Knowledge and Belief: 'De Dicto' and 'De
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Knowledge and Belief: 'De Dicto' and 'De Re' Author(s): Roderick Chisholm Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition , Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan., 1976), pp. 1-20 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319005 Accessed: 09-02-2016 18:18 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Tue, 09 Feb 2016 18:18:43 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RODERICK CHISHOLM KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF: 'DE DICTO' AND 'DE RE' 1. INTRODUCTION I will attemptto explicatethe conceptsof beliefde re, knowledgede dicto, and knowledgede re. The generalapproach to be developedhere may also be appliedto those otherintentional attitudes - for example,desire, hope, fear, and endeavor- which may be directedeither upon propositionsor upon things which are not propositions.It differsfrom other contem- porarytreatments of these topics in that it does not attemptto explicate belief and knowledgeby referenceto linguisticconcepts. I assumethat languageshould be explicatedby referenceto belief and knowledge,and that it is not enlighteningto attemptto explicatebelief and knowledge by referenceto language.2 The definitionsI will formulatepresuppose the followingphilosophical concepts:(i) that of beliefde dicto,or the acceptanceof a proposition,as expressedin the locution'h is acceptedby S'; (ii) that of epistemicprefer- ability,as expressedin 'p is epistemicallypreferable to q for S'; (iii) that of necessityde re, as expressedin 'x is necessarilysuch that it is F' (iv) that of a propertyor attribute,considered as an 'eternalobject', something existingin everypossible world; and (v) the conceptof a propositionbeing true. I will also make use of the expressionsof logic and allow myself certainschematic definitions. I believethat the systemof conceptsto be utilizedhere is muchsimpler than any of those presupposedby other discussionsof these topics. 2. DE DICTO BELIEF I proposethat, in what follows, we restrictthe schema S believesthat p, (wherep may be replacedby any Englishsentence) to its ordinaryde dicto sense.This will mean,for one thing,that we cannotexistentially generalize PhilosophicalStudies 29 (1976) 1-20. All Rights Reserved Copyright? 1976 by D. ReidelPublishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Tue, 09 Feb 2016 18:18:43 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 2 RODERICK CHISHOLM over any term within the sentencein the place of p. Thus if our de dicto belief sentenceis Jones believesthat the tallest man is wise we cannot take the propositionit expressesto entail Thereis an x such that Jones believesthat x is wise. Nor can we replaceany term withinthe sentenceoccupying the place of p by any other term havingthe same extension.Hence, even if we know both that(1) the tallestman is the fastestrunner and that (2) Jonesbelieves that the tallest man is wise, we cannot, on the basis of this information, drawthe inferenceto Jones believesthat the fastestrunner is wise. Anotherfeature of this de dicto use of 'Jones believesthat the tallest man is wise' is this: If we know that the sentenceis true, in this de dicto use, then we may say of Jonesthat, if he is asked'Is the tallestman wise?', if he understandsthe question, and if he intends to reply honestlyand correctly,then he will endeavorto replyin the affirmative. In suggestingthat we restrictthe locution 'S believes that p' to this de dictosense, I am not suggestingthat the locutionis in fact so restricted in ordinaryEnglish. Indeed, I believethat it is not so restricted.3 If we are sensitiveto what seem to be the ontologicalimplications of belief, the ontologicalimplications of the fact that people believethings, we will realizethat (1) Jones believesthat the tallest man is wise impliesthat (2) Thereis somethingthat Jones believes. If we do not see this at once, perhapsit will help us if we considersuch facts as the following.If we know, not only that (1) is true, but also that Smithbelieves that the tallestman is wise, then we may inferthat thereis somethingthat both Jones and Smith believe. But if there is something that both Jonesand Smithbelieve, then there is an answerto the question: And whatis that something?