INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY POLICY (ISP) WORKING PAPER FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN THE 2020 NAGORNO- KARABAKH WAR: DIMENSION AND COMPLEXITY by Vali KALEJI Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) The COVID-19 pandemic: impact for the post-Soviet spaceVIENNA and Russia’s 2020 aspirations TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 3 II. ARMENIAN AND WESTERN SOURCES: TURKEY’S ROLE IN DEPLOYING SYRIAN FIGHTERS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH ................................................................................... 5 III. TURKISH AND AZERI SOURCES: ARMENIA’S ROLE IN DEPLOYING ASALA, YPG AND PKK FIGHTERS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH .......................................................................... 12 IV. OFFICIAL POSITIONS ON SYRIAN FIGHTERS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH .................. 18 V. CONSEQUENCES ............................................................................................................ 38 VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 42 1 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Vali Kaleji is an expert on Central Asia and Caucasian Studies in Tehran, Iran. His recent publications in Persian: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Goals, Functions and Perspectives (2010), South Caucasus as a Regional Security Complex, (2014), Political Developments in the Republic of Armenia, 1988- 2013 (2014), Iran, Russia and China in Central Asia, Cooperation and Conflict with US Foreign Policy in Central Asia, (2015), US Foreign Policy in Central Asia: Process and Perspectives (2015) and Iran and the South Caucasus Republics (2017). Publications in English: Current Trends and Tendencies in the Political and Security Dimension of the North and South Caucasus: A View from Iran, Vienna based Institute for Security Policy (ISP) (September 2020), “Expanding Armenia - Israel Relations: Implications for Iran’s Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus”, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI), American Foreign Policy Council (September 10, 2020), Eight Principles of Iran’s Foreign Policy towards The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Valdai Discussion Club, Moscow (October 9, 2020) and Nagorno-Karabakh: Transformation from an Ethnic-Territorial to Ethnic-Religious Conflict, The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Moscow (October 21, 2020), From Ceasefire to Peace: The Necessity for a Russia, Iran and Turkey Partnership in the Karabakh Peace Talks, Valdai Discussion Club, Moscow (October 30, 2020) and “The Breakdown of the Status Quo and the International Dimension of the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis” written by Kerim Has (Turkey), Vali Kaleji (Iran) and Sergey Markedonov (Russia) published by Valdai Club in Moscow on December 17, 2020. E-mail address: [email protected] 2 I. INTRODUCTION The Second Karabakh War (September 27 - November 9, 2020) was the latest escalation of an unresolved conflict over the region, which is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but partially governed by the Republic of Artsakh, a breakaway state with an Armenian ethnic majority. As a result of the war, territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh including Jabrayil, Fuzuli, Qubadli and Zangilan as well as a strategic town of Shusha (to Azerbaijanis and Shushi to Armenians) were returned under Azerbaijani control. After six weeks of fierce fighting, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to end military operations in and around Nagorno-Karabakh in a ceasefire brokered by Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 10, 2020. According to the ceasefire, Armenia agreed to withdraw its troops from much of the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh including Lachin, Agdam and Kalbajar. The core of the enclave with ethnic Armenians and Stepanakert as its capital would remain outside the control of Azerbaijan. Baku will build a road linking the newly captured territories to Nakhchivan, an autonomous republic of Azerbaijan which had been geographically separated from the mainland. As the broker of the truce, Russia would send some 2.000 peacekeepers to the region, which would patrol between the Azeri troops and Nagorno- Karabakh, including the Lachin corridor, which connects the enclave with Armenia.1 Following the violent escalation of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the region has witnessed the various (and sometimes contradictory) widespread rumours of foreign fighters and volunteers including members of the Syria Free Army and Syrian Turkmens ostensibly 1 Stanly Johny, “Explained | Who won the war over Nagorno-Karabakh?”, The Hindu, November 18, 2020. 