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Penempatan Pasukan Amerika Serikat Di Niger Sebagai Bagian Dari Kebijakan Global War on Terror Tahun 2013 - 2017

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Penempatan Pasukan Amerika Serikat Di Niger Sebagai Bagian Dari Kebijakan Global War on Terror Tahun 2013 - 2017 PENEMPATAN PASUKAN AMERIKA SERIKAT DI NIGER SEBAGAI BAGIAN DARI KEBIJAKAN GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR TAHUN 2013 - 2017 Dewa Made Nanda Wijaya1), D.A. Wiwik Dharmiasih2), A.A. Bagus Surya Widya Nugraha3) 123)Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Universitas Udayana Email: [email protected]), [email protected]),[email protected]) ABSTRACT United States as the victim of 9/11 tragedy launch the Global War on Terror to combat global terrorism and to secure its national security. Sahel as a region passed by the Sahara Dessert is becoming a place to hide, recruit, financing and training camp for global terrorist network. The rise of terrorist network in the Sahel cannot be separated from Sahel States condition which been categorized as least developed countries. To counter the rise of terrorist threat in the Sahel Region. United States deploy its military forces in Niger. This research analyzes and describe the objective of United States military deployment in Niger, especially from 2013 until 2017. This research used security and counterterrorism framework to explain the objective of United States military deployment in Niger. Methodology that used in this research is qualitative-descriptive. Data in this research were gathers from multiple sources such as book, journal, and government reports that related with this research. Keywords: United States of America, Niger, Security Cooperation, Counterterrorism. 1. PENDAHULUAN sebagai ancaman fundamental bagi stabilitas Amerika Serikat merupakan negara keamanan nasional dan internasional (Bush yang mengalami serangan terorisme dalam White House, 2003). Untuk menghancurkan Tragedi 9/11. Serangan tersebut ditujukan dan meminimalisir potensi ancaman, GWOT terhadap simbol ekonomi dan militer Amerika menekankan pada tindakan militer terhadap Serikat, yaitu gedung kembar World Trade jaringan kelompok teroris transnasional, Center (WTC) dan Pentagon. Tercatat terutama jaringan Al-Qaeda (Record, 2003a) sebanyak 2.996 orang tewas dalam serangan Guna mempersempit ruang gerak teroris terburuk dalam sejarah Amerika jaringan terorisme global Pemerintah Amerika Serikat (Plumer, 2013). Osama Bin Laden, Serikat membangun berbagai kemitraan pimpinan dari Al-Qaeda, mengaku strategis. Salah satu dari kemitraan tersebut bertanggung jawab atas serangan mematikan adalah kerja sama bilateral antara Amerika tersebut. Setelah Tragedi 9/11, Amerika Serikat dengan Niger di wilayah Afrika Barat. Serikat kemudian mengambil berbagai Niger sebagai negara yang tepat berada di langkah untuk memerangi jaringan kelompok tengah-tengah wilayah Sahel dan dilewati teroris dan mencegah tragedi serupa terjadi. Gurun Sahara merupakan rute perdagangan Salah satu langkah yang diambil senjata, narkoba dan pergerakan teroris (Litt, Pemerintah Amerika Serikat adalah dengan 2017). Pada akhir tahun 2017 dilaporkan mengeluarkan kebijakan Global War on Terror setidaknya terdapat 800 pasukan militer (GWOT) atas Tragedi 9/11. Kebijakan GWOT Amerika Serikat yang ditempatkan di Niger. mengidentifikasi aktor terorisme transnasional Jumlah tersebut merupakan jumlah kedua 1 terbesar di Afrika setelah penempatan beberapa tahun, Pemerintah Nigeria mencoba pasukan militer Amerika Serikat di Djibouti memberantas Boko Haram dengan yang berjumlah 4.000 orang (Norman, 2018). menekankan pada pendekatan hard approach Penempatan pasukan militer Amerika yang menitikberatkan peranan militer untuk Serikat di Niger memunculkan perdebatan menangkap, menumpas, dan mencegah setelah terbunuhnya empat anggota pasukan potensi serangan teror. Hal ini dapat dilihat khusus Green Berret dalam sebuah patroli di dari peranan militer Nigeria dalam menjaga wilayah Tongo–Tongo, Niger, pada tanggal 4 keamanan nasional negaranya. Peranan Oktober 2017 (Browne, 2018). Kongres militer Nigeria semakin besar untuk Amerika Serikat menilai bahwa Pemerintah memberantas kelompok Boko Haram, Amerika Serikat tidak memiliki alasan yang terutama setelah meningkatnya frekuensi kuat, seperti penempatan pasukan militer serangan Boko Haram yang menewaskan Amerika Serikat di Afganistan untuk 3.000 orang dari tahun 2009–2012 (Udounwa, menghancurkan Taliban yang mendukung Al- 2013) Qaeda. Niger bukanlah negara pelaku teror Selain melaksanakan operasi militer, dan secara geografis merupakan negara yang Pemerintah Nigeria juga membentuk National kecil dan landlocked. Oleh sebab itu, alasan Focal Point on Terrorism (NFPT) tahun 2007 Pemerintah Amerika Serikat untuk dan resmi beroperasi tahun 2012. NFPT menempatkan pasukan militernya di Niger bertugas untuk mengkoordinasikan dan menjadi sangat menarik untuk diteliti. mengimplementasikan agenda keamanan Sehingga penelitian ini lebih lanjut Nigeria. Selain itu, Pemerintah Nigeria juga menjabarkan tujuan dari penempatan memfokuskan pada penggunaan teknologi pasukan militer Amerika Serikat di Niger dari moderen untuk intelijen, deteksi, dan tahun 2013 – 2017. pengawasan sebagai strategi counterterrorism di Nigeria. 