DOCSLIB.ORG

Gil Delannoi (Ed.)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Gil Delannoi (Ed.) DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND SORTITION Gil Delannoi (ed.) Les Cahiers du CEVIPOF Avril 2012, n°56 DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND SORTITION CONFERENCE, PARIS, CEVIPOF, OCTOBER 6TH-7TH 2011 Gil DELANNOI SCIENCES PO, CEVIPOF LAURENCE MOREL UNIVERSITÉ DE LILLE-II BARBARA GOODWIN UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA PETER STONE TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN ANTOINE CHOLLET UNIVERSITÉ DE LAUSANNE OLIVER DOWLEN CO-ORGANISATEUR DU PROGRAMME DE RECHERCHE SUR LE TIRAGE AU SORT These papers were presented during the first session of the Research Programme on sortition funded by Sciences Po and held at the CEVIPOF in October 2011. This session was organised by Gil Delannoi, one of the organisers of the Programme. The other two organisers are Oliver Dowlen and Peter Stone. The second session was held in November 2011 and the third in May 2012. A fourth session will be held in October 2012. More are planned. th th CONFERENCE, Paris, CEVIPOF, October 6 -7 2011 CONTENTS ON SEVERAL KINDS OF DEMOCRACY GIL DELANNOI ..................................................................................................... 5 SORTITION AND CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY LAURENCE MOREL ................................................................ 19 1. WHAT IS SORTITION? ................................................................................................................. 19 A. A mechanism for selecting alternatives .................................................................................................... 19 1. Randomly .......................................................................................................................................... 19 2. Two kinds of alternatives ................................................................................................................... 19 a. People (for the attribution of goods: typically positions or resources) ............................................................. 19 b. Policies ......................................................................................................................................................... 20 B. Sortition in the Political Sphere ................................................................................................................. 20 1. Athens and Florence ......................................................................................................................... 20 a. Athens........................................................................................................................................................... 20 b. Florence ........................................................................................................................................................ 21 2. The Rarity of Sortition ....................................................................................................................... 21 2. IS SORTITION A FORM OF DEMOCRACY? ............................................................................... 23 A. Sortition is not Democratic in Essence ..................................................................................................... 23 1. It “only” Represents Equal Opportunity ............................................................................................. 23 a. What is Democracy? ..................................................................................................................................... 23 b. What is Sortition? .......................................................................................................................................... 24 2. However, sortition might be “better” than democracy if only minority government is possible .......... 25 B. Sortition can be democratic (with some adjuncts) .................................................................................... 25 1. Sortition with frequent rotation: diachronic equality ........................................................................... 26 2. Sortition as a Sampling Technique: Synchronic Equality .................................................................. 27 3. “Quasi-direct democracy” .................................................................................................................. 27 C. Direct, Representative, Sortation Democracy ........................................................................................... 28 1. Selection for Positions ....................................................................................................................... 28 2. Recruitment of Assemblies ............................................................................................................... 28 3. A Mixed Regime? .............................................................................................................................. 29 3. SORTITION AND “GOOD GOVERNMENT” ................................................................................. 30 A. The Problem ............................................................................................................................................. 30 B. Competence ............................................................................................................................................. 31 1. Relevance of the Problem ................................................................................................................. 31 2. The Intrinsic Remedy ........................................................................................................................ 32 3. The Extrinsic Remedy ....................................................................................................................... 33 C. Correctness .............................................................................................................................................. 34 1. Definition and Relevance of the Problem .......................................................................................... 34 2. “Better” Rulers versus Responsible Rulers? ..................................................................................... 34 Conclusion: Prospects for Sortition ................................................................................................... 