Ernest Sosa and Virtuously Begging the Question

University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 9 May 18th, 9:00 AM - May 21st, 5:00 PM Ernest Sosa and virtuously begging the question Michael Walschots University of Windsor Scott F. Aikin Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive Part of the Philosophy Commons Walschots, Michael and Aikin, Scott F., "Ernest Sosa and virtuously begging the question" (2011). OSSA Conference Archive. 38. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA9/papersandcommentaries/38 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Ernest Sosa and virtuously begging the question MICHAEL WALSCHOTS Department of Philosophy University of Windsor 401 Sunset Ave. Windsor, ON N9P 3B4 Canada [email protected] ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the notion of epistemic circularity, supposedly different from logical circularity, and evaluates Ernest Sosa’s claim that this specific kind of circular reasoning is virtuous rather than vicious. I attempt to determine whether or not the conditions said to make epistemic circularity a permissible instance of begging the question could make other instances of circular reasoning equally permissible. KEYWORDS: begging the question, circular reasoning, Ernest Sosa, epistemic circularity, petitio principii, reliabilism. 1. INTRODUCTION In 1986, William Alston introduced the idea of ‘epistemic circularity’, which involves assuming the reliability of a given source of belief during the process of proving the reliability of that same source. Indeed, Alston claims that epistemic circularity is unavoidable during the attempt to provide such proof. Ernest Sosa has recently taken this issue up and has argued that given this kind of reasoning is unavoidable, epistemically circular reasoning is not vicious, but virtuous. Epistemic circularity is, in the first instance, an epistemological problem and because I am focusing here on Sosa’s answer to the problem, I begin with a summary of the way in which Sosa believes epistemological problems are variously approached. I then briefly discuss why epistemic circularity necessarily arises as a problem when one has certain epistemological commitments and go on to discuss why Sosa believes epistemic circularity is virtuous rather than vicious or fallacious. In the second half of the paper I treat epistemic circularity as an instance of begging the question and determine whether or not the conditions which are said to make epistemic circularity a permissible instance of begging the question classifies a certain type of circular reasoning as non-fallacious. 2. SOSA’S CONCEPTION OF EPISTEMOLOGY In his ‘Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity’ (1994: 264) Sosa divides var- ious epistemological positions into two camps: (1) ‘formal internalism’, which holds that “a belief can be justified and amount to knowledge only through the backing of reasons or arguments”, and (2) ‘formal externalism’, which is simply the denial of formal internalism, i.e. the denial that a belief can be justified and amount to knowledge only through Zenker, F. (ed.). Argumentation: Cognition and Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18-21, 2011. Windsor, ON (CD ROM), pp. 1-9. MICHAEL WALSCHOTS the backing of reasons or arguments1. More specifically, Sosa states that an acceptable internalist epistemological account of all one’s knowledge in some domain D would be a ‘legitimating’ account in the following sense: “A is a legitimating account of one’s knowledge in domain D IFF D is a domain of one’s beliefs that constitute knowledge and are hence justified (and more), and A specifies the sorts of inferences that justify one’s beliefs in D, without circularity or endless regress.” (Sosa 1994: 267, emphasis added) Sosa claims that this cannot be attained, however, for he says that if we adopt the position of the formal internalist, [i]t is impossible to attain a legitimating account of absolutely all one’s own knowledge; such an account admits only justification provided by inference or argument and, since it rules out circular or endlessly regressive inferences, such an account must stop with premises that it supposes or ‘presupposes’ that one is justified in accepting, without explaining how one is justified in accepting them in turn. (Sosa 1994: 267-8, emphasis added) Given that such a situation does indeed seem unsatisfactory and unobtainable on its own terms, Sosa believes we ought to be epistemological externalists (according to his definition). Sosa believes we have limited options when it comes to justifying a belief through inferences and arguments, however. Sosa puts the general situation thus: Sometimes a justified belief is justified because supported by reasons; reasons that the be- liever not only could have but does have…Justifying beliefs