fueron sumando 1 Resulta difícil establecer con precisión el número total de personas que conforman a esta etnia debido a la falta de un censo que arroje datos confiables en los países donde habitan y por la cantidad imprecisa de la diáspora kurda dentro y fuera de la región de Medio Oriente. Por tanto las cifras varían de una fuente a otra. Sin embargo, existe cierto consenso al manejar, por lo menos, una modesta cantidad de 25 millones de kurdos (McDowall, 2004). 2 Véase John Hutchinson y Anthoy D. Smith, eds. Ethnicity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 6. 5 partes del territorio kurdo e imponiendo sus respectivas administraciones a las poblaciones asentadas en aquellas zonas. A lo largo del siglo XX en Turquía, Irán y Siria los kurdos han sido privados de la mayoría de sus derechos más elementales, incluyendo el derecho a aprender su propio lenguaje en las escuelas y a salvaguardar su identidad cultural. En Irak, el único lugar donde existe una región autónoma kurda, la política de arabización (especialmente en el caso de Kirkuk) consistente en la transferencia de población árabe a zonas habitadas por kurdos, ha afectado zonas con ricos yacimientos petrolíferos o áreas fronterizas; esto ocasionó que dicha región autónoma fuera considerablemente reducida. Sin embargo, los kurdos son reconocidos (en Irak) como una entidad y disfrutan de mayores derechos políticos (autogobierno) y culturales con respectos de otras zonas del Kurdistán 3. Los efectos de la invasión a Irak en 2003 y los recientes sucesos en el Kurdistán (invasión turca al norte iraquí en febrero de 2008), otorgaron a los líderes kurdos en Irak mayor autonomía que la alcanzada desde 1991, incluso abriendo la posibilidad de conformar un Estado en la región autónoma tras el colapso del gobierno central en Bagdad y el acercamiento con Estados Unidos para derrocar al régimen de Hussein ( Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 81, noviembre 2008). Así, los kurdos en Irak encaran una gran oportunidad, no vista desde 1918, para satisfacer con éxito muchas de sus demandas como etnia. Mientras tanto, el deseo de Turquía de integrarse a la Unión Europea ofrece a los kurdos la esperanza de que finalmente, después de casi un siglo sin reconocer sus derechos políticos y culturales, la república turca pueda abrirse a una sociedad pluralista. El esbozo anterior permite dimensionar, de manera general, el importante papel estratégico que la cuestión kurda tiene en la región de Medio Oriente y el latente foco de inestabilidad que representa la ausencia de voluntad política para resolverlo, al alimentar las rivalidades regionales, las cuales podrían devenir en futuros conflictos. Por tanto, este trabajo tiene como objetivo principal analizar la evolución del nacionalismo kurdo y los principales factores externos e internos que derivaron en su 3 Esto se explica, en parte, por el proceso histórico de construcción nacional del Estado iraquí, pues las potencias vencedores en la Primera Guerra Mundial crearon un Estado sin tomar en cuenta las divisiones étnicas existentes en las provincias otomanas, provocando que el nacionalismo iraquí fuera muy débil y fragmentado. A diferencia de otros Estados como Turquía, donde el nacionalismo tuvo como pilar la indivisibilidad del pueblo y la cultura turca, la idea de una nación iraquí fue tejida fuera del entramado interno. Al paso de los años el liderazgo en Bagdad, con parciales excepciones de ciertos elementos pan-árabes en el sector militar, ha optado por una forma inclusiva de nacionalismo, abrazando en su interior a las diversas minorías como componentes distintos pero integrales de la nación iraquí. Más aún, a diferencia de Turquía donde los líderes y las instituciones políticas tradicionales kurdas fueron virtualmente eliminadas, las grandes confederaciones tribales kurdas han permanecido casi intactas en Irak (Ciment, 1996: 10-13). 6 incapacidad para conformar un Estado-nación,
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