36 DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND LOTTERY DEMOCRACY – TWO DIFFERENT CONCEPTS? BARBARA GOODWIN……………………………………………………………………………………37 1. FIRST, AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES .................................................................................... 37 2. DEFINITIONS OF DEMOCRACY ................................................................................................. 38 3. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY ............................................................................................. 39 4. DIRECT DEMOCRACY................................................................................................................. 42 5. LOTTERY DEMOCRACY ............................................................................................................. 46 LES CAHIERS DU CEVIPOF – AVRIL 2012/56 6. EVALUATING DIRECT VERSUS LOTTERY DEMOCRACY ....................................................... 47 Conclusions: On Lottery Democracy ................................................................................................. 48 MANY VOICES, DIFFERENT VOICES PETER STONE ...................................................................................................... 51 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 52 1. Intrinsic or Instrumental? ............................................................................................................... 55 2. Many People ................................................................................................................................. 57 3. Many Different People ................................................................................................................... 59 4. Proportionately Many Different People ......................................................................................... 65 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 67 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................... 70 DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND PARTY SYSTEM: A BLIND SPOT OF SWISS INSTITUTION/DÉMOCRATIE DIRECTE ET SYSTÈME PARTISAN : UN POINT AVEUGLE DES INSTITUTIONS SUISSES ANTOINE CHOLLET . 73 1. DIRECT DEMOCRACY................................................................................................................. 73 2. ELECTIONS .................................................................................................................................. 74 3. CONSULTATIVE DEMOCRACY .................................................................................................. 76 4. PARTY SYSTEM ........................................................................................................................... 77 5. DEMOCRATIZATION .................................................................................................................... 78 WHO? AND HOW? SORTITION, DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNEMENT OLIVER DOWEN .................... 81 Déjà parus ............................................................................................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Horizontalism
    Praise for Horizontalism "To read this book is to join the crucial conversation taking place within its pages: the inspiring, maddening, joyful cacophony of debate among movements building a genuinely new politics. Through her deeply re­ spectful documentary editing, Marina Sitrin has produced a work that embodies the values and practices it portrays." -Avi Lewis and Naomi Klein, co-creators of The Take "This book is really excellent. It goes straight to the important issues and gets people to talk about them in their own words. The result is a fascinating and important account of what is fresh and new about the Argentinian uprising."-John Holloway, author of Change the World Without Taking Power '' 'Another world is possible' was the catch-phrase of the World Social Forum, but it wasn't just possible; while the north was dreaming, that world was and is being built and lived in many parts of the global south. With the analytical insight of a political philosopher, the investigative zeal of a reporter, and the heart of a sister, Marina Sitrin has immersed herself in one of the most radical and important of these other worlds and brought us back stories, voices, and possibilities. This book on the many facets, phases and possibilities of the insurrections in Argentina since the economic implosion of December 2001 is riveting, moving, and profoundly important for those who want to know what revolution in our time might look like."-Rebecca Solnit, author of Savage Dreams and Hope in the Dark "This is the story of how people at the bottom turned Argentina upside down-told by those who did the overturning.
    [Show full text]
  • Il Sorteggio Come Metodo Di Decisione
    IL SORTEGGIO COME METODO DI DECISIONE. PRINCIPI E FATTISPECIE* di Marco Mandato** SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa – 2. Il sorteggio come regola ordinaria di decisione per tutelare l’eguaglianza in 'entrata' – 3. Il sorteggio come regola decisoria residuale o eccezionale per tutelare l’eguaglianza 'sopravvenuta' – 4. Il sorteggio come regola di formazione degli organi collegiali di valutazione e controllo – 4.1. Il sorteggio come regola di formazione degli organi collegiali con funzioni giurisdizionali – 5. Conclusioni 1. Premessa l sorteggio rappresenta un metodo per assumere le decisioni nell’ambito della I giuridicità1. Il caso è considerato il metodo più democratico2 perché, in fondo, la * Contributo sottoposto a double blind peer review. ** Dottore di ricerca in Diritto pubblico, comparato e internazionale – Teoria dello Stato e Istituzioni politiche comparate, Sapienza, Università di Roma. 1 Per un inquadramento preliminare e generale sul tema, sebbene relativamente al solo Diritto pubblico, cfr. ZEI, A., L’arbitrato del caso: applicazioni del metodo del sorteggio nel Diritto pubblico, in Nomos-Le attualità nel diritto, n. 1/2017. 2 Il carattere democratico del sorteggio è stato alla base del funzionamento della democrazia ateniese nel V e nel IV secolo a. C., nella Firenze del a Venezia dal 1268 e a Firenze dal 1328. Ad Atene, l’estrazione a sorte costituiva il metodo tipico per formare la Bulé e le cariche interne alla stessa. il Presidente, competente a gestire e organizzare i lavori. Il Presidente era uno dei pritani, ossia un consigliere della tribù dirigente che veniva estratto a sorte. Terminato il turno‘, al tramonto, si procedeva nuovamente all‘estrazione di un nuovo Presidente tra i pritani delle tribù in modo che ciascuna di esse avrebbe diretto gli affari‘ secondo il turno stabilito dal caso.