need to be justified in turn. And now we have three possibilities. As we consider the reasons for one’s belief, and the reasons, if any, for these reasons, and the reasons, if any, for these in turn, and so on, either (1) some ultimate reasons are justified noninferentially, are justified in some way that does not require the support of some ulterior reasons, or (2) there are no ultimate reasons: further reasons always justify one’s reasons, at every level, no matter how remote the level, and these further reasons always go beyond any reason already invoked at earlier levels, or (3) there are no ultimate reasons: further reasons always justify one’s reasons, at every level, but these further reasons need not go beyond reasons already invoked at earlier levels. (Sosa 2007: 122-3) Option 1 is foundationalism, which Sosa believes is not ultimately satisfactorily because, as stated, justification rests on beliefs that are in some way supposed to be justified noninferentially; option 2 is that of infinitism or the infinite regress which is ultimately unsatisfactory because belief can never ultimately attain justification; and option 3 “is that of the circle. One’s justifying structure of reasons circles: some reason for a reason at a given level returns us to an earlier level” (Sosa 2007: 123). Given that foundationalism and the infinite regress are out, for Sosa, as possible ways of justifying belief essentially through reasons and argument, the only other option seems to be circular reasoning. Sosa claims that epistemically circular reasoning is virtuous and not vicious, however. As such, he claims that it is a viable way for one to argue for the reliability of a source of belief through argument and he agrees that arguing for the reliability of our sources is necessarily circular. One would be inclined to argue in such a way only if one has certain commitments that classify one as a reliabilist, however. Before discussing epistemic circularity, I therefore briefly turn to the nature of these commitments. 1 Sosa acknowledges that he uses these terms in a special sense. I adopt his usage because I am only con- cerned with his characterization of our general epistemological situation here. It should therefore be noted that I acknowledge that the way in which Sosa uses these terms is not necessarily consistent with the way in which they are generally used in epistemology. 2 ERNEST SOSA AND VIRTUOUSLY BEGGING THE QUESTION 3. RELIABILISM In Beyond ‘Justification’ William Alston also acknowledges that when we question the epistemic status of some belief and when providing justification for some belief is limited to providing further beliefs or arguments, these beliefs and arguments can be questioned in turn and so on ad infinitum such that we would never “come to some assumption about which no doubts arise” (Alston 2005: 192). One way in which justification can be estab- lished and the infinite regress stopped is if we can establish “for an indefinitely large class of beliefs in advance of any critical examination” (Alston 2005: 197) that it makes no sense to question their epistemic status, i.e. to doubt or deny them. This would be to “reach a stage at which what is on the table is something that it makes no sense to doubt or deny” (Alston 2005: 196). Such is the attempt to establish the reliability of a given way of forming beliefs such that it can be determined that all the beliefs formed through such a belief forming process are reliable and are therefore unnecessary to question with re- spect to their epistemic status. Sosa is indeed a reliabilist and, as Noah Lemos rightly notes, “[t]he problem of epistemic circularity arises when we consider how we know whether our sources of belief are reliable” (Lemos 2009: 187). 4. THE NECESSITY OF CIRCULARITY If I wanted to justify belief P based on the fact that it came from a reliable source, the belief in the reliability of that source would have to itself be justified if ultimate justification for belief P is to be obtained. Proving the reliability of a source involves justifying a belief like Q:‘Source X is reliable’ by using other beliefs. If one is a reliabilist, then the only way for me to prove Q via argumentation, reasoning, etc., is if I use a belief to justify Q that is itself attained through a reliable source. Therefore, it seems that the reliability of a source of belief cannot be argued for without falling into circularity. Even if I could argue for the reliability of one source by assuming the reliability of another source, I would eventually have to justify my belief that that other source is reliable, and doing so would require that I assume some other source is reliable and so on until I must eventually assume the reliability of the source in question and, again, enter into a circle.

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