Foreign Fighters in the 2020 Nagorno- Karabakh War: Dimension and Complexity

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FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN THE 2020 NAGORNO- KARABAKH WAR: DIMENSION AND COMPLEXITY

by Vali KALEJI

Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)

The COVID-19 pandemic: impact for the post-Soviet spaceVIENNA and Russia’s 2020 aspirations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 3

II. ARMENIAN AND WESTERN SOURCES: TURKEY’S ROLE IN DEPLOYING SYRIAN

FIGHTERS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH ...... 5

III. TURKISH AND AZERI SOURCES: ARMENIA’S ROLE IN DEPLOYING ASALA, YPG AND

PKK FIGHTERS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH ...... 12

IV. OFFICIAL POSITIONS ON SYRIAN FIGHTERS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH ...... 18

V. CONSEQUENCES ...... 38

VI. CONCLUSION ...... 42

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Vali Kaleji is an expert on Central Asia and Caucasian Studies in Tehran, Iran. His recent publications in Persian: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Goals, Functions and Perspectives (2010), South Caucasus as a Regional Security Complex, (2014), Political

Developments in the Republic of Armenia, 1988- 2013 (2014), Iran, Russia and China in

Central Asia, Cooperation and Conflict with US Foreign Policy in Central Asia, (2015), US

Foreign Policy in Central Asia: Process and Perspectives (2015) and Iran and the South

Caucasus Republics (2017). Publications in English: Current Trends and Tendencies in the

Political and Security Dimension of the North and South Caucasus: A View from Iran,

Vienna based Institute for Security Policy (ISP) (September 2020), “Expanding Armenia -

Israel Relations: Implications for Iran’s Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus”, The Central

Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI), American Foreign Policy Council (September 10, 2020),

Eight Principles of Iran’s Foreign Policy towards The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Valdai

Discussion Club, Moscow (October 9, 2020) and Nagorno-Karabakh: Transformation from an Ethnic-Territorial to Ethnic-Religious Conflict, The Russian International Affairs Council

(RIAC), Moscow (October 21, 2020), From Ceasefire to Peace: The Necessity for a Russia, Iran and Turkey Partnership in the Karabakh Peace Talks, Valdai Discussion Club, Moscow

(October 30, 2020) and “The Breakdown of the Status Quo and the International Dimension of the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis” written by Kerim Has (Turkey), Vali Kaleji (Iran) and Sergey

Markedonov (Russia) published by Valdai Club in Moscow on December 17, 2020.

E-mail address: [email protected]

I. INTRODUCTION

The Second Karabakh War (September 27 - November 9, 2020) was the latest escalation of an unresolved conflict over the region, which is internationally recognized as part of

Azerbaijan, but partially governed by the Republic of Artsakh, a breakaway state with an

Armenian ethnic majority. As a result of the war, territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh including Jabrayil, Fuzuli, Qubadli and Zangilan as well as a strategic town of Shusha (to

Azerbaijanis and Shushi to Armenians) were returned under Azerbaijani control. After six weeks of fierce fighting, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to end military operations in and around Nagorno-Karabakh in a ceasefire brokered by Russian President Vladimir Putin on

November 10, 2020.

According to the ceasefire, Armenia agreed to withdraw its troops from much of the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh including Lachin, Agdam and Kalbajar. The core of the enclave with ethnic Armenians and Stepanakert as its capital would remain outside the control of Azerbaijan. Baku will build a road linking the newly captured territories to

Nakhchivan, an autonomous republic of Azerbaijan which had been geographically separated from the mainland. As the broker of the truce, Russia would send some 2.000 peacekeepers to the region, which would patrol between the Azeri troops and Nagorno-

Karabakh, including the Lachin corridor, which connects the enclave with Armenia.1

Following the violent escalation of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the region has witnessed the various (and sometimes contradictory) widespread rumours of foreign fighters and volunteers including members of the Syria Free Army and Syrian Turkmens ostensibly

1 Stanly Johny, “Explained | Who won the war over Nagorno-Karabakh?”, The Hindu, November 18, 2020.

having been imported to the Karabakh conflict. Reputable international media organizations, foreign governments, and independent analysts are not the only sources who report Syrian mercenaries have been fighting for Azerbaijan. There also are videos circulating on social media that purportedly show Syrian fighters in the conflict.2

Also, the participation of foreign fighters in the Karabakh war was not new. From 1992 to

1994, thousands of foreign fighters mostly Chechens and Afghan mujahideen were fighting on the side of Azerbaijan in the first Nagorno- Karabakh war. Members of the Armenian diaspora have travelled to the South Caucasus, answering the call of Yerevan to defend the disputed land. However, engagement of foreign fighters in The Second Karabakh War

(September 27 - November 9, 2020) is very important, because the conflict escalated into a full-scale war and led to withdraw of Armenian troops from seven territories around

Nagorno-Karabakh as well as a strategic town of Shusha. The rivalry between Turkey and

Russia in Syria and Libya was another important factor. Turkey sent between 3.500 and

3.800 paid Syrian fighters to Libya in 2019 to fight on the side of the UN-supported government, which was likely to degrade security and generate backlash from the Libyan public.3 Therefore some experts believe that the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War was “third front of rivalry” between Turkey and Russia and the presence of foreign fighters in the war can be evaluated in this context. Indeed, Ankara and Baku accused Armenia of transferring

People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) fighters from Syria and Iraq to the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh to train militias.

The sum of these issues made this a challenging issue in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.

2 Ron Synovitz, “Are Syrian Mercenaries Helping Azerbaijan Fight For Nagorno-Karabakh?”, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, October 15, 2020. 3 “Turkey sent up to 3,800 fighters to Libya, Pentagon report says”, The National, July 18, 2020.

II. ARMENIAN AND WESTERN SOURCES: TURKEY’S ROLE

IN DEPLOYING SYRIAN FIGHTERS IN NAGORNO-

KARABAKH

The first reports about Syrian militants being sent to help Azerbaijan emerged in late

September. They came from correspondents for western news organizations like Reuters and the BBC, as well as British newspapers like The Guardian and The Independent, who tapped into sources they'd developed during years of covering Syria's war. 4 The main argument of western Sources was Turkey’s role in transferring Syrian fighters to Libya. They fight under the banners of three groups in the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army-Sultan

Murad Brigades, Suleiman Shah and Liwa Al-Muntasser bi Allah.

In this regard, Ankara has been accused of sending around 5.000 Syrian fighters to support the internationally recognized government in the Libyan civil war, according to a report released in June by the US Department of Defense. By sending in the Syrians and deploying its own troops, Turkey has increased its influence in negotiations over the outcome of the conflict in the oil-rich North African country. He also disagreed with Russia and some Arab states that support opponents of the UN-backed government in Tripoli. Moscow and

Ankara, which have also intervened on both sides of the conflict in Syria, each aspire to the role of regional broker and have used mercenaries to advance their objectives. However,

Turkey’s assertion over Nagorno-Karabakh was seen in Moscow as an intrusion into an area

4 Ron Synovitz, “Are Syrian Mercenaries Helping Azerbaijan Fight For Nagorno-Karabakh?”, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, October 15, 2020.

it saw as firmly within its sphere of influence.5 Based on this background and argument, western sources covered Turkey’s role in deployingSyrian fighters in the 2020 Nagorno-

Karabakh war.

