INFANTRY in BATTLE from Somalia to the Global War on Terror
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INFANTRY IN BATTLE From Somalia to the Global War on Terror I love the infantrymen because they are the underdogs. They are the mud-rain-and-wind boys. They have no comforts, and they learn to live without necessities. And in the end, they are the guys that wars can’t be won without. Ernie Pyle New York World Telegram 5 May 1943 August 2005 CONTENTS CHAPTER Page INTRODUCTION ................................................. iii EDITOR‘S NOTES .................................................v 1. LEADERSHIP .........................................................1 2. INITIATIVE ..........................................................23 3. ADAPTABILITY ..................................................35 4. USING TERRAIN .................................................65 5. RECONNAISSANCE..........................................109 6. COMBINED ARMS ............................................129 7. MUTUAL SUPPORT ..........................................163 8. MARKSMANSHIP .............................................183 9. SECURITY ..........................................................193 10. REPORTING .......................................................217 11. PATROLLING ....................................................227 12. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ..............................233 13. CASUALTIES .....................................................247 14. CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS ........................257 15. U.S. ARMY VALUES .........................................279 16. CONCLUSION ....................................................317 GLOSSARY ........................................................321 INDEX .................................................................325 i INTRODUCTION In 1934, then-Colonel George C. Marshall commissioned Infantry in Battle to ―check the ideas acquired from peacetime instruction against the experience of battle.‖ In his introduction, Marshall wrote: ―there is much evidence to show that officers who have received the best peacetime training available find themselves surprised and confused by the difference between conditions as pictured in map problems and those they encounter in campaign…In our schools, we generally assume that the organizations are well-trained and at full strength, that subordinates are competent, that supply arrangements function, that communications work, that orders are carried out. In war, many or all of these conditions may be absent.‖ Today, in 2005, we find that Marshall‘s observations, recorded pre-WWII, are still true and relevant. At the time that the original Infantry in Battle was written, the face of war was in the midst of a transformation—from WWI trench warfare to maneuver warfare, enabled by armor and air support. The technology of the day added another dimension to the battlefield; thus, leaders had to adjust their thinking to incorporate these new technologies. Today, the Army finds itself, again, transforming to incorporate new technologies, certainly, but also to defeat a different type of enemy—the asymmetric threat. Our enemy is less predictable and less visible than in the past, and, thus, the lessons of those who have faced this threat become critical to those who will. Today‘s Army faces challenges that Marshall‘s Army did not. The Army of 1934 studied tactics and trained in preparation for the conventional war that would come in the next decade, and this study and training held its leaders in good stead. What the Army of 1934 did not have to consider was the wide range of tasks and the relative reduction in time and space iii that our Soldiers face today. As we fight the Global War on Terror, our leaders must be able to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice to conduct operations, ranging from Stability and Support to major combat operations and back again. This requirement for agility and adaptability necessitates that we turn to the experiences of those who have faced these challenges—in Somalia, Kosovo and Macedonia, Afghanistan, and Iraq—to guide us and assist in ensuring our success. As in 1934, we have drawn information from the personal experience monographs on file at the Infantry School; however, we have also included first-hand accounts of actions published in Infantry Magazine and other professional journals, input from the field, and information from personal interviews. Unlike the original, which limited its discussion to operations during WWI, this edition covers a broad variety of conditions, including operations in Kosovo, Macedonia, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to account for the range of challenges faced by today‘s Infantry leaders. According to Marshall‘s introduction in the original book, ―(t)he aim of its authors has been to develop fully and emphasize a few important lessons which can be substantiated by concrete cases rather than to produce just another book of abstract theory.