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AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN 16Th – 31St January 2019 Edition No: 002 ABOUT AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN

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AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN 16Th – 31St January 2019 Edition No: 002 ABOUT AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN AFRICAN UNION UNION AFRICAINE UNIÃO AFRICANA اﻻتحاد اﻻفريقي ACSRT/CAERT African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism Centre Africain d’Etudes et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN 16th – 31st January 2019 Edition No: 002 ABOUT AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN As part of its mandate to help build Counter Terrorism capacity of African Union Member States, and keep African Counter Terrorism Practitioners abreast with current trends of terrorism in Africa, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) has developed tools that allow it to collect, analyze and disseminate terrorism related incidents in Africa. The information gathering, processing and data analysis allow the ACSRT to provide Member States and P/CVE Practitioners with relevant information on trends and development of terrorism in Africa. The ACSRT disseminates its analysis of data collected on terrorism incidents through various productions. The Africa Terrorism Bulletin, a fortnightly compilation and data analysis is to form the basis for an African Terrorism Trend Analysis to be published by the Centre quarterly. THE BULLETIN IS PRODUCED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF H.E. Larry GBEVLO-LARTEY Esq., AU Special Representative for Counter Terrorism Cooperation / Director ACSRT RESEARCHERS Mr. Aristide IGIRANEZA, ACSRT Mr. Richard APAU, ACSRT Mr. Joseph Kiéba TINDANO, ACSRT REVIEWERS Dr. Fiifi EDU-AFFUL, KAIPTC Dr. Festus Kofi AUBYN, KAIPTC Mr. Idriss Mounir LALLALI, ACSRT Col. Christian Emmanuel MOUAYA POUYI, ACSRT Mr. Inusah ZIBLIM, ACSRT Mr. Adjewoda KUTOATI, ACSRT El Waled Elamir Mohamed, ACSRT © African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTENTS PAGE 1 Title Page 1 2 Table of Content 2 3 Executive Summary 3 4 Terrorism in Africa: Issue of Definition 4 5 Introduction 4 6 Threats Update 5 7 General Trend: Terrorism Incidents/CT Response 6 8 Total Number of Terrorist Attacks 6 9 Attacks by Region 7 10 Means of Attacks 7 11 Terrorist Groups and their Means of Attack 8 12 Primary Targets 9 13 Terrorist Groups and their Primary Targets 9 14 Total Terrorism Related Deaths 10 15 Deaths by Region 12 16 Deaths by Means of Attack 13 17 Attacks/Victims by Terrorist Groups 13 18 Members of Terrorist Groups Killed 15 19 Areas with High Recorded Incidents 16 20 Most Fatal Terrorism Incidents 17 21 In Focus: The Sahel Region 17 22 Total Attacks in the Sahel 18 23 Means of Attacks in the Sahel 18 24 Total Deaths in the Sahel 19 25 Deaths By Category in the Sahel 20 26 Synthesis Table of Terrorism Incidents 21 27 Synthesis Table of Terrorist Groups Activities 22 28 Record of Terrorism Incidents by Regions 23 29 Central Africa 23 30 East Africa 24 31 North Africa 27 32 Southern Africa 28 33 West Africa 29 34 Terrorism Related News 33 35 Conclusion 34 36 About the ACSRT 35 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY QUICK HIGHLIGHTS Al-Shabaab lost 107 members during CT operations. Other IS affiliates (in Sinai, Egypt) th st The period under review (16 -31 on the other hand, lost 75 members in CT January 2019) recorded a total of 59 operations. Boko Haram, ISWAP and JNIM, terrorists’ attacks, 1 clash between lost 6, 5 and 3 of their members to CT terrorist groups and a total of 555 operations respectively. 111 others killed by terrorism related deaths. counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency belong to unidentified/ unaffiliated groups. Out of the 555 terrorism related deaths, 283 resulted directly from terrorist Five countries most affected by terrorism attacks, whereas 272 were deaths during the period are Mali, Somalia, Nigeria, recorded during counter terrorism Burkina Faso, and Niger. (In decreasing operation by security forces. order). 55% (307) of the casualties were The Sahel region recorded 37 out of 59 members of terrorists groups. Security incidents of terrorist attacks, and a total deaths forces and Civilian casualties were 25% of 253 out of 555 representing 46% of the (140) and 20% (108) respectively. terrorism related deaths for the period. Out of the 253, 94 terrorists, 83 civilians and 76 In 35 out of the 59 attacks, the terrorists security and military personnel died in the used Small Arms and Light Weapons Sahel region. (SALW). 18 attacks involved the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 4 More civilians (77%) and military forces (54%) kidnappings for ransom and 2 mixed died in the Sahel than the rest of Africa. 31% (SALW & IEDs). of terrorists were killed in the Sahel as against 69% in the rest of Africa. Al-Shabaab and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) used IEDs more RECENT HIGH PROFILE INCIDENTS in their attacks than SALW. All attacks Recent high profile attacks include: by Boko Haram and Ansarul Islam used - The 16th January 2019 armed men attack on SALW. two villages in Menaka (Mali) in which 34 Tuareg civilians were killed. 