Growing in Goodness Towards a Symbiotic Ethics

1 Growing in Goodness Towards a Symbiotic Ethics Submitted by Alexander Badman-King, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in philosophy; 12/2016 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without prop- er acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. (Signature) Alexander Badman-King 1 2 ABSTRACT At its core, this thesis represents an attempt to outline and clarify a concept of ‘wisdom’. Building upon a fairly well established tradition of ‘philosophy as a way of life’ the discussion sets out an understanding of a model of philosophy which sets a union of the virtues as its ultimate goal (finding models of non-ethical and primarily ac- ademic philosophy to be lacking). Aristotle’s practical wisdom and Plato’s humble, human wisdom are found to be complimentary in certain key respects and useful (in conjunction) in describing the nature of this ‘wisdom’ as a state of moral expertise and broad insight (an understanding of, and action according to, that which is most important). An account is given of the kind of moderate moral realism which is able to account for the ‘moral facts’ which are necessary to render this sort of moral knowledge viable. This moderate realism is founded upon a similarly moderate or compromising epistemology which will itself constitute a recurring theme of this ‘wisdom’. Moving from this metaethical and epistemological justification, some account is given of the sort of practical means by which this moral knowledge might be arrived at with the suggestion that traditional analytic and cogitative practices must be com- bined with far more anthropological ‘living-with’ practices in order that this moral learning can be plausible. Further to this suggestion of an amalgam of philosophy and anthropology, an effort is made to describe the sense in which aesthetic and ethical insight converge in this process of recognising moral insight and that, as such, ‘true philosophy’ must also allow for artistic (particularly narrative and poetic) methods. Having made a case for the practice of philosophy to move substantially away from its conventional means, the latter half of the thesis sets out a specific model of ‘living-with philosophy’ in an attempt to demonstrate this novel model of philosophy and the more detailed nature of wisdom. This ‘case study’ takes the shape of living-with other living things and the stories and lessons which have unfolded through my own life with the non-human world. Due to the fundamental (practically, emotionally and 2 3 conceptually fundamental) and particularly varied nature of living with (by and through) non-human life, organic vegetable gardening is taken as a good (if not the best) means of realising this process of moral learning. The thesis focuses upon the way in which close living with non-human life can and should highlight the manner in which various virtues which are fundamental to a union of virtue can appear to be in conflict (particularly what might be called ‘compassion’ and ‘prudence’). Ultimately an attempt is made to describe the way in which these conflicts can and should be found to be complimentary to the realisation of wisdom through a subtle, complex but intuitive process of balancing. The thesis concludes with an examination of this act of balancing, particularly ‘in the face of death’, and the way in which it is commensurate with moods and attitudes of quietness, poignancy and good humour. It is found that wisdom, the union of virtues, is more than the sum of its parts, that it is characterised particularly by these kinds of attitude (echoing the moderation and humility explored at the outset). 3 4 4 Contents page 5 0. Moral Knowledge (‘Wisdom’) as the Purpose of Philosophy and Life. – In which the idea of a complex and partly intellectual virtue is suggested as an appropriate goal 6 of philosophy and human life more generally and the thesis is situated in the field of ‘philosophy as a way of life’. PART 1: ETHICS, ANTHROPOLOGY AND ART. 1. Plato and Aristotle on the Nature of Wisdom – In which an attempt is made to draw from Aristotle’s ‘Nichomachean Ethics’ and Plato’s ‘Apology’ a coherent theory of wis- 18 dom to serve as the basis of the following discussion. 2. Moderate Realism as the Epistemic and Metaethical Basis of Wisdom. – In which the kind of moral realism and free will which seem to be entailed by the ancient theo- 37 ries of wisdom are adapted into an epistemic attitude of good-humoured forgiveness which will serve as a metaethical basis for the whole discussion of wisdom. 