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Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, Niece of National Rally Leader Marine Le Pen, Is Challenging Her Aunt’S Politics

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Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, Niece of National Rally Leader Marine Le Pen, Is Challenging Her Aunt’S Politics LAURA STEVENS/CAMERALAURA PRESS Face of the future: Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, niece of National Rally leader Marine Le Pen, is challenging her aunt’s politics 30 | NEW STATESMAN | 1-7 NOVEMBER 2019 THE CLOSING OF THE CONSERVATIVE MIND Between revolution and reaction In the latest article in our series, we look at the state of French politics and the emergence of Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, who aspires to unite the far right with the traditional Catholic right By Hugo Drochon he primaries to choose the can- to today”). It has had several editions, no- parliament but suffrage was strictly limited didate for the Republicans in the tably in 1963 and in 1968, when it changed to propertied men. Thiers was in favour of 2017 French presidential election its name to Les Droites en France; the fourth expanding suffrage, and organised several took place in November 2016. and final edition was published in 1982. colourful campaign banquets to promote There were three main candi- Rémond’s thesis, as the 2016 primaries it, but Guizot was implacably opposed. His Tdates: the early frontrunner Alain Juppé, show, still captures something essential answer to those who wanted to vote was the former president Nicolas Sarkozy and about French politics. “enrichissez-vous!” (enrich yourself!). In the outsider François Fillon. To everyone’s Legitimists can be traced back to the roy- short: earn enough money so that you have surprise, Fillon came first in the first round alists who rejected the French Revolution the right to vote. The monarchy was over- of voting on 20 November, relegating Juppé and value tradition, Catholicism and order. thrown by the popular revolution of 1848. into second place and eliminating the for- They supported the House of Bourbon, and The Bonapartists hark back to the “little mer president he had served under as prime were in power during the Bourbon Res- general” himself, but they came to promi- minister. In the second round, Fillon beat toration after the fall of Napoleon in 1815: nence after 1848 when Napoleon’s nephew Juppé by winning more than 66 per cent of they attempted – and failed – to reverse the Napoleon III discarded the Second Repub- the vote. changes inaugurated by the revolution and lic, to which he’d been elected president, to What was striking about the contest is restore the Old Regime to France. found the Second French Empire in 1852. that each candidate seemed to incarnate one They were overthrown during the July Bonapartism is associated with a strong of the three “rights” traditionally associated Revolution of 1830, when the Orléanists charismatic leader who legitimises his rule with France: the “liberal” Juppé, the “au- came to power. The Orléanists support- through plebiscites, thereby integrating the thoritarian” Sarkozy and the “traditional- ed constitutional monarchy under Louis lower classes, in contrast to the old nobil- ist” Fillon. Juppé was the modernising “Or- Philippe of the House of Orléans and were ity (Legitimists) or the upper classes (Or- léanist”, keen on reform. Sarkozy was the liberals, especially economically. The pe- léanists), into politics. Like the Orléanists, populist and authoritarian “Bonapartist”, riod is closely associated with banking, who tried to reconcile the French Revolu- who had scant regard for intermediary bod- industry and finance; Louis Philippe was tion with the monarchy, the Bonapartists ies. Fillon was the “Legitimist”, relying on known as the “Bourgeois King”. The two accept the legacy of the revolution and call the nostalgic conservative Catholic vote. dominant figures were the left-of-centre for a strong nationalist state. It was the historian René Rémond who Adolphe Thiers and the right-of-centre Throughout the four editions of his book elaborated the thesis of the “three rights” François Guizot, whom the king favoured. Rémond tried to keep his thesis up to date. in his 1954 book La Droite en France de 1815 Today we might call these two men “aris- After the fall of the Bourbons the reac- à nos jours (“The right in France from 1815 tocratic-liberals”: they were in favour of tionary “Legitimist” faction settled into t 1-7 NOVEMBER 2019 | NEW STATESMAN | 31 t opposition, but it made a return in the social and economic liberalisation, mod- May were won by Marine Le Pen’s re- 20th century through the Action Française, ernisation and a firm commitment to the baptised National Rally (from the historic a nationalist, anti-Semitic group founded European project, of which de Gaulle had FN), which edged out Macron’s Renew in reaction to the Dreyfus affair. It grew to been critical. When Chirac came to power