    [Show full text]
  • THE SINGLE-MEMBER PLURALITY and MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS : Different Concepts of an Election
    THE SINGLE-MEMBER PLURALITY AND MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS : Different Concepts of an Election by James C. Anderson A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2006 © James C. Anderson 2006 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Library and Bibliotheque et Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-23700-7 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-23700-7 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce,Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve,sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet,distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform,et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation.
    [Show full text]
  • Social Choice Theory Christian List
    1 Social Choice Theory Christian List Social choice theory is the study of collective decision procedures. It is not a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, preferences, judgments, welfare). Central questions are: How can a group of individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given set of options? What are the properties of different voting systems? When is a voting system democratic? How can a collective (e.g., electorate, legislature, collegial court, expert panel, or committee) arrive at coherent collective preferences or judgments on some issues, on the basis of its members’ individual preferences or judgments? How can we rank different social alternatives in an order of social welfare? Social choice theorists study these questions not just by looking at examples, but by developing general models and proving theorems. Pioneered in the 18th century by Nicolas de Condorcet and Jean-Charles de Borda and in the 19th century by Charles Dodgson (also known as Lewis Carroll), social choice theory took off in the 20th century with the works of Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Duncan Black. Its influence extends across economics, political science, philosophy, mathematics, and recently computer science and biology. Apart from contributing to our understanding of collective decision procedures, social choice theory has applications in the areas of institutional design, welfare economics, and social epistemology. 1. History of social choice theory 1.1 Condorcet The two scholars most often associated with the development of social choice theory are the Frenchman Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-1794) and the American Kenneth Arrow (born 1921).
    [Show full text]
  • Absolute Voting Rules Adrian Vermeule
    University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Economics 2005 Absolute Voting Rules Adrian Vermeule Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Adrian Vermeule, "Absolute Voting Rules" (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 257, 2005). This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CHICAGO JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 257 (2D SERIES) Absolute Voting Rules Adrian Vermeule THE LAW SCHOOL THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO August 2005 This paper can be downloaded without charge at: The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=791724 Absolute Voting Rules Adrian Vermeule* The theory of voting rules developed in law, political science, and economics typically compares simple majority rule with alternatives, such as various types of supermajority rules1 and submajority rules.2 There is another critical dimension to these questions, however. Consider the following puzzles: $ In the United States Congress, the votes of a majority of those present and voting are necessary to approve a law.3 In the legislatures of California and Minnesota,4 however, the votes of a majority of all elected members are required.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Distortion of Voting with Multiple Representative Candidates∗
    The Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-18) On the Distortion of Voting with Multiple Representative Candidates∗ Yu Cheng Shaddin Dughmi David Kempe Duke University University of Southern California University of Southern California Abstract voters and the chosen candidate in a suitable metric space (Anshelevich 2016; Anshelevich, Bhardwaj, and Postl 2015; We study positional voting rules when candidates and voters Anshelevich and Postl 2016; Goel, Krishnaswamy, and Mu- are embedded in a common metric space, and cardinal pref- erences are naturally given by distances in the metric space. nagala 2017). The underlying assumption is that the closer In a positional voting rule, each candidate receives a score a candidate is to a voter, the more similar their positions on from each ballot based on the ballot’s rank order; the candi- key questions are. Because proximity implies that the voter date with the highest total score wins the election. The cost would benefit from the candidate’s election, voters will rank of a candidate is his sum of distances to all voters, and the candidates by increasing distance, a model known as single- distortion of an election is the ratio between the cost of the peaked preferences (Black 1948; Downs 1957; Black 1958; elected candidate and the cost of the optimum candidate. We Moulin 1980; Merrill and Grofman 1999; Barbera,` Gul, consider the case when candidates are representative of the and Stacchetti 1993; Richards, Richards, and McKay 1998; population, in the sense that they are drawn i.i.d. from the Barbera` 2001). population of the voters, and analyze the expected distortion Even in the absence of strategic voting, voting systems of positional voting rules.
