Salafism in the Maghreb CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTL PEACE

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace offers decision­ makers global, independent, and strategic insight and innovative ideas that advance international peace. Founded in 1910 as the first inter­ national affairs think tank in the United States, it is a global institu­ tion with centers in Beijing, Beirut, Brussels, Moscow, New Delhi, and Washington. Carnegie’s network works together to provide analysis, shape policy debates, and propose solutions to the most consequential global threats. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace does not take in­ stitutional positions. Its scholars embody a variety of national and regional outlooks as well as the issues that transcend them. All views expressed in its publications are solely those of the author or authors. Salafism in the Maghreb Politics, Piety, and Militancy xwx

Frederic Wehrey & Anouar Boukhars

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1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Paperback printed by Marquis, Canada Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors of the book would like to express their deep thanks to the many people who helped during the research and writing process. First and foremost, we owe much gratitude to the Henry Luce Foundation for its generosity in sponsoring a two-​year project on Salafism in the Maghreb. This is the second instance of the Foundation’s support to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and, as in the past, the experience has been immensely rewarding and stimulating. Toby Volkman, Luce’s Director of Initiatives, has been an enthusiastic advocate, mentor, and constructive critic of our work—and​ a true pleasure to work with. We are also grateful to the Carnegie Endowment for providing a collegial and independent home for the research and in particular Marwan Muasher and Michele Dunne of the Middle East program for their unwavering commitment to deeply researched and people-​centered work on the region. Within the Middle East program, we were fortunate to harness the talents of several capable colleagues: junior fellows Katherine Pollock and Anmar Jerjees provided indispensable research assistance, while Blair Scott kept a firm hand on the tiller of day-​to-​day affairs. We spent much time in the field delving into the social and political con­ text of Salafism, and we could not have carried out this exploration without the countless individuals in the Maghreb who facilitated our travel, brokered meetings, protected us, and spoke to us candidly—​sometimes at great risk to themselves. For their safety, many must remain anonymous. Those we can mention include Professor Mohamedou Meyine, whose tireless efforts, hospitality, and warmth made Fred Wehrey’s research truly memorable. In addition, the entire staff of the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur l’Ouest Saharien (CEROS) providing a welcoming research home. Both of us are indebted to the scholars and analysts who have shaped our thinking on Salafism and the Maghreb, some of whom gathered together for an incredibly rich and stimulating discussion on Maghrebi Salafism, in the congenial setting of seaside Tunis in the winter of 2018. We wish in par­ ticular to thank the following for their penetrating critiques of our chapter drafts: Alex Thurston, Francesco Cavatorta, Stéphane Lacroix, Hicham

( vii ) ( viii ) Acknowledgments

Houdaifa, Mohamed Masbah, Dalia Ghanem Yazbeck, Mohammed M. Hafez, Joas Wagemakers, Amel Boubekeur, Raphael Lefevre, Yezid Sayigh, Geoffrey Howard, Jalel Harchaoui, and Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim. At Carnegie, a lunchtime discussion with colleagues—​many of them non–​ Middle East specialists in the fields of democratization, governance, and security—​helped us reframe our analysis through a comparative lens. We thank Carnegie’s senior vice president Tom Carothers for facilitating this exchange. At Oxford University Press, we extend our thanks to our editor, David McBride, for his interest and enthusiasm for the project and to the Press’s stellar team of production editors and marketing professionals. Lastly, we are both blessed with supportive partners who indulged our absences in the field and frequent preoccupations and, most importantly, have made the journey all the more worthwhile. Anouar Boukhars sends his gratitude to Naima Hachad, and Fred Wehrey his appreciation to Nakisa Karimian. Introduction

itting at the nexus of three continents, the Maghreb region of North Africa (comprising the Arab states of Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, STunisia, and Libya) has, for centuries, been a hub of rich political, eco­ nomic, and cultural exchange, especially around the Mediterranean basin. But in the last century, the Maghreb has been a minor player on the world stage. Its influence was barely felt during the Cold War, with the exception of the Algerian War of Independence and, perhaps, the international bel­ ligerency of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. It remained mostly on the margins of the Arab world’s central dramas like the Arab-​Israeli conflict, the Arab rivalry with Iran, the post-​9/​11 US-​led “war on terror,” and the Iraq War. Its main conflicts over the past decades, the Western Sahara dispute and the bloody Algerian civil war during the 1990s, seemed to have mostly escaped attention from the West, and even the world. Yet in late 2010 and early 2011 all that changed. The self-​immolation of a Tunisian fruit seller triggered protests that toppled the Tunisian regime and spread far across the Arab world. In the Maghreb, the aftershocks of that electrifying episode were felt most strongly in Libya, which saw the overthrow of Gaddafi in October 2011 after an eight-​month revolution backed by NATO-​led forces. Though initially marked by optimism and successful elections, Libya quickly fragmented into civil war by 2014. The resulting vacuum collapsed the boundaries, which were always more per­ meable than many had assumed, between the Maghreb, the Sahel, and the Mediterranean.1 Libyan arms and Tuareg fighters destabilized Mali, pro­ voking French intervention. Libya also became the deadliest thoroughfare for the world’s most catastrophic crisis of human migration, with thousands perishing along a central Mediterranean route that started from its shores.

Salafism in the Maghreb.Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, Oxford University Press (2019). © Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190942403.001.0001 ( 2 ) Introduction

It earned the dubious distinction of hosting the Islamic State’s most pow­ erful branch outside of Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, the Maghreb as a whole accounted for the largest per capita percentage of foreign fighters traveling to fight for the terrorist group in Iraq and Syria, often from peripheral ­re gions where unemployment and underemployment was high, especially in Tunisia and Libya.2 These are the issues that have grabbed the attention of the media and policymakers. But the Maghreb is being transformed in many other signif­ icant and sometimes understudied ways. By raising the demands of its in­ creasingly youthful population, the Arab Spring opened up new forms of contestation.3 Tunisia still remains the most hopeful prospect for democ­ racy, yet its future has been dimmed by corruption and authoritarian back­ sliding. The Moroccan and Mauritanian governments emerged unscathed from the Arab revolts yet remain authoritarian, despite some cosmetic and preemptive reforms. Algeria, too, seemed to bypass the 2011 upheavals, but the 2019 protests against entrenched corruption and President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s fifth presidential term show that there are limits to how long authoritarians can contain public frustration.4 Every country in the Maghreb is facing varying levels of unemployment, economic slowdown, and mounting disenchantment among its citizens, especially those on its rural and urban peripheries. One result of this upheaval has been the spread of a literalist, revivalist form of Islam known as Salafism. This has taken many forms: Salafi political parties like Hizb al-​Nour in Egypt or Islah in Tunisia; militant, antidemo­ cratic groups like Ansar al-​Sharia in Tunisia and Libya, and proregime loy­ alist Salafis, to name but a few. This growing political profile also reflects the Salafis’ spread in Maghreb society. There is little conclusive, quantitative data about the spread of Salafism, but some polling suggests a general de­ cline in popular support for the region’s traditionalist forms of Islam, Maliki jurisprudence and Sufism, despite being promoted by local governments.5 Seizing on this disenchantment and buoyed by Gulf funding, Salafis are growing in influence. In many cases, they exploit their more adroit use of in­ formation technology to outmaneuver traditionalist imams while, in other cases, they benefit from patronage by Maghreb regimes themselves.6 In the case of Libya, Salafis are using militias to coerce and intimidate.7 But these “push” factors are only half the story. With its vision of establishing a more authentic and just moral order and connecting believers to a transcendent community, Salafism’s appeal has historically been the strongest during times of dislocation and disorientation.8 It has served as mobilizing ideology against a multitude of grievances: corruption; eco­ nomic marginalization; Western influence and liberalism; injustices; and repression. It has expressed itself through proselytization and education, introduction ( 3 ) electioneering and, as is well known in the West, jihadi violence. With its broad variations in regime type, political openness, economic develop­ ment, and societal makeup, the Maghreb region encompasses all of these manifestations. And yet Salafism in the Maghreb remains understudied.9 When Islamism in the region is studied, it is often political Islamists like the Ennahda party in Tunisia.10 If Salafism is addressed at all, it is often as an exogenous influence, an import of the particular brand of Salafism known as Wahhabism as prac­ ticed in Saudi Arabia, or, most commonly, in the radical, violent variation espoused by the Islamic State and al-​Qaeda. To be sure, these dimensions are important: Saudi Arabia remains central to spreading and sustaining Salafism in the Maghreb via education, media, funding, and other means. And Maghrebi radicalization is indeed a growing concern: taking advantage of the Islamic State’s erosion, al-​Qaeda’s Maghreb affiliate is staging a come­ back, exploiting the grievances of marginalized regions and populations bypassed by the promise of the Arab Spring.11 But Salafism in the Maghreb is also more indigenous, complex, and dynamic than these simple tropes suggest. To begin with, Salafism has a long pedigree in this region that predates the surge of Saudi and Gulf influence in the 1960s. North Africans came into contact with Wahhabi Salafis during the eighteenth century and by the early twentieth century, a modernist, reformist Salafist current was challenging colonial rule, particularly in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.12 Moreover, as this volume will show, Salafism has evolved to accommodate local political pressures and societal contexts. The result is that the Maghreb has emerged as an arena for some of the most important debates within contemporary Salafism—​about the relationship between religion and the state, the orga­ nization of political life, and the morality and efficacy of violence, to name but a few. And these deliberations are not exclusively the purview of Salafi theologians and legal scholars but rather include the practice of Salafism as a lived, everyday reality—​by political parties, activists, dissidents, and militants. What is missing from much scholarship is an in-​depth explora­ tion of these dynamics. This book aims to fill that gap. Through fieldwork in the countries of the Maghreb and interviews with Maghrebi Salafis, officials, academics, and civil-​society activists, we aim to provide a comprehensive inquiry of the origins and growth of Salafism in each country, assessing the soci­ oeconomic, political, and transnational drivers, as well as Salafi relations with the state and other Islamists. Ultimately, we want to understand how Salafism in the Maghreb has been molded by local and national imperatives and how, in turn, it is affecting the politics, economy, and society of the ( 4 ) Introduction region. We do not mean to suggest that Salafism per se is transforming the Maghreb’s political order, despite the fervent hopes of some adherents. Yet Salafism exists as an important window into the Maghreb’s state-​society dy­ namics, socioeconomic shifts, demographic pressures, and questions of na­ tional and supranational identity. Understanding why and how Salafism is taking root will yield a fuller understanding of this important region—​and of the global phenomenon of Salafism itself. CHAPTER 2 w Ambiguities of Salafism in Mauritania

The State, Clerics, and Violence

INTRODUCTION

Salafism in Mauritania both coexists with and reflects the country’s rich Islamic traditions of Maliki jurisprudence and a number of Islamist polit­ ical movements. The Salafi current developed partly from the influx of Saudi and Gulf funding in the late 1970s and 1980s, as well as from Mauritanian students traveling to Saudi Arabia, a process that began decades earlier.1 Yet these Gulf influences have been strongly molded by Mauritania’s local context. The deeply embedded traditions of desert Islamic schools (the mahadir; singular mahdara), itinerant preachers (du’at; singular da’i), and Sufi orders have also shaped the development of Mauritanian Salafism. Mauritanian Salafi actors, even while challenging these trends and trying to overcome their hierarchies, must situate their discourse within an “au­ thentic” Mauritanian milieu that sometimes dilutes Salafism’s foreign influences and more dogmatic tenets.2 Similarly, Mauritania’s socioeconomic landscape has affected Salafism. A vast desert country with a small population of just over four million, Mauritania is beset by a dizzying array of socio-​economic problems and authoritarianism that have made it vulnerability to instability and jihadist violence. Literacy hovers at just over 50 percent.3 Despite the presence of abundant resources—​iron ore, natural gas, and fishing, to name a few—​ it currently ranks an abysmal 159th out of 189 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index.4 Politically, it has long suffered from

Salafism in the Maghreb.Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, Oxford University Press (2019). © Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190942403.001.0001 ( 20 ) Salafism in the Maghreb repression, persecution of journalists, and military interference: since 1978, there has been a steady succession of coup détets. Freedom House lists it as “Not Free,” and ranking near-​bottom on scores of civil and political rights.5 International observers and domestic critics see the country’s practice of presidential elections as little more than a facade to perpetuate the rule of narrow clique of military and commercial elites. Corruption among these elites is endemic: Transparency International ranks Mauritania 144th out of 180 countries for perceptions of public sector corruption.6 Mauritania is also defined by deep ethno-​linguistic and racial strati­ fication. The main divide which affects political and economic life is­ be tween an elite, former slave-​owning caste—​the bidane—​Arab-​Berbers, also known as “white moors”—and​ the haratine (singular hartani), former slaves or “black moors,” who only gained their freedom with the official abolition of slavery in 1981 (an issue and a history that remain deeply contentious in Mauritania today, with some haratine activists charging that widespread slavery still persists). These two groups comprise 70% of the population; the remaining 30% consist of Afro-​Mauritanian ethnicities who hail from the south: Halpulaar, Fulani, Soninke, and Wolof.7 Relations between the three are fraught due to disparities in social class and ethnolinguistic tensions, as well as long-​standing bitterness due to a purge of black military officers in 1987, intercommunal violence on both sides of the Mauritania-​ Senegal border in 1989, and subsequent state crackdowns targeting black Mauritanians. Successive governments led by serving or former military officers have only worsened the cleavages by concentrating wealth among elite bidane, perpetuating corruption, and keeping the education system decrepit.8 In tandem, Mauritania’s rulers have sought to regulate and co-​opt Islam as a means to shore up their sagging legitimacy ever since the estab­ lishment of the country as an Islamic republic in 1960.9 This chapter explores the interplay between these socioeconomic and political dynamics and the development of Salafism. Drawing from field interviews with Mauritanian Salafis and local observers of the movement, it first canvasses the country’s Islamic heritage and cultural context, focusing in particular on such institutions as the mahdara. It then traces the birth of Salafism and its subsequent growth alongside a number of other Islamist currents, unpacking the contentious and cyclical relationship between Islamists and Mauritania’s rulers. That relationship reached its apex with a spate of jihadi attacks in the mid-​2000s. The motives and outlooks of the jihadis are covered, as are the Salafi scholars who inspired the jihadis but who later broke with them and instead aided the government. The resulting period of prison dialogue between extremist jihadis and more moderate senior Islamic figures is covered at length, based on interviews with cler­ ical mediators and former detainees. Though the jihadi trend in Mauritania ambiguities of salafism in mauritania ( 21 ) remains a minority, a number of Mauritanians continue to fight in jihadi organizations in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, and Mauritanians have filled high-​ranking positions in jihadi groups—​most notably al-​Qaida—​often as spiritual and legal figures.10 Meanwhile, formerly imprisoned Salafi-​jihadi scholars are given latitude to preach and speak on political matters, pro­ vided they do not directly threaten the government. This chapter concludes that both politico and jihadi Salafisms remain circumscribed by state control and the strong countervailing pressures of Mauritania’s other Islamists. The government has put forward this “Mauritanian model” of jihadi rehabilitation and clerical co-​option. But its dealings with jihadism—​and with Salafism writ large—​are ultimately less a model than the product of calculated ambiguity. And the narrative remains shaky, especially given the country’s bleak socioeconomic picture, history of military coups, corruption, and societal tensions—​all of which are po­ tent sources of radicalization.

THE RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL LANDSCAPE

As a young boy in the 1940s, the Mauritanian Islamic scholar Hamdan Ould al-​Tah recalls traveling through the desert countryside and seeing “libraries in tents and books scattered under acacia trees . . . books on the Qur’an and Islamic science.”11 Mauritanian society then, he related, was characterized by ruralism, nomadism, and abject poverty. And yet, al-Tah insists, this physical destitution was accompanied by intellectual richness: a high degree of Islamic learning and scientific knowledge of which the de­ sert Bedouin were the proprietors, rather than Mauritania’s meager urban centers. “The country was a library inside a tent,” he said by way of a col­ orful metaphor; adding, “We were Bedouin in our outside appearance but internally civilized.”12 While imbued with some poetic license, this account, reflects an impor­ tant facet of Mauritanian religious life: the proliferation of Islamic learning among mostly rural Maliki scholars and Sufi brotherhoods that began cen­ turies before the influx of Gulf money to Salafi mosques and institutes. Religious knowledge in this Saharan milieu was further accorded a high de­ gree of social status, especially among the heads of Sufi brotherhoods, the marabouts, who embodied knowledge, political power, and mysticism.13 According to one Mauritanian saying, a young man could only get mar­ ried when he had the “three forties”: he had reached forty years of age, had acquired forty camels, and had memorized forty chapters of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).14 All of this reflects the collective memory of the country’s ( 22 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

Islamic heritage under the Al Murabit (Almoravid) dynasty, which legiti­ mized its rule through Maliki jurisprudence.15 Throughout the centuries, Maliki juridical traditions were perpetuated by Mauritania’s zwaya caste, a bidane tribal network described by one scholar as a “premodern occupational group” with Berber roots who saw themselves as guarantors of religious and mystical knowledge.16 The scholarly zwaya coexisted uneasily with and often struggled against a political and warrior caste, the Banu Hassan, who claimed Arab lineage. Modernity and urbani­ zation have diluted the distinction between the two—​but not completely.17 Thezway a continue to fill the ranks of the civil service and merchant class.18 And the transmission of zwaya social mores into Mauritanian society is cru­ cial for understanding Mauritania’s deeply ingrained institution of Islamic learning, the mahdara, which the zwaya class historically oversaw.19 Originating in the nomadism of the desert, and reportedly dating back to the time of the Almoravid, mahdara schools provide free Islamic in­ struction to male and females, starting at age six or seven and continuing through their twenties.20 The instruction—​mostly Maliki in orientation, though some are affiliated with Sufi brotherhoods and Salafism—​includes Qur’an, Hadith (sayings of the prophet Mohammad), fiqh, as well as Arabic grammar, logic, arithmetic, rhetoric, and literature.21 Understudied and the subject of many ill-​founded assumptions, the mahadir also attracted foreign students from across the Islamic world, some of whom were drawn by an idealized vision of desert austerity that comported well with their picture of Islam during the time of the prophet Muhammad and his companions.22 The mahadir thus served as important forum for the comingling of dif­ ferent Islamic currents, to include figures who would become high-​ranking members in al-​Qaeda and other jihadi groups, many from Algeria and Libya.23 This recruitment prompted a heavy government effort from 2005 to 2010 to regulate and oversee the mahdara, including the registration and tracking of students and vetting of curricula—what​ one former minister of Islamic affairs called “control and containment.”24 Today, proponents of the mahdara argue that it is “vaccination” against extremism; the “moderate” and apolitical Islam taught in its lecture spaces serves to fortify young people with theological protection against the “mis­ guided” overtures of the extremists. “Someone who knows sharia won’t joint extremism,” a former minister of Islamic affairs told the author.25 Yet more objective observers take a more nuanced view: while acknowledging that the mahdara do not directly radicalize young people, they often fail to provide students with skills necessary for entry into a globalized workforce, contributing to Mauritania’s economic woes.26 Lacking other options, graduates are often funneled into continued higher Islamic education and careers in the country’s religious class—as​ judges, preachers, scholars, ambiguities of salafism in mauritania ( 23 ) or teachers of Arabic.27 Recently, however, the Mauritanian government is addressing this through such initiatives as the professional center for mahdara graduates that focus on practical jobs training.28 Coexisting alongside and integrating Maliki traditions, Sufi orders are another major feature of the Mauritanian landscape. The regional networks of Mauritania’s two largest Sufi orders—​the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya—​ have historically cut across Mauritania’s borders into the Sahel and sub-​ Saharan Africa and even the Gulf.29 Among Mauritanians, membership in a Sufi brotherhood overlaps with tribal and ethnic affiliations, especially in the south. The leaders of Sufi brotherhoods, the marabouts, exert authority over both religious and tribal constituents.30

THE EARLY ROOTS OF SALAFISM

Salafism’s rise in Mauritania was the result of a number of converging so­ cioeconomic and religious trends, which included external funding from the Gulf and the emergence of a number of other politically active Islamist currents. It also coincided with the rise of greater religiosity in Mauritania’s urban spaces, born of the proliferation of mosques and an exodus from rural areas. Yet even before this, the colonial period facilitated early exchanges, when some Mauritanian scholars left the country to reside in the Gulf, where they had an influential impact on the subsequent devel­ opment of Saudi-​based Salafism.31 A key theme underpinning Mauritanian Salafism across the decades has always been the imperative of authenticity and adaptability. The sense of authenticity distinguished Salafism within a crowded religious field starting in the latter half of the twentieth cen­ tury, marked by the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jama’at Tabiligh, and strong Sufi traditions. Starting in the 1970s, the country experienced a wave of rapid urbaniza­ tion, wrought by severe drought conditions in rural areas. The number of people living in cities increased from 8% of the population in 1962 to 25% in 1975.32 The dislocation created by this urbanization also created new opportunities for empowering ideologies to challenge existing hierarchies, especially among the new arrivals to urban areas who often lacked social capital.33 Initially, leftists had some success among the rural migrants—​but here again, according to one local scholar, tribal preferences held sway, with entire tribes sometimes becoming Marxist. By the late 1970s, however, po­ litically active Islamists movements had taken root. Their rise was facilitated in part by the Arabization and Islamization poli­ cies of successive governments. In 1965, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah’s ( 24 ) Salafism in the Maghreb regime implemented compulsory Arabic language education—​a move that sparked protests from the country’s non-​Arab population, but also enabled the spread of Salafi texts, often via expatriate teachers from Arab nations.34 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the government was actively trying to Islamicize society, in part to block the spread of Nasserism and Arab na­ tionalism.35 The reign of Colonel Mohamed Haidalla, who participated in a coup against Daddah in 1978 and ruled the country from 1980 until 1984, only accelerated the growth of Islam; in 1980, Haidalla made sharia the country’s sole source of legislation.36 Over the next two decades, an influx of Gulf money and the travel of Mauritanian students to the Gulf for study saw the proliferation of mosques and institutes in Mauritania, transforming the urban landscape of the cap­ ital city of Nouakchott.37 According to one authoritative survey by scholar Yahya Ould al-​Barah, the number of mosques rose from 17 in 1967 to 617 in 2003; of these over half benefited from Gulf patronage.38 A number of Gulf-​sponsored charities also sprang up that helped propagate Salafism: the Islamic Relief Organization, the Africa Muslim Agency, the International African Relief Agency, and the Emirate Aid Agency. So did associations and educational bodies such as the local branch of the World Islamic League, Islamic Cultural Association, and, most importantly, the Institute for Islamic Studies and Research (ISERI), founded in 1979 with Saudi funding.39 Although Salafi in orientation, ISERI would go on to produce leading figures across the Islamist spectrum, representing currents as di­ verse as the Muslim Brotherhood, pro-​state “quietist” clerics, and jihadis.40 Complementing these formal institutions, family and tribal bonds often proved influential in shaping the entrée of Salafism into Mauritanian society—​and perpetuating it, especially outside the capital. In some cases, Salafism became a vehicle for tribal mobilization. One tribe, the Tadjakanet in the central region of Guérou, is well known for its adherence to Salafism and played a key role in the formation of ISERI.41 Many Mauritanian judges in the Gulf, especially the Emirates, hail from the tribe.42 The preeminent Salafi personality to emerge during this period, Sheikh Buddah ​Buṣayrī, is widely considered the progenitor of the country’s Salafi current. Born in 1920 in the country’s southwest, a historic zone of religious learning and piety, Busayri started preaching in a mosque in Nouakchott’s Ksar neighborhood—​the first mosque in the capital—​and later at the “Grand Mosque” (nicknamed the Saudi Mosque because of its funding) in the center of the city.43 His intellectual output was characterized by heavy polemics against Maliki fiqh, the most prominent of which is titled “The Most Brilliant Path: He Who Works with the Preponderant Evidence Has Not Left the Maliki School.”44 ambiguities of salafism in mauritania ( 25 )

Today, his influence is felt across the Salafi spectrum, from politico Salafis, to pro-​state quietists, to violent jihadis. Among the jihadis, two leading Libyan militants, Abu Yahya al-​Libi and ʿAtiyatullah ʿAbd al-​ Rahman, studied at his mahdara in the early 1990s and eulogized him upon his death in 2009.45 Similarly, a major intellectual force behind Mauritanian jihadism—​the hardline preacher Mohamed Salem Ould Mohamed Lemine, alias “al-​Majlissi,” who was arrested for involvement in Mauritania’s first Al-​Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) cells—​studied with him.46 Yet his former students also include cadres of quietist clerics, including his pro-​state son-​in-​law, Ahmedou Ould Lemrabott, who followed him as the imam of the Saudi-​funded Grand Mosque in Noaukchott.47 Yet despite the influence of Busayri and the influx of Gulf funding, Salafism’s development was tempered by the presence of other Islamist currents. Often within the same Saudi-​funded, ostensibly Salafi organiza­ tions, diverse currents coexisted; the Islamic Cultural Association, for ex­ ample, included a number of Sufi-​affiliated businessman.48 Added to this, by the late 1980s, the Jamaat Tabligh began its nationwide proselytizing activities via the du’at, who mounted a concerted challenge to the propri­ etorship of religious learning by the zwaya class.49 Yet it was the Muslim Brotherhood, however, that offered the starkest challenge to the Salafis, through political engagement and social work, particularly in Nouakchott’s poorer neighborhoods, like Toujanine and Arafat.50 Here a Brotherhood-​ inspired party called Tawassoul found traction among poor and jobless bidane whose prospects had been partly dimmed by the replacement of French with Arabic, as well as lower-​ranking haratine, in hardscrabble neighborhoods as Mina.51 In contrast to the Brotherhood, Salafis were not as engaged in local electoral politics, arguing that it diluted theological and dogmatic purity.52

THE RISE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM

By the mid-​1980s, these diverse Islamists, despite their doctrinal differences, reconciled to form the country’s first political Islamist body. Incorporating Tablighis, Sufis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafis, the Haraka Siyasiya Islamiya fi Muritanya (the Islamic Political Movement in Mauritania; here­ after referred to by the acronym HASIM) quickly established itself as an opposition force to the reign of Haidalla, though it emphasized nonvio­ lent activism.53 In this, it was aided by the teachings of a charismatic cleric named Mohamed Ould Sidi Yahya, who can be considered the country’s second major Salafi luminary after Busayri.54 ( 26 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

Yet Yahya’s rise—along​ with that of HASIM—​was ultimately circumscribed by yet another turnover in Mauritania’s government. In 1984, Haidalla was toppled by Colonel Maaouya Ould Taya. Lasting until 2005, Taya’s reign would be marked by seesaw relations with Islamists and Salafis, with a cycle of arrests and pardons, which may have contributed to further radicalization. Under pressure from the international commu­ nity to democratize, Taya announced the implementation of a multiparty electoral system in 1991. But the opening proved illusory. While Islamist movements had previously avoided confrontation with the Mauritanian government, by the early and mid-​1990s they had become increasingly ac­ tive, particularly Salafis.55 Regional developments, especially the growing assertiveness of Islamists in Algeria also reportedly played a role in Taya’s turn toward the repression of Islamists.56 In 1991, Taya tightened the con­ trol of the executive branch over clerics with the creation of an oversight body called the High Islamic Council.57 In 1992, he refused to recognize the efforts of Yahya and HASIM to form a political party. Then in 1994, after Mauritania’s first municipal elections, in which Islamists, along with other oppositionists won seventeen of 208 districts, the government took even harsher measures, arresting scores and banning several Islamic associations and clubs. Suspected jihadi organizations were allegedly targeted but so were nonviolent institutes, charities, and clubs that had thus far flourished, including HASIM.58 Sidi Yahya was briefly placed under house arrest, but other Mauritanian clerics endured far worse, including deportation, imprisonment, alleged torture, and release only after appearances on state television pledging fealty.59 Yet the Islamists were not cowed; many simply shifted to education and charitable activities, or moved their organizations underground.60 Others fled abroad only to re­ turn with an even stronger resolve against the government.61 The emergence of a newer generation of independent Islamist leaders, to include Salafis, was partly galvanized by Taya’s foreign policy shifts. The Mauritanian president had antagonized the United States in the early 1990s by supporting Iraqi president Saddam Husayn but then increasingly aligned himself with the United States by the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1999, for example, Taya took the controversial step of recognizing Israel. Then, after the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the regime aligned itself with the US-​led “war on terror,” which included coop­ eration on multilateral security initiatives like the Pan-​Sahel Initiative and the Trans Saharan Counter-​terrorism Partnership. All of this gave ammuni­ tion to Islamists who accused the Taya government of excessive deference to the West and of abrogating the country’s sovereignty.62 One Islamic scholar in particular, a young cleric named Mohamed al-Hasen Ould al-Dedew, emerged at the forefront of Islamist criticism ambiguities of salafism in mauritania ( 27 ) against these foreign policy trends.63 In 2002, Dedew issued a fatwa forbid­ ding entering into relations with Israel, which marked a major escalation in the saga of confrontation between Islamists and the state. It also marked the start of his meteoric political rise, boosting his popularity inside and outside Mauritania. Born in Boutilimit, a center of Islamic learning in southwestern Mauritania, Dedew grew up in a distinguished family of Islamic scholars, the most famous of which was his maternal uncle Muhammad Salim ʿAbd al-​Wadud (1929–2009),​ who served as minister of culture and as the head of the High Islamic Council.64 Dedew’s educational background combined a traditional mahdara schooling with a more modern, Saudi-​sponsored Salafi education, including a stint at the ISERI and then the College of Sharia at Saudi Arabia’s Imam Muhammad bin Saud University, where he was exposed to the thought of Salafi luminaries such as Nasr al-​Din al-​Albani and Abd al-​Aziz bin Baz, and later served as a mosque imam. In Nouakchott’s Arafat neighborhood, he founded the Center for Training Islamic Scholars (Markaz Taqwin al-​Ulama).65 Dedew’s fusion of Mauritanian and Gulf influences blurred the boundaries of his seeming Salafi orientation and underscored the imper­ ative of Mauritanian Salafis situating themselves within a heterogeneous Mauritanian context. He defies easy categorization. On the one hand, ac­ cording to Mauritanian scholar Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, Dedew “works to strengthen the radical Salafi tendency of Islamism in Mauritania.”66 On the other, he is seen by other scholars as the spiritual patron of the Muslim Brotherhood-​aligned Tawassoul, which in other contexts would be a stark contradiction, given the animosity between the two movements.67 Similarly, Alex Thurston has pointed to his friendly relations with Sufis—​ deemed heretical by doctrinaire Salafis—​as evidence of a broader and growing trend of “post-​Salafism.” in West Africa.68 His Center for Training Islamic Scholars includes diverse strands of Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.69 By the turn of the century, Dedew had emerged as the one of the most popular religious figures in Mauritania.70 Just as Sidi Yahya had done a gen­ eration before, he leveraged new media technology to amplify his message and connect with new constituents—​first satellite television and then so­ cial media.71 He secured a massive following, not just among the urban youth of Mauritania but throughout the Muslim world, in Asia, Europe, and especially the Gulf.72 He seized on populist themes of Muslim dig­ nity, anticolonialism, anticorruption, and resistance, advocating for jihad in Palestine, Chechnya, and Afghanistan.73 While not an explicitly political figure, his brazenness and popularity brought him into frequent confronta­ tion with the regime, which arrested him repeatedly. And yet, with the rise ( 28 ) Salafism in the Maghreb of violent jihadism in the mid-​2000s, he actively sided with the regime in countering extremism.

THE JIHADI CHALLENGE AND THE REGIME RESPONSE

The Salafi jihadi challenge that rattled Mauritania from 2005 to 2011 arose from confluence of global, regional, and local factors. In the 1980s, young Mauritanians went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets, connecting them to global jihadi networks; at least five Mauritanians would ascend to the upper ranks of al-​Qaeda, the most famous of which is Mahfouz Ould al-​ Walid, hereafter referred to by his well-​known nom de guerre, Abu Hafs al-​Mauritani.74 Born in southwest Mauritania into the Idab-​Lihsen, a zwaya tribe fa­ mous for its religious scholarship, he passed through a traditional mahdara education and graduated from ISERI.75 Renowned as a poet, he traveled to Sudan and Afghanistan, where he became a judicial and religious advisor to Osama bin Laden before breaking with al-​Qaeda before the 2001 attacks on the United States. The United States suspected him of some type of involvement in planning the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000—an​ accusation that Abu Hafs al-​Mauritani denies.76 After a period of detention in Iran, he returned to Mauritania in 2012 where he was imprisoned and released, becoming a critic of al-​Qaeda’s militancy.77 Just as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had mobilized Abu Hafs al-​ Mauritani, a new generation of Mauritanian jihadis were incensed by the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the suffering of Muslims in Palestine and Chechnya. Those that were unable to travel and fight in these struggles transferred their rage toward the Mauritanian regime. At the same time, new jihadi battlefields opened in the neighboring Sahel and Sahara: the spillover of Algeria’s civil war spawned the creation of the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) which was later rebranded Al-​Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.78 The Taya regime’s association with the Western-​led war on terror after 9/11​ provided a powerful fodder for militants to mo­ bilize against the regime. Commenting on this dynamic, one Salafi cleric formerly connected to the jihadis spoke bitterly about the regime’s coun­ terterror “marketplace,” arguing that it actually increased the radicalism it sought to diminish. “The person who fights terrorism creates terrorism,” he noted.79 The latter phase of Taya’s rule provided the spark for jihadi attacks. In April 2003, the Mauritanian ruler undertook the most severe crackdown ambiguities of salafism in mauritania ( 29 ) since 1994, detaining thirty-​five Islamic clerics, judges, and other figures, including venerated scholars like Dedew.80 Mosques, schools, and institutes outside of state control were shuttered, and the minister for Islamic affairs at the time famously threatened to “turn the mosques into bakeries”—a​ crude boast that would become a lightning rod for jihadis who accused the Taya regime of heresy and hypocrisy.81 In the year that followed, coup attempts—​in June 2003 and August 2004—​gave further pretext for the government to go after Islamists—​even though there is no evidence they were connected.82 The alleged torture of those detained would be cited later by young Mauritanian jihadis as part of the motivation for the wave of vio­ lence that followed.83 That wave started in June 2005, when over 150 GSPC fighters stormed a military base in northeast Mauritania, killing fifteen Mauritanian soldiers. In a statement, Mokhtar Belmokhtar and the GSPC decried the Mauritanian regime’s association with the US-​led war on terror. Coincidentally, perhaps, the attack happened a mere two days before the American-​led “Flintlock” exercise was supposed to take place, in which four hundred American spe­ cial forces trained alongside soldiers from Sahelian countries, including Mauritania.84 In addition, the GSPC stated that the attack was also “to avenge our brothers imprisoned by the miscreant regime in Nouakchott.”85 Over the next six years, Mauritania would be rattled by fourteen attacks on its soil, conducted by Mauritanian GSPC and AQIM cells, operating out of northern Mali. The terrorists struck foreign targets—​embassies, aid workers, and tourists—as​ well as regime security forces.86 The scale and ferocity of the violence was unprecedented, prompting a flurry of in­ trospection and reflection among local and foreign observers. Just who were the young Mauritanians behind the bedlam and what, exactly, had radicalized them?

WHO ARE THE JIHADIS?

Profiles of Mauritanian jihadis—​both imprisoned suspects and those confirmed killed inside Mauritania and abroad—​come from government sources and must necessarily be treated with caution. Still, a number of ethnic and socioeconomic patterns can be discerned. According to one widely cited sample of seventy arrested persons (included those accused of violence and their supporters), bidane account for three out of four, with haratine and Afro-​Mauritanians, comprising a minority, at 17% and 9% respectively.87 Economically, the majority were from middle-​ or lower-​ income backgrounds, and most were under the age of thirty.88 A number of other common experiences seemed to link their lives: underemployment ( 30 ) Salafism in the Maghreb and delinquency, service or attempted service in the army, followed by a “conversion” to Salafism in a mosque and then recruitment and training for jihad, usually in Algeria, northern Mali or, less frequently, remote parts of Mauritania.89 Many passed through a mahdara, though, as mentioned above, Mauritanian officials and scholars deny that this was the direct source of a radicalization or recruitment.90 Even so, the presence of foreign jihadis from Libya, Algeria, and Mali spurred a concerted government ef­ fort to monitor foreign attendance atmahadir starting in 2005.91 Another data set provided by a Mauritanian scholar closely connected to the rehabilitation effort comprises twenty-​one deceased Mauritanian jihadis, four of whom died in Mauritania and the rest outside. As in the previous set, the vast majority were young, usually seventeen to twenty-​ one years old and overwhelmingly bidane (only four were haratine).92 One of them, a twenty-​two-​year-​old hartani named Abu Ubayd al-​Basri, who carried out Mauritania’s first suicide bombing against the French embassy in 2009, seems to embody many of the common traits, especially the dislo­ cation born of urbanization.93 Having moved to Nouakchott from the de­ sert town of Dar al-Barka, his working-​class parents (his father was a baker and his mother a seamstress) raised him in the hardscrabble neighborhood of Basra. He was the fourth of eight children, and his upbringing was not especially pious, according to his mother. Though he avoided petty crimi­ nality, his early life was marked by successive failures: two failed attempts at his baccalaureate and a rejection from the gendarmerie in 2008.94 That same year, he left home, reportedly to attend a jihadi training camp in Algeria or northern Mali, based on subsequent video released by AQIM.95 Al-​Basri’s underachievement, along with the troubled family lives and criminality of other suspects, are sometimes cited by Mauritanian officials as among the root causes of jihadism. They often add that jihadi violence was enabled by a faulty or “incorrect” understanding of Islamic texts.96 To be sure, these psychological, socioeconomic, and educational dimensions exist. But what is clear from the pronouncements of several prominent jihadis is that their use of violence is also politically motivated and directed against very real and well-​articulated grievances, such as Mauritania’s rela­ tions with the West, authoritarianism, torture, and corruption.97 Nowhere is this political dimension more apparent than in the world­ view of a pivotal cell leader of Mauritania’s AQIM network, Khadim Ould Semane. A thirty-​something former used-​car dealer, he received part of his education at a Sufi school in Senegal before drifting back to Nouakchott. He reportedly led a bohemian lifestyle that included frequenting nightclubs before his “awakening” and attendance at radical mosques. Angered by the US invasion of Iraq, he went to northern Mali and, at some point, was re­ portedly directed by Mokhtar Belmokhtar to set up clandestine cells in ambiguities of salafism in mauritania ( 31 )

Mauritania.98 Swept up in Taya’s arrests of jihadis in 2005, he escaped from prison in 2006 only to be captured in 2008.99 In a 2006 interview, he lists a number of motivations, including the corrupting threat of foreign influence on the oneness of God (tawhid), the pervasive role of American and Jewish intelligence, the need to liberate Muslim lands from unbelievers, and, espe­ cially, the torture of a number of Mauritanian clerics, with “chainsaws” and “electrical burns.”100 Regional discrimination by the Mauritanian regime to­ ward citizens of the south factored heavily into his accusations of torture of these clerics.101 Ironically, though, many of the very same clerics cited by Ould Semane would be deployed against him during a government-​sponsored program of reindoctrination and rehabilitation.

THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE: CRACKDOWN AND DIALOGUE

The Mauritanian government battled the jihadi challenge through a mix of arrests and military action that culminated in pitched battles by the summer of 2011. But it also took the fight into the realm of theology and doctrine, to dis­ suade imprisoned jihadis (a vague and broad category that included those who committed violent acts, supported them, or sympathized with them) of the legitimacy of violence against the state—what​ one former minister of Islamic affairs calls “a war of ideas.”102 In pursing this so-​called soft coun­ terterrorism approach, the state mobilized its religious bureaucracy into lengthy sessions of dialogue, debate, and reindoctrination with the jihadis, combined with programs to help them reintegrate into society through the intercession of family members and jobs training.103 In the case of Mauritania, the central figure enlisted by the regime was Mohamed al-Hasen Ould al-Dedew. This had a particular effect on the Ould Semane: the young jihadi had attended Dedew’s mosque and had reportedly served as his bodyguard.104 But more importantly was an ideo­ logical affinity; Dedew’s platform of critique against the Mauritanian gov­ ernment, especially its corruption and its alignment with the West in the war on terror, paralleled the grievances of Ould Semane and other jihadis.105 His repeated incarceration added to his credibility. In 2009, Dedew, in conjunction with other Islamists from the Brotherhood-​affiliated Tawassoul party, reportedly proposed the initi­ ative to the prisoners, who by this time numbered roughly seventy.106 What followed at first was a series of exchanges in the local press before face-​to-​face dialogue took place within the prison itself in January 2010. ( 32 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

Besides Dedew, a broad swathe of clerics would participate over successive rounds: pro-government figures such as the imam of the Grand Mosque in Nouakchott, Ahmedou Ould Lemrabott, and Hamdan Ould -​al Tah, the secretary general of the League of Mauritanian Ulema.107 So did clerical fig­ ures with closer connections to the jihadis themselves: the aforementioned Abu Hafs al-​Mauritani, and also an important Salafi scholar with jihadi leanings named Ahmed Mazid Ould Abdel Haq. A student of the venerated Salafi cleric Shaykh Buddah Ould al-​Buṣayri, Ould Abdel Haq went on pursue a master’s degree and a doctorate and taught at the Institute for Islamic Studies and Research, where one of his students was Abu Hafs al-​Mauritani. Like al-​Mauritani, Ould Abdel Haq was drawn to bin Laden; in the late 1990s he went to Khartoum, where he tutored bin Laden’s sons in Arabic until the al-​Qaeda leader fled to Pakistan and Afghanistan.108 In 2005 he was imprisoned by the regime until 2007, on the basis of collaboration with AQIM—he​ attributes his delayed re­ lease, after other Islamists had been freed, to the regime’s desire to use Salafi prisoners as a form of barter with the West.109 As the government’s first di­ alogue efforts with the jihadi started in 2010, Ould Abdel Haq was critical of the initial composition of the clerical committees: they were too broad in outlook, comprising Sufis, Malikis, Brotherhood, and Salafis. But more ­im portantly, he argued, they included a number of former government officials who were notorious for their crackdown on Islamists.110 In 2012, after the amnesty of 2010 and the release of thirty-​two prisoners, he and others suc­ cessfully advocated a different approach for the hardcore detainees: a three-​ person committee comprised of Dedew, himself, and another cleric and a presidential counselor who was also trusted by the detainees.111 In the sessions that followed over the next seventeen days, Ould Abdel Haq and others deployed a variety of approaches in their dialogue. They started with a recognition that, even in the latter stages of the dialogue, those who were imprisoned had not necessarily committed violent acts. Among the central ideas deployed by the cleric in the dialogue was the Islamic scriptural precedent of “security” or “a guarantee” (al-​’aman) for for­ eign and non-​Islamic guests inside Mauritania—​categorized as “protected persons” (al-musta’min​ ).112 In addition, he told them, it was lawful to call for sharia in the country but not to use violence to do so. To bolster these arguments, he not only drew from the Qur’an and Hadith but also more contemporary thinkers, some of them former jihadi ideologues. Among the latter, he cited the towering Syrian ideologue Abd-​al Mun’em Mustafa Halima (also known as Abu Basir al-​Tartusi), whose condemnation of al-​ Qaeda’s suicide bombings of a London metro marked a major salvo in jihadi juridical debates about killing civilians.113 Specifically, al-​Tartusi deployed ambiguities of salafism in mauritania ( 33 ) the concept of a “covenant” (ʿahd) of security between Muslims residing in non-​Muslim countries and non-​Muslims residing in Muslim states.114 These themes were repeated by Abu Hafs al-​Mauritani, who joined latter rounds of dialogue following his release from prison. In an interview, he acknowledged the jihadis’ frustration at corruption and their desire to be ruled by Islamic law.115 Despite this, he told the imprisoned jihadis that it was impermissible to use force to demand Islamic law and that the Mauritanian government, for all of its imperfections, presented the oppor­ tunity to call for Islamic law.116 Were the dialogues successful? When thirty-​five prisoners were released after a presidential amnesty in late 2010, government architects and sup­ portive clerics of the program had answered a resounding yes.117 The very prospect of dialogue split the prisoners into two groups, a group of forty-​seven prisoners and another, more recalcitrant group led by Ould Semane.118 Semane in particular would prove defiant: in one of the sessions he wore a white T-​shirt upon which he had hand drawn a grenade, an as­ sault rifle, and the words “al-​Qaeda.”119 He would pen a series of letters to Dedew and to Ould Abdel Haq, accusing them of betrayal of Salafi creed and marshaling an array of clerics—​mostly from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Jordan—​to refute their arguments for moderation and peaceful activism.120 Beyond the jihadis’ obstinacy, several other caveats apply to the “model” of dialogue. First, from the beginning, the regime was always circumspect about those it considered redeemable. Dedew and his clerics at the conclu­ sion of their initial sessions recommended the freeing of those who had not participated in violence and lighter sentences for the rest. He was report­ edly shocked when lengthy prison terms and death sentences were handed down.121 Though the sentences have not been carried out as of this writing, they nevertheless illustrate that the so-​called soft approach was always accompanied by the threat of punitive measures, including incarceration and, reportedly, torture.122 Second, the reintegration of ex-prisoners has re­ portedly been uneven. According to local media, the government provided micro-funds to each of the pardoned detainees to start their own income- producing projects such as the selling of phone credit and buying, fixing, and selling cars.123 Yet, according to a released prisoner and to a cleric who participated in the dialogue and maintains contact with former prisoners, the government has not kept its promises of providing sustainable jobs for the young men.124 Among those still imprisoned, rights activists have al­ leged that the government is denying them access to census documenta­ tion, which effectively cuts off their children’s access to certain schooling and overseas medical care.125 Echoing this, in an extensive interview in 2015, the cleric Ould Abdel Haq said that parts of the prison dialogue had ( 34 ) Salafism in the Maghreb failed, listing a lack of follow-up by the government as one of several defi­ ciencies. Even so, he acknowledged that the endeavor had helped stem re­ cruitment into the jihadists’ ranks.126 For over half a decade, Mauritania has not witnessed jihadi attacks on its soil—​a remarkable turnaround given the spate of violence that shook the country from 2005 to 2011. But questions remain about the durability of the peace—as​ well as its price. Most famously, a document dated March 2010 recovered from Osama bin Laden’s compound during the 2011 raid by American special forces hints at a quid pro quo deal between AQIM and the Mauritanian government. In return for the government freeing impris­ oned AQIM members and paying a fee to militants, AQIM would agree to cease attacks on Mauritanian soil.127 Feeding into this suspicion was the Mauritanian regime’s release in 2015 of Sidi Mohamed Ould Mohamed Ould Boumam, the former spokesperson for a branch of AQIM in Mali called Ansar Dine, which baffled many observers.128 Yet the Mauritanian government and figures close to al-​Qaeda denied any such agreement—​ at any rate, the Mauritanian regime has not released many of its AQIM prisoners like Ould Semane.129 What seems more likely is that Mauritanian government has pursued a policy of calculated ambiguity in both its foreign and domestic policy that serves as a pressure release and insulates itself from jihadi critiques. In this, it is responding to the 2013 French-​led military intervention in northern Mali against a coalition of Tuareg separatists and Ansar Dine. Dubbed “Operation Serval,” the French campaign proved to be a major source of so­ cietal debate and clerical opposition within Mauritania.130 As the operation unfolded, a group of thirty-​nine Mauritanian clerics, including the radical cleric Majlissi, issued a fatwa condemning the intervention as a neocoloni­ alist campaign and exhorting their fellow Muslims citizens—​but not the Mauritanian government directly—to​ stand in solidarity with Muslims in Mali. Beyond this statement, a number of luminaries added to the chorus of condemnation, including the Brotherhood-​affiliated Tawassoul and Dedew.131 The Mauritanian government’s ensuing response to the French interven­ tion was a hands-​off one. Though it had intervened in Mali in 2010 and 2011 to pursue al-​Qaeda, it did not elect to join the French-​led campaign in 2013. Instead, it focused on fortifying its 2,237-​kilometer-​long border with Mali—a​ policy of defensive containment akin to that pursued by its neighbor, Algeria.132 Whether or not this was tied to domestic pressure from the clerics is unclear—​at the very least, it was one factor of many that influenced the government’s calculus. And the government’s resulting ret­ icence on Mali cannot be ruled out as one of the reasons for the lack of AQIM attacks on Mauritanian soil.133 In addition, the draw of Mali as a ambiguities of salafism in mauritania ( 35 ) battlefield diverted Mauritanian youths who might otherwise direct their ire against the Mauritanian regime, though many of them were reportedly drawn to Mali by communal cross-​border tribal ties as much as religious ideology.134 Aside from this foreign policy concession, the Mauritanian govern­ ment at home has given jihadists a degree of media and ideological lati­ tude at home. Most notably, Mauritanian media outlets—in​ particular, the Nouakchott News Agency, Al-​Akhbar, and Sahara—​have provided a platform for regional jihadist groups to post statements and communiques, while at the same time offering exclusive reportage and insights that are valuable for counterterrorism researchers. Though the outlets justify this access as proof of their independence, concessions by the Mauritanian gov­ ernment are also at play.135 The Mauritanian regime has also created space for a number of outspoken clerics to continue speaking and preaching, provided they do not cross cer­ tain red lines of calling for violence against the government. For example, the cleric al-​Majlissi has been able to maintain his hardline views on democ­ racy, specifically American efforts to subvert Islam through projects such as “Democratic Islam,”136 and his critique of neocolonialism.137 He has also criticized the pro-government imam of Nouakchott’s Grand Mosque.138 In 2015, he was briefly arrested on the suspicion of supporting the Islamic State, and though he was released, he continues his role as a provocateur. Abu Hafs al-​Mauritani, in particular, is given a degree of latitude; he has spoken favorably on jihad against foreign occupation but has criticized the jihadis’ attempts to topple Muslim governments and has condemned the Islamic State. Toward Mauritania’s politics, he presents himself as a prin­ cipled, loyal oppositionist. A recent example includes his criticism of the Mauritanian government’s invitation to Egyptian clerics from al-​Azhar to attend a counterextremism conference in Nouakchott—a​ statement that was reposted by the more activist Tawassoul party.139 What seems clear that this space allows for some stridency—​but within the boundaries proscribed and enforced by the government. Government supporters of this approach—a​ mix of coercion and co-​option—​have argued that it has defanged the ideology of the violent jihadis, leaving them without a spiritual guide. “The jihadis don’t have a head,” said one of them.140 Even so, the question then becomes how much of the clerics’ moderation is temporary and tactical. The case of another prominent cleric, Dr. Mohamed Ould Ahmed Zarouq (known as Al-​Sha’ir, or “the Poet”), whose imprisonment was cited by Khadim Ould Semane in 2006 as one of his grievances against the Mauritanian government, is illustra­ tive. In 2009, Zarouq penned a letter renouncing militancy against Muslim governments—​but only because it was impractical and the jihadis had no ( 36 ) Salafism in the Maghreb chance of winning. On the other exclusionary and extremist aspects of ji­ hadi ideology, particularly his endorsement of takfir, he never relented.141

CONCLUSION

Beyond the Mauritanian government’s one-​dimensional narrative of re­ ligious moderation and rehabilitation, Salafism in Mauritania is a com­ plex, ever-​changing phenomenon. The Salafi current has been shaped by the country’s unique socioreligious context of Sufi influences and Islamic learning, as well as its rapid urbanization, exchanges with the Gulf, and deep ethnic-​racial divides. The presence of competing Islamist movements with grass-​roots, populist appeal—​combined with the country’s deeply rooted Islamic heritage—have​ exerted strong pressure on Salafis to adapt and even dissimulate. The result has been a tempering, at least among more main­ stream figures like Dedew, of Salafism’s more dogmatic and exclusionary tenets. It is true that the violent expressions of Salafism have peaked and ap­ pear to have been contained since 2011. Meanwhile, Salafi impulses toward political activism and party politics appear to have been stifled as well; the Salafi cleric Ahmed Mazid Ould Abdel Haq recently told an interviewer that Salafis do not have the financial or human capital to establish a party.142 Thus, Salafism seems to be confined to two poles, each centered on nonvi­ olent preaching and media: a progovernment trend embodied in the figure of the imam of the Grand Mosque, Ahmedou Ould Lemrabott, and a more strident strain embodied by Abu Hafs al-​Mauritani and al-​Majlissi that, while provocative, still respects the regime’s red lines. Yet the government’s triumphalism should be treated with care. The country remains mired in corruption and economic disparity. Peripheral and border areas, the sites of much jihadist activity, desperately need de­ velopment. The recent discovery of offshore gas and oil on the border with Senegal has brought an attendant influx of foreign direct investment, raising hopes for broad economic improvement.143 Yet some Mauritanian observers privately wonder whether the money will reach the public, given the government’s corruption and non-​transparency.144 And, perversely, the windfall could be new fodder for the jihadists’ critique of the gov­ ernment: AQIM may try to portray the investments as infringements on Mauritania’s sovereignty. Added to this is the growing authoritarianism and clampdown on free speech by the regime of President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who won re-​election in 2009 and again in 2014.145 In January 2019, Ould Abdel Aziz seem dispel rumors that he would seek a third presidential term by ambiguities of salafism in mauritania ( 37 ) endorsing the candidacy of one of his longtime loyalists, Defense Minister Mohamed Ould Ghazouani for presidential elections in mid-​2019. But longtime observers of Mauritania saw this as a skillful move to perpet­ uate the grip on power of the his coterie of elites drawn from the Union for the Republic Party—​as well as the tradition of military influence over politics.146 Moreover, in the run-​up to the elections, the President cracked down on Islamists. In late September 2018, for example, he closed the Center for Training Islamic Scholars run by Dedew, accusing it of promoting radicalism: in a speech before a military parade, he resorted to common tropes about safeguarding a “correct” Islam against the distortions of the Muslim Brotherhood.147 Such actions do not bode well for future stability: the sustained imprisonment of venerated clerics like Dedew and the pro­ longed closure of political space for Islamists could inspire a new cadres of Mauritanian militants, repeating a cycle of the past. All of this suggests that the specter of violent jihadism has not disappeared. It is certainly true that the country is not a base for a base for the Islamic State, despite alarmist predictions and the percentage of young Mauritanians joining jihadist groups abroad has dwindled in the last several years.148 But jihadist groups continue to exploit Mauritania’s un­ regulated media and use the country’s territory as a the thoroughfare and logistical base.149 A resurgent al-​Qaeda in nearby Mali and Burkina Faso remains a potent threat, given the aforementioned communique of May 2018.150 Moreover, Mauritania’s longtime reticence about sustained, extra-​ territorial military operations, which may have insulated it from jihadist attacks, is changing. Specifically, Nouakchott has recently raised its regional profile in the G5 Sahel Force—a​ five-​nation, counterterrorism coalition of Sahelian countries that has struggled with organization and resources.151 Mauritania is host to the organization’s headquarters and a Mauritanian of­ ficer, a general from military intelligence, recently took over command of its joint force.152 In tandem with future Mauritanian cross-​border operations, this growing prominence give jihadists a new propaganda boon. At the moment, however, it remains unclear whether and how militants will act in Mauritania—and​ whether they will jeopardize the supposed “deal” that still exists in the country. What seems certain is that the post-​ 2011 lull in violence may not last indefinitely. CHAPTER 3 w The Paradoxical Mutations of Salafism in Morocco

INTRODUCTION

Salafism in Morocco has long been a dynamic movement. Debates and disputes on issues of creed (‛aqida), political party activism (ḥizbiyya), and progress (al-taqaddum​ ) have recurred for decades. But it is differences in both the local context and the conditions of transnational, global Islam that have often influenced how Salafism projected itself. When Morocco was a French protectorate (1912–​56), Salafism was often described as modernist reformism. Such perception began to fade after independence with the ascendance of Salafi factions for whom doctrinal purity was of paramount importance. The Moroccan monarchy and the global ascendance of Saudi Arabia as a major sponsor of this strain of Salafism contributed to the dom­ inance of what came to be known as quietist Salafism in Morocco. Such dominance persisted till the Arab uprisings of 2011. This chapter takes Morocco as a case study to investigate the rise, ev­ olution, and development of Salafism in Morocco. Special attention is given to the quietist current that, for decades, had remained wedded to a vision that enforced doctrinal and ritual purity and prohibited political ac­ tivism before succumbing to the pressure of local and regional events. The May 2003 terrorist attack in Casablanca and the birth of the February 20 prodemocracy movement in 2011 shook the quietist current to its core, raising fundamental questions about the adaptability of its activities and methods of activism. Marked by regime crackdown on Salafi infrastructure,

Salafism in the Maghreb.Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, Oxford University Press (2019). © Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190942403.001.0001 the paradoxical mutations of salafism in morocco ( 39 ) the attack also saw young quietist Salafis grow less aloof to political sen­ sibilities and interests even as they remained dedicated first and foremost to doctrinal purity and peaceful proselytization. This created tensions and contradictions in Salafi thought that were compounded by the 2011 Arab uprisings and their chaotic aftermath. The end result is the fractionaliza­ tion of the quietist Salafi current into two camps; one that reverted back to its principle of conformity to Salafi traditions and absolute obedience to political authority and another that persists in a reformist bent, charting a middle ground between Salafi strictures and Islamic modernism. This chapter illustrates this great rift within quietist Salafism by tracing the course taken by two of the most prominent figures of this current and the critical stages that have influenced their ideological postures, relations with the ruling regime, and adaptability to local and regional changes. Mohamed Maghraoui has, for decades, been the most dominant and influ­ ential figure of quietist Salafism. Hammad Kabbaj—​who gained visibility as Maghraoui’s deputy, a position he resigned in protest of his mentor’s en­ dorsement of the July 3, 2013 coup in Egypt—​is best known for providing the intellectual and religious backbone for the hesitant movement of qui­ etist Salafism toward a mix of Salafi da’wa (proselytizing) with political and social activism. Their bifurcating paths reveal the mutations, paradoxes, and adaptations of quietist Salafism.

THE GESTATION OF MOROCCAN SALAFISM

In Morocco, debates and controversies about the precepts of religious under­ standing and interpretation of the doctrine of the forefathers, or madhhab al-salaf​ , have often been interwoven with deeper contests over questions of authority and power in the political and religious arena. It is in one such contest under the reign of Sultan Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allah (1757–​90) and particularly Sultan Mawlay Sulayman (1792–1822)​ that the precepts of the Wahhabi tradition started to make small inroads into the kingdom.1 The rulers of Morocco have always sought to keep the religious arena fragmented to better control it.2 By introducing Wahhabism as another religious reference point, Sulayman tried to bolster his authority over his competitors, particularly the influential Sufi networks of the Wazzaniyya, the Nasiriyya, Tijaniyya, and the Darqawiyya.3 By condemning some excesses of Sufi practices—​such as singing and dancing to induce religious ecstasy or asking saints for blessings and/or​ intercession with God—as​ blameworthy innovations that contravene the tenets of faith and weaken the unity of Moroccans against external threats, the sultan hoped to bran­ dish his reformist credentials and piety while discrediting the other sources ( 40 ) Salafism in the Maghreb of religious power.4 To be sure, his religious policies were never intended to purge Sufism, a deeply anchored tradition in Morocco.5 Nonetheless, the process of reforming Sufi practices to align with “true” Islamic princi­ ples failed to gain traction with local populations, religious scholars, and political elite. The nineteenth century saw its own share of gradual cross-​pollination between Moroccan forms of Islam steeped in ʿAshari theology, Maliki ju­ risprudence and Sufism, and nonindigenous ways of conceptualizing and interpreting matters of orthodoxy (correct belief) and orthopraxy (correct behavior). Muḥammad bin Jaafar al-​Kattani and Abdallah Idris al-​Sanusi promoted the ideas of the fourteenth-​century Hanbali thinker Taqi al-​Din Ibn Taymiya, known for his religious purism and critique of superstitious practices and beliefs. Idris al-​Sanusi used his proximity to the entourage of Sultan Hassan I (1873 to 1894) to advocate for a thorough reassessment of Islamic legal scholarship and some Sufi practices deemed beyond the pale. But the diffusion of purist positions about theological fideism and the importance of Hadith studies in the interpretation of the law ended up alienating several influential Sufis, such as Ahmed Ben Taleb Bensouda, who accused al-​Sanusi of distorting Islamic principles and harming the faith.6 Like prior efforts at rethinking the particulars of Moroccan Islam, al-​ Sanusi’s ideas remained too elitist and popularly marginal to be able to pro­ duce a constructive debate about Islamic doctrines, practices, and tradition. The fortunes of Moroccan reformists began to change in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the threats of European encroachments mushroomed into an existential crisis, the need for reforms to bring about a renewal and renaissance of the Moroccan Muslim commu­ nity became palpable. In the process, two reformist responses developed in parallel to each other. One was purist and called for a regeneration of Islamic knowledge through direct and literal engagement with sacred texts. Its major exponent was Muhammad Taqi al-​Din al-​Hilali (1894–​1987), a former Sufi of the Tijani order who earned a doctorate in Arabic litera­ ture from the University of Berlin and developed strong connections with the most prominent Wahhabi scholars in Saudi Arabia. The second re­ sponse was modernist in orientation, and it emphasized the revitalization of Moroccan Islam through a scripturalist but rationalist engagement with Islam’s authoritative texts. Abu Shuaib al-​Dukkali (1878–​1937) is credited with transforming the Moroccan reformist discourse from the margins of significance into a pervasive intellectual and popular force.7 His teachings provided the seed for the development of modernist Salafism, which was still a vague and undeveloped concept. They also laid the foundation for subsuming Salafism into the budding nationalist movement, of which the main protagonists were his students. the paradoxical mutations of salafism in morocco ( 41 )

Once such influential figure was Mohamed Allal -​al Fassi (1910–​1974), who became the most dominant standard-​bearer of Moroccan Salafism.8 Under Allal al-​Fassi, Mohammed Belarbi el Alaoui,9 and other associates, the Salafi movement championed a firmly nationalist and modernist per­ spective inspired by the fourteenth-​century Andalusian jurist Abu Ishaq al-​ Shatibi and his theory of maqasid (higher objectives of sharia),10 as well as by the modernist attitude to Islamic law adopted by the founders of Middle Eastern Islamic modernism, Jamal al Din al Afghani (1838–​1897) and his disciple Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905).​ 11 For Allal al-​Fassi, Salafism was a constructive force that fostered progress and kindled nationalistic revo­ lutionary consciousness. It was a fighting faith whose goals centered pri­ marily on three major interlocking imperatives: the defensive call to arms, liberation of the masses from their lethargic state of mind,12 and reform of traditional educational systems. The latter, he believed, was especially crit­ ical to marginalize the forces of intellectual passivity and enable the devel­ opment of a democratic Moroccan Islam that was free from the shackles of religious complacency (Sufism) and the Maliki juridical tradition.13 However popular Allal al-​Fassi’s views became, they did not garner unani­ mous support from all those who identified as Salafis. His conceptualization of Salafism as an open creed that fostered independent reasoning, women’s equality,14 and freedom of religion provoked the ire of the purist camp, which firmly believed that the revival of the Muslim community necessitated the homogenization of Islam and the purge of foreign innovations. But even when the religious reforms that Allal al-​Fassi and his followers advocated did not measure up to the doctrinaire stances that the purists held, they had every incentive to avoid disagreements over orthodoxy undermining the struggle against French colonialism. Ironically, writes Henri Lauzière, the fight against colonial rule ended up acting as “a moderating influence,” even if only momentarily.15 The most notable example is Muhammad Taqi al-​Din al-​Hilali, who preached the importance of multilingualism and the exposure to the scientific subjects prevalent in Western universities. To be sure, he dissuaded Muslims from studying in Europe, but nonetheless called for the opening of a university in Morocco where Europeans could come and impart their knowledge to the locals.16 The bottom line is that both modernists and purists tolerated each other, while the French were still occupying Morocco. The modernists countenanced al-​Hilali’s views, which grew more rigid when he returned to live in Morocco in 1942. His emphasis on religious purism and proper Salafi codes of conduct as well as his pro­ motion of Hanbali and Wahhabi discourses exasperated some modernists, yet they did not treat him as an outcast. For his part, al-​Hilali disapproved of the “misguided” understanding that the modernists had of religion, but he still respected their intellect and appreciated their activism.17 ( 42 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

By the 1930s and 1940s, the modernist movement transformed Salafism into a flourishing seedbed for anyone that promoted the rebirth of the Muslim community through reclaiming its position of Ummatun Wasat (a centrist nation) that avoided ghulu (extremes), accommodated scientific progress, and provided the basis for balanced reforms.18 This conception helped form a bridge between the old Moroccan traditional ulema (scholars) and younger secularists schooled in European univer­ sities. Some of the former welcomed the modern applicability of Islamic principles and concepts such as wasatiyya (moderate Islamic thought) and maslaha (public interest) to create a confident Moroccan Islamic polity that shunned superstitious spirituality (Sufism) and indomitably confronted the colonial regime and its collaborators. As for the secularist camp, an appreciable number conceded the powerful function that mod­ ernist Salafism played in fostering public virtue. Even the most pugnacious secularist leaders of the time—​such as revolutionary politician Mehdi Ben Barka, who was abducted and presumably murdered in Paris by the regime of King Hassan II in 1965—acknowledged​ that the standard-​bearers of Salafism in the Moroccan nationalist movement helped change his views of religion as a force preoccupied with emotion and fascinated with magic and the miraculous.19 On the eve of independence, Salafism became a term that modernists wore as a badge of honor and secularists respected as a project of Islamic renaissance aimed at liberating Moroccans from stagnation and French colonialism.

