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Mashurabdullah Muqbil Ahmed SECRET // 20330915 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATES COMMAND HEADQUARTERS , JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION , GUANTANAMO BAY , CUBA APOAE09360 JTF- GTMO- CDR 15 September2008 MEMORANDUMFORCommander, UnitedStates SouthernCommand, 3511NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN 000324DP (S ) JTF - GTMO Detainee Assessment 1. ( S) Personal Information : JDIMS/ NDRC Reference Name: Mashur Abdullah Muqbil Ahmnad al- Sabri Current/ True Name and Aliases : MashurAbdullah Muqbil Ahmed al-Sabri, Raheim al-Naser Abu Abdullah , Masheer Ahmed , Mashural- Taizi, Abu Salman al-Makki Abu Jamila al-Yemeni Place of Birth: Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA) Date ofBirth: 26 December 1977 Citizenship: Yemen ( YM ) Internment Serial Number (ISN) : -000324DP 2. (U//FOUO Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. ( U ) JTF- GTMO Assessment : a. (S) Recommendation : JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) . JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 27 September 2007 . b . ( S //NF) Executive Summary: Ifreleased without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would immediately seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities. Since transfer to JTF -GTMO, detainee has engaged infew hostile incidents and is relatively compliant with guard force personnel. However, detainee CLASSIFIED BY : MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON : E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED , SECTION 1.4 ( C DECLASSIFY ON : 20330915 SECRET NOFORN 20330915 SECRET 20330915 JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for ISN 000324DP (S ) has demonstrated support for the hostilities ofother detainees. Detainee was a member of a Yemeni al-Qaida cell directly involved with the USS COLE attack . Members of this cell conducted surveillance on the USS COLE and prepared explosives for the bombing. Detainee was recruited and facilitated through the al- Qaida network and traveled to Afghanistan (AF), where he received advanced training at al-Qaida facilities. Detainee is assessed to have served as a guesthouse facilitator (a position of trust and authority), associated with senior al- Qaida members, and probably swore bayat ( oath of allegiance to Usama BinLaden (UBL) . Detainee participated in combat in Afghanistan. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE INAN SCI SUPPLEMENT. GTMO determined this detainee to be A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A LOW threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value . ( NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes inthis assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Added alias Abu Jamila al-Yemeni Added further information about detainee's role in the al-Qaida organization Updated SCI addendum 4. ( U ) Detainee's Account of Events : The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account . These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy , or reliability . a. (S//NF) Prior History: Although born in Mecca, detainee's parents are both from Taiz, YM, which prevented him from obtaining Saudi citizenship . Detainee and his family lived in Mabdah, SA until 1990. Detainee dropped out ofschool in the ninth grade and ranhis own taxi service using the family car . In 1997, detainee met Mansur Sharifthrough a common friend, Bashir al- Shadadi. eventually stayed at the house where detainee resided. In the winter of 1998, Saudi authorities went to detainee's residence to arrest Sharifon passport forgery charges. They also arrested detainee for harboring a fugitive. Because detainee was 1 000252 SIR21-JUN-2008 2 000324302 20-FEB-2002, 000324KB05-NOV- 2002 3 TD-314/ 11163-02, TRRS -04-01-0650, IIR6 034 0059 05, TD - 314 / , 000837KB 01-NOV-2002, 000840 KB 01-NOV-2002, AnalystNote: A variantofMansuris Monsour. 