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1 Self-Knowledge in Plato 1. Introduction Socrates' Account Of Self-Knowledge in Plato 1. Introduction Socrates’ account of the defining moment of his life, when he learned that Apollo’s oracle had declared him the wisest of men (Apology 21a1), recalls the inscription, ‘Know yourself’, in the temple of Apollo at Delphi2: Having heard these [words], I wondered, ‘Whatever does the God mean, and what is he riddling? For I know (sunoida) myself to be wise about nothing great or small. What then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For I don’t suppose he lies; it is not permissible for him.’ (21b2-7) Socrates has (some) self-knowledge, the very thing the inscription enjoins all to acquire (which prior to Socrates’ intellectualist take on it might have been understood as ‘know your place’), yet the content of this knowledge, that he knows nothing great or small, is now being questioned by the oracle’s pronouncement that he is wisest among men. In response to this conflict between what he knows of himself and what the oracle says about him, Socrates tries to refute (elenchein) the oracle by examining 1 References to Plato’s text are to the standard Stephanus pagination followed by both original-language editions and most translations. Translations in this chapter are all my own, but the reader may find it convenient to consult John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (eds.) The Complete Works of Plato (Hackett, 1997) for context and/or other translations. 2 In Plato’s Protagoras Socrates says the ancient sages inscribed (grapsantes) their wise sayings in the temple (343b); while we might be skeptical that the ancient sages did the inscribing, Socrates seems to take for granted the existence of the inscriptions. 1 (exetazô/exetazesthai) those with a reputation for knowledge (21b-c). But he finds that the politicians and poets, who know nothing fine, and the craftsmen, who know only their crafts, take themselves to know about virtue when they do not (22a-e). On seeing this, he realizes that although he knows nothing fine and good, nothing of human and social virtue (20c), at least he lacks the ‘most blameworthy’ (29a-b) false conceit of knowledge that keeps one from seeking knowledge, and his awareness of his own ignorance in this matter is rare enough, and valuable enough, to earn it the title ‘human wisdom’ (23a-b, cf. 20d). This is what the oracle means by saying Socrates is the wisest among men: he is wisest in human wisdom. Socrates reckons that in examining himself and others, he is doing as the god commands him (30a, e). He considers the unexamined life not worth living for a human being (38a). Does examination itself make a life worth living, or is examination necessary for recognizing one’s own ignorance, which is a pre-condition for seeking the (‘divine’) knowledge of what is fine and good (cf. Sophist 230a-c)? We will return to this question below, in section 2. In contrast with the Apology, the Phaedrus has Socrates saying that he lacks self- knowledge: I am not able to know myself as per the Delphic inscription . whether I turn out to be some beast more complicated and raging than Typhon or a gentler and simpler animal, by nature sharing in a divine and modest lot. (Phaedrus 229e5- 30a6) Which is it, does Socrates have or lack self-knowledge? On the assumption that the self-knowledge Socrates has ought to be different from the self-knowledge he lacks, this paper explains the differences in content between the 2 two kinds of knowledge, and describes the two kinds of inquiry directed at each kind of self-knowledge. We may distinguish two questions corresponding to two ways of hearing the injunction to know oneself. (1) Concerning one’s state: is one knowledgeable or ignorant? good or bad? (2) Concerning one’s capacities: what is one’s nature such that one is able to become good or bad, and knowledgeable or ignorant, viz., what are one’s capacities to inquire, desire, anger, and so on? are all of these equally essential to what one is? While an answer to (2) may be implicit in any answer to (1), several (‘early’) dialogues pursue only (1), examining various important subjects about which Socrates and his interlocutors may be knowledgeable or ignorant, and other (‘middle’ and ‘late’) dialogues pursue (2), determining the soul’s basic constituents and exploring their behaviour in different conditions. Both kinds of inquiry treat the self that is to be known (viz., the state or the set of capacities) as capable of being quite different in reality from the way it appears to itself. The answer to (2) includes the claim that the best element of the self is its capacity to know, which when it actually knows is in its best condition itself and makes the soul as a