‖ It educated leaders who triumphed against the threats of the 20th Century. Our hope is that we can do the same for our leaders facing the threats of the 21st Century. Benjamin C. Freakley Major General, U.S. Army Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School Fort Benning, Georgia May 15, 2005 iv EDITOR’S NOTE Twenty years ago, the Infantry School restarted the monograph program that had languished after WWII. I was fortunate to be able to assist the writers as they came to the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, later known as the Infantry Captain‘s Career Course, and it is from these monographs that most of the vignettes come. Therefore, I would first like to thank those officers who captured their operational experience so others could learn from them. Thanks also to Judith Sasser who assisted in this effort in more ways than I can count. The discussions for each of the vignettes were composed by some of the smartest men I know, the Infantry School‘s Tactics Small Group Instructors, in particular LTC Nigel D. Smith, MAJ Chad Q. Christman, MAJ Nicholas E. Davis, MAJ Geoffrey D. Greene, MAJ Darren K. Jennings, MAJ Michael G. Knowlton, MAJ Nelson G. Kraft, MAJ Campbell W. Paine, MAJ Paul J. Salmon, MAJ Stephen P. Talbott, MAJ Samuel J. Welch, CPT Gregory A. Cannata, CPT Dominick L. Edwards, CPT George C. Hackler, CPT Eric M. Hiu, CPT Thomas J. McCarron, CPT James T. McGahey, CPT Clifton B. Trout, CPT William D. Voorhies, CPT Stephen Wargo, CPT Joshua D. Wright, and CPT Daniel R. Miller. COL Edmund W. Woolfolk Jr., COL (ret.) Frank J. Stone, LTC John D. Harding, LTC James G. Riley, CSM Kevin T. Dalley, and 1SG (ret.) Gary Connor were an integral part of this project, providing oversight, feedback, and support. Finally, thanks to MG Benjamin Freakley—who commissioned this work. Joanie Horton Editor v CHAPTER 1: Leadership The moral equilibrium of the man is tremendously affected by an outward calmness on the part of the leader. The soldier‘s nerves, taut from anxiety of what lies ahead, will be soothed and healed if the leader sets an example of coolness. Bewildered by the noise and confusion of battle, the man feels instinctively that the situation cannot be so dangerous as it appears if he sees that his leader remains unaffected, that his orders are given clearly and deliberately, and that his tactics show decision and judgment…But if the leader reveals himself irresolute and confused, then, more even than if he shows personal fear, the infection spreads instantly to his men. Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart Thoughts on War, 1944 INTRODUCTION: When one considers the combat power the Infantry brings to the fight, the fundamental element of that combat power is Leadership. The other elements—Maneuver, Protection, Firepower, and Information—are assets brought to bear through effective leadership. While leadership may be difficult to codify—why else would the sheer number of books be devoted to the topic—the Army defines it as ―influencing people, by providing purpose, direction, and motivation.‖ The combat leader, from the individual Soldier to the commanding general, brings his values and attributes; becomes a master at his skills; and then acts to influence, operate, and improve his unit. Leadership qualities are born from tough, realistic training and honed by experience. The study of the profession of arms 1 Infantry in Battle and of leaders of the past provides the foundation from which great leaders can begin to develop. On 5 April 2003, the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) for TF 1-30, 3rd ID, received the order for the TF to attack north toward Baghdad. The following morning, we began our attack. The initial leg of the drive took several hours and was uneventful, but before we knew it, we were on the outskirts of Baghdad, crossing the Euphrates River, and driving straight down the middle of a six-lane western interstate-style hardball road, heading into Baghdad. Artillery was landing nearby, destroyed civilian vehicles were strewn across the landscape, and here we were driving down the road as if we were going to the mall back home in Columbus, Georgia. We were actually reading the green road signs (which were in English) and using them to help guide us onto the proper exits off the interstate. The tank company was traveling at the front of our Task Force formation, as was always the case. It was periodically calling in spot reports during movements. Suddenly, a report we had not received before came across the radio, ―enemy tanks to our front.‖ The order was given to close with and destroy them. This brought our Task Force convoy to a halt in the middle of the six-lane interstate around Baghdad. As the tank company