PLATO Philebus Translated with Notes and Commentary by J. C. B. GOSLING FELLOW OF ST. EDMUND HALL OXFORD CLARENDON PRESS·OXFORD 1975 Oxford University Press, Ely House, London W. I GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON CAPE TOWN IBADAN NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA ADDIS ABABA DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI LAHORE DACC� KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE HONG KONG TOKYO CASEBOUND ISBN 0 19 872044 0 PAPERBACK ISBN 0 19 872054 8 ©Oxford University Press 1975 All rights reserved. No pa1t of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval vstem, or transmitted, in anyfo1111 or h_vanymeans, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, 1eco1ding or otite1wise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press Printed in Great Britain by Billing & Sons Limited, Guildford and London PREFACE It may help to make some comments on the purpose of this volume. It is intended primarily forphilosophers with no ancient Greek, who wish to study Plato. Such people may like readable English but their need is to get some idea of relationships in the original and ambiguities. So while I have omitted many occurrences of 'O Protarchus', 'O Socrates', for style's sake, much of the English is cumbersome. Thus the translations ofperas (determinant), apeiron (indeterminate). pathos (what is undergone) are often barbarous, but, as it is in given passages important for a reader to know that the same word is used, l have preserved the same translation. Sometimes (psyche (soul?), alethes (true?)) this has proved too much for me, and I have inserted a transliteration of the Greek word in brackets. Where there is dispute about the text or translation, or a note on the meaning of some term, there is an asterisk in the margin of the text, referring the reader to the notes at the end of the text. A word of warning is, however, in order here. So far as possible the line divisions of the English text correspond to those of the Stephanus pagination of the Oxford text. Sometimes, however, there is a lack of correspondence, so since asterisks come against the English that has given rise to comment the reader will sometimes need to be prepared to explore in the notes. The Introduction is intended to give some idea of the main interpretational problems in the Philebus. While a clear line cannot always be preserved, the division of labour between notes and general commentary is that the latter should tackle general problems of interpretation in the relevant sections, the former more particular questions, especially of text and translation. With regard to disputes on the text, I have aimed, except where largish sections are at issue, to give a transliteration and translation of the disputed terms so that a Greekless reader may get some idea of the dispute. Sometimes a passage is too long, or too little hangs on it. In such cases I have been less considerate, more dogmatic. Unless otherwise specified in the notes I have followed the Oxford text. The translation never embodies my own suggested readings, but always one alrea.dy PREFACE suggested unless expressly stated. I have given at the end a list of works consulted. While I have doubtless done injustice to most, I should mention Elsa Striker's work in particular. It came to my notice rather late on in the book's preparation, but clearly deserves notice. I have referredto it often, but must say that my reading has been hasty and it is improbable that I have digested all the subtleties or always got her arguments right. It is an important and ingenious work. My inten­ tion has been to draw attention to it. I should hate anyone to read it only through my reports. I should like to thank my colleagues at St. Edmund Hall for giving me leave for a term in 1970, and the authorities at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, forgiving me a visiting fellowship during that period. I had useful discussions with Dr. E. L. Burge, Mr. K. Lycos, Miss E. Reid while there and was enabled to do the greater part of what follows. I am grateful to Dr. Malcolm Brown for starting me thinking on lines that led to the present interpretation of peras and apeiron. I ain also indebted to Mr. M. J. Woods for a number of suggestions and criticisms and especially for prodding not too annoyingly until some minimum standard of clarity was achieved on the main theses. J. C. B. GOSLING vi CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ix TRANSLATION NOTES 73 GENERAL COMMENTARY 139 BIBLIOGRAPHY 229 ADDENDA 231 INDEX 233 INTRODUCTION The main theme of the dialogue seems clear enough. The question at issue at first is whether a life of pleasure or of intelligence is the good. lt is decided that a life combining both is best, and so the argument shifts to the question of whether intelligence or pleasure can take more credit for it. It is argued that intelligence is vital for the production of the right mixture and that various intellectual pursuits will have pride of place within the mixture. Pleasure comes low down in the scale, and so the dialogue ends, with the victory going to intelligence. This skeleton conceals a good many problems, however. The major ones can be roughly divided into three. First there are prob­ lems as to just how we are supposed to think of the contending parties-pleasure and intelligence. Secondly, there is a methodolo­ gical or metaphysical section where considerable play is made with two technical terms, peras and apeiron. We seem to be told that understanding the interplay of these two is the key to all our prob­ lems. In fact, they seem to create problems, as it is difficult to extract a coherent interpretation of either of the main sections where they occur, and even more difficultto devise an interpretation which either yields the same technical use of the terms in the two passages or makes it clear how Plato could have thought they were the same. Thirdly, there is a problem as to what the connection is supposed to be between the key to our problems and the problems it is to unlock. Obviously the answer to this cannot be independent of the answers to the previous two problems. lt may, of course, be that there is no answer. Perhaps Plato is hopelessly confused, or has put together a rag-bag of arguments and carelessly failed to note their mutual irrelevance. That is a possible conclusion, but it could only be established by showing that no more coherent interpretation is as plausible. I shall thereforeproceed on the assumption that the onus of proof is on the rag-bag theory and that the presumption is in favour of saying that Plato thought with some reason that the various parts were relevant to each other. That, ix INTRODUCTION however, is for the notes and commentary. For the present I shall take the main problem areas in turn, and try to indicate the main difficultieswithin them. 1. Pleasure and Intelligence At first sight the opposition between Socrates and Philebus seems clear enough. They are arguing about what sort of life a man should aspire to. Socrates holds that a life of sheer intellectual activity with­ out any tainting of pleasure is the ideal or at least preferable to Philebus' candidate. Philebus rejects this academic life and insists on a life of pleasure as everyone's aim. Yet how clear is it? It is tempting to interpret Philebus as holding that the actual (or proper?) way of deciding what to do is to ask what is most pleasurable. This is the only criterion usable by men or animals. Consequently, as that is the only goal found desirable, and as the goal is always pleasure, the ideal is obviously a life of nothing but pleasurable activities. Something of this sort seems to have been held by Eudoxus (cf. Aristotle Nico­ machean Ethics 1172b) who was influential in the Academy. Such a view, however, involves no antipathy to intelligence, only to pleasure­ less intelligent activity. It could well be held that intelligence is needed to ensure the most pleasant life possible and that some intellectual activities are pleasant or even among the most pleasant. Perhaps, then, the opposition should be seen as between an intel­ lectual life and a life of pleasure according to the common accept­ ation of that expression. After all, the name 'Philebus' seems to be an invention of Plato's, translatable as 'Love boy'. One would expect Mr. Loveboy to have sensual interests, and it is notable that at 12b Philebus' goddess is named Aphrodite, and in general he is portrayed as standing up for roughly physical pleasure. In that case the oppo­ sition is between an intellectual life and a life given to certain sorts of pleasure. If that is so, Socrates should not be opposed to pleasure simpliciter, nor Philebus to all forms of intelligence, but the former to a life devoted to certain pleasures, the latter to a life of intellectual activity not geared to the securing of such pleasures. But Socrates could praise the delights of the intellectual life, and Philebus allow of some intelligent activity. By 20e seq., however, the opposition is spoken of as though it were between a life that contained intellectual x INTRODUCTION activity only and no enjoyment, and a life of constant pleasure with­ out the power to remember, recognize, or anticipate one's pleasure, nor to work out means for its attainment. Philebus is by now portrayed as holding that the factthat a life is at all stages enjoyable, is a necessary, sufficient and, with regard to intelligence, exclusive condition of its being good, that 'good' and 'pleasant' are at least coextensive, if not synonymous.