Sharp Power, Youth Power, and the New Politics in Taiwan
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SHARP POWER, YOUTH POWER, AND THE NEW POLITICS IN TAIWAN Graeme Read N 2018, the People’s Republic of countries’, particularly that deployed IChina (PRC) stepped up efforts to by authoritarian regimes to enforce isolate Taiwan and hinder its quest their objectives abroad. for international recognition. Three In the case of Taiwan, China’s countries formerly maintaining full growing use of sharp power can be diplomatic relations with the Repub- traced to the 2016 election of Tsai lic of China (ROC) — the Dominican Ing-wen’s 蔡英文 Democratic Pro- Republic, Burkino Faso, and El Sal- gressive Party (DPP) government. vador — broke these ties to establish The DPP won both executive and leg- them with the PRC, reducing Taiwan’s islative power, crystallising popular political allies to just seventeen world- dissatisfaction with the pro-China wide. Not just a matter of chequebook Kuomintang (KMT) government. At diplomacy, this represents a spike in the same time, ‘third force’ minor Beijing’s application of ‘sharp power’ parties rose to prominence, present- — a term coined in a National Endow- ing alternatives to Taiwan’s two-party ment for Democracy report in 2017, politics. In 2018, these parties, fuelled and discussed in detail in chapter 2 by young activists’ disillusionment of the report.1 Sharp power signifies with establishment politics, prepared influence that ‘pierces, penetrates, for the November elections and the or perforates the political and infor- chance to embed the politics of ‘youth mation environments in the targeted power’ into local political structures. 180 The Sunflower Student Movement law-era activism, it has since become 181 太陽花學運 of 2014, during which stu- more moderate and no longer explicit- dents occupied the Legislative Yuan ly advocates Taiwanese independence. and forced the government to suspend On paper, the NPP’s reformist agenda the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agree- and liberal-democratic values are sim- ment, was a critical moment for Tai- ilar to those of the DPP. But the NPP wan’s civil society. (see the China Story attracts both independence advocates Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, Forum and social activists disillusioned by the ‘Occupy Taiwan’, pp.136–145). Activists DPP. The NPP advocates progressive Sharp Power, Youth Power, and the New Sharp Power, Youth Politics in Taiwan Read Graeme proved they could effectively mobilise democracy fused with localisation: and deploy ‘people power’ outside ei- rendering Taiwan a ‘normal’ sover- POWER ther of the two major parties. From eign country, reconciling with injustic- this movement emerged what is now es of an authoritarian past, and deep- the third-largest parliamentary party: ening transparent and participatory CHINA STORY YEARBOOK CHINA STORY the New Power Party (NPP). The NPP democracy. — cofounded by heavy metal vocalist, In early January 2018, five NPP former chair of Amnesty Internation- legislators staged a hunger strike to al Taiwan, and independence activist protest the DPP’s proposed amend- Freddy Lim 林昶佐 — explicitly pre- ments to the Labour Standards Act sented itself as the direct successor of to remove protective stipulations re- the youth activist movement, heralding garding workers’ time off and rest pe- a new era of politics and youth power riods. They accused the DPP of being that sought to transform Taiwan’s gov- beholden to business interests at the ernment into one more responsive to expense of its working base. The KMT the people’s needs and wishes. stood with the NPP in criticising the Since the 2016 elections, the NPP governing DPP, disconcerting some of has distanced itself from the DPP, with the NPP’s hardcore anti-KMT support- which it once cooperated against their ers. The NPP also criticised the DPP for common enemy, the KMT. Throughout inaction on marriage equality, after 2018, the NPP broke with DPP plat- the Constitutional Court ruled current forms in both parliament and public. marriage laws invalid in 2017. The While the DPP was Taiwan’s original NPP nevertheless supported the DPP opposition party, with roots in martial government’s proposed pension re- New Power Party hunger strike outside the Presidential Office Building, Taipei, January 2018. Freddy Lim can be seen in the far left of the picture Source: 顥中 王, Flickr forms, to the ire of KMT-aligned vested voter turnout for a valid referendum. interests. The Party thus demonstrat- The minimum voting age for referen- ed an issue-based approach to policy, dums was also lowered to eighteen. rather than falling into an anti-KMT A referendum was first proposed by coalition with the DPP. Willing to chal- Thomas Liao Wen-I 廖文毅 during the lenge both major parties on issues of 1940s KMT era as a means of enacting national identity and social welfare, Taiwanese self-determination, and the NPP positioned itself as being more further accompanied the rise of activ- idealistic than the pragmatic DPP. ism in the 1980s and democratisation The district elections in Novem- in the 1990s.2 Rather than resolving ber coincided with several referen- the question of Taiwan’s sovereign- dums following a revision of the ty, however, referendums largely be- Referendum Act that took effect in came tools of KMT–DPP electioneer- January. The new Act significantly re- ing. The majority have failed to secure duced thresholds required to propose minimum voter turnouts, thanks to a national ballot and the minimum the parties putting up simultaneous, 182 competing proposals, as well as calls spiritual successor of the DPP, it repre- 183 for boycotts.3 Importantly, this year’s sents a new generation of Taiwanese referendums were not deployed by activists. Although the same-sex mar- either major party but by activists as riage referendums were voted down means of direct political participation. and the DPP lost significant ground in Approximately half of the proposed the 2018 elections, the NPP neverthe- referendums aimed to resolve some less won 16 council seats. Part of the aspect of marriage equality. Supported continuing processes of localisation by the NPP, activist groupings and in- and democratisation, the NPP articu- dividuals from the major parties, civil lates ‘natural independence’ 天然獨, Sharp Power, Youth Power, and the New Sharp Power, Youth Politics in Taiwan Read Graeme society is revitalising referendums as a advocating for a generation of Taiwan- POWER tool of democratisation. ese young people who embrace local The changes to Taiwan’s Referen- identity and want to realign politics dum Act have lowered barriers to with the grassroots. Working in tan- CHINA STORY YEARBOOK CHINA STORY popular political participation in an dem with a generational shift towards era of youth power. Following the Sun- Taiwan-centrism as the new socio-cul- flower Movement, a young generation tural norm, new politics delegitimis- of activists working from both within es the political hegemony of the two parliament and through civil society parties, the DPP and its ‘pan-green’ al- organisations are reframing politics lies versus the KMT and its ‘pan-blue’ as the concern of every citizen and not supporters. Advocates of this new pol- just the stomping grounds of privileged itics assume the contest over national families and established organisations. identity has already been decided, and Where the KMT opposed same-sex that there is a need for new thinking in marriage and the DPP faltered, the the political sphere. Whether the NPP NPP championed the cause. can maintain its momentum and revo- So what exactly is new about lutionise Taiwan’s political system yet the New Power Party? In a sense, the remains to be seen. This text is taken from China Story Yearbook 2018: Power, edited by Jane Golley, Linda Jaivin, Paul J. Farrelly and Sharon Strange, published 2019 by ANU Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. doi.org/10.22459/CSY.2019.06B.