World War the Opening Gambit I

Home , Battle of the Frontiers, Joseph Joffre, Plan XVII, Schlieffen Plan

HISTORYHISTORY — PAST AND PERSPECTIVE World War The Opening Gambit I

In the prelude to WWI, both the French and Germans German infantry are shown advancing on the battlefield in 1914. The spiked helmets proved planned for a quick defeat of the enemy. When the war to be more ornamental than practical and were opened, it was the Germ an plan that almost worked. later replaced by helmets that were designed to provide more protection. by Brian Farmer ority of strength arrayed against it would be virtually impossible to withstand, es- mobilize more quickly than could Russia, erman military operations of the pecially if the war turned out to be a pro- making it initially the more dangerous First World War began on the tracted one, since Germany was not in a adversary; (2) the Russian concentration G Western or Franco-Belgian front. position to win a war of attrition. of forces might take place too far to the To understand why Europe slid so rap- east for German forces to reach quickly, idly into the abyss (for the background, The Von Schlieffen Plan which would likely cause a spoiling at- see Prelude to the Guns of August, The The war plan that Germany ultimately tack to fail; and (3) the Russian forces New A mericAN , August 25, 2014), one adopted was created by Count Alfred might retreat into the interior of its enor- needs to consider the strategic position in von Schlieffen, chief of the General Staff mous land mass, thus depriving Germany which Germany found itself. As explained from 1891 to 1905. Schlieffen decided of the quick victory it needed. in that previous article in this series cover- that the only course for Germany, when The gap in time between the comple- ing the 100th-anniversary period of World faced with a war on two fronts, was to tion of the German and Russian mobiliza- War I, military mobilization effectively concentrate its forces in order to defeat tions was estimated to be no more than six meant war for every nation that took such one enemy, then to turn and deal with the weeks. It was during that time span that action. This was especially true for Ger- other foe. Germany would literally have France had to be knocked out of the war, many because it was outnumbered by its to fight two separate, consecutive wars, freeing Germany to turn east and deal with opponents and because of the German war using almost its whole army for each one. the Russian forces that would by then be plan, which had been shaped by the recog- This course of action was possible only expected to come pouring over Germanys nition of Germanys numerically inferior because Germany could mobilize much eastern frontier. But how was France to be position. Open to attack from the west more rapidly than could Russia, due to beaten in just six weeks? The Franco-Ger- (by France) and from the east (by Russia), its superior rail network and smaller land man border was 150 miles long, and half Germany would be facing armies almost area. Schlieffens proposal was to exploit of it was covered by the Vosges Moun- twice the size of the combined German the resulting time gap between the com- tains, with only the gap around the Belfort and Austro-Hungarian forces. If Germany pletion of the German and Russian mobi- area providing an easy entry into France. divided its army equally, placing half in lizations for a sudden attack on France. Making the situation even worse, France the west to face France and half in the east Three considerations made France the had extended its natural defenses by a to face Russia, then the numerical superi- target for the first attack: (1) France could chain of fortifications that r an by way of