ASCENDANCE OF QUIETIST SALAFISM

In the postindependence period, the alliance between Salafi modernists, purists (known as quietists after independence), and secularists fractured under the weight of power struggles and the pull of the potent ideologies of Arab nationalism and socialism.20 The old theologians quickly found themselves at odds with the secular turn that Moroccan nationalism was taking. The religious centrality of the monarchy emerged as another di­ visive issue among Salafis. Those that resigned themselves to the preem­ inence of the palace aspired to shape the cultural and religious spheres through the power of the enlightened monarch. This camp, incorporated into the official clergy, relished the postindependence maelstrom of ideo­ logical ferment and antagonism as an opportunity to get in the good graces of the monarch while doing battle against leftist movements. The latter were locked in a struggle with the monarchy over the nature of the govern­ mental structures of the newly independent Moroccan state; the arrange­ ment of the powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial processes; and the paradoxical mutations of salafism in morocco ( 43 ) the proper role of religion in politics. The sacralizing of the monarchy in the 1962 constitution escalated tensions with the Left as well as within parts of the nationalist Salafi modernist movement that boycotted the vote on the constitutional changes. This tumultuous political landscape was aggravated soon afterward by the failure of the dramatic 1971 and 1972 military coups and the emer­ gence of a new breed of autodidact religious activists and intellectuals schooled in modern secular institutions but bent on contesting the political and religious authority of the monarchy as well as the growing influence of leftist movements in universities.21 This new trend of political activism was represented by the militant organization Shabiba al-​Islamiya (Islamic Youth), which was established in 1969 by Abdelkarim Moutii and Al Adl Wal Ihsan (Justice and Welfare), a Sufi-​inspired Islamist group set up by the charismatic Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine (d. 2012). The latter shot to promi­ nence in the 1970s when he published “Islam or the Deluge,” an open letter addressed to the late King Hassan II, admonishing him to forgo his position as a religious leader and content himself with that of head of state. In the midst of this agitation, the promises of the Salafi modernists to reconcile the ordinances of religion with the demands of the times started to wither away. The modernists were outflanked by their secular allies in the Istiqlal (Independence) party that Allal al-​Fassi helped found in 1944. They were also outmaneuvered by both the palace, which appropriated their Islamic idioms and modernist themes, and the Islamists, who gradu­ ally proved better at putting religion into politics while mobilizing popular support. The fact that several Salafi modernists were recruited and co-​opted into the political establishment did not help either. In fact, it contributed to the dilution of their reformist credentials and the eventual fading away of Salafism as a concept that denotes modernism and social progress. The main beneficiaries of the marginalization of the Salafi modernists were qui­ etist Salafists, whose survival was never linked to their capacity to translate the modernists ideas and priorities of sociopolitical reforms into action. In fact, the quietists severed their ties to the modernists as soon as they became no longer constrained by the requirements of unity and flexibility that the struggle against colonial rule demanded. Gone were the days when quietists could identify as Salafis in creed and yet support progressive so­ ciopolitical reforms. In the postindependence period, the quietist Salafists became intransigent over the meaning and application of Salafi orthodoxy and orthopraxy.22 To be sure, this rigidity earned them the scorn and disdain of the political elite, who dismissed them as being wildly out of tune with the realities of postindependence Morocco. Throughout the sixties, the quietists struggled to gain popular traction, developing only a marginal presence in the north ( 44 ) Salafism in the Maghreb of the country.23 Their travails were compounded by the rise of Islamism as a dynamic sociopolitical force. Yet ironically, it was their purist worldview that facilitated their survival and eventual monopolization of the meaning of Salafism. Their avoidance of active politics and confrontation with state authorities earned them the palace’s tolerance. The monarchy still acted as the guardian of official Moroccan Islam, whose basic precepts, laws, and practices stood in opposition to the quietists’ neo-​Hanbali theology. Al-​ Hilali was vocal about his distaste for Morocco’s religious orientation,24 even if he never dared criticize the monarchy, the principal interpreter and enforcer of Islamic doctrines and laws in Morocco. After all, the palace was willing to allow the quietists room to maneuver, as their existence served to fragment the religious field and counteract the political adversaries of the monarchy. More consequentially, the monarchy tacitly welcomed the quietists’ drive to activate their deep connections with the Saudis in the service of the fight against first leftist, then Islamist opposition groups.25 The Moroccan monarchy’s acquiescence to the growth of Wahhabi-​ inspired Salafism and Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to spread its ideology and teachings were the main catalysts behind the transformation of quietist Salafism into an important network of proselytism. This time, unlike the first failed forays of Wahhabism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which were aborted by local and cultural resistance, the Saudi oil-​financed proselytizing machine helped empower the quietists.26 Al-​Hilali, who left Morocco after independence to settle in Saudi Arabia, where he felt his re­ ligious credentials were more valued and coveted, returned to the country in the early 1970s, buttressed by Saudi money and its growing transnational proselytizing networks. According to the late minister of religious affairs, Abdelkbir Alaoui M’Daghri, al-​Hilali was the first Salafi to receive a monthly salary from Saudi Arabia in exchange for defending and propagating Wahhabism.27 Saudi institutions presumably financed his religious activities and helped in the production and distribution of his books. Scholarships were also awarded to hundreds of Moroccan students who went to study in Saudi universities.28 Al-​Hilali used his ties to major Wahhabis to secure monetary support for Salafi activists and oversee a budget that his friend, Bin Baz, allocated for proselytizing activities in Morocco.29 Over time, Morocco started to count dozens of Qur’anic schools dom­ inated by Saudi-​aligned Salafi preachers, the most prominent of which became a student of Hilali, Sheikh Mohamed Maghraoui (b. 1948) who founded the influential NGO the Moroccan Association to call for the Qur’an and the Sunna in Marrakesh in 1976. Like most successful Salafis, mainly those trained in Saudi Arabia or granted the seal of approval by the international stalwarts of the Salafi ideology, Maghraoui gained in prom­ inence when al-​Hilali facilitated his admission to the Islamic University the paradoxical mutations of salafism in morocco ( 45 ) in Medina.30 Maghraoui built his connections with major Salafi scholars and ingratiated himself with the Wahhabi establishment during his time in Medina. The Saudi links proved critical in supporting the network of Qur’anic learning centers he established to spread the quietist interpreta­ tion of Islam and, most importantly for the Saudis and Moroccan monarchy, to stand up to the challenges of revolutionary Shiism and political Islam. Over the years, Maghraoui has organized several events and devoted sev­ eral lectures that attacked Shia as perfidious hypocrites. Like his mentor al-​Hilali, he denounced them for being a group of ahl al-bida​ ’ (heretics) who believe in the concept of a Hidden Imam and denigrate the Prophet’s companions (the first three caliphs) as usurpers of power. Maghraoui went even further in a lecture he gave in 2010, where he described Shiism as a sect whose core doctrines and fundamental beliefs were established by Abdullah Ibn Saba al-​Yahudi, who was Jewish but presumably converted to Islam during the reign of Uthman in order to sow dissent among Muslims.31 Another favorite target of Maghraoui’s was the late supreme guide of the banned Sufi-​inspired Islamist group Al Adl Wal Ihsan, Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine, whom he regularly blasted as a deluded heretic and promoter of syncretic bida’ (innovation). Maghraoui also criticized Yassine for op­ posing the monarchy. For Sheikh Maghraoui, the exact obedience to God’s commands and ordinances cannot be disconnected from the ultimate rev­ erence and loyalty to the person of the ruler. In this vein, he cautioned his followers against the vices of participation politics, as those that engage in politics contravene the Salafimanhaj (method) and deviate from its guiding principles. For Maghraoui, political action opens the way to discord and leads to unacceptable compromises and concessions, which, from the point of view of Salafi logic, is considered a grave violation of the foundations of Salafi creed. Maghraoui’s stances did not garner the approval of all Salafis. It is true that by al-​Hilali’s death in 1987, he assumed the mantle of quietist Salafism in Morocco, but a number of Salafis enunciated reservations about some aspects of his Salafi methodology, orientation, and attitude to political au­ thority. His absolute loyalty to the Saudi regime caused tensions within the Salafi community, leading to some high-​level defections.32 The most prominent defector was Mohamed Fizazi, who wrote a book titled Traitors Not Scholars: Take Your Caution, accusing Maghraoui of being a traitor whose loyalty was bought through the Saudi riyal.33 Fizazi also reproached Maghraoui for dragging his quietist current into the conflict between the Moroccan regime and Al Adl Wal Ihsan. Despite these criticisms and defections, Maghraoui remained un­ daunted, correctly calculating that his loyalty to the Moroccan regime and his closeness to the Saudi clerical establishment was the best strategy for ( 46 ) Salafism in the Maghreb his movement to grow. Maghraoui’s attacks on the political adversaries of the monarchy were indeed welcomed by the authorities, which in turn accommodated some of his interests, namely the preservation of his asso­ ciation and allowing the proliferation of Qur’anic schools and religiously based NGOs. Maghraoui expressed his gratitude by constantly reaffirming his absolute subservience to the holders of political power. This explains Maghraoui’s unabashed apologia of the late King Hassan II, as starkly expressed when he pinned the blame for those who were imprisoned and tortured during the monarch’s reign on their supposed lack of the appro­ priate virtues to make good use of freedom.34 In other words, those that stoked conflict and discord through social contention and contestation of power reaped the whirlwind they sowed. Those that obeyed supreme polit­ ical authority and steered clear of acts that threatened to destabilize public order or antagonize the authorities reaped the thriving benefits of being in the good graces of the regime. Maghraoui cited the survival of his associ­ ation during the massive security crackdown on Salafis that followed the May 2003 Casablanca terrorist attack as an example of the benefits accrued from strict conformism to regime rules. In typical apologetic fashion, he absolved the government of the well-​documented abuses that occurred in that period, declaring that the security response was measured and propor­ tional to the threat posed.35

SIGNS OF BUDDING POLITICIZATION

Maghraoui has long bragged about his ability to act as a buffer between religious youth and the radical voices that call for violence or activism in politics. But the emergence of the radical underground in Morocco put the quietist current on the defensive, forcing Maghraoui to tighten his grip on his NGOs, quickly disavowing any of his disciples who exhibited violent radical tendencies, such as Abdelhaq Redouane and the preacher Youssef Assoli. The same fate befell Abdelhakim al-Fakhiri, who in the view of Maghraoui breached one of the regime’s red lines by addressing a letter to the monarch complaining about the spread in society of elements of shirk (asso­ciationism), Christian proselytism, secularism, and so on.36 In a post-​ 2003 political environment marked by the regime’s aggressive monitoring of all Salafi institutions and activities as well as clampdown on the sale of books, videos, and cassette tapes of popular Salafi leaders that were freely available outside mosques and bookstores, Maghraoui and his supporters had to demonstrate to the regime their continuing utility as an antidote against violent extremism and antisystemic politics. Simultaneously, they had to show their followers that their approach remained the best hedge the paradoxical mutations of salafism in morocco ( 47 ) against the intrusive power of the state. These were difficult tasks to fulfill at a time when the regime was vigorously enacting drastic reform efforts to re­ structure the religious field and weed out religious discourses and teachings that deviate from the orientation of Moroccan Islam. “The hour of truth has struck, heralding the end of an era of laxism in the face of those who exploit democracy to attack the authority of the state,” King Mohamed VI said after the May 2003 attacks, publicly recognizing that state authorities had allowed those who “wanted to send Morocco backwards” room to operate.37 The signs of Salafi​-jihadi discourses started to become apparent in the mid-​1990s, spawned both by the split in the global Salafi movement following the deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait38 and by the emergence of the global Salafi-​ jihadi literature in Morocco, brought to the country by Moroccans residing in Europe.39 Local Salafi sheikhs that would come to the general public’s attention after the May 2003 terrorist attacks helped spread a romantic and heroic version of defensive armed struggle, gradually inculcating a new cul­ ture of jihadi activism into the public imagination of the disaffected youths in search of a fantasy escape from their social and psychological malaise. The first signs of a Salafi slide into violence appeared in 1998.40 Small groups originating in shantytowns and outlying suburbs of larger cities that the press dubbed Takfir wa’l-​Hijra (Excommunication and Exile) terrorized neighbors that did not conform to their puritanical vision of morality and social conduct.41 But up until the terrorist attacks that hit the United States in 2001, Moroccan authorities adopted a lax approach toward the turn of a fringe of the Salafi groups to vigilante-​style activities. The regime’s assess­ ment was that Salafi jihadists were confined to marginal areas and consti­ tuted no serious threat to the state. In some cases, their presence was even salutary, as they helped reduce crime and drugs. This complacency began to fray after the 2001 terrorist attacks on American soil and the resultant global war on terrorism.42 The May 2003 suicide bombs represented a major shock to the country. The regime launched a massive crackdown against the Salafi movement, targeting its firebrand preachers, recalcitrant followers, and makeshift spaces of gatherings and prayers. Save the most docile and quiescent Salafi associations, the regime closed dozens of Salafi NGOs and Qur’anic schools. This assault on Salafi symbols and infrastructure was accompa­ nied by a radical overhaul of the country’s religious institutions and social policy. In 2004, King Mohammed VI established the Supreme Council of the Ulema, with the primary task of closely monitoring all forms of religious expressions and teachings. A few years later came the establish­ ment of regional councils and their local sections. The goal, to use the monarch’s words, was to bolster “the nation’s spiritual security, ensuring the ( 48 ) Salafism in the Maghreb preservation of its religious doctrine, which is based on a tolerant Sunni Islam . . . and to guide the people and combat those who hold extremist v iews.” 43 Dar al-Hadith al Hassania, the center that trains religious scholars, also underwent a major overhaul to its curriculum and makeup, which saw for the first time the introduction of themurshidat (female spiritual guides). The Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, which is charged with managing the religious field, saw its own share of restruc­ turing. The appointment of Ahmed Taoufiq, a follower of the Boutchichi Sufi brotherhood, to replace the long-​standing minister Abdelkbir Alaoui M’Daghri, accused by his detractors of being too close to Salafis,44 was a clear signal that the regime intended to reactivate Sufism as a resource in its efforts to retake control of the religious field.45 The appointment of Ahmed Taoufik as head of religious affairs and the reintroduction of Sufism as a key element of Moroccan Islam, which draws on the Ashari creed and Maliki school of law, alarmed the Salafis, who feared that the regime was determined to isolate them. The author­ ities’ security crackdown against Salafi NGOs and Qur’anic schools was a stark reminder of the vulnerability of Salafis and their need for protec­ tion, which for some Salafis meant looking for political allies sympathetic to their plight. Over time, the feeling of being besieged and emascu­ lated by the state’s unrelenting, hardline approach sowed the seeds for the politicization of some parts of the Salafi camp, even as they remained dedicated first and foremost to doctrinal purity and peaceful proselyti­ zation. It also drove the beginning of a low-​key rapprochement with the moderate Islamists of The Party of Justice and Development (PJD), who managed not only to survive the security onslaught of the post-​2003 environment but to deepen their anchoring in society as legitimate po­ litical actors untainted by corruption. This was exemplified by the lim­ ited number of Maghraoui Salafists who supported the PJD in the 2007 legislative elections, even if the majority remained loyal to their prin­ ciples of avoiding the ballot box. The authorities’ closure of sixty-​five Qur’anic schools in the summer of 2008 and the voluntary exile of Sheikh Maghraoui into Saudi Arabia gave another impetus to the need to partic­ ipate in organized political action.46 In parallel to this gradual gestation within quietist Salafism, an inter­ esting process of dynamic change in the ideological outlook of some Salafi-​jihadists had been developing. In the aftermath of the 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks, which included members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM),47 the three major figures and theoreticians of the jihadist current, Mohammed Rafiki Abou Hafs, Mohamed Fizazi, and Hassan Kettani, signaled their readiness to break away from the ex­ tremist doctrine of the radical current within the Salafi movement. Several the paradoxical mutations of salafism in morocco ( 49 ) jihadist detainees also wrote letters published in newspapers where they foreswore violence and recognized the religious and political authority of the monarchy. It is important to note that these revisions stemmed from individual initiatives, which most likely explains their limited impact on other jihadists. Unlike the revisionism of al-​Jama’at Islamiyya in Egypt, which renounced violence in 2002 and moved the organization closer to the peaceful activism of the Muslim Brotherhood,48 a number of radical jihadists in Morocco disapproved of the collective repentance launched by the emblematic figures of the jihadist trend (Abou Hafs, Kettani, and Fizazi). The sprouting of jihadist networks of recruiters, who funneled rad­ icalized Moroccans to Iraq after the US invasion and the terrifying events of March and April 2007 in which several suicide bombers were shot by the police or blew themselves up, was a chilling reminder that there were still Salafi jihadis who refused to renounce violence or their support for al-​Qaeda and its affiliates.49 The Arab uprisings of 2011 and their subsequent derailment, espe­ cially in Syria and Egypt, expedited the debates and fault lines within dif­ ferent Salafi groupings. In the Salafi-jihadi camp, the main sheikhs who were amnestied by the king enthusiastically embraced the opportunities offered by social media and the expanding public space, from which they were banished after 2003, to try to rehabilitate their reputations and re­ define their political orientations. The Moroccan regime encouraged these endeavors by allowing the former Salafi jihadi sheikhs accessibility to public media and the right to set up NGOs, as Hassan Kettani and Mohammed Rafiki Abou Hafs did in 2012 with the establishment of Dar al-​Hikma (The House of Wisdom). In 2013, they established Al-​Basira (Insight), which went beyond Dar al-​Hikma’s narrow focus on education and theological matters to embrace charity and mobilize former Salafi prisoners to participate in politics. Sheikh Mohammed al-​Fizazi had even bigger ambitions with his attempt to form a political party in 2012. Fizazi had to quickly drop the idea, as the regime was not ready to accept such move. Fizazi also failed to gather support among Salafis for his political project. Within the quietist Salafi camp, the onset of the 2011 Arab uprisings gave a momentary sense of moral clarity and political expediency for the majority of quietists who were still resistant or reluctant to throw their sup­ port behind the PJD. The November 2011 legislative elections provided the clearest sign of an expansion of the budding partnership between main­ stream Islamists and traditional Salafis.50 The latter campaigned openly and actively for PJD candidates, helping contribute to the Islamists’ sweep of Salafi hubs in cities such as Marrakesh, where in earlier elections the PJD had paltry results. ( 50 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

THE SALAFI SPRING

The Arab uprisings nudged the quietist Salafi current to a far less equiv­ ocal course toward political engagement. A few holdouts notwithstanding, especially within the Madkhali current—​named after the Saudi sheikh Rabi al-​Madkhali, which denounced street protests as acts of sedition—​ the general trend welcomed the openness that the revolts brought.51 Maghraoui, who once rejected any form of street activism as an inexcusable transgression against royal prerogatives, affirmed in an interview with the Moroccan online paper Hespress the legitimacy of most of the demands of the February 20 youth protest movement, a loose coalition of Moroccan leftists, liberals, and Islamists.52 To be sure, the movement never called for the overthrow of the king, and the latter’s quick and positive response to the protests on March 9, 2011, made it more publicly palatable and less costly for quietist Salafis to readily adjust to the new realities. Unlike his dismissal of most Arab leaders as corrupt and illegitimate, sowing the seeds of their destruction by the enslavement of their people and ferocious suppression of religion, Maghraoui praised the Moroccan monarchy as a legitimate in­ stitution, hoping all the while that political change would elevate the role of Islam in state affairs.53 This course changing marked by pragmatic flexibility became much more noticeable upon Maghraoui’s return from exile in April 2011. Maghraoui and his followers saw an opportunity to redress the grievances that befell them after 2003 in the Moroccan spring. Quietist Salafis had kept mostly silent about the severe constraints imposed on them and the public stigma attached to them for their presumed ideological association with the perpetrators of the 2003 terrorist attacks. The February 20 protests broke their isolation and emboldened them to demand the opening of their closed schools and the restoration of their right to preach freely and peacefully. The king’s unexpected televised address in March 2011, where he announced constitutional changes and his subsequent royal pardon of dozens of Salafi jihadi prisoners, opened the path for quietist Salafis to press their case by creating the National Coordination for Associations of Qur’anic Schools, an organization with a political tinge. Together with other NGOs defending the rights of remaining jihadis in prison, such as the Al Karama forum and al-​Nassir, the Coordination launched a public cam­ paign to maximize Salafis’ public exposure and raise public awareness of the injustices that they suffered after the attacks of 2003. The Salafis’ foray into the political marketplace came with their partici­ pation in the vote on the new constitution and their support for the PJD’s candidates in the November 2011 parliamentary vote.54 Both votes came amid fierce ideological debates about whether freedoms of thought and the paradoxical mutations of salafism in morocco ( 51 ) conscience should become constitutionally protected rights.55 Salafis used these battles over the identity of the state as justification for their participa­ tion in the ballot box. Many believed that secularism had infiltrated state institutions, including the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which they blamed for sponsoring the heresies of Sufi organizations while closing Qur’anic schools,56 muffling the amplified call to prayer from mosques, and tight­ ening the muzzle on Friday sermons, just to name a few transgressions.57 It had become clear that shunning political participation ceded the strategic advantage to their secular adversaries. Maghraoui’s responses did not go as far as forming a political party and challenging Islamists in electoral politics, as their Egyptian counterparts did. Nor did they attempt to integrate into political parties, as some former Salafi jihadis such as Abu Hafs did in 2013 by joining the small Islamist Party of Renaissance and Virtue, a group that split from the PJD and opened its doors to former Salafi detainees. Instead, they threw their lot in with the PJD in a tactical alliance. With the political contestation in full swing, the Salafis and the PJD tried to expand their timid rapprochement through sponsored meetings, pubic events, and conference sessions. The student wing of the Islamist Unity and Reform Movement (MUR) con­ vened several events at universities where Salafis and Islamists attempted to bridge some of the gaps in their views on how to adapt to fast-​shifting soci­ opolitical contexts. Salafis came to see the PJD—while​ far from being the exemplary paragon of Salafi virtue and rectitude—​as a more trustworthy institutional actor that they hoped could safeguard their religious rights and defend the nation from the perversions of aggressive secularism and creeping dogmatic liberalism.58 In other words, the principal merit of the cooperation stemmed from its tactical convenience rather than any doc­ trinal affinity or agreement. After all, when the Qur’anic schools were closed in 2008, it was the PJD through its parliamentarians and the party’s ideo­ logical arm (MUR) and affiliated human rights associations that defended the right of nonviolent Salafis to exist as well as operate within the bounds of the law.59 This utilitarian calculation of costs and benefits drove a reshuffling of priorities, even as doctrinal beliefs remained relatively constant. In the un­ predictable context of popular agitation, the main theater of ideological rivalry shifted from confrontation with Shia, Sufis, and the illegal Islamist-​ Sufi movement Al Adl Wal Ihsan, to a focus on what Salafis deemed the more pernicious threat emanating from secular forces and their allies within the regime.60 In this context, the rapprochement with the PJD, at least in the early phases of the Arab Spring, seemed to be a win-​win. In the same calculated and pragmatic fashion, the quietist Salafis strove to avoid run­ ning afoul of the monarchy, which skillfully reined in revolutionary fervor ( 52 ) Salafism in the Maghreb through institutional changes that kept the balance of power in favor of the royal palace. Maghraoui, for example, praised the March 9, 2011, royal speech for laying the foundations for sustainable reforms that would propel the country forward. He also defended the maintenance in the new consti­ tution of the royal prerogatives and the religious supremacy of the king as necessary for stability. The fact that Al Adl Wal Ihsan and much of the lead­ ership of the February 20 movement opposed the constitutional changes, which they deemed insufficient to bring about a genuine parliamentary democracy where the king reigns but does not rule, was a perceived as an additional bonus, as it put the Salafis on the side of the monarchy, which indeed ended up rewarding Maghraoui for his support by allowing the opening of his Qur’anic schools. This turnaround of quietist Salafism was always contingent on at least the payoffs of politically securing the survival of their proselytizing networks. There was no methodical effort to develop clear doctrinal guidelines on po­ litical actions. Maghraoui tried do so after the onset of the Arab uprisings, but several gray zones shrouded the movement’s changing approach to po­ litical participation. He stated in an interview with Hespress in April 2011 that demonstrations and street protests were categorically prohibited in countries governed by Islamic law.61 In circumstances where the laws of the land allowed for people to protest, the sheikh granted permission to par­ ticipate. In such cases, he argued, it might be effective to guide the protests and transform them into a productive vehicle that promotes the right mes­ sage of Islam while avoiding stirring unrest and violence. This provides the context for his qualified welcome of the February 20 movement. While acknowledging the legitimacy of most of its demands, he nevertheless called on it to embrace a reformist project that was based on the Qur’an and the commandments of the Prophet. As he put it, such conformity was the surest way to achieve social justice and the moralization of politics.

THE BIFURCATIONS OF SALAFI QUIETISM

Maghraoui’s gray-​zone ideological position was a consequence of the un­ predictable developments in Morocco and its environs. Political instru­ mentalism and ideological ambiguity were necessary to demonstrate the adaptability of Salafism without undermining its credibility in the eyes of its followers. They also allowed the quietists the flexibility to backtrack and readjust depending on how the political situation evolved in Morocco. Subsequent events lent credence to this calculation. When the counter­ revolutionary headwinds began blowing in much of the Arab world, the quietists temporized to see how tenacious or dull the glimmerings of the paradoxical mutations of salafism in morocco ( 53 ) political openness would turn out to be. As events would soon demonstrate, the pendulum swing was neither a temporary bump nor an aberration. In Morocco, the resurgence of old patterns of pressure began almost as soon as the quietists’ rapprochement with the PJD converted into elec­ toral support for the Islamists. First, the authorities exerted pressure on Maghraoui to substitute support for the PJD for palace-​friendly parties, namely the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) or the National Rally of Independents.62 When Maghraoui reportedly refused to conform,63 the regime hit the movement where it hurt most: by ordering the closure of four Qur’anic schools affiliated with Maghroui and his Association for the Qur’an and Sunna in June 2013. The ministry also targeted several Salafi imams for dismissal.64 All of this dialed up the pressure on Maghraoui, who was already facing internal tensions within his Salafi movement. In 2012, the introduction that Maghraoui wrote in Hammad Kabbaj’s book Foresight and Persistence caused wide controversy among the sheikhs and students of Qur’anic schools. The book reads like a political treatise that defends the legitimacy of partici­ pating in political systems that incorporate elements that contradict “true” Islamic laws. More startling for some is the book’s attempts to prove that democracy, which Maghraoui had long denounced as un-​Islamic, was not all inconsistent with Islamic principles. Quite the contrary, it contains provisions that are part and parcel of sharia. As such, the book’s author argues there is no objection to accepting and benefiting from some of its principles, whether through participating in elections or through protests, demonstrations, and strikes.65 Maghraoui tried to contain the divisions between the politicized camp within his allies and those that resisted this abrupt turnaround.66 But the regime’s closure of his schools, which the opponents of politicization blamed on the writings and actions of Kabbaj and his followers, eventu­ ally forced Maghraoui to revert to the status quo ante of unstinting sub­ servience to the regime. In March 2014, he issued a statement reaffirming the apolitical mission of the Association for the Qur’an and Sunna.67 In a not-​so-​tacit rejoinder to those disappointed with his volte-​face, Magharoui cautioned his followers to keep their eye on the ball. The imperative that drove the movement to warm up to political participation was contextual and tactical. The moment that supporting the PJD electorally turned out to be a losing gamble, it became a matter of survival to line up behind the regime’s preferences.68 Maghraoui’s 2014 turnabout alienated the politico current,69 occasioning a definitive crack within the quietist movement. The defining moment that opened the door for fraction was the 2013 military coup in Egypt and the subsequent brutalization of the Muslim Brotherhood. Maghraoui blessed ( 54 ) Salafism in the Maghreb the coup of Abdel-​Fattah al-​Sisi, which was enthusiastically endorsed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two of Morocco’s closest allies. The hope was that such a move could put him again in good standing with the Moroccan regime. Maghraoui’s stand on the coup disappointed many of his followers, even if an appreciable number of older Salafis un­ derstood the political rationale behind it.70 The malcontents who could not stomach the coup or the massive repression unleashed against the Muslim Brotherhood broke rank with Maghraoui. The most prominent of defectors was his deputy, Hammad Kabbaj, who resigned from the Association for the Qur’an and the Sunna. Kabbaj and a number of young, grass-​roots Salafis condemned the coup and joined the demonstration of August 2013 in Rabat to protest the bloody dispersal of the sit-​in in Rabaa Al-​Adawiyah square in Cairo. Kabbaj also blasted the Egyptian Salafi Nour party for being a sellout.71 The leadership of the Nour party justified its position on stra­ tegic grounds. It calculated that entering into confrontation with the mili­ tary regime was imprudent and foolish. Politically and electorally, it hoped that the weakening of the Brotherhood would redound to its advantage.72 A major escalation came from a poem written by Adil Raffouch on August 18, 2013, a rising star within the politico Salafis, which decried the treachery and moral bankruptcy of the Saudi monarchy, painfully manifested by its support for the military coup.73 Maghraoui upbraided Raffouch for his transgression on Saudi authority, pressuring him to retract and apologize—to​ no avail. Maghraoui also issued a statement in which he washed his hand of any responsibility for the poem, all the while reiterating his unbounded loyalty and gratitude to the Saudi regime. This uncondi­ tional support for the Saudi regime led Adil Raffouch and Hammad Kabbaj to cut their ties with Maghraoui’s Moroccan Association for the Qur’an and the Sunna. Since then, the chasm between Maghraoui and Kabbaj has only grown, with their disagreements and conflicts playing out in social media, newspapers, and other forums. Maghraoui’s open support for the pro-​ regime Party of Authenticity and Progress (PAM) in the 2016 legislative elections74 brought a torrent of criticism upon him by political Salafists who viewed the PAM’s then leader, Ilyas Omari, a former Marxist, as a counter­ feit politician.75 Beyond rational thought, lamented Kabbaj in a Facebook post, Sheikh Maghraoui threw himself into the arms of an ideological foe while simultaneously pillorying any forms of cooperation with Al Adl Wal Ihsan.76 Working with Omari to defend the country’s vital interests was un­ derstandable, but to vilify a great scholar and recognized nationalist such as Sheikh Yassine, no matter how much one might disagree with some of his thoughts, was illogical and irrational. Kabbaj also deplored the lack of civility that Maghraoui’s supporters showed in debates on important issues. the paradoxical mutations of salafism in morocco ( 55 )

In berserk agitation, he wrote, they leveled aggressive attacks against anyone who dared criticize the sheikh’s mistakes or engage in intellectual ijtihad.77 Kabbaj also directed his criticism at Maghraoui’s allies, especially the Madhkali current whose supporters habitually busied themselves singing the praises of corrupt dictatorships while demonizing political opponents, especially political Islamists, whom they treated as worse than Khawarij, a despised Muslim sect that emerged in the first fitna (chaos) within the Muslim community, which resulted in the permanent division between the Sunnis and Shia. Especially troubling for Kabbaj and his followers is the dangerous radicalization of the Madkhali movement, whose followers seem to have concluded that it is lawful to kill deviant political Islamists, as it was lawful to eliminate the Kawarij. Through this reasoning, al-​ Madkhali’s most prominent disciple in Egypt, Sheikh Muhammad Sa’id Raslan, declared the Muslim Brothers’ blood lawful for shedding. Sheikh Rabi Bin Hadi Madkhali, wrote Kabbaj, builds on the same reasoning to call on his followers in Libya to fight the Muslim Brothers and the ulema who support them.78 Along the same lines, Adil Raffouch decries Madkhalis’ incitement to violence against the Muslim Brothers and their supporters, likening their behavior and thoughts to ISIS’s deviant worldview. From Egypt to Syria to Morocco, he believes Madkhalists have dangerously deviated from the understanding and implementation of Salafimanhaj (method) and aqida (creed). Their slogan, writes Raffouch, has become “Betraying the Righteous and Supporting the Corrupt.”79

POLITICO SALAFISM

Prior to the 2011 Arab uprisings, the flirtation of quietist Salafists with political engagement was extremely limited and unorganized, as were theological endeavors to rationalize participation into political life. The Arab uprisings jolted quietist Salafism, injecting polemics about the legitimacy of street protests, political contestation, and voting. The first cracks appeared within the quietist camp with Madkhali Salafis, who remained firmly opposed to any form of politics or organized work, and the Maghraoui current, which cautiously welcomed the protest move­ ment. The military coup in Egypt forced another reconfiguration of qui­ etist Salafism. This is the second time that the quietist Salafi current had fractured. The first major schism occurred with the Saudi collaboration with the United States during the First Gulf War (1990–91).​ The movement seriously frac­ tured along generational lines, blurring the boundaries between politics ( 56 ) Salafism in the Maghreb and religion, and rebellion against a ruler’s commands. Such rifts with the Saudi Salafi establishment were mirrored in the Moroccan context. It is still early to tell how the current line of cleavage is drawn within the quietist Salafi stream. Nonetheless, the intellectual and political stances of Kabbaj and others is a manifestation of budding political Salafism, a reformist cur­ rent that strives to strike a balance between Salafi dogma and engagement with the sociopolitical challenges of the day. The return of Maghraoui to his old fold opened the way for the re­ formist current within quietist Salafism to begin honing the theological arguments that allow for political activism within the confines of the Salafi creed. In his writings, Hammad Kabbaj attempts to further develop the theory of al-fiqh​ al-waqi​ (jurisprudence of current affairs) that is in­ formed by fiqh al-​muwazanat wa al-awlawiyat​ (jurisprudence of balances and priorities). The act of muwazanat and al-awlawiyat​ necessitates that Salafis strive to balance between variousmasalih (plural of maslahah, meaning interests, advantages) and mafasid (corruptions, harm) to ad­ vance public interests.80 Despite the ills of democracy, argues Kabbaj, there are no bigger mafasid in the Muslim world today than the use of violence to bring about change or the withdrawal from politics, leaving the door wide open for the cor­ rupt and the secularists to monopolize the political landscape. The last two have done irreparable damage to Muslim countries, leaving them bereft of the values of competence, fairness, accountability, and good governance that the pious predecessors (al-salaf​ al-salih​ ) and rightly guided caliphs (al-​Khulafāʾu al-Rāshidūn​ ) enjoined.81 For Kabbaj, it is because democracy enshrines these principles in laws and institutions that Morocco’s reformist scholars at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century embraced it. These enlightened religious scholars, as illustrated in the first part of this chapter, saw in the flexibility that democracy provided an op­ portunity to defend Morocco’s sovereignty, its Islamic character, and the equal rights of its citizens. Kabbaj revives the contributions and thoughts of major scholars like Allal al-​Fassi, Abdallah Guennoun, Abd al-​Kabir al-​Kattani, and Mohammed Belarbi Alaoui. Citing Allal al-​Fassi, he reminds his readers that under the reign of Moulay Abdelhafid (1908–12),​ the ulema conditioned their bayah (the traditional rite of allegiance) of the sultan on the establishment of a parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy. Unfortunately, writes nationalist leader Hadj Ahmed Maaninou (1906–​2003), colonial aggression stifled this constitutional movement.82 Kabbaj also highlights the duty of religious scholars to speak truth to power, as evidenced by the example of Mohamed Belarbi Alaoui (1880–​1964), known as Sheikh the paradoxical mutations of salafism in morocco ( 57 ) al-Islam, who went from serving at the upper echelons of government to opposing King Hassan’s constitution of 1962. This cost-​benefit analysis can lead to the tolerance of some mafasid if the end result is fulfillment of a truly public virtue. In other words, Salafis can participate in politics if there is a possibility that they can help reduce vice and injustices. Kabbaj rationalizes participation in politics even in imper­ fect settings by citing the example of the prophet Yusuf/​Joseph, who served in a non-​Muslim system as the grand vizier of the treasury. Yusuf’s intelli­ gence, honesty, and moral uprightness earned him a position of authority with the possibility to reduce wrongs and injustices. “Yusuf did not condi­ tion his entry into government on the banning of alcohol, eating pork, and renunciation of Pharonic beliefs,” says Kabbaj, “but instead he took upon himself the heavy charge of serving the people and relieving their hardships from severe drought and oppressive politics.” The story of the prophet Yusuf, who had been falsely accused and imprisoned, provides compelling evidence that a Muslim should never hesitate to serve in positions of au­ thority as long as he has the right qualities: credibility, competence, and honesty (amanah). Kabbaj also cites the example of the king of Aksum, located in modern-​ day northern Ethiopia and Eritrea, known to Ethiopian Muslims as al-​ Najashi and to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church as Armha.83 After his (presumed) conversion to Islam, which is contested among scholars, “Prophet Muhammad” says Kabbaj, “did not order al-​Najashi to abdicate his throne and come pray in his mosque and listen to his sermons.” Instead, he encouraged him to keep his position, as his rule would be more benefi­ cial to his subjects and the nascent Muslim community in Arabia than if his opponents held power. These are models worth emulating by honest and competent politicians. Their presence in ministries, embassies, and munic­ ipalities is much better for them and the people than the supererogatory (nawafil) prayers, fasting, and pilgrimages (hajj and umrah). As the Prophet said, “The best person is the one who benefits other people the most.” It is too early to tell how successful Kabbaj and other sheikhs who pro­ vide the intellectual and religious backbone for a mixture of Salafida’wa (proselytizing) with political and social activism will be. The current draws its strength from a group of educated and middle-​class youths who joined the Maghraoui current in the 1990s. Like their elders, this second gener­ ation of Salafis remain faithful to dogma and the necessity of spreading the Salafi call of purity and authenticity throughtarbiya (education) and da’wa. But unlike the older sheikhs, they believe that their mission might be better accomplished by political dynamism and pragmatic contextual considerations that prioritize the expansion of alliances and investment in the social and charitable domain to broaden the Salafi base. ( 58 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

CONCLUSION

The capacity of Kabbaj and his supporters to move along the political con­ tinuum is not a forgone conclusion. As developments within the Maghraoui current have shown, the politicization of Salafism does not proceed along a linear path. Kabbaj’s experiment in adapting Salafi doctrines to shifting sociopolitical contexts still needs to mature, but as it continues unfolding, it needs to contend with several challenges, including the continuing re­ silience of quietist Salafis and the regime’s determination to control the process of Salafi political activism. As the 2016 legislative elections demon­ strated, Salafism remains fragmented, with Hammad Kabbaj supporting the PJD, Mohammed Maghraoui backing the party closest to the regime, the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), Abou Hafs joining the Istiqlal party, and Abdelkrim Chadli, convicted of terrorism in 2003, throwing his lot with the Democratic and Social Movement—​another proregime party. The regime’s co-​optation of the former Salafi jihadis has deepened the rift between sheikhs and their followers, as evidenced by the latter’s deser­ tion of public political life. Many former Salafi prisoners express deep dis­ appointment with their leaders’ perceived betrayal of collective interests for the sake of advancing personal gains. An appreciable number hold them responsible for not leveraging their contacts with the authorities to help them benefit from social reintegration programs. After all, the regime facil­ itated their own integration.84 Others have been disaffected by the radical ideological revisions that some of their sheiks have undergone, especially Abu Hafs, who now defends individual freedoms and demands a review of Islamic heritage and laws, and Abdelkrim Chadli, who joined a party run by a former police commissioner.85 CHAPTER 4 w The Fragmentation of Salafism in Algeria

INTRODUCTION

Amid the volatility of the post-​Arab revolts of 2011, Salafi ideology and activism have emerged as the locus of societal contention and political controversy. In Algeria, prominent secular voices warning against the “creeping Salafization” of society are getting louder. Newspapers, espe­ cially Francophone ones such as El Watan, have run alarming stories about Salafi conspiracies and their “war plan” to undermine Algerian Islam.1 Since taking office in May 2014, the minister of religious affairs, Mohamed Aïssa, has joined the chorus of warnings against the surge of subversive preaching by rogue imams and the proliferation of deviant ideas that distort and dis­ rupt Algeria’s religious traditions and practice. Salafis, especially quietists who dominate much of the Salafi discourse in Algeria, defend themselves against such accusations no less vigorously than their critics. Prominent Salafi figures such as Mohamed Ali Ferkous, Abdelghani Aouissat, Azzedine Ramdani, and Azhar Sniqra have used their websites and online presence to denounce what they describe as an elabo­ rate smear campaign that has turned to all-​out demagoguery and scaremon­ gering.2 In their own characterization, the threat of Salafism to society is a figment of the wild imagination of secularists and Islamic currents that op­ pose Salafism, like the Sufis. Instead of being a destabilizing force of agita­ tion and intimidation, they assert that Salafism, in its purest form, has been an effective antidote to revolutionary ideologies, providing a legitimate

Salafism in the Maghreb.Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, Oxford University Press (2019). © Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190942403.001.0001 ( 60 ) Salafism in the Maghreb counternarrative to contentious political and violent action. Quietist Salafis credit themselves with providing disillusioned youth with a strong iden­ tity and clear purpose. It is this appeal to youthful angst, they contend, that distinguishes them from destructive violent actors, sterile politicized reli­ gious movements, and moribund state-​sanctioned religious institutions. This ability to upstage their religious counterparts has indeed been notable, especially since the decline that jihadi and politico Salafis suffered during and after Algeria’s internal bloody conflict in the 1990s. This chapter explores the ebbs and flows of Salafi ideology and activity in Algeria and explains how such evolutionary process has been largely de­ pendent on shifting opportunity structures and Salafis’ own interactions with the governing authorities. Special attention is paid to the tensions within Salafism, its attitude toward politics and violence, and its interactions with other actors and movements. Valuable insights can be drawn from the case of Algeria, in which Salafi jihadis violently mobilized against the Algerian military regime, especially in 1982–​87 and 1991–99.​ These jihadis drew heavily from a long revolutionary tradition of defensive jihad, which lent powerful mobilizing energies to the Algerian resistance against French colonialism, as epitomized by Emir Abdelkader (1832–47),​ 3 Sheikh Al Mokrani (1871),4 Sheikh Bouamama in 1881,5 and the National Liberation Front (FLN) in the War of Independence (1954–​62). Interestingly, some Algerian Salafi jihadis also claim that their struggle is in historical continuity with that of the emblematic reformist figureʿ Abd al-​Hamid ibn Badis (1899–​1940), who founded the influential Association of Algerian Muslim ‘Ulema (AAMU) in 1931, an organization that many came to refer to as the torchbearer of Salafism in Algeria.6 This emphasis on historical references reveals how influential the local social and politico-​ religious context is to the discursive mechanisms, mobilizing ideas, and contention of Algerian contemporary Salafism. To be sure, the influence of outside events, doctrines, and movements has also played a role in the ide­ ological hybridization of Salafism and its polarization into quietist, politico, and jihadi strands. But as will be illustrated later, it is the local context that makes the most significant difference on how quietist, politico, and jihadi salafis think, operate, and behave. These three categories in the Algerian context are analyzed in depth in what follows.

THE GENESIS OF ALGERIAN SALAFISM

It was in Algeria where the French colonial enterprise had its most over­ bearing incursion. The French conquest in 1830 turned Algeria into a lab­ oratory of unfettered social engineering, an experiment whose forms and the fragmentation of salafism in algeria ( 61 ) penetrations had bred existential crises for the local populations. Unlike in Morocco, where the corrosive dimensions of French dominance did not seriously threaten to damage native cultures and language, the indignities of colonialism in Algeria imperiled the structure of society. This aroused atavistic fears that the country’s cultural heritage and religion itself were at risk. It was only natural that it was in Algeria where the Muslim commu­ nity had the greatest stakes in mounting a vigorous defense of the integ­ rity of the country’s cultural, linguistic, and religious identity. Islam came to be an effective instrument in grass-​roots mobilization for the armed insurrections conducted against French rule in the nineteenth century. It was also an important resource in the hands of the ulema to neutralize the policy of displacement and assimilation perpetrated by the colonial admin­ istration and supported by some Algerian political parties and intellectuals who defended the embrace of French language and culture as the only path for indigenous communities to enjoy the same rights and privileges as French citizens.7 To be sure, it was not until the early twentieth century that a group of young religious scholars and reformist thinkers educated at the great centers of learning and knowledge in the Zitouna University in Tunisia and in the Mashriq (Arab East) emerged as a budding religio-​politico force. For reformists such as Ben Badis (1899–1940)​ and Sheikh Mohamed Bashir al-​Ibrahimi (1889–​1965), breaking the yoke of colonialism rested on the moral regeneration of the Algerian people,8 as clearly stipulated by the Qur’anic verse: “God will never change the condition of a people until they change it for themselves.”9 Thistajdid (renewal) and islah (reform) required an enlightened embrace of the ways of the salaf (pious ancestors) as the ultimate reference. Such claim to authenticity, however, involved an ability to adapt to the times. In other words, it was only through associating the authoritative legacy of the salaf with modernism that Algerians could find the path to political and cultural emancipation. Between 1924 and 1925, the reformists began to develop strategies to promote their reformist thoughts, articulate their political philosophy, and build linkages with the public. It was for these specific purposes that in July 1924 a group of reformists, under the leadership of Ben Badis, began pub­ lishing El-​Mountaquid (The Critic), which was quickly shut down by French authorities for its sharp criticism of colonial policies. In 1925, Ben Badis founded the monthly Al-Shihab​ (The Meteor), which survived until the be­ ginning of World War II. Ben Badis and his companions had three targets in their sights: the Sufi brotherhoods that were pervasive in rural areas;10 the co-​opted official Muslim establishment; and liberal assimilationists such as prominent Algerian politician Ferhat Abbas, who famously wrote that for lack of historical traces to the existence of an Algerian fatherland, ( 62 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

“France was his fatherland.” Ben Badis responded to Abbas’s statement, saying: “This Muslim Algerian nation is not France, cannot be France, and does not wish to be France.”11 In other words, even if the French were truly sincere in implementing the cries of their revolutionary triad of “liberty, equality, fraternity” in Alegria, Algeria’s distinct ethnic nationality and core beliefs made assimilation not only impossible but indeed undesirable for Algerians. In their effort to organize a broad-​based social reformist movement, Ben Badis and his followers helped build a network of religious schools in the 1920s. Those schools proclaimed: “Islam is our religion; Arabic is our language; Algeria is our fatherland,”12 which would later become the ral­ lying cry of the Algerian call for independence. Imams and circuit-​riding preachers turned mosques into facilities to cement the broader idea of a distinct Arab and Muslim Algerian nation. When the French authorities restricted such access, they expanded their resources into the creation of religious and cultural associations, beginning in the process the gradual politicization of Salafism in Algeria. In 1931, Ben Badis helped found the AAMU to further their actions and reflections on the best means to con­ struct an Algerian identity.13 The prominent Algerian historian Ali Merad described the reformist movement efforts to standardize Muslim practices as a struggle pitting urban religion against rural religious traditionalism that reformists derided as superstitious and ignorant. By stripping Algerian Islam of its “backward” Sufi trappings and fixed Maliki doctrinal system, reformists strove to not only “purify” Islam but modernize it by making it more intelligible to peasants.14 The reformists’ ideological response to rural Islam derived from their inspiration from the conceptions and worldview (tasawwur) of the major leaders of the reformist school in Egypt, such as Jamal al Din al Afghani (1838–​1897) and especially Muhammad Abduh (1849–​1905), whom Ben Badis met in Algeria in 1903.15 Ali Merad acknowledged such intellec­ tual influence, but he also stressed the impact that Taqi al-​Din Ibn Taymiya (1263–​1328) had on Ben Badis. The latter had admiration for the decisive role that Ibn Taymiya’s teachings, further elaborated by Muhammad ibn Abd al-​Wahhab (1703–​1792), had on the mobilization of Arab tribes for the establishment of the Saudi state.16 The problem of resisting colonial rule and authority ultimately raised the question of whether or not the reformist ulema should endorse the use of violence in their struggle for liberation. Here they staked out an ambig­ uous, if not contradictory, position. On the one hand, reformists within AAMU, such as Larbi Tebessi, emphasized engagement in education and social activism as the best means to advance the causes of Arabism and the fragmentation of salafism in algeria ( 63 )

Algerian nationalism. The magazine al-Shihab​ went even further when in June 1936 an article denounced the use of violence by the other branches of Algerian nationalism, notably the Algerian People’s Party (PPA), founded by Messali Hadj and supported by students and workers.17 Unlike what it described as the blood-​soaked sideshow envisioned by its ideological adversaries, the AAMU held faith that with time colonial pol­ itics would change and Algeria would peacefully fulfill its desire for self-​ determination.18 The following year, however, Ben Badis contradicted the line that he traced for AAMU when he declared that independence was not given but taken. In May 1937, he praised the means that the national martyrs who fought French colonial rule used in the nineteenth century as exemplars of jihad that Muslim reformists might need to embrace in the pursuit of just and worthy ends.19 Yet, despite these contradictions, the reformist ulema did not openly support revolutionary jihad until they joined the FLN in February 1956. This tainted their otherwise un­ deniable contribution to the maturation of Algerian nationalism, writes Algerian scholar Bilel Ainine.20 It also allowed their rivals in the PPA, which became in 1946 the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), to displace them as the main contenders to lead the nationalist movement, until the MTLD itself fractured on the eve of the War of Independence. Despite its loss of leadership of the nationalist movement and the death of its sheikh, Ben Badis, in 1940, the influence of the Islamic reformism promoted by AAMU was such that even secular-​leaning groups used Islam as a mobilizing force.21 For example, the nationalist movement represented by PPA/​MTLD found its expression in an Islamo-​populist tendency that appropriated many of the AAMU’s slogans and revolutionized them.22 The FLN, a movement that incorporated within its midst several powerful com­ peting ideological strains, also invoked the empowering narrative of the Algerian personality and its Arab-​Islamic identity. The AAMU helped re­ activate the Arab-​Islamic awakening of the Algerian people, a feat that the FLN instrumentalized to rally the masses to its own ideology of combat and political objectives.23 In its recruitment propaganda, the FLN appealed to the bonds of blood and religion that connected Algerians to those who sacrificed their lives in the insurrections of the nineteenth century in de­ fense of the fatherland. Those who assisted the “infidel” colonizers against the Algerian Mujahideen or refused to support the FLN were designated apostates or enemies of the nation.24 In its efforts at homogenization of Algerian society and concentration of power, the FLN amplified the role of Islam, crediting Algerian martyrs and the ulema for cementing Algerian nationalism. ( 64 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

THE TORTUOUS ROAD TO RADICAL SALAFISM

By independence in 1962, the Islamic nationalist movement had to posi­ tion itself in an Algeria transformed into a one-​party state where the FLN professed unity but brooked no ideological or factional dissent. There were many within the ulema who resented the FLN’s authoritarian populism and exploitative usurpation of the fruits of the spiritual revolution that the Ben Badis project of religious renewal helped bring about. This appropriation of the powers of religion by the FLN was instrumentalized to sideline the major currents of Algerian nationalism (ulema, liberals, and Marxists).25 For example, the constitution and family code of 1963 declared Islam as the foundation of the Algerian state. Such solemn declarative formulations, however, were tempered by the secular proclivities of the powerful tech­ nocratic and francophone factions within the FLN, which favored political secularism even if they recognized the necessity of resorting to religious symbols to appeal to people’s passions. The Algiers charter of April 1964 bore the print of what the heirs of Ben Badis referred to as the “Frenchified” technocratic elite. Much to their chagrin, the document paid only lip ser­ vice to Islam, while it stressed the socialist orientation of the state.26 In order to combat the adoption of this secularist option by the FLN, some former members of the AAMU founded the Jami’yat al-Qiyam al-Islamiyya (Islamic Values Association) in 1963. Led by Hachemi Tijani, a bilingual who professed his attachment to the reformist worldview of Ben Badis’ AAMU, al-​Qiyam al-​Islamiyya pressured the government to use its coercive powers to purge Algerian society from the sinister projects of secular movements. “All Parties, all regimes, and all leaders, which did not base themselves on Islam are illegal and dangerous,” stated an article in the French-​language edition of Humanisme Musulman in 1965.27 Early manifestations of the aggressiveness of al-​Qiyam al-​Islamiyya occurred in university campuses, where its members and secular leftists vi­ olently confronted each other. The government’s relative tolerance of the organization reached its limits in 1966 when al-​Qiyam al-​Islamiyya sent a letter to Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, protesting the execution of Egyptian ideologue Sayid Qutb (1906–1966).​ The Houari Boumediene re­ gime (1965–78)​ initially suspended al-​Qiyam al-​Islamiyya, before officially dissolving it after its discourse became more political in 1970. Despite its being outlawed, the association’s religious vision left an indelible imprint on Algeria’s culture-​war debates over the role of religion in public life and Arabization of the educational system and government administration.28 Heeding the age-​old advice of keeping your enemies close, Boumediene, for example, opted for integrating a number of the association’s ulema into the fragmentation of salafism in algeria ( 65 ) the state, hoping that the move would help him retain control of the inevi­ table (re)Islamization process of the country while preempting any tempta­ tion to resort to clandestine violent action. For some al-​Qiyam al-​Islamiyya cadres, joining the state allowed them to escape repression while shaping the Islamization process from above. Others, such as Abdel Latif Sultani and Ahmed Sahnoun, refused to serve in the state’s religious bureaucracy. It is these Algerian scholars who would be major players in the politicization of organizations focused on the regeneration of cultural and moral values. The appointment of Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi (the son of the prominent sheikh Bachir al-​Ibrahimi of the AAMU) as minister of education in the 1960s and of culture and information in the 1970s was the crystallization of this entente between Boumediene and the ulema who chose to join the state’s institutions. With the Arabization of the school system proceeding by fits and starts, Ibrahimi injected new dynamism in this process of enhancing the values of Arab-​Islamic identity in the education curriculum. For Ibrahimi, one of the school’s main tasks was to represent and impart society’s traditionalist values. “Islam is the value of values in Algerian life,” he said. “The other values owe their importance, their existence and the consideration that they enjoy only to their being in harmony or having links parallel with Islam, or because they have their origins in Islam or are subject to it.”29 The other “apostles of linguistic Jacobinism”30 included the minister of justice, Boualem Benhamouda, and the minister of original education and religious affairs, Mouloud Kassim Naït Belkacem.31 The problem is that these efforts to undo the vestiges of colonial in­ doctrination were poorly planned and deeply unsettling to Algeria’s di­ verse social and cultural realities. The state’s utilitarian embrace of this orientation turned out to be a Pandora’s box that Boumediene’s successors struggled to control. Ironically, the politics of language intended as both a legitimacy-​boosting mechanism and a means of social control ended up being a legitimacy-​eroding strategy that undermined social cohesion and peace. The first graduates with Arabized degrees were confronted with the shock of the unemployment phenomenon,32 producing feelings of alien­ ation and isolation that a number of increasingly virulent preachers were all too happy to tap into and exploit for political-​religious contestation of a state that was still dominated by francophone technocrats.33 By the late 1970s, it was becoming clear that state policies failed to stem the development of contestatory forms of opposition to the legitimacy of state institutions, including the credibility of religious authorities and state-​sanctioned imams. In September 1981, this opposition took a violent turn when a group of religious activists occupied a mosque in Laghouat by force, dislodging the state-​appointed imam, calling for holy war against ( 66 ) Salafism in the Maghreb the regime, and finally stabbing a policeman who tried to evict them from the premises.34 The following year saw the emergence in the governorate of Algiers of small radical groups that used violence to “command what is good and forbid what is reprehensible.”35 This radicalization process cul­ minated in November 1982 with the official debut of Algeria’s first post­ independence jihadi group, the Armed Islamic Movement of Mustapha Bouyali, a former member of the FLN and a Kabyle Berber.36 Up until this time, the contestation of Salafi jihadis was expressed through limited so­ ciopolitical violence (altercations between Marxists and Salafis, stabbings, riots) that did not directly target the state, writes Bilel Ainine. In fact, the government, especially under Chadli Bendjedid, who had started relaxing state control over the economy, turned a blind eye to some of the violence that targeted its socialist allies.37 It is only when Salafi activists raised their demands to expedite the full implementation of sharia law that the government turned to targeted repres­ sion of their most hardened members. This ensured a vicious circle of rising state repression of antisystemic views, which provoked further radicalization, ultimately sowing the seeds for more violence against state authority. The principal catalyst in driving Bouyali to wage a five-​year insurgency against the government was the killing of his brother in front of his children by the security services in April 1982. Other activists who lost family members or friends also decided to join Bouyali’s group of several hundred guerilla fighters in the mountains, replicating in their mind “the flight from Mecca in AD 622, when the Prophet Mohammed and his small band of followers, no longer able to practice their religion, withdrew to the city of Medina.”38 To use the words of Martin Evans and John Phillips, Bouyali played on the “image of exile, struggle and victory in the face of overwhelming odds, the notion that Muslims will be tested but, if they remain true to God’s will and Mohammed’s teachings, will vanquish their foes” to mobilize his supporters.39 Bouyali also invoked his own role in the War for Independence to make the case for his jihad against the “godless” Algerian state.40 By the time of his death in 1987, Bouyali had become something of a folk hero for Algerian Salafis and Islamists who resented the government policies.41 As the curtain fell on the Bouyali episode and the Soviet-​Afghan War (1979–​89) was drawing to an end, the Algerian government became belea­ guered by the collapse in oil prices, a sharp deterioration in living standards, and rising social dissent. The October 1988 riots shook the military-​led state, forcing it to bring an end to one-​party rule.42 As this opportunity knocked, Islamists, including Salafis, rushed to seize it. Both groups cashed in on the organizational strength of their network of educational, cultural, and religious associations. At a time of economic distress, this ready-​made civic infrastructure, bolstered by their charismatic mosque preachers and the fragmentation of salafism in algeria ( 67 ) a generation of intelligentsia, especially among teachers and students, provided a newly found purpose for the legions of poor and unemployed Algerians. “The links, friendships and social welfare provided by the street mosques gave meaning to lost lives because they offered up joy, warmth and human solidarity,” write Evans and Phillips. And, more significantly, “By casting young people as the warriors of God, proud, strong, and de­ serving of respect, the street mosque movement instilled self-​belief. Fired up by religious indignation, its followers had nothing to be afraid of.”43 Despite their mobilization advantages, Islamists, including the Salafis, were divided among themselves about the proper approach to take at a time of political flux. Salafis encountered the wrenching dilemma of whether ­ac tive political participation was permissible under a utilitarian calculation. More reticent Salafis, such as Sheikh Ferkous, Ahmed Sahnoun, Kamal Nour, Abdelmalek Ramdani, and Salim Serrar, cautioned against the risk of participation, preferring to temporize and focus on social and religious activism as a less risky way to achieve their goals. Other major figures of Salafi activism such as Abbassi Madani, Ali Benhadj, Hachemi Sahnouni, Kamel Guemazi, and Abdelbaki Sahraoui, however, threw their weight be­ hind the creation of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Writing in the FIS newspaper Al-​Mounquid (The Savior), Ali Belhadj equated participation in the municipal elections of 1990 to honoring those that gave their lives in October 1988 and to the millions of Algerians who adhered to the ideas of the FIS. “We could not sit back and let the catastrophic management of municipalities and governorate continue,” he wrote.44 In other words, new circumstances allowed exceptions to rules and demanded a rapid shift in traditional approaches, tactics, and strategies. Or as Belhadj described it, the time had come for gaining agency and transcending victimhood. In his view, the rise of the FIS made it possible to reverse the erosion of cul­ tural values, self-​identity, and social structures caused by the inherent sym­ bolic violence and Western cultural invasion of Algeria. Belhadj’s utilitarian arguments and justifications for the politicization of Salafism would echo twenty years later in several Arab countries, most notably in Egypt, where Hizb al-​Nour (Party of Light) was founded in 2011. As in Algeria, some Egyptian Salafis contended that “in the postrevolution era, they needed a party of their own to have a say in the transition.”45 In the end, an appreciable number of Salafis’ joined the FIS, even if their base constituted a diffuse agglomeration of activists and sympathizers that lacked coherent ideological moorings to Salafi principles. Salafists’ diffuse structure was also replicated in the FIS as a broad, multistranded movement that encapsulated a range of groups from Salafis and Jama’at at-​Tabligh, which usually eschewed politics, to Islamists who were divided between a local tendency and one influenced by international trends. ( 68 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

In hindsight, the military’s decision on January 4, 1992, to abort the electoral process and rob the FIS of victory in the second round of parlia­ mentary elections is unsurprising, even if in the process it unleashed a dev­ astating civil war. The military and the Islamists, including Salafis, could not survive mutual suspicions without an explicit understanding of the terms of the democratic transition and a negotiated understanding between the old authoritarian elites and their challengers regarding the prerogatives of the state. In the end, the consequences of the confusion over regime interests and opposition motives were disastrous;46 the military’s indiscriminate suppression of the FIS fueled Islamist and Salafi rage and radicalized its het­ erogeneous members and sympathizers.47 The return of Algerian veterans of the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s only exacerbated the violence.

