The Cologne Ricin Plot
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Mapping Threats to Peace and Democracy Worldwide
ISSN: 2600-3457 Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide Normandy Index 2021 STUDY EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Members' Research Service PE 690.670 – July 2021 EN Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide Normandy Index 2021 The 'Normandy Index', now in its third year, aims to measure the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world. It was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2021 exercise and explains how the Index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country's performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 51 individual country case studies, derived from the Index. EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service AUTHORS Editor: Étienne Bassot Authors: Elena Lazarou and Branislav Stanicek, Members' Research Service Graphics by Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova and Giulio Sabbati This paper has been drawn up by the Members' Research Service, within the Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS) of the Secretariat of the European Parliament. The underlying data have been supplied by the Institute for Economics and Peace. Naja Bentzen, Enrico D'Ambrogio, Enrique Gómez Ramírez, Gisela Grieger, Issam Hallak, Beatrix Immenkamp, Tania Latici, Philippe Perchoc, Eric Pichon, Jakub Przetacznik, Martin Russell and Ionel Zamfir drafted case studies in this edition of the Normandy Index. -
Looters Vs. Traitors: the Muqawama (“Resistance”) Narrative, and Its Detractors, in Contemporary Mauritania Elemine Ould Mohamed Baba and Francisco Freire
Looters vs. Traitors: The Muqawama (“Resistance”) Narrative, and its Detractors, in Contemporary Mauritania Elemine Ould Mohamed Baba and Francisco Freire Abstract: Since 2012, when broadcasting licenses were granted to various private television and radio stations in Mauritania, the controversy around the Battle of Um Tounsi (and Mauritania’s colonial past more generally) has grown substantially. One of the results of this unprecedented level of media freedom has been the prop- agation of views defending the Mauritanian resistance (muqawama in Arabic) to French colonization. On the one hand, verbal and written accounts have emerged which paint certain groups and actors as French colonial power sympathizers. At the same time, various online publications have responded by seriously questioning the very existence of a structured resistance to colonization. This article, drawing pre- dominantly on local sources, highlights the importance of this controversy in study- ing the western Saharan region social model and its contemporary uses. African Studies Review, Volume 63, Number 2 (June 2020), pp. 258– 280 Elemine Ould Mohamed Baba is Professor of History and Sociolinguistics at the University of Nouakchott, Mauritania (Ph.D. University of Provence (Aix- Marseille I); Fulbright Scholar resident at Northwestern University 2012–2013), and a Senior Research Consultant at the CAPSAHARA project (ERC-2016- StG-716467). E-mail: [email protected] Francisco Freire is an Anthropologist (Ph.D. Universidade Nova de Lisboa 2009) at CRIA–NOVA FCSH (Lisbon, Portugal). He is the Principal Investigator of the European Research Council funded project CAPSAHARA: Critical Approaches to Politics, Social Activism and Islamic Militancy in the Western Saharan Region (ERC-2016-StG-716467). -
Salafism in the Maghreb Politics, Piety, and Militancy Xwx
Salafism in the Maghreb CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTL PEACE The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace offers decision makers global, independent, and strategic insight and innovative ideas that advance international peace. Founded in 1910 as the first inter national affairs think tank in the United States, it is a global institu tion with centers in Beijing, Beirut, Brussels, Moscow, New Delhi, and Washington. Carnegie’s network works together to provide analysis, shape policy debates, and propose solutions to the most consequential global threats. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace does not take in stitutional positions. Its scholars embody a variety of national and regional outlooks as well as the issues that transcend them. All views expressed in its publications are solely those of the author or authors. Salafism in the Maghreb Politics, Piety, and Militancy xwx Frederic Wehrey & Anouar Boukhars 1 1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. -