34 THE NEW AMERICAN • OCTObER 6, 2014 Belfort and Verdun to the borders of Lux- enemies weaknesses was the key to the deployed in the west against France, and embourg and Belgium. Just past Verdun plan and the brilliance of the strategy. the bulk of it would go to the right (north) lay the Ardennes region, which was hilly Although Luxembourg, Belgium, and wing, which would pivot at Metz, march and wooded and would slow any advance. Holland were neutral countries, Schlief- through Belgium and northern France, Schlieffen was convinced that a frontal as- fen and the German General Staff did not cross the Seine River to the northwest of sault could achieve only limited success worry about the infamy that would ac- Paris, sweep around Paris to the west and because the enemy could just fall back and company the violation of their neutrality. south, and hammer the French army back survive to fight another day. From the Ger- The German military leadership believed against the Swiss frontier (see map). This man perspective, this type of war was use- that France intended to violate Belgian hammerhead of a right wing was to be as less, for with every day that victory was neutrality, no matter what Germany did, strong as possible, and Schlieffen allot- delayed in the West, the Russians would and Schlieffen was convinced that con- ted 79 divisions to it. The German left be growing stronger in the East. From his centrating German forces on the border (south) wing, holding the line from Metz study of military history, Schlieffen con- with Belgium would lure French forces to the Swiss frontier, was to be given only cluded that a quick victory was possible into invading Belgium first, in order to nine divisions, some reserve forces, and only if French forces could be outflanked set up a better defensive line in the Meuse the garrisons of Metz and Strasbourg. and encircled. River valley. Indeed, until 1912, French Schlieffen anticipated that, at the out- Obviously, there were two flanks to war plans called for the invasion of Bel- set of war, France would launch attacks the French defensive line. If the Germans gium, and it was only the political consid- against Alsace-Lorraine. He therefore moved to their left (around the southern eration of Great Britains attitude toward planned that his left wing would swing flank of the French line), they would such a maneuver that caused France to back, again pivoting at Metz, in order to have to pass through the Jura Mountains abandon it. lure the French army away from the de- of Switzerland, which would slow their Schlieffens plan called for position- cisive northern sector. advance, and they would emerge far ing 10 divisions in East Prussia, in order However, the German army was never from any vital point in France. However, to defend against a Russian invasion. All large eno ugh to be able to deploy the studies that Schlieffen conducted during of the rest of the German army would be number of divisions necessary to ensure staff rides convinced him that, by moving very wide to the right (around the northern flank of the French line), through Luxem- bourg, Belgium, and the southern part of Holland, it would be possible to circumvent the French defenses. The invasion of Dutch territory seemed necessary, because any Ger- man advance north of the Ardennes would run into the narrow gorge of the Meuse River valley, which was blocked by the fortress city of Liège. By marching north of Liège, through the southern part of Holland, German forces could bypass the Liège fortress. Thus, at the same time that Schlief- fen was exploiting a gap in time, he would also be exploiting a gap The Schlieffen Plan (shown here) called for luring French forces into attacking the German left wing, while a strong in space. This double German right wing quickly encircled Paris and forced a French capitulation. Germany was not able to field enough exploitation of the two troops to carry out the plan successfully. www.TheNewAmerican.com 35 HISTORYHISTORY — PAST AND PERSPECTIVE

ened sector in time to thwart advance of the German army to the Schlieffen decided that the only course the German strategy. Hence, west. Particularly if England should for Germany, when faced with a war on the weakness of the German use the violation of Belgian neutral- left wing was as much a part ity as a pretext for entering the war two fronts, was to concentrate its forces in of the Schlieffen Plan as against us.... order to defeat one enemy, then to turn and was the strength of the right Furthermore it will be very im- wing. The more deeply that portant to have in Holland a country deal with the other foe. the French became commit- whose neutrality allows us to have ted to Alsace-Lorraine, the imports and supplies. She must be the that Schlieffens plan could be carried less hope they would have of disengag- windpipe that enables us to breathe. out successfully. Worse still, the addi- ing themselves in time to meet the Ger- tion of the British Expeditionary Force man swoop from the north and west. By Those comments are significant, because (BEF) to the French order of battle was altering the relative strengths of his wings, they show that Moltke had lost confi- to make the German troop shortage des- Moltke showed that he did not adequately dence in the quick victory on the West- perate, especially after the Italians, who comprehend the essence of Schlieffens ern Front that Germany needed. Imports were supposed to fight on Germanys side strategy. and supplies are vital considerations for in southern France, failed to honor their The second important change initiated a protracted war but are of minor concern commitments under the provisions of the by Moltke was the cancellation of the in- for a six-week campaign. As the alterna- Triple Alliance. vasion of Dutch territory. He wrote: tive to marching across southern Holland, Moltke decided that the potential bottle- Too Many Generals Spoil the War A hostile Holland at our back could neck in the Meuse River valley at Liège General Helmuth von Moltke succeeded have disastrous consequences for the would have to be cleared at the outbreak Schlieffen as chief of the General of hostilities, which meant that Staff in 1905. Moltke was un- Belgium would have to be in- happy with the Schlieffen Plan, vaded while the German mo- considering it to be too much of bilization was still under way. a gamble. Although he was right, The French war plan, known his attempts to make it less of a as Plan XVII, which was com- gamble undermined rather than pleted in February of 1914 enhanced its chances of success. under the direction of General He worried about the weakness of Joseph Joffre, played perfectly the German left wing from Metz into the expectations of the to the Swiss border and feared Schlieffen Plan. Joffre anticipat- that a French offensive would ed that Germany would invade cut in behind his forces and Belgium but did not believe that sever his lines of communica- the Germans would try to move tions. Moltke therefore assigned in force west of the Meuse most of the new divisions that River. A German advance into became available between 1905 Belgium was welcomed, since and 1914 to the left wing rather Joffre calculated that, if Ger- than to the right wing. By doing many strengthened its right so, Moltke gained some imag- wing, then either its center or ined security but actually cre- its left wing must be relatively ated a greater risk, for the whole weak. He therefore proposed to point of Schlieffens strategy had attack first the German left wing been to emphasize the weight of in the region between Metz and the swinging hammerhead of the Strasbourg, and then to launch right wing. The concentration of a second offensive against the force on the right and the great German center north of Metz. wheeling-around maneuver were French intelligence underesti- meant to increase the chances mated German strength, assum- that the German army would ing that Germany, like France, fight its decisive battle with a would not use its reserves at local superiority of force. This German General Helmuth von Moltke was a reluctant chief of staff, the outbreak of the war. It was calculation was not a certainty, chosen by the Kaiser for his name (his great uncle was a victorious this miscalculation that helped for the French might be able to military leader against France during 1870) rather than for his to compensate Germany for its switch their forces to the threat- leadership qualities. shortage of troops under the