JIHADI FRACTIONALIZATION

The transition away from and back to authoritarianism vindicated two main currents within the Salafi camp: the quietist Salafis who warned that the cre­ ation of a political party risked blowing up in the face of Salafis, dangerously jeopardizing their relative freedom to preach and expand; and the jihadi Salafis who doubted that the regime would ever allow Islamists and Salafis to come to power though the ballot box. The 1992 coup emboldened the jihadi Salafis, whose influence within the Islamist movement was contained by the popularity and charisma of leaders who advocated for political par­ ticipation. With the killing or imprisonment of their Islamist rivals, the scene was set for disparate jihadis to lead the revolt against a military regime dominated by proponents of confrontational and eradicationist policies. But factionalism within the jihadi milieu promised a volatile war against the regime as well as between rival militant groupings. The resultant civil war represented the typical strategic problems, paradoxes, and negations that characterize jihadi interactions in insur­ gencies waged against tough-​to-​beat regimes.48 Instead of closing ranks and increasing their odds of success against a formidable military regime, Algerian jihadi groups quickly descended into fratricidal disputes and fac­ tional strife over goals and targeting policies. This self-​defeating behavior drained both personnel and resources. It also allowed the government to employ the classic divide-​and-​conquer strategy. The irreconcilable ideo­ logical differences between jihadis and pragmatic Islamists and the indisci­ pline of recruits opened the jihadi camp to infiltration by security services and increased the lure of defections. The most intransigent of the groups, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which fed its cadres and followers a rigid ideological diet, pursued a the fragmentation of salafism in algeria ( 69 ) relentless and uncompromising war against its less hawkish opponents, es­ pecially the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), which the FIS created in 1994 to balance the ascendance of the GIA. The AIS denounced the zeal and adventurism of the GIA, a diffuse movement that saw itself as “the only le­ gitimate organization for jihad in Algeria,” insisting that all “all mujahedeen must join the GIA,” reject the sinful “innovations of the Islamists and refuse any negotiations, compromises or truces with the moderate camp in the Algerian regime.”49 As one GIA communique bluntly put it, “There is no neutrality in the war we are waging. With the exception of those who are with us, all others are apostates and deserve to die.”50 The AIS, however, as stated by its then-​general commander, Madani Mezraq, fought “on the basis of two principles: a return to the legitimate political process and respect for the choice of the Algerian people.”51 Once AIS efforts to weaken the GIA and pressure the government to come to the negotiating table with the FIS failed, it declared a unilateral cease-​fire in 1997 and officially disbanded in 2000 after its fighters were granted­ am nesty under the Algerian Civil Concord Act of 1999. The AIS-​FIS calcula­ tion was that it was better to quit a losing war than become tainted by the GIA’s extreme brutality and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, which were damaging the Islamist project and its standing with Algerians. By 1998, the GIA effectively imploded following a spate of fratricidal infighting, internal purges, and the state’s increasingly effective counterterrorism measures. In this context, GIA commander Hassan Hattab broke off from the group and founded the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), promising to target the regime and spare civilians. By then, however, it was too late; jihadi groups had lost the public sympathy they enjoyed in the im­ mediate aftermath of the military coup. By 2003, the group became plagued by internal divisions and was running low on money and fighters. Several militants put down their arms as part of two amnesty initiatives launched by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, while the rest were hunted down by Algerian security forces or forced into the fringes of Algerian territory and into its neighbors.

THE ENTRENCHMENT OF QUIETIST SALAFISM

During the 1990s and 2000s, quietist Salafis strove to refurbish their image, distance themselves from violence, and reclaim lost territory. In so doing, they repositioned themselves within the religious and political sphere as an authentic alternative to the jihadis’ perversion of Salafism as well as the erosion of the authority of political Islam and state-​sanctioned religious institutions. For conservative Algerians traumatized by the civil war, quietist ( 70 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

Salafism seemed to offer a new path. The ease of acceding to Salafi networks was particularly appealing to disillusioned young Algerians in desperate pur­ suit of a new empowering identity and a strong sense of purpose. For the regime, quietist Salafis also held several benefits. For one, they seemed better equipped to challenge jihadis in their own language. They also held promise to help dissuade at-​risk youth from both politics and violent extremism. It is for this purpose that in 2007, the Ministry of Religious Affairs mobilized Salafi imams to lead the Ramadan religious lectures, a newly established initiative to promote a moderate, peaceful and tolerant Islam.52 The ministry also solicited the services of the influential Salafi leader Abdelmalek Ramdani to wage theological battles against -​al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and delegitimize their actions and propaganda efforts on Islamic grounds. In the 1990s, Ramdani emerged as a vigorous denouncer of terrorism and its ideologues, especially Omar Mahmoud Mohammed Othman, alias “Abu Qatada,” to whom he devoted a whole pamphlet of scathing criticism, Takhlis al ibād min Wahshiyat Abu Qatada (Unshackling People from the Savagery of Abu Qatada). He also condemned the GIA as well as the politicization of Salafism, disavowing its prominent symbol, Ali Belhadj, in his book Madarik an Nadhar fi as Siyâsa.53 His positions earned him the wrath of Salafi jihadis, forcing him into exile in Saudi Arabia, where he still serves as an imam. In 2008, it was the turn of Radio Qur’an to use the services and authority that major qui­ etist Salafis like Abdelghani Aouissat held to condemn suicide operations and offer rebuttals of the practice oftakfir (excommunication). Aouissat is an important figure of the Salafi movement, particularly in his native Kabylia, the primary Amazigh (Berber) region of northern Algeria. In the early 1970s, he was a student of the Maliki school and a dis­ ciple of Sheikh Amer El Arbaoui, Sheikh Mouhammed Malek Al-Waghlissi, and the late sheikh Ahmed Hamani, then president of the Islamic High Council. His turn to Salafism began in the mid-​1970s after reading books of the renowned Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, as well as Ibn Taymiya, Ibn al-​Qayyim al-​Jawziyya, and Ibn Abd al-​Wahhab. Like his Salafi counterparts who gained credibility and visibility, the ultimate rite of passage for Ouissat was through close encounters and engagement with the Saudi luminaries of the Salafi movement, foremost among whom was Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz (1910–1999).​ He then parlayed his reli­ gious credentials and progovernment views into the coveted job of issuing fatwas and guidance on a wide range of subjects on both national (Channel 1) and regional (Channel 2) radio. For fifteen years, he had his proper ­re ligious segment broadcast through Channel 2 in Kabylia. On Channel 1, he hosted two programs, Hadîth Es-Sabâh​ and Hadîth El Djoumoua, both lasting for many years.54 the fragmentation of salafism in algeria ( 71 )

The Algerian regime also propped up Mohamed Ali Ferkous, who, the Saudi sheikh Muhammad bin Hadi al-​Madkhali designated in January 2018, alongside Abdelmadjid Djemaa and Lazhar Snigra, as the representative of Salafism in Algeria.55 Ferkous boasts the most brand recognition, as illus­ trated by the number of visitors to his high-​traffic website (over sixty mil­ lion so far). He is also a prolific author, producer of numerous fatwas, and eloquent orator—​his followers compare his appearance and voice to that of Nasiruddin al-Albani. His immersion stage in the Salafi‘aqida (creed) and manhaj (path) took place in Saudi Arabia, where he studied under the likes of Sheikh Atia Ben Mohammed Salim, Abd El Kader Ben Sheba El Hamd, Abu Bakr Jabir El Djazairi, and Mohammed Mokhtar Shanqiti. When he returned to Algeria in 1982, he joined the Faculty of Islamic Sciences as director of research and programming. Until 2017, he had been in charge of Dar El Fadhila in Mohammadia in Algiers, reportedly financed by Saudi Arabia. Throughout his trajectory, Sheikh Ferkous has been playing a cautious, long-​term game. At every occasion, he denounces the jihadis as seditionists whose sole objective is to create fitna (chaos) in the house of Islam. Their violent revolutionary ethos, epitomized by their chaotic impulse to mind­ lessly kill the innocent and destroy the property of the believers, belies their loud and desperate claims to be authentic Salafis. Whatever their claims and attempts to hide their deceitful doctrines under the label of Salafism, writes Ferkous, theirs remains a false creed that professedly violates the core components of Salafism: justice, moderation and patience.56 The latter attribute is particularly important as a guiding principle in dealing with Muslim rulers. According to Ferkous, Muslims should obey political authority in ma’ruf (beneficence/​benevolence) and advise and wish them well. In this, he follows the example reportedly set by the Prophet, who said, “Whoever sees something from his ruler that he dislikes, then let him be patient.” If he commands committing sins, however, then he forfeits all right to alle­ giance. But even when the loyalty owed is withheld, revolt against authority remains unlawful as its consequences are more often than not dire for do­ mestic peace and security. Ferkous rationalizes this realism-​based doctrine by referencing the classical works of Malik bin Anas, Ibn Taymiya, Imam al-​Nawawi, and Imam al-​Ajurri and other scholars.57 Ferkous’s assault on the theological distortions of the jihadis expands to what he deems the dangerous religious innovations of Salafis-politico. The divisions of Salafism into such distinct marked categories, he asserts, are created out of the misleading thoughts of some deluded Salafis and the per­ nicious plots of their enemies to sow discord among those who adhere to the traditions of the “devout ancestors.” In such ways, traps have been laid ( 72 ) Salafism in the Maghreb to ensnare Salafis into internal disputes and confrontations that pit the re­ gime loyalists on quietists against jihadis and politicos against quietists. The Salafis’ own theological transgressions have opened the way for their ene­ mies to manipulate and slap labels like “Wahhabi” on them. Citing the late sheikh Mohamed Bachir al-​Ibrahimi, who succeeded Ben Badis at the helm of AAMU, Ferkous warns about the divide-​and-​conquer strategy designed by their enemies to sully their da’wa, discredit their education (tarbiyya), and eventually sink them into oblivion. For Ferkous, the multiple expressions of Salafism and the stubbornness of Salafis who operate in doctrinal confusion are two of the main obstacles that impede the expansion of “pure” Islam in Algerian society. In several of his writings, he expresses his disappointments with Salafis who populate chat rooms, discussion groups, and forums to propagate theological errors and disparage the true upholders of the doctrine of the salaf. Their igno­ rance leads them to confuse the quantity of information they produce with the quality of truthfulness. In support of his opinion, Ferkous quotes the opinions of several scholars who warned about the vanity and dishonesty of the self-​proclaimed unscrupulous scholars who stir controversy, disputes, and rancor among the adherents of the Sunnah. Quoting Ibn Rajab Al-​ Hanbali, he says that the refrain of the righteous predecessors and imams from engaging in excessive disputes and arguments was not due to their ig­ norance or inability to respond: “Rather, they remained silent due to their knowledge and fear of Allah.” Their successors, “who spoke much and delved deeply into issues, did not do so because they had more knowledge than them, but rather due to their love of speaking and lack of scrupulousness.”58 In addition to jihadists and politicos, Ferkous opposes secularist and Sufis.59 Under the banner of nationalism, socialism, modernism and world­ liness, Western secularism has penetrated Algerian society and its edu­ cational institutions, devaluing Arabic language, wrecking moral values, spreading sexual immorality, and damaging the sacred institution of family. The result, according to Ferkous, is a new generation of young Algerians who are morally adrift. Their lack of moral compass has left them -​ill equipped to resist the temptations of greed, lust, opportunism, and decep­ tion. As for Sufism, Ferkous writes that “its deviant ideas and false beliefs are a great danger to the doctrine of tawhid (monotheism).” Its absorption of foreign ideas and rituals opened the way for every corrupter of faith and malicious intruder to disfigure the purity of creation and legitimize the disconnect of people from their roots. Ferkous believes that Algerians ex­ press surprise when they are reminded that Sufis such as the Tidjaniyya acted as collaborators with French colonialists. Given this history, he adds that it isn’t surprising that Western governments and their allies have been the fragmentation of salafism in algeria ( 73 ) actively promoting Sufism as a counterweight to the efforts of the vanguard of Muslims who defend discourses of the purity of Islamic scriptures. The last challenge that quietist Salafis face stems from risk of divisions within their own ranks. Despite their avowal to form a cohesive commu­ nity of believers, Salafis have had to contend with conflicting personalities, ideas, and motivations. The resignation of Ferkous from Dar El Fadhila and the Islah magazine in October 2017 exposed simmering tensions within quietist Salafism between followers of the Saudi sheikh Muhammad bin Hadi al-​Madkhali and those that subscribe to the teachings of Rabi bin Hadi al-Makdhali, another more prominent Saudi cleric who hails from the same tribe. The latter’s followers, known in Algeria as the Group of Eight, are led by Abdelghani Aouissat and Azzedine Ramadani, and dominate Dar al-​Fadila body and the Islah magazine which Ferkous reportedly quit in protest over issues of management in Dar al-​Fadila and the doctrinal “pu­ rity” of some Salafis. The gap has only broadened since into a full-​fledged public dispute between the camp of Ferkous, Abdelmadjid Djemaa and Lazhar Snigra and the Group of Eight. In an open letter published online in May 2018, the Group of Eight decried the intransigence of the camp of Ferkous and rejected as unreasonable the preconditions they set in order to mend fences, including cessation of lecturing in mosques controlled by sheikhs they deem as ignorant of the true “Salafimanhaj ” as well as publicly disowning affiliated Salafists such as Ramdani and scholars they endorsed such as Ali al-​Halabi.60

SALAFISTS ON THE MARCH

In the face of the challenges enumerated above, Ferkous lays out his strategy for rolling back the floodgates of falsehoods (manhaj al-​batil), as propagated by so-​called “sham Salafis” (jihadis and politicos), Sufis and secularists. To provide context, he cautions his disciples and followers to always determine the proper response to heresies. First, “One must distinguish between a person who hides his reprehensible heresies and another who openly flaunt and propagate them.” In the latter case, the proper course of action that the “true and pure” sheikhs must take depends on the strength or weakness of their position. Simply put, if dealt a weak hand, they have no other option but to be patient and avoid acting in ways that give their enemies the pre­ text to “oppress the people of the Sunnah, or drive them out of the mosque and restrict their activities.” If the moment is opportune for firmness, then “it would be necessary to repress the heresies according to the norms that religion prescribes.”61 ( 74 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

Such repression can take the form of pressuring or intimidating imams to quit. In one mosque situated atop the Aïn El Bey plateau in Constantine, Salafi students resorted to the common tactic of disrupting sermons, accusing the imam of violating the Islamic aqida (creed) and being unfit to lead the prayers. In another instance, while the imam was preaching, they started reciting Qur’anic verses loudly and calling for their own separate prayer.62 In this case, the attempts to evict the imam failed when outraged congregants chased the student Salafis from the mosque. In areas where Salafis feel that they have the wind at their back, they mobilize their followers to challenge and even refuse the imams sent by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In the Berber province of Tizi Ouzou in northern Algeria, according to a report in the newspaper El Watan, they have already overtaken several mosques. When they face resistance, they build their own mosque, as happened in Beni Douala, a town in Tizi Ouzou province. Salafis have also gradually expanded their presence in the remote areas of the country. In Ghardaïa, gateway to the Algerian Sahara and the birth­ place of Mokhtar Belmokhtar,63 the legendary one-​eyed militant tied to several terror groups in the Maghreb and Sahel, Salafis have been trying to exploit the growing tensions between the Chaamba Arabs, present in most of the Algerian south, and the Mozabite Berbers of the Muslim Ibadi sect, an insular group with its own systems of values, codes of conduct, and rules. Since 2009, Ghardaïa has seen clashes erupt intermittently between the different communities over resources, land, and migration.64 But since the bloody fighting of 2013 and 2015, outbreaks of violence seem to en­ dure, and the group elders who used to mediate and mitigate conflicts stand powerless in front of a new generation that is increasingly unafraid to rebel against traditional forms of leadership. Salafis such as Ahmed Seqlab, who was trained in Saudi Arabia and enjoys a large online following, have also exacerbated the tensions by inciting violence65 or issuing virulent fatwas branding Ibadis as “enemies of Allah.”66 Further south in Adrar province near the border with Mali, Salafis are also trying to challenge the dominance of the Tijaniyya Brotherhood. Their best-​known figure is Abu Abdillah Salem Al Mourida El Adrari, who pur­ sued Salafi thoughts and knowledge in Mauritania from 1994 to 2002. His followers in Adrar, where he teaches Salafi creed, principles, and methods, compare him to Muqbil bin Hadi al-​Wadi`i (1933–2001),​ a major Yemeni scholar credited with reviving Salafism in his home country. Like al-​Wadi`i, who started his mission in the small town of Dammaj in Saada governorate before seeing his Dar al-​Hadith catapult into the forefront of Salafi institutes educating thousands of students, El Adrari aspires to spread Salafi ideology at Adrar and beyond. On several occasions, he traveled to Ghardaïa to the fragmentation of salafism in algeria ( 75 ) give lectures on the fundamentals of Salafism and rail about the sins of the Mozabite Berbers.”67 Several factors explain Salafis’ gradual expansion in Algeria. In a di­ lemma echoed across the Middle East and North Africa region, Algerians face economic stagnation, political paralysis, and generational changes. With its strict moral codes and promises to confront societal ills, Salafism provides disgruntled youth with an alternative to the growing irrelevance of co-​opted mainstream Islamist movements and moribund state-​sanctioned religious institutions.68 Paradoxically, the state has played a role in the surge of quietist Salafism. It promoted the quietists as bulwarks against politico and jihadi Salafis. It also instrumentalized them as the perfect bogeyman to scare secularists and liberals alike, deepening the ideological cleavages within society. The regime thrives on such divisions, as they allow it to act as the ultimate arbiter of societal conflict. Given their political quietism, the government allowed quietist Salafis to operate their own private schools and (informal) businesses. Several Salafis who exited violent extremism and renounced political activism became informal economic-​sector actors. The Algerian press devoted extended coverage to cases of former jihadis who developed import businesses that specialized in cosmetics, women’s underwear, religious books and CDs, and mobile phones.69 Some of these businesses thrived thanks to the facilities awarded to them by the authori­ ties and the connections they established with their business counterparts in the Gulf. To be sure, not all former jihadis joined this class of successful entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, and small company workers. An appreciable number had to eke out a living in petty trading marketplaces.

SALAFISM AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

The onset of the 2011 Arab uprisings provided an opportunity for quietist Salafis to prove their worth to the regime as a rampart against social and political contestation. All its main figures issued calls for Algerians to buck the wave of contestation and regime change rocking the Arab world. Their fatwas and sermons featured the same themes that emphasized foreign seditious scheming to manipulate local agitators and naive idealists into fomenting political upheaval and violent decay.70 In the name of freedom, dignity, and democracy, they warned, the disbelievers embellished the virtues of democratic revolutions and fueled through the media and other telecommunications means the hottest fire of temptations and hatred. The result, they explained, was to magnify the wedge between the rulers and their governed, prompting societal fissures that lead inevitably to the rise of insecurity and worsening corruption.71 ( 76 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

Sheikh Abdelmalek Ramdani, who lives in Saudi Arabia, issued a forty-​ eight-​page fatwa urging Algerians not to fall for the trap of seductive sedi­ tion. “Unrest,” he warned, “is a tool created by democratic systems which are against Islam.”72 Echoing the oft-​repeated admonition of the stalwarts of global quietist Salafism, he asserted that “as long as the commander of the nation is a Muslim, you must obey and listen to him.” If the ruler falls short in his worldly duties, he advised “prayer and patience.” Abdelmalek Ramdani added another deterrent to street protests: ikhtilat (gender mixing). In his view, Islam prohibits ikhtilat; therefore, mixed-​sex protests are illicit. Sheikh Ferkous also threw his weight against the Arab uprisings, using his online pulpit to warn believers against joining the protest bandwagon. He issued a fatwa blasting acts of self-​immolation as grave transgressions against God’s will. For Sheikh Ferkous, the shahid (martyr) is the one who dies defending his religion, his honor, or his family. Other examples of martyrs include the ones who drown and the women who die while giving birth. As for public demonstrations, marches, and sit-​ins, the sheikh dismissed them as modern ideas and methods inspired by the French Revolution. Even when the discontent and grievances of the faithful are legitimate, he said, people’s claims for redress should not be expressed through protests, strikes, and riots. By adopting these alien practices, he cautioned, Algeria will fall victim to cultural contamination, internal dis­ cord, and chaos.73 In the run-​up to the presidential election of 2014, Ferkous, Ramdani, Abdelghani Aouisset, and others reiterated their calls for Algerians to steer clear of partisan positions and politicized critics of the regime, including Salafis who have embraced the Arab Spring as an opportunity to shake up politics. To justify their contradictory position of supporting the Algerian regime while calling for boycotts of elections used by the same regime to bolster perceptions of its legitimacy, particularly in the international arena, Ferkous uses the example of the king of Aksum. Aksum is located in modern-​day northern Ethiopia and Eritrea, and its king, al-​Najashi, “neither applied sharia in his realm nor engaged in legitimate jihad,” the sheikh wrote: “But God forgave him nonetheless, as his people were not Muslims and would not have supported its application.”74 Najashi’s pur­ ported conversion to Islam and his refusal to extradite the companions of the prophet Muhammad who fled the persecution of the ruling Quraysh tribe of Mecca were good deeds that compensated for whatever lapses or errors of judgments he might have committed. In other words, whatever the failings and blunderings of then President Bouteflika and his entourage, Algerians still owe them a degree of gratitude for keeping Algeria stable and much more welcoming to people of da’wa than is the case in some Muslim countries. the fragmentation of salafism in algeria ( 77 )

Ferkous’s attacks on hizbiyya (partisanship and factionalism) earned him a strong rebuke from another prominent firebrand Salafi, Abdelafatah Hamadache, who launched in 2013 the Islamic Sahwa Front (not recog­ nized by the state). Sheikh Hamadache belittled Ferkous’s religious au­ thority, dismissing him as lacking the experience and the basic knowledge to render judgments on contemporary issues. He also derided Ferkous’s fatwas and writings on absolute loyalty to dictatorial regimes and his re­ stricted view of the doctrine of jihad. “I urge you to stay away from issues that fall outside your field of expertise,” he berated Ferkous, adding that it is “unacceptable to hear the one who hates jihad and the mujahideen, who never fought in the name of Allah nor participated in a fight with his oppressed brothers for the liberation of Muslim lands, issue [ignorant] fatwas.”75 Hamadache’s incendiary style has done little to elevate his stature among the Salafi community. For example, his calls for establishing diplomatic re­ lations with the Islamic State sparked uproar among non-​jihadi Salafis and other Islamist hardliners. His 2014 Facebook fatwa, where he called for the execution of novelist Kamel Daoud for disparaging Islam, enraged quietist Salafis, as the controversy brought a fiery torrent of public outrage not only on Hamadache but on Salafism as a whole.76 So far, Hamadache has failed either to gain state recognition or to sell the idea of political engagement to young Salafis. With the exception of the endorsement he received from Ali Belhadj, his previous comrade in the banned FIS, he has also failed to get any Salafi authority in Saudi Arabia or Algeria to vouch for his Salafi credentials or support his endeavor. Hamadache is not the only Salafi to seek in vain the creation of a po­ litical party. Ali Belhadj, who left prison in 2006, experienced the same fate when he tried to run for the presidency in 2014.77 The same applied to former guerilla fighter Madani Mezrag, who created the Algerian Front for Reconciliation and Salvation in 2014. Mezrag has access to several media outlets and is allowed to preach and organize gatherings. In June 2014, then minister of state and chief of staff of President Ahmed Ouyahia consulted him on the revision of the constitution. But despite his treatment as a “na­ tional figure,” the regime is still determined to keep politico Salafis and former members of the FIS outside the political fold.78 As early as 2000, the regime refused to authorize former minister of education and foreign affairs Taleb al-​Ibrahimi, to create the Wafa party for fear that he wanted to use it as a front for former FIS leaders.79 Those that tried to circumvent the ban on politico Salafis by inte­ grating already existent political parties did not fare any better. In 2002, the Movement for National Renewal saw the government purge former members of the FIS from its electoral lists.80 During the local elections of ( 78 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

2007, the Society Movement for Peace had to revise its electoral lists to make them conform to the regime’s rules. This prohibition on participation in politics and the absence of credible public opinion surveys make it difficult to measure the degree of support that political Salafism has among the population. Hamadache and Madani Mezrag claim that the youth Salafi base is yearning for representation in the established order. “We want to turn the page, but not tear the page out,” said Mezrag. “Sooner or later,” he added, “we will be a political party. Sooner or later the regime will have no choice but to accept us.”81 Regardless of whether the Algerian regime fulfills Mezrag’s prediction or not, the trend in Salafism has been pronouncedly geared toward apolitical activism. Hamadache, Mezrag, and Belhadj hope that the massive popular protests that erupted in Algeria after the ailing president Bouteflika announced in February 2019 that he would run for a fifth term in office opens an oppor­ tunity for political Salafists to rejoin the political fray. Already the protests forced Bouteflika to first drop his re-​election bid and later to resign from office. It is difficult to predict Algeria’s trajectory going forward. But­ re gardless of whether the post-Bouteflika regime fulfills the desire of polit­ ical Salafists to legally pursue their political ambitions, it is unlikely that the politicos will be able to create the political and electoral tsunami that the FIS pulled off in 1990–91. Salafism has long been trending toward political activism, and quietist Salafists, as reiterated by Azhar Sniqra on February 19, 2019, remain steadfast in their rejection of politics and revolting against sitting political rulers.82 The jihadi Salafis have not fared any better. The onset of the Arab uprisings and the ascendency of the Islamic State did not have any noticeable impact on the jihadi landscape in Algeria. Unlike neighboring countries, where ji­ hadi Salafis and their sympathizers emerged out of the shadows into the contested ground of street activism, religious proselytizing, or mobiliza­ tion of disaffected youth to join the theaters of conflict in Libya and Syria, the jihadi presence has remained largely contained in its traditional ambit in the mountains of Kabylia in the north and parts of Algeria’s Sahara and the Sahel region. As the Algerian authorities describe it, terrorism in the country remains residual, even if the risks of major attacks exist, as was tragically demonstrated in January 2013, when Algerian terrorist Mokhtar Belmokhtar struck at the heart of Algeria’s oil-​producing region, taking hundreds of workers and foreign nationals hostage. The boldness and scope of the attack at the Ain Amenas gas complex in southeast Algeria exposed critical weaknesses in Algeria’s counterterrorist policy. With that being said, the relatively low number of Algerians who have joined the so-​called Islamic State is a testament to the failure of its revolutionary message to the fragmentation of salafism in algeria ( 79 ) appeal to a society still traumatized by the ghosts of the mass atrocities of the 1990s. For an appreciable number of Algerian scholars, the scars of the so-called “Black Decade” and the regime’s combination of a hard and soft counterterrorism strategy have significantly curtailed militancy.83 Another contributing factor for the failure of the Islamic State to gain a firm foothold in the country is attributed to AQIM’s fierce resistance and the refusal of most of its foot soldiers to withdraw their loyalty from the group’s Algerian emir, Abdelmalek Droukdel. The latter prohibited his followers from joining the jihad in Syria, urging them to stay focused on the “apostate” regimes of the Maghreb and Sahel region. The same ap­ plied to veteran jihadi Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who has been harassing the Algerian and Sahelian regimes for the last two decades. To be sure, small factions of AQIM joined forces with the Islamic State, helping create Jund al Khilafah or Wilayat Jaza’ir, an affiliate of Abu Bakr Baghdadi’s group that once operated in several areas of the country, including Constantine, Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdès, Bouira, El Oued, and Illizi provinces. 84 In 2015 and 2016, the group claimed several attacks on Algerian security forces.85 But this Islamic State affiliate soon crumbled, leaving AQIM as a lingering, if contained, threat.

CONCLUSION

This chapter examined how Algerian Salafism has evolved over time, with a particular focus on its ideological fractionalization and factionalism. From the tortuous road to jihadi Salafism in the 1990s to the entrenchment of quietist Salafism in the new millennium, the chapter addressed the complex and thorny relationship between and among the different Salafi factions and how, during critical junctures, they have positioned themselves vis-​à-​ vis each other and vis-​à-​vis the Algerian regime. The chapter also examined the many forces that contributed to the forceful re-​emergence of Salafi ide­ ology and activism as the locus of societal contention and controversy in the wake of the Arab uprisings. To be sure, the political and revolutionary variant of Salafism remains a contentious fringe. But the weakening of these two strands of Salafism stands in sharp contrast with the gradual surge of loud Salafi voices who abstain from formal politics and reject violence and advocate the spread and application of their strictly conservative theolog­ ical orientation in society. This evolving influence and growing strength of Algeria’s quietist Salafists does not mean that this is a harmonious or coop­ erative movement. Salafists have had to grapple with leadership disputes, interpretational divergences and disagreements over agendas and strategies ( 80 ) Salafism in the Maghreb to pursue. Despite this, however, quietist Salafis continue to expand their influence. In the post-​2011 era, the regime has struggled to develop a coherent strategy to contain the gradual expansion of Salafism in Algerian society. On the one hand, the minister of religious affairs, Mohamed Aïssa, has been warning about the rigid teachings and insubordination of Salafi clerics, as was exemplified in January 2018 when Salafi imams defied an order by the minister of religious affairs to devote the Friday sermon to the Amazigh New Year’s Day, Yennayer, now a national and official holiday. Sheikh Ferkous issued a fatwa denouncing the celebration of this “pagan” holiday as haram (illicit).86 A few years earlier, in 2014, a large group of Salafi imams provoked outrage when they refused to lead funeral prayers in memory of Algerian soldiers who died when a military transport plane crashed into Djebel Fertas mountain near Oum El Bouaghi.87 On the other hand, some factions within the Algerian regime con­ tinue to see quietist Salafism as a useful tool to deploy against the regional, tribal, sectarian, and jihadi threats that face Algeria. In March 2017, then Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia seemed to confirm the suspicions of his critics, who blame his government for instrumentalizing Salafism for political ends. In a speech to his party’s activists in the southern town of Tamanrasset where he denounced the pernicious plots of some NGOs and foreign associations, Ouyahia portrayed Salafism as a virtuous model to follow. “We love Salafism, it is in our religion, let us be Salafists in our ­na tionalism,” he exhorted.88 Whatever the truth about the regime’s policy toward Salafism, the steady expansion of quietist Salafism is a manifestation of the crisis of state institutions.89 An appreciable number of Algerians cannot find in­ spiration or self-​confidence in the traditional institutions of religion. The neighborhood imams who once played an important role in molding the worldviews of ordinary Algerians have been increasingly contested by Salafi preachers.90 The popular appeal of Sufism has also weakened. A 2011 public opinion survey conducted by the University of Algiers and Binghamton University found that while a majority of respondents saw Sufi organiza­ tions as more prone to peaceful and tolerant teachings, they disapproved of some of their religious practices as beyond acceptable Islamic jurispru­ dence.91 Mainstream Islamists do not fare any better. Unlike in Tunisia and Morocco, where Islamist parties have matured into important intellectual and political forces, Algerian Islamist political parties have sunk into intel­ lectual lethargy and are largely disconnected from their electoral constitu­ encies. Their inability to adjust to major recent social transformations has eroded their social and political standing in society. the fragmentation of salafism in algeria ( 81 )

As the stature of Islamist parties and Sufi organizations continues to decrease, that of quietist Salafis continue to rise. With their moralizing discourse and promises to tackle societal ills, Salafists have proven adept at filling the ideological, social, and political void left by Algeria’s state institutions. CHAPTER 5 w Managing Salafism in Tunisia

A Post-​revolutionary Dilemma

INTRODUCTION

Despite the turmoil in much of the Arab world, Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Spring, continues to limp along the tortuous road to democracy. During this journey, the country has provided fresh insights into Islamism and secularism and their competing claims to freedom and justice and the dilemmas of how these contested concepts should be ordered and weighed against each other. Such tensions have deeply shaped the nature of Islamist-​ secularist interactions in postrevolutionary Tunisia.1 The Tunisian case has also provided a unique context in which the deep divisions among Islamist actors themselves over the nature of and rules for religious activism and mobilization played out in the new Tunisia. Among the thorniest issues is the problem of what to do with the explosion of Salafism into public life, especially groups that articulated a hegemonic vision of both society and political. Islamists in particular were surprised after the revolution to dis­ cover that Salafism had become a social reality in the country, especially in the most disaffected areas. Before Tunisia’s January 2011 revolution, the majority of Tunisian Salafists avoided politics and treaded carefully in their actions. But after the stunning overthrow of Tunisian President Zine al-​Abidine Ben Ali, youths who had “Salaficized” clandestinely under Ben Ali came out of the shadows, dedicated to the unfinished work of spreading their ideas. Quietist Salafis set up several charities and schools to reclaim Islam’s preeminence in

Salafism in the Maghreb.Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, Oxford University Press (2019). © Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190942403.001.0001 managing salafism in tunisia ( 83 ) society. Newly founded Salafi parties ratcheted up the pressure on Tunisia’s new rulers to carve out a bigger role for Islam in politics. But it was Salafi jihadists who sought to reap the biggest gains from the political transition. Powered by the release of hundreds of Salafists from prison and the return of several prominent sheikhs to Tunisia from their sanctuaries in Western Europe, the jihadists began spreading their roots in the poor and marginal­ ized areas where state authority was lacking. This was a unique situation in the Arab world. For the first time, jihadist ideologies and democratic experience intermingled, arousing greater passions, hopes, and fears. For a brief moment, Tunisia became a theater to test the political and ideational impact of democratization on antisystemic groups with jihadist ideological visions. This chapter examines the novelty of this case and provides insights on the factors that affected and mediated jihadist interactions with both the Islamist Ennahda-​led government and other groups with opposing moral and ideological stances. Such an analysis of intrajihadi dynamics, jihadi-​regime dynamics, and intergroup dynamics with other social and political actors helps elucidate the choice of strategies that jihadists adopted and how those choices were deeply affected by their own internal contradictions and ambiguities.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF TUNISIAN SALAFISM

Tunisian Salafism has had its own peculiar trajectory and local articulations that were shaped by both internal and international influences. As else­ where in the Maghreb, Tunisian Salafism is a modern creation whose seeds took root during the existentialist anxiety and intellectual ferment that accompanied the process of colonialism and the subsequent quest for state­ hood. But unlike Morocco, which was never occupied by the Ottomans, or Algeria, where aggressive French settler colonialism necessitated religious unity among the indigenous population, Salafism in Tunisia germinated within an Islamic reform movement that accommodated a diverse array of understandings of islah (reform) and ideology. In the nineteenth century, reformist Ottomanism shaped the patterns of Islamic thought in Tunisia.2 Both the so-​called modernist reformers and traditionalists had their Islamic aspirations influenced by the inspiration of the Ottoman Tanzimat reform program from 1839 to 1856. Despite their contending visions for renewal, both factions were preoccupied with the necessity of socioeconomic and political reforms to withstand the assault of menacing European powers. In so doing, they debated the merits of strong centralized governments, checks and balances, constitutional rule, and other principles designed to strengthen the Tunisian realm. Most agreed with ( 84 ) Salafism in the Maghreb the imperative of political modernization, but interpretive contradictions and conceptual ambiguities plagued their reform agendas and thought.3 Reform-​minded thinkers supported strong central government powers but wanted limits on that same power. They wanted governments to drive social change while at the same time they wanted to see popular sentiment act as a check on the political elite. Kheireddine Pacha, the most emblematic Ottoman Tunisian reformist figure of this period, is representative of the paradoxes at the heart of re­ formist thought. For example, he blasted the debilitating effects of arbi­ trary rule, but when he became prime minister (1873–​77), he balked at implementing the democratic principles enshrined in the 1861 constitu­ tion. Instead of pushing for the establishment of representative assemblies, he focused his energies on trying to build a strong centralized government, which in his view constituted the only effective way to bring about national regeneration and renewal. In the end, Kheireddine’s political reforms failed, partly because of his own elitist conceptualization of political authority and partly because of the resistance of vested interests, including that of the beys of Tunisia,4 who refused to cede any of their executive powers.5 When the French took over Tunisia in 1881, the revolutionary ideals that Kheireddine embodied did not die out. A new breed of reformers became the carriers of his ideas, especially in the education and religious realms, where his legacy is still most recognized. For example, Kheireddine is credited, and celebrated by modernists, for modernizing the curric­ ulum of institutions of higher religious learning, especially the prestigious Zitouna University, which he also placed under the control of government. The alumni of Sadiki College, a modern secondary school that he founded in 1875, became the incubator of a small but influential elite. At the turn of the twentieth century, two currents of thought came to influence the political and religious trajectories of Tunisian reform.6 The first trend was closely connected to the Tunisian school of Kheireddine, which saw political reform as the sine qua non condition of progress and revitalization of the Tunisian community. The second trend wrapped itself around the narrative advanced by modernist reformers such as Jamal al-​ Din al-​Afghani (1838–1897)​ and the Egyptian scholar Muḥammad ʿAbdu (1849–​1905). While both schools were intellectual and modernist, the second trend was characterized by its focus on the necessity of religious rationalization and repudiation of fatalism and blind imitation (taqlid) and ignorant conformity to precedent. This emphasis on the cultural as­ pect of reforms appealed to both the traditional ulema establishment clus­ tered around the Zitouna school, namely Salem Bouhajeb and Mohamed Essounoussi, and members of the Tunisian Youth Movement such as Béchir Sfar and Ali Bouchoucha, who had their formative years at Sadiki College.7 managing salafism in tunisia ( 85 )

Yet despite its appeal to reformists, the modernist Salafi trend was hos­ tile to local religious and cultural practices. This created a rift in the Islamic reform movement, which split into two camps. The first camp was a radical faction of neo-​Salafi orientation that attacked the ideological rigidity of some of the traditional ulema to fully embrace the reinterpretation of Islamic principles for the twentieth century as well as the intellectual deca­ dence and backwardness of the centers of popular Islam. This group, com­ posed of intellectuals who studied in Zitouna, such as Mohamed J. Aïbi, founder of the magazine Khérédine and the newspaper As-Sawab​ , Taïeb Ben Issa, founder of the newspaper Al-Moushir​ , Hammadi al-​Jaziri, founder of a-​Nadim, and Slimane al-​Jadaoui of Morshid al-​Ummah, used literary journals, magazines, and newspapers as national forums to lead their cam­ paign against stagnant thought and deviant ideas.8 The most consequential figure of this current was Sheikh Abdelaziz Thaalbi, author of the influential La Tunisie Martyre and founder of the Tunisian Party, later renamed the Free Tunisian Destourian (constitutional) Party.9 The second current tried to find a middle ground between faithfulness to Tunisia’s traditional learning institutions and the imperative to adapt to modernity by reforming Islamic law and education. Its most influential leaders of this trend included Mohamed al-​Aziz Djaït and Mohamed Tahar Ben Achour. The latter was a towering and prolific religious figure, so much so that during a visit to Zitouna, the Islamic reformist Muhammad Abduh reportedly bestowed upon him the title of “Ambassador of the Islamic Message.”10 Ben Achour had also established a close relationship with Rashid Rida, contributing to the Rida’s journal of Islamic reform Al-Manār​ (The Lighthouse).11 Today, Ben Achour is most recognized for his advocacy of tolerance, moderation, and appreciation of diversity in opinions and ideas. The silencing of opinion and suppression of ideas, he wrote in 1904, would bring only misfortune upon Muslims. History, he added, bore witness that Muslims in the past had never shied away from polemical debates. Apart from few fanatics, he argued, the prevalent understanding was that obscurantism was a folly that could only thwart Islamic progress and advancement.12 This flexibility of thought and action was reflected in the social and doc­ trinal makeup of this second current of reformist thought. In the social realm, its composition included the baldi (bourgeois) and first-​rank ulema as well as afaqi ulema, sheikhs of rural origin such as Mohamed An-​Nakhli and Mohamed al-​Khidhr Ben H’sine who pushed to open the country’s prestigious religious institutions to religious leaders who hailed from the lower stratum. In the realm of jurisprudence, the group also accommodated a number of ulema who adhered to the minority Hanafi madhhab,13 namely Othman Ben al-​Khodja, Mokhtar Ben Mahmoud, and the brothers Chedli and Hedi Ben al-​Cadi.14 ( 86 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

The multitude of voices within this group, underpinned by their soci­ ocultural and economic diversity, made it more amenable to deliberation, compromises, and moderation. In this, writes Abdellatif Hermassi, they were largely indebted to the doctrine of the new Salafiyya, including its refusal to adhere to any one madhhab and its condemnation of social decay and spiritual degradation. But unlike Abduh and Rashid Rida and the neo-​Salafi current in Tunisia that aimed a great deal of criticism at Sufism and maraboutism, this school of thought was cautious in its approach to Sufi beliefs and practices. Like Mohamed al-​Khidhr Ben H’sine, its adherents adopted a two-​pronged approach that recognized the merits of Sufi orders in teaching the Qur’an, imparting virtue, and providing relief to the needy, while criticizing the excesses and dubious practices of some elements affiliated with the brotherhoods.15 Despite divergences in opinions between the two currents of the Tunisian reformist movement, their framework of reforms was simi­ larly structured along pan-​Islamic lines on a local terrain dominated by European powers until the end of the first decade of the 1900s. After the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the reforms began to take a na­ tional character. Inspired by the Young Turk movement, a group of urban elites, known as the Young Tunisians, pressed for the implementation of the principle of national self-​determination. But unlike the dominant narratives that situated the Tunisian nationalist movement along a traditionalist-​ modernist dichotomy, the differences between nationalists who identified as “modernists,” “conservatives,” “traditionalists,” or “Salafists” were limited. As Hibou Béatrice writes, the notion of Tunisianite, the uniquely Tunisian identity of reformism, was understood at the time as encapsulating an at­ tachment to pan-​Islamism, even to pan-​Arabism, while at the same time differentiating itself in particular by its openness to Western modernity.16 Of course, the divisions within the Tunisian nationalist movement should not be underestimated. The strongest ideological fissures that beset this movement pitted its most conservative elements against the prominent religious scholar, journalist, and politician Tahar Haddad, who embraced a progressive vision of women’s role in society.17 In his book Our Women in the Sharia and in Society, published in 1930, he spoke out against the full-​body veil for women and called for the abolition of polygamy and en­ actment of equal rights in divorce for men and women.18 These demands drew the ire of both religious conservatives, who accused him of dab­ bling in heresy, and the majority of political leaders within the Destour, or Liberal Constitutional Party, who feared that his ideas were too divisive and harmful for their campaign of mass popular mobilization.19 The second rift within the nationalist movement had a strong regional-​ educational dimension. In the early 1930s, a new breed of Western-​educated young men who hailed from the coastal regions of the country began to managing salafism in tunisia ( 87 ) challenge the Destour party’s leadership, viewed largely as too conservative and politically unsophisticated.20 One of the movement’s members, Habib Bourguiba, criticized the old guard as too elitist and unable to organize the kind of revolutionary mass mobilization necessary to challenge French rule.21 Habib Bourguiba, a great admirer of Attaturk and leader of the party of Neo-​Destour, which he founded in 1932 in opposition to what he perceived as the too timid nationalism of the traditional Tunisian bourgeoisie, linked to the class of merchants and craftsmen as well as to the large families of the ulema of the Zitouna, quickly positioned himself as mildly anticlerical. To be sure, Bourguiba was a shrewd manipulator of religious symbols,22 defending in 1929 the wearing of the veil as a symbol of Tunisian person­ ality23 and in 1932 supporting the mufti of Bizerte in his fatwa against the burial, in Islamic cemeteries, of Tunisians who became naturalized French. Bourguiba used these controversies to blast the official ulema, whom he derided as too accommodating toward colonial authorities, and to cement his reputation as defender of the Islamic identity of Tunisia. “They accuse us of being the gravediggers of religion,” he said, but in reality, the “sheikh courtiers,” as he liked to refer to religious scholars, colluded with those most intent on destroying Islam. They and their predecessors, he added, always aligned themselves, the adversaries of the religion and the Muslim world. They distinguished themselves by their servile submission to French authorities.24 In the two decades that followed, he anointed himself as a great Muslim reformer and the sole heir to the legacy of the modernist reformism inherited from Kheireddine Pasha. In designating Kheireddine as the “precursor of Tunisian nationalism,” Bourguiba deliberately erased both the Ottoman dimension of the Tunisian reformist experience and the influences of the reform movement led by Jamal al-​Din al-​Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida.25 The struggle for independence tempered Bourguiba’s strategy of emasculating the different ideological tendencies within the Tunisian nationalist movement, but his vision of a national future rested on his desire to have a total monopoly over both the political and the religious realms.26

THE PARADOXES OF DOMESTICATING ISLAM

Independence laid bare the seething ideological cleavages within the na­ tional movement. Once that lid was ripped off, the struggle to determine the national cultural identity of the country rested on whoever came to control the reins of power. At that time, there was a fierce struggle between ( 88 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef, another nationalist leader, for dominance over the state apparatus and resources as well as the control of the Neo-​ Destour Party—which​ would later become the Constitutional Democratic Rally Party and was Tunisia’s ruling party from independence through the 2011 revolution. The ensuing battles led to near-​civil war between Ben Youssef’s supporters—​including members of the religious establish­ ment, traditional merchants, and the old commercial elite of the south and his native Djerba, off the southeast coast of Tunisia—​and defenders of Bourguiba, including modern professionals, landowners, and members of the petite bourgeoisie in the coastal Sahel. Bourguiba and his Sahel clan emerged victorious from this power struggle, subduing—​thanks to the French military support—a​ southern rebellion and forcing Ben Youssef to flee into exile in Germany, where he was assassinated in 1961. Bourguiba and his Francophile allies then delib­ erately excluded conservative and Arabized middle classes from their na­ tional building project.27 The ideological antipathy and social schisms that divide the north and south of Tunisia today have their roots in old divisions that tore the nationalist movement for independence of the 1950s into two regionally divergent ideological and political interests.28 During his first years in power, Bourguiba proceeded to zealously build a new architecture of order shaped by his monopolistic and exclusivist in­ terpretation of the nature of the state, its historical traditions, and religious legacies. He took from Kheireddine his elitist conception of society and politics, prioritizing technocratic governance over participatory policy decision processes. This technocratic thinking coupled with his authori­ tarian streak quickly resulted in the creation of a republican model that was antipluralist and deeply despotic.29 The closing off of political spaces occurred in tandem with the disman­ tling of the infrastructure of the old religious order. The religious institutions and their structures of authority were seen as a major obstacle to the most radical aspects of Bourguiba’s ambitions to recreate Tunisia’s society in his own image. The fact that an appreciable number of Salafis, conservative intellectuals, and ulema sided with his political nemesis, Salah Ben Youssef, who advocated an overriding commitment to Arab-​Islamic values and sol­ idarity, gave Bourguiba urgent impetus to try to liquidate the ideological and institutional base of dissent to his authority. Bourguiba saw his first years in office as critical to translating his hege­ monic societal project into institutional reality. The success of such a project depended in no small measure on throttling the religious enterprise at its very heart. In this, the president was wildly successful, as it took him a mere three years to take apart the institutions of the old religious order. Between 1956 and 1957, he clipped the wings of the religious establishment by seizing managing salafism in tunisia ( 89 ) control of the religious habous (charitable endowments), the most important source of income for the ulema, abolishing the Islamic religious courts, and excluding ulema from their role as interpreters and expounders of Islamic law, including in the sphere of personal status.30 In 1958, Bourguiba dealt ulema another major blow by unifying and standardizing education along the lines provided by the French model, abolishing in the process religious primary schools (kuttab) and dismantling Zitouna University, which he integrated into the University of Tunis as a mere faculty of theology and religious science.31 By the end of the 1950s, Bourguiba looked supreme. After ransacking the institutions of the religious establishment, al-Mujahid​ al-Akbar​ (the greatest combatant, a nickname for Bourguiba) wanted to lead a social rev­ olution that challenged some of the most central aspects of religion and fundamentally altered religious practice. As a self-​proclaimed mufti, he claimed to have the ultimate authority as interpreter for all matters of faith. “Believe me, my interpretation of Muslim law is the most valid interpreta­ tion. If the Prophet were still among us, he would subscribe to it,” he said in one of his speeches in 1964.32 In the name of progress and development, he belittled the significance of the Muslim feast of sacrifice and the performing of hajj (pilgrimage). In one of his most notorious acts, he went as far as inciting Tunisians not to fast during Ramadan, earning him a rare rebuke from the ulema, who were scandalized by his attack on one of the five pil­ lars of Islam. From independence to the late sixties, Bourguiba continued his aggres­ sive secularization policies even when he had to maintain some semblance of religious attachment.33 After all, Bourguiba never rejected the Muslim identity of the state, enshrining Islam in the 1959 constitution as the “reli­ gion of the state and the President of the Republic.” He was also careful to frame his assault on religious dogma and institutions within the tradition of Islamic reforms. In his view, he was not modifying the sources of Islam but simply proposing new and innovative readings of religious texts, using the Islamic tools of ijtihad (interpretation and reasoning based on religious texts) and maṣlaḥa (public interest) to connect the original Islamic sources with the changing realities of Tunisian society. This is, after all, the meaning of the prophetic tradition that “God sent to this community, every hundred years, someone to renew its religion.” Bourguiba’s critics, especially within the conservative elements of society and the dormant religious establish­ ment, resented his claims to religious authority and posture as a religious reformer. Ironically, Bourguiba’s dissolution of religious institutions created the seeds that would undermine his attempts to transform society. From the beginning, the main challenge for the president and his allies was what to do with the sixteen thousand students and five hundred professors who ( 90 ) Salafism in the Maghreb populated the religious institutions Bourguiba was so determined to liq­ uidate.34 The solution was to force the older cohorts of teachers into retire­ ment and integrate the rest into secular high schools. For the ulema, this was a demotion, as they saw their status of respected professors of theology reduced to mere teachers of presumably minor subjects (Arabic, civics, and religious education, which was curtailed to few hours a week). But by consigning them to what he thought were the fringes of the sec­ ular realm, Bourguiba had, in fact, allowed the ulema a foot in the door of a strategic area, where little by little they began to have an imprint on a new generation of young students. In the most paradoxical and unexpected way, it took a Bourguibian decision for the ulema to fertilize the ideas they sowed while they were in Zitouna. As Tunisian scholar Malika Zaghal put it, through their new positions, the ulema imparted the Salafi ideas they nur­ tured at Zitouna to a new cohort of teenagers, some of whom would con­ stitute during the 1970s the locus of Islamist mobilization at universities.35 In the early 1970s, Bourguiba delivered a further boost to the status of religion in society. This time the move was not inadvertent. By 1969, the president’s experiment with a socially oriented model of the market economy failed and Bourguiba had to switch gears. In so doing, he entered into a confrontation with leftists who dominated universities and unions. To eliminate such powerful opposition, Bourguiba followed the same play­ book as the other Arab authoritarian leaders who were battling their own leftist dissent: softening the most radical edges of his secularist discourse and praising the country’s Islamic heritage and the virtues of Arabization. His speeches became littered with references to religious symbols. Tunisia’s official newspaper,El Amal, began to devote several editorials to religious topics, highlighting the “Islamic origins of Bourguiba’s Thought” and proudly displaying his photo performing the religious duty of hajj, the same duty he once railed against.36 Gradually, he allowed religious groups that were discreet and shunned politics room to preach and organize seminars, or halaqat (circles), on the necessity for religious resurgence and cultural revival in Tunisia. This time also saw the re-​emergence of books, cassettes, and journals that called for a return to Islam as a cure to the ills that were corroding Tunisian society.37 Bourguiba also tried to prop up the religious institutions he himself had pulverized by creating the Association for the Preservation of the Qur’an. The creation of these new institutional structures was designed to manage the resurgence of religion in society and to counter the rise of autonomous religious movements. The emergence of a potentially powerful movement that coalesced in 1981 into Le Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (The Movement for Islamic Tendency), however, alarmed the Bourguibian establishment, bringing an end to the president’s flirtation with the organizations that managing salafism in tunisia ( 91 ) emerged from the Islamic revivalist moment of the 1970s. What followed was a confrontational phase when religious activists became more polit­ icized and grew in numbers at the same time that the state intensified its repressive methods, cracking down on Islamists’ leaders and the infra­ structure that sustained their movement. Bourguiba ordered a ban on women wearing the veil and the closure of prayer rooms in educational establishments, factories, and offices.38 A respite occurred when Zine al-​Abidine Ben Ali orchestrated on November 7, 1987, a bloodless coup against Bourguiba. The new president wanted to soften the hard ideological edges of his predecessor’s religious policy while wresting back control of the flow of religious discourse and expression. As a former interior minister who battled the rise of cultural discontent and dissident religious actors, Ben Ali believed that the survival of a dominating state rested on its ability to aggressively regulate the re­ ligious sphere while retaining a veneer of religious legitimacy. In his first years in office, Ben Ali multiplied presidential initiatives and symbolic acts to portray himself as the ultimate protector of Islam. In this regard, he made it a new rule to start and end his speeches with verses of the Qur’an. He ordered the call to daily prayer, including ṣalat (Friday prayer), to be broad­ cast live on government radio. To prove his extrinsic religiosity, he used tel­ evision to showcase images of himself praying or performing umrah, the nonmandatory pilgrimage made by Muslims to Mecca. In this process of ostensibly reconciling Tunisia with its past excesses and mistakes, Ben Ali released hundreds of Islamist prisoners, including Rached Ghannouchi, and nominated one of their most prominent members, Sheikh Abdel Fattah Mourou, as president of the Islamic Superior Council. But after 1989 elections, in which the Islamist Ennahda party emerged as a formidable politics force, Ben Ali’s true self emerged.39 The president had hoped that the government (re)appropriation of the Arabo-​Islamic iden­ tity of Tunisia and demonstrations of presidential faith would undermine Islamic organizations and actors. When Ben Ali’s hopes to embody the country’s religious authority proved to be wishful thinking, he sought to eradicate all rival politico-​religious actors. In the process, he maligned po­ litical Islam as a pernicious foreign import that only the power of the state could thwart. “There is no other defender of the religion of the Tunisians than the State, the State of all Tunisians, which seeks to preserve and pro­ tect the faith,” he said in 1989. In other words, the state was the only actor with the power and legitimacy to define and regulate Islam.40 By the mid-1990s, Ben Ali drove Tunisian Islamists underground and tightened the state’s grip on the management of mosques and religious ed­ ucation. He also became obsessed with Tunisian women’s attire, banning the wearing of the veil—​or hijab—​in public institutions, including in the ( 92 ) Salafism in the Maghreb public health and educations sectors. Yet like Bourguiba, his attempts at manipulating religious symbolism and controlling religious discourse failed to stem the growing presence of Islamic practices in Tunisian social life. For example, the veil’s visible resurgence in the early 2000s was a clear means of cultural and religious resistance to the president and his attempts to regulate religious practice. Journalist and writer Samy Ghorbal estimates that the number of women who donned the veil or headscarf in the 2000s reached approximately 40%, composed to the single digits in the early years of Ben Ali’s rule. Unlike the 1990s, when religious activism was connected to political demands and oppositional politics, contentious politics in the 2000s played out in the cultural landscapes of identity and values.

RELIGIOUS INDIVIDUALIZATION AND PLURALIZATION

The void left by Ben Ali’s repression of Ennahda was thus filled by new forms of religiosity. The proliferation of Islamic religious satellite channels in the last part of the 1990s contributed to the pluralization of the religious sphere. Salafism became particularly attractive to a segment of the popula­ tion drawn to its individualistic nature, the seeming clarity and simplicity of its message, and the virtual connectivity it provided. Adopting a Salafi iden­ tity became a means to articulate one’s individuality and distinctiveness. In the public sphere, this manifested itself in uniquely Salafi modes of dreass and codes of personel behavior. For Ben Ali, this seemingly depoliticized form of resistance was less threatening to state power even when it challenged his authority to fully regulate religious practice and attire. This assessment was accompanied by a delicate balancing act of containment in which the regime accommodated and tried to manipulate relatively benign forms of cultural resistance while repressing the more intransigent and blatant acts of politics, especially po­ litical and armed religious dissidence. Accordingly, the apolitical orientation of the Tunisian Salafi tendency shielded it from the wrath of the security services. Its small number of preachers and limited places of learning were not harassed as long as they avoided inciting political controversies, sedition, and violence. These Salafis, in a way, got a boost in organizing grass-​roots operations from the same state authorities that harshly repressed political Islamists. They congregated with like-​minded religious soulmates in discussion groups (halaqat ilm), designated cafés, and mosques in areas where discontent was widespread, such as the suburbs of the capital (Ettadhamen and Intilaka), the neglected center-​west (Sidi Bouzid), and cities like Bizerte, Menzel managing salafism in tunisia ( 93 )

Bourguiba, Rades, and Ezzahra.41 Others gathered virtually in internet chat rooms or other online spaces where they bypassed the regime’s control of information and circumvented its censorship of Salafi literature.42 These virtual experiences, supported by local charismatic preachers, helped gen­ erate feelings of identification and solidarity. They also provided adherents a religious framework to understand and critique what was perceived as the corruption of Tunisian state and society. To be sure, these interpre­ tive frameworks were based on simplistic and partial interpretations of Islam. The fact that a number of Tunisians accepted them uncritically can be attributed, at least in part, to the absence of any open space where one could discuss religion, politics, and public policy. This is a point that several Ennahda members and seculars have made.43 Gradually, this closed mindset led to the formation of small, radical Salafi cliques intent on aggressively, and at times violently, challenging the status quo. Virtual spaces became mediums through which initiation into violent extremism took place. Radical preachers and jihadi recruiters urged Muslims to defend their beliefs and values by joining the battlefields where Islam was under siege. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, dozens of Tunisians answered these calls for violence and militancy abroad, and these holy warriors also began to build their network of contacts among disgruntled young people back in Tunisia.”44 Because of the repressive state apparatus, violent jihad was mainly carried out abroad, namely in Iraq. Domestically, Salafi jihadists were implicated in the April 11, 2002, terrorist attack on Djerba as well as the “Soliman affair” in 2006–​7, the first serious terrorist threat in the history of Tunisia that saw a cell of several dozen Salafi jihadists battle the security forces for days in the southern Tunis (suburbs of Soliman).45 The shock of the brazen assault, reminded many Tunisian of a previous clashes in 1980 when rebel commandos took over the southern mining city of Gafsa for several days before the security forces backed by the French army smashed the insurgents. The Soliman affair also prompted a massive and indiscriminate crackdown on Islamic activists, especially in Tunisia’s rest­ less periphery,46 long marginalized and stigmatized as a zone of tribalism, dereliction, and unruliness.47 Most of those apprehended, according to scholars Vincent Geisser and Eric Gobe, had no connection to the budding Salafi current in the country.48 At most, some had participated directly or indirectly in fund­ raising campaigns in solidarity with the Iraqi people or consulted online literature or websites that the regime deemed illegal. For the government, the goal of the indiscriminate clampdown was to demonstrate that the state retained full security control over its people and territory. ( 94 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

Yet the Ben Ali regime understood that this security approach was not enough to repress the country’s religious dissenters. In a context where the state had already lost the battle of the hijab, the regime desperately needed to manage the growing current of religiosity. It is in this context that in 2007 Ben Ali’s son-​in-​law, Sakhr Materi, launched Tunisia’s first Islamic radio sta­ tion, Radio Zitouna. The Administrative Court of Tunis also struck down a circular that prohibited women wearing the hijab from working in public institutions. In the end, Ben Ali failed in his attempts to control, repress, and manipu­ late religious symbols, meanings, and significations. Even his successes and quick triumphs over political Islam bore the seeds of future trouble. His pol­ itics of aggressive depoliticization and systematic eradication of Islamists along with the contradictions of his economic development policies created a social crisis that had a profoundly disorienting effect on many Tunisians. Most youths were frustrated by the wrenching social transformations trig­ gered by the moral hazards of globalization and their regime’s pursuit of public policies detached from accountability and social justice. Some of the most desperate and insecure young people found in Salafism and its social structures a refuge from social and moral dislocations.

SALAFISM AFTER THE REVOLUTION

The stunning overthrow of Ben Ali in January 2011 provided disparate Salafi groups with a sudden opportunity to start of another revolutionary movement in poor neighborhoods.49 Salafists of every stripe came to the fore, but it was the so-​called Salafi jihadists who strove the hardest to ex­ ploit the political transition. The weakening of the state’s authority and the disorganization of its security forces after the collapse of the Ben Ali dic­ tatorship facilitated the jihadists’ drive to create social spaces where they could impose social and moral order.50 Previously, Ben Ali had relied on the police and legions of paid informants to monitor Salafi radicals and po­ litical opponents. But after his ouster, his network of spies was disbanded, and some members of the police force across the country either abandoned their posts or were reluctant to exercise their duties for fear of revenge or prosecution for their past functions in Ben Ali’s hated security apparatus.51 The Salafi jihadists employed a two-​track strategy in the new political context: broadening their support base in poor urban neighborhoods through social activism and the propagation of Salafi ideology while simul­ taneously aggressively recruiting disaffected Tunisians into international jihadi squads fighting in Syria, Mali, and Libya. At home, they promised not to wage violence against the state because it had shed authoritarianism managing salafism in tunisia ( 95 ) and ceased repressing religion. Only in abodes where God’s law was still besieged and preaching was restricted did qital (fighting or killing) remain a duty.52 Their efforts were widespread. They established themselves in several Tunisian mosques, forcefully pushing out imams and religious figures imposed by the former regime.53 They turned these places of worship into spaces where they railed against the evils of secularism and Westernization. In their zeal to prevent vice and promote virtue, Salafi vigilantes attacked art shows, desecrated mausoleums, and burned liquor stores. In some neighborhoods where they were dominant, they pressured residents to conform to a strict Salafi code of conduct. In others, they formed morality squads to enforce codes of moral strictures, especially dress codes and the separation of men and women. In poor urban zones marked by social malaise, isolation, and high unem­ ployment, they positioned themselves as agents of order and purveyors of transparent justice. They also volunteered to resolve interpersonal disputes and other civic issues. During disturbances, they deployed their men to protect vital economic assets, public buildings, and private property.54 The jihadists also invested heavily in social activism, providing jobs, Islamic education, and alms to the poor.55 Jihadists stressed the contrast between their activism and charity work and the political polarization and partisan gridlock that rocked state institutions, hurt the economy, and created social unrest. They argued that their overlapping religious, social, and economic agendas fostered a sense of communal bonding that transcended petty squabbles and destructive political divides. The appeal of Salafi discourse and radical activism can be attributed to the disillusionment of a small but significant minority of Tunisian youth in the most marginalized communities with a democratic transition that had struggled to meet their aspirations for jobs and social justice. Most felt betrayed by the postrevolutionary political process, which they perceived as dominated by a coterie of old politicians intent on reproducing the same exclusionary economic policies of the old regime. Salafism offered them a way to further their political and social preferences through revolutionary methods. Salafi jihadism provided the promise for youths to acquire an au­ thentic individual identity and new self-​worth to respond to their social marginality and exclusion. Most of the converts to Salafism after the rev­ olution embraced Salafi jihadism because of its revolutionary fervor and confrontational street tactics.56 Salafi jihadism became appealing in poor areas because it posited a dy­ namic, radical agenda that stood in stark contrast to the anemic agendas of the Left and old-​fashioned political Islam. It became almost a psycho­ logical phenomenon with its own constructed myths about how alienated ( 96 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

Tunisians could conceive of their identities and gain acceptance in social settings where they expressed themselves and nurtured their spirituality. To adherents, this market of significance with its own doctrines and practices provided an escape from social dislocations and the compromised Islam preached in state-​controlled mosques. One of the challenges that faced the Salafi jihadists, however, was how to transform the heterogeneous Salafi-​jihadi networks into a fixed struc­ ture with a central authority and identified leadership. The media depicted Salafi jihadism as a monolithic movement, but events on the ground showed that the movement was fragmented. Even when they adopted Salafi social norms and lifestyles, some Salafi jihadists were resistant to joining organizational structures that they saw as divisive and contradic­ tory to Salafi teachings.