Remote Warfare Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Remote Warfare Interdisciplinary Perspectives ALASDAIR MCKAY, ABIGAIL WATSON & MEGAN KARLSHØJ-PEDERSEN This e-book is provided without charge via free download by E-International Relations (www.E-IR.info). It is not permitted to be sold in electronic format under any circumstances. If you enjoy our free e-books, please consider leaving a small donation to allow us to continue investing in open access publications: http://www.e-ir.info/about/donate/ i Remote Warfare Interdisciplinary Perspectives EDITED BY ALASDAIR MCKAY, ABIGAIL WATSON AND MEGAN KARLSHØJ-PEDERSEN ii E-International Relations www.E-IR.info Bristol, England 2021 ISBN 978-1-910814-56-7 This book is published under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license. You are free to: • Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format • Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material Under the following terms: • Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. • NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes. Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission. Please contact [email protected] for any such enquiries, including for licensing and translation requests. Other than the terms noted above, there are no restrictions placed on the use and dissemination of this book for student learning materials/scholarly use. Production: Michael Tang Cover Image: Ruslan Shugushev/Shutterstock A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. -
LET4CAP Law Enforcement Training for Capacity Building NIGER
Co-funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING FOR CAPACITY BUILDING LET4CAP Law Enforcement Training for Capacity Building NIGER Downloadable Country Booklet DL. 2.5 (Ve 1.2) Dissemination level: PU Let4Cap Grant Contract no.: HOME/ 2015/ISFP/AG/LETX/8753 Start date: 01/11/2016 Duration: 33 months Dissemination Level PU: Public X PP: Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission) RE: Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission) Revision history Rev. Date Author Notes 1.0 20/03/2018 SSSA Overall structure and first draft 1.1 06/05/2018 SSSA Second version after internal feedback among SSSA staff 1.2 09/05/2018 SSSA Final version version before feedback from partners LET4CAP_WorkpackageNumber 2 Deliverable_2.5 VER1.2 WorkpackageNumber 2 Deliverable Deliverable 2.5 Downloadable country booklets VER V. 1 . 2 2 NIGER Country Information Package 3 This Country Information Package has been prepared by Eric REPETTO and Claudia KNERING, under the scientific supervision of Professor Andrea de GUTTRY and Dr. Annalisa CRETA. Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy www.santannapisa.it LET4CAP, co-funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union, aims to contribute to more consistent and efficient assistance in law enforcement capacity building to third countries. The Project consists in the design and provision of training interventions drawn on the experience of the partners and fine-tuned after a piloting and consolidation phase. © 2018 by LET4CAP All rights reserved. 4 Table of contents 1. Country Profile 1.1Country in Brief 1.2Modern and Contemporary History of Niger 1.3 Geography 1.4Territorial and Administrative Units 1.5 Population 1.6Ethnic Groups, Languages, Religion 1.7Health 1.8Education and Literacy 1.9Country Economy 2. -
254 the Social Roots of Jihadist Violence in Burkina Fasos North
The Social Roots of Jihadist Violence in Burkina Faso’s North Africa Report N°254 | 12 October 2017 Translation from French Headquarters International Crisis Group Avenue Louise 149 • 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 • Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Preventing War. Shaping Peace. Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 The Social Roots of the Crisis ........................................................................................... 3 A. Malam Ibrahim Dicko, from the Radio to Jihad ....................................................... 3 B. The Challenge to an Ossified and Unequal Social Order .......................................... 4 C. A Distant Relationship with the Government ........................................................... 7 D. An Especially Vulnerable Province on the Border with Mali .................................... 9 A Considerable Military Effort ......................................................................................... 11 A. The Sahel Region under Threat ................................................................................. 11 B. A Security Apparatus under Reconstruction ............................................................. 13 C. Regional and International Cooperation .................................................................. -
High-Threat Chemical Agents: Characteristics, Effects, and Policy Implications
Order Code RL31861 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web High-Threat Chemical Agents: Characteristics, Effects, and Policy Implications Updated September 9, 2003 Dana A. Shea Analyst in Science and Technology Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress High-Threat Chemical Agents: Characteristics, Effects, and Policy Implications Summary Terrorist use of chemical agents has been a noted concern, highlighted after the Tokyo Sarin gas attacks of 1995. The events of September 11, 2001, increased Congressional attention towards reducing the vulnerability of the United States to such attacks. High-threat chemical agents, which include chemical weapons and some toxic industrial chemicals, are normally organized by military planners into four groups: nerve agents, blister