3 having been imported to the Karabakh conflict. Reputable international media organizations, foreign governments, and independent analysts are not the only sources who report Syrian mercenaries have been fighting for Azerbaijan. There also are videos circulating on social media that purportedly show Syrian fighters in the conflict.2 Also, the participation of foreign fighters in the Karabakh war was not new. From 1992 to 1994, thousands of foreign fighters mostly Chechens and Afghan mujahideen were fighting on the side of Azerbaijan in the first Nagorno- Karabakh war. Members of the Armenian diaspora have travelled to the South Caucasus, answering the call of Yerevan to defend the disputed land. However, engagement of foreign fighters in The Second Karabakh War (September 27 - November 9, 2020) is very important, because the conflict escalated into a full-scale war and led to withdraw of Armenian troops from seven territories around Nagorno-Karabakh as well as a strategic town of Shusha. The rivalry between Turkey and Russia in Syria and Libya was another important factor. Turkey sent between 3.500 and 3.800 paid Syrian fighters to Libya in 2019 to fight on the side of the UN-supported government, which was likely to degrade security and generate backlash from the Libyan public.3 Therefore some experts believe that the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War was “third front of rivalry” between Turkey and Russia and the presence of foreign fighters in the war can be evaluated in this context. Indeed, Ankara and Baku accused Armenia of transferring People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) fighters from Syria and Iraq to the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh to train militias. The sum of these issues made this a challenging issue in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. 2 Ron Synovitz, “Are Syrian Mercenaries Helping Azerbaijan Fight For Nagorno-Karabakh?”, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, October 15, 2020. 3 “Turkey sent up to 3,800 fighters to Libya, Pentagon report says”, The National, July 18, 2020. 4 II. ARMENIAN AND WESTERN SOURCES: TURKEY’S ROLE IN DEPLOYING SYRIAN FIGHTERS IN NAGORNO- KARABAKH The first reports about Syrian militants being sent to help Azerbaijan emerged in late September. They came from correspondents for western news organizations like Reuters and the BBC, as well as British newspapers like The Guardian and The Independent, who tapped into sources they'd developed during years of covering Syria's war. 4 The main argument of western Sources was Turkey’s role in transferring Syrian fighters to Libya. They fight under the banners of three groups in the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army-Sultan Murad Brigades, Suleiman Shah and Liwa Al-Muntasser bi Allah. In this regard, Ankara has been accused of sending around 5.000 Syrian fighters to support the internationally recognized government in the Libyan civil war, according to a report released in June by the US Department of Defense. By sending in the Syrians and deploying its own troops, Turkey has increased its influence in negotiations over the outcome of the conflict in the oil-rich North African country. He also disagreed with Russia and some Arab states that support opponents of the UN-backed government in Tripoli. Moscow and Ankara, which have also intervened on both sides of the conflict in Syria, each aspire to the role of regional broker and have used mercenaries to advance their objectives. However, Turkey’s assertion over Nagorno-Karabakh was seen in Moscow as an intrusion into an area 4 Ron Synovitz, “Are Syrian Mercenaries Helping Azerbaijan Fight For Nagorno-Karabakh?”, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, October 15, 2020. 5 it saw as firmly within its sphere of influence.5 Based on this background and argument, western sources covered Turkey’s role in deployingSyrian fighters in the 2020 Nagorno- Karabakh war. The next day after the war began, on September 28, 2020, Reuters quoted two unidentified members of Turkish-backed rebel groups in northern Syria as saying they were being deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh. The two told the news agency that they expected to guard facilities, not to fight and that the deployment had been coordinated with Ankara. Both men said they had been told by their commanders in the Syrian National Army - an umbrella group of Syrian rebels backed by Turkey - that they would receive about 1.500,- USD per month for their services. "I didn't want to go, but I don't have any money," one of the fighters, who used to belong to the Turkish-backed rebel group Ahrar al-Sham, told Reuters. "Life is 5 Raja Abdulrahim, “Turkish-backed Syrian Fighters Join Armenian-Azeri Conflict”, The Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2020. 6 very hard and poor." The second source, who belonged to the Turkish-backed rebel group Jaish al-Nukhba, said he had been told that 1.000 Syrians were to be deployed to Azerbaijan.6 The Times published a report on September 29, 2020, that Turkey