The next day after the war began, on September 28, 2020, Reuters quoted two unidentified members of Turkish-backed rebel groups in northern Syria as saying they were being deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh. The two told the news agency that they expected to guard facilities, not to fight and that the deployment had been coordinated with Ankara. Both men said they had been told by their commanders in the Syrian National Army - an umbrella group of Syrian rebels backed by Turkey - that they would receive about 1.500,- USD per month for their services. "I didn't want to go, but I don't have any money," one of the fighters, who used to belong to the Turkish-backed rebel group Ahrar al-Sham, told Reuters. "Life is

5 Raja Abdulrahim, “Turkish-backed Syrian Fighters Join Armenian-Azeri Conflict”, The Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2020.

very hard and poor." The second source, who belonged to the Turkish-backed rebel group

Jaish al-Nukhba, said he had been told that 1.000 Syrians were to be deployed to Azerbaijan.6

The Times published a report on September 29, 2020, that Turkey is sending mercenaries to Azerbaijan after two days of clashes with the Armenian forces, raising fears that external powers such as Russia could be drawn into the conflict. These were Syrian mercenaries recruited by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government to assist the Azerbaijani military. Although no official data was provided by Ankara, press sources estimate several hundred, up to 1.200-1.500 fighters. They were offered approximately 1.500,- to 2.000,-

USD monthly, a huge salary compared to what they could earn in Syria. In any case, Baku officially denied the presence of Syrian fighters.7

The Guardian mentioned in its report on October 5, 2020, “Syrian rebel fighters have signed up to work for a private Turkish security company as border guards in Azerbaijan, several

6 “Turkey deploying Syrian fighters to help ally Azerbaijan, two fighters say”, Reuters, September 28, 2020. 7 Richard Spencer, “Nagorno-Karabakh clashes: Turkey sends Syrian mercenaries into combat against Armenians”, The Times, September 29, 2020.

volunteers in Syria’s last rebel stronghold have said, at a time when the long-running conflict between Baku and neighbouring Armenia is showing dangerous signs of escalation.

The potential deployment is a sign of Turkey’s growing appetite for projecting power abroad and opens the third theatre in its regional rivalry with Moscow. Ankara is already engaged in a volatile power struggle with Russia in the conflicts in Syria and Libya, and tensions could now spill over into Nagorno-Karabakh. The Guardian spoke to three men living in the last rebel-controlled corner of Syria, who said that almost a decade of war and grinding poverty had made them keen to register with militia leaders and brokers who promised work with a private Turkish security company overseas. They expect to travel over the border to Turkey before being flown to Azerbaijan.8

Foreign Policy stated on October 5, 2020, that 1.500 Turkish-backed Syrian fighters were deployed on the Azerbaijani side. The first fighters were transferred in late September to southern Turkey and then flown from Gaziantep to Ankara, before being transferred to

Azerbaijan on September 25, 2020. According to fighter accounts, SNA commanders arrived earlier to explore the region and coordinate with the Azerbaijani army about the distribution of troops.9

The Washington Post was writing on October 13, 2020, about the repatriation of the bodies of 52 Syrian fighters and reported the deployment of Syrian mercenaries as a fact. The newspaper mentioned: “Families gathered around a refrigerated truck at a Syrian-Turkish border post, waiting earlier this month for the drivers to dispense their awful cargo: the bodies of 52 Syrian men, killed in a war 600 miles away. The dead were mercenaries, recruited by Turkish-backed militias in Syria to fight on behalf of Azerbaijan against

8 Bethan McKernan, “Syrian rebel fighters prepare to deploy to Azerbaijan is a sign of Turkey’s ambition”, The Gurdian, October 5, 2020. 9 Liz Cookman, “Syrians Make Up Turkey’s Proxy Army in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Foreign Policy, October 5, 2020.

Armenia, relatives said. They were deployed as shock troops, to claw back scraps of territory in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.”.10

The Wall Street Journal reported on October 14, 2020, that “hundreds of fighters from Syrian militias allied with Turkey have joined the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, and hundreds more are preparing to go, according to two Syrians involved in the effort. After skirmishes first flared in Nagorno-

Karabakh in July, word spread among Syrian rebel factions that Turkey was enlisting fighters to go fight in the enclave, according to four people with direct knowledge of the sign-ups. A

Syrian rebel involved in deployments said fighters had been travelling there since mid-

September — before the latest round of clashes —in groups of up to 100 at a time. Another

Syrian with ties to the rebel groups also estimated hundreds had gone. Dozens have also returned, alarmed by the fierce fighting, that person said. The Syrian rebel, who has been charged with preparing spreadsheets of men enlisting to go to Nagorno-Karabakh, said many were lured by monthly salaries of up to 2.000 USD. “Going to Libya or to Azerbaijan has become a normal thing,” said the fighter, who added that he briefly considered signing up himself because he struggles to support his family. One Syrian who has long worked with the rebel groups and who has been in direct contact with two Syrian men fighting in

Azerbaijan said he has been told that casualties among the Syrian fighters are rising fast.

“They say it’s hell,” said the man, who added that as many as 200 have already asked to return. “Those who have gone there and not been killed or injured in some way are the exception. Some of the fighters already want to come back”.11

10 Kareem Fahim, Isabelle Khurshudyan and Zakaria Zakaria, “Deaths of Syrian mercenaries show how Turkey, Russia could get sucked into Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”, The Washington Post, October 14, 2020. 11 Raja Abdulrahim, “Turkish-backed Syrian Fighters Join Armenian-Azeri Conflict”, The Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2020.

IRAVABAN has published a report on October 22, 2020, entitled “Syrian mercenaries in

Nagorno-Karabakh: who they are, what they are doing there and where they were spotted”.

This report mentioned that “The Syrians who are fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh are fully or almost entirely recruited in northwestern Syria. In addition to local residents, there are many refugees (more precisely, internally displaced persons) from the areas of the country controlled by Damascus. These territories are fully or partially controlled by Turkish troops, which have been expanding their presence in Syria since 2016, including with the help of groups recruited from the Syrians. Back in July, when the previous exacerbation of the

Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict began (recall also that joint Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises were held in late July – early August ). According to IRAVABAN's report intermediaries began to appear in Afrin in early August, later starting to recruit fighters.12

The Arab News mentioned on December 2, 2020, “More than 2.580 Syrian combatants have been sent to back Baku in total, of whom 293 have died, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitoring group. “More than 900 fighters from pro-Ankara factions have returned to Syria in several waves,” the latest on November 27, Observatory head Rami

Abdel Rahman said. The rest of the fighters were expected home in the coming days.

Returning fighters went back to northern parts of war-torn Syria under control of pro-Turkey rebels, including Afrin, Jarabulus and Al-Bab, Abdel Rahman said.”.13

Finally, BBC noted on December 10, 2020, that “Turkey and Azerbaijan deny that Syrian mercenaries were used in the recent offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh but four Syrians have told the BBC that after enlisting for sentry duties in Azerbaijan, they were unexpectedly thrown into battle on the front line. It was back in August of this year that the rumours

12 “Syrian mercenaries in Nagorno-Karabakh: who they are, what they are doing there and where they were spotted”, IRAVABAN. Net, October 22, 2020. 13 “More than 900 Syrian fighters return home from Karabakh”, The Arab News, December 2, 2020.

started to circulate in rebel-held areas of northern Syria: there was well-paid work to be had overseas."I had a friend who told me that there is a very good job you can do, just to be at military checkpoints in Azerbaijan," one man told me. "They told us our mission would be to serve as sentries on the border - as peacekeepers. They were offering 2.000 USD a month!

It felt like a fortune for us," said another. Both applied for the job through Turkish-backed rebel factions that make up what's known as the Syrian National Army, a force in northern

Syria opposed to President Bashar al-Assad. In an area where few earn more than 1 USD a day, the promised salary seemed like a godsend. It's estimated that somewhere between

1.500 and 2.000 men signed up and travelled to Azerbaijan, via Turkey, on Turkish military transport aircraft.14

14 Ed Butler, “The Syrian mercenaries used as 'cannon fodder' in Nagorno-Karabakh”, BBC, on December 10, 2020.

III. TURKISH AND AZERI SOURCES: ARMENIA’S ROLE IN

DEPLOYING ASALA, YPG AND PKK FIGHTERS IN

NAGORNO-KARABAKH

In contrast to the Western media, Azeri and Turkish mass media rejected the western reports about Syrian militias in Nagorno-Karabakh war. Most Azerbaijanis view reports about Syrian fighters in their country as unproven. They dismiss the allegations as part of a disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting Azerbaijan. Baku-based human rights activist Anar Mammadli refuses to believe Sunni militants from the Turkish-backed SNA would join troops from predominantly Shi'ite Azerbaijan to fight a “war in Karabakh”. “There is no concrete fact about Turkey's military support except political support to Azerbaijan”,

Mammadli tweeted when such stories began to emerge. “By such manipulation at the expense of unconfirmed and unknown sources, they try to dress the conflict in religious clothes.”.15

Azerbaijani freelance journalist Seymur Kazimov told RFE/RL recently from the conflict zone that “rumours there are Syrians fighting on our side are untrue. There is no evidence”.