22 of the attacks targeted civilians, 22 - The 27th January 2019 suspected armed men targeted security forces, 8 targeted from Anasrul Islam attack in Sikire, Soum International Organizations (MINUSMA (Burkina Faso) in which 10 civilians were and AMISOM), and 7 targeted killed and 2 injured. Government Institutions and Officials. th - The 20 January 2019 JNIM attacked on MINUSMA camp in Arguelhok, Kidal (Mali) All attacks by Boko Haran (Islamic State killing 10 Soldiers of Chadian nationalities in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and injuring 25. faction) and Ansarul Islam targeted Security/Military forces. Majority of Al- Security forces have remained responsive to the Shabaab and JNIM attacks targeted situation. Counter -Terrorism Operations have been Security forces and international significant in January 2019. 305 members of terrorist organization (MINUSMA and AMISOM groups have been killed in CT Operations. These troops), Boko Haram (Shekau faction) include 75 suspected terrorists killed in Sinai targeted civilians most in their attacks. Peninsula between 19th and 27th January 2019. In Somalia, 73 al-Shabaab members were killed in Bar- Al-Shabaab killed 56 (54 military), th ISWAP killed 51 (all military), Ansarul Sanguni, Juba on 19 January 2019. Similarly, the Islam killed 5 (all military), Other IS Nigeria Armed Forces killed 58 armed bandits in th Affiliates killed 7 (all military) and Boko Zamfara on 20 January 2019. Haram killed 8 (all civilians). 3 TERRORISM IN AFRICA: ISSUE OF DEFINITION Notwithstanding the lack of a universal definition of terrorism, article 1 paragraph 3, (a) and (b) and article 3 of the African Union in its 1999 CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM, defines what constitutes a Terrorist Act. The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and therefore this Africa Terrorism Bulletin defers to this definition. INTRODUCTION The objective of the Africa Terrorism Bulletin is to provide a fortnight assessment of terrorism and violent extremism situation and trends on the continent. This is aimed at providing African Union Member States up to date information on terrorism incidents and its related activities. The data for the analysis of this Bulletin, is limited to information stored in the ACSRT Database, collected in conformity with the definition of terrorist acts as defined by the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The ACSRT maintains a robust database that stores information on terrorism, more specifically, on terrorist groups and individuals, terrorist activities and related scourges, and avail this information to the African Union Commission and the African Union Member States. The information for the Database is collected by the ACSRT Situation Room Team using the Africa Media Monitor (AMM) developed in collaboration with the European Union Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) for advanced web mining and information extraction. By dint of the AMM, the Situation Room Team scans and accesses over 1400 websites 7/24 and retrieves real time information on terrorist incidents in the four official AU languages (English, French, Arabic and Portuguese). The Centre also stores terrorism related information received from Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) based on existing cooperation, in addition to information received through the AU Continental Early Warning Situation-Room as well as reports from AU Field Missions. To ensure validity and reliability of the data stored in the database, the Centre verifies all terrorism incidents retrieved by means of the AMM, RECs and RMs from the ACSRT Focal Points of the Member States. The Focal Points are the official representatives appointed by each of the 55 Member States to collaborate and share information on terrorism and related activities with the ACSRT. As a mandated body of the African Union, the information provided by the Member States on terrorism regarding the number of attacks, deaths and injuries recorded and as verified by the Focal Points are considered the right number and official data for the ACSRT Database irrespective of any conflicting number from other sources. 4 THREAT UPDATE Terrorism and Violent Extremism remain significant threats to international peace and security. Although no country is immune to these threats, Africa has been particularly susceptible. Weak institutions, porous borders, inadequately trained or ill-equipped security forces, historical grievances and lack of economic opportunities have created conditions for terrorism and violent extremism to grow and fester in parts of the continent. Acts of terrorism and violent extremism, have emerged as major threats to peace, security, stability and development on the continent of Africa. West Africa and the Sahel regions have become home to terrorist groups in recent times such that numerous protracted atrocities have been committed against innocent civilians, security forces, international organizations and government agencies by the various terrorist groups.
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