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Change in Kant Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment Of Change in Kant Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Hope Celeste Sample, M.A. Graduate Program in Philosophy The Ohio State University 2018 Dissertation Committee Lisa Shabel, Advisor Lisa Downing Julia Jorati Tamar Rudavsky Clinton Tolley Copyright by Hope Celeste Sample 2018 ii Abstract I argue that, for Kant, the inner representation of time enables the direct perception of change, whether it is the self or an external object that undergoes alteration. My interpretation contrasts with a standard view of Kant according to which time only enables direct perception of the temporal qualities of the self. My dissertation project orients Kant’s philosophy of time within a significant philosophical tradition that links time with change (a theme found in Parmenides, Augustine, and Husserl, among others). i Dedication Dedicated to Paul and Sue Sample ii Acknowledgments To begin with, I am grateful for all of the support provided by my parents, Paul and Sue Sample. Additionally, I could not have asked for a better advisor than Lisa Shabel for my project. Lisa has provided constant support that also prioritized my development of independent thought, which enabled me to develop a project that is truly my own. In my development as a philosopher, I have benefitted immeasurably by my conversations with William Taschek, whose office door was always open. I have also greatly benefitted from Julia Jorati’s constant help on matters both philosophical and professional. I am thankful for Lisa Downing’s insightful philosophical comments on my work that enabled productive development of themes in my project. For all of the philosophical conversations that influenced the development of this dissertation, I give thanks to Clinton Tolley. I am also thankful for my formative experience in Tamar Rudavsky’s Spinoza seminar and our fruitful conversations about the philosophy of time. I am lucky to have Juan Garcia as a friend and colleague. His helpful comments on several drafts of my chapters from various stages of development have been a crucial part of the development of this research project. I am grateful to my dissertation writing group for their support and helpful comments: Krista Benson, Krupal Amin, and Julie Dentzer. I also thank Harry Deutsch, Aidan Makwana, Adrian Bardon, Bennett McNulty, and Nathan Oaklander for their feedback on significant portions of my dissertation, whose chapters are greatly improved as a result. iii Vita 2011 to present…………………Ph.D. candidate, Philosophy, The Ohio State University 2009-2011………………………………..M.A., Philosophy, Northern Illinois University 2007-2009……………….B.A. Magna Cum Laude, Philosophy, Illinois State University 2005-2007………………………………….A.S with Honors, McHenry Country College Publications “Kant on Time and Change: A Series, B Series, or Both?” in Logic and Philosophy of Time: Themes in Prior, edited by Per Hasle, Patrick Blackburn, and Peter Øhrstrøm, Aalborg University Press, 2017. “What Makes for Conceptual Similarity?” co-authored with Olivera Savic in Theoria, Beograd 60:4, 2017. Fields of Study Major Field: Philosophy iv Table of Contents Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………....i Dedication………………………………………………………………………………...ii Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………….iii Vita……………………………………………………………………………………….iv Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….1 Chapter 1: Time and Change in the Inaugural Dissertation and the 1772 Letter to Herz...7 Chapter 2: What Does Kant Mean by an Inner Representation of Time?.………………36 Chapter 3: Time and Change in Kant…………………………………………………....69 Chapter 4: A Kantian Approach to the A Series/B Series Debate……………………...100 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...120 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………125 v Introduction Immanuel Kant claims that mental representations of time and space play a fundamental role in our thoughts about the world that we experience. More precisely, he claims that we have pure representations of time and space, which means that our representations of time and space are innate structures of the mind rather than things we perceive via sensation. In particular, Kant claims that the pure representation of time enables the perception of the self, while the pure representation of space enables the perception of things spatially distinct from the self. Kant also claims, however, that time is universal in the sense that it relates us to objects of the senses in general, whereas space is limited to external objects. Though it has not gone entirely unnoted, the universal function of the pure inner representation of time has not yet received a satisfactory treatment in the Kant literature. This is due to a dominant interpretative trend that assumes that time and space are similar in all relevant respects and thus, that time only directly enables the perception of inner objects parallel to the way that space only directly enables the perception of