Fortnightly Review Hong Kong and Taiwan: Two Davids Facing A
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Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 8 Global Taiwan Brief Vol 5. Issue1 8 Fortnightly Review Russell Hsiao Hong Kong and Taiwan: Two Davids Facing a Chinese Goliath Melissa Chan Taiwan’s Catch-Up with Myanmar Constrained by China Ties I-wei Jennifer Chang Increased PLA Activity Near Taiwan: How to Respond? J. Michael Cole The “Taiwan Model” for Self-Defense Shirley Kan Time to Harden the Last Line of Defense: Taiwan’s Reserve Force Michael Mazza Fortnightly Review The Global Taiwan Brief is a By: Russell Hsiao bi-weekly publication released every other Wednesday and pro- Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) and editor-in-chief of the vides insight into the latest news Global Taiwan Brief. on Taiwan. Who and What Will Shape the KMT’s “New” China Policy? Editor-in-Chief Russell Hsiao After the new chairman of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT), Johnny Chiang ( Staff Editor 江啟臣), took over the helm of the ailing centenarian Party, a central question has been Katherine Schultz how the 47-year-old former minister of the Government Information Office-turned-leg- Copy Editor islator will reorient the KMT’s relations with “China” and change the Party’s discourse Marshall Reid on cross-Strait relations. The KMT’s traditional position of favoring closer cross-Strait The views and opinions expressed interactions has been fundamentally challenged in recent years. This was especially true in these articles are those of the in the 2020 elections, when Beijing’s increasingly aggressive approach towards Taiwan authors and do not necessarily re- and neighboring Hong Kong sent a warning signal to the people of Taiwan, serving as flect the official policy or position one of the factors contributing to the Party’s defeat in the elections. The KMT Reform of the Global Taiwan Institute. Committee (改革委員會)—which has a total of 62 members—officially launched after the new chairman was elected and is headed by Chiang, with KMT Secretary General To view web sources cited in the published papers (underlined in Li Chien-lung (李乾龍) serving as deputy-general convener. According to news reports, printed text), visit http://global- the Committee is divided into four groups: the “Cross-Strait Discussion Group,” the “Or- taiwan.org/2020/04/vol-5-is- ganizational Reform Group,” the “Youth Participation Group,” and the “Financial Stabil- sue-8/. ity Group.” The group that is most in the public spotlight is the Cross-Strait Discussion Group. Global Taiwan Institute 1836 Jefferson Place NW, The “Cross-Strait Discussion Group” (兩岸論述組) is in charge of gathering ideas from Washington DC 20036 the Party’s leading thinkers on cross-Strait relations and proposing a new platform for [email protected] the Reform Committee and the new chairman to consider and the Party to adopt. Proba- bly the single most contentious policy issue facing the Reform Committee will be wheth- To subscribe, visit er the Party will retain in its original form, discard, or modify in some way the so-called http://globaltaiwan.org/sub- scribe/. “1992 Consensus,” which refers to the tacit agreement between the KMT and the Chi- © 2020 · Global Taiwan Institute Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 8 2 nese Communist Party (CCP) that the two sides of the override the opinions of the others remains to be seen. Strait belonged to “One China” and with each side free The former deputy director of the KMT Mainland Af- to interpret what that “China” is. There is reportedly a fairs Department also said that the Party and Beijing total of 16 cross-Strait experts and scholars included in are now at a stalemate. Interestingly, Chenclaimed that the group. They are: Wang Hsin-hsien (王信賢), Chi- the KMT did not send any representatives to partici- ang Shuo-ping (江碩平), Shen Ching-kuang (沈慶光), pate in this year’s Tomb-Sweeping Day celebration—a Lin Yu-fang (林郁方), Chiu Shih-yi (邱師儀), Yu Chen- traditional Chinese holiday that celebrates ancestor hua (俞振華), Shih Wei-Chuan (施威全), Tu Li-Hsuan remembrance—at the Yellow Emperor’s Mausoleum (涂力旋), Kao Wen-cheng (高文誠), Kao Su-po (高思 in China’s Shaanxi province. The KMT has sent repre- 博), Chen Wang-Chuan (陳汪全), Tseng Pai-wen (曾柏 sentatives to this event every year since former Chair- 文), Liu Tai-ting (劉泰廷), Cheng Kuang-hung (鄭光宏), man Lien Chan (連戰) visited in 2009. Additionally, he Su Chi (蘇起), and Huang Shao-ting (黃紹庭). cited the annual KMT-CCP Forum, which is reportedly In an interview with the China Review News—a Hong not going to be held this year because the two parties Kong-based news outlet with close ties to Beijing— have not agreed to the matter. Through these actions, Professor Edward Chen (陳一新), a former deputy the new chairman appears to be signaling to Beijing director for