He said the “scandal” was started by one foreign journalist who “wrote an article based on one guy - no name, no pictures. Nothing. No one verified this”. “Even for me as a journalist, it's impossible to get this information”, Kazimov argued, claiming there hadn't been any killed or wounded Syria mercenaries on the Azerbaijani side. “Like, OK, guys. If you have some evidence, share it with us”, Kazimov said. “Nothing. Just gossip. It's not serious stuff”.

15 Ron Synovitz, “Are Syrian Mercenaries Helping Azerbaijan Fight For Nagorno-Karabakh?”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 15, 2020.

Instead, Azeri and Turkish mass media emphasized on presence of Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Kurdistan

Workers' Party (PKK) in the region. Azeri and Turkish mass media believed that the presence of ASALA members in Karabakh is related to travelling of Armenian diaspora to the region for supporting the Republic of Artsakh. Reuters in a report on October 9, 2020, mentioned that “the violence has prompted mass mobilisation across Armenia and seen its vast global diaspora spring into action. Armenians across the world have lobbied their governments for stronger support for Armenia in the conflict, while others have donated time and money to support the ethnic Armenian soldiers fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. Around 10.000 people volunteered to take up arms on the first day of fighting, according to the Armenian

Defence Ministry.16 Indeed, Turkish and Azeri sources believed that historical enmity of

Armenians and Kurds with Turkey has led to the presence of YPG and PKK forces in

Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time, there are very close relations between Armenia and the Kurdistan Region (KRI).

The Turkish and Azeri sources believed that the fighters followed several different routes to reach their destination, including using Iran as a transit country, reports said. One of the routes included the transfer of fighters from Iraq’s Sulaymaniyah to Sabis, then to

Kermanshah in Iran. Another group from Mount Qandil in Iraq also passed through Iran’s

Urmiya on their way to Nagorno-Karabakh. 17 Based on this background and argument,

Turkish and Azeri sources covered Armenia’s role in deploying ASALA, YPG and PKK fighters in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

16 Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, “Armenian diaspora rushes to Nagorno-Karabakh to back troops”, Reuters, October 9, 2020. 17 “Armenia transfers YPG/PKK terrorists to the occupied area to train militias against Azerbaijan”, Daily Sabah, September 25, 2020.

Daily Sabah, one of many pro-government newspapers in Turkey mentioned, on September

25, 2020, that many YPG/PKK fighters (whom Daily Sabah calls terrorists) who received training in Iraq and Syria were transferred to Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh region occupied by Armenia to train Armenian militias against Azerbaijan and ultimately open a new front against Turkey. The fighters are expected to provide training to Armenian militias on sabotage, raids and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), according to a report by Turkish daily Yeni Şafak, citing Azerbaijani media outlets. Earlier in September, Armenia proposed to establish a militia of volunteers following tensions with Azerbaijan in the Tovuz region.

The YPG/PKK fighters are expected to train these volunteers, reports said. Armenian

Ambassador to Iraq Hrachya Poladian reportedly contacted the YPG/PKK fighters in Syria and Iraq and convinced them to go to Nagorno-Karabakh for training. The ambassador also secured an agreement with northern Iraq's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which is led by the Talabani family, for the transfer of fighters from Iraq.18

18 “Armenia transfers YPG/PKK terrorists to the occupied area to train militias against Azerbaijan”, Daily Sabah, September 25, 2020.

Turkey-based Yeni Shafak newspaper reported on September 25, 2020, that “Yerevan, which settled Lebanese citizens of Armenian origin to Karabakh in order to change the demography in the region, dispatched dozens of PKK terrorists to the region in recent weeks," Yeni Shafak wrote: "The contact with the PKK terrorists in Syria and Iraq was established by Hrachya Poladian, the Armenian Ambassador to Baghdad. Poladian convinced the groups in meetings and agreed with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [party] under the control of the Talabani family in Northern Iraq for the transfer of terrorists from

Syria and Iraq to Karabakh.”.19

Azernews published a report on October 25, 2020, entitled “Names of foreign mercenaries fighting in Karabakh within Armenian army revealed”. This report mentioned that “after the outbreak of hostilities and the defeat of the Armenian armed forces inflicted on it by the

Azerbaijani army, the Armenian government accelerated the process of attracting foreign

19 Mushvig Mehdiye, “Armenia Deploys PKK Terrorists To Occupied Azerbaijani Lands”, Caspian News, September 26, 2020.

mercenaries and terrorists. Considering the serious losses of the Armenian army, this was to be expected. Armenia attracts foreign citizens to battles through its diaspora. For this, special flights are even organized. Armenia attracts mercenaries mainly from France,

Canada, Lebanon, Spain, Greece, and other countries. This is evidenced by foreign passports found on the mercenaries killed during the fighting. Thus, the passports of Greek citizen

Aren Osipov, Spanish citizen Armen Knyazyan, French citizen Arthur Hovhannisyan,

Canadian citizen Christopher Artin, Lebanese citizen Gevorg Hajiyan, Syrian citizen Stepan

Keshishyan and many other extremist mercenaries were found.”.20

Anadolu Agency that is a state-run news agency headquartered in Ankara, Turkey, reported on October 26, 2020, that Armenia has made YPG/PKK fighters brought to Upper Karabakh from Syria and Iraq wear Azerbaijani soldiers’ uniforms. Anadolu Agency refers to information obtained from intelligence sources, that the fighters are deployed in the city of

Shusha. Hikmet Hajiyev, an assistant to Azerbaijan’s president, had said Armenia deployed the YPG/PKK fighters to the front lines in Upper Karabakh. Armenian soldier Albert

Mikaelyan, who was taken prisoner in the operation launched by the Azerbaijani army to save its territories, also admitted that the fighters were in the Armenian ranks in Upper

Karabakh and said they are paid a salary of 600 USD.21

Azerbaijan State News Agency (AZERTAC) stated, on November 29, 2020, that the “PKK terrorists fought alongside the Armenian army in Nagorno-Karabakh, the terror group's senior member has confirmed, according to Anadolu Agency. Speaking to a terrorist- affiliated media outlet, Layika Gultekin, a senior member, said they took part in recent

Armenian attacks on Azerbaijan. We went to Nagorno-Karabakh to fight alongside

20 “Names of foreign mercenaries fighting in Karabakh within Armenian army revealed”, Azernews, October 25, 2020. 21 “Armenia making PKK terrorists wear Azerbaijani uniforms”, Anadolu Agency, October 26, 2020.

Armenian soldiers. We will always be with the Armenians whenever they wish us to be," she said. Turkish security officials believe the terror group expects to win Armenia's favour for its presence in northern Iraq.”.22

22 “PKK terrorists fought in Armenian ranks in Karabakh”, Azerbaijan State News Agency (AZERTAC), November 29, 2020.

IV. OFFICIAL POSITIONS ON SYRIAN FIGHTERS IN

NAGORNO-KARABAKH

In addition to western sources, the official positions of some countries were also very noteworthy. The composition and diversity of these countries are also interesting given their political positions.