ATTEMPTED INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The only serious attempt at institutional collective action came with the rad­ ical Salafi group Ansar al-​Sharia (AST), founded by Seifallah Ben Hassine (aka Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi) in April 2011. Abu Iyadh, who cofounded the Tunisian Islamic Combatant Group in 2000, prioritized central control over the growth of Salafi jihadism, fearing counterproductive actions might hurt the movement.57 These concerns were quickly realized when the movement became mired in controversies over vigilante violence against art shows, mausoleums, and liquor stores.58 AST began as a tight-knit group of veteran Salafis whose social and po­ litical identity was crafted in the 1990s and 2000s in both global theatres of conflict and in Tunisian prisons. In jail, Abu Iyadh played a critical role in cementing a web of relationships in which an informal network of Salafis became embedded. The 2011 revolution helped further expand that web of relationships. For the first time, Abu Iyadh and Shaykh al-​Khatib al-​Idrissi, a prominent Salafi theoretician who was trained in Saudi Arabia, had the opportunity to preach and proselytize to a national audience. To broaden its base of followers, AST embedded itself into the social fabric of Tunisia’s poor areas where the state’s authority was weak concentrating on charitable activities and the provision of law and security. AST’s growth, however, brought its own challenges, ranging from problems of coordination to disagreements over the movement’s direc­ tion and expectations. The domain of interactions between the move­ ment leaders and its followers became gradually slippery and fragmented, impacting the ability of the top leadership to set well-​defined rules and en­ sure compliance with them. AST’s interaction processes with other Salafi managing salafism in tunisia ( 97 ) actors loosely connected to it also “kept fluctuating in function of changing political circumstances.”59 Abu Iyadh defended the path of formal structuration based on the necessities of the moment. He argued that Salafi jihadism had grown ex­ ponentially and needed to be structured and managed. Without formal or­ ganization and mobilizing structures, the connections between the jihadi sheikhs and followers risked becoming frayed, and this lack of central con­ trol over strategy and organization was bound to lead to counterproductive actions that hurt the movement. Unplanned and untargeted violence had proven costly for the Salafi jihadists, for instance, shocking most Tunisians, alienating target constituencies, and inviting state repression. In 2012, Abu Iyadh tried to catalyze a broad-​based mass movement that acted as a collective. AST’s second national congress in Kairouan assem­ bled more than five thousand participants to give expression and direction to AST’s effort to become a movement of historical significance. Abu Iyadh wanted this congress to formalize the creation of a centralized concerted-​ action organization that functioned as an expression of the collective will of both national leaders and their grass roots. Abu Iyadh also wanted to make AST a routinized part of the Tunisian scene. To that end, he invited prominent public figures such as Radhia Nasraoui, a female secular human rights activist and director of the Association for the Fight against Torture in Tunisia, to attend AST gathering in Keirouan. Ghannouchi and other Islamists also attended two of AST’s official meetings.60 Aby Iyad also aggressively marketed AST as a rational organization com­ mitted to promoting human capital. In several instances, he lambasted po­ litical and business elites for imposing on society an imported and failing economic model. To bring about social justice and economic fairness, he said in May 2012 that the financial system needed to be fundamentally changed. As if in campaign mode, Iyadh called for strengthening the role of workers through the establishment of Islamic unions and watchdog associations. He outlined new development opportunities through the in­ troduction of different forms of tourism that were, according to him, mor­ ally superior to and more lucrative than current alternatives that polluted local cultures and damaged communities.61 For a moment, it seemed that AST was on its way to becoming a nor­ malized and institutionalized radical group. To be sure, nobody expected AST to embrace the conventional ideals of democracy, but the possibility of seeing a jihadi group operate nonviolently within the fold of a nascent democratic structure was tantalizing.62 In the end, however, this experiment in normalization slammed against the movement’s own contradictory tendencies. AST suffered from deep internal divisions about the theological justification and ideological merit ( 98 ) Salafism in the Maghreb of institutionalization. There were also some Salafists who were com­ pletely opposed to any forms of institutionalization. They argued that it is not allowed under Salafi doctrine because it divides the community of believers and violates the sacred principle of tawhid (the unity of God). Khatib Idrissi cautioned against turning AST into another Ikhwani (Muslim Brotherhood) project where Salafi activists become embroiled in political partisanship and factionalism (hizbiyya), diluting in the process the theo­ logical integrity of Islam. There were also strategic reasons for opposition, as institutionalization risked making Salafists lose their elan and attraction. After all, it was the antisystemic and revolutionary discourse of Salafi jihadists that appealed to an appreciable number of disenfranchised and disaffected young Tunisians. This large cohort of AST demanded the imposition of sharia and wanted the movement to adopt a more confrontational stance toward the author­ ities. Some advocated the forceful moralization of the public sphere. At its core, this is the insoluble dilemma that AST faced. Most of its members relished their new freedoms but demanded that the same privileges and rights not be extended to those they deemed as irreligionists. In fact, they wanted the government to enforce their own understanding of what consti­ tuted Islamic social models of life. AST’s inability to resolve this core quan­ dary could explain, at least partially, the group’s contradictory behavior and its eventual demise.63

THE ISLAMISTS’ DILEMMA IN GRAPPLING WITH SALAFISM

AST’s structural heterogeneity and its insoluble internal contradictions complicated the Islamist-​led government’s attempts to engage, negotiate with, or suppress Salafi jihadists. When it came to power, Ennahda was confronted with the challenge of handling Salafi radicalism. The revolu­ tionary moment brought the ideological struggles between mainstream Islamism and Salafism into the open. Despite Ennahda’s consciousness of the ideological challenge that Salafists posed, Islamists were surprised after the revolution to discover that Salafism had become a social reality in the country, especially in the most disaffected areas. This ideological struggle between Islamists and Salafists has been an organic part of the Tunisian Islamist debates for decades. For mainstream Islamists, Salafists have always posed a theoretical and ideological challenge as well as a hindrance to their political project. The rupture between the two currents played out openly in doctrinal, ethical, and political battles that Rached Ghannouchi led against the Salafists from his exile in England.64 managing salafism in tunisia ( 99 )

Islamists long assumed that their reformist Islamist ideology presented a solution to the malaise that Tunisia endured under Ben Ali. As an agent of political and ideological socialization, Ennahda believed initiation to Islamism passed naturally through itself and the movement associated with it. Ennahda hoped that its attempts at rationalizing its value-​norm system and assigning a pragmatic function to Islamist thought in politics would ap­ peal in an increasingly differentiated social setting. After all, as Ghannouchi explained, the rethinking of Islamist politics is a continuation of a long tradition of Islamic renewal and reform in the Maghreb.65 In this regard, Ennahda’s innovations are consistent with the essence of Islamic teachings, namely justice and liberty.66 While this was largely true, in its efforts to build an ideological con­ struct that is pragmatic and capable of speaking to large swaths of society, Ennahda lost ground in the most neglected areas of the country. During its two decades in the wilderness, Ennahda tried to reassure the middle class and its secular critics that it did not have a radical religious agenda or redis­ tributive economic plan. That effort created a disconnect between the party and the poor communities it claimed to represent. Salafists denounced the party’s embrace of democracy and its conceptions of an Islamic state as anathema to pure Islamism. And Ghannouchi’s progressive interpretation of Islamic law as consistent with the values of liberty, freedom, and citizen­ ship was seen as a travesty by many in the Salafist camp. Overtime, the party lost some of its monopoly on religious social ac­ tivism as it scrambled to survive both the ruthless onslaught of state repres­ sion under Ben Ali and the concomitant rise of new forms of religiosity and ideological production. Moreover, the confines imposed by exile forced the party to concede terrain to other emerging brands of religious populism that benefited from deepening social malaise and a gaping ideological void. As a result, a new generation of disaffected Tunisians grew up with little exposure to Ennahda. Added to this, there were three contradictory views within the party over how to address the challenge of Salafism: engage with the Salafists, collaborate with the nonviolent adherents, or take a hardline stance against the radical wing of the Salafi current.67

ENGAGING SALAFISM

The first and dominant view was a centrist strategy that emphasized ­en gagement and persuasion. Its proponents contended that being hard-​nosed on radical Salafists would be highly ineffective and would increase the like­ lihood of recruitment into violent extremist organizations. It is important to note that this view was also shared by some within the Left, especially ( 100 ) Salafism in the Maghreb former president Moncef Marzouki, a moderate secularist and a longtime defender of human rights. Ennahda’s Rached Ghannouchi was the chief defender of this soft-​side approach. He warned that it was Ben Ali’s repression of political Islam and social exclusion of peripheral communities that drove some Tunisians into religious radicalism.68 Ghannouchi was cognizant that tempering Salafism’s rise would require operating on a long time horizon, but he was confident that a state strategy that focused less on coercive demands than on inte­ grating marginalized groups would end up forcing Salafists to moderate their behavior.69 According to Ennahda, Salafism’s excess of religious emotionalism and desire for cultural confrontation were attributable to youth’s fervent zeal.70 Outraged and constrained by the old regime, young radicals saw in the rev­ olution an opportunity to forcefully articulate their cultural expressions and promote their militant understanding of Salafism. Many were un­ willing to tolerate any restrictions on their religious and cultural activities or give in to “narrow-​minded” pragmatism, Ennahda’s Osama Al Saghir, then a member of Tunisia’s Constituent Assembly, told one of the authors in Tunis in August 2013. Ennahda saw this youth militancy as a passing phase. The new freedoms presented a cathartic chance to release pent-​up frustrations and anger. Once the youth realized the impracticality of their goals, they would temper their ardency. Ghannouchi liked to point to his own party’s trajectory as a primer in the evolutionary ideological moderation of religious movements.71 The moment Ennahda’s leaders discovered that ideological purity was leading to a dead end, they began a radical rethinking of their political and ideolog­ ical views. In a democratic Tunisia, Ghannouchi told me in an interview on February 2014 and it was held in IISS, Washington, DC, Salafists would be forced to initiate ideological revisions once their utopic experimentation hits a wall. Ghannouchi genuinely believed that in a free market of ideas, Salafists would see the wisdom of adopting a gradual and pragmatic approach to promoting Islamic values and morals. In one of his controversial remarks, he pleaded with young Salafists to adjust their tactics, proceed with cau­ tion, and most importantly appreciate how far they have come. If they overreached, he warned them, the freedoms they enjoy could be fleeting. As a cautionary tale, Ghannouchi used the Algerian tragedy of the 1990s to show Salafists the dangers of moving too fast. Algerian Islamists misread the balance of power and tried to quickly dominate the political system, alarming secular parties, civil society organizations, and several intellectuals and media personalities. Ghannouchi warned that the resultant military coup to “save the republic” could also happen in Tunisia, where visceral managing salafism in tunisia ( 101 ) opponents of Salafists and Islamists still held powerful positions in the mil­ itary, security services, media, and judiciary. The Ennahda leader was trying to convince impatient Salafi preachers and leaders of Islamic associations to pick their battles care­ fully. When they escalated their street protests for the inclusion of sharia in the constitution, Ghannouchi asked them not to lose sight of the big picture: “Why are you still insisting on sharia when you can open a [Qur’anic] school?” He argued that such demands were unnecessary and counterproductive, stemming from superficial thinking and serving only to distract from the goal of reassuring the people and cementing Islamist political and social gains.72 Ghannouchi consistently denounced Salafi violence. “We must be firm with those who break the law,” he said in an interview with Robert Fisk of the Independent and it was published online on October 24, 2012, “but some of our opponents, they want us to adopt the same methods as Ben Ali, opening prison camps, arresting thousands of people, and using torture and kangaroo courts just because they belong to this group.” Ghannouchi insisted on making a distinction between ideological belief and criminal acts. “If a driver doesn’t stop at a red light, he should not be asked what his ideology is, but told he has broken the law.”73 To further underscore this commitement to peaceful activism, he urged Salafists to follow the path of an earlier Tunisian Salafi party, the Jabhat al-Islah.74 The party’s founder, Mohamed al-​Khouja, is a reformed jihadi who renounced support for violence and terrorism, and he is usually held as an example of behavioral deradicalization. But Ghannouchi encountered problems. Most crucially Tunisian ji­ hadi returnees from Iraq and other theaters of conflict have not followed a path of peaceful activism. Complicating matters further for the Islamists was that the new Salafi parties that have renounced violence and were taking part in the political process struggled to gain footing in traditional Salafi strongholds. For instance, Jabhat al-​Islah, a party that was formed in 2012, is unwaveringly committed to the application of sharia law, which offers the disenfranchised youth the promise of justice and equality for all under the law.75 Still, the younger generation saw the party as the rep­ resentation of an older generation of Salafists that was disconnected from the needs and demands of the disenfranchised youth. The party’s em­ phasis on political structures and the slow and unsure process of legis­ lative institutionalization of Salafi demands had little appeal in Tunisian Salafi circles. Moreover, most young Salafists rejected involvement in politics and the democratic disconnect it engenders in favor of social activism and “street politics.”76,77 Many young Salafists were still uncomfortable with initiating ( 102 ) Salafism in the Maghreb a dramatic turnaround that risked making admissible what had until then been impermissible according to a number of adherents—​institutionalizing divisions through forming or joining organizations or political parties. The fact that the leadership of the new Salafi political parties was largely viewed as old and aloof made the case for participating in partisan politics all the more daunting. Despite these obstacles, Ghannouchi’s conciliatory approach con­ stituted the majority view within Ennahda. The preference was to dis­ suade radical Salafi factions from extremism and to possibly integrate them into Ennahda or other, already-​existing Salafi parties.78 But in the end, Ghannouchi overestimated his ability to exercise moral influence on young Salafists and build a political consensus on how to deal with their challenge.79 His attempts to deploy his charismatic skills and re­ ligious authority failed to connect with a new generation of youth that grew deeply disenchanted with the government and a political transition that they viewed as class biased and managed by old politicians. Young Salafists also grew impatient with Ennahda’s ideological concessions and gradualism, denouncing the party’s exclusion of sharia from the consti­ tution. Ghannouchi also misjudged the infectious influence that the ji­ hadi returnees had on a new generation of Salafi activists who spent their culturally and ideologically formative years exposed to radical preaching from Saudi Arabia.80

ALLIES, NOT ENEMIES

The second Tunisian strategy for dealing with the Salafi challenge was one of collaboration with nonviolent Salafists. The main proponents of this line were ultraconservative Islamist leaders who considered Ennahda and Salafists as part of the same Islamist family.81 The strategy was based on the politics of identity and populism. It supported electoral and doctrinal alliances between Islamists and Salafists. Collaboration between Salafists and Islamists started in the early 1990s with the destruction of Ennahda’s formal structures and the penetration of Salafism into Tunisia. While the spread of this new ideology did not fully supplant the established system of political Islam, a number of Islamists embraced Salafi beliefs and practices.82 Over time, a subset of Ennahda emerged that blended Salafi thoughts with Islamist politics.83 The most important representative of this approach was Sadok Chourou, an influential preacher and a member of the Constituent Assembly (2011–​ 2014) that was responsible for drafting Tunisia’s new constitution. He managing salafism in tunisia ( 103 ) spent twenty years in captivity and has impeccable ideological credentials, earning him the respect of Salafists and the sympathy of political Islamists.84 He quickly became the voice of Ennahda’s purist camp, a watchdog pres­ sure group that advanced an absolutist message and militated for the im­ plementation of sharia law. He used the threat of Salafi radicalization and violence to extract concessions from the state on the role of religion in so­ ciety. In his view, the application of Islamic laws would pull the rug out from the strident religious extremists who had long relied on the government’s relegation of religion to the sidelines of social and intellectual life as effec­ tive recruiting tools. In January 2014, for example, when Ennahda agreed to the opposition’s demand to ban accusations of apostasy, Chourou angrily condemned this concession as a step too far. He decried what he deemed as the dangerous dilution of Islam in the draft constitution, a document he slammed as “stillborn” and as the product of internal and external diktats. Chourou’s denunciations angered several within Ennahda, including the head of the party’s parliamentary group, Sahbi Atig, who hailed the new charter as the pride of all Tunisians.85

CONFRONTING RADICALISM

The third Tunisian strategy was the one preferred by the former prime minister, Ali Laarayedh, who had advocated a hardline stance against radical Salafis. He had warned Ennahda that it needed to distance itself from Salafi groups arguing that failure to stem the propagation of rad­ ical Salafism threatened the political and electoral prospects of his party and risked destroying the democratic transition. This confrontational strategy was in the minority in Ennahda, as many of its members feared the return of the repressive state tactics of the past. Yet as the security situation in Tunisian deteriorated, this position became the official party policy.86 The government was initially reluctant to take on radical Salafists, and it had limited capacity to do so. But Ghannouchi’s strategy of selective en­ gagement began to fail in September 2012 when raging mobs set fire to the US embassy and the American Cooperative School of Tunis. To be sure, Salafists were not the only ones who participated in the violence. As noted by scholar Fredric Volpi, the mob included youths in ‘sporting shorts and t-shirts from neighboring poor suburbs who engaged in looting once the protest became more violent.87 Such vigilantism by Salafi proved destructive to the Islamists, forcing them, as leaders of the coalition government, to harden their security ( 104 ) Salafism in the Maghreb approach, targeting AST’s structures, grass-​roots organizations, and social activities. The state’s tough countermeasures escalated into a cycle of repres­ sion and retaliation. After the government prevented AST from holding its third annual gathering in 2013, the group hardened its rhetoric against the state and Ennahda. This process of radicalization coincided with the rise of terrorism in Tunisia’s border regions. A jihadist group that called itself the Brigade of Uqba ibn Nafi in Tunisia appeared in the Mount Chaambi area near the Algerian border, killing several Tunisian soldiers in the summer of 2013.88 The Ennahda-​led government accused AST of supporting this armed ji­ hadist cell and held it responsible for both the attacks at Mount Chaambi and the killing of Brahmi and another secular politician, Chokri Belaid. In August 2013, the government classified AST as a terrorist organization and escalated its massive security crackdown on the movement and its sympathizers. By the time Ennahda left the government in January 2014, AST was greatly weakened and deeply fragmented. The perils of such fragmenta­ tion and disorganization were seen in the violent and unpredictable terror attacks carried out by individuals or small groups no longer affiliated with AST. Some of these groups also engaged in criminal activities. By late 2014, AST had ceased to exist. This left behind an ideological void and a large, disgruntled constituency, whose members either went dormant, operated underground by integrating smuggling networks and building social linkages in Ben Guerdane close to the border with Libya, or joined the Syrian or Libyan theaters of war.89 Other Salafists continued the fight against the government’s “tyranny” by linking up with the Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade near the Algerian border. Militant groups also expanded their targets to include civilian as well as military targets.90 In 2015 alone, three major attacks in Tunisia were claimed by the Islamic State—​at the Bardo National Museum in the capital of Tunis (twenty-​two deaths), a beach re­ sort at Sousse (thirty-​eight deaths), and a Tunisian presidential guard bus in downtown Tunis (twelve deaths).91 And in March 2016, dozens of Islamic State–​trained sleeper cells staged a dramatic assault on Tunisian security forces in Ben Guerdane.92 Tunisian security forces successfully repelled the attempt by Islamic State militants to seize Ben Guerdane and inflame a dis­ gruntled populace into open revolt. Since the jihadist attacks of 2015 and 2016, Tunisia has made significant progress in neutralizing the threat of terrorism within its borders. The po­ lice and intelligence services have also managed to re-​establish their pres­ ence in the many areas once controlled by Salafist jihadists.93 The frequent intimidations and threatening parades of young men dressed in traditional robes with long beards has also ceased. managing salafism in tunisia ( 105 )

WITHER SALAFISM?

The AST experiment in securing a permanent position for Salafi jihadism in Tunisia failed when the group’s efforts to institutionalize itself and af­ firm its routinization collapsed under the weight of its internal ambigui­ ties and contradictions. Out of the ashes of AST, however, there are some signs that a more conciliatory strain of Salafism is trying to carve a place for itself in the public arena of contestation. Mostly, this takes the form of peaceful activism where some Salafists have created associations to protest against the aggressive and intrusive policing of young people suspected of radicalism. Salafists complain of degrading treatment, unlawful raids, arbi­ trary arrests, and judicial harassment. Families of suspects and fighters who have returned home to Tunisia also complain of persecution and system­ atic police abuse. In critiquing the state, Salafi associations have used the master frame of civil liberties and individual rights to deliver their message. This instrumentalization of human rights to explain and denounce the repres­ sion of Salafists “speaks to the ability of the human rights discourse to penetrate all sectors of society and inform the practice of widely different social and political actors.”94 To be sure, exposure to broader ideational factors, such as religious freedom, dignity, and justice is not tantamount to embracing them. Nonetheless, some Salafists have become convinced of the feasibility of building narratives around the idea of rights and freedoms to highlight the discrimination, stigmatization, and targeting of religious youth, especially in the poorer suburbs and long-​neglected border regions that bear the brunt of the government’s ironfisted security policy. Salafists have also adopted legalistic strategies to push back against the state’s management of religious affairs. For example, in October 2015, sev­ eral associations from the Tunisian city of Sfax staged a well-​organized protest in front of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in the capital, Tunis. Their charge was against what they deemed as the arbitrary dismissal of a number of imams. More precisely, the associations contested the illegality of the acts as the eviction was carried out through an administrative order before the judiciary ruled on the matter. These forms of well-​organized and peaceful mobilization (sit-​ins, marches, and petitions) represent a stark contrast from the revolutionary practices and confrontational street protests of AST.95 It is too early to say whether this Salafi orientation can become a framework of peaceful social mobilization and Salafi activism. It is also far too early to cheer AST’s demise and the jihadists’ retreat. An appre­ ciable number of youth in Tunisia have lost confidence in the country’s democratic transition and have envised a deep frustration toward state ( 106 ) Salafism in the Maghreb authority. Added to this, Social inequality and regional asymmetries are also deepening the chasm between Tunisia’s restless periphery and its eastern Mediterranean coast. All of these factors carry the potential to undermine the country’s democratic transition and facilitate a comeback of violent jihadists. CHAPTER 6 w Salafism and Libya’s State Collapse

The Case of the Madkhalis

INTRODUCTION

In Libya, a postrevolutionary fragmentation into hyperlocal politics, fac­ tional conflict, the struggle for oil wealth and civil war have profoundly transformed Salafism. Salafis in war-torn Libya have emerged as highly au­ tonomous and assertive actors, in social, religious, and educational spaces, as well as in the security sector and on the battlefield. Among Libya’s Salafis, militant jihadists have received the most attention. Emerging early in the 2011 revolution, they drew upon a long legacy of armed Islamist ac­ tion that started in the 1980s from the Afghan war generation, attempted to topple Gaddafi in the 1990s, and participated in other wars in Algeria, Chechnya, and Iraq. Exploiting this trend, the Islamic State, drawing from Libyan fighters returning from the Syrian jihad and bolstered by foreign advisors and recruits, set up its strongest affiliate outside of Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda’s Saharan affiliates have used Libya’s ungovernance, especially in the south, for logistics and training. Yet the country’s Salafi landscape is far more complex than this focus on jihadi currents suggests—and even within the jihadi movement, there are intense debates and fissures. The vast majority of Libya’s Salafis are nonviolent and focused on da’wa and piety. Some participated in Libya’s aborted election experiment in 2012, an event that confronted Salafis with potential opportunities and dilemmas regarding whether or not to affiliate with the state; and if so, how to best approach such affiliation. With Libya’s

Salafism in the Maghreb.Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, Oxford University Press (2019). © Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190942403.001.0001 ( 108 ) Salafism in the Maghreb dissolution into warring factions starting in 2014, Salafis emerged as major political and military players. At the center of this new assertiveness is a particular variant of Salafism— the so-called Madkhali1 current, named for its affiliation with Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, the Saudi “quietist” cleric whose views are described in ­chapter 1.2 Originally supported in Libya by Gaddafi, albeit tentatively be­ cause of their links to Saudi Arabia, these Salafis were intended to shore up his regime with their doctrine of political obedience. In the postrevo­ lutionary period, this bedrock ideology of quietism, commonly thought to be immutable and theologically fixed, has been transformed by Libya’s frac­ tured context. Madkhali militias are now active across Libya as partisans in the national political conflict. As in the case of other armed groups and factions, some of them are engaged in a fierce struggle for Libya’s oil wealth and control of the illicit economy to enhance their power.3 They have also waged an ideological contest with Sufis and other Islamist currents over public space, schools, mosques, and Islamic endowments (awqaf), and on radio and television airwaves. Sometimes this confrontation has spilled into violence. Aside from Libya’s political vacuum and factional conflict, the growth of the Madkhalis has been aided by psychological, economic, and sociological factors. Those factors include the attraction of Salafism as a means to assert personal autonomy and discipline in the face of growing chaos, the role of Madkhalism in establishing grassroots economic networks (though there does not seem to be a specific class base to Madkhalis), and the ability of Madkhalism to mediate, if not completely overcome, tribal and even eth­ nolinguistic barriers. More recently, adherents of Madkhalism have pointed to the chaos in Libya that followed the overthrow of Gaddafi to advance a narrative of triumphalism—that they were right all along in not challenging the dictator’s rule.4 This chapter will explore the growth and implications of Madkhali Salafism in Libya, situating this little-studied trend within Libya’s soci­ oeconomic and political context, especially the latter stages of Gaddafi’s rule and the bedlam that followed the 2011 revolution. It will argue that Madkhalism’s rise has been facilitated by Libya’s institutional vacuum, the legacy of Gaddafi’s policy of active sponsorship, political fragmenta­ tion, the proliferation of armed groups, and competition for economic re­ sources. It will trace the doctrinal debates and dilemmas that confronted the Madkhalis about associating with the state and Libya’s widening polit­ ical fissures. Rampant crime and the growth of the Islamic State provided many Madkhali armed groups a ready-made narrative to sell to Libyan publics, as crime fighters and counterterrorists. While it is unlikely that the Madkhalis will cohere as a national political force, as some have argued, salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 109 ) given the strength of local affinities to region, town, and tribe, there is still communication and cooperation among Madkhali factions across the country. Moreover, their power in society is likely to grow, especially when compared to weakened Sufis and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as hy­ brid Islamist currents. While some of this is due to the Madkhalis’ use of armed force and access to funds, it also reflects a deeper evolution of parts of Libyan society toward greater conservatism, especially since the 2011 revolution.

SALAFISM AND LIBYA’S ISLAMIST LANDSCAPE

A vast desert country three times the size of France, Libya’s popula­ tion sits at around 6.5 million—less than the population of the state of Massachusetts. Most of its citizens are concentrated in urban centers along the Mediterranean coast, with 65% in Tripolitania and 28% in the east, Cyrenaica or Barqa. The inhabitants of the southern region of Fezzan, with its strong links to the Sahel and Sahara, constitute just 7%.5 The country is overwhelmingly Sunni and Arabic speaking, with ethnolinguistic minori­ ties—the Imazighen (commonly known as Berbers), the Tuareg, and the Tabu—inhabiting the western and southern peripheries. Tribal kinship re­ mains an important social bond, though it is often context-dependent and constructed.6 Libya’s long history of weak institutions has influenced its present conditions. Even in antiquity, Libya was a place on the margins, and its suc­ cessive foreign rulers—the Ottomans, the Italians, and the British—never set up real indigenous political institutions or created a local educated class, preferring instead to rule through urban notables and rural tribal elites. For centuries, the country lacked any structure resembling a protostate, with the possible exception of the Sufi revivalist order of the Sanussiya.7 Founded in 1843 by Muhammad bin ‘Ali al-Sanussi, the Sanussiya achieved widespread influence in the eastern Cyrenaica during the Ottoman administration.8 In its doctrinal outlook, the Sanussiya can be said to re­ semble Salafism, especially the reformist Salafism under Muhammad Abuh and Rashid Rida. It posited an austere and scripturalist Islam that returned to the “pure sources”—the Qur’an and Hadith—in order to fortify the Muslim ummah against European influence.9 Politically, though, the order’s influence hinged on its use of Islam to assimilate Libyan tribes—princi­ pally, the Arab Saadi and Murabitun, as well as the Tuareg and Tabu—and, especially, the role of its zawiyas (lodges) in mediating conflict and trans- Saharan trade. The arrival of the Italian occupation in 1911, with its wide­ spread devastation of pastoralism and catastrophic loss of life, presented ( 110 ) Salafism in the Maghreb a dire challenge to the Sanussi elite and to the role of Islam as a political unifier.10 In 1951, Libya became independent. The new state, formed from the provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan with the reluctant coop­ eration of local elites, was ruled as a kingdom by the head of the eastern- based Sanussi order, Muhammad Idris bin Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Senussi (known as King Idris). During this troubled reign, Libya remained one of the poorest countries on earth, and illiteracy hovered at 90%.11 Though the king tried to use Islam to shore up his sagging legitimacy, a number of so­ cietal trends undermined his efforts: urbanization and the erosion of trib­ alism, the discovery of oil, and the rise of competing ideologies sweeping the Arab world, like Arab nationalism and the Muslim Brotherhood.12 Underpinning these movements in Libya was growing criticism of Idris as a lackey of foreign interests, rooted in his hosting of American and British military bases and deals with Western oil companies. On September 1, 1969, a group of Libyan army officers toppled Idris in a bloodless coup. The young captain who quickly emerged at the head of the officers’ clique, Muammar Gaddafi, undertook a series of socioec­ onomic, cultural, and political changes inspired by the Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism of his idol Gamal Abdel Nasser, the ruler of Egypt, and by socialism. Ideologically, Gaddafi saw Islam and especially the tradi­ tionalist Islam of the Sanussiya as reactionary and antimodern. But more importantly, the Sufi orders of the Sanussiya presented threats to Gaddafi’s rule. And so in the first years of his self-styled revolution, he sought to de­ stroy the vestiges of the Sanussiya dynasty through the expropriation of land endowments, the destruction of Sufi shrines and other sites, and prop­ aganda attacks on Sufis.13 Yet beyond this initial denigration of the Sanussiya, Islam figured prom­ inently in the ensuing rule of Muammar Gaddafi. Using the country’s oil wealth, he built up Islamic institutions to neutralize opponents and curry support. In 1972, he created his own missionary vehicle for propagating Islam, the Islamic Call Society.14 In a seminal 1973 speech in Zuwara, he laid out sharia as a basis for law in the Libyan state—part of his burgeoning “Third Universal Theory” that underpinned his Green Book.15 By 1977, this vision of Islamic socialism combined with direct democracy and Arab nationalism had coalesced into the declaration of the Jamahirya, or “state of the masses.”16 Citing the supposed egalitarianism of this new political construct, he declared that every citizen had the right to use ijtihad (inde­ pendent reasoning) to access the Qur’an, thus removing the raison d’être of the clerical class.17 Increasingly, much of Gaddafi’s Islamization of society became aimed at undercutting traditional clerical elites while also trying to “out-Islamicize” salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 111 ) political Islamists. Faced with mounting opposition from the ulema, he undertook a series of repressive measures, to include banning political discussions by clerics and imprisoning and killing clerical critics, often after forced confessions of foreign funding.18 The Muslim Brotherhood was a particular target of his crackdown.19 By the 1980s, Gaddafi’s appropriation of Islam and his crackdown drove dissident voices toward underground militancy. Yet in quick succession, Gaddafi was able to root out these cells and unravel their plots, whether from the Islamist wings of the National Salvation Front or the Hizb al-Tahrir, which tried to infiltrate the armed forces, or the tiny Harakat al-Jihad organization, which had reportedly planned a string of assassinations and bombings.20 Even so, by the late 1980s, a serious and sustained challenge to his re­ gime emerged from the ranks of Libyan veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Roughly eight hundred to a thousand Libyans went to Afghanistan, drawn primarily from urban centers such as Tripoli and Benghazi, with backgrounds ranging from unskilled laborers to a minority of postgraduates.21 Many who went had absorbed the Salafi-jihadist ideas of Abdullah Azzam through smuggled cassettes, and they later mixed with other fighters from across the Arab world in safehouses in Peshawar and on the Afghan battlefield.22 Inspired by this ferment, a cadre of these veterans formed the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, in 1990.23 Seeking to establish an Islamic state in Libya through the clandestine, elitist model of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the LIFG and various offshoots conducted a fierce insurgency, marked by repeated assassination attempts against Gaddafi and raids on army training camps and arms depots. The regime responded brutally, with airstrikes, ground assaults, and mass arrests. The eastern town of Dirna—histori­ cally a locus of anti-Gaddafi sentiment and armed mobilization—suffered siege-like repression in the form of shutoffs of water and electricity and the closure of cultural outlets.24 The regime threw hundreds of LIFG fighters into prison and razed the homes of their families and supporters.25 Unsurprisingly, this wave of incarceration and collective punishment would contribute to the radicalization of a second generation of jihadists, espe­ cially after the regime’s massacre of over one thousand prisoners at Tripoli’s Abu Slim prison in 1996. By the turn of the millennium, Gaddafi’s crackdown had weakened the LIFG through arrests and deaths. Combined with this attrition, the move­ ment had failed to achieve popular support, especially among eastern Libya’s major tribes, who filled the ranks of the security services and elite army units.26 Events outside Libya had further halted its campaign; several of its Algeria-based leaders were executed by the Algerian GIA (Armed Islamic Group) for refusing to pledge allegiance, while other LIFG ideologues ( 112 ) Salafism in the Maghreb came to believe that jihad could be practiced on other battlefields, such as Chechnya.27 In 2000, the LIFG’s Afghanistan-based leadership declared a cease-fire, to be revisited in 2003.28 Yet the post-9/11 period presented even greater challenges to its future: presenting itself as a partner in the American-led “global war on terrorism,” the Gaddafi regime cooperated with the CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in arresting LIFG members abroad—allegedly for ties to al-Qaeda, though the LIFG as a whole had in fact refused to join the terrorist organization.29 In 2005, Gaddafi opened a dialogue with exiled LIFG leaders and im­ prisoned cadres. Spearheaded by Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam, this program of “deradicalization” was inspired by a similar program underway in Egypt and relied upon a range of inducements to cooperative prisoners.30 Using a Doha-based cleric named Ali Sallabi as an intermediary and drawing upon the efforts of exiled LIFG leaders to meet secretly with imprisoned members, the multiyear effort produced a sweeping theological “revision” by LIFG ideologues that argued in detailed juridical terms for the impermissibility of violent jihad. The effort caused splits in the LIFG’s ranks, most notably from the hardliner Abu Layth al-Libi, who rejected the talks and who, in conjunction with Aymen al-Zawahiri, announced the group’s joining with al-Qaeda in 2007—a move opposed by a majority of the LIFG’s other lead­ ership.31 By 2010, the regime declared the deradicalization and rehabilita­ tion program a success, marking its conclusion with a release of prisoners and a gala dinner hosted by Saif and attended by Western counterterrorism experts. Yet for all the fanfare, the deradicalization process failed to remove the underlying socioeconomic and political grievances against Gaddafi that had fueled jihadism—or opposition in general. Many of those jihadists deemed “rehabilitated” would join the revolution of 2011 at its outset, as­ cending to prominent positions of military command through their pre­ vious battlefield experience and also military support from Qatar. In the meantime, though, the removal of the jihadist threat through this project of deradicalization saw the concurrent growth of the so-called Madkhali strand of Salafism, co-opted and deployed by the Gaddafi regime to further minimize the appeal of the jihadism and other forms of activist Islam.

THE RISE OF MADKHALISM UNDER GADDAFI

Madkhali Salafism in Libya grew out of a combination of social, political, and foreign influences: increased religiosity among Libyan youth—to in­ clude their connections via new media to outside Islamic influences; co-op­ tion and sponsorship by Gaddafi; and the Saudi government’s promotion salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 113 ) of Madkhalism both at home and abroad. Yet for much of the 1980s the regime adopted an ambivalent and, according to some Salafis, ignorant atti­ tude about Salafism: its intelligence services simply did not grasp the signif­ icance of the written and audio Salafi material that had started coming into the country from abroad.32 By the 1990s, however, this shifted drastically. In the context of the war in neighboring Algeria and the LIFG insurgency at home, the regime began scrutinizing Libya’s Salafi community and forcing its members underground. Yet Libyan Salafism continued to grow; Libyan Salafi figures recall smuggling audio recordings and pamphlets into the country after returning from the hajj pilgrimage.33 Similarly, Libyan Salafi discourse continued to mature abroad, among the itinerant and scattered Libyan veterans of the Afghanistan war and the students and graduates of seminaries in Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.34 By the early and mid-1990s, Libyan Salafis in Libya and abroad became partisans in the splits that emerged among Saudi Salafi clerical networks, starting especially with the purge of Muslim Brotherhood–aligned teachers from the Islamic University of Medina (the main hub for Saudi Salafi ed­ ucation for foreign students) and the rise of Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, allegedly with Saudi intelligence support, as a central figure in the Saudi regime’s promotion of Salafi quietism.35 Libyans partook in the key Salafi political and theological debates that defined these fissures: the establish­ ment of the Islamic Emirate in Kunar Afghanistan in 1990,36 the basing of US troops on Saudi soil during the First Gulf War of 1990–91, and the 1991 Madrid peace conference between Israel and Palestine. During these debates, some Libyans, students of al-Albani or al-Madkhali, stayed loyal to the quietist line, while others followed Brotherhood-inspired sahwa or “awakening” clerics. One of the most consequential fissures in the Libyan Salafi field, one that would reach its apogee during and after the 2011 revolution, occurred not in Saudi Arabia but in Yemen. Attracted by the promise of free lodging and a rigorous education, dozens of Libyan Salafists had in the late 1990s gone to study with a Yemeni quietist preacher named Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i at his guesthouse and seminary, the Dar al-Hadith, in the town of Dammaj in Yemen’s Saada governorate. A towering figure in modern Salafism, al-Wadi’i’s views on eschewing politics in favor of da’wa and charity were similar in some respects to those of Madkhali (both had studied under al-Albani at the Islamic University of Medina), but unlike al-Madkhali, al-Wadi’i was a sharp critic of the Saudi government’s policies, though he later reconciled with the monarchy, toward the end of his life.37 After al-Wadi’i’s death in 2001, a schism erupted among his intellectual heirs, centered around one of his prominent students, a cleric named Abu al-Hassan al-Ma’ribi.38 Al-Ma’ribi had adopted a more supportive position ( 114 ) Salafism in the Maghreb toward political participation that was closer, critics said, to the position of the Muslim Brotherhood and of sahwa clerics like Salman al-Awda.39 In the ensuing debates among the alumni of al-Wadi’i’s seminary, Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali himself weighed in with books and pamphlets against al-Ma’ribi from his position at the Islamic University of Medina.40 Libyan Salafis were divided as well, between those who supported al-Wadi’i and al-Madkhali and those who backed more activist stance propagated by al-Ma’ribi (derided by their opponents as “Ma’ribis”).41 And as the Libyan graduates of al-Wadi’i’s seminary returned to Libya in 2002, the fissures between the so-called Ma’ribis and the Madkhalis were felt in mosques and discussion circles—but they reached their highest point in the Salafi responses to the 2011 revolution and its aftermath.42 All of this took place alongside a burgeoning alignment between Gaddafi and the Saudi intelligence over suppressing the activist and Salafi-jihadist currents, while co-opting more loyalist figures. In 1995, to portray himself as a patron of piety, Gaddafi dispatched a planeload of Libyan hajj pilgrims to Mecca.43 In early 1998, following a meeting of Arab intelligence chiefs in Tunis and the subsequent visit to Libya by the Saudi interior minister at the time, Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, Saudi Arabia took a harder approach toward Libyan Salafists—of all shades—residing in the Kingdom. In April of that year, Riyadh expelled a number of Libyan Salafi figures living in Mecca and Medina. Some were members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, but many others were simply Libyan students who had overstayed their visas. Some of the Libyans were transferred to back to Libya intelli­ gence custody via a Libyan ship (originally carrying Libyan hajj pilgrims but repurposed for the return voyage to ferry prisoners back to Libya). Many were then incarcerated at the notorious Abu Slim prison in Tripoli.44 Yet roughly this same year, Gaddafi’s policies toward Salafism shifted. Realizing that the apolitical, progovernment, and “quietist” strains of Salafism could be a useful bulwark for his regime against political Islamists and jihadists, Gaddafi moved from a policy of monitoring to co-opting and supporting Salafism. Multiple Salafi sources alleged that this was due to the influence of Egyptian intelligence, which by this time had developed its own strategy for playing different Islamist strands against each other. Regardless of how it came about, the impact of this shift was felt immediately in Libya. The Gaddafi regime loosened its restrictions on Libyans studying Salafism abroad, albeit for clerics with a more quietist bent who subscribed to the ideas of al-Albani, bin Baz, and al-Madkhali in Saudi Arabia and Muqbil al-Wadi’i in Yemen.45 By 2002, Salafi books and cassettes were being allowed into Libya. Starting in 2003, with the permission of the Libyan domestic in­ telligence agency, Libyan Salafists returning from Saudi Arabia and Yemen were allowed to work as imams and khatibs in mosques.46 The result of salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 115 ) all of this was a tremendous expansion for Salafism, albeit with close re­ gime supervision. “Themanabar (mosque pulpits) were overflowing with Salafism,” remembers one practicing Salafi in Tripoli.47 Much of this co-option was intended to supplement the program of theological revisions undertaken by imprisoned LIFG members and over­ seen by Gaddafi’s London-educated son, Saif al-Islam. Saif himself culti­ vated links to more activist, non-Madkhali, but still-loyal Saudi clerics, such as Salman al-Awda and Ayidh al-Qarni, inviting both of them to Libya in 2010 to give speeches in the context of Saif’s rehabilitation of impris­ oned jihadists.48 In the case of Madkhalism, however, another son, Saadi, appeared to have been the main shepherd for its growing influence in Libya—to the point where some Libyans today refer to the Madkhalis as “Jamaat Saadi” or “Saadi’s Faction.”49 Saadi’s personal convictions regarding Salafism are the subject of debate and speculation. According to one Salafi eyewitness, he met Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali in Saudi Arabia during the hajj pilgrimage in 1995.50 Others allege that he was initially closer to Abu Hassan al-Ma’ribi’s supporters in Libya.51 Multiple Salafi sources contend that a Libyan Madkhali figure residing in Tripoli but hailing from the east named Muhammad Mika’ili Nazal (nicknamed Abu Abdallah al-Abyari) proved instrumental in converting Saadi to Madkhali Salafism.52 Still other Salafis contend that his arrival to Salafism coincided with a personal crisis after his suspension from an Italian football team for failing a drug test. What seems mostly likely is that a mixture of personal conviction by Saadi and, starting in the 2000s, regime instrumentalism—directed by Gaddafi— played a role. As Madkhalism spread widely in Libya during the early and middle 2000s, it did so without regard for geography or class. Some Libyan Salafi sources ascribe a poorer, tribal background to Madkhalis, asserting that their influence is felt among urban areas that are inhabited by first- or sec­ ond-generation migrants from rural areas. In Tripoli, one Salafi adherent re­ lated, they are present in neighborhoods of Ghut al-Shaal, Draybi, Hadba, and Abu Slim, especially among the public-housing complexes constructed by Gaddafi to accommodate recent arrivals from the hinterland. Similarly, in Misrata, a municipal official with ties to the Salafis related that Madkhalis had secured their strongest influence in parts of the city that comprised mixed families from “outside” Misrata, to include public-housing areas near the Iron and Steel Company, Qasr al-Ahmed, and Al-Jazira. In neighborhoods and suburbs with more social homogeneity—such as Zawiyat al-Mahjub, where Sufi influence is linked to a more prominent or “noble” Misratan family—the Salafis found it harder to penetrate.53 Multiple Salafi and non-Salafi sources also point to the Madkhalis’ role in forming economic cooperatives in businesses and trades, which involved ( 116 ) Salafism in the Maghreb the pooling and sharing of capital based on mutual trust and group soli­ darity, which adherence to Madkhalism provided. These include the dis­ tribution of bottled water and baked bread, as well as the operation of car rental agencies.54 None of this can be corroborated by any reliable data. Today, Madkhali Salafis are present in the east, west, and south, in urban areas, mountains, and the desert. Some do indeed hail from poorer economic backgrounds, but some are also wealthy. Madkhali Salafi affiliation often divides Libyan families. Madkhalis are also inclusive of ethnolinguistic diversity. For ex­ ample, a key Madkhali figure in western Libya today is an ethnic Amazigh named Majdi Hafala.55 Madkhalism can also in some instances bridge communal divides that are usually marked by antagonism: for example, a Madkhali armed group in the southeast city of Kufra called the Subul al-Salam Brigade includes ethnic Arabs and Tabu. There is also no reliable data on the age of Madkhali figures, though sev­ eral of its leaders today, including Hafala, are in their late thirties, having come of age in Saudi or Yemeni schools. Still other Madkhalis reportedly arrive at Salafism without formal education, often through self-study or after the hajj or umrah.56 Given this socioeconomic and communal diver­ sity, it seems likely that the most common dominator among Madkhalis, at least in the last years of the Gaddafi regime, was support for and patronage by the regime. In this sense, the growth of Madkhalism at the twilight of the Gaddafi period represented something of a nationalization project, designed to create an indigenous class of Salafi adherents that could be controlled and deployed by the state—though Gaddafi himself never com­ pletely trusted their ties to Saudi Arabia, according to Libyan Madkhali sources.57 The protests and later armed revolution against Gaddafi in early 2011 put this policy to the test and confronted followers of Madkhalism with stark choices. Early in the uprising, Gaddafi sought to capitalize on the in­ vestment he’d made in patronizing these loyalist Salafis by deploying them against the nascent protests. His son Saadi—who by now was reported to have grown a full beard in the manner proscribed by Salafis—spearheaded this mobilization, directing Madkhali sheikhs to send text messages on regime-controlled mobile networks. The Salafi leader Majdi Hafala, regarded then as the most senior of the Madkhali sheikhs, issued a fatwa urging citizens in Salafi terms to “remain steadfast” ilzam( baytak—literally “hold fast to your house”) and to not “break ranks with the legitimate ruler” (kharuj ‘ala wali al-amr), calling the protests the “fitna (strife) of al-Qaeda,” led by mercenaries.58 Externally, Gaddafi tried to rally the support of Salafi clerics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In March 2011, for example, reportedly in a phone call with Saadi, he sought religious backing from the popular salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 117 )

Saudi clerics Ayidh al-Qarni and Salman al-Awda. Both rejected this plea; al-Qarni even issued a fatwa against Gaddafi, extolling those who died in the revolt against the dictator as “martyrs.”59 For his part, the cleric Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, whose followers Gaddafi had long shored up as a bulwark against dissent, reportedly urged followers in Libya to remain at home—to refrain from actively supporting both the regime and the rebels.60 He remained silent throughout the revolu­ tion until October 2011, when he issued an audio recording, calling Gaddafi a “criminal” but warning against further fitna—advising Libyan Salafis not to participate in ongoing rebel operations against loyalist holdouts in the towns of Sirte and Bani Walid.61 In the end, many Madkhalis did in fact remain passive during the revolution. Some actively sided with Gaddafi. Sometimes the dilemma about whether to support the revolution caused splits along generational lines. For example, the son of one now-deceased Madkhali preacher from Benghazi remembers debating his father, telling him that to sit on the sidelines meant ceding initiative to competing Islamists. He stated: “I told my father, ‘Look, we have to do something. . . . We can’t just let the Muslim Brotherhood take over.’ ”62 In western Libya and Tripoli, some Salafis, motivated more by familial and local ties than ideology, joined the rebellion belatedly in the summer of 2011 and par­ ticipated in a coordinated uprising in the capital on August 20.63 Those Libyan Madkhalis who did stay loyal earned opprobrium after Gaddafi’s death from revolutionaries, especially from more activist and oppositional Islamist currents, like the Muslim Brotherhood. “We called them the ‘white chickens,’ ” said one Brotherhood activist, referring to their white, calf- length robes.64 Yet in the wake of Libya’s subsequent decline into chaos, starting in 2013, the loyalist Madkhalis seized the moral high ground, arguing that they were prescient in their opposition to breaking ranks with Gaddafi. Those Salafis who had revolted came under the scrutiny of fellow Salafis. One of them admitted to the author in early 2019 that he keeps a photocopy of a state­ ment from a senior Saudi cleric, Saleh al-Luhaydan, urging rebellion in 2011, as a sort of insurance card to show that his sedition was authorized at the time by a respected Salafi juridical reference.65

SALAFISM AFTER GADDAFI: A REORDERING OF THE LANDSCAPE

The fall of Gaddafi and the sudden opening of Libyan politics proved to be a disorienting experience for Libya’s Salafis, confronting them with new choices about affiliation with the state and the use of violence. More than ( 118 ) Salafism in the Maghreb the other countries discussed in this volume, this sudden break had a pro­ found effect on the trajectory of Salafism. It produced what can best be described as a “recomposition” of the Salafi field that included the forma­ tion of Salafi political parties, the organization of Salafis into armed militias, and the expansion of Salafi influences into education and the media sphere. Among the first major challenges were Libya’s preparations for the 2012 parliamentary elections, which occasioned great debate among Libya’s Salafis. On the one hand, some activist Salafis, influenced by the formation of Salafi parties in Tunisia and Egypt, supported elections and sought to participate in them. One Libyan Salafist party, the al-Asala (Authenticity), reportedly took its inspiration from Kuwait’s Al-Umma party.66 On the other hand, the older generation of Salafi jihadists, especially the leadership within the LIFG, welcomed the 2012 elections and formed two parties, al-Watan, led by Abd al-Hakim Bilhaj, and al-Umma al-Wasat, led by Sami Saadi.67 Overall, however, the majority of Libyan Madkhalis rejected the 2012 elections and the legislature it produced—the General National Congress—as heretical, partly because it included more activist and rival Islamist currents such as the Brotherhood.68 Those Salafis who did partici­ pate in the elections struggled, like many political parties, to formulate a co­ herent platform and agenda. They faced stiff competition from the Muslim Brotherhood and from a cross-ideological coalition, the National Forces Alliance, often erroneously referred to in the media as “secular.” Their pop­ ularity was further hindered by their jihadist histories or their association with the former regime. Many Libyans wondered what the Salafis were ac­ tually bringing to a country that was already socially conservative, favoring instead those with technocratic backgrounds over the Salafis’ slogans of piety.69 The voting results only confirmed their worst fears: among the ex-LIFG cadre, only one Salafi candidate, the Umma al-Wasat political figure Abd al-Wahab al-Qaid, from the southern town Murzuq, won a seat on the organized party lists.70 Bilhaj’s much-trumpeted al-Watan party secured none. Roughly twenty Salafis, mostly from the al-Asala, obtained seats as independents.71 The next major turning point for Libya’s Salafis was the parliamentary debate in early 2013 over a controversial piece of legislation, the Political Isolation Law, which sought to exclude broad swaths of Libyans from fu­ ture government employment based a sweeping definition of complicity with the former regime. In successive drafts, the circle of guilt expanded, to include student union leaders, economists, former military officers, and even those who had broken with Gaddafi or tried to work for reform from within.72 It drew support from a loose coalition of Islamists as well as from revolutionary towns like the western port city of Misrata, which had salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 119 ) endured a vicious, months-long siege in 2011. Among the Salafis and other Islamists, there were splits. The former LIFG leader Abd al-Hakim Bilhaj opposed the law, telling the author that in enacting an exclusionary law, Libyans “needed to distinguish between those who worked for the Gaddafi system (nitham) and for the state (dawla).” 73 Yet another former LIFG Salafi luminary, the Umma al-Wasat politician Abd al-Wahhab al-Qaid, played a singular role in spearheading the law.74 In May 2013, the law finally passed, to an international outcry and the dismay of many Libyans. Though the majority of Libyans expressed sup­ port for some sort of lustration, this was too much for many. The law had far-reaching effects on Libya’s subsequent fracturing, sharpening the lines between Islamists and their opponents and between towns and groups that had benefited from Gaddafi’s patronage and those that sought a complete remaking of the old order. More importantly, because the law had passed with pressure from militias, it demonstrated the growing vulnerability of elected institutions to increasingly formidable armed groups, including those with an Islamist and Salafi orientation.75 Aside from their entry into politics, Salafis in Libya appeared as a major force in its armed groups or militias.76 The proliferation of these groups has been a major destabilizing factor in Libya since the revolution, though their origins and types are diverse. Many armed groups formed spontaneously during the 2011 uprising along town or even neighborhood lines and later grew in strength through foreign support. Still others developed after the revolution, when the transitional authorities starting diverting oil funds to the armed groups, resulting in a swelling of the militias’ ranks. The current struggle today in Libya is in large measure a scramble by political elites and militias, to include those with a Madkhali orientation, for control of these funds. Some of the armed groups could be said to fulfill the role of community policing in their respective towns. But many became predatory and heavily involved in abuses like smuggling and torture.77 Others grabbed oil fields, airports, ministries, and ports to use as strategic leverage with the weak transitional government. And as Libya’s political divisions widened, the militias aligned themselves with political factions and their foreign patrons. Underpinning all this is the weakness of the regular army and police, which had been gutted by years of institutional neglect by Gaddafi.78 Among Islamist and Salafi armed groups, several types existed. A more moderate camp consisted of groups formed during the revolution with foreign aid and support (usually from Qatar), led by former LIFG figures like Bilhaj. As was discussed previously, most supported the new state and elections. The second constellation of jihadists comprised younger men in their twenties and early thirties and ex-prisoners from Abu Slim, who ( 120 ) Salafism in the Maghreb rejected the new state and the principle of elections as shirk (polytheism) and bida’ (innovation). Before associating with the state, they argued, there needed to be Islamic law in place. “Under Gaddafi, the army protected the taghut (tyrant),” one of their clerical sympathizers stated, “and to ensure that the army will not be used against the people or Muslims, we need an Islamic constitution in place.”79 At the center of this trend was the Salafi jihadist militia Ansar al-Sharia, formed in Benghazi in mid-2011 by Muhammad al-Zahawi, a former ap­ pliance store owner and ex–Abu Slim prison inmate.80 Drawing inspiration from the rise of like-minded groups in neighboring Tunisia, Ansar al-Sharia followed the ideological model put forward by the noted al-Qaeda luminary Muhammad al-Maqdisi, which privileged armed struggle while empha­ sizing the peaceful consolidation of power through proselytization, educa­ tion, and organization.81 In Benghazi, Ansar al-Sharia put these teachings into practice through a program of charity and social services like clinics, youth camps, and antidrug campaigns.82 Yet aside from this face of public works, the group had a darker side. Starting in mid-2012, Ansar al-Sharia set up training camps to the south of Benghazi for young Libyans and foreigners, especially Tunisians, wishing to fight abroad. It provided logistics for al-Qaeda’s affiliates in the Sahara, the Sinai, and the Arabian Peninsula.83 By late 2012, Ansar al-Sharia was helping Libyan jihadists travel to fight in Syria; many would later return to form the Libyan branch of the Islamic State, along with an influx of foreigners, espe­ cially Tunisians, and Libyan defections from Ansar al-Sharia.84 Though Libya’s jihadists like Ansar al-Sharia and the Islamic State have historically seized the attention of outside media, the most powerful cat­ egory of Islamist armed groups are those affiliated with Madkhali Salafis. In contrast to the Salafi-jihadist rejectionists, they supported the political authorities of the new state on the basis of doctrinal loyalty to the wali al-amr, though they sought greater space to pursue da’wa and, unlike Bilhaj and his cohort, opposed elections. Many Madkhali armed groups emerged in late 2011 and early 2012 under the nominal authority of the Ministry of Interior, acting to supplement the weak police in policing the capital, tack­ ling illegal drugs but also prostitution and alcohol. A strong tone of Islamic morality underpinned these policing tasks, justified on the basis of the Islamic precept of “commanding right and forbidding wrong.”85 This nar­ rative of “combating crime” intensified among Madkhali armed groups as Libya’s fragmentation worsened. Among the most formidable of these Salafi militias-turned-police to de­ velop in the capital is the Special Deterrence Force, led by a former met­ alworker and Salafi named Abdelraouf Kara.86 Based at Tripoli’s Matiga Airport, the militia is drawn primarily from youth from the surrounding salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 121 ) neighborhood of Suq al-Jumaa, a longtime bastion of Islamist piety and rev­ olutionary opposition to Gaddafi. It is this local link that primarily defines the character of the Special Deterrence Force rather than its purely Salafi outlook—roughly 60% of its members are believed to be practicing Salafis from the Madkhali current, according to one interlocutor close to the group.87 Moreover, in recent years, it has become increasingly fractured and can be said to be less a coherent ideological force than an umbrella for sev­ eral highly personalized subunits with various economic interests.88 The origins of the Deterrence Force lie in the latter stages of the revolu­ tion, when the youth of Suq al-Jumaa formed clandestine cells that rose up on August 20 and later established themselves as militias at Matiga Airport, with support from Islamists backed by Qatar. Kara’s militia initially focused on hunting down Gaddafi loyalists but then switched to combat the influx of illicit drugs.89 He later broke with his erstwhile Islamist allies and, with funds from the Ministry of Interior, quickly established himself as a major power broker in the capital. Though Tripoli residents supported the antivice activities of Kara’s force and other Salafi militias, many were also alarmed by a wave of Salafi attacks that occurred from late 2011 to mid-2013 against Libya’s Sufi heritage—to include shrines, mosques, libraries, and graves. Doctrinally, the Madkhalis justified these attacks as preventing polytheism (Salafis regard the Sufis’ veneration of saints and other practices as a form of idolatry and interces­ sion, threatening the principle of tawhid, or monotheism).90 Much of the destruction was overseen by Ministry of Interior security forces, demon­ strating a level of Salafi sympathy inside the ranks of the police and militia- turned-police, like the Deterrence Force. Abdelraouf Kara tried to distance himself from the attacks, stating in an interview that while his men had par­ ticipated, he himself had not ordered the assault.91 As Libya’s political divisions widened and as successive schemes for dis­ arming and demobilizing the armed groups failed, the Madkhali militias gained in power. They received a major boost with the outbreak of civil war in 2014.