36 THE NEW AMERICAN • OCTObER 6, 2014 French General Joseph Joffre (in dark uniform, sporting white mustache) is shown here inspecting troops. His Plan XVII proved to be a failure, but he learned from his mistakes and ultimately succeeded in turning back the German invasion of France.

Schlieffen Plan and allowed the plan to be tiers. The first engagement was the French armies caused them to collide with the as successful as it was in the opening weeks offensive in Lorraine, which commenced on French Third and Fourth armies on Au- of the war. August 14. For four days the Germans fell gust 22. The French attacked vigorously, Liège was considered to be one of the back slowly, delaying with rear guards and taking enormous losses, and finally fell strongest fortresses in Europe. The city artillery fire, and inflicting heavy casualties. back after three days of bloody fighting. was protected by 12 forts, arranged in a As the planned final line of resistance was Receiving reports of a smashing victory, ring 10 miles in diameter and dominating neared, the German defense stiffened. On German headquarters got the impression the surrounding terrain with their guns. August 20, the Germans counterattacked that the two French armies had been al- Although its position was very strong, and pushed the French back all along the most eliminated. In fact, they were ready its garrison of 40,000 men was not large line. For the next five days, the French with- and able to fight again. enough to defend the gaps between the drew and established themselves on the for- The third engagement was the Battle forts. The German plan was for special tified heights around Nancy. Believing the of the Sambre, which took place at the units, under cover of artillery fire, to French armies to be beaten, Moltke changed angle formed by the confluence of the penetrate the gaps between the forts and the battle plan and authorized offensive Sambre and Meuse rivers near Namur, capture the city. Those units crossed into operations around Nancy, something that and where the French Fifth Army had Belgium on August 4 and encountered en- Schlieffen had always warned against. The taken up a position by August 20. On trenched Belgian infantry. After several French defeat in Lorraine actually turned August 21, advance units of the Ger- days of heavy fighting, Liège finally fell out well for France, because it tied down man Second Army reached the Sambre on August 7. But the forts continued to German troops and kept Moltke from send- River and attacked. A bloody, discon- hold out, so, on August 12, the Germans ing them to his right wing, where they might nected battle followed, lasting into the brought up their heavy siege guns. These have made a difference in the final outcome night. The French counterattacked on 42-centimeter howitzers, the heaviest ar- of the campaign. the following day but were thrown back tillery used up to that time, were too much The second engagement was the Battle with heavy losses. The commander of for the forts, since they had been built to of the Ardennes, named for the forested the French Fifth Army, General Charles withstand shelling from only up to 21-cen- area in southern Belgium to the west of Lanrezac, planned to attack again on Au- timeter cannon fire. The last fort fell on Luxembourg. The German Fourth and gust 23, but received news that the Ger- August 16, allowing the westward march Fifth armies, forming the pivot of the great man Third Army had crossed the Meuse of the German First and Second armies to German wheel at the center of the Western River to the south, forcing him to send begin on the right wing. Front, had been moving forward slowly, some of his forces there to head off the The initial meeting of the main Allied and regulating their advance with the speed Germans, protect his rear area, and allow German armies on the Western Front con- of the hammerhead, the First and Second the rest of his forces to withdraw. It was sisted of four separate engagements, which armies further to the north. The zones of another German victory, but the French became known as the Battle of the Fron- advance for the German Fourth and Fifth Fifth Army had survived to fight again.