Republic of Armenia

From the onset of the clashes, Armenia accused Turkey of sending mercenaries from northern Syria to fight alongside the Azeris. Indeed, Armenia rejected reports of Azeri and

Turkish sources about deploying ASALA, YPG and PKK fighters in Nagorno-Karabakh. In this regard, the official Government of Armenia Twitter account wrote that the country was engaged in a “clash of civilizations” and Nichol Pashinyan repeated it and told TIME on

October 2, 2020, that “Armenia and Karabakh have now become a civilizational front line”.

He accused Erdogan of sending between 1.500–2.000 "Syrian terrorists” to the region in support of Azerbaijan, a country with whom Turkey shares deep cultural and economic ties.23 Indeed, spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense told that Armenian forces were “the torchbearers of civilization fighting to the death against darkness and evil.”.24 Armenian officials refer to the “War of Civilizations” come back to Samuel Huntington that in his renowned work “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” has used the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Armenian-Azeri discrepancies as an example to

23 Joseph Hincks, “Armenia's Prime Minister Accuses Turkey of 'Reinstating the Ottoman Empire' in Sending Mercenaries to Nagorno Karabakh”, TIME, October 6, 2020. 24 Joshua Kucera, “Question of Syrian mercenaries takes over Armenia-Azerbaijan information war”, Eurasianet, October 1, 2020.

demonstrate the confrontation between the Christian and the Muslim world and evidence for the civilizational disputes.25

Armenia's ambassador to Moscow, Vardan Toganian, said on September 28, 2020, that

“Turkey had sent around 4.000 Syrian fighters to Azerbaijan, and that they were fighting in

Nagorno-Karabakh. The fighters were taking part in fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh, a region inside Azerbaijan that is run by ethnic Armenians.26 In an explicit reaction, Armenian Prime

Minister Nikol Pashinyan told the French newspaper, Le Figaro, on October 2, 2020, that

Turkey had "transported thousands of mercenaries and terrorists" to Azerbaijan from northern Syria. Pashinyan mentioned that “I am not even sure that Azerbaijan has any control over those terrorists fighting on their side. Our intelligence has witnessed that the mercenaries enter the stores in Azeri settlements and ban the sale of alcohol, saying that they are applying Sharia law over there.”.27 Indeed, Putin and Pashinyan, in a phone call, on

October 2, 2020, expressed serious concern in connection with incoming information about the involvement in hostilities of gunmen from illegal armed units from the Middle

East.28

Armenia’s foreign ministry said the Artsakh Defence Army, its name for the ethnic

Armenian forces in the internationally unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, had captured two Syrian combatants over the weekend, one from Idlib province and the other

25 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 26 “Armenian envoy says Turkey sent 4,000 Syrian fighters to Azerbaijan amid fighting – Ifax”, Reuters, September 28, 2020. 27 “The international community must intervene as swiftly as possible to prevent the spread of violence” – PM Pashinyan’s interview with Le Figaro, The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (official website), October 2, 2020. 28 “Putin, Pashinyan express concern over reports about militants in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Russian News Agency (TASS), October 2, 2020.

from Hama.29 Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said in a Facebook post that the involvement of “foreign mercenaries” was “a threat not only to the security of Nagorno-

Karabakh and Armenia but also to international security and this issue should become a subject of an international investigation.”.30

Also, speaking to RFE/RL's Armenian Service on September 30, Turkish studies specialist

Ruben Safrastian of Armenia's National Academy of Sciences said that he believes Turkey is responsible for sending up to 1.000 Syrian fighters to Azerbaijan so far. "It is clear to me that

Turkey is trying to create quite large groups of jihadists controlled by it for them to help their ally Azerbaijan", Safrastian said.31

Foreign Ministry of Armenia issued an official statement November 1, 2020, about foreign fighters in Karabakh that mentioned “on November 1, during the military actions the military units of the Artsakh Defense Army captured the second terrorist fighter involved by the Azerbaijani side in the military hostilities against Artsakh, who introduced himself as

Yusuf Alaabet al-Hajji, a resident of the village of Ziyadiya in the Jisr al-Shughur region of

Idlib province of Syria. It should be noted that another terrorist fighter was captured by the

Artsakh Defense Army earlier on October 30 introducing himself as Mehrab Muhammad

Al-Shkheir from the Syrian city of Hama. The Armenian side has repeatedly voiced out about the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters and jihadists by Turkey from various "hot spots" in the Middle East, particularly from Libya and the areas under its control in Syria, and their subsequent transfer and deployment to the region with the purpose of committing atrocities against the people of Artsakh. The above-mentioned fact is not merely confirmed

29 “UN says Nagorno-Karabakh attacks could be war crimes”, EURACTIV, November 3, 2020. 30 Ibid. 31 Michael Scollon, “Armenia, Azerbaijan in War Of Words Over Turkey's Alleged Deployment Of Syrian Rebels In Nagorno-Karabakh”, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 30, 2020.

by the intelligence services of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, a number of our partners and the international community, but also by the direct testimonies of the terrorists. 32 On the other hand, Lebanese Armenian MP Hagop Pakradounian said that

“Armenian political parties have no intention of sending young people (to Karabakh), there is no such organised action”.33 It seems that this position was a reaction by Armenia diaspora about the news of deploying ASALA in Karabakh.

Russian Federation

Russia has traditionally been seen as an ally of the Armenians. Over the last two decades, the

Kremlin has been under no illusions that, with a petrodollar-fuelled Azeri defence budget three times the size of Armenia's, the balance of power has been inexorably tilting towards

Azerbaijan. Moscow tried to pressure Armenia to accept a diplomatic settlement brokered by Russia, the USA and France, but the Armenian side refused to make concessions. This is why for years Russia has made it clear to the Armenian government that the military treaty between Yerevan and Moscow covers only the internationally recognised territory of

Armenia, and not Karabakh. When the Azeri onslaught began, Armenia was on its own.

When a democratic revolution in Armenia brought Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power in 2018, Yerevan's public stance on Nagorno-Karabakh became even tougher.34

As the war raged this autumn over Azerbaijan's breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, some Armenians expressed a sense of betrayal that long-standing ally Russia wasn't

32 “Statement by the Foreign Ministry of Armenia regarding the deployment of foreign terrorist fighters in the region by Turkey and Azerbaijan”, Ministery of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, November 1, 2020. 33 “Who are the foreign fighters in Nagorno-Karabakh?”, The Times of India, October 3, 2020. 34 Alexander Gabuev, “Viewpoint: Russia and Turkey - unlikely victors of Karabakh conflict”, BBC, November 12, 2020.

providing more support to ethnic Armenian fighters in the conflict. 35 Nevertheless, as political analyst Richard Giragosian told RFE/RL that many Armenians now viewed Russia as a "saviour" rather than a "scapegoat" to be blamed for the territorial losses of the Armenian forces.36

In spite of adopting this position that was in favour of Azerbaijan, Moscow supported

Armenia regarding sending mercenaries by Turkey from northern Syria to fight in

Karabakh. Therefore, Russia accused Turkey of sending “foreign terrorists and mercenaries” to the warzone and warned that if Nagorno-Karabakh falls, it could become an Islamist stronghold.37

The Russian Foreign Ministry announced on September 30, 2020, that according to

"information that is coming in, fighters from illegal armed formations are being sent to the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, including from Syria and Libya, to participate directly in the military action." In this regard, Russia called on the countries involved to prevent the use of "foreign terrorists and mercenaries" in the conflict. Without naming any particular nation, it called on governments to "take effective steps to prevent the use of terrorists and mercenaries in the conflict" and to "withdraw them from the region without delay.".38

In addition, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu raised the issue of Middle East fighters in a phone call with his Turkish counterpart, Hulusi Akar. And on Tuesday, Russia warned

35 Ron Synovitz, “Armenians See Russia As 'Savior' Not 'Scapegoat' In Nagorno-Karabakh War”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 24, 2020. 36 Ibid. 37 Matteo Pugliese, “The Role of Foreign Fighters in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Istituto pergli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), Italy, October 8, 2020. 38 Michael Scollon, “Armenia, Azerbaijan In War Of Words Over Turkey's Alleged Deployment Of Syrian Rebels In Nagorno-Karabakh”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 30, 2020.

of the possible “transfer of terrorist fighters” from the Middle East to Nagorno-Karabakh.39

Sergei Naryshkin, the head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), even warned on

October 6, 2020, that the conflict could turn the region into "a new launching pad for international terrorist organizations" to enter Russia and other nearby countries. He said the conflict was attracting people he described as mercenaries and terrorists from the Middle

East. "We are talking about hundreds and already even thousands of radicals hoping to earn money in a new Karabakh war," he said.40

Furthermore, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart

Mohammad Javad Zarif expressed concern over the potential involvement of Syrian and

Libyan fighters in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 41 The same position of Tehran and

Moscow against this issue was interesting because Iran and Russia clearly supported the return of the territories surrounding Karabakh to Azerbaijan.