MADKHALIS IN LIBYA’S CIVIL WAR, 2014 TO THE PRESENT

The causes of Libya’s post-2011 civil war are complex and varied, resulting from unresolved disputes over the Political Isolation Law, the politicization of the militias, regional meddling, debates about the inclusion of Islamists in political power, and factional conflicts over the control of the security sector and, especially, the distribution of oil wealth. The most proximate ( 122 ) Salafism in the Maghreb cause was a rapid decline in security in Benghazi and eastern Libya in late 2013 and 2014, attributed partially to an escalation in jihadist violence, which anti-Islamists contend was abetted and tolerated by Brotherhood and Salafist figures in the Tripoli parliament. The violence picked up in the summer of 2012, when jihadists attacked a series of Western diplomatic targets, culminating in the September 11–12 attack on the US diplomatic outpost in Benghazi that killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans.92 By 2013, the killings had shifted to Libyans: former security officers and judges, as well as ­out spoken activists and journalists.93 While some of this was ideological, much of it must be seen in the context of criminality and tribal vendettas and, especially, revenge by Islamists (particularly ex–Abu Slim inmates) for the regime’s repression in the 1990s.94 By 2013, the jihadists’ growing power was abetted by worsening political polarization in Libya. In neighboring Egypt, the overthrow of the elected Muslim Brotherhood president Muhammad al-Mursi by General Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi and the massacre of Brotherhood members and supporters in the summer of 2013 contributed to the hardening and radicalization of Libyan Islamists in Libya. Across the region, the declining fortunes of Brotherhood networks were felt in Libya: prostate, moderate figures within the Islamist militias ranks became steadily marginalized, while radicals ascended, especially in Benghazi. The capture by US forces of the wanted al-Qaeda suspect Abu Anas al-Libi in late 2013 added further grist for the radical voices who accused the weak Libyan prime minister of selling out Libyan sovereignty. In Benghazi, pragmatic figures from prostate militias like Rafallah al-Sahati Companies and the February 17 Brigade fled the city, while hardliners within the Ansar al-Sharia militia and another armed group called the Libya Shield gained the upper hand. The tenuous cooper­ ation between Islamist brigades and uniformed security forces unraveled as assassinations and vigilantism increased. By early 2014, many Benghazi residents, along with anti-Islamist currents and eastern tribes, secretly hoped that a Sisi-like figure would arrive to re­ store order to the city and, more importantly, to remove Islamists, espe­ cially the Brotherhood, from Libyan politics.95 In May 2014, such a figure arrived in the form of Khalifa Haftar, septuagenarian general and onetime ally of Gaddafi who had defected in the 1980s during the Chad war and became a CIA asset before living in exile in northern Virginia for nearly twenty years.96 In 2011, he returned to Libya in an unsuccessful bid to seize the reigns of the armed revolution. Retiring from the limelight for several years, he re-emerged in the midst of Libya’s growing polarization, skillfully on the grievances of eastern tribes and disaffected military units. With this support, he launched a military operation in Benghazi, ostensibly designed salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 123 ) to restore security and eliminate the Islamist militias.97 But a broader and less explicit goal was to dismantle the General National Congress in Tripoli, which he asserted had overstayed its mandate and whose Islamist legislators were funding extremist armed groups in the east. Dubbed “Operation Dignity,” Haftar’s campaign set in motion a chain of events that would cascade across the country into civil war. In July of that year, partly out of the fear that Haftar was preparing to assault the capital, revolutionary factions and Islamists in and around Tripoli launched an at­ tack on the capital’s international airport, which evolved into the so-called Libya Dawn operation.98 By early 2015, Libya had effectively split in two. The eastern region allied with General Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) set up parallel political and economic institutions, while the western revolutionary and Islamists affiliated with Libya Dawn estab­ lished their own governing authority, the National Salvation Government. Adding to the turmoil, regional powers sent arms, money, and advisors to the warring factions: Qatar and Turkey backed the Dawn faction, while the UAE and Egypt backed General Haftar’s LNA. The UAE proved especially aggressive, sending airstrikes and special operations raids.99 The role of Islamists and Salafis in this conflict is important and ­com plex. Contrary to popular opinion, the battle lines were not strictly be­ tween Islamists (Libya Dawn in the west) and anti-Islamists (Haftar and his Dignity coalition). Instead, a myriad of identities, affiliations, and interests coalesced into two very loose camps, drawing from tribes, regional interests, and towns. Underpinning all this was a division over how much of the old order to preserve and how much remake and also how to distribute oil wealth—and Islamists were naturally part of this debate. In the east, the civil war, contrary to Haftar’s aims, actually strengthened the hardline jihadists: in launching his campaign, Haftar made no distinction—rhetori­ cally and in practice—between rejectionist militias like Ansar al-Sharia and other Islamists who, while certainly not liberal, supported the Libyan state and could have been reconciled to it. The result of this lumping together was predictable: radical and moderate Islamists joined forces in a military coalition called the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) in the summer of 2014.100 Another significant effect of the civil war in eastern Libya was the mo­ bilization of Madkhali Salafists as armed political actors, moving well be­ yond their already established roles in the policing sector and social sphere. At first glance, this politicization would seem to be a paradox among the so-called quietist Salafis—at least in theory, the Madkhalis were supposed to eschew political activism. Yet across the country, the Libyan Madkhalis joined in factional battles, demonstrating the inadequacy of terms like “quietism” when describing this Salafi current in the Libyan milieu. Many ( 124 ) Salafism in the Maghreb justified the taking of arms by citing statements from their clerical referents in Saudi Arabia and doctrinal imperatives of “fighting disbelief” or “com­ manding right and forbidding wrong.”101 But a degree of nuance is needed here. In many cases, Saudi clerical pronouncements were highly ambiguous, leaving it up to Libyan adherents to interpret them. This is especially true for Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, who in some instances expressively forbade participation in Libya’s fighting among certain segments of Libya’s Salafi communities—namely those that were not directly threatened. For example, at the start of Operation Dignity, Salafis in western Libyan dispatched a former Libyan student of al-Madkhali’s to meet with the Saudi cleric and solicit his advice about Haftar. His response, according to the Libyan source, was that Libyan Salafis should only bear arms to defend themselves and their particular territory, rather than joining in a distant conflict in their country that did not directly concern them.102 In early 2015, al-Madkhali followed this up with a public fatwa forbidding participation in the broader Dawn-Dignity conflict.103 In 2016, however, Madkhali shifted his stance. That July, he pub­ licly exhorted his Libyan followers to confront the Benghazi Defense Brigades, an offshoot of the Islamist BRSC coalition that had been battling Haftar. Importantly, his disparaging of the Defense Brigades as a Muslim Brotherhood group backed by Qatar shows how the broader Emirati and Saudi rivalry with Qatar reverberated in Libya.104 But this exogenous factor should not be overstated at the expense of the agency of local Salafis. Specifically, his endorsement of fighting came in the context of yet ­an other delegation to Saudi Arabia of Libyan Madkhali Salafists, this time from Benghazi, to seek a statement from the cleric supporting the Dignity operation.105 More consequential than Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali’s pronouncements is the fact that Madkhalis across Libya are intimately tied to Libya’s cities, towns, and regions. Many of these communities joined the national Dawn- Dignity conflict for highly parochial reasons, often to gain leverage over communal and local rivals in the broader scramble for resources and power. In the east, these calculations were especially evident in the decision of local Salafis to join the fighting. To be sure, some Madkhalis conspired with Haftar before his May 2014 attack. But for many, the Dignity campaign presented them with a doctrinal dilemma about whether to mobilize mili­ tarily that some Salafi sources compared to the 2011 revolution.106 A combination of social and political factors prompted them to take up arms. Since the revolution, many of them had chafed at the influence in eastern Libya of jihadist militias. One Madkhali cleric recalls performing da’wa in secret, in the Benghazi neighborhood of al-Laythi—a historic base for jihadist recruitment and therefore antipathy to the Madkhalis.107 Others salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 125 ) cited the string of assassinations they had suffered at the hands of the Islamist and jihadists. A key incident that spurred many to fight for Haftar was the late 2013 killing of Colonel Kamal Bazaza, a Madkhali Salafist head of the Islamic Affairs department in the Benghazi Security Directorate, whose sermons enjoyed wide popularity.108 As the war in Benghazi evolved, the Madkhalis became an increasingly prominent presence on the battle­ field, earning a reputation as fierce fighters. Some joined an almost exclu­ sively Madkhali armed group under LNA command, the Tawhid Battalion (later renamed the 210 Infantry Battalion), while others joined existing LNA units like the special forces. Still others fought in pro-Dignity neigh­ borhood militias, which came to be called the “support forces.”109 By the late summer and early fall of 2017, after nearly three years of grinding urban warfare that reduced Benghazi’s storied old city to ruins, Haftar’s forces declared victory. The war had caused massive casualties and displaced thousands. Many of his Islamist opponents had died, but others fled to Misrata to the west and to desert bases southwest of Benghazi, where they regrouped. Meanwhile, in Benghazi and in the east, the military vic­ tory shifted the role of the armed Madkhali groups. The LNA undertook the disbanding and dispersal of some brigades to “numbered” LNA units. In many cases, though, this was simply a rebranding: Madkhali militias continue to exist as cohesive bodies, with some enjoying patronage and support from Haftar’s sons, most notably Khaled, who integrated them into a well-equipped LNA unit he commanded, called the 106th Infantry Battalion.110 Some Madkhali units participated in Haftar’s subsequent mil­ itary campaigns against local Islamists, jihadists, and other forces in the eastern city of Dirna and across the oil crescent and the southern Fezzan region.111 And, as will be discussed at length below, still other Madkhali militias assumed policing functions across the east and exerted influence on social norms and Islamic institutions, such as the ministry of awqaf (Islamic endowments). Meanwhile, in late 2015, a tortuous, months-long UN-brokered peace process had produced a new Libyan transitional government that, at least in theory, was supposed to bridge the Dawn-Dignity divide, unify Libya’s par­ allel political institutions, and end the civil war. But the agreement that was signed in the resort town of Skhirat, Morocco, in December 2015, was deeply flawed—specifically because it never included the Libyan armed groups with the preponderance of power on the ground. It also never received a full buy-in from the east, partly because Haftar’s role in the new power structure remained unaddressed. Most importantly, perhaps, Haftar’s Arab backers— the Emirates and Egypt—along with France and Russia, continued their clandestine military and financial support to the general and his parallel administration in the east. The result of all of this was that the new “unity” ( 126 ) Salafism in the Maghreb government produced by the Skirat agreement, the Government of National Accord (GNA), was stillborn from the beginning. It arrived in Tripoli in early 2016 and immediately struggled to assert its authority beyond a few neighborhoods. Its governing structure was rife with political divisions and personality conflicts, especially with the Central Bank leadership over budget authority. It failed to deliver services across western and southern Libya. But for the Madkhalis, the GNA proved to be a boon. As was noted ear­ lier, the Madkhalis had suffered a blow with the rise of the Islamist-leaning National Salvation Government in late 2014, with several key Madkhali clerical figures fleeing the capital. The arrival of the GNA reversed this trend and allowed these figures to return. This was partly due to the fact that the GNA relied on Madkhali-leaning militias to protect itself and pro­ ject its authority—a dependency that was abetted by the GNA’s interna­ tional supporters.112 In the ensuing years, these militias, along with other non-Madkhali groups, coalesced into a group of four or five “supermilitias” who amassed enormous wealth and privileges—effectively capturing the state by colonizing ministries and preying on government coffers. The aforementioned Special Deterrence Force led by Abdelraouf Kara has been at the center of this militia behemoth. The GNA has relied on it for security, especially in guarding the Central Bank and in transporting foreign currency from Matiga Airport to the bank. For their part, Western backers of the GNA have also adopted a tolerant and even favorable view of the Deterrence Force, especially as the militia shifted to counterterrorism— another narrative that has been successfully trumpeted through its media outlets.113 Much of the force’s counterterrorism work has been focused on unraveling clandestine Islamic State cells in the capital and in the western region—particularly after an early 2016 attack on the Corinthia Hotel, a favorite of Western diplomats and businesspeople, and a US airstrike on an ISIS training camp in the western town of Sabratha.114 In mid-2017, the Deterrence Force arrested the older brother of Salman Abedi, a twenty- two-year-old Briton of Libyan descent who blew himself up in the name of the Islamic State in Manchester in May 2017, killing twenty-two people at a concert.115 The militia also runs a massive prison on his airport com­ pound—largely beyond any judicial oversight, where Madkhali Special Deterrence Force personnel conduct a “rehabilitation” program that is part jobs training and part theological re-education, designed both to prepare inmates for re-entry into society and to convince them of the illegitimacy of violent acts against a lawful ruler, using an array of Salafi texts from Saudi clerics like al-Albani and al-Fawzan.116 One such detainee, a Libyan Islamic State member and veteran of the Syrian jihad, described the program as emphasizing the “stories” (or context) behind the Hadiths that the Islamic State appropriated to justify its violence.117 salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 127 )

All of this support—from the GNA and Western backers—has taken place against the backdrop of the more doctrinaire Salafi aspects of the Deterrence Force’s policing, often undertaken by hardline subfactions and currents rather than ordered by Kara himself. As discussed at length below, Deterrence Force personnel have been involved in the harassment or de­ tention of activists and artists whom they deem un-Islamic.118 Moreover, recent UN reports have implicated Deterrence Force personnel in migrant trafficking, belying Kara’s Salafist claim of noncorruptibility.119 Elswhere in Libya, outside Tripoli, the civil war and foreign counterter­ rorism agendas have also increased Madkhali power. This dynamic is espe­ cially evident in the central coastal city of Sirte, where, in 2014, the Islamic State established its strongest base in Libya. In the spring of 2016, a coali­ tion of Libyan militias, mostly from Misrata, launched an attack on Sirte to dislodge the terrorist group. Backed by American air power and Western special forces, the campaign, dubbed Bunyan al-Marsus, lasted nearly seven months and resulted in the loss of over seven hundred anti–Islamic State Libyan fighters. One of the militias that fought alongside the Misratan coali­ tion was a Madkhali Salafist armed group called the 604th Infantry Battalion, which had been formed initially from Sirte-based Firjani tribesmen who had fled the city in summer 2015 after the Islamic State had brutally crushed an uprising by the Firjan tribe in Sirte’s Neighborhood Three (sparked by the killing of a popular Madkhali Salafist preacher from the tribe). Receiving arms and armored vehicles from like-minded Madkhali Salafist militias in Tripoli such as Abdelraouf Kara’s Special Deterrence Force as well as an­ other Tripoli-based militia, the Tripoli Revolutionaries Battalion, the 604th trained throughout late 2015 and early 2016, waiting for its chance for re­ venge.120 Fighting alongside Bunyan al-Marsus meant that the 604th’s rela­ tions with militias from Misrata were sometimes strained: the Misratans, after all, had attacked and wreaked havoc in Sirte during and after the 2011 revolution. Moreover, the 604th drew support from fighters in Bani Walid, Zintan, and Sabha—towns that also had troubled relations with Misrata.121 The 604th’s Salafi character also sat uneasily with some Misrata militias— many of whom were pious and conservative but not predisposed toward Islamism, whether from the Brotherhood or from Salafism.122 After the fall of the Islamic State, tensions with the Misratans increased as the 604th took over policing functions in liberated Sirte.123 Within sev­ eral months, it quickly emerged as the strongest security actor in the city, enforcing Salafi social mores, setting up its own Salafi schools, taking over media outlets, and replacing mosque imams with Salafis.124 More impor­ tant, though, are Misrata’s suspicions about the 604th’s collusion with Haftar given that the majority of the members in its ranks hail from Haftar’s tribe, the Firjan. Foreign and Libyan media outlets routinely report that the ( 128 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

604th battalion would act as an advance guard, or a sort of Trojan Horse, for Haftar’s forces in the event the LNA attacks Sirte.125 Yet in an inter­ view, a prominent commander in the 604th denied this, stating that he told Haftar’s Benghazi-based Salafi allies, the 210 Infantry Battalion, not to aid any attack by Haftar against the 604th’s (uneasy) allies in Sirte—such an attack on Sirte by the Madkhalis would be an undesirable “political war” (harb siyasiya), whereas assisting Haftar’s war against the BRSC and ISIS was legitimate—a war on the khawarij, or deviants, from Islam (i.e., the Brotherhood).126 While such statements cannot be corroborated, they highlight how affinities to town and tribe can temper Madkhali influence across Libya. Southern Libya (Fezzan) has also seen an expansion of Makdhali armed power and social clout, again, largely driven by the civil war and factional conflict. In the provincial southern capital of Sabha, for example, a major smuggling nexus and source of contention between warring communal groups, Salafist-leading militias worked closely with the Sabha Security Directorate and developed direct links with Salafi armed actors in western Libya, such as Kara’s Deterrence Force at Tripoli’s Matiga Airport. With the arrival of the anti-Haftar Misratan-led militias to Sabha in 2015, ostensibly to provide security, the Salafists’ power grew, especially in prisons, where they conducted Qur’an-based rehabilitation for inmates accused of drunk­ enness and other social infractions.127 East of Sabha, in the oasis town of Kufra, a Salafist brigade named the Subul al-Salam, dominated by Arabs from the Zway tribe but also ethnic Tabu, has seized control of contraband and migrant smuggling networks and has funneled them north to Salafi militias in coastal towns west of Tripoli, according to the United Nations.128 It was also allegedly involved in the destruction of the grave of a prominent Sufi sheikh.129 In early 2019, Madkhali Salafis in Libya’s south received another boost as Haftar’s LNA moved into the region, ostensibly to provide security and safeguard oil facilities. Accomplished largely through payments or promises of cash and the provision of materiel to southern communi­ ties and tribes, the sweep included a number of Madkhali Salafi militias, from both the east and the south. In tandem, the LNA had begun secret negotiations with communities in and around Tripoli, to include Madkhali Salafis.130 Madkhali factions along the western seaboard, especially in the towns of Sabratha and Surman, were said to be receiving funds and possibly weapons from Haftar’s camp.131 Even in Misrata, a town normally known for its opposition to Haftar, a growing Madkhali presence reportedly played a role in the warming of the city’s ties to Haftar.132 Haftar’s goal in this out­ reach this was to effect a swift and possibly bloodless entry into the capital, topple the GNA, and seize power for himself. salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 129 )

On April 4, 2019, Haftar’s forces launched a brazen attack on Tripoli, subverting a painstaking UN-brokered roadmap to replace the GNA via a national conference and elections. Haftar had planned on using the threat of overwhelming force, along with the secret alliances he’d built in and around Tripoli, to win over holdouts and fence sitters, to his side. To his surprise, however, disparate militias, some of whom had long opposed the GNA, unified against him—though the cooperation among them is marked by suspicion. For their part, Madkhali armed groups adopted an ambiguous approach. Those that had received prior support from Haftar, such as the Madkhali-leaning Wadi (Valley) Brigade in Sabratha, sided with the LNA.133 But social and political pressures within some towns, along with broader Libyan public opinion, constrained their behavior and lim­ ited their combat contribution to Haftar’s forces. In the case of Sabratha, Madkhali Salafi emissaries from outside the town arrived before April 4 and tried to dissuade Sabrathan Madkhalis from taking action that would endanger the community. “I told the Salafis, ‘you are surrounded by GNA supporters, you can’t survive a siege,” said one of these emissaries in an in­ terview. “If you want to participate with Haftar go to the mountains but don’t open a front in the city,” he continued.134 Echoing this, a prominent pro-GNA militia commander from Zawiya, a neighboring town east of Sabratha, met with the pro-LNA Madkhali Salafi commander of Sabratha’s Wadi Brigade, Musa al-Najem, just prior to Haftar’s attack. The two sides agreed not to open a front between the two towns in the event of war. As of the summer of 2019, this pact has so far been honored, even though fighters and armed groups from both towns, including Madkhalis, have participated in combat on other fronts.135 In Tripoli, the most significant Madkhali-leaning force, the Deterrence Force, adopted a similarly ambiguous stance. The question of proper loyalty reportedly divided the Madkhalis within the force, some regarding Haftar as the wali al-amr al-mataghalib (the wali al-amr with the preponderance of power), and others citing the GNA’s (nominal) international support as ev­ idence that it is the rightful wali al-amr. Non-Madkhali fighters under the force’s structure136 fought against Haftar’s attack, but the main Salafi subunits held back.137 In early June however, this ambivalence toward the conflict shifted slightly, when Mahmud Hamza, the commander of the Deterrence Force’s “2020” unit—a SWAT-type formation comprising many Makdhali adherents—sent some of his fighters to the front. The move was rooted partly in doctrine and clerical validation from Saudi Arabia, but more im­ portantly in pressure from other Tripoli militias and also the realization that Haftar was not going to enter Tripoli anytime soon.138 In Misrata, Madkhalis generally supported the city’s popular mobiliza­ tion against Haftar, even if they did not participate directly in combat in ( 130 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

Tripoli.139 In other towns, such as Zawiya and Zintan, splits over whether or not to support Haftar reverberated among Madkhalis as well. Prominent figures like Majdi Hafala and Tariq Durman have largely stayed silent.140 In Sirte, the 604th Battalion continues to lay low, though there are continuing suspicions among its erstwhile Misratan allies that it is secretly siding with Haftar. Contrary to some claims, a meeting between Haftar and Saudi Arabia’s King Salman in Riyadh before the April 4 attack did not guarantee him ac­ tive Madkhali military support in western Libya for the LNA’s advance. As of this writing Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali has not issued a statement, though some Libyan Salafis have reposted earlier pronouncements in favor of the LNA.141 In contrast, Egyptian Madkhali clerics have been especially vocif­ erous, applauding Haftar’s attack as a war against the khawarij (deviants) and urging Libyan Salafis to support him. They have also attacked Libyan Salafis for their prevarication or opposition to Haftar.142 But overall, for­ eign and especially Saudi clerical influences appear to have had a minimal effect on Libyan Madkhali Salafi behavior during this latest war. Instead, Libyan Madkhali armed groups have been influenced by their social ties with neighborhoods and towns, as well as the imperative to defend their economic interests and preserve political leverage among whoever emerges as the dominant authority at the end of the conflict.143 Taken in sum, these dynamics demonstrate, once again, how a seemingly immutable and “imported” ideology is shaped by local context.144

MADKHALISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY

Across the country, the Madkhalis’ involvement in the political civil war are accompanied by a growing presence in the media, in education, and in the religious sphere. As noted previously, this influence intensified in the wake of the 2011 revolution and has increased in recent years. Today, Madkhalis sponsor hundreds of young Libyans for umrah and hajj pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia, where they are sensitized and socialized to Madkhali doc­ trine. Madkhali radio stations and religious schools have proliferated, and, as noted, Madkhalis are trying to displace traditional Sufi and Maliki institutions.145 Madkhalis are using armed force or the threat of it to en­ force Salafi social conservativism, opposing musical venues, art festivals, standards of women’s dress they deem un-Islamic, and the public mixing of genders. Overlying this struggle for Libyan society and religious institutions is a long-standing intra-Islamist factional contest—at once doctrinal, social, and salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 131 ) political—with supporters of the grand mufti of Libya, Sadeq al-Ghariani, a prominent Muslim cleric and scholar who supported the 2011 revolution and was appointed by the transitional authorities as the head of the Tripoli Dar al-Ifta. Hailing from the Tripoli suburb of Tajura, al-Ghariani’s Islamist leanings are hard to decipher. They are perhaps best described as a mix of activist Salafism (he backed the Asala party during the 2012 elections) and Maliki thought, tinged with jihadism and sympathy for Brotherhood- linked factions, former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council.146 According to one close observer, he previously “resembled a Muslim Brother, wearing a suit and sporting a close-cropped beard and a British education.” Today, however, “he is Salafi inaqida (creed) but Maliki in his manhaj (practice).”147 What is clear is that he and his constellation of supporters are implacable foes of the Madkhalis. The Madkhalis’ struggle with Ghariani and his Islamist allies or sympathizers began shortly after the revolution, when Madkhalis increased their presence “on the street”—through the establishment of private schools, the distribution of books, and their control of manabar (pulpits) in neighborhood mosques—sometimes through force.148 But al-Ghariani’s adherents and sympathizers, whom the Madkhalis deride as mukhalaf (roughly, “contradictory”) or “Ma’ribis” (referring to the aforementioned schism with the Yemen-based cleric), maintained control of the endow­ ment offices in Tripoli.149 The struggle has been waged in the media, with activist Islamist television outlets (those linked with former LIFG figures, Ghariani, or the Brotherhood) deploying the term “Madkhali” starting in late 2013 to denigrate the loyalist and quietist-leaning Salafis as foreign agents, receiving orders from Saudi Arabia.150 As noted earlier, with the capture of Tripoli in 2014 by Dawn forces aligned with Ghariani, this prop­ aganda war escalated. On the ground, the Madkhalis suffered a sharp blow, and many of their figures fled to Zintan and other towns opposed to Dawn. But from late 2016 to early 2017, this shifted. Tripoli armed groups affiliated with the GNA, some of them with Madkhali members, undertook a series of armed actions against remnants of the National Salvation Government and Ghariani’s Islamist militia allies in Tripoli’s southern districts, who in­ cluded the BRSC and the BDB, as well as ex-LIFG figures.151 Madkhalis in Misrata undertook a similar effort. Within the space of a year, the balance of power in this intra-Islamist struggle tilted sharply in favor of the Madkhalis, with many of their key leaders returning to positions of prominence in the capital. The more revolutionary Islamists and Ghariani supporters were killed, imprisoned, or fled the country.152 Throughout this factional contest, the aforementioned Special Deterrence Force has been the vanguard of the Madkhalis’ ascendance in ( 132 ) Salafism in the Maghreb and around Tripoli. In battling Ghariani and his Islamist allies, Kara has deployed the counterterrorism card: Ghariani has supported the BRSC, the Islamist militia coalition that fought Haftar in Benghazi—and that sometimes shared the front lines with the Islamic State. The effects of this rivalry—along with others—on stability in the capital have been profound, resulting in gun battles, nighttime raids, and attempted jailbreaks. One of the most polarizing and far-reaching incidents occurred in November 2016, when Kara’s forces—specifically a hardline Salafi subunit known as the Crime Fighting Apparatus—reportedly kidnapped and killed Nader al-Umrani, the head of the Ghariani-led Dar al-Ifta’s Islamic Research and Studies Council.153 Subsequent investigations suggested the attacker was driven by Umrani’s frequent anti-Madkhali statements, though supporters of Umrani suggested it was undertaken at the direction of an Egyptian Salafist cleric, Haftar’s forces, or the United Arab Emirates.154 Whatever the motive, the killing was a major escalation among Islamist actors in the capital. Among armed groups affiliated with or sympathetic to the BRSC, the murder fueled a desire for revenge, resulting in violent assaults against Kara’s prison. The Brotherhood, too, believed the lines of battle had been drawn. “We are at war,” said one noted Brotherhood member and former militia commander.155 The killing of Umrani also fueled the per­ ception, already widespread, that elements within Kara’s force was sympa­ thetic with Haftar. Yet Kara’s response, in an early 2016 interview, was that he remained publicly loyal to the Tripoli government, even if his sympathies were divided. “I said, ‘God is Great!’ when Haftar attacked Ansar -al Sharia,” he stated. “But I can’t support him here in the capital because that would cause fitna.” 156 He added that, according to Salafi doctrine, “one is obligated to follow the strongest political authority in whatever territory one sits.” In response to this violence and Madkhali assertiveness, the Tripoli Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs issued a statement banning eleven Madkhali preachers from preaching in the capital’s mosques.157 Yet by 2018, the tide had turned in the favor of the Madkhalis in western Libya. In December of that year, the GNA prime minister appointed a Madkhali cleric named Mohammed Ahmed al-Abbani, who had previously served as the director of the awqaf office for the capital, as the director and chairman of the GNA-affiliated (and theoretically nationwide) Awqaf and Islamic Affairs Authority. This promotion, and the firing of the previous director— Abbas al-Qadi, who had served in the position since 2017—without any stated reason, was widely suspected to have arisen from Madkhali pressure, possibly from within the Deterrence Force.158 More broadly, the Madkhalis were angered over Qadi’s allowing of the public commemoration of the mawlid—the holiday celebrating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, which doctrinaire Salafis regard as heretical.159 salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 133 )

Another source of long-term concern for Libyans is that the country’s rival authorities in both the east and the west have tacitly backed the Madkhalis as their allies, often for self-serving political ends. In the east, this dynamic is especially evident through Haftar’s support of Madkhalis in his struggle against the UN-backed government in Tripoli. Yet many eastern residents privately wonder if the Madkhali Salafis have in fact become too powerful for Haftar to manage, calling into question the Madkhalis’ doc­ trine of obedience to the wali al-amr. As noted in September 2015 by a pro-Haftar tribal notable from the eastern tribe of the Ubaydat in Tobruk, “We are with them [the Madkhalis] for now against the Brotherhood, but they are extremist. They keep secrets.”160 Moreover, some Madkhalis are not necessarily loyal to Haftar in the east but to the speaker of the House of Representatives or to the House of Representatives itself, demonstrating the political malleability of the concept of the wali al-amr.161 Liberals in Benghazi have been concerned about the growth of Madkhalism as a byproduct of Haftar’s campaign: they acknowledge— sometimes bitterly—that they had backed Haftar to rid Benghazi of Islamists, not realizing that he would unleash Islamists of his own.162 Among the incidents they point to as evidence of Madkhalism’s power is a decree in February 2017 by Haftar’s military governor to ban Libyan women from traveling outside Libya without a mahram, or male chaperon—a de­ cision that was praised by the eastern, Madkhali-controlled Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs.163 A month later, on March 28, 2017, Madkhali militiamen affiliated with the 210 Infantry Battalion arrested three men planning an Earth Day celebration, on the basis that it was un-Islamic and linked to Freemasonry.164 Other signs of Madkhali power include threats against outspoken liberal journalists, the destruction of Sufi sites, the arrests of musical singers, the confiscation of books deemed un-Islamic, and enforcement of dress codes among women. Madkhalis are also prominent in eastern prisons, where they focus on the theological reindoctrination of prisoners, both from the BRSC and from the Islamic State. According to one Salafi cleric involved in these efforts, more than three to four hundred clerics have been commissioned by the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs to engage with prisoners, usually for about four hours a week. The clerics use the texts of al-Madkhali and al-Albani to convince the prisoners of the error of their ways and prepare a report to the head of the prison.165 External influences have helped the rise of Madkhalism in eastern Libya.166 Several Saudi clerics have visited Haftar-controlled areas; the most prominent is a Saudi Madkhali preacher of Palestinian-Jordanian or­ igin named Usama Utaybi, who visited in early 2017 at the invitation of Haftar’s LNA and the eastern-based Ministry of Endowments and Islamic ( 134 ) Salafism in the Maghreb

Affairs.167 In sermons across the east, Utaybi praised Haftar and denigrated the Brotherhood.168 Yet his welcome across the east and elsewhere was not universal. His visit to the eastern city of Tobruk was canceled due to local opposition. Elsewhere, when Utaybi tried to tour the western Nafusa mountains, the Zintani Madkhali Salafi cleric Tariq Durman opposed his visit.169 Taken in sum, the Tobruk and Zintan incidents against al-Utaybi dem­ onstrate an important aspect of Madkhali influence in Libya: it is not omnipresent and unchecked and is often buffered by region and tribe, despite the Salafis’ contention that they completely transcend these local affiliations. To be sure, there is coordination and communication between Salafi groups across the country. But just like other political and social enti­ ties, the Madkhali Salafists have found it difficult to extend their territorial reach across Libya’s fragmented landscape. Relatedly, there is sometimes societal pushback against the Salafis’ enforcement of draconian social norms—in the cases of the Earth Day arrest and the travel ban on women, a public outcry on social media contributed to a reversal or rescinding of the edicts. Similarly, there has been a strong public backlash against the Madkhalis’ opposition to various public expressions of Sufism. In tandem with this public reaction, there have been modest official steps to curtail the Madkhalis’ influence, reflecting the underlying unease felt by Haftar and his supporters about their power. For example, in April 2019, the prime min­ ister for the Haftar-aligned eastern government, Abdullah al-Thani, issued a decree removing a Madkhali figure as director of the eastern awqaf and appointing a member of the Sufi sect, Abd Al-Matlub Al-Abyad, to replace him.170 Some commentators have spoken of the Madkhali Salafis across Libya eventually cohering into a unified political force and dominating the country. To be sure, they are already implicitly, and in some cases explic­ itly political, aligning with both the Haftar-led LNA and the GNA. But aside from a dispersed media network and some instances of communi­ cation and cooperation in western Libya, Madkhali armed groups remain circumscribed by Libya’s factional and geographic divides. This is especially evident after Haftar’s April 4 attack on Tripoli, which underscored the ­pri macy of local context in shaping Madkhali behavior. Recent ideological splits among the Madkhalis pose another challenge to their unity. The most salient fissure here is between Libyan adherents of ­an other Saudi cleric, Muhammad Hadi al-Madkhali, who hails from the same Saudi tribe as Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, but who has criticized Rabi. The disagreement is mostly doctrinal, related to the insufficient application of the Madkhali precept of al-jarh wat-ta’dīl (praise and criticism). Specifically, salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 135 )

Muhammad has accused followers of Rabi, especially a Saudi cleric named Ubayd ibn Jabiri, of being saafiqat—a contentious term meaning, roughly, merchants with no capital of their own, who rely on others’ goods, or, in the case of Salafis, those who pretend clerical knowledge to unfairly ob­ tain power. Within Libya, this schism has reverberated beyond doctrine and across the political and social sphere. In August 2012, for example, Muhammad issued a congratulatory statement to Libyan Madkhalis who had destroyed a Sufi mausoleum in the western town of Zlitan.171 In 2015, he offered the Madkhalis an explicit call to arms for Haftar’s Dignity op­ eration, whereas Rabi was more circumspect.172 Since Haftar’s attack on Tripoli, Salafi sources indicated that much of the support for Muhammad came from the east, whereas the west remained loyal to Rabi.173 Then there is the question of the Salafis’ interest in governing directly and formally—and their ability to do so. While their commonplace label as “quietest” or “apolitical” no longer holds true, it seems unlikely that they will emerge as an explicitly political force at the national level. For now, they seem to benefit from a symbiotic and in some cases parasitic relation­ ship with weak political authorities. This allows them to indirectly influ­ ence the state behind the scenes and to profit from access to its economic resources, while retaining more public authority in the social and reli­ gious realm through the rubric of da’wa and in the policing sector, under the precept of “commanding right and forbidding wrong.” Moreover, their doctrinal beliefs concerning the impermissibility of democracy seem mal­ leable, especially in the face of popular will: in both eastern and western Libya, Madkhalis have identified the wali al-amr as elected legislatures and local councils.

CONCLUSION: WHITHER MADKHALISM?

Salafism in Libya has been closely molded by Libya’s postrevolutionary chaos, defined by the absence of national institutions, hyperlocalism, and the conduct of politics through armed force. Salafi jihadism has typically attracted the most Western attention, and indeed, this variant remains a present threat, bolstered by the security vacuum but also grievances born of displacement and marginalization—especially after the takeover of Benghazi by Haftar. But in terms of the most far-reaching effect on society and politics, it is the so-called quietist current of Madkhali Salafism that is playing the most important role. In its threat to a stable, inclusive, and peaceful civic state, the growth of Madkhalism is most alarming not because of its illiberalism or its superficial ( 136 ) Salafism in the Maghreb ideological similarity to Salafi jihadists. To be sure, the Madkhalis and ISIS/AQ share some tenets. But there is little to no evidence of Madkhalis crossing over to become members of these terrorist groups—if anything, Madkhalis have proven to be their strongest opponents, both doctrinally and militarily. What makes Madkhalism problematic in Libya is its coercive aspect: the use of force by Madkhali armed groups against religious, ideo­ logical, and political opponents, sometimes legitimated by the narrative of policing and countering terrorism. This, in turn, is ultimately a symptom of the pathologies that have bedeviled Libya since the 2011 revolution— chiefly, the lack of a central state and functioning institutions and, increas­ ingly, the struggle for access to oil wealth. Similarly, foreign interference plays a role: since 2011, rival regional actors have backed armed factions constituted along Islamist lines, whether Brotherhood-affiliated militias or those from the former LIFG, and this has undoubtedly shaped the religious landscape. Support for Madkhalis is less overt and probably more informal, through travel, education, and funding from Saudi Arabia. Even so, it follows a pat­ tern of Gulf—particularly Emirati and Saudi—backing for politically quietist religious actors as means to counter political Islamists like the Brotherhood and jihadists. The alignment of some Madkhalis with General Haftar’s model of au­ thoritarianism further underscores the utility of this current of Salafism to his Arab backers. And yet the relationship is more complex and contested than many realize, with Madkhali armed actors increasingly challenging the notion of a “patron-client” relationship. In the West, foreign actions play a role as well: foreign diplomats, including the UN, and foreign businesses tacitly backed or tolerated Madkhali armed groups because they supported the fragile Government of National Accord and because they acted as local proxies on challenges of interest to Western powers like counterterrorism. While the Madkhalis’ use of arms and funding no doubt accounts for the spread of the movement, there are also deeper sociological and psycholog­ ical drivers at work. In the midst of the chaos and uncertainty of post-Gaddafi Libya, the intellectual and spiritual security offered by Madkhalism’s doc­ trinal rigidity seems indisputable, as does its professed aim of overcoming the divides that have fragmented the country. Some of this appeal is likely the result of investments and support made by Gaddafi during the last years of his rule. But newer recruits are probably drawn by the mix of factors described in the introduction to this book: social mobilization, protest against old norms of social and political hierarchy, the promise of personal sovereignty (embodied in the Salafis’ self-label as the “saved sect”), and belonging to a self-contained community with proscribed norms of dress salafism and libya’s state collapse ( 137 ) and behavior. Such an allure suggests that the growth of Salafism in Libya, including Madkhalism, is less a “foreign,” “Saudi-directed” displacement of a so-called authentic Islam embodied by Sufism and Malikism than an or­ ganic, sometimes violent negotiation within Libya’s religious field—reflec­ tive, no doubt of domestic chaos and some external factors—but organic nonetheless. Conclusion

ince the 2011 Arab uprisings, Maghrebi Salafism has evolved and some­ times fragmented according to new shifts in state-​society relations, Sthe marginalization of key population segments and regions, economic hardships, and the assertiveness of an increasingly youthful population. In tandem, changing fortunes of other streams of Islamism and Islamic prac­ tice, whether the Muslim Brotherhood, Sufism, or Maliki jurisprudence, have provided Salafism new opportunities for growth. Endorsement by regimes and—​in the case of Libya, state collapse and fragmentation—​ have also played a determinant role in its spread. In nearly all these cases, so-called quietist, proregime Salafis have advanced a narrative of trium­ phalism in the wake of the post-​2011 chaos and disappointment. In some cases, this is because regime strategies of curtailing or stage-​managing elec­ toral politics and severely repressing jihadist currents have left quietists the last remaining current. In others, it most notably Libya, it is because Salafis failed to gain factor in elections among voters who demanded pragmatism and technocratic know-​how rather than morality and dogma. And yet Salafism in the Maghreb has also become increasingly political and opportunistic. The imperative for relevance has meant that Salafis in all the Maghreb cases have deployed and reinterpreted traditional Salafi precepts in unique and surprising ways. The result has been a sort of elas­ ticity that blurs the lines between quietism and politicos and between Salafis and non-​Salafist groups like the Brotherhood or even Sufis. As noted in ­chapter 1, the tripartite typology is an appropriate intellectual starting point, yet—​as the country chapters show—​Salafism as a lived, local re­ ality is infinitely more fluid, with Salafi actors—​even so-​called quietists—​ moving along the quietist-​political-​jihadist spectrum. The contours of Maghrebi Salafism have been shaped by national contexts and, especially, state capacity and strength. Libya lies at the ex­ treme end of the spectrum. After the 2012 experiment in electoral politics, the country descended into fragmentation and armed strife. In the resulting

Salafism in the Maghreb.Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, Oxford University Press (2019). © Oxford University Press DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190942403.001.0001 conclusion ( 139 ) vacuum and the absence of national institutions, Salafis, particularly the Madkhali variant of quietism, emerged as politicized armed actors, with sig­ nificant influence in the social and religious sphere. At the other end are the strong, intact states. In Morocco, for example, the monarchy has attempted to co-​opt some prominent quietist Salafis, while others have joined opposi­ tion parties, most notably Hammad Kabaj, who was enlisted by the Islamist Justice and Development Party. Similarly, Algeria, despite a strong tradi­ tion of secularism, the regime has tried to accommodate and even cele­ brate Salafism as part of Algerian national identity. Pragmatically, this stems from a recognition of the shortcomings of state clergy and Sufis. Tunisia also has a strong secularist hue but here there is little co-​option: the state’s contentious and securitized approach toward Salafism—​which witnessed a period of political and military ascendance from 2011 to 2013—has​ meant that Salafis exist in opposition and largely in the underground. In Mauritania, Salafis have a similarly fraught, bifurcated relationship with the government. But here, with strong local traditions of Sufism and scholarly Islam embodied in the uniquely Mauritanian zwaya religious class and in the mahdara (Islamic seminaries), Salafis face significant pressure to con­ form to and assimilate non-​Salafi traditions. This is embodied in the figure of Mokhtar el Hacen Ould Dedew, who has situated himself between Sufis, Salafism, and the Brotherhood. This latter dynamic highlights another strong trend among Maghrebi Salafism: its indigenization. Salafism in the Maghreb—and​ indeed Salafism around the globe—​is sometimes thought to be an extension of Saudi Arabia’s soft-​power projection, with local Salafi clerics taking their cues from clerical referents in Mecca and Medina. This is a gross distor­ tion of reality. To be sure, Saudi influence played an important role in cat­ alyzing Salafism in North Africa during the 1970s and 1980s, and Saudi institutes, charities, and clerics remain important influencers. But it is inaccurate to conceive of Maghrebi Salafis as Saudi proxies—​in fact, in many cases, Maghrebi Salafis have gone to extremes to distance themselves from the Gulf. The aforementioned Moroccan cleric Kabbaj offers a clear illustration—​his public criticism of Riyadh has been a constant source of vexation for the Moroccan monarchy, which receives significant funding from Saudi Arabia. Moreover, those Salafi currents that do align closely with Saudi clerics, most notably the so-​called Madkhali current—​the followers of Rabi bin Hadi al-​Madkhali—​expose themselves to significant costs to their popular legitimacy and criticism from Islamist (including fellow Salafis) and non-​Islamist voices. Moreover, the Maghreb and North Africa itself is increasingly exerting influence as a locus of Salafi thought and ­in fluence, often in the Gulf itself, subverting the common notion of one-​way influence from the Gulf to North Africa. Mauritania is a case in point. Its ( 140 ) Conclusion judges and preachers are sought after in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and its seminaries are popular source of education for Salafis across the Islamic world. All of this means that observers of the Maghreb should not look to Saudi Arabia or other Gulf actors as the primary determinants of Maghrebi Salafism. Recent actions by the Saudi monarchy toward the Salafi clergy, to include curbing some of the more incendiary discourse but also cracking down on politically active Salafis like the popular former Sahwi Salman al-​Awda, will certainly reverberate across global Salafi communities. But Saudi Arabia’s control over these communities’ outlooks and strategies was always overstated and, in the Maghreb, has become even weaker since the momentous events of 2011. The interplay and tension between the local and global is also important in understanding Salafi jihadism in the Maghreb. Here again, contempo­ rary accounts about the most notorious jihadist groups in the region—​ al-​Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Islamic State—​often portray these groups in the Maghreb as regional branches of a coherent, centralized movement. To be sure, the global dimension matters: waves of Maghreb youths went to fight in Afghanistan, where they commingled with jihadists from across the Arab world and absorbed radical, revolutionary new ideas that they brought back and attempted to apply—​particularly in Algeria and Libya—in​ toppling local governments. Though these efforts failed, the underlying grievances fueling radicalism remained and were often worsened by government crackdowns. This prompted successive gen­ erations to continue to travel to foreign battlefields, whether post-​2001 and post-​2003 (Afghanistan and Iraq) or post-​2011 (Syria and Iraq). In the latter conflicts, as noted in the introduction, the Maghreb as a whole accounted for the highest per capita of fighters traveling abroad, and these returning cadres, particularly from Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya, played a significant role in bringing the Islamic State to the Maghreb, though the only successful case of territorial control was Libya—and​ even this was partial and short-​lived. Yet despite these global influences, jihadism in the Maghreb remains a highly localized phenomenon. Along the Maghreb’s rural and urban periph­ eries, insurgency and militancy have highly localized roots, reflecting a mix of economic, political, and social grievances. Jihadism has certainly emerged as the most powerful repertoire and mobilizing vehicle; by connecting to global movements like al-​Qaeda or the Islamic State, local militants can ac­ crue branding and its attendant prestige, funding, and much-​needed skills, as evidenced by the Islamic State’s dispatch of hardened Iraqi, Syrian, and Yemeni advisors to Libya. Yet this globalization has invariably run into local realities. In some cases, it has taken the form of entrenched social identi­ ties like tribes or economic interests from smuggling networks. In others, it conclusion ( 141 ) is a pushback from local jihadists who reject the presence of foreigners or object to aspects of their ideology and strategy—​evident in the ejection of the Islamic State from Derna by rival jihadists led by the Abu Slim Martyrs Brigade. In many Maghreb states, strong state security, intelligence, and military responses blunted the so-​called caliphate’s entrée. History and historical memory also matter here: for example, of all the Maghreb countries, Algeria had the fewest number of foreign fighters going to the Islamic State, and jihadism as a whole has failed to take root, the result of strong state security responses (including a “soft” ideological approach) but also the searing memory of the “Black Decade” of the 1990s civil war. Even so, residual jihadists remain in Algeria’s hinterlands—in​ the Kabylia in the north and in the Saharan/​Sahelian south. This peripheral allure of jihadism—​along with other forms of non-​violent Salafism—is​ likely to en­ dure in other areas of the Maghreb where the state’s truncated sovereignty intersects with communal, economic, and social grievances—​Morocco’s Rif mountains, southern and western Tunisia, and southwest Libya are the most concerning regions. In recent years, much Western attention has been focused on com­ batting Salafi jihadism through a framework known as countering violent extremism (CVE), which includes a strong ideological component. As the preceding chapters make clear, Salafis, quietist or political Salafis particu­ larly, are seen by local governments and their backers as essential partners in this strategy. In Morocco, Algeria, and, to a lesser degree Mauritania, strong governments have increasingly pursued engagement and co-​option of non­ violent, Salafi quietists against jihadism—​believing that they have more le­ gitimacy among potential jihadist recruits than traditional Maliki imams or Sufi sheikhs. Even in fractured Libya, certain Salafi militia have positioned themselves as antijihadist bulwarks, on the battlefield but more importantly in countering jihadist ideology, through prison “rehabilitation” programs. Yet the rationale underpinning all of this is shaky, if not completely mis­ placed: it assumes that the motives for violence lie in Salafi ideology, which can be fine-​tuned and “corrected” through proper counseling by clerical figures who share some of the theological vocabulary with the militants. The great danger here is that regimes will deploy Salafi-​based theological approaches as a means to absolve themselves of the far more difficult and politically unpalatable work of addressing the worldly roots of jihadist vi­ olence: injustice, corruption, economic marginalization, and, especially, authoritarianism and state brutality. Western interest in “counterviolent extremism” only adds to this temptation, creating a sort of market where Maghrebi ministries of interior and ministries of religious affairs (and their Salafi clerical allies) attract Western funding and support on the basis of such ideological strategies while sidestepping reform. ( 142 ) Conclusion

The misplaced seductions of a singular focus on ideology in the struggle against violent jihadism also carry some concluding lessons for the future study of Salafism, in the Maghreb in beyond. To be sure, it is absolute nec­ essary to engage with the Salafis’ vocabulary of doctrine, creed, and prac­ tice. But to fully comprehend the allure of Salafism’s literalism and rigorous behavioral prescriptions, we need to look more locally, to the underlying social, economic, political, and even psychological drivers behind this movement. In the case of the Maghreb, we must reframe Salafism as a portal into the frustrations of a youth population that is drawn to the movement, whether in its quietist, political, or jihadist manifestations, as a moral critique against entrenched orders that have either failed them or no longer address their needs. These orders can certainly be political—the​ failing national projects of Arab authoritarians or disenchantment with thwarted democratic openings—​but more often they are social, economic, and highly local: the inadequacies of traditionalist forms of Islam; marginalization due to class or ethnolinguistic affiliation; the hierarchies of tribe; and the dislocations wrought by migration, globalization, and Western influences, to name a few. Even those Salafis defined as “loyalist” and who enjoy patronage from rulers frame their stance as a form of critique against a polluted order. Through such empathy and attention to local factors, we can move be­ yond condemnations of Salafism’s illiberalism, sectarianism, and intoler­ ance and seek to understand how Salafism’s promise of redemption, purity, mobilization, and membership in a borderless, “imagined community” can be enormously appealing. And as the chapters in this volume have shown, Salafism is likely to endure in the Maghreb as a dynamic force that is adapting itself to local social and political contexts, even as it challenges them. NOTES

INTRODUCTION 1. Frederic Wehrey, The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2018), pp. 207–​227. 2. Dave Sterman and Nate Rosenblatt, “All Jihad Is Local,” New America Foundation, April 5, 2018, https://​www.newamerica.org/​international-​security/​policy-​papers/​all-​jihad-​is-​ local/​. 3. For discussion of these dynamics across the Arab world, see Perry Cammack, Arab Fractures: Citizens, States and Social Contracts (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2017). 4. For discussions of these post-​2011 challenges, see Kristina Kausch, “Europe’s Maghreb Headache,” German Marshall Fund, May 16, 2017, http://www.gmfus.org/​ ​publications/​ europes-​maghreb-​headache; Anouar Boukhars, “The Maghreb’s Fragile Edges,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 19, 2018, https://​africacenter.org/​publication/​ maghreb-​fragile-​edges/​; Osama Abi Mershed, ed., Social Currents in North Africa: Culture and Governance after the Arab Spring (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 5. On challenges to Malikism, see Raphael Lefevre, “North Africa’s Maliki Crisis,” Journal of North African Studies 20, no. 5 (October 2015): pp. 683–687.​ On declining attitudes toward Sufism in North Africa, see “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society,” Pew Research Center, April 30, 2013, http://​assets.pewresearch.org/​wp-​content/​ uploads/​sites/​11/​2013/​04/​worlds-​muslims-​religion-​politics-​society-​full-​report.pdf. 6. Lefevre, “North Africa’s Maliki Crisis,” p. 685. 7. Frederic Wehrey, “Quiet No More?,” Diwan (blog), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 13, 2016, http://​carnegie-​mec.org/​diwan/​64846. 8. For discussion of these attractions, see Roel Meijer, “Introduction,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, edited by Roel Meijer (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 1–​32. 9. Recent exceptions and examples of shorter works include Anouar Boukhars, “The Politics of North African Salafism,”Orient 2 (2016): pp. 52–60,​ https://carnegieendowment.org/​ ​ files/​Article_​Boukhars.pdf; Mohamed Tozy, “Les enchaînements paradoxaux de l’histoire du salafisme: Instrumentalisation politique et actions de sécularisation,” inL’état d’injustice au Maghreb: Maroc et Tunisie, edited by Irene Bono, Béatrice Hibou, Hamza Meddeb, and Mohamed Tozy (Paris: Karthala, 2015); Henri Lauzière, The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). 10. For recent works: Aurélie Campana and Cédric Jourde, “Islamist Social Movements and Political Forces in North Africa, the Sahel and Beyond,” Mediterranean Politics 22, no. 1 (Winter 2016): pp. 1–​15, doi: 10.1080/​13629395.2016.1230945. On the Tunisian Ennahda party, see Anne Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda

( 143 ) ( 144 ) Notes to pages 3–8

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); Rory McCarthy, Inside Tunisia’s al-​Nahda (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 11. Raphaël Lefèvre, “The Resurgence of al-​Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib,” Journal of North African Studies 23, nos. 1–​2 (Fall 2017): pp. 278–​281. 12. Boukhars, “Politics of North African Salafism.”

CHAPTER 1 1. Recent and important works include Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 3 (2006): p. 207; Meijer, Global Salafism; Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, eds., Salafism after the Arab Awakening: Contending with People’s Power (London: Hurst, 2016); Alex Thurston, Salafism in Nigeria (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2016); Bernard Rougier, ed., Qu’est-​ce que le salafisme? (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2015); Andrew Hammond, “Producing Salafism: From Invented Tradition to State Agitprop,” inSalman’s Legacy: The Dilemmas of a New Era, edited by Madawi al-​Rasheed (London: Hurst, 2018), pp. 147–​164; Joas Wagemakers, Salafism in Jordan: Political Islam in a Quietest Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity (London: Hurst, 2011); Zoltan Pall, “Salafism in Lebanon: Local and Transnational Resources” (PhD dissertation, University of Utrecht, 2014). 2. Salafis do refer to themselves as a “sect,” as in their self-​referential description of Salafism as the “Saved Sect,” or Firqatun-Nājiyah​ —​which derives from one of the names of the Ahl al-​Sunna. 3. For a representative example, see Paul Berman, Terrorism and Liberalism (New York: Norton, 2004); Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2012); Robin Wright, “Don’t Fear All Islamists; Fear Salafis,” New York Times, August 19, 2012, https://​www. nytimes.com/​2012/​08/​20/​opinion/​dont-​fear-​all-​islamists-​fear-​salafis.html. For a more balanced view see Scott Shane, “Saudis and Extremism: Both the Arsonists and the Firefighters,”New York Times, August 25, 2016, https://​www.nytimes.com/​2016/​08/​26/​ world/​middleeast/​saudi-​arabia-​islam.html. 4. Joas Wagermakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-​ Maqdisi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 5. Roel Meijer, “Conclusion,” in Cavatorta and Merone, Salafism after the Arab Awakening, pp. 219–​239. 6. Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action,” in Meijer,Global Salafism, pp. 33–​57. 7. Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.” 8. Wagemakers, Salafism in Jordan, p. 29. 9. Lauzière, The Making of Salafism, pp. 20 and 231. 10. See Mohamed Said Ramadan, Al Salafiya Murahla Zamaniya Mubaraka La Madhab Islami (Salafism Is a Time Period and Not an Islamic School of Jurisprudence) (Dar al Fakr: Damascus, 1988); Bashir Mousa Nafie,Thahirat al Salafiya (The Phenomenon of Salafism) (Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2014). 11. Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi, pp. 2–​10. 12. The following is drawn from Meijer, “Introduction,” in Global Salafism; Thurston, Salafism in Nigeria, pp. 5–​11; Wagemakers, Quietist Jihad. 13. Haykel, “Nature of Salafi Thought,” p. 35. 14. Lefevre, “North Africa’s Maliki Crisis,” p. 685. 15. Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi, p. 60; Haykel, “Nature of Salafi Thought,” pp. 41;40–​ Thurston,Salafism in Nigeria, pp. 40–​44. Notes to pages 8–11 ( 145 )

16. Joas Wagemakers has called Wahhabism the Najdi branch of Salafism, while Zoltan Pall has cited the analogy of Leninism and communism. See Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi, p. 6; Pall, “Salafism in Lebanon,” p. 30. 17. Tarik K. Firro, “The Political Context of Early Wahhabi Discourse of Takfir,” Middle Eastern Studies 49, no. 5 (September 2013): pp. 770–​789. Also, Joas Wagemakers, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: -​al wala’ wa-​l-​bara in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-​Maqdisi,” in Meijer, Global Salafism, pp. 81–​106. 18. The seminal work on Wahhabism and its historical impact is David Commins,The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006). 19. Nabil Mouline, The Clerics of Islam: Religious Authority and Political Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014). 20. Stephane Lacroix, “L’apport de Muhammad Nasir al-​Din al-​Albani au salafism contemporain,” in Rougier, Qu’est-​ce que le salafisme?, pp. 45–​64. Albani also represented a Levantine trend of Salafism that demonstrates how the Middle East’s regional affinities permeated Salafism. 21. Lacroix, “L’apport de Muhammad Nasir al-​Din al-​Albani,” pp. 60–​62. 22. See Stephane Lacroix, “Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-​Din al-​Albani and His Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism,” in Meijer, Global Salafism, pp. 58–​ 80. Also, Roel Meijer, “Politicizing al-jarh​ wa-l-​ ta’dil​ : Rabi b. Hadi al-​Madkhali and the Transnational Battle for Religious Authority,” in The Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honour of Harald Motzki, edited by Nicolet Boekhoff van der Voort, Kees Versteegh, and Joas Wagemakers (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 380–381.​ 23. One of these thinkers, Rashid Rida, did try to reconcile Ibn Taymiyah with more mod­ ernist trends. Haykel, “Nature of Salafi Thought,” pp. 45–​46 and Hammond, “Producing Salafism,” p. 149. 24. The division between the “modernists” and “purists” is posted by Lauziere,The Making of Modern Salafism, pp. 4–​10. Thurston calls Rida, Abduh, and Afghani “proto-​Salafis.” Thurston, Salafism in Nigeria, p. 8; Haykel cites the moniker “Enlightened Salafism.” Haykel, “Nature of Salafi Thought,” p. 45. 25. Lauzière, The Making of Modern Salafism, p. 25. 26. Boukhars, “Politics of North African Salafism,” p. 52. 27. Lauziere, The Making of Modern Salafism, p. 25. 28. Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ‘Abd al-​Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970​ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). See also Marida Nahas, “State Systems and Revolutionary Challenge: Nasser, Khomeini, and the Middle East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 17, no. 4 (November 1985): p. 515. 29. Hammond, “Producing Salafism,” pp. 154–​156. 30. Nahas, “State Systems and Revolutionary Challenge,” p. 515. 31. On Saudi threat perceptions against ideological threats in the region, see Lawrence Rubin, Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); Gregory Gause III, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf,” Security Studies 13, no. 2 (Winter 2003): pp. 273–​305. 32. Frederic Wehrey, ed., Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), pp. 21–38;​ Raihan Ismail, Saudi Clerics and Shi’a Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 135–​165. 33. Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 34. Toby Craig Jones, “The Clerics, the Sahwa and the Saudi State,” Strategic Insights 4, no. 3 (March 2005), http://​www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/​si/​2005/​Mar/​JonesMar05. 35. Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-​Islamism since 1979 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). ( 146 ) Notes to pages 11–14

36. Jacob Olidort, “The Politics of ‘Quietist’ Salafism,” Brookings Institution, February 25, 2015, https://​www.brookings.edu/​research/​the-​politics-​of-​quietist-​salafism/​. 37. Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 22, 2008, https://​carnegieendowment.org/​2008/​09/​22/​saudi-​arabia-​s-​ soft-​counterterrorism-​strategy-​prevention-​rehabilitation-​and-​aftercare-​pub-​22155. 38. See Eman Elhussein, “The Enlightened Sheikhs of the New Saudi Arabia,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, June 27, 2018, http://www.agsiw.org/​ ​the-​enlightened-​ sheikhs-​of-​the-​new-​saudi-​arabia/​. 39. A public prosecutor later sought the death penalty for al-​Awdah. Reuters, “Saudi Arabia Seeks Death Penalty for Preacher Awdah—​Activists, Family,” September 4, 2018, https://​www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​saudi-​arrests/​saudi-​arabia-​seeks-​death-​penalty-​for-​ preacher-​awdah-​activists-​family-​idUSKCN1LK1PE. 40. Zoltan Pall and Martijn de Koning, “Being and Belonging in Transnational Salafism: Informality, Social Capital, and Authority in European and Middle Eastern Salafi Networks,”Journal of Muslims in Europe 6, no. 1 (2017): pp. 76–​103. 41. Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.” 42. Zoltan Pall’s critique echoes Wagemakers: he rejects the notion that quietists are not interested in politics, observing that alignment with the ruler is an inherently political act and that purists do engage in politics, but through “advice,” or nasiha, to a ruler that is hidden from public view. He further divides the purists into two categories: those who eschew or reject any form of political participation on the basis of creedal purity and those who permit some form of politics, as a form of da’wa, provided it is sanc­ tioned by the ruler. He proposes a second category of Salafis who refuse unconditional support to the ruler—​the harakis, or “activists.” Within this framework he includes politicos (those who engage in party politics and other forms of nonviolent public activism) and jihadists (those who use violence). Yet the definition of jihadists, he concedes, remains problematic: Wiktorowicz includes in this category those “who be­ lieve that jihad should not just be waged against invading or aggressive non-​Muslim enemies but should also be used in a revolutionary way against ‘apostate’ rulers in their own midst.” But many Salafis whom scholars have classified as politicos reserve the right to use violence against a ruler, if the ruler represses or engages in violence against citizens—​witness the support by politicos for armed uprisings in Libya and Syria in 2011. Pall, “Salafism in Lebanon,” pp. 36–​43. 43. Joas Wagemakers, “Revisiting Wiktorowicz,” in Cavatorta and Merone, Salafism after the Arab Awakening, p. 16. He further divides the quietists in aloofists, loyalists, and propagandists. 44. Wagemakers, Salafism in Jordan, p. 56. 45. Wagemakers, Salafism in Jordan, p. 24. 46. Author interview with Madkhali followers in Tripoli, Libya, November 2017. 47. Meijer, “Politicizing al-jarh​ wa-l-​ ta’dil​ ,” pp. 380–​381. 48. Also, Laurent Bonnefoy, “Quietest Salafis, the Arab Spring and the Politicisation Process,” in Cavatorta and Merone, Salafism after the Arab Awakening, pp. 205–​218. 49. Meijer, “Introduction,” Global Salafism, pp. 13–​18. 50. Bonnefoy, “Quietist Salafis,” p. 208. 51. Pall, “Salafism in Lebanon,” p. 39. 52. Bonnefoy, “Quietist Salafis,” p. 209. 53. For a critique of this thesis, see Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 54. Stephane Lacroix, “Religious Sectarianism and Political Pragmatism: The Paradox of Egypt’s al-​Nour Salafis,” inBeyond Sunni and Shia: The Roots of Sectarianism in a Changing Notes to pages 14–16 ( 147 )

Middle East, edited by Frederic Wehrey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 265–​282. 55. Lacroix, “Religious Sectarianism.” 56. Rory McCarthy, “Ennahda and the Challenge of Power,” Sada journal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 6, 2013, http://​carnegieendowment.org/​ sada/​52597. 57. On Libya, see Wehrey, The Burning Shores, p. 148, and on Bahrain, see Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf, pp. 62–​63. 58. Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi, p. 24. 59. An illustration of how contentious the debate has become is found in the debate be­ tween two scholars of Islamism, Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy, with the former arguing for Salafism’s theological influence on militancy (“the radicalization of Islam”) and the latter downplaying its impact, arguing instead for socioeconomic and psychological drivers (“the Islamization of radicalism”). Adam Nossiter, “That Ignoramus’: 2 French Scholars of Radical Islam Turn Bitter Rivals,”New York Times, July 12, 2016, https://www.nytimes.​ com/​2016/​07/​13/​world/​europe/​france-​radical-​islam.html. 60. For a discussion of Sayid Qutb’s broader influence on Arab world schisms see Fawaz Gerges, Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018). 61. This relates to the broader philosophical question: does religion cause violence? For a com­ pelling theologian’s view, see William T. Cavanaugh, “Does Religion Cause Violence?,” Harvard Divinity Bulletin 35, nos. 2–3​ (Spring–​Summer 2007), https://bulletin.hds.har​ ­ vard.edu/​articles/​springsummer2007/​does-​religion-​cause-​violence. 62. For good empirical surveys of the root causes: “The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, -​Al Qaeda and Beyond,” United States Institute for Peace /​ Woodrow Wilson Center, December 12, 2016, https://​www.usip.org/​sites/​default/​files/​The-​Jihadi-​Threat-​ISIS-​Al-​Qaeda-​ and-​Beyond.pdf; International Crisis Group, “Exploiting Disorder: Al-​Qaeda and the Islamic State,” Crisis Group Special Report, March 14, 2016, www.crisisgroup.org/​ global/​exploiting-​disorder-​al-​qaeda-​and-​islamic-​state; “MENA Economic Monitor, Economic and Social Inclusion to Prevent Violent Extremism,” World Bank Middle East and North African Region, October 2016, http://documents.worldbank.org/​ ​curated/​ en/​409591474983005625/​pdf/​108525-​REVISED-​PUBLIC.pdf; International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix,” September 13, 2004, https://​www.crisisgroup.org/​asia/​south-​east-​asia/​indonesia/​ indonesia-​backgrounder-​why-​salafism-​and-​terrorism-​mostly-​dont-​mix. 63. Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi-​Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism,” in Meijer, Global Salafism, pp. 244–​266. 64. William McCants, ed., “Militant Ideology Atlas,” United States Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center, 2006, https://​ctc.usma.edu/​militant-​ideology-​atlas/​. 65. Cole Bunzel, “Toward an Islamic Spring: Abu Muhammad al-​Maqdisi’s Prison Production,” Jihadica (blog), June 11, 2013, http://​www.jihadica.com/​toward-​an-​ islamic-​spring-​abu-​muhammad-​al-​maqdisi%E2%80%99s-​prison-​production/​; and Aaron Y. Zelin, “Maqdisi’s Disciples in Libya and Tunisia,” Foreign Policy Middle East Channel, November 14, 2012, http://​foreignpolicy.com/​2012/​11/​14/​maqdisis-​ disciples-​in-​libya-​and-​tunisia/​. 66. See Frederic Wehrey, “When the Islamic State Came to Libya,” The Atlantic, February 10, 2018, https://​www.theatlantic.com/​international/​archive/​2018/​02/​isis-​libya-​hiftar-​al-​ qaeda-​syria/​552419/​. 67. Barbara Walters, “The Extremist Advantage in Civil Wars,” International Security 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017): pp. 7–​39. On “marbling,” see United States Institute for Peace /​ Woodrow Wilson Center, “The Jihadi Threat.” ( 148 ) Notes to pages 16–20

68. Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 272. 69. For a discussion of Salafism and hierarchy, see Olivier Roy, “Introduction,” inTribes and Global Jihadism, edited by Virginie Collombier and Olivier Roy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 1–​13. 70. On women and Salafism see Anabel Inge,The Making of a Salafi Muslim Woman: Paths to Conversion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Richard A. Nielsen, “Women’s Authority in Patriarchal Social Movements: The Case of Female Salafi Preachers,” October 15, 2017; https://​pdfs.semanticscholar.org/​e689/​ffa3656b5901aabf03848fb13a0ddfe5f 25f.pdf and Iris Kolman, “Gender Activism in Salafism: A Case Study of Salafi Women in Tunis,” in Cavatorta and Merone, Salafism after the Arab Awakening, pp. 187–​204; M. De Koning, “Changing Worldviews and Friendship: An Exploration of the Life Stories of Two Female Salafis in the Netherlands,” in Meijer, Global Salafism, pp. 404–424;​ Sarah Ladbury, Women and Extremism: The Association of Women and Girls with Jihadi Groups and Implications for Programming (London: Department of International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2015). 71. Olivier Roy calls this a “holier than thou” game. See Roy, “Introduction,” in Tribes and Global Jihadism, p. 11. 72. Haykel, “Nature of Salafi Thought,” pp. 47–​51. 73. Richard Gauvain, Salafi Ritual Purity in the Presence of God (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 56. 74. Alexander Knysh, “Contextualizing the Salafi-​Sufi Conflict (from the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt),” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 4 (June 2007): pp. 503–​530. 75. Bernard Rougier, Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 76. On Yemen, Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen; on Indonesia, Julia Day Howell, “Indonesia’s Salafist Sufis,”Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 5 (2010): pp. 1029–​1051. 77. On Wahhabism and Salafism in Iraq, Hala Fattah, “Wahhabi’ Influences, Salafi Responses: Shaikh Mahmud Shukri and the Iraqi Salafi Movement, 1745–​1930,” Journal of Islamic Studies 14, no. 2 (May 2003): pp. 127–​148. 78. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf. 79. See Guido Steinberg, “Jihadi-​Salafism and the Shi’is: Remarks about the Intellectual Roots of anti-​Shi’ism,” in Meijer, Global Salafism, pp. 107–​125; Fanar Haddad, “Shia-​ centric State-​Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-​2003 Iraq,” in Wehrey, Beyond Sunni and Shia, pp. 115–134.​ On Syria and Hama, see Raphael Lefevre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