    [Show full text]
  • Random Selection in Politics
    Random selection in politics Lyn Carson and Brian Martin Published in 1999 by Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT Available for purchase from Praeger This is the text submitted to Praeger in February 1999. It differs from the published version in minor ways, including formatting, copy-editing changes, page numbering (100 pages instead of 161) and omission of the index. This version prepared August 2008 Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Random selection in decision making 10 3. Direct democracy 26 4. Citizen participation without random selection 36 5. Citizen participation with random selection: the early days 43 6. Citizen participation with random selection: yesterday, today, and tomorrow 52 7. Sortition futures 65 8. Strategies 76 Appendix: Examples of citizen participation 84 Bibliography 93 Acknowledgments Brownlea, John Burnheim, Ned Crosby, Many people we’ve talked to find the Jim Dator, Mary Lane, Marcus Schmidt, idea of random selection in politics and Stuart White. Their input was unnatural and unwelcome. This didn’t valuable even when we decided on an deter us! Fortunately, there were a few alternative approach. Helpful comments enthusiasts who got and kept us going. were also received from Ted Becker, Alan Davies, Fred Emery, and Merrelyn Stephen Healy, Lars Klüver, and Ken Emery provided the original inspiration Russell. Others who provided many years ago as well as ongoing information are acknowledged in the conversations. text. The process of obtaining comments Ted Becker encouraged us to write has been stimulating because not all this book. On drafts, we received readers go with us all the way on extensive comments from Arthur randomness.
    [Show full text]
  • A Canadian Model of Proportional Representation by Robert S. Ring A
    Proportional-first-past-the-post: A Canadian model of Proportional Representation by Robert S. Ring A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science Memorial University St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador May 2014 ii Abstract For more than a decade a majority of Canadians have consistently supported the idea of proportional representation when asked, yet all attempts at electoral reform thus far have failed. Even though a majority of Canadians support proportional representation, a majority also report they are satisfied with the current electoral system (even indicating support for both in the same survey). The author seeks to reconcile these potentially conflicting desires by designing a uniquely Canadian electoral system that keeps the positive and familiar features of first-past-the- post while creating a proportional election result. The author touches on the theory of representative democracy and its relationship with proportional representation before delving into the mechanics of electoral systems. He surveys some of the major electoral system proposals and options for Canada before finally presenting his made-in-Canada solution that he believes stands a better chance at gaining approval from Canadians than past proposals. iii Acknowledgements First of foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my brilliant supervisor, Dr. Amanda Bittner, whose continuous guidance, support, and advice over the past few years has been invaluable. I am especially grateful to you for encouraging me to pursue my Master’s and write about my electoral system idea.