Islamic Republic of Iran

The drastically upended situation along the southern edge of the South Caucasus has affected Iran in several complex ways. Among the three Great powers surrounding the region — Iran, Russia and Turkey — only Iran borders on the formerly Armenian-occupied

Azerbaijani territories of Zangilan, Jabrayil and Fuzuli, which adjoin Upper (“Nagorno)

Karabakh. These unique geographical realities have, thus, meant that Iran and its

39 Raja Abdulrahim, “Turkish-backed Syrian Fighters Join Armenian-Azeri Conflict”, The Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2020. 40 Nvard Hovhannisyan and Nailia Bagirova, “Russia warns that Nagorno-Karabakh could become Islamist militant stronghold”, Reuters, October 6, 2020. 41 “Russia, Iran concerned about the risk of foreign fighters in Nagorno-Karabakh: ministry”, Reuters, October 6, 2020.

northwestern frontiers have been profoundly impacted by the outcome of the 2020

Karabakh war.42

The major effect of the Second Karabakh War on Iran has been the emergence of novel perceived threats along the 138 km of border with Azerbaijan that is now again under Baku’s control. One of the persistent worries in Tehran relates to the various (and sometimes contradictory) widespread rumours of members of foreign fighters ostensibly having been imported to the Karabakh conflict. Under these circumstances, the Karabakh Conflict might lead to security threats from the terrorist and takfiri groups, whose anti-Shia and anti-

Iranian attitudes manifested in the Syrian Civil War. Therefore, in spite of Baku's position in returning occupied territories around Karabakh to Azerbaijan sovereignty, Tehran clearly opposed sending mercenaries by Turkey from northern Syria to fight in Karabakh.

In this regard, Iranian officials such as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President

Hassan Ruhani and Ali Akbar Velayati, the international relations advisor to the Supreme

Leader, foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and military commanders have warned against the danger of takfiri and jihadi groups on Iran’s border. Supreme Leader Ayatollah

Ali Khamenei declared that “terrorists should never think of approaching Iranian borders because if they do so they will be strongly dealt with”.43 This position by Supreme Leader was very important because he frankly mentioned that “all Azerbaijani territories occupied by

Armenia should be freed. All these lands should be given back to Azerbaijan. One of the main conditions is that these lands should be returned to Azerbaijan. The Republic of

Azerbaijan is entitled to be in control of its territory, and therefore, all of them should be

42 Vali Kaleji, “The 2020 Karabakh War’s Impact on the Northwestern Border of Iran”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation in Washington D.C. on December 18, 2020. 43 Yaghoub Fazeli, “Azerbaijani territories under Armenian control must be ‘liberated’: Iran’s Khamenei”, Al Arabiya English, November 3, 2020.

freed”. 44 After this position, Azerbaijan Foreign ministry in a statement appreciated

Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei's remarks on the importance of preserving Azerbaijan territorial integrity. 45 Therefore, opposition with foreign fighters in Karabakh by Supreme Leader showed that this issue as a threat for Iran’s national security is very important.

Indeed, President Hassan Rouhani said that “We fought terrorists in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq with the help of their people. It is unacceptable if certain people want to take terrorists from

Syria and other places to areas near the Iranian borders under different pretexts, and we have straightforwardly informed officials in both the Azerbaijan Republic and Armenia of our position in that regard.”.46 Furthermore, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif warned about the transfer of Daesh remnants to the Nagorno-Karabakh region and noted that: “the Islamic Republic will not tolerate the presence of Takfiri terrorists near its borders.

In recent talks and even before, we informed the officials of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as those of Russia and Turkey, that the Islamic Republic of Iran will not tolerate such a thing.

Currently, these terrorists are not present along our borders, but the probability that they will be present at a distance from our frontiers is still high, and we have declared this concern to both sides”.47

In reaction to this threat, Tehran tried to secure his borders and deployed troops along its border with Azerbaijan and Armenia in the country's northwest following stray fire from the

44 Ibid. 45 “We highly appreciate the statement made by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and the support given to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan," the statement reads. (Azerbaijan appreciates Iran Supreme Leader support for Azerbaijan territorial integrity, Islamic Republic News Agency- IRNA- November 4, 2020). 46 . “Rouhani warns against redeployment of terrorists to areas near Iran borders”, Pars Today, October 7, 2020. 47 “Zarif on Karabakh conflict: Iran won’t tolerate terrorists’ presence near borders”, Press TV, November 1, 2020.

Karabakh fighting. Iran's Army Ground Force launched a one-day military drill in the northwestern region of the country on October 9, 2020. The Chief Commander of the

Iranian Army, Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi attended the unannounced exercise.

The military exercise is held to enhance the preparedness of the army to counter possible threats against the country. The war game includes mechanized infantry and armoured units, drone squads, and artillery units. Also, Iran's Revolutionary Guards sent military reinforcements to its borders with Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan to protect its civilians from any projectiles coming from the conflict zone. The spokesman for the Iranian

Armed Forces, Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi, said in an interview with Persian- language Mizan news agency on November 7, 2020, “We demand the conflicting sides in

Karabakh that the Takfiris should not enter this region at all. Presence of Takfiri48 terrorists is unbearable to Iran and certainly, the Islamic Republic will not tolerate this presence at all.”.49 In general, these positions and reactions show that presence of foreign fighters in

Karabakh is a “red line” for Iran’ national security in the northwestern border.

Syria

Traditionally there is a close relation between Syria and Armenia. Thousands of Armenians still remain in Syria, mostly concentrated around ravaged Aleppo in the country’s north.

Syria’s Armenians are descendants of refugees who fled what is widely recognised as genocide at the hands of the Ottoman Empire a century ago. For many, the Syrian war evoked painful memories, all too reminiscent of the tales of their ancestors. 50 The

48 The term "takfiri" is used by Iranian authorities to refer to Sunni jihadists. A takfiri is a Muslim who commits takfir, i.e. accuses another Muslim of apostasy, potentially a cause of strife and violence in the Muslim community, since the sharia punishment for apostasy is death. 49 . “Armed Forces Spokesman: Iran Not to Tolerate Zionist Spy Bases, Takfiri Terrorists Near NW Borders”, Keyhan, Newspaper, November 7, 2020. 50 Ido Vock, “Why Armenia sides with Assad in Syria’s civil war”, Reaction, June 5, 2019.

differences between Syria and Armenia with Turkey were also very close to the relations between Yerevan and Damascus. That is why the Armenian government supported Bashar al-Assad in the civil war and sent a few dozen troops to support the Russian military mission in support of Bashar al-Assad. Furthermore, since early 2012, Armenia has been accepting diaspora members seeking to escape Syria’s civil strife. Over 15.000 Syrian Armenians fleeing the war in their country have been welcomed by the Armenian authorities who have given them citizenship and helped with their resettlement. Many who could not make it in the biggest Armenian cities have settled in neighbouring Nagorno-Karabakh, where they face difficult living conditions and the threat of a looming war.51 On the contrary, Syria recognized the Armenian Genocide in 2015, becoming the second Arab state after Lebanon to do so, which was perceived positively by Armenia and Armenians. Indeed, Syria has always supported Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in the last three decades.