CHAPTER 2 1. Specifically, French colonialism helped facilitate the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca and other Mauritanian contacts with the Gulf. 2. For example, the argument that jihadism or revolutionary violence is a wholly “foreign” important resulting from Gulf ideology is convincingly rebutted by Philip D. Curtin, who traces a tradition of religiously-​sanctioned Mauritanian militancy against unjust rulers to the 1600s. See Philip D. Curtain, “Jihad in West Africa: Early Phases and Inter-​Relations in Mauritania and Senegal,” Journal of African History 12, no. 1 (January 1971): pp. 11–24.​ 3. CIA World Factbook, 2018. 4. “Human Development Index: Country Profile of Mauritania,” United Nations Development Program, 2018, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MRT. 5. “Freedom in the World 2019,” Freedom House, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/report/ freedom-world/2019/mauritania. Notes to pages 20–23 ( 149 )

6. “Corruption Perceptions Index, 2018,” Transparency International, 2018, https://www. transparency.org/country/MRT. 7. Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert: Islam politique et changement social en Mauritanie (Paris: Karthala, 2013), p. 160. 8. Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim, “Managing the Sahelo-​Saharan Islamic Insurgency in Mauritania,” Sahel Research Group Working Paper, no. 3 (August 2014): p. 10. 9. Constant Hames, “Le rôle de l’Islam dans la société mauritanienne contemporaine,” Politique africaine 55 (October 1994): pp. 46–​51. 10. Ibrahim, “Managing the Sahelo-​Saharan Islamic Insurgency,” p. 17. 11. Author interview with Hamdan Ould al-​Tah, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 30, 2018. 12. Hamdan Ould al-​Tah, interview. 13. Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, “The Paradoxical Metamorphosis of Islamic Activism,” Mauritania Cahiers d’etudes africaines 206–​207, no. 2 (English version), (Winter 2012): p. 4. 14. Author interview with a Mauritanian historian, Noukchott, Mauritania, March 24, 2018. 15. Chouki El Hamel, “The Transmission of Islamic Knowledge in Moorish Society from the Rise of the Almoravids to the 19th Century,” Journal of Religion in Africa 29, no. 1 (February 1999): pp. 62–​87. 16. Mauritanian historian, interview. 17. Elemine Ould Baba Moustapha, “Negotiating Islamic Revival: Religiosity in Nouakchott City,” Islamic Africa 5, no. 1 (Spring 2014): p. 46. 18. Moustapha, “Negotiating Islamic Revival,” p. 52. 19. Moustapha, “Negotiating Islamic Revival,” p. 72. 20. Tarek Ladjal and Benaouda Bensaid, “Desert-​Based Muslim Religious Education: Mahdara as a Model,” Religious Education 112, no. 5 (May 2012): pp. 529–​541. 21. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Islam in Mauritania between Political Expansion and Globalization: Elites, Institutions, Knowledge, and Networks,” in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, edited by Benjamin F. Soares and Rene Otayek (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 37. 22. Author interview with Libyan mahdara graduates, Tripoli, Libya, December 5, 2017. In 2012, the Mauritanian government estimated that one-​quarter of mahdara students came from abroad. See Meimouna Saleck, “The Foreign Students of the Mahadhra in Mauritania Courted by Jihadists,” Dune Voices, March 12, 2015, http://​media-​diversity. org/​en/​index.php?option=com_​content&view=article&id=3052:the-​foreign-​students-​ of-​the-​mahadhra-​in-​mauritania-​courted-​by-​jihadists&catid=15:mdi-​news&Itemid=33 23. Prominent Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members who passed through Mauritanian mahadir include Abu Yahya al-​Libi and ‘Atiyatullah ‘Abd al-​Rahman. 24. Author interview with a former minister of Islamic affairs now working on counterradicalization, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 26, 2008. 25. Former minister of Islamic affairs, interview. 26. Saleck, “Foreign Students of the Mahadhra.” See the comments of Mauritanian scholar Mohamed Fall Ould Bah. 27. Mauritanian historian, interview. 28. Author interview with scholar Khalil Nahwi, who has set up an Institute for Modern Mahdara Studies, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 23, 2018. Related efforts in urban areas include Mohamed al-Hasen Ould al-Dedew’s Markaz Takwin al-​Ulama and the Mahdara Namudhajiyya of Muhammad Fadil. 29. For example, Sheikh Abdullah Bin Bayyah, a noted Mauritanian Sufi scholar and former government minister, teaches in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and has more recently been as­ sociated with the Emirates’ campaign against Qatar and the Brotherhood. See Usaama al-​Azami, “Gulf Crisis: How Autocrats Use Religious Scholars against Qatar,” Middle ( 150 ) Notes to pages 23–25

East Eye, August 4, 2017, http://​www.middleeasteye.net/​columns/​qatar-​uae-​forum-​for-​ promoting-​peace-​in-​muslim-​societies-​gulf-​religious-​scholars-​politics-​715865822. 30. Cedric Jourde, “Overlapping Solidarities: The Politics of Ethnicity and Sufi Turuq in Mauritania,” Maghreb Review 35, nos. 1–​2 (2010): pp. 222–​243. 31. One key example is the noted Mauritanian scholar Muhammad al-​Amin al-​Shinqiti (1907–​1972), who first traveled to Saudi Arabia in 1947 and later taught at the Islamic University of Medina, where one of his students was Rabi bin Hadi al-​Madkhali, the progenitor of the so-​called quietist school of loyalist Salafism whose influence would spread to several Maghreb countries in the 2000s. See his book: Muhammad al-​Amin al-​ Shinqiti, Rehlat al-​Hajj ila b’iat Allah al Rahman (The Pilgrimage to the Sacred House of Allah) (Jeddah: International Islamic Fiqh Academy, 2005), http://waqfeya.com/​ ​book. php?bid=7008. See also, Michael Farquhar and Alex Thurston, “How Mauritania exports religion to Saudi Arabia—​And not just the other way around,” Brookings Institution, December 13, 2018. 32. Alex Thurston, “Mauritania’s Islamists,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2015, https://​carnegieendowment.org/​files/​mauritania_​islamists.pdf. 33. Mauritanian historian, interview. 34. Over 70% of Mauritanians speak a dialect of Arabic called Hassaniya. Ibrahim, “Managing the Sahelo-​Saharan Islamic Insurgency,” p. 33. For background on the effects of Arabization and on regime repression toward Afro-​Mauritanians, see “Mauritania’s Campaign of Terror: State-​Sponsored Repression of Black Africans,” Human Rights Watch, April 1994, https://​www.hrw.org/​sites/​default/​files/​reports/​MAURITAN944.PDF. 35. Hamed El-​Said, New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and De-radicalization​ Programs (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 117. 36. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 4. 37. Author interview with a Salafi cleric, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 15, 2018. 38. The survey conducted by Yahya Ould al-​Barah is quoted in “Islam in Mauritania” by Ahmed Ould Salem, p. 40. 39. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Islam in Mauritania,” p. 37. 40. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis.” 41. International Crisis Group, “Islamism in North Africa IV: The Islamist Challenge in Mauritania: Threat or Scapegoat?,” May 11, 2005, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.​ net/​41-​islamism-​in-​north-​africa-​iv-​the-​islamist-​challenge-​in-​mauritania-​threat-​or-​ scapegoat-​french.pdf. 42. Author interview with a Mauritania activist, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 25, 2018. 43. Moustapha, “Negotiating Islamic Revival,” p. 52. 44. See https://​www.youtube.com/​watch?v=zncxj-​rzZiY. 45. See Aaron Zelin, “Purifying Islam and Combating the West: A Postmortem Analysis of the Indelible Impact of al-​Qaeda’s Abu Yahya al-​Libi,” Militant Leadership Monitor 3, no. 6, July 9, 2009. For the eulogy see https://​scholarship.tricolib.brynmawr.edu/​bitstream/​ handle/​10066/​4701/​AYL20090706.pdf?sequence=4. 46. For representative writings see the following: on jihad http://www.ilmway.com/​ ​site/​ maqdis/​MS_​2318.html; on takfir http://​www.alwahabiyah.com/​file/​Occation/​ vijename/​T-​K12-​ar.pdf. For the background of his arrest and the accusation of affiliation with AQIM: http://​www.elwatan.info/​node/​2179. 47. Author interview with Ahmedou Ould Lemrabott, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 26, 2018. 48. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 5. 49. Author interview with a Mauritanian activist and civil society leader, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 25, 2018. According to this interlocutor, the du’at (singular: da’i) are Notes to pages 25–27 ( 151 )

itinerant preachers who “travel from one place to another preaching in mosques, markets, and schools.” 50. Author interview with a Mauritania activist and civil society leader, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 25, 2018. 51. Author interview with a Mauritania scholar focusing on counter-​radicalization, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 20, 2018. According to this scholar, the theological mes­ sage of a transcendent and egalitarian community found traction among many haratine who joined Islamists to escape the confines of Mauritania’s race-​based hierarchies. For background on the Tawassoul party, see Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert, pp. 103–​142. 52. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 1. 53. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 5. HASIM arose as breakaway fac­ tion from an earlier Islamist formation, the first in the country, the Jamaat Islamiyya, es­ tablished in 1974, which critics saw as too close to the state. See Thurston, “Mauritania’s Islamists,” p. 6. 54. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 6. Born in the eastern Asaba region, Sidi Yahya moved to Nouakchott in 1978 and joined a state-​sponsored body, the Islamic Institute of Ibn Abbas, and preached in the Cinquieme district, an areas populated mostly by Afro-​Mauritanians. Much of his popularity was inspired by technology, specifically, the distribution of cassette sermons in the local idiom. International Crisis Group, “Islamism in North Africa IV,” p. 17. 55. Anouar Boukhars, “Mauritania’s Precarious Stability and Islamist Undercurrent,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 11, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/​ ​ 2016/​02/​11/​mauritania-​s-​precarious-​stability-​and-​islamist-​undercurrent-​pub-​62730. 56. Sebastian Elische, “Governing the Faithful: State Management of Salafi Activity in the Francophone Sahel,” Comparative Politics 51, no. 2 (January 2019): p. 210. 57. International Crisis Group, “Islamism in North Africa IV,” p. 10. 58. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” pp. 6–​7. 59. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” pp. 6–​7. 60. Francesco Cavatorta and Raquel Ojeda Garcia, “Islamism in Mauritania and the Narrative of Political Moderation,” Journal of Modern North African Studies 55, no. 2 (May 2017), p. 313. 61. Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem, “Islamic Radicalisation in Mauritania,” in Islamist Radicalisation in North Africa: Politics and Process, edited by George Joffe (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 185. 62. Thurston, “Mauritania’s Islamists,” p. 8. 63. For a biography of Dedew, see Alex Thurston, “Shaykh Muhammad al-​Hasan al-​Dedew (b. 1963), a Salafi Scholar in Contemporary Mauritania,” University of Cape Town, Center for Contemporary Islam, February 10, 2009; http://www.cci.uct.ac.za/​ ​usr/​cci/​ publications/​aria/​download_​issues/​2012/​Alex%20Thurston. 64. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 10. Born in 1929, Sheikh Mohammed Salem Ould Adoud was the son of another famous Islamic scholar named Mohamed Ali Ould Abdel Adoud and studied in Boutamlit before studying law in Tunisia. In Mauritania, he was appointed Minister of Islam and Culture while authoring a number of Salafi tracts that included “Total Belief of the Salafi.” For a short bio, see http://​www.aljazeera.net/​encyclopedia/​icons/​2014/​11/​10/​ %D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-​%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-​ %D9%88%D9%84%D8%AF-​%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF. 65. Moustapha, “Negotiating Islamic Revival,” p. 50. 66. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Islam in Mauritania,” p. 31. 67. Cavatorta and Garcia, “Islamism in Mauritania,” p. 314. ( 152 ) Notes to pages 27–30

68. Alex Thurston, “An Emerging Post-​Salafi Current in West Africa and Beyond,” Maydan, October 15, 2018; https://​www.themaydan.com/​2018/​10/​emerging-​post-​salafi-​ current-​west-​africa-​beyond/​. 69. Author interview with a Mauritanian scholar of Islam, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 19, 2018. 70. According to Ould Ahmed Salem, he is the most popular religious voice for Mauritanians under 30, who constitute 70% of the population. Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert, p. 99. 71. Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert, p. 98. 72. Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert, p. 100. 73. International Crisis Group, “Islamism in North Africa IV,” p. 20. 74. For a list, see Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert, pp. 146–149.​ For background on Abu Hafs al-​Mauritani, see this Al Jazeera interview: http://​www.aljazeera.net 75. Author interview with Mauritanian Salafi cleric, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 24, 2018. Also see Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert, p. 147. On the Idab-​Lihsen, see Moustapha, “Negotiating Islamic Revival,” p. 77. 76. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks,The 9/​11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), pp. 130. http://​govinfo.library.unt.edu/​911/​report/​911Report_​Ch4.pdf. 77. Salafi cleric, interview. 78. El-​Said, New Approaches to Countering Terrorism, p. 118. 79. Author interview with a Salafi cleric, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 25, 2018. 80. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Islamic Radicalisation in Mauritania,” p. 189. 81. According to interlocutors, this was broadcast on Radio Mauritanie. Author inter­ view in Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 2018. See also Ould Ahmed Salem, “Islamic Radicalisation in Mauritania,” p. 189. 82. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Islamic Radicalisation in Mauritania,” p. 289. 83. Author interview with a former detainee, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 24, 2018. For the scope of the torture allegations see “Mauritania: Torture at the Heart of the State,” Amnesty International, December 3, 2008, https://www.amnesty.org/​ ​download/​ Documents/​52000/​afr380092008en.pdf. 84. Hacen Ould Lebatt, “Généalogie d’Al-​Qaïda au Maghreb islamique,” Les cahiers de la revue défense nationale, May 2011, p. 28; available at https://​en.calameo.com/​read/​ 000558115c614e762cfb0 85. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 13. 86. Among the more prominent attacks: the 2007 killing four French tourists near southern town of Aleg, a 2008 assault on the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott, the 2009 assassina­ tion of Christopher Leggett, an American aid worker in Nouakchott, the 2009 suicide bombing of the French embassy and a 2010 suicide bombing against a Mauritanian military outpost at Nema. For a list see Ibrahim, “Managing the Sahelo-​Saharan Islamic Insurgency,” p. 13. 87. See Ibrahim, “Managing the Sahelo-​Saharan Islamic Insurgency,” p. 14. Also, Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert, pp. 13–​14. 88. Ibrahim, “Managing the Sahelo-​Saharan Islamic Insurgency,” p. 14. 89. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 17. 90. Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert, p. 161. 91. Author interview with Mauritanian scholar involved in counter-​radicalization, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 23, 2018. 92. Mauritanian scholar, interview. 93. This is a nom de guerre; Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem names him as Ahmed Ould Vih al-​ Barka. See Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 17. Notes to pages 30–33 ( 153 )

94. Author interview with a Mauritanian scholar involved in counter-​radicalization; see also this brief biography of the scholar; http://​odh-​mauritanie.com/​actualite-​362-​itineraire-​ d-​un-​kamikaze.html?m=9&a=2013. 95. Mauritanian scholar, interview. 96. Author interview with a former Minister of Islamic Affairs now working on counter-​ radicalization, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 26, 2018. 97. See, for example, the path of AQIM militant Sidi Ould Sidna, who participated in the killing of French tourists near the southern town of Aleg in 2007. While he happened upon the world of radical Islamist ideology after years of minor delinquency, he went on to avow the political dimensions of jihadism, equating the jihadi attacks against the re­ gime with the military’s use of coercion over the state. Nicholas Schmidle, “The Saharan Conundrum,” New York Times, February 15, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/​ ​2009/​02/​ 15/​magazine/​15Africa-​t.html. 98. See this biography: http://​essirage.net/​archive/​index.php/​news-​and-​reports/​ 447-​2010-​10-​18-​22-​11-​44.html. 99. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 16. 100. “Interview with Khadim Ould Semane,” Al-​Jazeera, July 15, 2006, http://www.aljazeera.​ net. 101. “Interview with Khadim Ould Semane.” 102. Author interview with a former Minister of Islamic Affairs now working on counter-​ radicalization, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 26, 2018. 103. This soft approach was following a template that had been applied with mixed results else­ where, in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Libya. 104. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 18. 105. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 18. 106. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 18. 107. Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert, p. 173. 108. Author interview with a Mauritanian scholar of Islam, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 23, 2018. 109. Author interview with Mauritanian Salafi cleric, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 26, 2018. 110. Salafi cleric, interview. 111. Salafi cleric, interview. 112. Salafi cleric, interview. 113. For a discussion, see Reuven Paz, “Islamic Legitimacy for the London Bombings,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (CSS) July 20, 2005, http://​www.terrorism-​info.org.il/​Data/​articles/​Art_​537/​537E_​1855722352. pdf. 114. See Abd-​al Mun’em Mustafa Halima (also known as Abu Basir al-​Tartusi), “Covenants and Security in Islam,” http://​www.en.altartosi.com/​Covenants.htm (no longer active). 115. Salafi cleric, interview. 116. Salafi cleric, interview. 117. Author interview with former Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Islamic Affairs officials involved in the dialogue, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 2018. 118. See Anon., “The First Session of Dialogue with the Salafis began with a Struggle for Leadership Among the Prisoners” (in Arabic), Al-Anbaa​ , January 18, 2010, https://www.​ anbaa.info/​?p=4068. 119. Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert, p. 173. 120. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 21. 121. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” p. 23. ( 154 ) Notes to pages 33–35

122. In recent years, according to the United Nations, torture is no longer “rampant” but still “occurs frequently.” See Amnesty International, “Mauritania, 2017/2018,” https://www. amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/mauritania/report-mauritania/ 123. “Pardoned Salafist Prisoners Benefit from Income-Generating Loans” (in Arabic), Sahara -جرفملا-نييفلسلا-ءانجسلا-ةدافتسا/Media, July 15, 2011, https://www.saharamedias.net ./رق-نم 124. Author interview with a Mauritanian Salafi cleric, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 24, 2018. 125. Ahmed Ould Sidi, “Children of Salafist Prisoners . . . Collective Punishment for Parents and Children” (in Arabic), Al-Araby, June 6, 2016, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/ .ءانبألاو-ءابآلل-يعامج-باقع-ايناتيروم-يف-نييفلسلا-ءانجسلا-لافطأ/investigations/2016/6/6 126. “Ahmed Mezid: The majority of the Salafi trend opposed the establishment of a political party” (in Arabic), Essirage, October 14, 2015, http://www.essirage.net/node/3490. 127. See Mark Hosenball, “Al Qaeda Leaders Made Plans for Peace Deal with Mauritania: Documents,” Reuters, March 1, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/​ ​article/​ us-​usa-​binladen-​mauritania-​idUSKCN0W356G. 128. Joe Bavier, “Mauritania Frees Wanted Senior Malian Islamist Insurgent,” Reuters, August 6, 2015, https://​uk.reuters.com/​article/​uk-​mauritania-​mali-​insurgency/​ mauritania-​frees-​senior-​malian-​islamist-​insurgent-​idUKKCN0QB1M120150806. 129. Author interview with former Mauritanian officials in the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 2018. 130. See Alex Thurston, “A Mauritanian Fatwa against the French-​Led Military Intervention in Mali,” Al-Maydan​ , January 13, 2017, https://www.themaydan.com/​ ​2017/​01/​ mauritanian-​fatwa-​french-​led-​military-​intervention-​mali/​. 131. Anon., “La Mauritanie affectée par la crise malienne,” Xinhua, January 24, 2013, http://​ french.peopledaily.com.cn/​96852/​8105195.html; Al-​Mokhtar Ould Mohammad, “Mauritanian Consensus against France Intervention in Mali,” Alakhbar (English), January 18, 2013, http://​english.al-​akhbar.com/​node/​14695. 132. Anon., “La Mauritanie affectée par la crise malienne.” 133. Salafi cleric, interview. 134. One Salafi cleric told the author, “Mali is good for us; the people with extremist ideas go there instead of staying here.” Author interview with a Mauritanian Salafi cleric, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 26, 2018. Also see Ibrahim, “Managing the Sahelo-​ Saharan Islamic Insurgency,” p. 23. 135. Laurent Prieuer, “Mauritania Media Opens Window on Saharan Islamist World,” Reuters, February 13, 2013, https://​uk.reuters.com/​article/​uk-​mali-​rebels-​ mauritania/​mauritania-​media-​opens-​window-​on-​saharan-​islamist-​world-​ idUKBRE91C0XB20130213. 136. Majlissi’s critique refers to a well-​known study by the US-​based RAND corporation think tank arguing for the promotion of “civil democratic Islam” as a counterterrorism strategy. Cheryl Benard, Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), https://​www.rand.org/​pubs/​monograph_​reports/​ MR1716.html. The RAND study became a lightning rod for criticism among Islamists and especially jihadists who saw it as a neocolonialist project. See Majlissi, “Democratic Islam Is an American Alternative,” http://​www.ilmway.com/​site/​maqdis/​MS_​16887. html. 137. See Majlissi, “Independence and the Loss of Identity” (in Arabic), Mauritania al-Yawm​ , November 30, 2014, http://​rimtoday.net/​?q=node/​2599. 138. Ould Ahmed Salem, “Paradoxical Metamorphosis,” pp. 19–​20. 139. See also the statement by Tawassoul at http://​tawassoul.net. Notes to pages 35–40 ( 155 )

140. Author interview with a Mauritania think-​tank scholar involved in counterradicalization, March 26, 2018. 141. Ould Ahmed Salem, Prêcher dans le désert, p. 168. 142. “Ahmed Mezid: The Majority of the Salafi Trend Opposed the Establishment of a Political Party” (in Arabic), Essirage, October 14, 2010, http://​www.essirage.net/​node/​3490. 143. “Mauritania-​Senegal Summit Yields Accord on Giant Gas Field,” Agence France Press, February 9, 2018, https://www.news24.com/​ ​Africa/​News/​ mauritania-​senegal-​summit-​yields-​accord-​on-​giant-​gas-​field-​20180209. 144. Author interview with activists in Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 2018. 145. The World Politics Review interview with Noel Foster, “Mauritania’s Weak Opposition Could Make Abdel Aziz President for Life,” World Politics Review, May 31, 2016, https://​www.worldpoliticsreview.com/​trend-​lines/​18929/​ mauritania-​s-​weak-​opposition-​could-​make-​abdel-​aziz-​president-​for-​life. 146. See Alex Thurston, “An Ould Mauritania: An Ould Ghazouani Presidency?” Sahel Blog, January 29, 2019, https://​sahelblog.wordpress.com/​2019/​01/​29/​mauritania-​an-​ould-​ ghazouani-​presidency/​. 147. Voice of America Afrique, “Fermeture d’un centre islamique jugé ‘extrémiste’ en Mauritanie,” September 25, 2018, https://al​-​ain.com/​article/​ mauritania-​military-​parade-​independence-​terrorism. 148. For a good discussion of the extent of the ISIS threat, see, Alex Thurston, “Is Mauritania Really a New ISIS Front,” IPI Global Observatory, July 2, 2015, https://​ theglobalobservatory.org/​2015/​07/​mauritania-​isis-​al-​qaeda-​terrorism/​. 149. Author interview with a former jihadist detainee, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 23, 2018. 150. The Arabic text of the statement is posted here: https://www.max​ -​security.com/​security-​ blog/​aqim-​statement-​threatening-​western-​companies-​in-​area-​from-​libya-​to-​mauritania-​ africa-​mena-​alert. 151. Formed in 2014, the G5 Sahel Force consists of Mali, Niger, chad Burkina Faso, and Mauritania. The organization has struggle with resources and organization. 152. Pascal Airault, “Le général Hanena Ould Sidi à la tête de la force du G5: la Mauritanie reprend en main la sécurité sahélienne,” L’Opinion, July 13, 2018, https://www.lopinion.​ fr/​edition/​international/​general-​hanena-​ould-​sidi-​a-​tete-​force-​g5-​mauritanie-​reprend-​ en-​main-​156652?utm_​source=twitter.

CHAPTER 3 1. Mohamed Ḍarif, Monarchie marocaine et acteurs religieux (al-​Dār al-​Bayḍāʾ: Presse de l’imprimérie Afrique Orient, 2010), p. 110; Paul L. Heck, “An Early Response to Wahhabism from Morocco: The Politics of Intercession,”Studia Islamica 107, no. 2 (2012): pp. 238–​239. 2. As prominent cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz once stated, “Sultans collected anti-​Sufis around them as they collected Sufis, anti-​legists as they collected legists, reformers as they collected anti-​reformers, playing them off against one another and attempting to keep them all centered on his, the Sultan’s, person as the First Muslim of the country.” Clifford Geertz,Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 72. 3. Heck, “An Early Response to Wahhabism,” pp. 239–​240. 4. Jamil Abun-​Nasr, “The Salafiyya Movement in Morocco: The Religious Bases of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement,” Middle Eastern Affairs no. 3, St. Antony’s Papers, vol. 1, edited by Albert Hourani (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963), p. 95. ( 156 ) Notes to pages 40–45

5. Henry Munson, Religion and Power in Morocco (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 85. 6. Malika Zeghal, Les islamistes marocains: Le défi de la monarchie (Paris: La Découverte, Collection Cahiers Libres, 2005), p. 40. 7. Zeghal, Les islamistes marocains, p. 40. 8. Youssef Belal, Le cheikh et le calife: Sociologie religieuse de l’Islam politique au Maroc (Lyon: ENS Editions, 2011). 9. Abderrahim Ouardighi, Un cheikh militant: Mohammed Belarbi el Alaoui, 1880–​1964 (Marseille: Editions du littoral, 1985), p. 28. 10. See Ahmad Al-​Raysuni, “Imam al-​Shatibi’s Theory of the Higher Objectives and Intents of Islamic Law, Trans,” International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2018, https://www.iiit.​ org/​uploads/​4/​9/​9/​6/​49960591/​books-​in-​brief_​imam_​al-​shatibis_​theory_​of_​the_​ higher_​objectives_​and_​intents_​of_​islamic_​law.pdf. 11. Abdelhadi Boutaleb, “Le Salafisme: Vision prospective,” inThe Salafist Movement in the Maghreb, edited by the Moroccan Association for Islamic Solidarity and Asilah Cultural Association (Rabat: Dar Alman, 2010), p. 26. 12. Allal El Fassi, Al-Naqd​ al-dhâtî​ (Self-Critique)​ (Cairo: Matba`a al-​`Alamiyya, 1952). 13. Belal, Le cheikh et le calife. 14. See Assia Benadada, “Les femmes dans le mouvement nationaliste marocain,” Clio: Histoire‚ femmes et sociétés 9 (1999), http://​journals.openedition.org/​clio/​1523. 15. Lauzière, The Making of Salafism, p. 102. 16. Lauzière, The Making of Salafism, p. 102. 17. Lauzière, The Making of Salafism, p. 102. 18. See Mohammed Abed al-​Jabri, Ishkaliyyat al-fikr​ al-arabi​ al-mu’asir​ (The Problems of Contemporary Arab Thought), 2nd ed. (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1990), pp. 107–​108. 19. Mohammed Masbah, “Salafist Movements in Morocco: Study of the Processes of Radicalization, Deradicalization and Moderation” (PhD dissertation, Mohammed V University, Rabat, Morocco, March 2016) (in Arabic), p. 118. 20. Anouar Boukhars, “The Origins of Militancy and Salafism in Morocco,” Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 12 (2005): pp. 1–​6. 21. Michel Abitbol, Histoire du Maroc (Paris: Perrin, 2009), p. 590. 22. Lauzière, The Making of Salafism. 23. Abdelhakim Aboullouz, “Le salafisme marocain au début des années 2000: Du conformisme au pouvoir à la participation,” in Le Maroc au present, edited by Baudouin Dupret, Zakaria Rhani, and Assia Boutaleb (Rabat: Centre Jacques-​Berque, 2015), pp. 805–​812. 24. Abdesammad El Amraoui, “ ‘Authentic Islam’: The Religious Profile of Taqī -​al Dīn al-​Hilālī (1893–​1987) as Reflected in His Fatwas” (PhD dissertation, Faculty of the Humanities, Leiden University, 2015). 25. Hassan Sarat, “Salafism in Morocco: Power Balance and Instrumentalization” (in Arabic), Al Jazeera, May 29, 2007, http://​www.aljazeera.net. 26. Mountassir Hamada, Le wahhabisme au Maroc (Wahhabism in Morocco) (Casablanca: Toubkal, 2012); see also Boukhars, “Politics of North African Salafism.” 27. “J’ai gagné la confiance des islamistes,” interview with Abdelkébir Alaoui M’Daghri, TelQuel, November 13, 2004. 28. Tozy, “Les enchaînements paradoxaux,” p. 217. 29. Lauzière, The Making of Salafism, p. 215. 30. Lauzière, The Making of Salafism, p. 215. 31. Mohamed Maghraoui, “Statement on the Truth about the Shia,” Islamway, August 3, 2010, https://​ar.islamway.net/​lesson/​102018. Notes to pages 45–48 ( 157 )

32. Samir Hamadi, “Salafists Revisions in Morocco” (in Arabic), Ahewar Online, July 31, 2015, http://​www.ahewar.org/​debat/​show.art.asp?aid=478421. 33. Mohamed Fizazi, Traitors Not Scholars: Take Your Caution, http://​www.ilmway.com/​site/​ maqdis/​MS_​26895.html. 34. Aboullouz, “Le Salafisme marocain.” 35. Aboullouz, “Le Salafisme marocain.” 36. Aboullouz, “Le Salafisme marocain.” 37. “Africa Faces Terrorism Spectre,” News 24, May 31, 2003, https://www.news24.com/​ ​ Africa/​News/​Africa-​faces-​terrorism-​spectre-​20030531. 38. The Saudi collaboration with the United States during the First Gulf War (1990–91)​ cre­ ated tectonic shifts within Saudi Salafism. The movement seriously fractured along gen­ erational lines, blurring the boundaries between politics and religion, and rebellion and disobedience to a ruler’s commands. Such rifts with the Saudi Salafi establishment were mirrored in the Moroccan context. Boukhars, “Origins of Militancy.” 39. The main books that became widely available in Morocco were by the radical Salafi cleric and Jordanian national Abu Qatada al-​Filistini, by Abu Musab al-​Suri, or by Egyptian Muhammad abd-​al-​Salam Faraj (d. 1982), best known for his book The Neglected Duty (Al-​Faridah al-​Gha’ibah). 40. In the late 1990s, community-​based organizations started to spring up in many crime-​ ridden neighborhoods that police rarely went into. State authorities allowed Salafists to preach, resolve disputes between families, and confront drug dealers. But soon Salafists moved from preaching and policing neighborhoods to becoming a kind of morality po­ lice, enforcing religious ethics (Hisba) through commanding right and forbidding wrong (al-​amr bi-l-​ ​ma’ruf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar​ ). See Abdallah Tourabi, “Les attentats du 16 mai 2003 à Casablanca et l’émergence du salafisme jihadiste,” in Rougier,Qu’est- ​ce que le salafisme?, pp. 211–​228. 41. Selma Belaala, “Morocco: Slums Breed Jihad,” Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2004. 42. The increasing virulence of Salafi firebrands had also had an impact on the government’s calculations. On September 18, 2001, sixteen Salafi scholars issued a fatwa virulently denouncing as impious and heretical an ecumenical, interfaith ceremony held in Saint-​ Pierre Cathedral in Rabat at the behest of the palace to commemorate the deaths of September 11. The signatories denounced the kingdom’s alliance with the United States, “not only a major sin (kabira), but an apostacy (ridda) and impiety (kufr).” See Zeghal, Les islamistes marocains, p. 261. The signatories made sure not to attack the monarchy, and the minister of religious affairs also managed to force a great many of the signatories to withdraw their signature, therefore pitting them against those who stood by their fatwa. Nonetheless, the tone of the fatwa and usage of explosive and dangerous words such as takfir and “apostasy” showed how the takfiri ideology was beginning to take a life of its own. 43. Quoted in Driss Maghraoui, “The Strengths and Limits of Religious Reforms in Morocco,” Mediterranean Politics 14, no. 2 (2009): pp. 195–​211. 44. M’Daghri denies accusations that he was the architect behind the spread of Wahhabism into Morocco. Instead he blames the Ministry of Interior for playing a major role in the spread of Wahhabism. See M’Daghri, “J’ai gagné la confiance des islamistes.” 45. Cecilia Fernández Suzor, “La modernization de l’Islam: Entretien avec Ahmed Taoufiq,” Afkar/Idées​ (Winter 2006–​7): pp. 11–​14. 46. The closure of the schools resulted after Maghraoui caused public anger over a ­re sponse he issued on his website to a question about the permissibility of marriage for prepubescent girls. His validation of such unions earned him an immediate rebuke from the Moroccan Council of Islamic Scholars, which denounced him as an “agitator.” The court also launched an inquiry, followed by the closure of several Qur’anic schools ( 158 ) Notes to pages 48–53

that he run, including his headquarters in Marrakesh. Maghraoui argued that his fatwa was misconstrued, stating in a YouTube video, “When this question came up, I cited certain criteria: the girl has to be physically strong, has to have a mature personality, and other capacities that are rare for a nine-​year-​old.” See “Shutdown of Moroccan Sheikh Sanctioning Marriage at Age Nine,” PBS, October 8, 2008, http://​www.pbs. org/​wnet/​wideangle/​uncategorized/​shutdown-​of-​moroccan-​sheikh-​sanctioning-​ marriage-​at-​age-​nine/​3448/​. 47. Fernando Reinares, “The Evidence of Al-​Qa`ida’s Role in the 2004 Madrid Attack,” CTC Sentinel 5, no. 3 (March 2012). 48. Amr Hamzawy and Sarah Grebowski, “From Violence to Moderation Al-​Jama’a al-​ Islamiya and al-​Jihad,” Carnegie Papers, April 2010, http://​carnegieendowment.org/​files/​ Hamzawy-​Grebowski-​EN.pdf. 49. Lamine Ghanmi, “Two Bombers Attack U.S. Targets in Morocco,” Reuters, April 14, 2017, https://​www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​morocco-​algeria/​ two-​bombers-​attack-​u-​s-​targets-​in-​morocco-​idUSL1452495120070414. 50. Ahmed Shukairi Dinni, “The Significance of the Salafi vote for the Justice and Development Party” (in Arabic), Hespress, November 29, 2011. 51. See Ahmed al-​Shukairi Dini, “Salafiyya Madhkalia in Morocco in Morocco: from Cooptation to Instrumentalization” (in Arabic), Hespress, January 12, 2011, https://​www. hespress.com/​opinions/​26883.html. 52. Morshid Daraji, “Maghraoui: The Demands of the February 20 Movement Are Legitimate and Reasonable” (in Arabic), Hespress, April 25, 2011, https://www.hespress.com/​ ​ interviews/​30814.html. 53. Daraji, “Maghraoui.” 54. Sheikh al-​Maghraoui urged his followers to register to vote and support the 2011 con­ stitutional referendum. “Taking into consideration the constitution’s enhanced emphasis on Islamic identity,” he wrote in a communiqué published on his Facebook page on June 23, “we call upon Moroccans to vote yes, while reasserting the need to continue de­ manding that a text stipulate the place of Islamic sharia in the legislative structure.” See the post: https://​www.facebook.com/​notes/​180913391966643. 55. Hammad Kabbaj, “The Constitutional Question in Morocco and the Islamic Identity” (in Arabic) Al Bayan, July 12, 2011, http://​www.albayan.co.uk/​mobile/​article2. aspx?id=1185; see also Belaid Karoum, “Maghraoui Vows to Respond Firmly to the New Constitution in the Event of a Violation of Islam” (in Arabic), Masaa, June 7, 2011, https://​www.maghress.com/​almassae/​134484. 56. “Salafi Preacher Hammad Kabbaj ‘Opens Fire’ on the Deviation of Sufism in Morocco” (in Arabic), Shabakat Andalus al-​Ikhbariya, August 21, 2011, https://www.maghress.com/​ ​ andaluspress/​10556. 57. Masbah, “Salafist Movements in Morocco,” p. 597. 58. Dini, “Significance of the Salafi Vote.” 59. Interview with Mohamed El Maghraoui, Al Mashhad Weekly, July 27, 2011. 60. Masbah, “Salafist Movements in Morocco,” p. 599. 61. Adil Karmoussi, “Magharoui: Protests in the Lands of Islam Is Not Permissible” (in Arabic), Hespress, April 15, 2011, https://​www.hespress.com/​interviews/​30395.html. 62. “Bakouri and Mansouri Ask for a Fatwa from al-​Maghraoui” (in Arabic), Masaa, November 13, 2018, https://​www.maghress.com/​almassae/​167095. Mustapha Bakouri was secretary general of PAM and Fatima-​Zahra Mansouri was mayor of Marrakesh. 63. Author interview with Maghraoui followers, Marrakesh, Morocco, September 28, 2017. 64. Ibrahim Talib, “Hold On, Mr. Minister of Religious Endowments: Secularism Is Not the Solution” (in Arabic), Hespress, July 1, 2013, https://www.hespress.com/​ ​writers/​82903. html. Notes to pages 53–59 ( 159 )

65. Samir Hamadi, “Politics Divides the Salafis in Morocco” (in Arabic),Hespress , April 2, 2014, https://​www.hespress.com/​writers/​174051.html. 66. Author interview with Maghraoui followers, Kenitra, Morocco, September 19, 2017. 67. Hassan Ashraf, “Sheikh al-​Maghraoui Rejects Politics and Demonstrations as They Only Instigate Chaos and Tribulations” (in Arabic), Hespress, March 10, 2014, https://www.​ hespress.com/​orbites/​153611.html. 68. Mohammed Masbah, “Between Da’wa and Politics: How Did Politicization Lead to Divisions among Salafists In Morocco?” (in Arabic), MIPA Institute, March 12, 2018, http://​mipa.institute/​5494. 69. In 2014, Maghraoui also escalated his attacks on ISIS, instructing his followers to de­ nounce violent extremists and their thought. To demonstrate the utility of his associa­ tion to the regime, he helped organize in September 2014 a well-​attended conference on combating extremism in Marrakesh in which several religious associations participated. See Mustapha Ismaili, “The Maghrawiyoun Attack Daesh from Marrakesh” (in Arabic), Ahdath Online, September 12, 2014, http://​ahdath.info/​20022. 70. Author interview with Hammad Kabbaj followers, Rabat, Morocco, September 21, 2017. 71. Mohammed Masbah, “Salafi Movements and the Political Process in Morocco,” in Cavatorta and Merone, Salafism after the Arab Awakening, pp. 87–​88. 72. Ashraf El-​Sherif, “Egypt’s Salafists at a Crossroads,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 29, 2015, http://​carnegieendowment.org/​files/​salafist_​crossroads.pdf. 73. Adil Raffouch, “O Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” (in Arabic), Hespress, August 18, 2013, https://​www.hespress.com/​opinions/​86950.html. 74. “Maghraoui Calls on Students and Imams of Dar Al-​Quran in Marrakesh to Vote for PAM,” YouTube, October 5, 2016, https://​www.youtube.com/​watch?v=aHhldHlJYM4. 75. “Moroccan Salafists Disavow a Salafi Sheikh Because of the Elections” (in Arabic),Arabi , October 6, 2016, https://​arabi21.com. 76. Facebook post, December 19, 2017, https://​www.facebook.com/​kabbadj.hammad/​. 77. Facebook post, December 19, 2017. 78. Hammad Khabbaj, “The Underpinnings of Violence in the Madhkali Current” (in Arabic), Kabbadj, November 23, 2016, http://​kabbadj.com. 79. Adil Raffouch, “On the Contradictions of Madhkalis” (in Arabic), Reffouch, December 20, 2016, http://​reffouch.com/​?p=754. 80. Masbah, “Salafist Movements in Morocco,” pp. 618–​632. 81. Hammad Khabbaj, “The Scholars of Morocco and the Democratic Choice” (in Arabic), Kabbadj, July 8, 2017, http://​kabbadj.com. 82. Khabbaj, “Scholars of Morocco.” 83. Terje Østebø, Muslim Ethiopia: The Christian Legacy, Identity Politics, and Islamic Reformism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 30. 84. Mohammed Masbah, “Morocco’s Salafi Ex-​Jihadis: Co-​optation, Engagement, and the Limits of Inclusion,” Middle East Brief 108 (April 2017), https://www.brandeis.edu/​ ​ crown/​publications/​meb/​MEB108.pdf. 85. Author interview with a group of young Salafi jihadists, Tangier, Morocco, July 2–4,​ 2017.

CHAPTER 4 1. Said Rabia, “Le plan de guerre des salafistes,”El Watan, December 26, 2017, http://​ www.elwatan.com/​dyn/​imprimer.php?link=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.elwatan. com%2Factualite%2Fle-​plan-​de-​guerre-​des-​salafistes-​26-​12-​2017-​359329_​109.php; see also Said Rabia, “Enquête sur le wahhabisme en Algérie au cœur de la nébuleuse salafiste,” El Watan, December 25, 2017, http://​www.elwatan.com/​actualite/​au-​coeur-​de-​la-​ nebuleuse-​salafiste-​25-​12-​2017-​359258_​109.php. ( 160 ) Notes to pages 59–64

2. Zerouati Yamine, “Salafism in Algeria between a Truce with Secularism and Confrontation with Sufism,” (in Arabic), Ahewar, January 4, 2014, http://​www.ahewar.org/​debat/​show. art.asp?aid=394330. 3. Bruno Etienne, Abdelkader: Isthme des isthmes (Barzakh al-​barazikh) (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 2003). 4. Saïd Bouamama, Algérie: Les racines de l’intégrisme (Brussels: Editions Aden, 2000), p. 34. 5. Liess Boukra, Algérie: La terreur sacrée, ed. Hervé Bourges (Lausanne: Favre, 2002). 6. Séverine Labat, Les islamistes algériens, entre les urnes et le maquis (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1995), p. 61. 7. This dream of French citizenship never really materialized, not even for the loyalindigenes . 8. Charles-​Robert Ageron, Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine, vol. 2, De l’insurrection de 1871 au déclenchement de la guerre de liberation (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1979), p. 327. 9. Qur’an: Surat 13, Ar-​Ra`d (Thunder). 10. Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 12–​13. 11. Slimane Chikh, L’Algérie en armes, ou, Le temps des certitudes (Alger: Casbah Éditions, 1998), p. 39. 12. Jacques Berque, “Politics and Nationalism in the Maghrib and the Sahara, 1919–35,”​ in General History of Africa, vol. 7, Africa under Colonial Domination, 1880–1935​ , edited by A. Adu Boahen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 614. 13. Brahim Younessi, “L’islamisme algérien: Nébuleuse ou mouvement social ?,” Politique étrangère 60, no. 2 (1995): pp. 365–​376. 14. Ali Mérad, Le réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940: Essai d’histoire religieuse et sociale (Paris: Mouton, 1967). 15. Willis, Islamist Challenge in Algeria, p. 9. 16. Mérad, Le réformisme musulman. 17. Bouamama, Algérie, p. 63. 18. Bouamama, Algérie, p. 63. 19. Ageron, Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine, p. 643. 20. Bilel Ainine, “Islam politique et entrée en radicalité violente: Le cas des salafistes radicaux violents algériens” (PhD dissertation, Université Paris-​Saclay, 2017), pp. 85–​86, https://​ tel.archives-​ouvertes.fr/​tel-​01633855/​document. 21. Edmund Burke III, “Recent Books on Colonial Algerian History,” Middle Eastern Studies 7, no. 2 (May 1971): pp. 241–​250. 22. Labat, Les islamistes algériens, pp. 60–​61. 23. Benjamin Stora, Histoire de la guerre d’Algérie (1954–1962)​ , 4th ed. (Paris: Édla Découverte, 2004), p. 43. 24. Guy Pervillé, “Terrorisme et guérilla: De la Toussaint rouge à la tragédie des harkis,” in La guerre d’Algérie (1954–​1962), edited by Yves Michaud (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 2005), p. 52. 25. Abderrahim Lamchichi, Islam et contestation au Maghreb: Histoire et perspectives méditerranéennes, edited by Jacques Chevallier (Paris: l’Harmattan, 1990), p. 147. 26. Belkacem Benzenine, “Les ulémas algériens et leurs positions sous le régime de Ben Bella,” in Le Maghreb et l’indépendance de l’Algérie, edited by Amar Mohand-​Amer and Belkacem Benzenine (Paris: Karthala, 2012), pp. 103–114.​ https://​ouvrages.crasc.dz/​ pdfs/​2012%20les%20indpendances%20au%20maghreb%20-​benzenine.pdf). 27. Willis, Islamist Challenge in Algeria. 28. Abderrahim Lamchichi, L’islamisme en Algérie (Paris: Editions l’Harmattan, 1992), p. 95. Notes to pages 65–68 ( 161 )

29. Laurie A. Brand, Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), p. 138. 30. This is term used by Mohammed Harbi, a dissident historian and secular political militant, to denounce what he viewed as the stifling despotism of the proponents of conservative and exclusivist traditions. See Mohammed Harbi, Le FLN: Mirage et réalité des à la prise du pouvoir (1945–1962)​ (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1980). 31. Brand, Official Stories, p. 138. 32. In November 1979, protests by Arabized students erupted at several Algerian universities. Students denounced the state’s presumed favoritism toward holders of graduate degrees in French. Their solution was to fully Arabize the administration. Omnipresent among the posters brandished by the posters were signs that read: “We are boycotting classes as we did in 1956/2​ and we will not go back until full Arabization is implemented,” “Unity of language is unity of mind,” and “The Arabic language is part of the 1954 revolution.” See Mohamed Benrabah, “The Language Planning Situation in Algeria,”Current Issues in Language Planning 64, no. 4 (March 2014): pp. 379–​502; see also John Ruedy, Modem Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Omar Assous, “Arabization and cultural conflicts in Algeria” (PhD dissertation, Northeastern University, 1985). 33. Lamchichi, Islam et contestation au Maghreb, p. 158. 34. See Ainine, “Islam politique,” p. 108. 35. Lamchichi, Islam et contestation au Maghreb, p. 159. 36. Abderrahmane Moussaoui, De la violence en Algérie, les lois du chaos (Arles: Actes Sud, 2006), p. 147. 37. Ainine, “Islam politique,” p. 111. 38. Martin Evans and John Phillips, Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 129. 39. Evans and Phillips, Algeria, p. 129. 40. Evans and Phillips, Algeria, p. 129. 41. Akbar Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), p. 188. 42. In the late 1980s, the Algerian elite felt threatened by popular unrest over corruption and unemployment. Responding to the outbreak of riots in major Algerian cities, the govern­ ment acted as authoritarian governments often do—​with a massive show of force that claimed the lives of over five hundred people. The brutality shocked Algerians and severely damaged the reputation of the army. Significantly weakened and divided, the regime, es­ pecially its moderate wing, calculated that the introduction of political reforms would restore stability and ease public bitterness. See Anouar Boukhars, “Political Violence in North Africa: The Perils of Incomplete Liberalization,” Brookings Institution, January 21, 2011, https://​www.brookings.edu/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2016/​06/​01_​north_​africa_​ boukhars.pdf 43. Evans and Phillips, Algeria, p. 134. 44. Ainine, “Islam politique,” p. 211. 45. Stéphane Lacroix, “Egypt’s Pragmatic Salafis: The Politics of Hizb-​ al Nour,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 1, 2016, https://​carnegieendowment. org/​files/​CP_​287_​Lacroix_​al_​Nour_​Party_​Final.pdf. 46. Boukhars, “Political Violence in North Africa.” 47. Drawing primarily from the experiences of Algeria, in addition to those of Egypt, Kashmir, the southern Philippines, Chechnya, and Tajikistan, Mohammed Hafez dem­ onstrated how Islamist rebellion “was a defensive response to brutal and indiscriminate repression that threatened the organizational and physical well-​being of Islamists and their supporters.” While acknowledging that repression alone cannot bring about mass ( 162 ) Notes to pages 68–74

rebellion, Hafez, nevertheless, shows how “in the context of institutional exclusion, re­ bellion became a legitimate strategy for countering repressive state policies.” Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 103; Mohammad Hafez, “A Tragedy of Errors: Thwarted Democratization and Islamist Violence in Algeria,” in Democratic Development and Political Terrorism, edited by William Crotty (Holliston, MA: Northeastern, 2005), pp. 301–​331. See also Mohammad Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement,” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 61–​88. 48. See the excellent study by Mohammed M. Hafez, “Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars,” Terrorism and Political Violence 2017. The journal Terrorism and Political Violence did not include the volume and issue numbers. The Taylor and Francis online page for the article does not have that information. 49. Cited in Hafez, “Fratricidal Rebels.” 50. Mohammed M. Hafez, “The Curse of Cain: Why Fratricidal Jihadis Fail to Learn from Their Mistakes,”CTC Sentinel 10 (November 2017): p. 1. 51. Hafez, “The Curse of Cain,” p. 1. 52. Amel Boubekeur, “Salafism and Radical Politics in Postconflict Algeria,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2008, http://​carnegieendowment.org/​ files/​salafism_​radical_​politics_​algeria.pdf. 53. “La starisation des Chouyoukh est désormais mondialisée,” El Watan, July 14, 2015, https://www.elwatan.com/​ edition/​ ​actualite/​ la-​starisation-​des-​chouyoukh-​est-​desormais-​mondialisee-​14-​07-​2015. 54. Said Rabia, “La filiation saoudienne des idéologues,” El Watan, December 25, 2017, http://​www.elwatan.com/​dyn/​imprimer.php?link=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.elwatan. com%2Factualite%2Fla-​filiation-​saoudienne-​des-​ideologues-​25-​12-​2017-​359259_​109. php. 55. Ali Boukhlef, “Quand l’Arabie Saoudite désigne les représentants salafistes algériens,”El Watan, January 14, 2018, http://​www.elwatan.com/​actualite/​quand-​l-​arabie-​saoudite-​ designe-​les-​representants-​salafistes-​algeriens-​14-​01-​2018-​360484_​109.php. 56. Mohamed Ali Ferkous, “The Honor of Embracing the Doctrine of Salafism and Aspects of Divergences with the So-​Called Jihadi and Partisan Salafism” (in Arabic), Dar Al-​Mawqi, https://​www.ferkous.com/​home/​page-​flip/​page. php?type=livre-​ar&id=rs-​18. 57. Ferkous, “Honor of Embracing the Doctrine.” 58. Mohamed Ali Ferkous, “Da’wa Salafiyya and the Obstacles in the Path of Its Growth and Expansion” (in Arabic), August 20, 2016, http://​ferkous.com/​home/​?q=art-​mois-​104. 59. Mohamed Ali Ferkous, “The Truths and Dangers of Secularism” (in Arabic), November 3, 2005, http://​ferkous.com/​home/​?q=art-​mois-​13. 60. Statement and clarification on what was raised about the meeting of Salafist preachers in Algeria with the reformist Sheikhs, May 19, 2018, https://www.elkistas.com/​ ​forum/​ forum/​main-​forum/​1381. 61. Rabia, “Enquête sur le wahhabisme.” 62. “Constantine: Guerre pour le controle des mosquees,” accessed on October 30, 2018, https://​www.liberte-​algerie.com/​actualite/​constantine-​guerre-​pour-​le-​controle-​des-​ mosquees-​9183/​pprint/​1. 63. Andrew Wojtanik, “Mokhtar Belmokhtar: One-​Eyed Firebrand of North Africa and the Sahel,” CTC Sentinel, March 1, 2015, https://​ctc.usma.edu/​app/​uploads/​2018/​01/​ CTC_​Mokhtar-​Belmokhtar-​Jihadi-​Bio-​February2015-​2.pdf. Notes to pages 74–79 ( 163 )

64. Isabelle Mandraud, “En Algérie, Ghardaïa enflammée par les violences communautaires,” Le Monde, February 2, 2016, http://​www.lemonde.fr/​afrique/​article/​2014/​02/​19/​en-​ algerie-​ghardaia-​enflammee-​par-​les-​violences-​communautaires_​4369303_​3212.html. 65. International Crisis Group, “Algeria’s South: Trouble’s Bellwether Middle East and North Africa,” November 21, 2016, https://​d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/​171-​algeria-​s-​ south-​trouble-​s-​bellwether.pdf. 66. The fatwa: “Message to the Algerian government,” www.youtube.com/​ watch?v=2MXJD35U3SY. “Ghardaia: Les tenants et aboutissements d’une fitna organisée,” Algerie-Focus​ , July 9, 2015, https://​www.algerie-​focus.com/​2015/​07/​ ghardaiales-​tenants-​et-​aboutissants-​dune-​fitna-​organisee/​. 67. “Découvrez: Cheikh Sâlem al Mourîda al Adrâri,” June 13, 2016, http://​hijra-​en-​algerie. com/​decouvrezSheikhh-​salem-​al-​mourida-​al-​adrari-​2-​1832. 68. Lefevre, “North Africa’s Maliki Crisis”; Anouar Boukhars, “‘Quietist’ and ‘Firebrand’ Salafism in Algeria,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 24, 2015, https://​carnegieendowment.org/​2015/​11/​24/​ quietist-​and-​firebrand-​salafism-​in-​algeria-​pub-​62075. 69. Ainine, “Islam politique,” p. 538. 70. Said Rabia, “Leur masque est leur alibi,” El Watan, December 26, 2017, http://​ www.elwatan.com/​dyn/​imprimer.php?link=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.elwatan. com%2Factualite%2Fleur-​masque-​est-​leur-​alibi-​26-​12-​2017-​359328_​109.php. 71. Rabia, “Leur masque.” 72. Lamine Chikhi, “Top Algerian Salafist’s Fatwa Says Unrest Un-​ Islamic,” Reuters, March 15, 2011, https://​www.reuters.com/​article/​ ozatp-​algeria-​religion-​unrest-​20110315-​idAFJOE72E0B620110315. 73. “Cheikh Ferkous: ‘Les victimes des manifestations ne sont pas des martyrs,’” Alg 24 online, May 4, 2011, https://​www.alg24.net/​Sheikhh-​ferkous-​les-​victimes-​des-​manifestations-​ ne-​sont-​pas-​des-​martyrs/​. 74. “Sheikhh Ferkous: ‘Les salafistes qui siègent aux Parlements arabes sont devenus des communistes,’” Echorouk Online, April 15, 2013, https://www.echoroukonline.com/​ ​ara/​ articles/​161827.html. 75. “Sheikhh Ferkous.” 76. In October 2014, Hamdache embarked on a “purification” campaign against bars and places of debauchery and prostitution in Algeria’s coastal areas. P. Markey and L. Chikhi, “Ex-​fighter’s Calls for Algeria Islamist Party Stir Ghosts of Past,” Reuters, September 22, 2015, https://​www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​algeria-​politics/​ex-​fighters-​calls-​for-​algeria-​ islamist-​party-​stir-​ghosts-​of-​past-​idUSKCN0RM1YX20150922. 77. Assiya Hamza, “Interdit de candidature, l’islamiste Ali Belhadj attend son heure,”France 24, April 11, 2014, http://​www.france24.com/​fr/​20140405-​algerie-​ali-​belhadj-​interdit-​ candidature-​presidentielle-​election-​front-​islamique-​salut. 78. Markey and Chikhi, “Ex-​Fighter’s Calls.” 79. Ainine, “Islam politique,” p. 544. 80. Abdelhak Azzouzi, Autoritarisme et aléas de la transition démocratique dans les pays du Maghreb (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006), p. 347. 81. Markey and Chikhi, “Ex-​Fighter’s Calls.” 82. Azhar Sniqra, “Advice and Guidance to Warnings about Demonstrations and Rallies,” February 19, 2019, http://​www.tasfia-​tarbia.org/​vb/​showthread. php?p=94329#post94329. 83. Dalia Ghanem Yazbeck, “Obstacles to ISIS Expansion,” Cipher Brief, September 2016, https://​www.thecipherbrief.com/​article/​africa/​obstacles-​to-​isis-​expansion#. V8fEyP9AEgM; see also Dalia Ghanem Yazbeck, “A Life after Jihadism,”Diwan (blog), ( 164 ) Notes to pages 79–82

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 17, 2017, http://carnegie​ -​mec. org/​diwan/​74708. 84. Emily Estelle and Brenna Snyder, “AQIM and ISIS in Algeria: Competing Campaigns,” Critical Threats Project, June 2, 2016, https://​www.criticalthreats.org/​analysis/​aqim-​ and-​isis-​in-​algeria-​competing-​campaigns#_​ednff088e21f4594b67bbc85f14d96aca752. 85. “IS Claims Bombing on Algerian Forces in Constantine,” SITE Intelligence Group, December 1, 2015; “IS Claims Second Bombing on Algerian Soldiers in Constantine,” SITE Intelligence Group, December 18, 2015; “IS-​Linked ‘Amaq News Reports Killing, Wounding of Algerian Soldiers in Skikda,” SITE Intelligence Group, January 29, 2016; Caleb Weiss, “Islamic State Claims Killing Algerian Soldiers,” Long War Journal, February 21, 2016, http://​www.longwarjournal.org/​archives/​2016/​02/​islamic-​state-​claims-​ killing-​algerian-​soldiers.php. 86. Khaled Bel, “Le chef des salafistes algériens décrète Yennayer ‘Haram’ dans une Fatwa,” ObservAlgerie Online, January 12, 2018, https://​observalgerie.com/​actualite-​algerie/​ societe/​chef-​salafistes-​algeriens-​decrete-​yennayer-​haram/​. 87. “Les imams ayant refusé d’accomplir la prière de l’absent révoqués,” Liberte, March 10, 2014, https://​www.liberte-​algerie.com/​actualite/​les-​imams-​ayant-​refuse-​daccomplir-​ la-​priere-​de-​labsent-​revoques-​202457. Algerian newspapers abound with stories about Salafi intolerance, exhibited itself in the mosques and street markets that Salafis domi­ nate. Salafis pressure street vendors and shopkeepers to adapt their goods to Islamic requirements and desist from selling alcohol and tobacco. In some mosques uncontrolled by the government, self-​proclaimed Salafi imams are accused of propagating a panoply of fiery hate speech and extremist views. L. Chikhi, “Hard-​Line Islam Steps Out of Shadows in Algeria,” Reuters, August 10, 2010; see also Khider Ouahab, “Accusé d’apostasie, l’imam refuse de prier à sa mémoire,” November 4, 2017, http://www.elwatan.com/​ ​regions/​est/​ skikda/​a-​ccuse-​d-​apostasie-​l-​imam-​refuse-​de-​prier-​a-​sa-​memoire-​04-​11-​2017-​355950_​ 128.php. 88. “Tamanrasset/​ Quand Ouyahia fait l’apologie du . . . salafisme,” Algerie-focus​ , March 12, 2017, http://​www.algerie-​focus.com/​2017/​03/​video-​tamanrasset-​ouyahia-​lapologie-​ salafisme/​. 89. On the decline of Malikism, see Lefevre, “North Africa’s Maliki Crisis.” 90. Mohamed Aïssa, “Le danger des imams autoproclamés,” El Watan, June 24, 2015. It is in this context that in 2015, the government announced the creation of the Scientific National Council (SNC), in charge of issuing “official” fatwas. The SNC has already is­ sued several religious decrees, from the permissibility of accepting bank loans for the ac­ quisition of subsidized apartments to the limits imposed on organ transplants and a ban on anonymous egg and sperm donation. Farid Alilat, “Algérie: La fatwa, une affaire d’état,” Jeune Afrique, February 18, 2015, http://​www.jeuneafrique.com/​225438/​politique/​alg-​ rie-​la-​fatwa-​une-​affaire-​d-​tat/​. 91. H. Khemissia, R. R. Larémontb and T. T. Eddinec, “Sufism, Salafism and State Policy towards Religion in Algeria: A Survey of Algerian Youth,” Journal of North African Studies 17, no. 3 (Spring 2012): pp. 547–​558.