    [Show full text]
  • Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (In a Constitutional Democracy)
    Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2013 Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional Democracy) Imer Flores Georgetown Law Center, [email protected] Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-161 This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1115 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2156455 Imer Flores, Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional Democracy), in LAW, LIBERTY, AND THE RULE OF LAW 77-101 (Imer B. Flores & Kenneth E. Himma eds., Springer Netherlands 2013) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons Chapter6 Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional Democracy) lmer B. Flores Tse-Kung asked, saying "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" K'ung1u-tzu said: "Is not reciprocity (i.e. 'shu') such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not ckJ to others." Confucius (2002, XV, 23, 225-226). 6.1 Introduction Taking the "rule of law" seriously implies readdressing and reassessing the claims that relate it to law and liberty, in general, and to a constitutional democracy, in particular. My argument is five-fold and has an addendum which intends to bridge the gap between Eastern and Western civilizations,
    [Show full text]
  • On Stable Rules for Selecting Committees Eric Kamwa
    On stable rules for selecting committees Eric Kamwa To cite this version: Eric Kamwa. On stable rules for selecting committees. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2017, 70, pp.36 - 44. 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.008. hal-01631177 HAL Id: hal-01631177 https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631177 Submitted on 27 Jun 2019 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. On Stable Rules for Selecting Committees Eric Kamwa Universit´edes Antilles, Facult´ede Droit et d’Economie de la Martinique, Campus de Schoelcher, F-97275 Schoelcher and Laboratoire Cara¨ıb´eende Sciences Sociales, LC2S UMR CNRS 8053 Abstract A voting rule is said to be stable if it always elects a fixed-size subset of candidates such that there is no outside candidate who is majority preferred to any candidate in this set whenever such a set exists. Such a set is called a Weak Condorcet Committee (WCC). Four stable rules have been proposed in the literature. In this paper, we propose two new stable rules. Since nothing is known about the properties of the stable rules, we evaluate all the identified stable rules on the basis of some appealing properties of voting rules.
    [Show full text]
  • Direct and Economic Democracy in Ancient Athens and Its Significance Today
    SOCIETY & NATURE, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1992) Direct and Economic Democracy in Ancient Athens and its Significance Today TAKIS FOTOPOULOS Abstract This article examines the intrinsic relationship between direct and economic democracy as it was exemplified in the case of classical Athens. The aim is to show that the final failure of the Athenian democracy was not due, as is usually asserted, to the innate weaknesses of direct democracy but, firstly, due to the fact that it always remained partial, embracing only part of its population, and, second, that it was never completed by a corresponding economic democracy. This fact implies that any attempt today at establishing direct democracy, which is not complemented by economic democracy, is condemned to failure. During the Athenian celebrations for the 2,500th anniversary of Cleisthenes' reforms (where there appeared a ridiculous show of the elite who celebrated, by themselves, the most anti- elitist form of democracy that has ever existed!), as well as in the wider `discussion' that followed on the significance of direct democracy, no reference was made to the relationship between direct and economic democracy. As I will try to show, however, the development of the Athenian democracy amongst its citizens (that is with the slaves and women excluded) kept pace with a determined effort to diminish the socio-economic differences between the citizens. Also, the decline itself of the Athenian democracy was, in my view, directly connected with its failure to become universal, and with the contradiction created by the fact that the political equality which the Athenian democracy had established for its citizens was, in the last instance, founded on economic inequality.
    [Show full text]
  • Download (4MB)
    ARISTOTLE AND DEMOCRACY A PhD Thesis submitted by Charalambos Ioannou Papageorgiou k k k k University College University of London LONDON 1991 ** ProQuest Number: 10609803 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10609803 Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 2 ABSTRACT The thesis undertakes a reconstruction and critical assessment of Aristotle's theory of democracy. The process of reconstruction requires at first the collection and organisation of the relevant material, since Aristotle's references to democracy, although numerous, are scattered throughout his political and ethical writings. A chapter is devoted to this task. This chapter also seeks to describe the historical and intellectual context in which Aristotle developed his ideas on democracy. The thesis then attempts to identify the fundamental principles which underlie Aristotle's conception of democracy. These are examined both in their relation to one another and also in their relation to the fundamental principles of Aristotle's political philosophy in general. Aristotle's teleological conception of the state and his theory of distributive justice based on proportionate equality are singled out as the salient principles which shape his conception, classification and criticism of democracy.
    [Show full text]