agents, choking agents, and blood agents. While the relative military threat posed by the various chemical types has varied over time, use of these chemicals against civilian targets is viewed as a low probability, high consequence event. High-threat chemical agents, depending on the type of agent used, cause a variety of symptoms in their victims. Some cause death by interfering with the nervous system. Some inhibit breathing and lead to asphyxiation. Others have caustic effects on contact. As a result, chemical attack treatment may be complicated by the need to identify at least the type of chemical used. Differences in treatment protocols for the various high-threat agents may also strain the resources of the public health system, especially in the case of mass casualties. Additionally, chemical agents trapped on the body or clothes of victims may place first responders and medical professionals at risk. -
4Th Quarterly Monitoring Report for the EUTF
EUTF Monitoring and Learning System Sahel and Lake Chad Q3 2019 REPORT COVERING UNTIL 30 SEPTEMBER 2019 Altai Consulting for the European Union – January 2020 © European Union January 2020 Unless specified otherwise, all pictures in this report are credited to Altai Consulting. Cover photo: Agadez, Old town, Niger. ALTAI CONSULTING Altai Consulting provides strategy consulting and research services to private companies, governments and public institutions in developing countries. Altai teams operate in more than 50 countries in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Since its inception 15 years ago, Altai Consulting has developed a strong focus on governance and civil society related research and programme evaluations. Contact Details: Philibert de Mercey (Project Director): [email protected] Eric Davin (Altai Partner): [email protected] www.altaiconsulting.com ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report was prepared by Eric Davin, Justine Rubira, Philibert de Mercey, Jacopo Patrini, Paola Hartpence, Garance Dauchy and Héloïse Voisin (Altai Consulting). We gratefully thank project staff from the implementing partners who took the time to sit with us and comply with our reporting requirements. We are in particular indebted to: ACF, AICS, Diakonia, Expertise France, GIZ, Humanité & Inclusion, IOM, LVIA, OXFAM, and Terre des Hommes in Burkina Faso; ACF, AFD, GIZ, IOM and SNV in Cameroon; ITC, IOM, GIZ, Enabel, IMVF in The Gambia; ITC, GIZ, Enabel, UNDP, UNCDF in Guinea, COGINTA, GIZ and OXFAM in Chad; AECID, Expertise France, Humanité & Inclusion, IOM, LVIA, LuxDev, SNV World and SOS SAHEL in Mali; Expertise France, ILO, IOM and Save the Children in Mauritania; ACTED, AFD, CISP, Civipol, FIIAPP, GIZ, HACP, IOM, Karkara, LuxDev and UNHCR in Niger; British Council, FAO, IOM, DRC, NRC, IRC, Mercy Corps, UNICEF, UNW and WFP in Nigeria; 20STM, AECID, ACTED, AFD, Civipol, Enabel, GRET, IOM, LuxDev and PPI in Senegal; and Civipol, EU-DGEAC, FIIAPP, Interpol, ITC, IOM, and UNHCR at the regional level. -
Aerodrome Safety Publication
Aerodrome Safety Publication Number: ASP 02/2017 Issued: 5 April 2017 UNDERSTANDING CHEMICAL AGENTS CONTENTS 1 Purpose ........................................................................................................ 2 2 Applicability ................................................................................................... 2 3 Cancellation .................................................................................................. 2 4 Effective Date ............................................................................................... 2 5 Introduction ................................................................................................... 2 6 Types of Chemical Agents ............................................................................ 3 7 Nerve Agents ................................................................................................ 3 8 Blister Agents ................................................................................................ 4 9 Blood Agents ................................................................................................ 4 10 Choking Agents ............................................................................................ 5 11 Protection against Chemical Agents ............................................................. 6 12 Detection of Chemical Agents ....................................................................... 6 13 Conclusion ................................................................................................... -
Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan Abdel Fattah El-Sisi Abdelmadjid Tebboune