CHAPTER 5 1. In the early years of the postrevolutionary period, Islamists and secularists argued inces­ santly over the social models of life they wanted to preserve or promote. Each camp feared that its individual ways of life (dress codes, dietary habits like alcohol consumption, and so on) might be jeopardized in the absence of absolute constitutional guarantees of individual liberties and religious rights. It is important to note that in these debates, the principles of political rights figure less prominently. In other words, the political warfare witnessed Notes to pages 82–87 ( 165 )

among the political parties and civil society was not fueled by competing political doctrines of government or divergences over the appropriate political and social contract. For more analysis, see Anouar Boukhars, “In the Crossfire: Islamists’ Travails in Tunisia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2014, https://​carnegieendowment.org/​ 2014/​01/​27/​in-​crossfire-​islamists-​travails-​in-​tunisia-​pub-​54311. 2. Hibou Béatrice, “Le réformisme, grand récit politique de la Tunisie contemporaine,” Revue d’histoire moderne & contemporaine 56, no. 4b (May 2009): pp. 14–​39, doi: 10.3917/​rhmc.565.0014. https://​www.cairn.info/​ revue-​d-​histoire-​moderne-​et-​contemporaine-​2009-​5-​page-​14.htm. 3. Béatrice, “Le réformisme.” 4. The beys ruled Tunisia from around 1613 until 1957, when the monarchy was abolished. 5. Béatrice, “Le réformisme.” 6. Abdellatif Hermassi, “Ulamas réformistes et religiosité populaire: Approche sociologique d’un différend tuniso-​algérien,” Insaniyat, December 2006, https://journals.openedition.​ org/​insaniyat/​9678/​. 7. Hermassi, “Ulamas réformistes.” 8. Hermassi, “Ulamas réformistes.” 9. Hermassi, “Ulamas réformistes.” 10. Moustapha Achour, “Tahar ibn Achour, chevalier de la libération et de l’illumination,” Monde Arabe, February 13, 2012, http://​www.ism-​france.org/​analyses/​Tahar-​ibn-​ Achour-​Chevalier-​de-​la-​liberation-​et-​de-​l-​illumination-​article-​16625. The original article in Arabic can be accessed at https://​www.turess.com/​alfajrnews/​19417. 11. Bashir Mousa Nafie, “Tahir Ibn Ashur: The Career and Thought of a Modern Reformist Alim, with Special Reference to His Work of Tafsir,” Journal of Qur’anic Studies 7, no. 1 (2005): p. 9. 12. Ennahda is in part reconstructing its ideology by referring to this kind of intellectual legacy. 13. The Ottomans reintroduced the Hanafi madhhab in 1574, which “for a time was imposed on the entire population.” See Arnold Green, The Tunisian Ulama, 1873–​1915: Social Structure and Response to Ideological Currents (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), p. 33. 14. Hermassi, “Ulamas réformistes.”. 15. Hermassi, “Ulamas réformistes.” 16. Béatrice, “Le réformisme.” 17. Mustafa Kariem, Pouvoir colonial et mouvement national: La Tunisie des années trente (Tunis: Alif, 1990), p. 51. 18. Martina Sabra, “The Tunisian Islamic Scholar and Activist Tahar Haddad: A Rebel Loyal to the Koran,” Qantara, November 26, 2010, https://en.qantara.de/​ ​content/​ the-​tunisian-​islamic-​scholar-​and-​activist-​tahar-​haddad-​a-​rebel-​loyal-​to-​the-​koran. 19. Bechir Tlili, “Des paradoxes de la pensée réformiste tunisienne moderne et contemporaine,” Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Istituto italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente 30, no. 3 (September 1975): pp. 317–​345; Bechir Tlili, “Au seuil du nationalisme tunisien: Documents inédits sur le panislamisme au Maghreb (1919–​ 1923),” in Nationalisme, socialisme et syndicalisme, vol. 1, Tunis: University of Tunis, 1984), pp. 65–​97. 20. “Neo-​Destour and Independence, 1934–​1956,” worldhistory, August 25, 2015, http://​ www.worldhistory.biz/​sundries/​46968-​tunisia-​neo-​destour-​and-​independence-​1934-​ 1956.html. 21. Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia, p. 21. 22. Malika Zeghal, “État et marché des biens religieux: Les voies égyptienne et tunisienne,” Critique Internationale 5 (1999): pp. 75–​95, https://​www.persee.fr/​doc/​criti_​1290-​ 7839_​1999_​num_​5_​1_​1504. ( 166 ) Notes to pages 87–93

23. Simon Hawkins, “Who Wears Hijab with the President: Constructing a Modern Islam in Tunisia,” Journal of Religion in Africa 41, no. 1 (2001): pp. 35–​58. 24. Paul Balta, Islam: Civilisation et sociétés (Paris: Editions Du rocher, 1991), p. 157. 25. Hibou, “Le réformisme.” 26. Zeghal, “État et marché des biens religieux.” 27. Khansa Ben Tarjem, “Islams politiques en Tunisie: De la contestation zitounienne au jihadisme. Genèse et évolution,” Maghreb Magazine 20 (May–​June 2013). 28. Today, the divisions can also be seen in the voting patterns of the two areas. In Tunisia’s 2014 elections, the votes showed that regional polarization and class divisions remain defining features of the country. Tunisia’s impoverished interior and south are ideologically and so­ cially far apart from the coastal north. Indeed, the presidential election results—​showing strong support in the south for Moncef Marzouki, while the north chose Beji Caid Essebsi—​ make Tunisia look more like two nations. Marzouki, who is from the south, was seen as an al­ ternative to the power structures that have dominated Tunisia since independence in 1956, in which elites from the capital, Tunis, and the coastal areas of the Sahel region played a leading role. See Anouar Boukhars, “The Reckoning: Tunisia’s Perilous Path to Democratic Stability,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/​ ​ 2015/​04/​02/​reckoning-​tunisia-​s-​perilous-​path-​to-​democratic-​stability-​pub-​59571. 29. Christina Omlin, “Ennahda Has an Unbelievable Capacity to Adjust,” Qantara, January 20, 2014, http://en.qantara.de/​ ​content/​ interview-​with-​hele-​beji-​ennahdahas-​an-​unbelievable-​capacity-​to-​adjust. 30. Frank Fregosi, “La régulation institutionnelle de l’islam en Tunisie: Entre audace moderniste et tutelle étatique,” Policy Paper 4, IFRI, November 2003, https://​www. sciencespo.fr/​ceri/​sites/​sciencespo.fr.ceri/​files/​artff.pdf. 31. Zeghal, “État et marché des biens religieux.” 32. Fregosi, “La régulation institutionnelle de l’islam.” 33. Zeghal, “État et marché des biens religieux.” 34. Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia since Independence: The Dynamics of One-​Party Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 54. 35. Zeghal, “État et marché des biens religieux.” 36. Marion Boulby, “The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence,”Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 (April 1988): pp. 590–​614. 37. Boulby, “The Islamic Challenge.” 38. Boulby, “The Islamic Challenge.” 39. The Movement for Islamic Tendency, or MTI, rebranded itself in 1988, changing its name to Ennahda. 40. Quoted in Rory McCarthy, “Re-​thinking Secularism in Post-​independence Tunisia,” Journal of North African Studies 19, no. 5 (May 2014): pp. 733–​750. 41. Vincent Geisser, “Ennahdha et les salafistes, radioscopie d’une re­ lation,” Réalités, June 26, 2012, www.realites.com.tn/​interview/​ vincent-​geisser-​ennahdha-​et-​les-​salafistesradioscopie-​dune-​relation. 42. By the late 1990s, many downloaded and distributed the outlawed books of Ibn Tamiyya and Muhammad Al Maqdisi. 43. Author interview with several Ennahda parliamentarians and secular elites, August 2013. 44. Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, “Tunisian Salafism: Between Institutional Politics, Dawa and Jihadism,” Orient 54, no. 3 (2013): pp. 31. 45. Sami Ghorbal, “Comment les salafistes ont été neutralisés,” Jeune Afrique, January 7, 2008, https://​www.jeuneafrique.com/​128126/​archives-​thematique/​comment-​les-​salafistes-​ ont-​t-​neutralis-​s/​. 46. Christophe Ayad, “Rafles tous azimuts en Tunisie: Après les récentes fusillades, le pouvoir ratisse large,” Libération, February 2, 2007. Notes to pages 93–98 ( 167 )

47. These are the same insidious old markers that President Esebsi used to denounce the 1.1 million Tunisians who had voted for his secular rival, Marzouki, in the first round of the 2014 presidential election. Such caricatures of the south as extremists and terrorist sympathizers combine nefariously to produce a reading of society in which the good lib­ eral and secular Tunisians face off against the bad Islamists. 48. Vincent Geisser and Eric Gobe, “Un si long règne . . . Le régime de Ben Ali vingtans après,” L’année du Maghreb (CNRS Éditions, 2008), https://journals.openedition.org/​ ​ anneemaghreb/​464#bodyftn13. 49. Some of the material in this section is based on Boukhars, “In the Crossfire.” 50. Monica Marks, “Plagued by Insecurities,” Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 5, 2013, http://​carnegieendowment.org/​2013/​03/​05/​ plagued-​by-​ insecurities/​fo7g. 51. “Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge,” International Crisis Group, N°137 | February 13, 2013, p. 38. 52. Qital is a derivative of the word jihad, which means an effort to submit to God and purify oneself from within. Examples of qital cited in the Qur’an are: “Fight [qatilu] in the way of God against those who fight you, but do not attack them first. Verily, God does not love the aggressors” (Qur’an: 2:190); “If they withdraw not from you, and offer you not peace, and refrain not their hand, take them, and slay them wherever you come to them; against them We have given you a clear authority” (Qur’an 4:91–​93). 53. “Now There Are Fewer Than 100,” religious affairs minister Noureddine Khadmi told Reuters in an interview. Tom Heneghan, “Ennahda’s Religious Policies Split Tunisia’s Ruling Party,” Huffington Post, April 9, 2013, www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/​ ​09/​04/​ Ennahda-​religious-​policies-​tunisia_​n_​3861793.html. 54. See International Crisis Group, “Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge,” Middle East/​ North Africa Report, no. 137, February 13, 2013, https://​www.crisisgroup.org/​middle-​ east-​north-​africa/​north-​africa/​tunisia/​tunisia-​violence-​and-​salafi-​challenge. 55. Tim Whewell, “Justice Kiosk: Tunisia’s Alternative Law Enforcers,” BBC News Magazine, July 29, 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/​news/​magazine-​23469218. 56. Monica Marks, “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current,” Mediterranean Politics 18, no. 1 (Spring 2013): pp. 104–​111. 57. Marks, “Youth Politics.” 58. Monica Marks, “Who Are Tunisia’s Salafis?,” Foreign Policy, September 28, 2012, http://​ foreignpolicy.com/​2012/​09/​28/​who-​are-​tunisias-​salafis/​. 59. Fredric Volpi, “Shaping Contention as a Salafi Movement: The Rise and Fall of Ansar -​al Sharia in Post-​revolutionary Tunisia,” in Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings: Mapping Interactions between Regimes and Protesters, edited by Fredric Volpi and James M. Jasper (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018), https://​www.academia.edu/​ 35988258/​Shaping_​Contention_​as_​a_​Salafi_​Movement_​The_​Rise_​and_​Fall_​of_​ Ansar_​al-​Sharia_​in_​Post-​Revolutionary_​Tunisia. 60. Sabrina Zouaghi and Francesco Cavatorta, “A Doomed Relationship: Ennahdha and Salafism,” Baker Institute for Public Policy, April 27, 2018, https://​www.bakerinstitute. org/​media/​files/​files/​7129f507/​bi-​brief-​042718-​cme-​carnegie-​tunisia3.pdf. 61. See Wafa Sdiri, “Vidéo: La nouvelle Tunisie aux yeux d’Abou Iyadh, leader des salafistes jihadistes,” Tunisie numérique, May 21, 2012, www.tunisienumerique.com/​ video-​la-​ nouvelle-​tunisie-​aux-​yeux-​d%E2%80%99abou-​iyadh-​leader-​des-​salafistesjihadistes/​ 125679. 62. Francesco Cavatorta, “Salafism, Liberalism, and Democratic Learning in Tunisia,” Journal of North African Studies 20, no. 5 (2015): pp. 770–​783. 63. Cavatorta, “Salafism, Liberalism.” ( 168 ) Notes to pages 98–102

64. “Interview with Vincent Geisser,” El Kasbah, December 2, 2012, www.facebook.com/ ​ notes/​el-​kasbah/​10-​questions-​%C3%A0-​vincent-​geisser/​493425510697021. 65. See Céline Lussato’s interview with Francois Burgat, “Tunisie: Le retrait d’Ennahda n’est pas l’échec de l’Islam politique,” Le Nouvel Observateur, October 29, 2013, https://www.​ nouvelobs.com/​monde/​20131029.OBS3037/​tunisie-​le-​retrait-​d-​ennahda-​n-​est-​pas-​un-​ echec-​de-​l-​islam-​politique.html. 66. Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, “Post-​Islamism, Ideological Evolution and ‘La Tunisianité’ of the Tunisian Islamist Party al-​Nahda,” Journal of Political Ideologies 20, no. 1 (2015): pp. 27–​42. 67. See Perrine Mouterde, “Au congrès de Kairouan, les salafistes seront tentés de provoquer Ennahda,” France 24, May 17, 2013, https://​www.france24.com/​fr/​ 20130517-​tunisie-​rassemblement-​kairouan-​salafistes-​tentation-​provoquer-​ennahda-​ geisser. 68. See Ghannouchi’s interview with Al Hayat, “Attack on Embassies Is Conspiracy Aimed at Stopping U.S. Dialogue with Islamists,” Al Hayat, September 30, 2012, http:// ​alhayat. com/​Details/​439628. 69. “Rached Ghannouchi: ‘Si nous diabolisons les salafistes, dans dix ou quinze ans, ils seront au pouvoir,’” Le Monde, October 10, 2012, www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/​ ​ article/2012/​ ​10/​ 18/​m-​ghannouchi-​si-​nous-​diabolisons-​les-​salafistes-​dans-​dix-​ouquinze-​ans-​ils-​seront-​ au-​pouvoir_​1777448_​1466522.html. 70. See Marks, “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism.” 71. Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, “Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conservative Party,” Democratization 20, no. 5 (Summer 2013): pp. 857–​875. 72. Roua Khlifi and Adam Le Nevez, “Secret Video Reveals Ghannouchi’s Vision for Islam in Tunisia,” Tunisia-​live, October 11, 2012, www.tunisia-​live.net/​2012/​10/​11/​ secret-​video-​reveals-​ghannouchis-​vision-​for-​islam-​in-​tunisia. 73. Robert Fisk, “Rached Ghannouchi Says He Doesn’t Want an Islamic State in Tunisia,” Independent, October 24, 2012, www.independent.co.uk/​voices/​comment/​ rachedghannouchi-​says-​he-​doesnt-​want-​an-​islamic-​state-​in-​tunisia-​can-​he-​prove-​his-​ criticswrong-​8225092.html. See also Ghannouchi’s interview in Hayat, “Attack on Embassies Is Conspiracy.” 74. Other Salafi parties that were granted permission include Hizb al-​Asala and Hizb al-​ Rahma. The radical Pan-​Islamist Hizb al-​Tahrir was also integrated into the political process. 75. For an excellent explanation of Islamic law and why sharia can be appealing to Muslims, see N. Feldman, “Why Shariah?,” New York Times, March 16, 2008, www. nytimes.com/​ 2008/​03/​16/​magazine/​16Shariah-​t.html?pagewanted=all&_​r=0. 76. Monica Marks, “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current,” Mediterranean Politics, March 2013. 77. Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, “Tunisian Salafism: Between Institutional Politics, Dawa and Jihadism,” Orient 54, no. 3 (2013): 31. 78. “En Tunisie, Ennahda face au défi de la contestation salafiste,”L’Orient– Le​ Jour, May 15, 2013, www.lorientlejour.com/​article/​814464/​en-​tunisie-​ennahda-​face-​au-​defi-​dela-​ contestation-​salafiste.html. 79. Ghannouchi acknowledged as much when he told Isabelle Mandraud of Le Monde that from the beginning, Ennahda should have been firmer with radical Salafists. “Rached Ghannouchi: ‘Ennahda a quitté le pouvoir par choix éthique,’”Le Monde, January 14, 2014, www.lemonde.fr/​tunisie/​article/​2014/​01/​14/​rached-​ghannouchinous-​avons-​ quitte-​le-​pouvoir-​par-​choix-​ethique_​4347544_​1466522.html. Notes to pages 102–108 ( 169 )

80. Kevin Casey, “A Crumbling Salafi Strategy,” Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 21, 2013, http://​carnegieendowment.org/​ sada/​2013/​08/​21/​crumbling-​ salafi-​strategy/​gjkq. 81. Geisser, “Ennahdha et les salafistes.” 82. Kamal Ben Younes, Islamists and Secularists in Tunisia: From Prisons and Repression to the Challenge of Governing the Country (Tunis: Berg Editions, 2012), p. 52. 83. Geisser, “Ennahdha et les salafistes.” 84. Frida Dahmani, “Tunisie: Chourou, l’imprécateur,” Jeune Afrique, September 19, 2013, www.jeuneafrique.com/​Article/​JA2748p049.xml1/​tunisie-​anc-​sadok-​ chourouennahdhatunisie-​chourou-​l-​imprecateur.html. 85. “Tunisie: Réactions des groupes parlementaires aux interventions de Chourou et Badi sur le projet de constitution,” Babnet Tunisie, January 18, 2014, www.babnet.net/​cadredetail-​ 78316.asp 86. See Isabelle Mandraud, “Ali Larayedh: ‘Je veux redonner confiance aux Tunisiens,’” Le Monde, March 26, 2013. 87. Volpi, “Shaping Contention.” 88. See Stefano M. Torelli, “Tunisia’s Elusive Jihadist Network,” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 11, no. 12 (June 2013): pp. 4–6;​ Stefano M. Torelli, “Meeting the Jihadi Challenge in Tunisia: The Military and Political Response,” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 11, no. 17 (September 2013): pp. 5–​7. 89. Olfa Lamloum, “Marginalisation, Insecurity and Uncertainty on the Tunisian-​Libyan Border: Ben Guerdane and Dhehiba from the Perspective of Their Inhabitants,” International Alert, December 2016, http://​www.international-​alert.org/​sites/​default/​ files/​TunisiaLibya_​MarginalisationInsecurityUncertaintyBorder_​EN_​2016.pdf. 90. International Crisis Group, “Jihadist Violence in Tunisia: The Urgent Need for a National Strategy,” Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa Briefing no. 50, June 22, 2016, https://​www.crisisgroup.org/​middle-​east-​north-​africa/​north-​africa/​tunisia/​ jihadist-​violence-​tunisia-​urgent-​need-​national-​strategy. 91. BBC, “Tunisia Attacks: Militants Jailed over 2015 Terror,” February 9, 2019, https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47183027. 92. Michaël Béchir Ayari, “Seven Ways to Steady a Tunisia under New Attack,” Crisis Group blog, March 9, 2016. 93. Ordinary citizens welcomed this “return” of the state in areas where the police had basically withdrawn. After the initial enthusiasms for the end of the repressive tactics of the police, cit­ izens began to ask for the police to come back as a degree of policing was a necessity. 94. Cavatorta, “Salafism, Liberalism.” 95. Volpi, “Shaping Contention.”

CHAPTER 6 1. The term “Madkhali” is itself highly contentious and reflective of an intense battle for public religious space, formal Islamic institutions, and mosques between Salafists and more politically active Islamist currents that defy easy categorization. According to sev­ eral interlocutors, it was in the early stages of these splits, in 2013, that activist Islamist currents—some aligned with Brotherhood and jihadist factions—started deploying the term “Madkhali” in their media outlets to denigrate their Salafist opponents as foreign proxies. Thus, the use of the term is somewhat constructed and anachronistic; scholars must be careful about projecting back into time divisions among Salafis that were not pre­ sent until later in the postrevolutionary period. With these caveats in mind, the term is still a useful device to encompass diverse adherents of this particular strain of Salafism, who do in fact regard Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali as their principal living clerical referent—though ( 170 ) Notes to pages 108–110

the relationship is not as slavish or one-way as their opponents maintain, and they also venerate other Salafi clerics, many of them deceased. 2. Lacroix, “Between Revolution and Apoliticism”; Meijer, “Politicizing al-jarh wa-l-ta’dil,” pp. 380–381. 3. Existing works and media reporting on the Madkhalis include Wehrey, “Quiet No More?”; Ahmad Salah Ali, “Libya’s Warring Parties Play a Dangerous Game Working with Madkhali Salafists,”Atlantic Council, November 3, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil. org/blogs/menasource/libya-s-warring-parties-play-a-dangerous-game-working-with- madkhali-salafists; Anas El Gomati, “Libya’s Islamists and the 17 February Revolution: A Battle for Revolutionary Theology,” in Routledge Handbook on the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization, edited by Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 120–121; Taylor Luck, “Libya Crisis as Opportunity: Who Are the Madkhalis,” Christian Science Monitor, January 17, 2018, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/0117/ Libya-crisis-as-opportunity-Who-are-the-Madkhalis; Andrew McGregor, “Radical Loyalty and the Libyan Crisis: A Profile of Salafist Shaykh Rabi’ bin Hadi -al Madkhali,” Aberfoyle International Security, January 19, 2017, http://www.aberfoylesecurity. com/?p=3840; Celian Mace, “En plein chaos libyen, les salafistes gagnent du ter­ rain,” Liberation, April 3, 2018, https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2018/04/03/ en-plein-chaos-libyen-les-salafistes-gagnent-du-terrain_1640801. 4. Author interview with Madkhali Salafis, Tripoli, Libya, February 2019. 5. “The World Fact Book,” Central Intelligence Agency, October 1, 2018, https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html. 6. Igor Cherstich, “When Tribesmen Do Not Act Tribal: Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (Not as Schizophrenia),” Middle East Critique 23, no. 4 (Winter 2014): pp. 405–421; Lisa Anderson, “Tribe and State: Libyan Anomalies,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, edited by Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 288–302. 7. Anna Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 27–29; Lisa Anderson, “‘They Defeated Us All’: International Interests, Local Politics, and Contested Sovereignty in Libya,” Middle East Journal 71, no. 2 (Spring 2017): pp. 232–233. 8. E. Evans Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949); Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), pp. 73–102; Faraj Najem, Tribe, Islam and State in Libya: Analytical Study of the Roots of Libyan Tribal Society and Evolution Up to the Qarmanli Reign (1781–1835) (Benghazi: Center for Africa Research, 2017), pp. 130–139. 9. Matteo Capasso and Karim Mezran, “The Idea of the Islamic State in Libyan Politics since Independence,” Storia del pensiero politico 3 (September–December 2014): pp. 423–438, doi: 10.4479/78764. 10. Eileen Ryan, “Italy and the Sanusiyya: Negotiating Authority in Colonial Libya, 1911– 1931” (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2012), https://academiccommons.co­ lumbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8542VP1; also: George Joffe, “Islamic Opposition in Libya,” Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 (April 1988): p. 618. 11. Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya: Continuity and Change (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 38. 12. Wehrey, The Burning Shores, p. 12. Also: Joffe, “Islamic Opposition in Libya,” p. 619. 13. Igor Chertisch, “Religious Violence in Libya: Who Is to Blame,” Huffington Post (blog), December 5, 2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/igor-cherstich/religious-violence- in-lib_b_2245265.html. 14. Alison Pargeter, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), pp. 71–72. Notes to pages 110–113 ( 171 )

15. Joffe, “Islamic Opposition in Libya,” p. 615. 16. Capasso and Mezran, “Idea of the Islamic State,” p. 432. 17. Capasso and Mezran, “Idea of the Islamic State,” p. 432; Joffe, “Islamic Opposition in Libya,” p. 624. 18. The most notable of these was the popular Tripoli imam Sheikh Muhammad Abdalsalam al-Bishti, who was kidnapped by Revolutionary Committee members and made to con­ fess on television about support from Saudi Arabia. See Pargeter, Libya, pp. 116–117. Another popular figure whom Qadhafi detained was the grand mufti,- Al Tahir al-Zawi, who was put under house arrest in 1978. 19. Inspired by the activism of the much larger and more entrenched movement in Egypt and bolstered by an overseas network, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood had tried unsuc­ cessfully to organize itself on university campuses. By the end of the 1980s, scores of its members languished in the notorious Abu Slim prison in Tripoli. 20. Joffe, “Islamic Opposition in Libya,” pp. 626–629. 21. Alison Pargeter, “Qadhafi and Political Islam,” inLibya since 1969: Qadhafi’s Revolution Revisited, edited by Dirk Vandewalle (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 94. 22. Author interview with a former veteran of the Afghan jihad, Tripoli, Libya, May 19, 2017. 23. This is evident in the case of one of these veterans, Abdulhakim Bilhaj, who grew up in the eastern Tripoli suburb of Suq al-Jumaa (Friday Market) where many of these dispos­ sessed families had gone. Author interview with Abdulhakim Bilhaj, Istanbul, Turkey, November 15, 2016. Author interview with Bilhaj and Khalid Sharif, another senior LIFG member and founder, Tripoli, Libya, February 10, 2016. Also: Omar Ashour, “Post-jihadism: Libya and the Global Transformations of Armed Islamist Movements,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 3 (2011): p. 382; Yehudit Ronen, “Qadhafi and Militant Islamism: Unprecedented Conflict,” Middle Eastern Studies 38, no. 4 (October 2002): p. 7. The actual existence of the LIFG was not revealed until the autumn 1995, during major clashes in Benghazi and other eastern cities. 24. Author interview with longtime Derna resident and historian, Tunis, Tunisia, November 19, 2016. 25. Ashour, “Post-jihadism,” p. 387. 26. Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn, eds., The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 212. 27. Ashour, “Post-jihadism,” p. 383. 28. Ashour, “Post-jihadism,” p. 383. 29. Luis Martiniz, The Libyan Paradox (London: Hurst, 2007), pp. 43–80. 30. Ashour, “Post-jihadism,” pp. 384–385. 31. Ashour, “Post-jihadism,” p. 385. 32. Author interviews with Salafi interlocutors, Tripoli, Libya, February 2019. 33. Ashour, “Post-jihadism,” pp. 285–286; author interview with a Salafi figure and militia leader, Tripoli, May 15, 2017. 34. Author interview with a Salafi adherent in Tripoli, November 2017. 35. On the role of the Islamic University of Medina and Madkhalism, see Michael Farquhar, Circuits of Faith Migration, Education, and the Wahhabi Mission (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), p. 106. 36. Farquhar, Circuits of Faith Migration, p. 106. The Islamic Emirate of Kunar was a brief statelet set up in 1990 by an Afghan Salafi named Jamil al-Rahman in the northeastern province of Kunar. Backed by the Saudi government under King Fahad, it instituted strict Salafi social norms but also held elections, which generated considerable debate. Its dissolution in 1991 at the hands of a rival Afghan faction and al-Rahman’s assassination generated a significant outpouring of mourning and commentary across the Salafi spectrum, from jihadists like Osama bin Laden to quietists like Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali. Many Salafis ( 172 ) Notes to pages 113–115

saw it as the first attempt at an ideal Islamic state. See Kevin Bell, “The First Islamic State: A Look Back at the Islamic Emirate of Kunar,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 2 (Winter 2016), https:// ctc.usma.edu/the-first-islamic-state-a-look-back-at-the-islamic-emirate-of-kunar/. 37. For background on al-Wadi’i, see Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen; Laurent Bonnefoy, “How Salafism Came to Yemen: An Unknown Legacy of Juhayman al-’Utaybi 30 Years On,” Middle East Institute, October 1, 2009, http://www.mei.edu/content/ how-salafism-came-yemen-unknown-legacy-juhayman-al-utaybi-30-years. 38. Originally of Egyptian origin (his original name is Mustafa bin Isma’il al-Sulaymani), al-Ma’ribi fled Egypt during the 1980s and, after studying with -al Wadi’i, established a seminary in the near the town of Ma’rib. See Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen, p. 71. 39. For background, see Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen, pp. 71–76. Doctrinaire Madkhalis refer to him as a Muslim Brotherhood “implant” or as Abu Al-Hassan al-Ma’ribi “al-Ikhwani” (the Brother) or “al-Masri” (the Egyptian). His critics also accused him of sympathy for Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda. 40. Salafis labeled the schism the “Fitna Abu al-Hassan” (The Discord of Abu al-Hassan). On Madkhali’s intervention, see Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen, p. 72. 41. Author interview with Madkhali Salafists, Tripoli, May and November 2017. According to one Libyan Salafi, “Anyone who didn’t declare Abu al-Hasan al-Ma’ribi’s ideas as bida’ (in­ novation) we called him a “Ma’ribi.” The Ma’ribis, this source added, “were always a little closer to the harakis or the du’at” (meaning the Saudi Sahwa clerics like Salman al-Awda and Safar al-Hawali). 42. The split between supporters of Ma’ribi and al-Wadi’i/Madkhali reverberated also in Algeria and even among Libya Salafis residing in Europe, specifically the large expatriate community in Manchester, England. Author interview with Libyan Salafi interlocutors and a Libyan conflict analyst, Tripoli, Libya, February 2019. The Libyan Salafis who sided with Ma’ribi include Shaaban Madud Khalifa Hadiya, also known as Abu Ubayda al-Zway, a notable activist Salafi from the western town of Zawiya, and Ahmed Gumata (also known as Abu Harun), as well as Nader Umrani, Mahmud bin Musa, and Abd al-Gader al-Na’rut. Libyan Yemeni graduates who stayed with Madkhali and Wadi’i include Madji Hafala, Muhammad al-Anqar, and Muhammad Mika’ili Nazal (Abu Abdallah al-Abyari). Author interview with Salafi figures in Tripoli, Libya, May and November 2017. 43. Ronen, “Qadhafi and Militant Islamism,” p. 7. 44. Author interview with Salafi figures and Ministry of Interior officials, Tripoli, Libya, May to November 2018. See also Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia, p. 74. 45. Author interview with Salafi figures, Tripoli, February 2019. 46. Author interviews with Salafi figures in Benghazi, May 2017 and Tripoli, February 2019. Also, the Algerian newspaper El-Sharuk published an article citing a Libyan in­ telligence dossier that, while it should be treated with care, corroborates this: “The Libyan Intelligence Exposed Secrets and Plots of the Domestic Current in the Region!,” El-Sharuk, December 25, 2017; https://www.echoroukonline.com. 47. Author interview with a Salafi adherent, Tripoli, Libya, June 2019. 48. “Sheikh al-Qarni Visits Libya to Give a Series of Lectures,” MENAS Associates, September 20, 2010; http://menasassociates.blogspot.com/2010/09/sheikh-al-qarni-visits-libya- to-give.html. 49. Gomati, “Libya’s Islamists,” p. 140. 50. Author interview with Salafi interlocutor, Tripoli, Libya, February 2019. 51. Author interviews with Salafi interlocutors in Tripoli, Libya, February 2019. 52. Author interview with a Salafi figure close to Abyari, Tripoli, Libya, May 11, 2017. Some sources allege that Saadi was closer to the “Ma’ribis” before meeting Nazal. Nazal later be­ came Saadi’s personal secretary in 2005. Notes to pages 115–118 ( 173 )

53. Author interview with a former member of the Misrata awqaf, Misrata, Libya, June 10, 2019. Other interlocutors have corroborated this “outsider” dimension of Salafism in Misrata by noting that many of the key Salafi figures in Misrata trace their lineage to lower- status families and tribes that were not perceived as “original,” or at least not as historically rooted in the city’s social fabric. 54. Author interviews in Tripoli, February and June 2019. 55. Born in the Tripoli neighborhood of Ghut al-Shaal but tracing his roots to the western Nafusa mountains, Hafala studied in Saudi Arabia and then in Yemen with Muqbil al-Wadi’i and briefly sided with Abu Hassan al-Ma’ribi before returning to the more qui­ etist Madkhali current. During the 2011 revolution, he issued a statement urging active Salafi support for Qadhafi as the wali al-amr—a defense that at least one Salafi observer alleges was partly coerced. After the revolution, he became a powerful figure among various Madkhali armed groups in Tripolitania, reportedly operating a school, mosque and guesthouse on Tripoli’s airport road. Author interviews with Salafi interlocutors, Tripoli, Libya, May 2017 and February 2019. Another key Amazigh Madkhali figure is Muhammad Abu Sala from Nalut. See Collombier, “Sirte’s Tribes,” pp. 213–214. 56. Author interview with a Salafi preacher, Laythi, Benghazi, Libya, November 25, 2017. 57. Author interview with a Salafi cleric, Tripoli, Libya, February 25, 2019. 58. Anon., “Salafism and Madkhalism in Libya . . . and Revolting against the Legitimate Ruler” (in Arabic) Al-Araby al-Jadeed (UK), September 14, 2014, https://www.alaraby.co.uk. 59. Emad Mekay, “Too Late, Qaddafi Seeks the Aid of Muslim Clerics,” New York Times, March 2, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/world/africa/03iht-M03- FATWA.html. 60. Author interviews with Salafi interlocutors in Tripoli, Libya, February 2019. A state­ ment attributed to him at the time has been taken off line. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=qB3XE5LaZz0. 61. See his audiotaped statement here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sriMveeY9vA. 62. Author interview with a Salafi figure, Benghazi, Libya, May 15, 2017. 63. Author interview with Abdelraouf Kara, Tripoli, Libya, November 2013. 64. Author interview with Muslim Brotherhood activists, Tripoli and Misrata, Libya, May 2017. 65. Author interview with a Salafi figure, Tripoli, Libya, February 24, 2019. 66. Gomati, “Libya’s Islamists,” p. 123. 67. Mary Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place: Libya’s Islamists during and after the Revolution,” in Cole and McQuinn, Libyan Revolution, p. 200. 68. Yet in the 2014 elections for its follow-on, the House of Representatives, in which the Muslim Brotherhood participation was significantly weakened, the Madkhalis adopted a supportive role, especially after then-prime minister Ali Zeidan had reportedly gone to Saudi Arabia to ask Rabi himself for a statement endorsing the voting. Anon., “Salafism and Madkhalism in Libya.” 69. Author interview with activists and voters in Tripoli and Benghazi, June–July 2012. See also Omar Ashour, “Libya’s Defeated Islamists,” al-Jazeera, July 18, 2012, https://www. aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/07/20127187155487377.html. 70. “General National Congress Elections in Libya: Final Report,” Carter Center, July 7, 2012, https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/elec­ tion_reports/libya-070712-final-rpt.pdf 71. Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 203. 72. Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Reject ‘Political Isolation Law,” May 4, 2013, https:// www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/04/libya-reject-political-isolation-law. Also: Wehrey, The Burning Shores, pp. 147–150. ( 174 ) Notes to pages 119–120

73. Author interview with Abd al-Hakim Bilhaj, Istanbul, Turkey, November 15, 2016. 74. Author interview with a former UN official, location withheld, September 10, 2016. 75. A gathering of militias called the Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Rooms (LROR) had been crucial in the passage of the law. The LROR is led by an activist Salafist named Shaaban Madud Khalifa Hadiya (also known as Abu Ubayda al-Zway) from the western revolutionary town of Zawiya. Author interview with Salafist figure in Tripoli, Libya, May 5, 2017. Hadiya earned a master’s degree in Arabic and a doctorate in sharia from the University of Alexandria before relocating to Yemen in 1993 for ten years where he studied with Muqbil al-Wadi’i and became a teacher at al-Wadi’i’s institute in Dammaj, Yemen, before aligning with Ma’ribi. He is thought to have returned to Libya after the 2011 revolution, when he quickly rose to power among the Zawiya-based rebels. In 2014, in a public speech, Shaaban announced his support for the Libya Dawn coalition and called on Khalifa Haftar to act in support of Libyans, according toAl-Wasat . In 2014, there was a prominent incident involving Hadiya when he was arrested in Egypt for al­ leged links to the Muslim Brotherhood, and then six Egyptians were kidnapped in Libya as a retaliation for his arrest. Hadiya, was released in a coordinated swap between the countries. See Salem Al-Abadi, “Shaaban to ‘Al-Wasat’: Haftar is Deceptive and Dignity is Retreating,” Al-Wasat, December 13, 2014, http://alwasat.ly/news/libya/48331; and also Nicholas A. Heras, “Sketches of Shaykh Sha’ban Madoud Khalifa Hadia and Uthman Mliqta, Rival Libyan Militia Commanders,” Militant Leadership Monitor 5, no. 5 (May 2014). Also: “Libyan Militia Commander Released in Swap for Abducted Egyptians,” The Guardian, January 27, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/ abducted-egyptian-diplomats-freed-libya-cairo. 76. For background on Libya’s militias and armed groups, see Wehrey, The Burning Shores, pp. 85–103. 77. Frederic Wehrey, “Libya’s Policing Sector: Dilemmas of Hybridity and Security Pluralism,” Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), The Politics of Post Conflict Reconstruction, July 2018, https://pomeps.org/2018/09/11/ libyas-policing-sector-the-dilemmas-of-hybridity-and-security-pluralism/. 78. Moncef Ouannès, Militaires, élites et modernisation dans la Libye Contemporaine (Paris: l’Harmattan, 2009). For a discussion of Libya’s fractured security sector and militia penetration, see Frederic Wehrey, “Ending Libya’s Civil War: Reconciling Politics, Rebuilding Security,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 24, 2014, https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/24/ ending-libya-s-civil-war-reconciling-politics-rebuilding-security-pub-56741. 79. Author interview with a cleric close to Ansar al-Sharia, Benghazi, November 10, 2013. 80. A longtime Benghazi resident with a murky jihadist past, al-Zahawi had been impris­ oned in Abu Slim in the late 1990s after being expelled from Saudi Arabia (he was re­ portedly studying there illegally, under his brother’s passport) and handed over to Gaddafi’s intelligence services. Fighting on the front lines in the 2011 revolution under an umbrella of Islamist-leaning armed groups, he broke ranks sometime in April 2011 over the recognition of Libya’s transitional council and Western intervention, forming the nucleus of Ansar al-Sharia. For a good discussion of the militia and its rise and fall, see Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Rise and Decline of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute, April 6, 2015, https://www.hudson.org/ research/11197-the-rise-and-decline-of-ansar-al-sharia-in-libya. 81. Maqdisi had once mentored the infamous Jordanian-born Iraqi terrorist and progenitor of the Islamic State Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. But after his former protégé’s murderous cam­ paign in Iraq had alienated potential supporters, he cautioned against extreme displays of violence directed at fellow Muslims. And with the 2011 Arab uprisings, he urged his followers not to fight but to take advantage of changing circumstances. Through his Notes to pages 120–124 ( 175 )

online legal forum Minbar al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (Platform for Monotheism and Jihad), Maqdisi and his allied clerics issued new directives concerning jihad. See Zelin, “Maqdisi’s Disciples.” 82. Wehrey, The Burning Shores, p. 108. 83. Ansar al-Sharia sent convoys of vehicles filled with young fighters from Benghazi, Derna, and other eastern towns to support jihadists fighting French troops in northern Mali. It also trained fighters loyal to the seasoned Algerian jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who would lead an attack on the Tigantourine gas facility in Amenas, Algeria, that killed thirty- seven foreigners. 84. Wehrey, “When the Islamic State Came to Libya.” 85. Wehrey, “Quiet No More.” 86. Wehrey, “Quiet No More.” Kara’s own outlook adheres more to scripturalist, da’wa Salafism than Madkhalism per se—while critics often maintain that he is driven by rank opportunism. In an interview, with the author he said he subscribed to such quietist tenets such as adherence to the wali al-amr. But he did not count Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali as one of his clerical referents, listing instead the Saudi clerics bin Uthaymin, al-Albani, bin Baz, as well the Yemeni cleric al-Wadi’i. He also exhibited some flexibility for democracy, saying, “I am opposed to it personally, but if the majority of Libyans want it, then I can’t oppose it.” Author interview with Abdelraouf Kara, Tripoli, Libya, May 15, 2013. 87. Author interview with Special Deterrence Force personnel, Tripoli, Libya, February 15, 2016. 88. The author is grateful to Libya scholar Jalel Harchaoui for this insight. Author’s email ex­ change with Jalel Harchaoui, March 2019. 89. Author interview with Abdelraouf Kara, Tripoli, Libya, February 15, 2016. The first ­mi litia that Kara established was called the Nawasi Brigade, named for a horse-riding club in Suq al-Jumaa, during the revolution. Later, as Kara became commander of a Tripoli-wide umbrella militia formation under the Ministry of Interior called the Supreme Security Committee “Support Branches,” the Nawasi Brigade affiliated itself under Kara. The ­rela tionship between the Nawasi (currently under the leadership of the Qaddur family from Suq al-Jumaa) and Kara’s Deterrence Force has always been fluid and permeable. 90. Chertisch, “Religious Violence in Libya.” 91. Author interview with Abdelraouf Kara, Tripoli, Libya, May 12, 2013. 92. For a detailed description of the attacks, see Wehrey,The Burning Shores, pp. 125–143. 93. Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Wave of Political Assassinations,” August 8, 2013, https:// www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/08/libya-wave-political-assassinations. 94. Frederic Wehrey, “The Battle for Benghazi,” The Atlantic, February 28, 2014, https://www. theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/the-battle-for-benghazi/284102/. 95. Wehrey, The Burning Shores, pp. 165–167. 96. Missy Ryan, “A Former CIA Asset Has Become a U.S. Headache in Libya,” Washington Post, August 17, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a- former-cia-asset-has-become-a-us-headache-in-libya/2016/08/17/a766e392-54c6- 11e6-bbf5-957ad17b4385_story.html?utm_term=.b139415091b2. 97. For a useful overview, see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “Dignity and Dawn: Libya’s Escalating Civil War,” ICCT Research Paper, February 2015, https:// www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-Barr-Dignity-and-Dawn-Libyas- Escalating-Civil-War-February2015.pdf. 98. Wehrey, “Ending Libya’s Civil War.” 99. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011), June 11, 2017, pp. 24–35. 100. Wehrey, “Ending Libya’s Civil War.” 101. Author interview with a member of the pro-Hiftar Tawhid Battalion, later remained the 210 Infantry Battalion, Benghazi, Libya, September 2015. One of the clearest and earliest ( 176 ) Notes to pages 124–127

endorsements from Saudi Arabia to support the LNA came from the grand mufti, Abdul- Aziz ibn Abdullah Al al-Sheikh. For his audiorecording in May 2014, see https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=IGj1YscOEUY. 102. Author interview with a former student of Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, Sabratha, Libya, February 2019. 103. For a recording of the statement, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TOyYSJnLuaA. 104. Madkhali recording in a YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=VTWezgeaiEk; see also “Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali calls for a Salafist Revolt Against the ‘Brotherhood’ in Libya” (in Arabic) Al-Arabi 21, July 9, 2016, https://arabi21. com. 105. Author interview with a Salafi cleric from the Salafi 210 Infantry Battalion who partici­ pated in the delegation, Benghazi, Libya, November 2017. 106. Author interview with a Salafi cleric Benghazi, Libya, May 19, 2017. 107. Author interview with a Madkhali Salafi cleric, Benghazi, Libya, May 5, 2017. 108. For videos of his sermons, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B0FzWL1g8n8; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Lb2L2wcMvc. 109. Author interviews and observations with LNA and support-force personnel in Benghazi, Libya, September 2015 and May 2017. 110. Author interviews with LNA commanders and observers in Benghazi, Libya, May 2017. 111. Author interviews with activists and civil society, Benghazi, Libya, May 2017. 112. Valerie Stocker, “How Armed Groups Are Plundering Libya’s Banks,” Middle East Eye, April 10, 2017, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/libya-bloodshed-how- spoils-war-are-divided-tripoli-451507400; Wolfram Lacher, “Tripoli’s Militia Cartel,” SWP Comment, April 20, 2018; https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/ libya-tripolis-militia-cartel/. 113. For posts about its seizures of drugs, see https://www.facebook.com/1021745154586317/ videos/1851344274959730/; for other posts about captured drugs: https://www.face­ book.com/1021745154586317/photos/a.1027717337322432.1073741829.102174 5154586317/1821188237975334/?type=3; https://www.facebook.com/permalink. php?story_fbid=1820485254712299&id=1021745154586317. 114. Author interview with Special Deterrence Force personnel, Tripoli, Libya, February 2016. 115. Bel Trew, “Manchester Bomber Salman Abedi’s Father and Brother Arrested by Rada, a Hardline Islamist Group,” The Times, May 25, 2017, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/ar­ ticle/salman-abedis-father-and-a-brother-arrested-by-rada-a-hardline-islamist-group- f7ffdtpbn. 116. Author’s observation, inside the Deterrence Force prison’s rehabilitation program, Tripoli, Libya, February 2016. According to the United Nations, torture is rampant, particularly against Islamic State suspects. Author telephone interview with a UN officer based in Tunis, Tunisia, September 2017. 117. Author interview with an Islamic State detainee, Tripoli, Libya, February 2016. 118. “Libya: Armed Group Shuts Down Comic Book Convention,” British Broadcasting Corporation, November 4, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41871697. For the Special Deterrence Force’s statement, see https://www.facebook.com/permalink. php?story_fbid=1792170270877131&id=1021745154586317. 119. Author interviews with United Nations and European Union officials, Tunis, Tunisia, November 2017. 120. Author interviews with members of the 604th Brigade, Sirte, Libya, November 2017 and with Salafi militias in Tripoli, May and November 2017. 121. Author interviews with members of the 604th Brigade, Sirte, Libya, June and July 2016. See also Wehrey, “Quiet No More.” Notes to pages 127–128 ( 177 )

122. Author interviews with Misratan militia members fighting in Bunyan al-Marsusi, Sirte, Libya, June and July 2016. 123. The 604th Battalion maintains an active Facebook page that often posts security updates as well as Salafi material, largely derived from proregime quietist Saudi clerics. On February 21, 2018, for example, the page posted a video of a recitation by Sheikh Salah Fawzan (pre­ sumably the prominent Salafi Saudi cleric who has been a member of various high religious bodies in Saudi Arabia). In July 2017, the page posted an Islamic verse or recitation of sorts with a reference to Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah Al al-Sheikh, the current grand mufti of Saudi Arabia. See https://www.facebook.com/pg/604.infantry.battalion/posts/?ref=page_ internal; https://www.facebook.com/604.infantry.battalion/videos/574894589552066/; https://www.facebook.com/604.infantry.battalion/photos/a.256349308073264.1073741 828.255077974867064/475268006181392/?type=3&theater. 124. Badi and Wehrey, “Place of Distinctive Despair.” 125. “The Madkhali Trend in Libya Is a Military Power in the Hand of Haftar” (in Arabic), Al-Araby, February 7, 2017, https://www.alaraby.co.uk. 126. Author interview with the commander of the 604h Brigade, Sirte, Libya, December 2017. 127. Author interview with Salafist prison wardens and civil society activists, Sabha, Libya, February 2016. See also Frederic Wehrey, “Insecurity and Governance Challenges in Southern Libya,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 30, 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/30/insecurity-and-governance- challenges-in-southern-libya-pub-68451. 128. Sami Zaptia, “Most Libyan Militias Involved in Illegal Migration Activities Nominally Affiliated to Official State Security Institutions: UN Libya Experts Panel Report,”Libya Herald, March 11, 2018. 129. Abdullah Ben Ibrahim, “Dignity Operation Armed Group Attacks Shrine of Libya’s Former King Idris Senussi’s Father,” Libya Observer, December 30, 2017, https:// www.libyaobserver.ly/crimes/dignity-operation-armed-group-attacks-shrine- libya%E2%80%99s-former-king-idris-senussi%E2%80%99s-father. 130. Jalel Harchaoui, “Libya’s Looming Contest for the Central Bank,” War on the Rocks, April 1, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/libyas-looming-contest-for-the- central-bank/. 131. Author’s interviews with security officials in Tripoli, November 2017 and also with local brigade leaders in Sabratha, Libya, February 2019. See also Frederic Wehrey, “A Minister, a General, and the Militias: Libya’s Shifting Balance of Power,” New York Review of Books, March 19, 2019, https://www.nybooks.com/ daily/2019/03/19/a-minister-a-general-militias-libyas-shifting-balance-of-power/. 132. According to interlocutors, Madkhali adherents were present in the city before and during the 2011 revolution, where many, perhaps because of their ideological opposition to bearing arms, performed functions like guarding a key prison and operating a ceme­ tery. The prison role continues to this day. More recently, Madkhalis have grown assertive through the formation of militias and “combating crime committees” that have suppressed more activist and jihadist currents. They have tried to influence the municipal council via the Madkhalist brother of the former mayor. They have also sought, unsuccessfully, to control the city’s awqaf (endowments) office. Key Madkhali figures in the city include Anwar Faraj al-Swessi, the most influential figure, Abu Ubayda -al Sh’hubi, also known as Abu Ubayda al-Misrati, who studied under Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i in Yemen, and Abd al-Rahma al-Kote, the leader of the Mirdas Battalion militia that fought the Islamic State in Sirte and who had pushed for reconciliation with Haftar’s camp prior to Haftar’s April 4th attack on the capital.. Author email exchanges with Misratan activists and for­ eign observers, February–March 2019. ( 178 ) Notes to pages 129–130

133. See, for example, a statement on the official Kaibat -al Wadi bi-Sabratha Facebook page asking all its fighters to join the battle on behalf of Khalifa Haftar. https://www.facebook. com/katibt.alwady/posts/2305357159675707. 134. Author interview with a Makhali Salafi figure in Tripoli, Libya, June 14, 2019. 135. Author interview with Zawiyan militia leader Mahmud bin Rajab, Tripoli, Libya, June 15, 2019. 136. On the front lines near a Yarmouk military camp, the author observed a subunit under Deterrence Force command that was made up entirely of ethnic Tuareg from the southern Libyan town of Ubari. Author’s observation on the front lines, Tripoli, Libya, June 7–22, 2019. 137. Arianna Poletti, “Marshal Haftar’s Alliance with Madkhali Salafists Is Very Dangerous” [in French], Jeune Afrique, April 9, 2019. 138. Author interview with a Libyan source close to Mahmud Hamza, Tripoli, Libya, June 20, 2019. According to this source, Hamza sent, he sent a delegation to Saudi Arabia to ask permission to join the battle on behalf of the GNA. Drawn from the top ten graduates of a Deterrence Force parachute course, the delegation performed umrah in Medina and met with a cleric affiliated with Rabi bin Hadi -al Madkhali. The cleric told them that the legitimate wali al-amr was the Libyan parliament, meaning the House of Representatives, which was notionally aligned to Haftar. According this source, Hamza questioned this ruling, saying, “Does Saudi Arabia (as an outsider) have a good understanding of Libya?” Then, the prime minister of the GNA, Fayez Seraj, visited Saudi Arabia and met with King Salman on June 5. Two days later, the cleric issued a new ruling that the GNA is the wali al-amr, but that the “war has a lot of shubhuhat (doubts and misunderstandings).” This was likely intended as a heavy caveat against a full-throated defense of the GNA. The cleric went on to authorize the Salafis in Libya to take up arms for the sake of “assisting the maltreated.” 139. For example, the influential Misratan Madkhali leader Anwar Faraj al-Swessi rebuked Haftar’s attack on the capital as a “betrayal” and refuted the media reporting that he had sided with the assault. See https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=5917 68368005885&id=100015181814853. 140. Author interview with Salafi interlocutor in Tripoli, Libya, June 14, 2019. Durman in par­ ticular was reportedly fearful of causing further fitna (strife) within the already divided town of Zintan. 141. See, for example, https://www.facebook.com/100012474798599/videos/ 617500245342463/. 142. For example, an Egyptian cleric named Khalid bin Uthman al-Masri rebuked the afore­ mentioned Tariq Durman for fighting Haftar’s LNA on the side of a prominent Zintani commander, the Usama al-Juwayli. Al-Masri also lambasted Saudi scholars, such as al-Fawzan, for not denouncing Durman. His audio recording is available at https://www. facebook.com/Mnbsalfjerba/videos/2158668074247528/. 143. According to Libyan sources, the Madkhalis are justifying their support for the GNA and its prime minister as the wali al-amr because they were able to provide salaries and facil­ itate the hajj pilgrimage. Author interviews with Madkhali Salafi interlocutors, Tripoli, Libya, June 2019. 144. On how local ties shaped the decision about whether or not to fight, see Wolfram Lacher, “Think Libya’s warring factions are only in it for the money? Think again,” Washington Post Monkey Cage Blog, April 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli­ tics/2019/04/10/think-libyas-warring-factions-are-only-it-money-think-again/?utm_ term=.b5f57b9aedc4. 145. In Misrata, for example, one former member of the city’s awqaf department recalls a struggle by Salafis to control the local administration ofawqaf because it owned Notes to pages 130–132 ( 179 )

substantial plots of land. Salafis also tried to take over mosques by having the sitting imam dismissed through an administrative sanction. According to one official, Salafis would­ at tend a mosque and submit their names on a petition to the local awqaf department that the imam had “made mistakes” in his interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith. In accord­ ance with procedure, the awqaf would send a committee to investigate, which included a surprise visit to a sermon and a review of the names on the petition. According to this interlocutor it became clear that the names on the petition were Salafis from outside the mosque, who had attended with the express purpose of removing the imam. Author inter­ view with a former member of the Misrata awqaf, Misrata, Libya, June 2019. 146. See Wolfram Lacher, “Faultlines of the Revolution: Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya,” research paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, May 2013, pp. 15–16, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/re­ search_papers/2013_RP04_lac.pdf. 147. Author interviews with Salafi figures in Tripoli, Libya, May 2017 and February 2019. 148. In one well-known case, Madkhalis ejected the imam of the Bir Mosque in the Siraj neigh­ borhood who had been appointed by the Ghariani-aligned faction. Author interviews with Salafi figures, Tripoli, Libya, February 2019. 149. Author interviews with Salafis in Tripoli, Libya, February 2019. 150. Author interview with Salafis in Tripoli, Libya, February 2019. 151. See, for example, the attack by the Central Security Force, a powerful, GNA- aligned militia based in Tripoli’s Abu Slim neighborhood, on the remnants of the National Salvation Government in the Rixos hotel in March 2017. Ahmed Elumami, “Tripoli Armed Factions Take Over Rival’s Compound in Heavy Fighting,” Reuters, March 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-tripoli/ tripoli-armed-factions-take-over-rivals-compound-in-heavy-fighting-idUSKBN16M1NY. 152. Many went to Turkey, though some fled to the eastern Tripoli quarter of Tajura, Ghariani’s home neighborhood, or to Misrata. 153. Moutaz Ali, “Man Confesses to Omrani Murder, Links to Rada Alleged,” Libya Herald, November 21, 2016, https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/11/21/ man-confesses-to-omrani-murder-links-to-rada-alleged/. 154. Specifically, a video published on the Facebook page of Tripoli’s Criminal Investigation Board shows a man named Haitham al-Zintani, a member of the Crime Fighting Apparatus, confessing his role in shooting and burying Umrani as punishment for his spreading the “false religious views” of a Salafist version of Islam different from that of Madkhali. According to Zintani’s confession, they were directed by the Egyptian Madkhalist Mohammed Saeed Raslan to kill Umrani. Following the murder, Libyan grand mufti Sadeq al-Ghariani “accused Libyan Madkhalis of being spies and would-be assassins acting on behalf of unnamed Arab Gulf countries. See “Grand Mufti Accuses Madkhali Followers of Being Foreign Agents and Planning to Kill Libyan Clerics,” Libya Herald, November 23, 2016, https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/11/23/grand- mufti-accuses-madkhali-followers-of-being-foreign-agents-and-planning-to-kill-libyan- clerics/. Also: Abdulkader Assad, “By Egyptian Fatwa and Libyan Execution, Libyan Cleric Nadir Al-Omrani Killed after 45 days of Kidnap sic[ ],” Libya Observer, https:// www.libyaobserver.ly/news/egyptian-fatwa-and-libyan-execution-libyan-cleric-nadir-al- omrani-killed-after-45-days-kidnap. 155. Author interview with a Muslim Brotherhood member and former revolutionary com­ mander, Tripoli, Libya, November 2018. 156. Author interview with Abdelraouf Kara, Tripoli, Libya, February 2016. 157. “Grand Mufti Accuses Madkhali Followers. The list included prominent preachers such as Majdi Hafala, Tariq Dirman, and Mohammed al-Anqar. ( 180 ) Notes to pages 132–135

158. Salafi interlocutors in Tripoli noted that the brother of Abbani was close to the Deterrence Force or actively involved with the militia. Author interviews in Tripoli, Libya, June 2019. 159. Author interview with a Madkhali Salafi adherent, Tripoli, Libya, February 2019. 160. Author interview with an Ubaydat tribal notable from Tobruk, Benghazi, Libya, September 2015. 161. Most notable among these is the eastern Madkhali Salafist Ashraf al-Mayyar al-Hasi. 162. Author interviews with a gathering of professors and local activists at the University of Benghazi, Benghazi, Libya, May 2017. 163. The decision was later retracted and replaced with another edict that stated that male and female travelers under forty-five had to obtain permission from Ministry of Interior. Anon., “Nazhuri Bans Women Flying from Labraq without Male Guardian,” Libya Herald, February 19, 2012, https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/02/19/ nazhuri-bans-women-flying-from-labraq-without-male-guardian/. 164. Author interview with a member of the 210 Infantry Battalion, Benghazi, Libya, May 2017. See also “Organizers of the ‘Earth Hour’ ceremony in Benghazi were referred to the Military Prosecution,” Al-Wasat, March 29, 2017, http://alwasat.ly/news/libya/128463. 165. Author interview with a Salafi cleric and member of the 210 Infantry Battalion, Benghazi, Libya, September 2015 and May 2017. 166. Direct Saudi funding to Madkhali armed groups is difficult to establish conclusively. Similarly, Emirati support to pro-LNA Madkhali armed groups probably falls within the context of broader Emirati support to Hiftar’s forces, though the Emiratis have backed Madkhali Salafist groups in Yemen. According to an Egyptian diplomat, the Emirati tol­ erance of and even support for Libyan Madkhali armed groups is a point of policy con­ tention between Cairo and Abu Dhabi. Author interview with an Egyptian diplomat, Washington, DC, April 10, 2017. 167. Jamie Prentis, “Radical Saudi Cleric Prevented from Speaking in Tobruk,” Libya Herald, February 7, 2017, https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/02/07/ radical-saudi-cleric-prevented-from-speaking-in-tobruk/. 168. Most recently, in what is allegedly a phone call between Haftar and Utaybi leaked by the Libya Observer on February 19, 2018, Utaybi warns Haftar to “protect himself . . . focus on supporting the real Islam that is followed by our Salafist brothers.” Utaybi also appar­ ently urged Haftar to bring Salafist clerics closer to him to provide him with Sharia advice. Earlier that week, the grand mufti, Sadeq al-Ghariani had publicly accused Saudi Arabia of sending Madkhali followers to support Haftar, saying that Haftar, like Qadhafi, had “blood on his hands.” For an audio of the alleged leaked phone call: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?time_continue=4&v=xyDzojbeMzs; for a Libya Observer article about the phone call: https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/saudi-extremist-cleric-phones-warlord-khalifa- haftar-give-him-instructions-how-build-his-army. 169. “The Religious Case in Libya,” Libyan Organization of Policies and Strategies (LOOPS), February 2017, http://loopsresearch.org/media/images/photoexmom3cuiq.pdf. 170. Anon., “The Dismissal of the Interim Government’s Endowment Chief: Sign of a Divorce between Haftar and the Madakhliya” [in Arabic], Libya Observer, April 23, 2019, https:// ar.libyaobserver.ly/article/4365. 171. For an audio recording of the statement, see https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=i60XNSXdqrw; “Extremists Demolish Libya’s Shrines Using Bulldozers, Explosives,” France 24, August 29, 2018, http://observers.france24.com/en/20120829- extremists-demolish-libya-shrines-using-bulldozers-explosives-libya-mausoleum-zliten- tripoli-video-salafists. Notes to page 135 ( 181 )

172. For his audio recording, seehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4LTc_3hpwZw&t=6s. His influence is also felt on the distribution of power on the ground: according an inter­ locutor, the Tripoli neighborhood of Abu Slim is influenced by Muhammad’s supporters, which has prevented followers of the powerful Libyan cleric Majdi Hafala, a Rabi sup­ porter, from entering. Author interviews with Salafis in Tripoli, February 2019. 173. The split has grown so severe that one Salafi figure called the post-2018 period the “Fitna al-Saafiqat.” Author interview with a Madkhali Salafi figure, Tripoli, Libya, June 16, 2019. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages.