Therefore, it’s not surprising that the Syrian government accused Turkey of transferring foreign fighters from Syria and Libya to the Republic of Azerbaijan. In this regard, Syrian

President Bashar al-Assad accused Turkish counterpart Tayyip Erdogan of being the main instigator in the deadliest fighting between Armenian and Azeri forces for more than 25 years. In an interview that is likely to exacerbate international frictions over the clashes in the South Caucasus region, Assad also said militants from Syria were being deployed to the conflict area. Syrian President told Russian news agency RIA: “He (Erdogan) was the main instigator and the initiator of the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”. 52 Reiterating accusations first levelled by French President Emmanuel

51 Reda El Mawy, “Why Armenia is welcoming Syrian Armenians”, BBC, April 23, 2015. 52 Nvard Hovhannisyan and Nailia Bagirova, “Syria's Assad blames Turkey for fighting between Azeris and Armenians”, Reuters, October 6, 2020.

Macron that Turkey has sent Syrian jihadists to fight in the conflict, Assad said: “Damascus can confirm this.”.53

France

France has always had close relations with Armenia. France has a large Armenian Diaspora, the third-largest in the world and the largest in the EU. France was also the first European country to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide in 2001 and in 2006, tensions mounted between France and Turkey after the French National Assembly voted in favour of a bill which makes Armenian Genocide denial illegal. Due to good relations between the two countries, 2006 was proclaimed the Year of Armenia in France. Also, France is a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, set up in 1992 to mediate a peaceful resolution over the disputed enclave. Armenia hosted a summit of the “Francophone Family” on October 11, 2018, that was another sign of close relations between Yerevan and Paris.

The Turkish-French relations have had many ups and downs in recent years. Tensions between Paris and Ankara is on the rise in major regional hotspots. In Libya, the two countries support different factions in the local civil war. In the eastern Mediterranean,

Paris' support for Athens over energy exploration also conflicts with Ankara. It is clear that

France wants to maintain unity within the EU and win the unanimity of member states on foreign issues. The country has also held joint military exercises with Greece in the eastern

Mediterranean Sea, covering the area of the Greek-Turkish conflict, namely the islands of

Kastellorizo. Although both France and Turkey are NATO members, it is difficult to resolve their differences within the framework of the organization. In general, the differences and conflicts between France and Turkey have become more complicated, as Ankara attempts

53 Ibid.

to become a major regional power and Paris tries to become a dominant player in the

Mediterranean region.54

The 2020 Karabakh war added to the tensions between Turkey and France. France accused

Turkey of “military involvement” on the side of Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia over the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region. French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told

Parliament that “the new aspect is that there is military involvement by Turkey which risks fuelling the internationalisation of the conflict.”.55

Indeed, French President Emmanuel Macron said that the Syrians from jihadist groups have transited through Gaziantep to reach Azerbaijan. According to Macron, intelligence reports indicate 300 fighters drawn from “jihadist groups” from the Syrian city of Aleppo have passed through Gaziantep in Turkey en route for Azerbaijan. “These fighters are known, tracked and identified”, he said. French President also told reporters at the EU summit in

Brussels on October 1, 2020, that “we now have information which indicates that Syrian fighters from jihadist groups have [transited] through Gaziantep [in southeastern Turkey] to reach the Nagorno-Karabakh theatre of operations. It is a very serious new fact which changes the situation.”.56

Furthermore, Macron’s office said in a statement he had discussed the issue as part of efforts to reach a ceasefire with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a telephone call. In this regard, Macron told that “I can announce that more than 300 Syrian Islamist militants, who had earlier left the Aleppo region, have been transferred to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict

54 He Zhigao, “France-Turkey disputes roiling European and Mediterranean affairs”, The Global Times, October 28, 2020. 55 Ibid. 56 John Irish and Michel Rose, “France accuses Turkey of sending Syrian jihadists to Nagorno-Karabakh”, Reuters, October 1, 2020.

zone through the Turkish Gaziantep. This is a confirmed fact, these people are identified, and all of them are affiliated with the Islamic State terrorist organization. I have discussed this issue with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who confirmed that Russia also possesses this information.”. 57 Although neither Macron nor the French government provided evidence to support the accusation about the mercenaries and the Kremlin made no mention of the accusation.58

In addition, Jean-Baptiste Lemoyne, a secretary of state at the French foreign ministry, at the end of his two-day visit to Yerevan told that “France expects concrete actions from Turkey so that Turkey removes the mercenaries from the region. Paris is going to discuss with its

European partners sanctions against Turkey.”.59 Therefore, the unfolding of hostilities in

Nagorno-Karabakh has increased Paris’s interest in the prospects of settling the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan considerably. However, it is worth noting the categorical and tough statements made by President Emmanuel Macron and French diplomats as compared to the more reserved statements by Russian and US officials.60

Official Positions of the Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan

Contrary to the positions of countries such as Armenia, Russia, Iran, Syria and France,

Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan denied the presence of Syrians in Nagorno-Karabakh and it was considered as propaganda and hostile acts against themself. In contrast, Ankara and Baku emphasised on roles of Armenian government and organisations of the Armenian diaspora in deploying ASALA, YPG and PKK fighters in the region. In this regard, they

57 “France: Turkey Has Sent 300 ISIS Fighters to Azerbaijan”, Homeland Security, October 5, 2020. 58 Ibid. 59 “France Urges Turkey to Remove ‘Mercenaries’ From Karabakh”, Asbarez, November 30, 2020. 60 Kerim Has, Vali Kaleji and Sergey Markedonov, “The Breakdown of the Status Quo and the International Dimension of the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis”, Valdai Club Discussion, Moscow, December 17, 2020, p. 26.

mentioned the records of this subject in the first Karabakh war (1988-1994) and settlement of Syrian Armenians in Yerevan and Nagorno-Karabakh since 2012.

The Republic of Azerbaijan

At the beginning of the 2020 Karabakh War, Baku has denied the presence of Syrians in

Nagorno-Karabakh and has called the reports “fake news”. In fact, most Azerbaijanis also view reports about Syrian fighters in their country as unproven. They dismiss the allegations as part of a disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Baku has accused Armenia of deploying Armenian diaspora and Iraqi Kurdish militants to the area.

President Ilham Aliyev swiftly denied the reports. He clearly mentioned this issue in the

Statement at the General Debate of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September 2020: “Armenia recruits and uses mercenaries and terrorists from different countries against Azerbaijan. Armenia is a state sponsoring terrorism. Armenia committed more than 30 terror acts in Azerbaijan. We have credible information about the presence of Armenian ASALA terror organization on the occupied territories. Armenian terrorists have killed 24 Turkish diplomats. Varuzhan Karapetian, member of ASALA terror organization who committed a terror act killing many people of different nationalities, in the airport Orly in Paris later was extradited to Armenia and then pardoned by the president of Armenia. This terrorist was treated as a hero in Armenia.”.61

Indeed, Hikmat Hajiyev, foreign policy advisor to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on September 29, 2020, calling the reports of Syrian fighters in Azerbaijan as “absolutely

61 “Statement by H.E. Mr Ilham Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan at the General Debate of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly”, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United Nations, September 24, 2020.

baseless” and dismissing them as “propaganda and fake news from Armenia”. “Why should

Azerbaijan bring others to its sovereign soil?” he asked, denying any military support from its close ally Turkey.62 He said in another position that “rumours of militants from Syria allegedly being redeployed to Azerbaijan are another provocation by the Armenian side and complete nonsense.”.63

In another news conference, Hikmet Hajiyev noted that “there is yet another disinformation piece against Azerbaijan. We completely reject it, Azerbaijan doesn't need any foreign affairs aid, because we have professional armed forces and we also have enough reserve forces”.