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The fourth engagement was the Battle of Mons, where the BEF had taken up a position on August 22. Advance units of the German First Army struck the Brit- ish position on August 23 and launched a series of attacks in close formation, which gave the British marksmen an opportunity to inflict heavy casualties. But the BEF, being greatly outnumbered, and hearing that the French Fifth Army was withdrawing on its right flank, realized that it would be futile to stand alone and began a retreat on August 24. Although the Battle of the Frontiers resulted in the collapse of the French offensive plan, General Joffre and his staff now had a better understanding of the German plan and set about to take ap- AP Images propriate countermeasures. Moltke, on Battle of Liège: Because German General Helmuth von Moltke decided not to move through the other hand, elated by the exaggerated southern Holland in the opening offensive on the Western Front, this forced German forces to reports of German successes, entertained have to neutralize the Belgian fortress of Liège. German cavalry are shown assembling prior to the illusion that he was on the verge of the attack on the city. winning the war. At this time, the Russians had already started to invade East Prussia troops. French reserves were then brought was noted by the French, which induced and the news from the Eastern Front was up and, in a general counterattack, drove Joffre to change his strategic plan and halt not good. Moltke felt that he could afford the Germans north until darkness closed the limits of the Allied retreat southward to transfer some of his forces from the the battle. The German Second Army was to a huge arc extending from Paris to Ver- Second and Third armies to East Prussia. so badly mauled that it stood in place for a dun. Joffres revised plan also called for Moltke was thus doing the very opposite day and a half, thus allowing the BEF and the newly assembled French Sixth Army in of what Schlieffen had always stressed: the French Fifth Army to continue their Paris to be ready for a quick counterstroke. Keep the right wing strong! retreat without interference. Moltke was aware that French forces build- After three days of retreat from Mons, After the Battle of Le Cateau, the Ger- ing up in Paris were becoming formidable the BEF decided to stand its ground at Le man First Army, under the command of and that sizable German forces would be Cateau on August 26. The German First General Alexander von Kluck, continued needed to hold them off, until the envelop- Army attacked and threatened to envelop its march to the southwest. On August 30, ment of the main French armies had been the British forces, but the French Second Kluck received a message from General completed. Moltke therefore ordered Kluck Cavalry Corps arrived just in time to divert Karl von Bülow, commander of the Ger- to move his army in such a manner as to the attention of the Germans and allow man Second Army, announcing that the protect the German right flank, but failed the British to withdraw. Meanwhile, the French at Guise had been defeated in a to inform Kluck of the French forces build- French Fifth Army was retreating from decisive fashion and requesting Kluck to ing up in Paris. It appeared to Kluck that its action on the Sambre River to the area help exploit the victory by moving south- Moltke wanted the French forces to be around Guise, situated about 15 miles eastward. Kluck realized that Moltke at driven southeastward, away from Paris. south of Le Cateau. The German Second headquarters should be consulted, but the Because of the poor communications with Army arrived on August 29 and attacked speed of communications was such that German headquarters, Kluck decided to from the north, driving back the French several days would elapse before he could continue his advance southward, in order receive a reply. Meanwhile, to cross the Marne River and overtake the the golden opportunity de- French Fifth Army (now commanded by Moltke, elated by the exaggerated scribed by Bülow would General Louis Franchet dEsperey) with have passed. Kluck there- the bulk of his forces, while leaving a reports of German successes, entertained fore decided to do as Bülow smaller force north of the Marne River, in the illusion that he was on the verge wished and changed his di- order to guard against any threat from the rection of advance, so as to direction of Paris. of winning the war. At this time, the pass to the east of Paris, rath- Russians had already started to invade er than to the west, a decision Beginning of the End that was to have far-reaching Allied forces began their counterattack East Prussia and the news from the consequences. along the whole length of the front from Eastern Front was not good. Klucks change in direction Paris to Verdun on September 5. At the