outer objects. The strategy of understanding Kant’s account of time merely by extension from Kant’s account of space can be seen in recent influential systematic interpretations of his philosophical system and even in influential analyses of the portion of the Critique of Pure Reason that contains Kant’s account of space and time (see Allison 2004, Parsons 1992, and Hatfield 2006). My dissertation challenges this strategy by showing that the assumption underlying this common 1 methodology is false. For Kant, there are relevant differences between time and space inattention to which obscures important features of his philosophical system. In particular, I defend an interpretation according to which time has a more basic and universal function than space in virtue of its role in the perception of change, whether of inner or outer objects. According to my interpretation, Kant’s position is that a pure inner representation of time is required for the perception of change, which is understood as the coming into being and going out of being of states of objects. As an illustration, when I transition from sitting to standing, my previous state of sitting passes away and my new state of standing comes into being. Let us refer to this type of change as dynamic succession. Importantly, dynamic succession is a classic account of change that can be found in Kant’s predecessors such as Parmenides, Aristotle, and Augustine. My interpretation derives from close analysis of Kant’s development of his doctrine of the pure inner representation of time within the context of eighteenth century philosophy of time. Notably, the extant literature on Kant’s account of time has focused mainly on Newton, Leibniz, Locke, and Hume as the relevant interlocutors. Kant’s views about time have not yet been sufficiently oriented in relation to those of his ancient and medieval predecessors, whose views about time and change are thoroughly intertwined. A figure whose views about time and change are of particular significance for understanding Kant is Augustine, as his Confessions raises a seminal issue about how we can perceive dynamic succession. Insofar as change involves states coming into being and going out of being, it is unclear how we can perceive, for example, a change from sitting to standing as something that has duration or happens over time. After all, in the perception of a change from sitting to standing the past state of an object no longer exists and thus, there is 2 never a sensation of the motion as a succession of sitting and standing in a single object. Even in the case of inner changes, one’s past mental states no longer exist. Thus, inner changes raise the same problem of how to perceive succession as something that occurs over time, given that prior non-existent states are not accessible in a present moment. In fact, Kant cites the relevant book of Confessions that discusses this issue about the perception of dynamic succession. Given Kant’s commitment to an account of change as dynamic succession and his familiarity with Augustine’s Confessions, Kant’s appeal to a pure inner representation of time can be fruitfully understood as resolving this Augustinian problem about the perception of dynamic succession. On my interpretation, Kant’s account of change as dynamic succession provides the philosophical foundation of Kant’s philosophy of time. With this in mind, my dissertation has four main chapters that analyze the theme of change in Kant’s philosophy of time. Chapter One argues that in the transitional period leading up to the Critique of Pure Reason Kant derives his theory of the inner representation of time as an attempt to account for dynamic succession. In turn, Chapter Two shows that Kant relies on the key premise that we perceive dynamic succession to establish that we have a pure inner representation of time in the Critique of Pure Reason. Following this, Chapter Three demonstrates that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant’s argument for temporal idealism relies on the central premise that there is intelligible dynamic succession. Chapter Four brings the preceding material on time and change to bear on the contemporary A Series/B Series debate. Focusing on the role of change in Kant’s philosophy of time, Chapter One analyzes the development of Kant’s account of time in the pre-Critical period. There are two significant problems that are apparently unrelated, but ultimately dovetail, in Kant’s famous 3 1772 letter to Herz. First, Kant aims in this letter to answer an objection to his temporal idealism, namely that it cannot account for the reality of perceived change. The basic idea behind the objection is this: since Kant is an idealist, he is at least committed to the reality of change in mental representation, and in turn, this commits him to the reality of time. Second, Kant’s letter raises the so-called “fundamental question of metaphysics” in which he aims to explain the scope of our entitlement to apply metaphysical concepts such as substance, cause, and community.
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