Europe list. As they did with Macron’s La prominence in the interwar years under the in 1995, he reinstated French state author- République En Marche!, the elections con- leadership of Charles Maurras, becoming a ity, and returned to the dirigiste principles firmed the anchoring of the National Rally royalist, counter-revolutionary, anti-par- of how to run the economy. (RN) in French political life. But here we liamentary and anti-liberal movement. It If it hadn’t been for “Penelopegate” – come to the limits of Rémond’s “three supported Catholic Integralism (that Ca- the “fake jobs” scandal engulfing Fillon’s rights”. Where does the National Rally fit tholicism should be the state religion) as English wife, Penelope, and questions about in? Should there also be a “fourth” right? well as the collaborationist Vichy regime who was paying for his fine tailored suits – That is the view the Israeli historian Zeev and Marshal Pétain, becoming entwined Fillon might today be president of France. Sternhell put forward in his 1978 book La with fascism, with which it has a compli- He didn’t miss out by much, claiming 20 Droite révolutionnaire, 1885-1914: Les origines cated relationship. per cent of the vote in the first round of the françaises du fascisme (“The revolutionary The Orléanists came back to power in elections in April 2017 and finishing third, right, 1885-1914: the French origins of fas- the aftermath of Napoleon III’s defeat just a little over a percentage point behind cism”). In it he argued that there exists a dis- tinct fourth “revolutionary” right in France: it is revolutionary because although it rejects As they did with Macron’s En Marche! the French Revolution like the “Legitimist” right, with which it shares certain character- party, the elections anchored the istics, it does not call for the return to the Old Regime. Instead it calls for the establishment National Rally in French political life of a new regime: fascism. For Sternhell, the revolutionary right cannot be simply sub- sumed under the “Legitimist” label as it in- to Bismarck in the Franco-Prussian War Marine Le Pen, who came second. Em- corporates elements of the radical left: it is a of 1870, which led to the collapse of the manuel Macron won 24 per cent in the merger of George Sorel’s revolutionary syn- Second Empire. Adolphe Thiers re- first round and defeated Le Pen in the sec- dicalism and the Action Française. turned to become the first president of the ond round of the contest on 7 May, 66 to Third Republic (1870-1940), where he put 34 per cent. rance has long been home to many down the Paris Commune and forced the The moment that best captured Fillon’s of the leading theorists of the far- Prussian troops to leave two years ahead doomed candidacy was the rally he held right, but Sternhell’s thesis of a of schedule. In his revised 1982 edition, on the Trocadero in Paris on 5 March 2017, specifically French fascism and its Rémond classified the liberal presidency of where he stoically gave a speech in heavy incarnation in the Vichy regime, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981) as an rain. At that point most of his party had Fparticularly in his subsequent book Ni droite Orléanist presidency. deserted him because of the scandals, but ni gauche: L’idéologie fasciste en France a large crowd had been bussed in because (Neither Left Nor Right: Fascist Ideology in he Fifth Republic, Charles de of the efforts of “Sens Commun” (Com- France), has been an ongoing source of con- Gaulle and Gaullism are all mon Sense). This is a micro-party within troversy. And yet, isn’t the phrase “neither instances of nationalist Bona- the Republicans, founded on the back of the left nor right” precisely one of Marine Le partism. De Gaulle was char- 2013 anti-gay marriage protests known as Pen’s slogans? (Nigel Farage has used it too ismatic and authoritarian. He the “Manif pour tous”. These conservative in the UK.) Tpositioned himself above the party politi- Catholics came out on the day for Fillon, as When Marine Le Pen became leader cal fray and ruled through plebiscite, the they had to help him win the primaries. of the FN in 2011 her aim was to break the centralised state being the main actor of It has been reported that Fillon might glass ceiling of 18 per cent of the vote her political reform. The Fifth Republic, have had some support from Russia: he father Jean-Marie Le Pen had achieved founded in 1958, institutionalised that form called Putin the defender of Christians in as party leader in 2002, when he reached of rule, so that today the structures of the the Middle East. In supporting both Fillon the second round of the presidential elec- French state, with a powerful president, and Le Pen – he met the latter in Moscow tion, losing to Chirac. She achieved this remain Bonapartist. during the campaign and offered loans to ambition by winning 34 per cent of the vote The ongoing struggle between the Orlé- the National Front (FN) – Putin thought he against Macron.
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