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THE SINGLE-MEMBER PLURALITY and MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS : Different Concepts of an Election

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THE SINGLE-MEMBER PLURALITY AND MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS : Different Concepts of an Election by James C. Anderson A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2006 © James C. Anderson 2006 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Library and Bibliotheque et Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-23700-7 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-23700-7 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce,Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve,sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet,distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform,et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privee, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont ete enleves de cette these. While these forms may be includedBien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. i * i Canada Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT The thesis is an analysis of the different concepts of an election reflected in the single-member plurality (SMP) electoral system and the mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system. These different concepts reflect the views held by proponents of the respective electoral systems about what an election is to accomplish and what an electoral system is to provide. Attention is paid to whether the concept of an election recognizes the “new reality” that is introduced. Such intentions embedded in the concept contribute to whether the respective electoral system successfully achieves the most important criteria which will be emphasized for measuring a “good” electoral system. It is argued in the thesis that, as a result of its wider and more modem concept of an election - to be explained - which focuses more on aggregate vote totals, the mixed- member proportional system better achieves the criteria which underpin a “good” electoral system. iii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Most importantly, I would like to thank my Dad. I would not be where I am today without him raising me by himself. Many thanks also must go out to my grandparents for all that they did for me growing up. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my thesis supervisor, Professor Williams, for the amount of work which he has put into helping me complete my thesis by continuing to push my writing in the right direction through his many recommendations. I would similarly like to thank my second reader, Professor Woolstencroft, for his advice regarding my thesis as well as in helping me to formulate the thesis topic in the first place. Finally, and more generally, I would like to thank all of those here in Ontario who have made me feel more welcome since I arrived in September 2004 and made my transition to life on this other side of the country - a move which, I'm not going to deny, I was unsettled about - a lot easier. iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv TABLE OF CONTENTS v INTRODUCTION_______________________________________________________ 1 CHAPTER ONE: CRITERIA FOR A “GOOD” ELECTORAL SYSTEM_________________________ 9 Criterion #1 - Fair and Accurate Conversion of Votes into Seats 12 Criterion #2- Minimizing “Wasted” Votes 15 Criterion #3 - Minimizing Compromised Voting 17 Other Criteria for a “Good” Electoral System 21 Democratic Values Criteria Desired to be Reflected in an Electoral System 25 Conclusion 30 CHAPTER TWO: SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SMP ELECTORAL SYSTEM______________________32 Criterion #1 - Fair and Accurate Conversion of Votes into Seats 32 Criterion #2 - Minimizing “Wasted” Votes 34 Criterion #3 - Minimizing Compromised Voting 35 SMP and Other Criteria for a “Good” Electoral System 37 SMP as a “Good” Electoral System 48 “What is wrong with this picture?” 50 CHAPTER THREE: A NEW CONCEPT OF AN ELECTION_______________________________________52 Alternative Features and Concepts of an Election 52 Debating Alternative Concepts of an Election in Parliament 58 SMP and Changed Political Realities 64 CHAPTER FOUR: THE MMP ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE CRITERIA______________________71 Criterion #1 — Proportionality 72 Criterion#2 — Effective Votes 73 Criterion #3 — Minimizing Compromised Voting 74 Secondary Criteria 76 v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) CHAPTER FIVE : OUTCOMES FROM CHANGING TO A MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEM____________77 Positive Outcomes From a Change to MMP 79 Negative Outcomes From a Change to MMP 95 Final Diagnosis of Outcomes 112 CHAPTERSIX: CONCLUSION____________________________________________________________115 APPENDIX: BARRIERS TO ELECTORAL REFORM_____________________________________125 The Possibility of Overcoming Barriers Towards Electoral Reform 134 BIBLIOGRAPHY:________________________________________________________142 vi Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTRODUCTION John Courtney's 2004 book, Elections, skillfully examines what he calls "the five pillars or building blocks of democratic elections in Canada."1 While "four of the five components (the franchise, electoral districting, voter registration, and election management) have changed immeasurably from the time of Confederation," the plurality system of voting has remained unchanged. As Courtney demonstrates, like many others, electoral reform has returned to the Canadian political agenda with the single-member plurality (SMP), or “first-past-the-post” (FPTP), system as the primary focus. Whether electoral reform is actually achieved in Canada, the debate over the merits of various alternatives is significant because the status quo and the alternatives mask a noteworthy - yet under-appreciated - conceptual divergence that lies at the very heart of electoral reform proposals. In a phrase, and in providing the approach to the thesis question, the single-member plurality and mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral systems assume different concepts of an election. In this thesis, these different concepts of an election reflected by the two respective systems and the leading criteria for evaluating an electoral system are analyzed. The parameters of the discussion question are confined to the SMP and MMP systems. The thesis does not, as its principal goal, seek to prove which electoral system is best. Rather, it sets out to diagnose and explain the substantial impact that this difference in the concept of an election has on each electoral system. Such an impact does have particular 1 John C. Courtney, Elections, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), xv. 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. pertinence regarding the ability or failure of the electoral system to meet the criteria which are laid out. The first thesis chapter evaluates and ranks the criteria for an effective electoral system. What are deemed to be the three most important criteria for an electoral system - the leading assumptions which should play a paramount role in a “good” electoral system are explained. These are the criteria which, in later chapters, are central in measuring both the SMP and MMP systems. Such factors contribute to the recognition and assessment of whether a fundamental problem exists. The leading criteria are aspects which are now increasingly expected from an electoral system. The general concept of what elections are intended to accomplish, and the principles underpinning what an electoral system is expected to provide, have changed considerably over time. The thesis strives to spell out which criteria are the most important for a “good” electoral system, and to justify why the other factors are not as vital. A specific section within the chapter provides a rationale for the ranking
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