whole good, but—unlike later Platonists and many interpreters (see section 3)—Plato’s answers to (1) and (2) do not reduce the self that is known to the knowing self. 2. Knowledge of one’s state In Plato’s Charmides, Critias proposes that temperance is to know oneself (164d), and that the person who is temperate has knowledge of what he knows and what he doesn’t know (167a). Some commentators complain that this discussion changes the 3 topic from knowledge of the self to knowledge of knowledge.3 But if Socrates’ human wisdom/knowledge of one’s own ignorance is the very self-knowledge enjoined by ‘know yourself’, this is not a change of topic, and in the Charmides, Critias and Socrates agree that knowledge of knowledge (and presumably of ignorance) causes its possessor to have self-knowledge (169e). The idea seems to be that self-knowledge, understood as knowledge of one’s own knowledge or ignorance, is an application of knowledge of knowledge and ignorance to one’s own case. In the Charmides, Socrates argues that knowledge of knowledge and ignorance is not possible, or, if it is possible, is not beneficial—as one would expect of a virtue like temperance. How do these arguments bear on Socrates’ knowledge of his own ignorance (Apology 21b), and his practice of cross-examining others to test their knowledge or ignorance? In the relevant passages of the Charmides, Critias proposes (and Socrates elaborates): (1) Self-knowledge is knowledge (epistêmê). Although all the other knowledges are about something other than themselves (166a), temperance/self-knowledge is uniquely of itself and all the other knowledges (166e5-6). The knowledge of knowledge Critias is describing is not a second-order knowledge that a person with first-order knowledge of some particular subject-matter, e.g. medicine, 3 Julia Annas, ‘Self-Knowledge in Early Plato’ in D.J. O’Meara ed., Platonic Investigations (Catholic University of America Press, 1985), 111-37 at 134; cf. M.M. McCabe ‘It goes deep with me’: Plato’s Charmides on knowledge, self-knowledge, and integrity’ in Philosophy, Ethics, and a Common Humanity: Essays in Honour of Raimond Gaita (Routledge, 2011), 161-81 at 167. 4 possesses in virtue of possessing that first-order knowledge. Rather, just like any first- order knowledge, knowledge of knowledge is treated as independent of any other (body of) knowledge, and is what it is in virtue of its subject-matter, in this case, knowledge. (2) A knowledge of itself and all other knowledges would have to be a knowledge of non-knowledge as well (as e.g. medicine, knowledge of health, is also knowledge of sickness). (166e7-8) (3) Only the possessor of this knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance can know whether he himself or anyone else has knowledge or not. (166e-67a) (Here the words, ti tis oiden kai oietai, eiper oiden, kai ti au oieitai kai men eidenai, oiden d’ou clearly echo Socrates’ account of the way in which he is the wisest, Apology 21d). Socrates counters: (4) The ability to know knowledge and ignorance is sui generis (atopon, 165c4, 168a10) among abilities: there is no sight that is of itself and other sights but not of color, similarly for sound, desire, fear, opinion . (167c-68a) (5) Knowledge is knowledge of something because of the sort of power it (viz. the knowledge) has, as a result of which (hôste) it is of (viz. can grasp) that thing. (168b) (6) Similarly, the greater is greater than something because of the sort of power it has, as a result of which it is greater than the smaller. (168c) (7) If the greater were greater than itself it would also be less than itself. (8) In general, anything that has a power over itself in relation to itself (pros heauto) will also have that nature which is had by the object over which it is a power. 5 (168d1-3) E.g. if sight, the object of which is color, is itself to be seen, sight must be colored. (9) But how are we to determine whether all powers are over something distinct, or there are some that can be of themselves? (170a) The issue is whether all powers are like relative magnitude (e.g. being greater than), which relate relata of contrary natures (the greater, the smaller) and so preclude the power from being related to itself—for that would require it to have contrary natures (168e). Knowledge would not be like this if, e.g., the key feature of the objects of knowledge that makes them knowable is their immateriality and unchangingness, at least if knowledge (or the subject of knowledge qua knower) is essentially immaterial and unchangeable.4 A possible lesson of (1) to (9) is that Socrates’ knowledge of ignorance should not be thought of as knowledge (epistêmê), strictly speaking, for that would have to be of what its object is (i.e.
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