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A Abrogation, Principle Of, 18, 140–143 Mecca, 140, 141 Medina, 140 Index A Al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 41, 42, 45, 145, Abrogation, Principle of, 18, 140–143 291, 295 Mecca, 140, 141 Azzam, Abdullah, 37, 40, 42, 43, Medina, 140, 141 146, 318, 328 verses, 18, 140, 141 al-Assad, Hafez, 297, 298 B al-Awlaki, Anwar, 265, 266, 275 bin Laden, Osama, 37, 38, 42, 43, Al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr, 3, 13, 43, 68, 111, 171, 172, 182, 194, 295 246, 290, 292 Allah, 2, 3, 12, 17, 30, 33, 34, 38, 42, 45, 46, 66, 82, 89, 110, 112, 137–142, 145–152, 165, 166, C 168–173, 184, 185, 187, 189, Caliphate, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 18, 191, 217, 219–223, 246, 269, 31, 32, 39, 41, 43–45, 66, 149, 270, 294, 298, 326 173, 184, 185, 187–192, 194, Al-Nusra Front, 40, 69, 294–296 264–266, 292–295, 302, 317, Al-Qaeda, 3, 6, 37, 40–46, 69, 146, 318, 320 184, 189, 194, 223, 236, 265, Caliph, 3, 31, 43, 184, 189, 192, 267, 269, 284, 287, 290–295, 295 315, 316, 318, 327 emirates, 192, 193 Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), 19, 287, Ottoman Empire, 44, 184, 189, 290, 291, 295 190 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 145, 290, World order, 3, 191, 322 291 Clash of Civilizations © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive 337 license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. Matusitz, Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9 338 INDEX Barber, Benjamin, 18 world risk society, 18, 240, 241 civilizations, 18, 207, 209, 210, Enemy 323 Apostates, 38, 39, 41, 82, 266, 321 culture wars, 221, 325, 326 dehumanization, 86, 87 Friedman, Thomas, 18 hatred, 61 Huntington, Samuel, 16, 18, 24, infidels, 39, 41, 45, 82, 146, 169, 207, 209, 210, 323, 324 172, 257, 289, 321 identity issues, 210–211 Kuffar, 39, 166 Jihad vs. McWorld, 18 persecution, 139 LexusandtheOliveTree,18, takfir, 187 214–216 unbelievers, 38, 42, 139, 166, 173 territorial issues, 211–212 Europol, 7, 21, 66 unprovable universalisms, 219–220 Communication, 12, 67, 213, 242, 271 F discourse, 262 Fear, 11, 12, 84, 145, 146, 148, 149, interpersonal communication, 90 164, 172, 220, 234, 296, 320 sermons, 271 Crusades, 1, 34, 143, 144, 220 G Gender, 17, 65, 66, 106, 119, 195, D 218, 245, 259 Dar al-harb, 4, 6, 33, 39, 169, 171, female jihadists, 66 173, 188, 324 women, 65, 66, 218 Dar al-Islam, 4, 6, 33, 171, 188, 324 Global Divergence Theory (GDT), Democracy 19, 322–324 free speech, 321 Globalization, 8, 12, 121, 207, 212, human rights, 216, 325, 326 214–216, 222, 233, 235, 264, liberty, 216, 221, 297, 324 318, 322–326 multiculturalism, 115, 120, 121 Group dynamics Western-based laws, 18, 216 collective emotional orientation, 195 communal routines, 17, 89, 90 E group grievance, 17, 79, 80 Economic conditions group identity, 80, 81, 83, 90 Beck, Ulrich, 18, 240 group polarization, 82 demographic factors, 234 group psychology, 80 failed states, 235, 236 groupthink, 17, 81–83 financial risks, 240, 241 In-group