3. An Amalgamation of Philosophy and Anthropology as the Best Method for Gain- ing Wisdom. – In which an outline is offered for the kind of virtue which will be looked 60 for in this investigation and a model of (moral) learning is suggested (based on an amalgam of anthropological and philosophical methods) which can act as the means by which the investigation can be pursued. 4. The Necessity of Aesthetics and Preeminence of Narrative in Practicing Anthro- pological-Philosophy. – Building on an idea of ‘thickness’ as used by Bernard Wil- liams and Clifford Geertz a notion is put forward as to how best to understand the per- suasive method of the ‘anthropological-philosophy’ described in the previous chapter. 85 This description culminates in a focus on an appreciation and understanding of narrative art as the best model for informing this method of method of wisdom seeking. PART 2: THE GARDEN 5 6 5. Purposiveness Amongst Living Things as a Focus of Wisdom and the Useful- ness of Fringe Cases for Acquiring Wisdom.– In which an attempt is made to ne- gotiate some of the difficulties when thinking about non-human lives as a possible set- ting for narrative anthropological philosophy. The suggestion is made that a concept of 116 purposiveness and fulfilment, in line with that upon which the working definition of wisdom has been founded, is vital to making sense of these non-human lives. The chapter closes with a description of some reasons why these non-human lives serve as an exemplary context for moral learning. 6. The Inevitability of Doing Harm, the Importance of Feeling Bad and the Central Role of Honesty, and Courage. – With a basis in the work of Albert Schweitzer and his ethic of reverence for life, an attempt is made to describe the way in which an ad- mixture of virtues can be cultivated through a familiarity with the conflicts and ethical dilemmas faced in the garden. Commensurate with the ‘unclean’ or moderate epistemology discussed at the outset, an ethic of feeling bad about doing the right thing is 146 proposed as vital to understanding these tragic conflicts of life. Furthermore, the suggestion is made that the soldierly virtues of courage and honesty, emphasised earlier by Plato, are a good focus for attempting to unravel the ways in which symbiotic ethics can be an exemplary form of philosophy. The chapter closes with an exploration of the role ‘belonging’ and extended identity must play in these little trials of the garden. 7. An Effort to Outline an Attitude of Steady Attention, Poignancy and Good Hu- mour in the Face of Death, as Constitutive of Wisdom. – This chapter begins with an attempt to outline an attitude of forgiveness (or stoicism) which is borne out of a close association with decay. The suggestion is made that there is a sense of steady pace which can be achieved through an awareness of symbiotic harmony and which is crucial to this attitude. At the normative core of this model of symbiotic moral learn- 199 ing is a particularly necessary virtue which is identified with patience and careful attention. The accurate recognition of the inevitability of death and suffering are found not to be terminal to this model of wisdom but vitally constitutive of it. By turning to the concept of Mono No Aware, the discussion attempts to close with a focus on small and fragile beauty as integral to wisdom and to the way this characterises wisdom with a sense of humour at the strange absurdity of the importance of small things in such a grand dance of life and death. 6 7 0 – Moral Knowledge (‘Wisdom’) as the Purpose of Philosophy and Life. What a Piece of Work is a Man? - Shakespeare, Hamlet, 2.2. ἐθος ανθροποι δαιμον - Heraclytus1 Some time ago I needed to introduce the topic of ‘wealth and poverty’ to some year nine pupils (around 13 or 14 years old). I decided that juxtaposing two vid- eo clips, one of conspicuous affluence and the other of evident poverty, would be an effective method for introducing the topic. I hoped that by showing a clip from some American competition eating first and then some footage of people in abject poverty I could shock the pupils into really engaging with the moral is- sues involved. The visceral contrast would be morally illustrative. It worked, I think. A good lesson. 1 Fragment (22B)119 of Heraclytus is (as can be expected of any fragment of Heraclytus) very tricky to pin down (Robin Waterfield gives a nice sense of this in his summary of Heraclytus’ fragments in R. Waterfield [tr.], The First Philosophers, [Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000], p.31.

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