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The Ethical Grounds for Lingering Concerns About New Conservation

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The Ethical Grounds for Lingering Concerns About New Conservation Heroes or thieves? The ethical grounds for lingering concerns about new conservation Chelsea Batavia & Michael Paul Nelson Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences ISSN 2190-6483 J Environ Stud Sci DOI 10.1007/s13412-016-0399-0 1 23 Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by AESS. This e- offprint is for personal use only and shall not be self-archived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com”. 1 23 Author's personal copy J Environ Stud Sci DOI 10.1007/s13412-016-0399-0 Heroes or thieves? The ethical grounds for lingering concerns about new conservation Chelsea Batavia1 & Michael Paul Nelson1 # AESS 2016 Abstract After several years of intense debate surrounding Keywords New conservation . Anthropocentrism . so-called new conservation, there has been a general trend Deontology . Conservation ethics . Immanuel Kant toward reconciliation among previously dissenting voices in the conservation community, a Bmore is more^ mentality pre- mised upon the belief that a greater diversity of conservation Introduction approaches will yield greater conservation benefits. However, there seems good reason to remain uneasy about the new Internal relations within the conservation community have conservation platform. We seek to clarify the reasons behind been strained of late. Over the past few years, the so-called this lingering unease, which we suspect is shared by others in new conservationists, advocating conservation projects that the conservation community, by re-examining new conserva- emphasize benefits to humans and human communities tion through an ethical lens. The debates around new conser- (Kareiva and Marvier 2012), have clashed with so-called tra- vation have focused predominantly on the outcomes it prom- ditional conservationists, advocating the protection of biodi- ises to produce, reasoning by way of a consequentialist ethical versity for its own sake (Soulé 2013). New conservationists framework. We introduce an alternative ethical framework, believe conservation Bfor the people^ will appeal to a much deontology, suggesting it provides novel insights that an ex- broader swath of society and still achieve conservation objec- clusively consequentialist perspective fails to appreciate. A tives, perhaps even more effectively than traditional conserva- deontological ethic is concerned not with effects and out- tion (Kareiva and Marvier 2007). They suggest that conserva- comes, but with intentions, and whether those intentions align tion pursued on principle, to uphold the intrinsic value of with moral principles and duties. From a deontological per- nature and non-human species, has failed (Lalasz et al. spective, a strategy such as new conservation, which is exclu- 2012), and that conservation marketed for the ostensible ben- sively focused on outcomes, appears highly suspect, especial- efits it provides to humans, sometimes labeled Becosystem ly when it endorses what is arguably an indefensible ethical services,^ will receive support from more diverse groups of orientation, anthropocentrism. We therefore suggest lingering people, ultimately resulting in increasingly effective conser- concerns over new conservation are well-founded, and that, at vation projects (Daily et al. 2009; Kareiva and Marvier 2012; least from a deontological perspective, the conservation com- Marvier and Wong 2012;Marvier2013; Kareiva 2014;Kirby munity has a moral obligation to act on the express principle 2014;Marris2014; Marvier 2014; Marvier and Kareiva that non-human species possess intrinsic value, which should 2014a, 2014b). be protected. More mollifying perspectives have recently come to the fore, suggesting that both the new and traditional camps have a rightful place and a necessary role in the conservation com- * Chelsea Batavia munity (Hunter et al. 2014; Marris and Applet 2014;Petriello [email protected] and Wallen 2015). Still, even as the community at large has moved toward an apparent reconciliation (Tallis and 1 Department of Forest Ecosystems and Society, Oregon State Lubchenco 2014), a vague sense of unease seems to linger, University, 321 Richardson Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331, USA to the extent that Marvier (2014)asks,Bwhy are people who Author's personal copy J Environ Stud Sci love the diversity of plants and animals and habitats so afraid characteristic of the act itself (i.e., why or how it happens). of a diversity of approaches and motivations within the con- Everyday decisions are often heavily influenced by conse- servation community?^ (p. 1). For those of us to whom this quentialist concerns. For example, deciding whether to drive question is likely addressed (perhaps also, e.g., Doak et al. a car or peddle a bicycle to work, one might consider time, 2014; Soulé 2013; Cafaro and Primack 2014; Miller et al. money, gas emissions, and personal enjoyment, each of which 2014; Wuerthner et al. 2014), we might ask ourselves a similar would be affected differently, depending on the mode of trans- question: why are we still so hesitant to simply put away portation selected. After weighing the relative costs and ben- differences, and B[celebrate] all motivations for conservation^ efits, one would likely choose whichever option seems to (Marvier and Kareiva 2014a,p.281)? produce the highest net benefit. Such a basic cost-benefit anal- Taking Marvier’s(2014) question seriously, we offer a re- ysis is one particularly prevalent mode of consequentialist sponse by attempting to clarify the nature of our hesitation. reasoning (Bennis et al. 2010). We first discuss the differences between consequentialist and While outcomes strongly influence our moral judgments, deontological ethics, and demonstrate how both can and humans also consider other morally relevant factors, such as should be brought to bear on moral judgments. We then dis- intentions or duties (Lombrozo 2009;Goreetal.2011), when cuss anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, using mul- they engage in moral reasoning or decision-making. This type tiple moral frameworks to illustrate why the former is morally of consideration, in which an action is judged according to suspect. Linking these two ethical taxonomies, we explain overarching moral principles about right and wrong, falls un- why we should be apprehensive about any approach (e.g., der the purview of deontological ethics. Perhaps the most new conservation) that implies outcomes are the sole criterion prominent advocate of a deontological approach was of morality, particularly when such an approach perpetuates Immanuel Kant (2002), who asserted, B[moral] worth depends an anthropocentric mindset. We conclude by suggesting that not on the actuality of the object of the action, but merely on conservationists are charged to carry forward a non- the principle of the volition, in accordance with which the anthropocentric moral banner, and new conservationists’ will- action is done^ (p. 15). Kant believed an act should be judged ingness to renounce this charge rightly creates unease in the entirely by the will or intention behind it. Outcomes are mor- conservation community. ally irrelevant in themselves. According to Kant, a morally good act is performed purely and explicitly out of a sense of Consequentialist and deontological ethics duty to uphold one principle, the categorical imperative. In many ways a secularized iteration of the golden rule, the cat- Classifying perspectives in the new conservation debates, egorical imperative states, BI ought never to conduct myself Hunter et al. (2014) invoke a taxonomy from environmental except so that I could also will that my maxim become a ethics, which distinguishes between biocentrism and anthro- universal law^ (Kant 2002, p. 18; emphasis in original). pocentrism (discussed further below). They argue that new Kant argued that, as rational beings, humans have a funda- conservationists emphasize a more anthropocentric moral phi- mental duty to act as befits their rational nature. Since ratio- losophy while traditional conservationists are more biocentric, nality demands consistency, Kant concluded we should act but that the two positions can actually complement one anoth- only in ways that, to be consistent, we could accept as univer- er to achieve a broader spectrum of conservation agendas sal norms (Kant 2002). The express intent to be rationally (Hunter et al. 2014). Although not entirely novel (e.g., consistent is categorically (i.e., on principle, rather than Norton 1991), such an Becumenical^ perspective (Marvier conditionally on outcomes) imperative (i.e., necessary) of a 2014) has recently become popular, with leading proponents good will, and a good act is one performed by a good will. of new conservation, along with voices from the larger con- Though Kant’s theory of morality is too intricate for thor- servation community, agreeing to set aside differences and ough discussion here, one specific offshoot of the categorical unite to tackle the challenges of conservation in as many ways imperative is particularly
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