the KMT’s Mainland Affairs Department, that the KMT does not have to cooperate with the PRC stated that one the difficulties of determining how the since China clearly does not cooperate with the Party. KMT’s China policy may change stems from the fact For example, Chen claimed that the KMT did not know that the Cross-Strait Discussion Group is comprised of in advance before Beijing proposed the preferential many different opinions from various factions within policies for Taiwan (惠台政策), such as the 31 or the the Party. As an example, Chen highlighted how the “one country, two systems, Taiwan plan” (一國兩制台 KMT’s brain trust on China policy includes former min- 灣方案). ister of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Su Chi, While the KMT’s traditional position of favoring closer National Chengchi University Professor Wang Hsin- cross-Strait relations may once have been an advan- Hsien, and National Taiwan University Professor Tso tage for the Party—especially during previous periods Cheng-tung (左正東), who is now the acting director of tense cross-Strait relations when voters preferred of the Party’s Mainland Affairs Department. According stability—it clearly turned into a liability in the 2020 to Chen, the three scholars represent starkly different election after Beijing ratcheted up its bullying of Tai- views within the Party on China policy. Wang is asso- wan and Hong Kong. Furthermore, Beijing’s narrow in- ciated with the “light Green” camp (in reference to terpretation of the “1992 Consensus,” which essential- the ruling Democratic Progressive Party coalition), Su ly equates it with the “One-China” principle and “one favors a firm adherence to the “1992 Consensus,” and country, two systems,” has squeezed the air out of the Tso advocates for the democratization of the People’s room to expand the interpretation of the supposed Republic of China. In Chen’s view, it will be very difficult second clause of the tacit agreement of “different in- to integrate these different views into one platform, terpretations.” much less satisfy Beijing as well as more than half of the Taiwanese people. According to Dr. Austin Wang in his GTI occasional re- port “Surveying the Taiwanese Psychology on Self-De- Moreover, regardless of the respective views of these fense and Self-Determination,” which utilizes an orig- individuals, Chen argues that the KMT will ultimate- inal survey on the Taiwanese public’s views on the ly need to put forward a discourse on cross-Strait re- “1992 Consensus”: lations that is acceptable to Beijing. The KMT could shelve or even abolish the “1992 Consensus.” Howev- “If China and the United States wanted the Tai- er, it would need to be replaced with a formula that wan government to openly accept the “1992 Beijing could accept. According to Chen, the inclusion Consensus,” they should at first loosen, rather of Su in the Cross-Strait Discussion Group was intend- than constrain, the definition of this magic word. ed to appease China, though whether Su alone could … the public opinion in Taiwan on “1992 Consen- Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 8 3 sus” is malleable depending on how Taiwanese The main point: The policy recommendations that will people perceive and interpret the term.” come out of the KMT’s Cross-Strait Discussion Group must reconcile external pressures shaping its China The urgency of reform cannot be understated. As Bon- policy but also internal differences and contradictions nie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International among the various views within the Party on China pol- Studies observed at a conference co-hosted by Global icies. Taiwan Institute and The Heritage Foundation after the January 11 elections: “The real question is whether the party [KMT] Taiwan Becomes More than a Tourist Destination for itself reforms. Whether some of the older gen- Hong Kong as Beijing Tightens Grip eration people move aside [and] make way for the younger generation. Whether they try to The political and business environments in Hong Kong redefine themselves as an indigenous party. are deteriorating further as Beijing tightens its grip There are younger people that I’ve talked to in over the Special Administration Regions (SAR), once the KMT that would like to be the ‘Taiwan Kuo- the poster child for business innovation and economic mintang,’ not the ‘China Kuomintang’—that may vibrancy. Local startups are increasingly looking out- be a bridge too far in the immediate future. But side the territory for expanding business opportuni- they have to figure out their messaging and their ties. In arecent poll conducted by a Hong Kong organi- policies, and, of course, fundamentally have to zation, Taiwan has emerged as the top choice for local examine what their policies going to be going startup businesses looking for expansion opportuni- forward towards Beijing.