2. TINJAUAN PUSTAKA Tahun 2012, Pemerintah Nigeria Kajian Pustaka melakukan penyatuan antara kekuatan militer Literatur pertama yang digunakan dengan soft power untuk menangani masalah merupakan karya Solomon Effiong Udounwa terorisme. Pendekatan soft approach yang (2013) yang berjudul Boko Haram: dilaksanakan seperti melakukan kerja sama Developing New Strategies to Combat antar departemen, adanya kontrol batas Terrorism in Nigeria. Udounwa (2013) dalam negara untuk menekan penggunaan senjata tulisannya memaparkan upaya penumpasan ilegal, melakukan reformasi terhadap sistem kelompok teror Jama’atul Alhul Sunnah hukum dan peningkatan kesejahteraan Lidda’wati Wal Jihad atau Boko Haram di ekonomi. Pemerintah Nigeria juga melakukan Nigeria. Boko Haram sebagai kelompok teror kerja sama dengan beberapa negara untuk yang ingin menegakan hukum syariah Islam meningkatkan kemampuan teknologi dan di Nigeria mulai melakukan tindakan infrastruktur untuk menangani isu terorisme. kekerasan ekstrim pada tahun 2002. Selama Kerja sama yang dilakukan dengan Amerika 2 Serikat secara khusus menekankan pada pertahanannya terhadap ancaman terorisme bantuan ekonomi, keamanan dan mitra utama yang semakin meningkat di negara tersebut. Nigeria untuk memobilisasi bantuan Pemerintah Tunisia dalam upaya internasional yang sangat dibutuhkan oleh meningkatkan kemampuan keamanannya, negara tersebut. melakukan kerja sama baik secara bilateral, Tulisan Udounwa (2013) memberikan regional dan multilateral dengan beberapa gambaran mengenai bentuk-bentuk negara. Hal ini dilakukan karena secara counterterrorism yang dilakukan oleh negara kapabilitas militer, angkatan bersenjata dalam merespon ancaman keamanan yang Tunisia tidak begitu kuat dan mengalami ada. Counterterrorism baik melalui usaha kekurangan pendanaan untuk memperbarui militer (hard approach), non-militer (soft persenjataan maupun dalam meningkatkan approach), maupun penggabungan dari kapabilitas militernya. Sejak tahun 2014, keduanya, sangatlah penting untuk Pemerintah Tunisia mulai mendapat bantuan menetralisir ancaman yang muncul dari khusus dari Pemerintah Amerika Serikat dan kelompok teror. Melalui tulisan Udounwa negara-negara Eropa. Bantuan tersebut tidak (2013), penelitian ini mencoba melihat usaha terlepas dari pergantian rezim di Tunisia yang negara dalam menangani ancaman kelompok mulai menganut sistem demokrasi dan isu teror, baik dengan cara memobilisasi terorisme seperti ISIS. Selain itu, Pemerintah militernya untuk menyerang basis kekuatan Amerika Serikat juga memandang kerja sama kelompok teror dan mencegah jatuhnya suatu dengan Tunisia dapat membantu kepentingan daerah ke tangan kelompok tersebut melalui keamanan Amerika Serikat untuk memerangi upaya penempatan unit-unit militer dan dan menghancurkan jaringan kelompok teror pemberian bantuan. Akan tetapi, tulisan seperti ISIS yang beroperasi di wilayah Udounwa (2013) belum memberikan tersebut. gambaran secara lengkap mengenai Peningkatan kerja sama antara pentingnya kerja sama keamanan antar Amerika Serikat dan Tunisia terjadi ketika negara dalam memberantas kelompok teror. Pemerintah Amerika Serikat memberikan Serta faktor-faktor yang diperhatikan negara status Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) kepada dalam melakukan kerja sama keamanan dan Tunisia. Pemerintah Amerika Serikat dari apa tujuan negara bersedia melakukan kerja tahun 2011 hingga 2014 memberikan bantuan sama. sebesar 121 miliar USD untuk meningkatkan Guna melengkapi tulisan Udounwa kemampuan counterterrorism dan penguatan (2013) penelitian ini menggunakan literatur keamanan perbatasan dengan hampir 106 kedua yang ditulis oleh Gergerly Varga (2017) miliar USD digunakan untuk membeli yang berjudul Building Partnership in komponen persenjataan. Challenging Times: The Defence Arragments Tulisan Vagra (2017) menguatkan of Tunisia (2017) memaparkan tentang kerja penelitian ini dengan memberikan justifikasi sama antara Tunisia dengan sejumlah negara dari urgensi kerja sama keamanan antar untuk meningkatkan kapabilitas negara dalam menghadapi isu keamanan 3 bersama, yaitu terorisme. Melalui kerja sama, tersebut menjadi dasar bagi penempatan negara dapat meningkatkan kapabilitas pasukan militer Amerika Serikat di Niger. keamanan negaranya dengan bantuan negara lain yang juga memiliki kepentingan Counterterrorism keamanan yang sama. Melalui kerja sama Counterterrorism diartikan sebagai antar negaralah counterterrorism dapat upaya negara dengan menggunakan hukum, berjalan dengan optimal. Tulisan Vagra militer dan tindakan lainnya untuk berhubungan erat dengan penelitian ini yang menghancurkan
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