vs. Out-group, 83–84 modernity, 214, 240, 326 psychosocial resilience, 17, 87, 88, poverty, 10, 15, 16, 18, 233–235, 90 238, 244 Social Identity Theory (SIT), 82 risk communities, 241, 242 socialization, 1, 79, 87 INDEX 339 US vs. them, 82 Finsbury Park Mosque, 269 foreign fighters, 10, 31, 66, 109, 184, 245, 290, 303, 322 H greater jihad, 35, 36 Hadith, 30, 31, 33, 35–37, 63, 138, harb, 30 140, 142–145, 148, 165, 169, holy war, 17, 34, 38, 39, 64, 66, 217, 222 143, 145, 148, 166, 169, 173, hadith-driven jihad, 18, 142 187, 268, 270, 289, 295, 315, Kitab al-Jihad, 143 317, 318, 321, 322 Hamas, 40, 43, 116, 140, 189, 239, homegrown jihadists, 7, 117 299 indirect jihadist players, 17, 45, 46 Islamic conquests, 33, 143 I jihadist ideologues, 17, 41, 42, 86, Internet, 8, 46, 65, 111, 117, 193, 112, 169, 186 259, 261, 266, 272, 318, 322 jihadist leaders, 42, 43, 64, 69, 81, social networks, 66 89, 137, 166, 194, 212 YouTube, 15 jihadist sermons, 19, 255, 261–266, Iranian Revolution, 18, 183 269–272 Islam lesser jihad, 17, 35, 36 dawah, 145, 151, 187 mujahedin, 2, 9, 10, 46, 66, 149, hijrah, 3, 138, 142, 191, 294 171, 184, 259, 270, 287, 294, Islamic revival, 8, 35, 107, 322 303 reformation in Islam, 8, 19, 316, offensive jihad, 17, 37–39, 172, 321–323 186 Treatment of non-Muslim Prophetic Methodology, 144, 145 minorities, 217–219 qital, 30 Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), struggle, 10, 29–31, 34–36, 87, 3, 5–7, 13, 15, 19, 37, 40, 41, 146, 172, 212, 214, 287, 288, 43, 45, 46, 65, 66, 69, 109, 144, 292, 294, 327 149, 182, 190, 192, 259, 270, war, 2, 3, 8, 14, 16–19, 30, 33, 35, 284, 285, 287, 292–296, 315, 36, 38, 39, 41, 64, 66, 69, 316, 318 109, 139, 142, 143, 145, 148, Islamic State, 4, 45, 66, 109, 137, 163, 166, 167, 169–173, 186, 169, 182, 190, 294 188, 190, 193, 211, 266–268, 270, 284, 289, 291, 295, 296, J 315–317, 321 Jihad defensive jihad, 37, 38, 42, 43, 172, 187 fard al-kifaya, 34 L fard ayn, 34, 172 Lashkar-e-Taiba, 40, 151 340 INDEX M O Martyrdom Outbidding Jannah, 18, 147–151 Caucasus Emirate, 19, 284, 301, karbala, 150 302 Kasab, Ajmal, 151, 152 competition hypothesis, 301 martyr, 89, 145–147, 151 fratricidal jihadists, 288, 289 internal rifts, 1, 19, 284, 285, 287 shahid, 89, 145, 146, 148, 150, Peshawar school massacre (2014), 238 289 suicide terrorism, 146–148 Muhammad (Prophet), 3, 30–32, 35, 42, 43, 110, 137, 142, 144, P 148–150, 187, 189, 190, 192, Pakistan, 2, 12, 38, 46, 68, 151, 164, 217, 292, 320 167, 168, 190, 193, 209, 234, Muslim Brotherhood, 3, 18, 35, 37, 289, 294, 316 41, 42, 183–190, 296, 299, 320, Politics 322 blowback theory, 14, 18, 193–195 Al-Banna, Hassan, 184, 185, 189 foreign policy, 18, 193, 195, 260 al-Husseini, Amin, 185 political Islam, 11, 194, 317 Alliance with Nazi Germany, political jihadism, 185, 186, 189 185–186 Propaganda, 44, 108, 149, 151, 292, Muslims 294 Belgium, 17, 67, 105, 108, 113, 114, 119, 244, 245 first-, second- and third-generation Q Muslims, 46, 104, 107, Quran 109–113, 119 People of the Book, 138, 139, 141 Quran-driven jihad, 18, 137–138 