38 THE NEW AMERICAN • OCTObER 6, 2014 eastern end of the battle line the assault to be temporary and, after regrouping, fensive strategy: 80 percent of the infan- achieved little. At the western end, how- the Germans would try to resume their try officers were either killed or wounded ever, the BEF joined an effective coun- advance. during the first five months of the war. teroffensive that was spearheaded by the By September 14, German forces had Joffre was responsible for the disastrous newly formed French Ninth Army. But it completed their retreat and had set up Plan XVII but, when his strategy col- was the outflanking move of the French formidable defensive positions along the lapsed in the Battle of the Frontiers, he Sixth Army from Paris that did the most Aisne River. When the Allies repeated did not panic or get discouraged. Instead, to unhinge the German position. Finally frontal attacks against these positions he kept his head and shifted forces to the aware that the French Sixth Army was a failed, they attempted to envelop the Ger- left wing, in order to halt the German ad- major threat to his rear, Kluck ordered his man flank on the north. This initiated a vance and then to counterattack. Joffre troops to withdraw northward across the series of enveloping maneuvers by both maintained good communications with Marne River to the French Sixth Army sides, each determined to outflank the his officers throughout the campaign. As front. This maneuver created a wide gap other, which succeeded only in extending a result, he was always familiar with the between the German First and Second the front farther and farther northward. military situation, and his subordinates armies, and would ultimately lead to the The final clashes took place between the were never in doubt as to what he wanted abandonment of the Schlieffen Plan and Lys River and the English Channel in the them to do. the doom of the German campaign on the First Battle of Ypres from October 12 to The Schlieffen Plan depended for its suc- Western Front. November 11. The Allies and the Ger- cess on close control, speed of execution, During the ensuing battles, the Ger- mans fought desperately to succeed in and a strong encircling right wing. It failed mans initially gained the upper hand. this last opportunity for envelopment, but primarily because of General von Moltkes However, the BEF was able to exploit the without success. Exhausted and running lack of direction and control, for which gap that had opened between the German low on ammunition, the two sides began inadequate communications were partly First and Second armies and advanced to dig in and strengthen their positions. to blame. It is difficult to understand why into it, which threw Moltke into a panic. Trench warfare was about to begin. the Germans, who were usually precise and The limited amount of information filter- By the end of 1914, it had become ap- well prepared, had neglected this vital area ing into German headquarters convinced parent that both the French Plan XVII of military support. Moltke remained aloof Moltke that the battle was in the process and the German Schlieffen Plan had in his headquarters far to the rear and let of being lost. On September 8, he dis- completely failed. Under the prevailing his subordinates have their own way. As a patched a staff officer, Colonel Richard circumstances, Plan XVII was unrealis- result, they failed to cooperate with each Hentsch, from his headquarters in Bel- tic and never had a chance of success. other and did not follow the strategic plan. gium to the battlefront, with the authority General Joffre had underestimated Ger- All German commanders made the error to order a retreat, should Hentsch judge man capabilities for a major campaign of interpreting their early successes as it to be necessary. Hentsch drove along west of the Meuse River, and the French decisive victories and the planned French the battlefront, became convinced that attacks were made over terrain that was withdrawal as a total rout. The Battle of the the situation near Paris was critical, and not favorable for large-scale offensive ac- Marne was a great strategic victory for the ordered a retreat to the Aisne River on tion. Also, an unreasonable faith had been Allies, and it turned out to be the turning September 9. The retreat was intended placed in the deeply implanted French of- point of the entire war. n

Battle of the Marne: German forces shown in red, French and British in blue.