AAMU (Association of Algerian Muslim radical, 95 ‘Ulema), 60, 62–63, 71–72 religious, 92 Al-Abadi, Salem, 174n75 social, 95 Abbas, Ferhat, 61–62 street politics, 101–2 Abbasid period, 7–8, 14, 18 Al Adl Wal Ihsan (Justice and Welfare) party, Abdelhafid, Moulay, 56–57 43, 45, 51–52, 54–55 Abdelkader, Emir, 60 Adoud, Mohamed Ali Ould Abdel, 151n64 Abduh, Muḥammad, 8–9, 41, 62, 84–85, 87, Adoud, Mohammed Salem Ould, 151n64 145n24 El Adrari, Salem Al Mourida (Abu Abdillah), Abedi, Salman, 126 74–75 Abou Hafs (Mohammed Rafiki), 48–49, Adrar Province, Algeria, 74–75 51, 58 advice to a ruler (nasiha), 14 Abu Abdallah al-Abyari (Muhammad al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 8–9, 41, 62, 84, 87, Mika’ili Nazal), 115, 172n42, 172n52 145n24 Abu Abdillah (Salem Al Mourida El Adrari), Afghanistan, 10, 140 74–75 Soviet-Afghan War veterans, 28, 66–67, Abu Bakr Baghdadi, 79 111, 112–13 Abu Harun (Ahmed Gumata), 172n42 US war, 28 Abu Iyad al Tunisi (Seifallah Ben Hassine), Africa Muslim Agency, 24 96–97 Afro-Mauritanians, 20, 29–30, 150n34 Abu Qatada (Omar Mahmoud Mohammed Ahl Sunnah Wal-Jama’ah, 72–73 Othman), 70 Aïbi, Mohamed J., 85 Abu Sala, Muhammad, 173n55 Ain Amenas, Algeria gas complex attack, Abu Slim Martyrs Brigade, 140–41 78–79, 175n83 Abu Slim prison, 114, 171n19 Ainine, Bilel, 62–63, 65–66, 161n34 jihadists from, 111, 119–20, 122, AIS (Islamic Salvation Army), 68–69 174n80 Aïssa, Mohamed, 59, 80 al-Abyari, Abu Abdallah (Muhammad al-Ajurri, Imam, 71 Mika’ili Nazal), 115, 172n42, 172n52 Al-Akhbar, 35 activism, 17 Aksum, 57, 76 apolitical, 78 Al al-Shaykh, 8 haraki or activist Salafism, 67, 146n42 Alaoui, Mohammed Belarbi (Sheikh Islam), peaceful, 105 56–57 political, 25–28 el Alaoui, Mohammed Belarbi, 41 political partisanship (hizbiyya), 14, 38, al-Albani, Muhammad Nasiruddin, 8, 14, 27, 77, 97–98 70, 113, 114–15, 133

( 207 ) ( 208 ) Index

Algeria. See also Maghreb region ambiguity, calculated, 21, 34 Adrar Province, 74–75 American Cooperative School of Tunis, April 1964 charter, 64 103 Arab Spring, 2, 75–79 al-Anqar, Muhammad, 172n549, 180n158 Civil Concord Act of 1999, 69 Ansar al-Sharia (AST), 2, 96–98, 103–5, civil war, 1, 28, 59–60, 68, 141 120, 122, 132, 175n83 constitution and family code of 1963, 64 nucleus, 174n80 defense policy, 34–35 platforms, 15–16 fatwas, 163n66 Ansar Dine, 34–35 foreign fighters, 141 anti-Shiism, 18, 45 French citizenship, 160n7 Aouissat, Abdelghani, 59–60, 70, 73, 76 French colonial era, 60–62, 83 apolitical activism, 78, See also activism Islamism, 26, 66–67, 80, 100–1, ‛aqida (creed), 38 161–62n47 AQIM. See Al-Qaeda in the Islamic jihadi Salafism, 60, 72–73, 78–80, 141 Maghreb Madkhalis, 13 Arab-Berbers (bidane), 20, 22, 25, 29–30 Ministry of Religious Affairs, 70, 74 Arab Cold War, 9–10 nationalism, 64 Arabic language, 7, 161n32 policy toward Salafism, 80, 141 Arab-Israeli conflict, 1, 9–10 politicos, 72–73 Arabization, 23–24, 65, 150n34, 161n32 purification campaign, 163n76 Arab nationalism, 9–10, 23–24, 110 quietist Salafism, 59–60, 69–80 Arab Spring, 1–2, 13, 49–52, 55 radical Salafism, 64–68 Salafism after, 75–79, 94–96 Ramadan religious lectures, 70 El Arbaoui, Amer, 70 relations with AQIM, 70, 79 armed groups. See also specific militias, Salafism, 3, 59–81, 138–39, 140, 164n87 brigades, battalions by name Scientific National Council (SNC), funding, 119–20, 125–26, 139–40, 164n90 180n167 security, 141 Madkhali, 119–20, 121, 123, 125–26, soft approach, 141 135–36, 174n78, 177n672, 180n634 student protests, 161n32 supermilitias, 125–26 Sufism, 72–73 Armed Islamic Group (GIA), 68–69, 70, Tigantourine gas facility attack, 78–79, 111–12 175n83 Armed Islamic Movement, 65–66 Tizi Ouzou Province, 74 Armha (al-Najashi), 57 War of Independence, 1, 60, 66 arms, 1–2, 123, 136–37 Algerian Front for Reconciliation and al-Asala (Authenticity) party (Libya), 118 Salvation, 77 ʿAshari theology, 40 Algerian People’s Party (PPA), 62–63 Ashour, Omar, 171n23 Ali, Ahmad Salah, 169n3 Assad, Abdulkader, 179–80n155 Almoravid (Al Murabit) dynasty, 21–22 Association for the Preservation of the Al-Mounquid (The Savior), 67 Quran, 90 Al Murabit dynasty, 21–22 Association of Algerian Muslim ‘Ulema Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), (AAMU), 60, 62–63, 71–72 140, See also al-Qaeda Assoli, Youssef, 46–47 in Algeria, 70, 79 AST. See Ansar al-Sharia in Mauritania, 25, 28, 29–30, 34–35 Atig, Sahbi, 102–3 terrorist attacks, 29 authenticity, 6, 23 theological battles, 70 Authenticity (al-Asala) party, 118 Amazigh (Berber), 7, 116 Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), Amazigh New Year’s Day (Yennayer), 80 53, 54–55, 58 Index ( 209 ) authoritarianism, 2, 142 Ben Hassine, Seifallah (Abu Iyad al Tunisi), in Algeria, 64, 68 96–97 in Libya, 136 Ben H’sine, Mohamed al-Khidhr, 85–86 in Mauritania, 19–20, 36–37 Beni Douala, Algeria, 74 transition to, 68 Ben Issa, Taïeb, 85 awakening (sahwa), 10–11, 12–13, 17, 113, Ben Mahmoud, Mokhtar, 85 158n51 Bensouda, Ahmed Ben Taleb, 40 al-Awda, Salman, 11–12, 113–14, 115, 116– Ben Youssef, Salah, 87–88 17, 139–40, 146n39, 172n41 Berbers Awlad Sulayman tribe, 128 Amazigh, 7, 116 al-Azhar, 35 bidane (Arab-Berbers, “white Azzam, Abdullah, 111 moors”), 20, 22, 25, 29–30 Mozabite, 74–75 Baghdadi, Abu Bakr, 79 Berman, Paul, 144n3 Bahrain, 14–15, 147n57 beys, 165n4 Bakouri, Mustapha, 158n62 bida’ (innovations), 7, 13, 119–20, 172n41 Bani Walid, Libya, 117, 127 bidane (Arab-Berbers or “white moors”), 20, Banu Hassan, 22 22, 25 Bardo National Museum (Tunis), 104 jihadis, 29–30 al-Barka, Ahmed Ould Vih, 152n93 Bilhaj, Abd al-Hakim, 118–20, 171n23 Barqa, Libya, 109 al-Binali, Turki, 15–16 Barr, Nathaniel, 175n97 bin Anas, Malik, 71 Al-Basira (Insight), 49 Bin Bayyah, Abdullah, 149–50n29 al-Basri, Abu Ubayd, 30 bin Baz, Abd al-Aziz, 27, 44, 70, 114–15 Bazaza, Kamal, 124–26 bin Laden, Osama, 11, 28, 32, 34, Béatrice, Hibou, 86 171–72n36 Bedouin, 21 bin Musa, Mahmud, 172n42 Belaid, Chokri, 102, 104 Bir Mosque, 179n149 Belhadj, Ali, 67, 70, 77, 78 al-Bishti, Muhammad Abdalsalam, 171n18 Belkacem, Mouloud Kassim Naït, 65 black moors (haratine), 20, 25, 29–30, Bell, Kevin, 171–72n36 151n51 Belmokhtar, Mokhtar, 29, 30–31, 74, 78–79, Bonnefoy, Laurent, 144n1, 146n48, 175n83 172n39 Ben Achour, Mohamed Tahar, 85 Bouamama, Sheikh, 60 Benadada, Assia, 156n14 Bouchoucha, Ali, 84 Ben al-Cadi, Chedli, 85 Bouhajeb, Salem, 84 Ben al-Cadi, Hedi, 85 Boukhars, Anouar, 143n9, 164–65n1, Ben Ali, Zine al-Abidine, 82, 91–92, 94, 99 166n28 methods, 101 Boumama, Sidi Mohamed Ould Mohamed overthrow, 94 Ould, 34 Ben al-Khodja, Othman, 85 Boumediene, Houari, 64–65 Ben Badis, ʿAbd al-Hamid, 60–63, 71–72 Bourguiba, Habib, 86–91 Ben Barka, Mehdi, 42 Boutchichi brotherhood, 47–48 Bendjedid, Chadli, 65–66 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 69, 76 Benghazi, Libya, 120, 122, 124 Bouyali, Mustapha, 65–67 Benghazi Defense Brigades, 124 Brahmi, 104 Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), (BRSC), 123, 124, 133 111–12 Ben Guerdane, Tunisia, 104 BRSC (Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Benhadj, Ali, 67 Council), 123, 124, 133 Benhamouda, Boualem, 65 Bunyan al-Marsus, 127 ( 210 ) Index

Burkina Faso, 34–35, 37, 155n151 contemporary Salafism, 12–13 al-Buṣayrī, Buddah Ould, 24–25, 32 conversion to Salafism, 29–30 Corinthia Hotel, 126 Cairo, Egypt, 17 corruption, 2, 19–20, 33, 36 Campana, Aurélie, 143–44 countering violent extremism (CVE), 141 Casablanca, Morocco, 38–39, 47–48 counterterrorism, 108–9, 126, 135–36, Cavanaugh, William T., 147n61 154n136 censorship, 92–93 Trans Saharan Counter-terrorism Center for Training Islamic Scholars (Markaz Partnership, 26 Taqwin al-Ulama), 27, 36–37, 149n28 crime, combating, 120, 131–32, 177n132, Central Intelligency Agency (CIA), 111–12 See also police and policing Chaamba Arabs, 74 cultural landscape, 21–23 Chad, 34–35, 128 Curtin, Philip D., 148n2 Chadli, Abdelkrim, 58 CVE (countering violent extremism), 141 charities, Gulf-sponsored, 24 Cyrenaica, 109, 110 chat rooms, 92–93 Chechnya, 28, 111–12 Daddah, Mokhtar Ould, 23–24 Chourou, Sadok, 102–3 Daesh, 127–28 CIA (Central Intelligency Agency), 111–12 Dagestan, 17 civic republicanism, 14 Daoud, Kamel, 77 classical Arabic, 7 Dar al-Fadila, 73 clerics. See also individual clerics Dar al-Hadith, 113–14 awakening (sahwa), 10–11, 12–13, 17, Dar al-hadith al Hassania, 47–48 113, 158n51 Dar al-Hikma (The House of Wisdom), 49 co-option by, 36, 133 Dar al-Ifta, 131 Mauritanian model, 19–37 Islamic Research and Studies Council, pronouncements, 124 (see also fatwas) 131–32 and violence, 19–37 Dar El Fadhila in Mohammadia, 71, 73 Cold War, 1, 9–10 Darqawiyya, 39–40 collaboration, 102–3 da’wa (proselytization), 12, 57, 107–8, 135 colonialism debauchery, 163n76 French, 9, 41, 56–57, 60–62, 83, 148n1 Dedew, Mohamed el Hacen Ould, 26–29, neocolonialism, 34, 35, 154n136 31–32, 33–34, 36–37, 149n28, 151n63 Comic-Con, 126 Dedew, Mokhtar el Hacen Ould, 138–39 Commins, David, 145n18 De Koning, M., 148n70 Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and democracy, 135 the Prevention of Vice. See also Ansar February 20 prodemocracy movement, al-Sharia 38–39, 50, 51–52 community-based organizations, 157n40 Democratic and Social Movement, 58 community policing, 119, 177n132 democratic Islam, 41, 154n136 complicity, 118–19 “Democratic Islam” project, 35 conciliatory or soft approach, 99–102, 103, deradicalization, 112 153n103 desert Islamic schools (mahdara), 19, 22–23, conflict mediation, 126 29–30, 138–39, 149n22, 149n28 confrontational strategy, 103–4 despotism, 161n30 conservatives, 86 Destour (Liberal Constitutional Party), social conservatism, 130 86–87 ultraconservative Islamism, 102–3 deviants (khwarij), 127–28 Constitutional Democratic Rally Party dialogue (Tunisia), 87–88 caveats for, 33–34 consultation (shura), 14 chat rooms, 92–93 Index ( 211 )

deradicalization, 112 soft approach, 153n103 discussion circles (halaqat), 90, 92–93 support for LNA, 122, 123 government response to jihadi challenge, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 111 31–36, 141 El Amal, 90 Dini, Ahmed al-Shukairi, 158n51 El Arbaoui, Amer, 70 diplomacy, 77 El Fakhari, Abdelhakim, 46–47 Dirman, Tariq, 133–34, 180n158 El Gomati, Anas, 169 Dirna, Libya, 111 El Hamd, Abd El Kader Ben Sheba, 71 discrimination, regional, 30–31 Elhussein, Eman, 146n49 discussion circles (halaqat), 90, 92–93 El-Mountaquid (The Critic), 61–62 Djaït, Mohamed al-Aziz, 85 El-Sharuk, 172n46 El Djazairi, Abu Bakr Jabir, 71 El Watan, 59 Djemaa, Abdelmadjid, 71, 73 Emirate Aid Agency, 24 Djerba, Tunisia, 93 Emirates. See United Arab Emirates doctrinal battles, 130–31 engagement, 99–102 doctrine of the forefathers (madhab al-salaf), selective, 103 39–40 enlightened Salafism, 145n24 domestication, 87–92 Ennahda (Tunisia), 3, 91, 92–93, 99, 143– Draybi, Tripoli, 115–16 44, 165n12, 168n79 dress codes, 7 collaboration with nonviolent Salafists, for women, 91–92, 94, 133 102–3 Droukdel, Abdelmalek, 79 confrontational strategy, 103–4 drug seizures, 176n113 destruction, 102 du’at (singular: da’i) (itinerant preachers), purist camp, 102–3 19, 25, 150–51n49 soft-side or conciliatory approach, 99–102 al-Dukkali, Abu Shuaib, 40 views over how to address the challenge of Salafism, 99–100 Earth Day celebrations, 133, 134 Essebsi, Beji Caid, 166n28, 167n47 economic conditions, 2 Essounoussi, Mohamed, 84 economic cooperatives, 115–16 ethnonationalism, 17 education Evans, Martin, 66 Arabization of schools, 65 excommunication (takfir), 7–8, 12, 70, French model, 88–89 150n46, 157n42 kuttab (religious primary schools), 88–89 factionalism madhahib (schools of jurisprudence), 6, in Algeria, 79–80 7–8 hizbiyya (partisanship), 14, 38, 77, 97–98 mahdara schools (desert Islamic schools), in Libya, 123 19, 22–23, 29–30, 138–39, 149n22, Madkhali, 123 149n28 Fadil, Muhammad, 149n28 Quranic schools, 44–46, 47–48, 50, 53 Fahad (King of Saudi Arabia), 171–72n36 religious schools, 62 El Fakhari, Abdelhakim, 46–47 tarbiya, 57 family bonds, 24 Egypt Faraj, Muahmmad abd-al-Salam, 157n39 Arab Spring, 49 Farquhar, Michael, 150n31 deradicalization, 112 al-Fassi, Mohamed Allal, 41, 43, 56–57 military coup (2013), 53–54 fatalism, 84 Nasser regime, 9–10 Fattah, Hala, 148n77 Salafi political parties or party-like fatwas “associations,” 14–15 against alliance with US, 157n42 Salafism, 67 against al-Qaeda, 116–17 ( 212 ) Index

against Amazigh New Year’s Day, freedom of expression (free speech), 35, Yennayer, 80 36–37, 92–93 against burials of naturalized French, 87 freedom of religion, 41 against Gaddafi, 116–17 Freemasonry, 133 against Kamel Daoud, 77 Free Tunisian Destourian (constitutional) against Operation Serval, 34 Party, 85 against participation in Dawn-Dignity Frenchified technocracy, 64 conflict, 124 Fulani, 20 against relations with Israel, 26–27 funding, 119–20, 125–26, 136–37 against self-immolation, 76 Saudi, 139–40, 180n167 against street protests, 76 future directions, 105–6 Fawzan, Salah, 177n123 February 17 Brigade, 122 G5 Sahel Force, 37, 155n151 February 20 prodemocracy movement, Gaddafi, Muammar, 1, 108, 110–12, 119, 38–39, 50, 51–52 171n18 Feldman, N., 168n75 Green Book, 110 Ferkous, Mohamed Ali, 59–60, 67, 71–73, Islamization, 110–11 76–77, 80 Madkhalism under, 112–17 Fezzan, Libya, 109, 110, 128 Third Universal Theory, 110 al-Filistini, Abu Qatada, 157n39 Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, 175n97 fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), 21–22 Gause, Gregory III, 145n31 fiqh al-muwazanat wa al-awlawiyat Gauvain, Richard, 17 (jurisprudence of balances and Geisser, Vincent, 93 priorities), 56 gender mixing (ikhtilat), 76 al-fiqh al-waqi (jurisprudence of current General National Congress (Libya), 118, affairs), 56 122–23 Firjan tribe, 127–28 Gerges, Fawaz, 147n60 First Gulf War, 113, 157n38 gestation, 39–42 FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), 67–69, 77–78 Ghannouchi, Rached, 91, 97, 98–99, Fitna Abu al-Hassan (The Discord of Abu 168n68, 168n73, 168n79 al-Hassan), 172n40 soft-side or conciliatory approach, Fizazi, Mohamed, 45, 48–49 99–102, 103 Flintlock (US), 29 Ghardaïa, Algeria, 74 FLN (National Liberation Front), 60, 62–64 al-Ghariani, Sadeq, 126, 131, 179n146, foreign interference, 136 179–80n155, 180n169 foreign jihadis, 1–2, 29–30, 140, 141 Ghorbal, Samy, 92 Foresight and Persistence (Kabbaj), 53 Ghut al-Shaal, Tripoli, 115–16 former slaves and descendants of former GIA (Armed Islamic Group), 68–69, 70, slaves (haratine), 20, 25, 29–30, 111–12 151n51 GICM (Moroccan Islamic Combatant fragmentation or fractionalization, 59–81, Group), 48–49 138–39 globalization, 94, 140–41 ideological, 79–80 Gobe, Eric, 93 jihadi, 68–69 Gold, Dore, 144n3 quietist, 38–39, 52–56 El Gomati, Anas, 169 France, 1–2 Green Book (Gaddafi), 110 citizenship, 160n7 Group of Eight, 73 colonialism, 9, 41, 56–57, 60–62, 83, GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and 148n1 Combat), 28–29 naturalized French, 87 Guemazi, Kamel, 67 Operation Serval, 34–35 Guennoun, Abdallah, 56–57 Index ( 213 )

Gulf-sponsored charities, 24 Hassan I, 40 Gulf War, 10 Hassan II, 42, 45–46 Gumata, Ahmed (Abu Harun), 172n549 Hassaniya, 150n34 Hattab, Hassan, 69 Hadba, Tripoli, 115–16 al-Hawali, Safar, 172n41 Haddad, Fanar, 148n79 headscarf or veil, 90–92, 94 Haddad, Tahar, 86 Hegghammer, Thomas, 15–16 Hadith, 6, 7, 22 Heras, Nicholas A., 174n75 Hadiya, Shaaban Madud Khalifa (Abu Hermassi, Abdellatif, 86 Ubayda al-Zway), 172n42, 174n75 Hespress, 50, 52 Hadj, Messali, 62–63 hierarchy, 16, 148n69 Hafala, Majdi, 116–17, 172n42, 173n55, High Islamic Council (Mauritania), 26, 27 180n158, 181n173 hijab, 94 Hafez, Mohammed, 161–62n48 al-Hilali, Muhammad Taqi al-Din, 40, 41, Haftar, Khaled, 125 43–45 Haftar, Khalifa, 55, 122–26, 127–28, 133, Hisba (religious ethics), 157n40 174n75 Hizb al-Asala, 168n74 Operation Dignity, 123–24, 134–35 Hizb al-Nour (Party of Light), 2, 12–13, and Utaybi, 180n169 14–15, 53–54, 67 Haftar, Saddam, 125 Hizb al-Rahma, 168n74 Haidalla, Mohamed, 23–24, 26 Hizb al-Tahrir, 110–11, 168n74 al-Halabi, Ali, 73 hizbiyya (partisanship), 14, 38, 77, 97–98 halaqat (discussion circles), 90, 92–93 Hosenball, Mark, 154n127 Halima, Abd-al Mun’em Mustafa (Abu Basir Howell, Julia Day, 148n76 al-Tartusi), 32–33, 153n114 human rights, 105 Halpulaar, 20 human trafficking, 125–26 Hama, 18, 148n79 Hussein, Saddam, 10, 26 Hamadache, Abdelafatah, 77, 78, 163n76 Hamani, Ahmed, 70 Ibadis, 74–75 El Hamd, Abd El Kader Ben Sheba, 71 Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad, 8, 18, 70 Hamid, Shadi, 146n53 Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 70 Hammond, Andrew, 144n1 Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, 72 Hanafi madhhab, 165n13 Ibn Saba al-Yahudi, Abdullah, 45 Hanbal, Ahmed Bin, 7–8 Ibn Saud, Abd al-Aziz, 8 Hanbalism, 7–8, 14 Ibn Taymiya, Taqi al-Din, 7–8, 18, 40, 62, 70, Haraka Siyasiya Islamiya fi Muritanya 71, 145n23, 166n42 (Islamic Political Movement in al-Ibrahimi, Mohamed Bachir, 61, 65, Mauritania; HASIM), 25–26, 71–72 151n53 al-Ibrahimi, Taleb, 77 Harakat al-Jihad, 110–11 Ibrahimini, Ahmed Taleb, 65 haraki or activist Salafism, 67, 146n42 Idab-Lihsen tribe, 28 haratine (former slaves or “black moors”), ideology, 142 20, 25, 29–30, 151n51 doctrinal battles, 130–31 Harbi, Mohammed, 161n30 doctrine of the forefathers (madhab harb siyasiya (political war), 127–28 al-salaf), 39–40 Harchaoui, Jalel, 175n88 fractionalization, 79–80 al-Hasi, Ashraf al-Mayyar, 125–26, Islamic State, 15 180n162 Islamist vs Salafist, 98 HASIM (Haraka Siyasiya Islamiya fi juridical debates, 32–33 Muritanya; Islamic Political Movement modern, 8 in Mauritania), 25–26, 151n53 al-Qaeda, 15 ( 214 ) Index ideology (contd) Salafism (see Salafism) takfiri, 157n42 Saudi influence on, 11–12 theological battles, 70 Sunni, 9–10 war of ideas, 31 war on khwarij or deviants from, 127–28 Idris (Muhammad Idris bin Muhammad Islam, Sheikh (Mohammed Belarbi Alaoui), al-Mahdi al-Senussi), 110 56–57 Idrissi, Khatib, 97–98 al-Islam, Saadi, 115, 116–17, 172n52 al-Idrissi, Shaykh al-Khatib, 96 al-Islam, Saif, 112, 115 ijtihad (independent reasoning), 7, 41, Islamic Call Society, 110 54–55, 89, 110 Islamic Cultural Association, 24, 25 ikhtilat (gender mixing), 76 Islamic Emirate of Kunar, 113, 171–72n36 Ikhwani (Muslim Brotherhood), 97–98 Islamic Institute of Ibn Abbas, 151n54 illiteracy, 110 Islamic law Imazighen, 109 call for, 33, 119–20 inclusion-moderation hypothesis, 14–15 desire for rule by, 33 Independence (Istiqlal) party (Morocco), sharia law, 101, 110 43, 58 Islamic Political Movement in Mauritania independent reasoning (ijtihad), 7, 41, (Haraka Siyasiya Islamiya fi Muritanya; 54–55, 89, 110 HASIM), 25–26, 151n53 indigenization, 139–40 Islamic Relief Organization, 24 individualization, religious, 92–94 Islamic Research and Studies Council, Indonesia, 17, 148n76 131–32 Inge, Anabel, 148n70 Islamic Sahwa Front, 77 innovations (bida’), 7, 13, 119–20, 172n41 Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), 68–69 Institute for Islamic Studies and Research Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 67–69, 77–78 (ISERI), 24 Islamic State, 1–2, 3, 11, 140 institutionalization, 96–98 aims, 15–16 International African Relief Agency, 24 diplomatic relations, 77 International Crisis Group, 167n54 foreign fighters, 141 internet chat rooms, 92–93 growth, 108–9 Iran, 1, 10, 18 ideology, 15 Iran-Iraq war, 10 in Libya, 107, 120, 126 Iraq, 93, 140 terrorist activities, 126 Gulf War, 10 in Tunisia, 104 invasion of Kuwait, 47 worldview, 16 Iran-Iraq war, 10 Islamic texts US war, 28, 93 approach to reading, 16 Wahhabism and Salafism, 148n77 faulty or “incorrect” understanding of, 30 Iraq War, 1, 18 Hadith, 6, 7, 22 ISERI (Institute for Islamic Studies and sacred texts, 16 Research), 24 Islamic thought, moderate (wassatiya), 42 ISIS, 126, 133, 155n148, 159n69 Islamic University of Medina, 9–10, 113–14, islah (reform), 61, 83 171n35 islahists, 61–62 Islamic Values Association (Jam’iyat Islah party, 2, 73 al-Qiyam al-Islamiyya), 64–65 Islam Islamic Youth (Shabiba al-Islamiya), 43 democratic, 41, 154n136 Islamism, 2–3 deterritorialized, 17 in Algeria, 26, 66–67, 80, 98–99, 100–1 domestication of, 87–92 collaboration with Salafism, 98–99, 102–3 Moroccan, 48 in Libya, 109–12, 123, 127 radicalization of, 147n59 mainstream, 98 Index ( 215 )

in Mauritania, 26, 151n51 in Libya, 107, 111, 119–20, 135 mobilization, 90 in Maghreb, 10, 15–16, 140–41 in Morocco, 43 in Mauritania, 20–21, 28–36, 148n2 political parties, 80 motivations, 30–31 rebellion, 161–62n47 quietist, 15 reformist, 99 radicalization, 111 repression, 26 recruitment, 29–30 rise, 43 rehabilitation, 21, 35–36 Shia, 10 root causes, 30 Sunni, 18 support for al-Qaeda, 48–49 support for, 123 terrorist attacks, 93 see( also terrorism) in Tunisia, 90, 91–92, 98–99, 102–3 threat causes, 147n60 ultraconservative, 102–3 in Tunisia, 82–83, 93, 94–96, 101–2, Islamist Party of Renaissance and 104–5 Virtue, 51 violent, 37, 93, 104, 121–22 Islamist Unity and Reform Movement of war veterans, 101–2 (MUR), 51 Jourde, Cédric, 143–44 Islamization, 23–24, 147n59 journalism, 133 Israel, 26–27, 113 Jund al Khilafah (Wilayat Jaza’ir), 79 Arab-Israeli conflict, 1, 9–10 juridical debates, 32–33 el Issa, Mohamed, 11–12 jurisprudence Istiqlal (Independence) party (Morocco), of balances and priorities (fiqh 43, 58 al-muwazanat wa al-awlawiyat), 56 Italy, 109–10 of current affairs(al-fiqh al-waqi), 56 Islamic (fiqh), 21–22 Jabhat al-Islah, 101 madhahib (schools of jurisprudence), 6, al-Jabri, Mohammed Abed, 156n18 7–8 al-Jadaoui, Slimane, 85 Maliki, 2, 21–22, 40, 143n5, 164n89 Jamaat Islamiyya (Morocco), 151n53 Justice and Development Party (PJD), 48, al-Jama’at Islamiyya (Egypt), 48–49 49, 50–52, 53, 58, 138–39 Jamaat Saadi, 115 Justice and Equality Movement, 128 Jama’at Tabiligh, 23, 25, 67 Justice and Welfare (Al Adl Wal Ihsan), 43 Jamahirya (state of the masses), 110 Jam’iyat al-Qiyam al-Islamiyya (Islamic Kabbaj, Hammad, 39, 53–55, 56–58, 138–40 Values Association) (Algeria), 64–65 Kabylia, 70 al-Jaziri, Hammadi, 85 Kara, Abdelraouf, 120–21, 126–32, 175n86, jihad, 150n46 175n89 jihadi Salafism anti-ISIS campaigns, 126 in Algeria, 60, 72–73, 78–80, 141 Special Deterrence Force, 120–21, 126– after Arab Spring, 94–96 32, 176n119 definition of, 146n42 Al Karama forum, 50 ex-Abu Slim prisoners, 111, 119–20, 122, al-Kattani, Abd al-Kabir, 56–57 174n80 al-Kattani, Muḥammad bin Jaafar, 40 foreign, 1–2, 29–30, 139–40, 141 Kawarij sect, 55 fractionalization, 68–69 Kenya, 28 global networks, 28 Kepel, Gilles, 147n59 government response to, 28–29, 31–36 Kettani, Hassan, 48–49 grievances that fuel, 112 Khashoggi, Jamal, 11–12 identification, 29–31 Khawarij sect, 55 institutionalization, 96–98 Kheireddine Pacha, 84 juridical debates, 32–33 al-Khouja, Mohamed, 101 ( 216 ) Index khawarij (deviants), 127–28 Ministry of Interior, 120, 121, 127–28, Knysh, Alexander, 17 175n89, 180n164 Kolman, Iris, 148n70 Political Isolation Law, 118–19, 121–22 al-Kote, Abd al-Rahman, 177n132 population, 109 Kufra, Libya, 116, 128 quietist Salafism, 135 Kunar, Afghanistan, 113, 171–72n36 Sabha Security Directorate, 128 kuttab (religious primary schools), 88–89 Salafi political parties or party-like Kuwait, 14–15, 47 “associations,” 14–15 Salafism, 2, 107–37, 138–39, 140, 141, Laarayedh, Ali, 103 172n42 Lacroix, Stephane, 14–15, 145n22 security, 120, 126, 128, 131, 135, 174n78, Ladbury, Sarah, 148n70 175n89, 177n132 Lauzière, Henri, 9, 41, 143n9 sharia law, 110 Lebanese refugee camps, 17 soft approach, 153n103 Lefevre, Raphael, 148n79 state collapse, 107–37, 138–39 legalistic strategies, 105 Sufi heritage, 121 Leggett, Christopher, 152n86 Supreme Security Committee Support Lemine, Mohamed Salem Ould Mohamed Branches, 175n89 (al-Majlissi), 25, 34–35, 36, 154n137 veterans, 140 Lemrabott, Ahmedou Ould, 25, 31–32, 36 violence, 108, 121–22 Liberal Constitutional Party (Destour), Libya Dawn coalition, 123–24, 131, 86–87 174n75 al-Libi, Abu Anas, 122 Libyan arms, 1–2 al-Libi, Abu Layth, 112 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), al-Libi, Abu Yahya, 25, 149n23 111–13, 114, 171n23 Libya, 1–2, 140, 147n57, See also Maghreb Libyan National Army (LNA), 125, 133–34 region support for, 123, 175–76n101 Arab Spring, 13, 116–17 Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Rooms armed militias, 119–20, 121, 174n76, (LROR), 174n75 174n78, 177n132 Libya Shield, 122 Benghazi Defense Brigades, 124 LIFG (Libyan Islamic Fighting Group), Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council 111–13, 114, 171n23 (BRSC), 123, 124, 133 literacy, 19–20, 110 Central Bank, 125–26 literalism, 7 civil war, 1–2, 121, 138–39 LNA. See Libyan National Army concerning regions, 141 local dynamics, 16–18, 140–41 contemporary struggles, 130 London, England, 32–33 elections, 118, 138, 173n68 LROR (Libyan Revolutionaries Operations factionalism, 123 Rooms), 174n75 foreign interference, 136 Luck, Taylor, 169 General National Congress, 118, 122–23 al-Luhaydan, Saleh, 117 Government of National Accord, 125–26, Lussato, Céline, 168n482 136 illiteracy, 110 Maaninou, Hadj Ahmed, 56–57 Islamic State, 120 Mace, Celian, 169 Islamism, 109–12, 127 Madani, Abbassi, 67 jihadists, 107, 119–20, 135 madhab al-salaf (doctrine of the forefathers), Madkhalis, 13, 107–37, 138–39, 39–40 179n149 madhahib (schools of jurisprudence), 6, 7–8 Ministry of Endowments and Islamic al-Madkhali, Muhammad bin Hadi, 71, 73 Affairs, 131–32, 133–34 clerical pronouncements, 124 Index ( 217 )

disagreement with Rabi bin Hadi mahdara schools (Islamic schools in al-Madkhali, 134–35 Mauritania), 19, 22–23, 29–30, 138– fatwa against participation in Dawn- 39, 149n22 Dignity conflict, 124 foreign attendance, 29–30 al-Madkhali, Rabi bin Hadi, 8, 13, 50, 73, Mahdara Namudhajiyya, 149n28 108, 113–15, 150n121, 158n51, al-Majlissi (Mohamed Salem Ould 172n40, 172n42 Mohamed Lemine), 25, 34–35, 36, adherents (see Madkhalis) 154n137 and al-Rahman’s assassination, 171–72n36 Majura Protection Force, 125–26 disagreement with Muhammad Hadi Mali, 1–2, 20–21, 94–95, 154n134 al-Madkhali, 134–35 al-Qaeda activity, 34–35, 37 and Kara, 175n86 G5 Sahel Force, 155n151 warning against further fitna, 117 Operation Serval, 34–35 Madkhalis Maliki jurisprudence, 2, 21–22, 40, 143n5, in Algeria, 13 164n89 armed groups, 119–20, 121, 123, 125–26, Al-Manār (The Lighthouse), 85 135–36, 174n78, 177n672, 180n634 Mandraud, Isabelle, 168n79, 169n86 contemporary struggles, 130 Mansouri, Fatima-Zahra, 158n62 drivers, 136–37 maqasid (higher objectives of sharia), 41 emergence, 158n51 al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad, 15–16, 120, factionalism, 123, 128 166n42, 174–75n81 funding, 139–40, 180n167 marabouts, 21–22, 23 influence, 13, 133–34 marginalization, 43, 135 Jamaat Saadi (Libya), 115 al-Ma’ribi, Abu Al-Hassan (Mustafa bin in Libya, 13, 107–37, 138–39, 171n35, Isma’il al-Sulaymani), 113–14, 115, 173n68, 179n149 172n41, 173n55 in Morocco, 50, 55 Ma’ribis, 113–14, 131, 172n42 quietist, 13, 135 Markaz Taqwin al-Ulama (Center for radicalization, 55, 111–12 Training Islamic Scholars), 27, 36–37, rise and growth, 112–17, 133–34, 136–37 149n28 Saadi’s Faction (Libya), 115 martyrs, 76, 116–17 Salafi Spring, 50 Marxists, 65–66 in Saudi Arabia, 158n51 Marzouki, Moncef, 166n28 support for, 112–13, 133–34, 136, maṣlaḥa (public interest), 42, 89 180n167 Materi, Sakhr, 94 terminology, 131 Matiga Airport (Tripoli), 120–21, 126 urban warfare, 124–26 al-Mauritani, Abu Hafs (Mahfouz Ould works and media on, 169 al-Walid), 28, 31–33, 34–35, 36, Madkhaliyya (adherents of Madkhali). See 152n74 Madkhalis Mauritania. See also Maghreb region Madrid peace conference (1991), 113 Al Murabit (Almoravid) dynasty, 21–22 Maghraoui, Mohamed, 39, 44–47, 50–55, Arabization, 23–24 58, 157–58n287, 158n54 Arab Spring, 2 attacks on ISIS, 159n69 authoritarianism, 36–37 exile into Saudi Arabia, 48 border security, 34–35 Maghreb region, 1–4 See also specific Arab clerical committees, 32 states corruption, 36 Islamism, 2–3 cultural landscape, 21–23 jihadism, 140–41 domestic policy, 34–35 Salafism, 2–4, 138–42 Flintlock exercise, 29 Mahdara Namudhajiyya, 149n28 foreign policy, 34–35 ( 218 ) Index

Mauritania (contd) Minbar al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (Platform French colonial era, 148n1 for Monotheism and Jihad), G5 Sahel Force, 155n151 174–75n81 High Islamic Council, 26, 27 Mirdas Battalion, 177n132 Islamists, 26, 151n51 Misrata, Libya, 128 Islamization, 23–24 al-Misrati, Abu Ubayda (Abu Ubayda jihadis, 20–21, 28–36, 148n2 al-Sh’hubi), 177n132 literacy, 19–20 mobile networks, 116–17 mahdara schools (Islamic schools), 19, mobilization, 90, See also activism 22–23, 29–30, 138–39, 149n22 moderate Islamic thought (wassatiya), 42 poverty, 36 modernist Salafism, 8–9, 145n24 relations with AQIM, 25, 28, 29–30, in Algeria, 72–73 34–35 marginalization of, 43 relations with US, 26 in Morocco, 38, 40–42, 43 religious landscape, 21–23 in Tunisia, 85, 86 response to jihadi challenge, 31–36, 141 Mohamed Bin Salman, 11–12 Salafism, 19–37, 138–40 Mohamed VI, 47–48 sharia, 23–24 Mokrani, Al, 60 socioeconomic conditions, 19–20, Mongols, 18 22–23 morality police, 157n40, See also police and Sufi orders, 19, 23 policing Taya regime, 28 moral superiority, 17 terrorism, 29, 152n86 Moroccan Association for the Quran and urbanization, 23 Sunna, 44–45, 53–54 violence, 28–29, 34, 152n86 Moroccan Council of Islamic Scholars, war of ideas, 31 157–58n46 zwaya tribes, 138–39 Moroccan Islam, 48 Mauritanian model, 21, 35–36 Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group M’Ballah, Mohamed al-Mokhtar Ould, 32 (GICM), 48–49 McGregor, Andrew, 169 Morocco, 83, 141, See also Maghreb region M’Daghri, Abdelkbir Alaoui, 44, 47–48, Arab Spring, 2, 49 157n285 community-based organizations, 157n40 media relations, 35, 131 concerning regions, 141 social media, 134 February 20 prodemocracy movement, television (TV), 91, 131 38–39, 50, 51–52 threats against journalists, 133 French colonial era, 9, 38 Mediterranean Sea, 1–2 Ministry of Interior, 157n44 Meijer, Roel, 5–6, 14, 144n1, 145n22 Ministry of Religious Endowments and Merad, Ali, 62 Islamic Affairs, 47–48, 50–51 Mezrag, Madani, 77, 78 National Coordination for Associations of MI6 (British Secret Intelligence Service), Quranic Schools, 50 111–12 quietist Salafism, 42–46, 138–39 migrants and migration, 1–2, 126, 128 Quranic schools, 44–46, 47–48, 50, 53 militancy radical underground, 46–47 calls for, 93 Salafi NGOs, 44–49, 50 Salafism’s theological influence on, 15, Salafi political parties or party-like 147n59 “associations,” 14–15 militarization, 128 Salafism, 3, 38–58, 138–39, 157n38 Militia of Uqba ibn Nafi in Tunisia, 104 Sufism, 40 militias. See armed groups; specific militias, Supreme Council of the Ulema, 47–48 brigades, battalions by name as Ummatun Wasata (centrist nation), 42 Index ( 219 )

Wahhabism, 39–40, 157n44 al-Najashi (Armha), 57, 76 war veterans, 140 An-Nakhli, Mohamed, 85 Al-Mounquid (The Savior), 67 al-Na’rut, Abd al-Gader, 172n42 mourchidat (female spiritual guides), 47–48 nasiha (advice to a ruler), 14 Mourou, Abdel Fattah, 91 Nasiriyya, 39–40 Mouterde, Perrine, 168n67 Nasraoui, Radhia, 97 Moutii, Abdelkarim, 43 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 9–10, 64–65, 110 Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI, Nasserism, 23–24 Movement for Islamic Tendency), 90, al-Nassir, 50 166n39 See also Ennahda National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Movement for Islamic Tendency (US), 152n76 (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique, National Coordination for Associations of MTI), 90, 166n39 See also Ennahda Quranic Schools (Morocco), 50 Movement for National Renewal (Algeria), National Forces Alliance (Libya), 118 77–78 nationalism, 72–73 Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Arab, 23–24, 110 Liberties (MTLD), 62–63 ethnonationalist struggle, 17 Mozabite Berbers, 74–75 Tunisian, 86–87 MTI (Mouvement de la Tendance National Liberation Front (FLN) (Algeria), Islamique, Movement for Islamic 60, 64 Tendency), 90, 166n39 See also National Rally of Independents (Morocco), Ennahda 53 MTLD (Movement for the Triumph of National Salvation Front (Libya), 110–11 Democratic Liberties), 62–63 NATO, 1–2 Muhammad bin Nayef, 114 Nawasi Brigade, 175n89 Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allah, 39–40 al-Nawawi, Imam, 71 MUR (Islamist Unity and Reform Nazal, Muhammad Mika’ili (Abu Abdallah Movement), 51 al-Abyari), 115, 172n42, 172n52 Al Murabit dynasty, 21–22 neocolonialism, 154n136 Murabitun, 109–10 critiques of, 35 al-Mursi, Muhammad, 122 fatwas against, 34 Muslim Brotherhood, 3, 9, 10, 14–15 Neo-Destour (Tunisia), 87–88 brutalization, 53–54, 55 neo-Salafism, 86 in Egypt, 122 New Year’s Day (Yennayer), 80 Ikhwani, 97–98 NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), in Libya, 110–11, 117, 118, 121–22, 44–49, 50 127–28, 132, 171n19 Nielsen, Richard A., 148n70 in Mauritania, 23, 25 Niger, 34–35, 155n151 in Morocco, 53–54, 55 nomadism, 21, 22 Muslims, 6 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Ibadi, 74 44–49, 50 Shia, 18, 45 nonviolent Salafism, 102–3 Sunni, 6 North Africa, 139–40 See also specific Muslim World League, 9–10, 11–12 countries Mu’tazila, 7–8 Nouakchott, Mauritania, 24–25, 27, 35, 36 mysticism, 21–22 Nouakchott News Agency, 35 Nour, Kamal, 67 Nafie, Bashir Mousa, 144n10 al-Nour party (Party of Light) (Egypt), 2, Nafusa mountains, 133–34 12–13, 14–15, 53–54, 67 Nahas, Marida, 145n28 Nahwi, Khalil, 149n28 oil industry, 9–10, 135–36 ( 220 ) Index

Omari, Ilyas, 54–55 political activism. See also activism Operation Dignity (Libya), 123–24, rise of, 25–28 134–35 street politics, 101–2 Operation Serval (Mauritania), 34–35 political contexts, 17 orthodoxy (correct belief), 40, 43 Political Isolation Law (Libya), 118–19, orthopraxy (correct behavior), 40, 43 121–22 Othman, Omar Mahmoud Mohammed political parties or party-like “associations.” (Abu Qatada), 70 See also specific parties and associations Ottoman Empire, 165n13 Islamist, 80 Ottomanism, reformist, 83–84 Salafi, 14–15, 168n74 Ould Abdel Aziz, Mohamed, 36–37 political partisanship (hizbiyya), 14, 38, 77, Ould Abdel Haq, Ahmed Mazid, 31–34, 36 97–98 Ould Ghazouani, Mohamed, 36–37 political Salafism, 141,See also politico Ould Semane, Khadim, 30–31, 33–34, Salafism 35–36 in Algeria, 70, 78 Ould Sidna, Sidi, 153n97 budding, 46–49 Ouyahia, Ahmed, 77, 80 in Libya, 123 in Mauritania, 25–28 Palestine, 17, 28, 113 in Morocco, 46–49 Palestinian refugees, 17 rise of, 25–28 Pall, Zoltan, 146n42 political war (harb siyasiya), 127–28 PAM (Party of Authenticity and Modernity), politico Salafism, 12–13, 14–15, 146n42,See 53, 54–55, 58 also political Salafism pan-Arabism, 86 in Algeria, 72–73, 78 pan-Islamism, 86 in Mauritania, 21, 25–28 Pan-Sahel Initiative, 26 in Morocco, 55–57 Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), support for, 78 53, 54–55, 58 polytheism (shirk), 7, 119–20, 121 Party of Light (Hizb al-Nour), 2, 12–13, pornography, 126 14–15, 53–54, 67 post-Salafism, 27 party politics (hizbiyya), 14, 38, 77, 97–98 poverty, 21, 36 patron-client relations, 136 PPA (Algerian People’s Party), 62–63 Paz, Reuven, 153n113 preachers, itinerant (du’at; singular: da’i), 19, peaceful activism, 105, See also activism 25, 150–51n49 personal appearance, 7 prison rehabilitation. See also rehabilitation Phillips, John, 66 clerical co-option of, 133 piety, 107–8 Madkhali, 141 markers of, 7, 114 propaganda, 10 PJD (Justice and Development Party), 48, FLN, 63 49, 50–52, 53, 58, 138–39 Madkhali, 110, 131 pluralization, 92–94 proselytization (da’wa), 12, 57, 107–8, 135 poetry, 35, 54 prostitution, 163n76 police and policing protests combating crime committees, 177n132 street protests, 76, 101, 105 community policing, 119 student protests, 161n32 contemporary struggles, 130 proto-Salafis, 145n24 in Libya, 119, 120–21, 130, 135–36 public interest (maṣlaḥa), 42, 89 Madkhali, 135–36 purist Salafism, 8–10, 12–13, 42–43, 145n24, morality police, 157n40 146n42, See also quietist Salafism in Tunisia, 104, 169n93 vigilantism, 103–4, 125–26 Qaddur family, 175n89 Index ( 221 )

Qadhafi. See Gaddafi, Muammar in Mauritania, 36–37 Qadiriyya order, 23 post-revolutionary, 98 al-Qaeda, 3, 11, See also Al-Qaeda in the in Tunisia, 98, 99–102, 103–4 Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) radio, 70, 130 ideology and worldview, 15, 16 Radio Mauritanie, 152n81 in Libya, 107, 112, 120 Radio Quran, 70 in Mauritania, 20–21, 22, 28, 32–33 Radio Zitouna, 94 in Morocco, 48–49 Rafallah al-Sahati Companies, 122 al-Qaid, Abd al-Wahab, 118–19 Raffouch, Adil, 54, 55 al-Qarni, Ayidh, 115, 116–17 Rafiki, Mohammed (Abou Hafs), 48–49, Qatar, 119–20, 123, 124 51, 58 qital (fighting or killing), 94–95, 167n52 al-Rahman, ‘Atiyatullah ‘Abd, 25, 149n23 al-Qiyam al-Islamiyya. See Jam’iyat al-Qiyam al-Rahman, Jamil, 171–72n36 al-Islamiyya (Islamic Values Association) Ramadan, 70, 89 quietist Salafism, 8, 12–14, 141, 146n42,See Ramadan, Mohamed Said, 144n10 also purist Salafism Ramdani, Abdelmalek, 67, 70, 76 in Algeria, 59–60, 69–80 Ramdani, Azzedine, 59–60, 73 ascendance, 42–46 RAND corporation, 154n136 bifurcations and fractures, 38–39, 52–56 Raslan, Muhammad Sa’id, 55, 179–80n155 entrenchment, 69–80 Al-Raysuni, Ahmad, 156n10 expansion factors, 75 recruitment jihadi, 15 international, 94–95 in Libya, 113, 114–15, 123, 131, 135, 136 for jihad, 29–30 Maghrebi, 138 online, 93 in Morocco, 38–39, 42–46, 52–56, Redouane, Abdelhaq, 46–47 138–39 reformism politicization, 123 in Algeria, 62 support for, 113, 131, 136 Islamist, 99 Qur’an modernist, 38 literalist approach to, 7 in Morocco, 38 qital, 167n52 Ottomanist, 83–84 Quranic schools, 44–46, 47–48 Tunisian, 83–86, 87, 99 closures, 53 refugee camps, 17 National Coordination for Associations of regional discrimination, 30–31 Quranic Schools (Morocco), 50 rehabilitation Quraysh tribe, 76 Madkhali programs, 112, 126, 128, 141 Qutb, Sayid, 15, 64–65, 147n60 Mauritanian model, 21, 35–36 Rabia, Said, 159n1 religiosity, 91, 92 radical activism, 95, See also activism religious activism, 92, See also activism radicalization religious ethics (Hisba), 157n40 in Algeria, 65–66 religious individualization, 92–94 deradicalization, 112 religious institutions, 89–90 of Islam, 147n59 religious schools, 62, 88–89, See also jihadi, 111 education; Quranic schools in Libya, 111–12 religious sites, 130 Madkhali, 55, 111–12 republicanism, civic, 14 in Morocco, 55 Revolutionary Committee, 171n18 radical Salafism revolutionary violence, 148n2, See also jihadi in Algeria, 64–68 Salafism engagement with, 99–102, 103 Rida, Muhammad Rashid, 8–9, 85, 87, Islamization of, 147n59 145n24 ( 222 ) Index

Rif mountains, 141 enlightened, 145n24 Ronen, Yehudit, 171n23 entrenchment, 69–80 Roy, Olivier, 16, 17, 147n59, 148n71 expansion factors, 75 Rubin, Lawrence, 145n31 fragmentation, 38–39, 52–56, 59–81 ruralism, 21 future directions, 105–6 rural scholars, 21–22 Gaddafi’s policies toward, 114–15 genesis and development, 9, 23, 39–42, Saadi, Sami, 118 60–63 Saadi’s Faction, 115 haraki or activist, 67, 146n42 Saadi tribe, 109–10 and hierarchy, 148n69 saafiqat (merchants), 134–35 intellectual heritage, 7–12 Sabha, Libya, 127, 128 internationalization, 10 Sabratha, Libya, 126, 128 in Iraq, 148n77 sacred texts Islamist collaboration, 102–3 approach to reading, 7, 16 Islamist grappling, 98–99 Hadith, 6, 7, 22 jihadi, 15–16, 60, 68–69, 72–73, 78–80, Qur’an, 7, 167n52 82–83, 94–98, 104–5, 107, 111, 119– Sadiki College, 84 20, 135, 146n42 Al Saghir, Osama, 100 jihadi discourse, 47 Sahara (media outlet), 35 Levantine trend, 145n20 Sahara desert, 28 Libyan, 107–37, 138–39, 140, 172n42 Sahel, 1–2, 20–21, 28 Madkhali, 108–9, 112–17, 133, 134 Sahel clan, 88 Maghreb region, 2–4, 138–42 Sahnoun, Ahmed, 64–65, 67 management of, 82–106 Sahnouni, Hachemi, 67 on the march, 73–75 Sahraoui, Abdelbaki, 67 markers of piety, 7, 114 sahwa (awakening), 10–11, 12–13, 17, 113, Mauritanian, 19–37, 138–39 158n51 and militancy, 15, 147n59 Saint-Pierre Cathedral (Rabat), 157n42 militarization, 128 Saiqa (Thunderbolt) Special Forces, 125–26 modern ideology, 8 al-salaf al-salih (Mohammed and his modernist, 8–9, 38, 85, 145n24 companions), 7 in Morocco, 38–58, 138–39, 157n38 Salaficization, 82–83 Najdi branch, 145n16 Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat, 69 neo-Salafism, 86 Salafism nonviolent, 102–3 in Algeria, 59–81, 138–39, 164n87 in North Africa, 139–40 allure or appeal, 16–18, 142 paradoxical mutations, 38–58 and Arab Spring, 55, 75–79, 94–96 political, 78, 141 attempted institutionalization of, 96–98 politicization, 46–49, 70 bifurcations and divisions, 52–55, 71–72 politico, 12–13, 14–15, 55–57, 72–73, conciliatory approach to, 99–102 146n42 construction of, 83–87 post-revolutionary, 82–106 contemporary currents, 12–13 post-Salafism, 27 contradictory views over how to address proto-Salafism, 145n24 the challenge of, 99 purist, 8–10, 145n24, 146n42 conversion to, 29–30 push factors, 2 core beliefs and practices, 7, 110 quietist, 8, 11, 12–14, 38–39, 42–46, currents, 5–18 52–56, 59–60, 69–80, 113, 114–15, definition, 5–18 123, 135, 136, 138, 141, 146n42 in Egypt, 67 radical, 64–68, 98, 99–100 engagement with, 99–102 reformist, 38 Index ( 223 )

roots, 6, 23–25 support for Egypt, 53–54 Saudi-based or Saudi-inspired, 8–9, 23, support for Madkhalis, 112–13, 131, 136, 157n38 139–40, 158n51, 180n167 Saudi influence, 11–12, 113, 139–40 support for Salafists, 114 as “Saved Sect,” or Firqatun-Nājiyah, support for Wahhabis, 44–45 144n2 threat perceptions, 12–13, 145n31 self-referential description, 6, 136–37, Wahhabism, 3, 5–6 144n2 scholars, rural, 21–22 social mores, 127–28 schools. See education soft-side or conciliatory approach to, Scientific National Council (SNC) (Algeria), 99–102, 103, 141, 153n103 164n90 spread of, 9–10 Sdiri, Wafa, 167n61 and state collapse, 107–37 sectarianism, 7–8, 18 support for, 78, 113, 136 secularism, 72–73, 95 terminology, 6 security covenants, 32–33, 126 transnational networks, 12 security issues. See also police and policing in Tunisia, 82–106, 138–39 in Algeria, 141 universalist, 17 border security, 34–35 views on other sects, 18 combating crime, 120, 175n89, violent, 47, 101 177n132 virtuous, 80 in Libya, 120, 126, 128, 131, 135, 174n78, Wahhabi, 7, 9–10 175n89, 177n132 and women, 16, 86, 148n70 in Mauritania, 34–35 Salafi Spring, 50–52 in Tunisia, 94 Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat self-immolation, 1–2, 76 (GSPC), 28–29 Senegal, 20 Salafist Sufis, 17 al-Senussi, Muhammad Idris bin Muhammad Salafiyya Dawn, 14–15 al-Mahdi (Idris), 110 Salafization, creeping, 59 September 11 terrorist attacks, 5–6, 93 Salem, Zekeria Ould Ahmed, 27, 152n70, Seqlab, Ahmed, 74 152n75, 152n93 Serrar, Salim, 67 Salim, Atia Ben Mohammed, 71 Sfar, Béchir, 84 Sallabi, Ali, 112 Sfax, 105 al-Sanusi, Abdallah Idris, 40 shabaab al-manatiq support Sanussiya, 109–10 forces, 125–26 al-Sanussiya, Muhammad bin ‘Ali, 109–10 Shabiba al-Islamiya (Islamic Youth), 43 Al Saud family, 8, 10 Al-Sha’ir (“the Poet,” Mohamed Ould Al Saud, Mohamed Bin Salman, 11–12 Ahmed Zarouq), 35 Al Saud, Muhammad bin Nayef, 114 Shane, Scott, 144n3 Saudi Arabia, 5–6, 11 Shanqiti, Mohammed Mokhtar, 71 clerical pronouncements, 124 sharia, 23–24, 168n75 education and social matters, 8 maqasid (higher objectives of sharia), 41 First Gulf War, 157n38 sharia law, 101, 110 indoctrination, 130 al-Shatibi, Abu Ishaq, 41 modern, 8 Al ash-Sheikh, Abdul-Aziz ibn Abdullah, oil industry, 9–10 175–76n101, 177n123 relations with Iran, 18 al-Sh’hubi, Abu Ubayda (Abu Ubayda relations with Qatar, 124 al-Misrati), 177n132 relations with US, 157n38 Shia Islamism, 10, 14–15 Salafism, 11–12, 139–40, 157n38 Shia Muslims, 18, 45 soft approach, 153n103 Al-Shihab (The Meteor), 61–63 ( 224 ) Index

Shiism, 7 in Mauritania, 27 anti-Shiism, 18, 45 in Morocco, 40 al-Shinqiti, Muhammad al-Amin, 150n31 orders, 19, 23, 39–40, 47–48 shirk (polytheism), 7, 119–20 Salafist, 17 shura (consultation), 14 suicide bombings, 30, 32–33, 48–49, 126, Sirte, Libya, 117 152n86 al-Sisi, Abdel-Fattah, 53–54, 122 condemnation of, 70 604th Infantry Battalion, 127–28, 177n123 Sulayman, Mawlay, 39–40 slavery, 20 al-Sulaymani, Mustafa bin Isma’il (Abu former slaves (haratine), 20, 25, 29–30, Al-Hassan al-Ma’ribi), 113–14, 115, 151n51 172n41, 173n55 smuggling, 128, 140–41 Sultani, Abdel Latif, 64–65 SNC (Scientific National Council) (Algeria), Sunni Islam, 9–10, 72–73 164n90 Sunni Islamists, 18 Sniqra, Azhar, 59–60, 71, 73, 78 Sunni Muslims, 6 social activism, 95, See also activism supermilitias, 125–26 social conservatism, 130 support forces, 125–26 socialism, 72–73, 110 Supreme Council of the Ulema (Morocco), social justice, 94 47–48 social media, 134 Suq al-Jumaa (Friday Market) (Tripoli), social norms, 127–28, 134 120–21, 126, 171n23 Society Movement for Peace (Algeria), al-Suri, Abu Musab, 157n39 77–78 Surman, Libya, 128 sociopolitical violence, 65–66 Syria, 49, 94–95, 140, 148n79 soft approach, 99–102, 103, 141, 153n103 Soliman affair, 93 Tabu, 109–10, 116, 128 Solof, 20 Tadjakanet tribe, 24 Soninke, 20 al-Tah, Hamdan Ould, 21, 31–32 Sousse, Tunisia, 104 Al-Tahir al-Zawi, 171n18 Soviet-Afghan War veterans, 28, 66–67, 111, tajdid (renewal), 61 112–13 al-Tajuri, Nafati, 125–26 Spain, 48–49 takfir (excommunication), 7–8, 12, 70, Special Deterrence Force (Libya), 120–21, 150n46, 157n42 126–32, 175n89, 176n119 Takfir wa’l-Hijra (Excommunication and spiritual guides. See also specific individuals Exile), 47 clerics, 19–37 Tanzania, 28 du’at (singular: da’i) (itinerant preachers), Tanzimat reform program, 83–84 19, 25, 150–51n49 Taoufiq, Ahmed, 47–48 mourchidat (female spiritual guides), al-taqaddum (progress), 38 47–48 tarbiya (education), 57 state collapse, 107–37, 138–39 al-Tarhuni, Izz al-Din, 125–26 Steinberg, Guido, 148n79 al-Tartusi, Abu Basir (Abd-al Mun’em Stevens, J. Christopher, 122 Mustafa Halima), 32–33, 153n114 street politics, 101–2 Tawassoul party (Mauritania), 25, 27, 31–32, street protests, 76, 101, 105 34, 35, 151n51, 154n139 student protests, 161n32 tawhid (unity of God), 7, 97–98, 121 Subul al-Salam Brigade, 116, 128 Tawhid Battalion, 55, 125–26, 175–76n101 Sufism, 2, 6, 7 Taya, Maaouya Ould, 26, 28–29, 30–31 in Algeria, 59–60, 72–73, 80 Tebessi, Larbi, 62–63 attitudes toward, 143n5 technocracy, Frenchified, 64 in Libya, 121, 127–28, 133, 134–35 television (TV), 91, 131 Index ( 225 ) terminology and Madkhalis, 109–10, 115–16, 128 Madkhali, 131 and Salafis, 24, 93 Salafi, 6 Tripoli, Libya terrorism Abu Slim neighborhood, 115–16, in Algeria, 78–79, 175n83 181n173 AQIM activities, 29 Abu Slim prison, 111, 119–20, 122, Casablanca attack (May 2003), 38–39, 171n19, 174n80 47–48 Madkhalism, 115–16 counterterrorism, 26, 108–9, 126, 135– Matiga Airport, 120–21, 126 36, 154n136 Suq al-Jumaa (Friday Market), 120–21, Djerba attack (April 11, 2002), 93 126, 171n23 Islamic State activities, 126 urban warfare, 124–26 jihadi, 93 Tripoli Revolutionaries Battalion, 127 Madrid attacks (2004), 48–49 Tripolitania, Libya, 109, 110, 128 in Mauritania, 28, 29, 152n86 Tuareg, 1–2 Soliman affair, 93 Madkhalis, 109–10 suicide bombings, 30, 32–33, 48–49, 70, Operation Serval against, 34–35 126, 152n86 al Tunisi, Abu Iyad (Seifallah Ben Hassine), by Takfir wa’l-Hijra (Excommunication 96–97 and Exile), 47 Tunisia, 1–2, See also Maghreb region Tigantourine gas facility attack (Ain Arabo-Islamic identity, 91 Amenas, Algeria), 78–79, 175n83 Arab Spring, 1–2, 94–96 in Tunisia, 104 beys, 165n4 against US, 5–6, 28, 93, 103, 122 concerning regions, 141 war on terror, 1, 26, 29, 111–12 conservatives, 86 text messages, 116–17 Constituent Assembly, 102–3 Thaalbi, Abdelaziz, 85 Islamism, 90, 91–92, 98, 102–3 theology, 70, 141 jihadi Salafism, 82–83, 94–96, 104–5 doctrinal battles, 130–31 modernism, 85, 86 doctrine of the forefathers (madhab nationalism, 86–87 al-salaf), 39–40 neo-Salafism, 86 Third Universal Theory (Gaddafi), 110 pluralization, 92–94 Thunderbolt (Saiqa) Special Forces, 125–26 police and policing, 169n93 Thurston, Alex, 27, 144n1, 150n31, 151n63, post-revolutionary, 82–106 154n130, 155n146, 155n148 radicalism, 103–4 Tigantourine gas facility attack (Ain Amenas, reformism, 83–84, 86, 87 Algeria), 78–79, 175n83 religious individualization, 92–94 Tijani, Hachemi, 64–65 Salafi parties, 14–15, 168n74 Tijaniyya Brotherhood, 23, 39–40, 72–73, Salafism, 3, 82–106, 138–39 74–75 security approach, 94 Tizi Ouzou Province, Algeria, 74 Soliman affair, 93 Tobruk, Libya, 133–34 street protests, 101 Torelli, Stefano M., 169n88 Tanzimat reform program, 83–84 torture, 30–31, 126 terrorism, 104 Tozy, Mohamed, 143n9 traditionalism, 86 traditionalism, 65, 86 voting patterns, 166n28 transnationalism, 12 war veterans, 140 Trans Saharan Counter-terrorism Tunisian Islamic Combatant Group, 96 Partnership, 26 Tunisianité, 86 travel ban on women, 133, 134 Tunisian Party, 85 tribes and tribalism, 140–41 Tunisian Youth Movement, 84 ( 226 ) Index

Turkey, 83–84, 123, 165n13 in Morocco, 47 TV (television), 91, 131 motivation for, 30–31, 141 210 Infantry Battalion, 127–28, 133, qital (fighting or killing), 94–95, 167n52 175–76n101 revolutionary, 148n2 Salafi, 47, 101 Ubaydat tribe, 133 sociopolitical, 65–66 ultraconservative Islamism, 102–3 state and, 19–37 al-Umma al-Wasat party, 118 struggle against, 142 Al-Umma party, 26, 118 in Tunisia, 93, 94–95, 101, 104 Ummatun Wasata, 42 virtue, 17 al-Umrani, Nader, 131–32, 172n42, Volpi, Fredric, 103 179–80n155 underachievement, 30 al-Wadi’i, Muqbil bin Hadi, 74–75, 172n38, unemployment, 2 172n42, 173n55, 174n75, 177n132 Union for the Republic Party (Mauritania), education, 113–14 36–37 influence, 14, 113–14 United Arab Emirates (UAE) al-Wadud, Muhammad Salim ʿAbd, 27 support for Madkhalis, 123, 124, 131–32, Wafa party, 77 136, 180n167 Wagemakers, Joas, 5–6, 12–13, 15, 144n1, support for Salafis, 24, 53–54 145n17 United States El Waghlissi, Mouhammed Malek, 70 First Gulf War, 113, 157n38 Wahhabism, 3, 5–6, 8–9, 18, 71–72 Flintlock exercise, 29 branch of Salafism, 7, 9–10, 145n16 Gulf War, 10 historical impact, 9–10, 145n18 invasion of Iraq, 93 in Iraq, 148n77 relations with Mauritania, 26 in Morocco, 39–40, 44, 157n44 relations with Saudi Arabia, 47, 157n38 Saudi support for, 44–45 terrorist attacks against, 5–6, 28, 93, 103, 122 al-wala’ wa al-bara (loyalty and disavowal), 8 war on terror, 1, 26, 29, 111–12 wali al-amr, 133, 135 United States Embassy, Benghazi, 122 al-Walid, Mahfouz Ould (Abu Hafs United States Embassy, Tunis, 103 al-Mauritani), 28, 31–33, 34–35, 36, University of Tunis, 88–89 152n74 Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade, 104 war urbanization, 23 of ideas, 31 urban warfare, 124–26 on khwarij or deviants from Islam, 127–28 USS Cole, 28 political war (harb siyasiya), 127–28 al-Utaybi, Juhayman, 8 on terror, 1, 26 al-Utaybi, Usama, 133–34, 180n169 urban warfare, 124–26 veterans of, 28, 66–67, 101–2, 111, veil or headscarf, 90–92, 94 112–13, 140 veterans, 101–2, 140 wassatiya (moderate Islamic thought), 42 Soviet-Afghan War, 28, 66–67, 111, 112–13 El Watan, 59 vigilantism, 103–4, 125–26 al-Watan party, 118 violence Wazzaniyya, 39–40 in Algeria, 65–66 Westernization, 95 causes of, 147n61 Western Sahara, 1 clerics and, 19–37 Western secularism, 72–73 countering violent extremism (CVE), 141 white moors (bidane), 20, 22, 25, 29–30 jihadi, 37, 93, 104, 121–22 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, 12–13, 15, 144n1, in Libya, 108, 121–22 146n42 in Mauritania, 19–37 Wilayat Jaza’ir (Jund al Khilafah), 79 Index ( 227 )

Wolf, Anne, 143–44 frustrations, 142 women shabaab al-manatiq support forces, dress codes for, 91–92, 94, 133 125–26 ikhtilat (gender mixing), 76 mourchidat (female spiritual Zaghal, Malika, 90 guides), 47–48 al-Zahawi, Muhammad, 120, 174n80 travel ban on, 133, 134 Zarouq, Mohamed Ould Ahmed (Al-Sha’ir, women’s equality, 41 “the Poet”), 35 women’s roles, 16, 86, 148n70 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 15–16, 18, World Islamic League, 24 174–75n81 worldliness, 72–73 al-Zawahiri, Aymen, 112 Wright, Robin, 144n3 zawiyas (lodges), 109–10 Yahya, Mohamed Ould Sidi, 25–26, 151n54 Zeidan, Ali, 173n68 Yassine, Abdessalam, 43, 45, 54–55 Zelin, Aaron, 150n45, 174n80 Yazbeck, Dalia Ghanem, 163–64n83 Zintan, Libya, 127, 133–34 Yemen, 113–14, 148n76 al-Zintani, Haitham, 179–80n155 Arab Spring, 13 Zitouna University, 61, 84, 88–89 Salafist Sufis, 17 al-Zway, Abu Ubayda (Shaaban Madud Yennayer (Amazigh New Year’s Day), 80 Khalifa Hadiya), 172n42, 174n75 Young Tunisians, 86 zwaya tribes, 22, 25, 138–39 Young Turk movement, 86 Zway tribe, 128 youth population, 105–6