France, 17, 67, 68, 105, 108, 113–115 Sunna, 142, 164, 165, 168, 169, 184, 217, 222 Great Britain, 17, 105, 113, 115, Sword verses, 139 118, 144 violence in the Quran, 138, 139, Israel, 17, 34, 35, 105, 113, 116, 268 183, 189, 194, 317 Qutb, Sayyid Netherlands, 47, 108, 112, 113, decadence, 18 118, 119 fitna, 186, 320 Palestine, 35, 185 jahiliyyah, 3, 186, 187, 320 Qutbism, 18, 186, 187, 320 N R National Counterterrorism Center, 4, Radicalization 20, 293 Camp Bucca, 69 INDEX 341 fundamentalism, 62, 67 September 11, 2001, 1, 2, 5, 31, 68, Guantánamo Bay, 68, 317 81, 87, 106, 111, 189, 193, 194, Islamic radicalization, 17, 62–64, 269, 328 64, 65, 67, 107, 117 Sharia jihadization, 17, 63–68, 113, 114, fiqh, 18, 168, 169, 171 260 Islamic military jurisprudence, 170, military detention centers 171 (radicalization in), 17, 68 Just War, 38, 169 no-go zones, 108, 239 law, 1, 4, 18, 45, 138, 165–167, pathways to radicalization, 60, 107 169, 170, 190, 217, 219, 221, prisons (radicalization in), 17, 59, 222, 318 67, 68, 118 sharia-driven jihad, 166 radical ideology, 62, 104 siyar, 170 radicalization through self-learning, ulema, 30, 167 259–260 Social alienation radical milieu, 17, 61, 63, 107 anomie, 103, 104 revolutionary, 59 durkheim, 103 slippery slope (model), 60–61 estrangement, 113, 114 social environment, 61 failed integration (model), 17, 104 True Believer (syndrome), 60 insiders vs. outsiders, 17, 110 Religion isolation, 103 devout, 90, 136, 172, 324 marginalization, 103 laïcité (laicity), 67 social closure theory, 17, 105, 106 social exclusion, 103, 105, 106 sacralization of conflict, 18, 137–138 social integration (lack of), 118 structural discrimination, 106 scriptures, 1, 135, 139, 163 Sri Lanka Easter bombings (2019), 8, secularism, 12, 67, 221 13, 15 social construction of religion, 136 Syrian Civil War, 3, 19, 284, 292, Rogo, Aboud, 267, 268 295, 296, 303 S T Salafism, 30, 106, 120, 182, 302, Taliban, 11, 68, 167, 188, 189, 245, 318–320, 322, 324–327 246 Golden Age of Islam, 44, 318 Terrorism Salafism as Fascism, 8, 19, 316, bombings, 6, 11, 14, 37, 80, 108, 319–321 238, 266, 298, 299 totalitarianism, 319 extremism, 2, 80, 104, 283 Saudi Arabia, 38, 41–43, 109, 110, insurgency, 6, 44 164, 166–168, 183, 184, 194, lone-wolf terror, 10, 80 195, 216, 218, 246, 317 mass shootings, 2, 266 342 INDEX militancy, 2, 5, 68, 118, 300 taking action, 256 vehicle-ramming attacks, 2, 7, 64 violence, 1, 2, 14, 60, 80, 81, 86, 104, 136, 166, 181, 210, 234, U 236, 255, 283 Ummah, 3, 4, 9, 30–34, 38, 39, 44, Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 63, 64, 66, 82, 107, 112, 117, 7, 21 119, 164, 170, 172, 185, 190, Transformative learning 195, 213, 219, 222, 243, 246, communicative learning, 256 262, 266, 318, 321, 322, 327 frame of reference, 257, 258, 271 imagined communities, 213, instrumental learning, 256 243–244 meaning-making processes, 256, transnationalism, 31, 107, 189 257, 268 paradigm shift, 259, 261, 272 perspective transformation, 256, W 257, 259 Wahhabism, 167.
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