2 SECRET NOFORN 20330915 SECRET 20330915 JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for ISN -000324DP (S ) a Yemeni citizen, he was deported to Yemen , relocating to Taiz. After six months in Taiz, detainee moved to Sanaa, YM where he lived with 15 other individuals in a house owned by Shadadi's family. Several of the men living inthe house were involved in an auto theft ring that resulted in a police raid in May 1999 and detainee's Detainee was released in 5 late January 2000 , after spending nine months injail . b . ( ) Recruitment and Travel : In January 2000 , one of detainee's friends, Ayub Mohammad Ali, who had traveled to Afghanistan for military training and fought for the Taliban, convinced detainee to travel to Afghanistan for a better life. Detainee stated Ali was affiliated with the religious group Jamaat al-Tablighi (JT). In August 2000 detainee left Sanaa and traveled with three other Yemeni extremists to Quetta, Pakistan (PK), via Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Karachi, PK. From Quetta , detainee continued on to Kandahar, AF and stayed at the Hajji Habash Guesthouse for two weeks. ? c. ( NF) Training and Activities: Detainee traveled to Kandahar, and after two weeks , he traveled to Jalalabad, AF where he remained at Abu Zubair al- Janubi’s Guesthouse for approximately one year. During that time, detainee traveled to the front lines near Kabul, AF armed with a Russian -made Makarov pistol. With the Northern Alliance approaching Jalalabad, detainee attempted to escape to Pakistan. Abu Zubair al- Janubi arranged travel for 10 detainee out of Afghanistan . 5. ( U) Capture Information : a. ( S //NF) Detainee remained in a border town for approximately one month waiting for his passport to be sent to him, before surrendering to Pakistani authorities. was transferred through four different prisons before being transferred to US custody on 5 January 2002.12 4 IIR6 034 0685 02, 000324302 18-JUL-2002 5 000324302 20-FEB-2002, 000324302 19-MAY-2002, IIR 6 034 0685 02, IIR4 2012566 04 6 000324 302 24 -JUL-2003 7 000324302 19-MAY-2002, 000324302 20-FEB-2002, 000324302 27-FEB-2002, IIR 6 034 0685 02 8 TD-314/ 01498-02 302 19-MAY-2002, 000324302 27 -FEB-2002, 000324 302 18-JUL-2002, IIR 6 034 0685 02 10 IIR 6 034 0685 02 11 000324 302 19-MAY -2002, Analyst Note: During this time, detainee claims to have given his passport to al Janubi, who was to forward it to detainee’s next destination . According to detainee , he waited for Janubi to send his passport, but it never arrived. 000324 27-FEB- 2002, TD-314/00845-02, AnalystNote: Coalitionforcesadvancedto Jalalabadonor about 11 December2001.Accordingto detainee'stimeline, his capturewas inmid-January2002, whichconflictswith detainee'sdate oftransferto US controlin earlyJanuary. Accountingfor the monthafter departingfrom Jalalabad 3 SECRET NOFORN 20330915 SECRET 20330915 JTF- GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnderDoDControl(CD) for ISN 000324DP(S) b. ( S) Property Held: None . (S) Transferredto JTF- GTMO: 1 May2002 d (S ) Reasonsfor Transferto JTF-GTMO: To provideinformationon the following: Al-Qaida operationsandpersonnelin Yemenassociatedwith the bombingofthe USS COLE The HajjiHabashGuesthouseand IslamicInstitutein Kandahar AyoubMuhammedAli, an al-Qaidaand Talibanrecruiterand travel facilitator 6. S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account : Though detainee has provided some corroborated information, he has omitted key details of his associates and personal activities in support of al-Qaida . Reporting indicates detainee had more of a leadership role than detainee is willing to admit . Detainee continues to downplay his significance and affiliations with other al Qaida members. Detainee denies ever attending a terrorist training camp, but his name is included on applications for terrorist training. Although detainee has provided unique information about his associates who were linked to the USS COLE attack, he denies any involvement, contrary to reporting from other sources . He sometimes has claimed he was born in Taiz, YM and other times in Mecca, SA, demonstrating his willingness to mislead US intelligence officials on even the most basic detail. 7. (U DetaineeThreat: a. (S) Assessment: Detaineeis assessedto be a HIGHrisk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b . (S// NF) Reasons for Continued Detention : Detainee was a member of an Yemeni al Qaida cell which was directly involved with the USS COLE attack Detainee attended advanced training in Afghanistan after recruitment by a known al - Qaida facilitator . If released without rehabilitation , close supervision , and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would immediately seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities. Since transfer to JTF GTMO , detainee has engaged infew hostile incidents and is relatively compliant with guard and multiple prison transfers, includingthe transfer to US forces on 5 January 2002 , detainee’s capture date was no later than mid- December 2001 . 13 TD -314 / 00684-02, TRRS-04-01-0650 4 SECRET NOFORN 20330915 SECRET 20330915 JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for ISN -000324DP (S ) force personnel. However, detainee
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