Indeed, Hajiyev believed that Armenians from the diaspora have been deployed in

Karabakh. He said that “Armenians from Syria and Lebanon are being deployed to Armenia and they are in the ranks of the Armenian armed forces fighting against Azerbaijan.”.64

In addition, Azerbaijan's foreign ministry said in the statement that “ethnic Armenians from

Syria, Lebanon, Russia, Georgia, Greece and the United Arab Emirates had been deployed or were on their way to operate as foreign terrorist fighters on the ethnic Armenian side.

Armenia and Armenian diaspora organizations bear international legal liability for organizing these terrorist activities.”.65

Turkey

For Turkey, the war in Karabakh was a showcase for Ankara's growing role in the strategically important South Caucasus. But at the same time, Turkey's interferences in Syria, Libya and

Eastern Mediterranean caused a new confrontation between Turkey with the West and

62 Michael Scollon, “Armenia, Azerbaijan in War of Words Over Turkey's Alleged Deployment of Syrian Rebels In Nagorno-Karabakh”, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 30, 2020. 63 “Who Are The Foreign Fighters In Nagorno-Karabakh?”, Barron’s, October 2, 2020. 64 Ibid. 65 “Azerbaijan claims advances in Karabakh, Armenia vows historic struggle”, France 24, October 3, 2020.

Russia. Therefore, these countries accused Turkey to transfer and deploy foreign fighters from Syria and Libya to the Republic of Azerbaijan and Karabakh. Ankara did not immediately respond but has described similar accusations as part of attempts by Armenia to create “dark propaganda” about Turkey.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, speaking to members of his political party, denied that Turkey was sending Syrian fighters to the war. “They have work in their own land. They won’t go there,” he said, adding that Turkey was “ready to give all kinds of support to our

[Azerbaijani] brothers and sisters, and we will do so again.”.66 Indeed, a Turkish defence ministry source said that “We strongly reject such claims. Our support consists of military advice and training of Azerbaijan’s armed forces. The Turkish ministry of defence does not deal with recruiting or transferring militiamen anywhere in the world.”. 67 Furthermore,

Turkey’s Foreign Ministry Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said that accusations it was involved in sending

Syrian fighters to the Caucasus were “baseless”.68 Turkish European Union Affairs Minister

Omer Celik also called such reports "lies" spread by Armenia to cover up their own hostility and to try to create an umbrella of dark propaganda over Turkey.69

In parallel with the denial of this accusation, Turkey accused Armenia of deploying

Armenian diaspora and Iraqi Kurdish militants in Karabakh. In this regard, the Defense

Ministry of Turkey has urged “the Kurdish PKK terror group and its Syrian wing YPG, who collaborate with the Armenian Army in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region of

66 Anealla Safdar and Usaid Siddiqui, “Turkey denies sending Syrian fighters: Nagorno-Karabakh live news”. Aljazeera, October 14, 2020. 67 Bethan McKernan, “Syrian rebel fighters prepare to deploy to Azerbaijan in sign of Turkey’s ambition”, The Guardian, September 28, 2020. 68 Michael Scollon, “Armenia, Azerbaijan in War of Words Over Turkey's Alleged Deployment of Syrian Rebels In Nagorno-Karabakh”, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 30, 2020. 69 Ron Synovitz, “Are Syrian Mercenaries Helping Azerbaijan Fight For Nagorno-Karabakh?”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 15, 2020.

Azerbaijan, to leave the region immediately.”. 70 Indeed, the Turkish defence ministry’s spokeswoman Nadide Sebnem Aktop told reporters on October 4, 2020, that “PKK/YPG terrorists collaborating with Armenian terrorists who target innocent civilians must leave the region immediately, otherwise, as always, they will be once again disappointed.”.71

Neutral Positions

In addition to the reciprocal positions and accusations mentioned, neutral positions were taken by the United Nations and the Minsk Group. The report of UN High Commissioner for

Human Rights (OHCHR) mentions to names all three countries including Armenia,

Azerbaijan and Turkey in deploying foreign mercenaries in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. But in taking the position of the Minsk Group, there are no mention names of foreign countries or terrorist groups.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is a department of the Secretariat of the United Nations that works to promote and protect the human rights that are guaranteed under international law and stipulated in the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The Headquarters of the office is in Geneva and New

York. OHCHR office in Geneva issued a statement entitled “Mercenaries in and around the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone must be withdrawn” on November 11, 2020.72

70 Orkhan Jalilov, “Turkey Urges Kurdish Terrorists Collaborating With Armenia To Leave Occupied Nagorno- Karabakh Region”, Caspian News, October 7, 2020. 71 Ibid. 72 “Mercenaries in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone must be withdrawn – UN experts”, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Geneva, November 11, 2020.

The statement can be divided into two parts. In the first part, the statement mentioned to

Turkey and Azerbaijan’s role in deporting foreign fighters in Karabakh: “UN human rights experts noted the agreement reached on 9 November to put an end to hostilities in the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and hope that it will lead to sustained peace in the region. They are nonetheless concerned by the use of mercenaries in and around the conflict zone until this agreement was reached, and expressed alarm at the devastating consequences for the civilian population, with little prospects of accountability. The UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries said there were widespread reports that the Government of Azerbaijan, with Turkey’s assistance, relied on Syrian fighters to shore-up and sustain its military operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, including on the frontline. The fighters appeared to be motivated primarily by private gain, given the dire economic situation in the

Syrian Arab Republic, the UN experts said. In case of death, their relatives were reportedly promised financial compensation and Turkish nationality. Moreover, reports indicate that

Turkey engaged in large-scale recruitment and transfer of Syrian men to Azerbaijan through armed factions, some of which are affiliated with the Syrian National Army. “The alleged role of Turkey is all the more concerning given the similar allegations addressed earlier this year by the Working Group in relation to its role in recruiting, deploying and financing such fighters to take part in the conflict in Libya,” Kwaja added. In this context, it is even more worrisome that the Syrian fighters deployed to Azerbaijan are allegedly affiliated with armed groups and individuals that, in some cases, have been accused of war crimes and serious human rights abuses during the conflict in Syria, thus seemingly perpetuating a cycle of impunity and risking further abuses of international law. 73 In the second part of the statement mentioned to Armenia’s role in deporting foreign fighters in Karabakh: “The

Working Group also received reports indicating that Armenia has been involved in the

73 Ibid.

deployment of foreign nationals to fight in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The experts are looking into these reports to ascertain possible links to mercenary-related activities, such as the context in which these actors operate and their possible motivations. The Working

Group will continue to monitor any use of mercenary-related actors by the sides.”.74

In reaction to the statement of OHCHR, the Turkish Foreign Ministry Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu stated that “The United Nations Human Rights Council’s “baseless claims” on the use of

Syrian fighters in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia are completely disconnected from reality and damage the organization’s credibility. The reason why this fake news was circulating is Armenia’s effort to create the perception that it is allegedly a 'victim country fighting against international terrorism' and to divert attention from its illegal occupation,” the ministry said in a written statement. It was proven that

Armenia recorded members of the Syrian National Army and published this as alleged evidence on the internet. These fake videos and words of persons who were made to speak in return for money have neither credibility nor validity, it added. The ministry said that the report indicating that Armenia used foreign fighters in the conflict was a positive step though insufficient.75

Minsk Group

The OSCE Minsk Group - co-chaired by France, Russia and the US - was formed in 1992 to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, but to no avail. A cease-fire, however, was agreed upon in 1994. Although Minsk Group was silent about the presence of foreign fighters in

Karabakh, in Joint Statement by the heads of delegation of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair

74 “Mercenaries in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone must be withdrawn – UN experts”, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Geneva, November 11, 2020. 75 “Turkey: UN statement on mercenaries in Karabakh conflict 'damages body’s credibility'”, Daily Sabah, November 13, 2020.

countries (Russia, France and the United States) on December 3, 2020,76 clearly “call for the full and prompt departure from the region of all foreign mercenaries, and call upon all parties to facilitate this departure.”.77 As is clear from the text of the statement, there is no mention of the name of a specific group or country. The emphasis of Minsk Group on “all foreign mercenaries” and “all parties” shows that they do not want to get into a challenging topic after the ceasefire agreement of the Nagorno-Karabakh on November 10, 2020.