Abdel Fattah al-Burhan Hage Geingob Mukhammedkalyi Abylgaziev Abdel Fattah el-Sisi Haitham bin Tariq Nana Akufo-Addo Abdelmadjid Tebboune Hassan Ali Khayre Narendra Modi Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi Hassan Diab Nayib Bukele Abdullah II Hassanal Bolkiah Nguyen Phú Trong Abiy Ahmed Hereditary Prince Alois Nicolás Maduro Adama Barrow Hubert Minnis Nicos Anastasiades Adil Abdul-Mahdi Hun Sen Nikol Pashinyan Alassane Ouattara Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta Oliver Spasovski Alberto Fernández Ibrahim Mohamed Solih Patrice Talon Alejandro Giammattei Idriss Déby Paul Biya Alessandro Mancini Igor Matovič Paul Kagame Alexander Lukashenko Ilham Aliyev Pedro Sánchez Ali Bongo Ondimba Imran Khan Peter Mutharika Ali Khamenei Ion Chicu Pierre Nkurunziza Allen Chastanet Isaias Afwerki Pope Francis Alpha Condé Ismaïl Omar Guelleh Pravind Jugnauth Ana Brnabić Iván Duque Prayut Chan-o-cha Andrej Babiš Jacinda Ardern Pōhiva Tu’i’onetoa Andrej Plenković Jair Bolsonaro Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev Andrew Holness James Marape Ralph Gonsalves Andry Rajoelina Janez Janša Raúl Castro Andrés Manuel López Obrador Jeanine Áñez Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Angela Merkel John Magufuli Robert Abela António Costa Joko Widodo Roch Marc Christian Kaboré Ashraf Ghani Jorge Carlos Fonseca Rodrigo Duterte Azali Assoumani Jovenel Moïse Roosevelt Skerrit Bashar al-Assad João Lourenço Salman Benjamin Netanyahu Juan Orlando Hernández Salva Kiir Mayardit Boris Johnson Julius Maada Bio Sanna Marin Bounnhang Vorachith Justin Trudeau Scott Morrison Boyko Borisov Jüri Ratas Sebastian Kurz Carlos Alvarado Quesada KP Sharma Oli Sebastián Piñera Charlot Salwai Katrín Jakobsdóttir Serge Telle Cyril Ramaphosa Kausea Natano Shavkat Mirziyoyev Daniel Ortega Kaïs Saïed Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa Danilo Medina Keith Mitchell Sheikh Hasina Danny Faure Keith Rowley Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan David A. -
A New Framework for US Policy in the Sahel
Marcellus POLICY ANALYSIS Spring 2021 - Marcellus Policy Analysis No. 1 A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Sahel by John Ramming Chappell EXECUTIVE SUMMARY merican foreign policy in the Sahel has not worked. Counterterrorism has pre- dominated in the U.S. approach to the region since 2001, resulting in a policy focused on security assistance and military cooperation. However, the influ- ence of Salafi-jihadist groups in the region has markedly increased, civilian Afatalities have skyrocketed, and a militarized approach has undermined security sector governance. U.S. strategy has not adequately addressed the root causes of conflict—po- litical marginalization, poverty, and environmental pressures—that have contributed to a vicious cycle of conflict and fragility. The challenges facing the Sahel call for a new ap- proach. To effect lasting change in the Sahel, the United States needs to replace the overmilita- rized status quo with an affirmative strategy of diplomatic engagement.The United States should reduce military engagement in the Sahel, which is disproportionate to relatively limited interests. However, withdrawal alone would be insufficient to shift regional -dy namics because other stakeholders would continue counterterrorism campaigns based on the American model. Therefore, the Biden administration should implement the Global Fragility Strategy in the Sahel and phase out the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership to right the bal- ance between diplomatic and military tools. The United States should work with regional stakeholders to coordinate a broader shift in its Sahel policy. 1 The Status Quo Approach to the Initiatives Such as the TSCTP and Sahel Has Failed AFRICOM Have Failed to Curb Militancy The Sahel is a semi-arid strip of grassland stretching The U.S. -
Sahel Blog Translation Projects, Number 1 October 2020 An
Sahel Blog Translation Projects, Number 1 October 2020 An Annotated Translation of the Islamic State’s “Liptako: Graveyard of Crusaders and Apostates” Alex Thurston Translator’s Introduction The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) is a key armed actor in the tri-border zone between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.1 ISGS is the central counterterrorism target for those governments and especially for France, and the tri-border zone has become the key priority for France’s Sahel-focused counterterrorism mission, Operation Barkhane. That zone is also the priority for the French-backed G5 Sahel Joint Force, which draws soldiers from Mauritania and Chad in addition to the three countries that make up the tri-border zone.2 The Joint Force was created in 2017.3 ISGS emerged out of a May 2015 rupture within al-Murabitun, itself a breakaway faction of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).4 ISGS’ leader, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Over time, his unit has gained more recognition from the Islamic State central leadership, which labels ISGS a part of the “Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).” At the international level, ISGS is most famous for its October 2017 ambush on a joint American-Nigerien patrol outside the Nigerien village of Tongo- Tongo.5 1 For background on the violence in the tri-border zone, see William Assanvo, Baba Dakono, Lori-Anne Théroux- Bénoni and Ibrahim Maïga, “Violent extremism, Organised Crime and Local Conflicts in Liptako-Gourma,” Institute for Security Studies, December 2019, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war-26-eng.pdf.