(Or there is an answerto the question:What is one thingthat they both believe?)In the case of our examplethe answer would be: That the tallestman is wise. This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Tue, 09 Feb 2016 18:18:43 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF: 'DE DICTO' AND 'DE RE' 3 We may obviouslyinfer (2) above from 'Thereis somethingthat both Jones and Smithbelieve'. But the truth of (2) is hardlydependent upon the fact that Smithhappens to believethe samething Jones does. It would seem, therefore,that once we are clear about what is implied by (1), when (1) is taken in the way we have suggested,then we should see that (1) implies(2).4 Given, then, that (1) does imply (2), it is usefulfor philosophicalpur- poses to make (1) more explicit.The logical structureof (1) is more ade- quatelyexposed if we rewriteit as (3) Jones acceptsthe propositionthat the tallest man is wise. Statement(3) expressesa straightforwarddyadic relation between Jones and a certainproposition, enabling us to infer 'Thereexist an x and a y such that x acceptsy'. Thus our sentence(3) is an instanceof this generalschema: S acceptsthe propositionthat p. I proposewe take this locution as the paradigmaticexpression of belief de dictoand introducethe moreordinary locution, instanced by (1), as an abbreviation.Thus we will have (DI) S believesthat p = Df The propositionthat p is acceptedby S. The definitionis schematic;we may replacep by any Englishsentence. Let us say that, if a man thus acceptsa proposition,then the proposition is one of the objectsof his belief. It is essentialto note that,very often, the propositionswe say we believe (even when we are speakingsincerely) are not in fact the objectsof our belief. I might point to a certainformula in PrincipiaMathematica and say "I believe that proposition",when, in fact, the propositionI accept is the one I might expressby saying"The propositionexpressed by that formula is true". The latter propositioncould be said, in Brentano's terminology,to be a surrogatefor the former.5 3. DE RE BELIEF One may make analogous points about what has been called de re belief. This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Tue, 09 Feb 2016 18:18:43 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 4 RODERICK CHISHOLM If we remainsensitive to what seem to be the ontologicalimplications of belief, we will realizethat (1) The tallest man is believedby Jones to be wise implies (2) There is somethingthat Jones attributesto the tallest man. (In the placeof 'attributesto the tallestman', we mightsay 'believesof the tallestman'.) If one does not see immediatelythat (1) implies(2), one has only to note that, if (2) is true, and if the tallest man is also believedby Smith to be wise, then we could say that there is somethingthat both Jones and Smithattribute to the tallestman. The logical structureof (1), then, is somewhatmore adequatelyexpressed if we rewriteit as (3) Jones attributesthe propertyof beingwise to the tallestman. Our sentenceis thus an instanceof this generalschema S attributesto x the propertyof being F wherethe letterF is replaceableby any predicate-expression(e.g., 'wise' or 'such that he is wise' or 'suchthat he is wise and all men are mortal'). I proposewe take this locutionas the paradigmaticexpression of belief de re and introducethe more ordinarylocution, instancedby (1), as an abbreviation.Thus we will have (D2) x is believedby S to be F=Df S attributesthe propertyof being F to x. But the definiensof (D2), 'S attributesthe propertyof being F to x', is not includedamong the philosophicalconcepts we allowed ourselves at the outset. One problem,then, is that of explicatingthe concept of attributinga propertyto a thing. 4. INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN BELIEF 'DE RE' AND 'DE DICTO' The followingsummary may now throw some light upon what has been said about the objectsof belief.The lettersF and G occupythe placesof predicateexpressions and 'the F' is short for 'the thing which is F'. (a) S believesthat the F is G. (b) The F is believedby S to be G. This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Tue, 09 Feb 2016 18:18:43 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF: 'DE DICTO' AND 'DE RE' 5 (c) S believesthat the propositionthat the F is G is true. (d) The propositionthat the F is G is believedby S to be true. (e) The propositionthat the F is G is acceptedby S. (f) S believesthat the F has the propertyof being G. (g) The F is believedby S to be such that it has the propertyof being G. (h) S attributesthe propertyof being G to the F. These eight locutions are easily confused with each other and such confusionsometimes infects what has been writtenabout the philosophy of belief. Let us ask, with respectto each of these locutions,which ones of the othersit entails.6 If 'accepts'and 'attributes'are restrictedin the ways in which I have proposed,then we may assertthat the followingentailment relations hold: a entailse b entailsh c entailsa, d, and e e entails a f entails a and e g entailsb and h h entailsb But no additionalentailment relations hold among these locutions.