Geometry and Empirical Science Author(s): C. G. Hempel Source: The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan., 1945), pp. 7-17 Published by: Mathematical Association of America Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2304830 . Accessed: 03/02/2015 13:33 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected]. Mathematical Association of America is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Mathematical Monthly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 140.180.251.176 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 13:33:42 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions GEOMETRY AND EMPIRICAL SCIENCE C. G. HEMPEL, QueensCollege 1. Introduction. The most distinctive characteristic which differentiates mathematics from the various branches of empirical science, and which ac- counts forits fame as the queen of the sciences,is no doubt the peculiar certainty and necessityof its results. No propositionin even the most advanced parts of empiricalscience can ever attain this status; a hypothesisconcerning "matters of empirical fact" can at best acquire what is loosely called a high probability or a high degree of confirmationon the basis of the relevant evidence available; but however well it may have been confirmedby careful tests, the possibility can never be precluded that it will have to be discarded later in the light of new and disconfirmingevidence.