Phil. 173: Metaethics Oct. 1, 2019 Lecture 9: Can Nihilists Live Their Nihilism?

I. If Nihilism Is True, Then What Should We Do? Whether this question is even coherent depends on what sort of nihilism one adheres to. A few varieties: moral nihilism: There is no such thing as rightness, wrongness, duty, obligation, or any other moral notion. practical nihilism: There is no such thing as practical normativity of any type (i.e. no such thing as any sort of normative notion that applies to action), including the following: what one ought morally to do; what one ought prudentially to do; and what one ought all-things-considered to do. normative nihilism: There is no such thing as any normative notion. If the type of nihilism in question is practical or normative nihilism, then the above question makes no sense. If the type of nihilism in question is moral nihilism, and if the only sort of practical consideration that one is not a nihilist about are prudential ones (as in Joyce’s case), then the question makes sense and is equivalent to: “If moral nihilism is true, then what is it in my best interests to do?” Note that in this case, in addition to being a moral nihilist, one is also a practical egoist. Note, also, that if one is a moral nihilist, it is not entirely clear that one is entitled to talk about what we should do as opposed to what I (or you, or she, or he, or they) should do—the move from what it’s in each of our individual interests to do, to what it’s in our collective interest to do, is precisely the sort of thing in which morality consists. Let us focus on the question of what, if one came to realize that moral nihilism were true, one should do specifically with regards to one’s use of moral terminology and one’s holding of moral beliefs. There are four salient options here: 1. abolitionism: Jettison all moral vocabulary, and renounce all moral beliefs. 2. conservatism: Continue to use moral vocabulary as before, and continue to hold all of one’s old moral beliefs (even though most of them are untrue). 3. propagandism: Renounce all of one’s own moral beliefs, but hide the evidence for the truth of moral nihilism from others, so that they might continue to hold their (mostly untrue) moral beliefs. 4. fictionalism: Instead of believing in moral matters, and instead of engaging in moral discourse, adopt a fictionalist stance toward them (i.e. treat morality as a useful fiction).

II. Williams on the Difficulty of Abolitionism The chapter by Bernard Williams nicely stresses how difficult it is to be a true abolitionist moral nihilist. In order to genuinely renounce all moral beliefs and attitudes, one must not:

• be moved by distinctively moral considerations, such as “caring about other people’s interests, having any inclination to tell the truth or keep promises if it does not suit [one] to do so, [and] being disposed to reject courses of action on the ground that they are unfair or dishonorable or selfish” (p. 4);

• adhere to the more formal aspects of morality, by (for example) having a disposition “to stand back and have the thought that if it is ‘all right’ for [one] to act in these ways, it must be ‘all right’ for others to act similarly against [one]” (p. 5); • resent how others treat one, since resentment is a distinctively moral attitude (p. 5);

• think of oneself as being more splendid or courageous than the craven masses, since these are very nearly moral notions which depend on the idea that some dispositions are better for humans to have than others (pp. 6–7). The crucial distinction here is between a person without morality and a person with a peculiar morality.

III. Nagel on the Impossibility of Abolitionism Thomas Nagel argues for a stronger conclusion than Williams’: he thinks jettisoning moral thought and talk is not just difficult, but impossible. According to Nagel, abolitionist practical nihilism is impossible: “The question ‘What should I do?’ like the question ‘What should I believe?’ is always in order. It is always possible to think about the question in normative terms, and the process is not rendered pointless by any fact of a different kind—any desire or emotion or feeling, any habit or practice or convention, any contingent cultural or social background. Such things may in fact guide our actions, but it is always possible to take their relation to action as an object of further normative reflection and ask, ‘How should I act, given that these things are true of me or of my situation?’ ” (p. 244). (There are indications that Nagel thinks this point shows not just that abolitionist practical nihilism is impossible, but moreover that practical nihilism itself is false, though he doesn’t fill in the details.) According to Nagel, a similar line of reasoning shows that abolitionist moral nihilism is also impossible: “The type of thought that generates answers to this question [i.e. ‘What should I do?’] is practical reason. But, further, it is always possible for the question to take a specifically moral form, since one of the successor questions to which it leads is, ‘What should anyone in my situation do?’—and consideration of that question leads in turn to questions about what everyone should do, not only in this situation but more generally” (p. 244).

IV. Joyce on the Cost of Conservatism According to Joyce, the (prudential) cost of having untrue moral beliefs is too great to make conservative moral nihilism a viable option. Reasons why true beliefs might be valuable:

• They might have intrinsic value. (Joyce doesn’t rely on this claim, which would be odd for a moral nihilist to make.)

• They might have direct instrumental value. Joyce cites William James’ example of the value of having a true belief that a certain cow-path leads to a certain house, when one is lost in the woods trying to find a way to that house (p. 178).

• They might have indirect instrumental value. Even if one does not act on a given true belief, it might still be instrumentally valuable, since “we never know whether and in what way a belief may be called upon to serve action” (p. 178). Also, the general policy of aiming for true beliefs and avoiding false ones (a policy we might call ‘critical inquiry’) is, according to Joyce, the most effective way of forming beliefs (p. 179). If we emphasize the importance of us, as a group, of engaging in critical inquiry together (as well as the benefits our true beliefs give to each other), a similar argument could be used against the viability of propagandist moral nihilism.