76 The Heads of Delegation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries – Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, Deputy Secretary of State of the United States Stephen E. Biegun, and Minister for European and Foreign Affairs of France Jean-Yves Le Drian - welcome the cessation of military activities in the area of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in accordance with the statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, and President of the Russian Federation from November 9, 2020. 77 “Joint Statement by the Heads of Delegation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries”, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), December 3, 2020.

V. CONSEQUENCES

Despite the ambiguities about the presence of foreign fighters in the 2020 Nagorno-

Karabakh war, its consequences are very important. It can change the shape and nature of the conflict. In summary, we can mention some important consequences of the presence of foreign fighters:

1. Conflict Becoming Complicated

The presence of foreign fighters who are outside the geography and history of the South

Caucasus can lead to complication of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It can take this conflict out of the state of war between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the involvement of various militant groups will further complicate the crisis and create similar conditions like in Iraq,

Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan. The presence of foreign fighters will make it difficult to maintain a ceasefire in the contact lines of the Nagorno-Karabakh and it will definitely have a negative impact on the prospect of establishing peace in the region in the future.

2. Internationalization of the Conflict

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a “local dispute” from 1988 to 1991. In the second stage, the conflict was a “regional dispute” from 1991-1994. Therefore, the presence of foreign fighters from various countries like Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya and other countries in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war can change the conflict to an “international dispute”. The “internationalization of the conflict” is a great threat for the security arrangements in the South Caucasus and it will make resolving the conflict more difficult.

3. Transformation of an Ethnic-Territorial to Ethnic-Religious Conflict

In his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order”, Samuel

Huntington used the example of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to demonstrate the conflict between the Christians and Muslims and civilizational clashes. When Huntington was writing his book in the 1990s, Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan were fighting over

Nagorno-Karabakh. The American thinker cited this conflict, together with the Balkan conflict to illustrate the transition of world order and regime changes after the Cold War.

However, contrary to Huntington’s belief, conflicts and wars in the Caucasus, including those in Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are more of ethnical than religious nature. In resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, elites of different ethnic groups have made numerous efforts to mobilize the masses by bringing up religious sentiments. However, the ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azeris has always been more troublesome than the religious dispute between Christians and Muslims.

However, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of the last decade and the recent military encounter between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan of this year are different from conflicts in the early 1990s. One of the reasons is the rise of extremist groups in the 21st century. The crises in Syria and Iraq and the presence of Salafi, Takfiri and Wahhabi forces in the past decade has brought extremist groups such as the Al-Nosra Front and ISIS in Syria and Iraq to the Caucasus region. The belief system and apparatus of these extremist groups are closely connected to the religious beliefs in the North Caucasus (Chechnya, Ingush and

Dagestan), especially in the Islamic Emirate of Caucasus. Because of their belief system, the

Caucasian members of the Salafi and jihadi groups have become the third most killed group in the Syrian Civil War, after Saudi Arabian and Egyptian citizens. One decade after the eruption of Syria and Iraq crises, the Salafi and jihadi groups, mainly ISIS and Al-Nosra Front, have lost the majority of their controlled territories. Their losses have left them with three new choices to rebuild their military basis and continue their activities: Afghanistan, Yemen

and Libya. Given the tensions in the Caucasus and between Armenia and the Republic of

Azerbaijan, it turns out that the Caucasus has attracted the attention of the Salafi and Jihadi groups and might become their next military base after Afghanistan, Yemen and Libya. The issue has become urgent under the conditions of intensified Turkey-Russia rivalries in Syria and Libya. As a result, the involvement of the Syria Free Army and Syrian Turkmens in the territorial conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh has further complicated the regional conflict, for many people fear that the presence of Jihadis and Takfiris may cause an ethnoreligious dispute in the region.

It should be noted that in comparison with the primary principles of Islam, the concept of jihadism in the Salafi and takfiri thoughts is more than a secondary jurisprudential decree.

Takfiris believe that assassinating enemies of Allah is essential to the creation of an Islamic government. Another feature of jihadism is its instrumentalization. Contrary to Sunni jurisprudence that only the ulama can grant permission for jihadism, the takfiri jihad movement has promoted Jihadism and made it an effective tool to fight against their enemies. The Jihadi leaders who are lack of competence and academic degree for becoming traditional ulamas see themselves entitled to Jihadism. They believe that Jihad is an obligatory affair overlooked by Muslims. For example, Abdullah Azzam, a Salafi scholar and a jihadi leader in Afghanistan who is known as the intellectual father of al-Qaida, underlines that Muslims have a wrong understanding of Jihadism. Contrary to Muslims who believe that Jihadism is a religious guide for them to serve God in daily life, such as delivering sermons and helping the family and parents, Azzam believes that the only meaning of

Jihadism is to fight. Azzam’s definition of Jihad allows power-thirsty religious leaders to take advantage of the religious interests among Muslim youths to realize their political goals.

With such extended and superficial understanding from the concept of jihadism, the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict goes beyond the ethnic-territorial dispute between Azeris and

Armenians, for religious disputes in the region would ultimately lead to the “Kishmirization of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”. With the addition of religious conflicts, more violence and human casualties would occur, and the prospects for durable peace in the region would be bleaker than before in the area. Although thousands of people have lost their lives in the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and in bitter incidences such as the massacres in Khojaly and

Sumgait in the past three decades, the Caucasus has never seen the crimes as violent as the ones committed in Syria and Iraq against the Izadi and Kurdish minorities.

Another important point is that if jihadists fight against Christian Armenians and non-

Muslims, the Shia populations of the Republic of Azerbaijan will be accused of takfir and apostasy. The bitter experiences of Afghan, Syrian and Iraqi Muslims have indicated that the accusation of paganism and apostasy by the extremist groups will provoke Muslim extremism in Shias. Among the extremist groups, Salafi and Takfiri accuse Muslims of takfir and execute them without asking for permission from the Sunni Ulamas. Therefore, the presence of the Salafi and Jihadi groups would be a Damocles Sword which threatens the

Shia society of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the long run. In turn, countries in the region, such as Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan, have become particularly aware of such threats.78

78 Vali Kaleji, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Transformation from an Ethnic-Territorial to Ethnic-Religious Conflict”, The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Moscow, October 21, 2020.

VI. CONCLUSION

An Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation is nothing new in international politics. However, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war was covered extensively by the mass media. Presence of foreign fighters in the 2020 Karabakh war was one of the main topics of mass media. In addition, various countries have taken a stand in this regard which is very noteworthy due to their different political positions. Armenia, Iran, Russia, France and Syria accuses Turkey and Azerbaijan of deploying foreign fighters including Turkey-backed Syrian National

Army- Sultan Murad Brigades, Suleiman Shah and Liwa Al-Muntasser bi Allah in Karabakh.

In contrast, Baku and Ankara accuse Armenia of deploying foreign forces including

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), People’s Protection Units

(YPG) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the region.

Although three countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey rejected the accusations, UN

High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Misk group show that this is a serious issue and that there are concerns at the international level. Consequences of foreign fighters in the Nagorno-Karabakh are very important. The Karabakh conflict can be complicated, it can change the conflict from a “regional dispute” to an “international dispute” and transform the nature of the conflict from an ethnic-territorial to ethnic-religious conflict that will make it difficult to maintain a ceasefire in the contact lines of the Nagorno-Karabakh and it will definitely have a negative impact on the prospect of establishing peace in the region in the future. There is no doubt that accurate proof of the dimensions and extent of the presence of foreign fighters in Karabakh requires independent investigations that can be able to evaluate this issue based on documented and accurate evidence.